1.Stone v. Mississippi
101 U.S. 814 (1879)
Facts:
In 1867, the Legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a lottery
company for twenty-five years in consideration of a stipulated sum in
cash, an annual payment of a further sum, and a percentage of receipts
from the sale of tickets. A provision of the constitution adopted in
1868 declares that
"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale
of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall any lottery heretofore
authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."
Issue: Whether or not the charter granted by the Mississipi Legislature
is in conlfict the above provision of the constitution?
Held:
1. That this provision is not in conflict with sec. 10, art. 1, of the
Constitution of the United States, which prohibits a State from "passing
a law impairing the obligation of contracts."
2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more than a license to
enjoy the privilege conferred for the time, and on the terms specified,
subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal.
3. The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the
will of the people of the state authoritatively expressed, in relation
to the continuance of such business in their midst.
Affirming the judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it was too
late to contend that public contracts were not within the prohibition
of contractual impairments (p. 816). Instead, the Court held that the
state legislature could not bargain away by contract the inalienable
police power. Admitting difficulty defining the extent of this
reservation the Court concluded that the police power included the
prohibition of a lottery that presented a grave injury to public morals.
The Court further ruled that persons who ran lotteries pursuant to a
state charter had merely a license or privilege, not a contract. Thus,
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative
bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions.
These serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law,such as genocide,crimes against humanity, war crimes and
crimes of aggression. On Dec.28,2000, the RP, through Charge d-Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,by its terms, is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As the filing of the
instant petition, only 92 out of 132 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among
the 92.
Issue:
Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing
immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally
recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the
fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to
the [ICC] x x x.63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which,
as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement,
virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty
obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the nonsurrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion
by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x
x The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly
and judiciously.
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No.
4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:
1. refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it
fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 or 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to
SC
on
certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for
being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police
power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the
local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated
in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution
among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for
its (PP131s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives
them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception
from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is
comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not
exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7
hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under
R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In
short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must
be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different
class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has
been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:
FACTS: On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior
citizens the following privileges. Petitioners MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC.
AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC assail the constitutionality of Section 4
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432,3 as amended by RA 9257,4 and the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as
these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior
citizens as a tax deduction. Senior Citizens are given 20% discounts on on their
purchases from or use of hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, medicine; uneral and burial services.
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY.
B. WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE
THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE
CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RULING
The Petition lacks merit.
There exists an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy exists
when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. The Petition must therefore show that "the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the tax deduction scheme challenged by petitioners
has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists
an actual case or controversy.
The validity of the 20% senior citizen discount and tax deduction scheme under
RA 9257, as an exercise of police power of the State, has already been settled in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
disease. In 1903, because the plaintiff, Henning Jacobson, believed that the
smallpox vaccination was unsound for his health, he refused to have the
vaccination that the city of Cambridge required of all of its residents. Pursuant to
applicable law of the commonwealth, Jacobson was fined $5 for his refusal to be
inoculated.
Jacobson then unsuccessfully filed suit, as the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found that the local statute was consistent with the
commonwealths constitution. On further review, Jacobson argued before the
U.S. Supreme Court that the law violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
liberty, because it took away his right to care for his own body in the way that he
deemed best.
ISSUE
In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the state"s police
power include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?
11.Us vs Toribio
Facts:
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit
for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license.
He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one
way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit
to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of
the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just
and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain
such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to
the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair
the public rights and interests of the community.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation
and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners
constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?
HELD
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property
rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests
are disregarded.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance
invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash
up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who
needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of
people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare.
Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of
the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding
were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.