OIL JOINT DEVELOPMENT AFF

Notes:
Thesis to this aff is that even though oil/gas companies are in the process of producing more oil, they cant because there are
restrictions on production (think moratorium) the plan presents a model of joint development zones to go drill in places where we
could not previously (either because of the moratorium or ocean border disputes between the US and other countries like Russia or
China in the Arctic region). Drilling more is critical because theres so much more oil out there and getting more oil gives the US
legislative body more incentive to reduce restrictions on export restrictions (this is the exports advantage) and drilling with joint
economic zones is key because that establishes a model that is more practical than other clumsy pieces of law like LOST.
Both advantages are defenses of US actions
A) export supply is a reason why the drilling oil mechanism of the plan is key (against advantage counterplans or a counterplan to
drill something else)
B) the hot-spots/Arctic advantage is a reason why the joint development mechanism of the plan is key

***ADVANTAGES***

inherency 1ac
contention 1: inherency ---- the US opened up rig searches but not production of ocean oil production
WINES 2/27/2014 NYT Contributor (Wines, Michael, FEB. 27, 2014, U.S. Moves Toward Atlantic Oil Exploration, Stirring Debate
Over Sea Life, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/us/us-moves-toward-atlantic-oil-exploration-stirring-debate-over-sea-life.html?
_r=0)
The Interior Department opened the door on Thursday to the first searches in decades for oil and gas off the Atlantic coast, recommending that
undersea seismic surveys proceed, though with a host of safeguards to shield marine life from much of their impact. The recommendation is likely to be adopted after a period of public
comment and over objections by environmental activists who say it will be ruinous for the climate and sea life alike. The American Petroleum Institute called the recommendation a critical step
toward bolstering the nations energy security, predicting that oil

and gas production in the region could create 280,000 new jobs and generate $195
billion in private investment. Activists were livid. Allowing exploration could be a death sentence for many marine mammals, and is needlessly turning the Atlantic Ocean into a
blast zone, Jacqueline Savitz, a vice president at the conservation group Oceana, said in a statement on Thursday. Oceana and other groups have campaigned for months against the Atlantic
survey plans, citing Interior Department calculations that the intense noise of seismic exploration could kill and injure thousands of dolphins and whales. But while the assessment released on
Thursday repeats those estimates, it also largely dismisses them, stating that they employ multiple worst-case scenarios and ignore measures by humans and the mammals themselves to avoid
harm. Many marine scientists say the estimates of death and injury are at best seriously inflated. Theres no argument that some of these sounds can harm animals, but its blown out of
proportion, Arthur N. Popper, who heads the University of Marylands laboratory of aquatic bioacoustics, said in an interview. Its the Flipper syndrome, or Free Willy. How the noise
affects sea mammals behavior in the long term an issue about which little is known is a much greater concern, he said. A formal decision to proceed with surveys would reopen a swath
off the East Coast stretching from Delaware to Cape Canaveral, Fla., that has been closed to petroleum exploration since the early 1980s.

Actual drilling of test wells could

not begin until a White House ban on production in the Atlantic expires in 2017 , and even then, only after the
government agrees to lease ocean tracts to oil companies, an issue officials have barely begun to study. The petroleum industry has sunk 51 wells off
the East Coast none of them successful enough to begin production in decades past. But the Interior Department said in 2011 that 3.3 billion barrels of
recoverable oil and 312 trillion cubic feet of natural gas could lie in the exploration area, and nine companies have already applied for
permits to begin surveys. President Obama committed in 2010 to allowing oil and gas surveys along the same stretch of the Atlantic, and
the government had planned to lease tracts off the Virginia coast for exploration in 2011. But those plans collapsed after the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster in April 2010, and the government later banned activity in the area until 2017 .

plan 1ac
text: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its non-military joint development of crude oil
production in the Earths oceans

production advantage 1ac

contention 2 advantages; advantage 1: exports
drilling for more oil in outer-continental areas to changing the USs position on exporting crude oil --- can lead to massive
exports around the globe
HARDER 2014 NOIA market analyst (Amy Harder, Crude Debate: Should Washington Lift Oil Export Ban?, January 6, 2014,
http://www.noia.org/crude-debate-should-washington-lift-oil-export-ban/)
Since 2008, U.S. oil production has increased 56
percent, and our imports have correspondingly fallen to the lowest level since the mid-1990s. In response to this oil boom, refineries
have been exporting at record amounts gasoline, diesel, and other products refined from oil, which do not face the same federal
restrictions as crude oil. In response to this trend and the broader oil and natural-gas boom, companies including Exxon Mobil and
Continental Resources are calling on Congress to lift the ban. Newspapers like The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Bloomberg
News, and Financial Times have made similar statements. Calls to preserve the ban appear to be fewer. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
A federal ban dating back decades that restricts exports of crude oil is suddenly in Washingtons crosshairs. Should we get rid of it?

Robert Menendez, D-N.J., says lifting the ban would benefit only major oil companies and could end up hurting U.S. drivers in the long run with higher gasoline prices. The ban dates back to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo,

In the few cases exports are

allowedmostly to Canadacompanies must obtain a specific license from the Commerce Department in order to do so . What are the pros
which sent domestic oil prices soaring. In the wake of that incident, Congress decided to restrict exports of crude in most cases as a means to limit future oil-price shocks.

and cons of lifting the ban? Is there a middle ground between leaving it as-is and eliminating it altogether? What should be this debates driving factors, such as gasoline prices and economic growth? How could lifting the ban
affect the environment, including, potentially, encouraging more drilling?

Do you think Washington has the political appetite to change the law? Or, will this be a debate with a

lot of talk but no action? Randall Luthi Should Washington Lift the Oil Export Ban?

The short answer is that such a decision must be accompanied by

strategic changes in U.S. policy. Oil should be viewed as a valuable commodity, like corn, wheat, textiles, and manufactured goods;
The oil and gas
sector is no different, and this is where the U.S. needs some strategic planning and policy decisions. We need to do more to ensure we have abundant oil and
all essential to our economic well-being. Talk of increasing exports for any given commodity naturally leads to concern that costs will rise as goods or resources needed here at home become scarce.

To ensure that this energy renaissance continues we must open up

more of our offshore areas to oil and natural gas exploration. The onshore natural gas boom has put us on the edge of being able to be an energy exporter, but that effort
needs to be complemented by a consistent, reliable energy program that will allow for exploration in federal waters
in the Atlantic Ocean, the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific Ocean and offshore Alaska . Having multiple sources of
energy will not only make the U.S. more energy secure, but will provide the cushion we need to be able to export vital
energy to the world.
natural gas resources not just to meet our needs, but to help supply the world as well.

export power is key to resetting international geopolitics --- key to hegemony

MILLS 2012 - adjunct fellow with the Manhattan Institute and Forbes Energy Intelligence columnist, served in President Ronald
Reagans White House Science Office (Mark, physicist, 7/25/12, U.S. can become an energy export nation Politico)
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78978_Page2.html
A number of recent detailed forecasts predict that the U.S. could close in on zero imports if current trends continue. We could finally
realize that elusive goal of energy independence. In the process, we could add nearly $1 trillion in cumulative federal, state and local government tax
revenues and generate 2 to 4 million new jobs. But independence misses the point in a world craving fuel. We need to become an exporter .
The U.S. could, in collaboration with Canada and Mexico similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement, forge policies to encourage hydrocarbon production and
export. That would reset geopolitics. And just starting down that path would really light a fire under job and economic growth. We
know sufficient geophysical resources exist to support an export-nation policy. U.S. Geological Survey data reveal that this continent

has more than 10,000 billion barrels of oil-equivalent in natural gas, oil and coal. Thats more than four times the resources of the
Middle East. We consume only 20 billion of that a year. If we maximized North American hydrocarbon potential, our energy exports
to the world could exceed those from the Middle East by 2030. This would add something like $7 trillion to our economies, spur
manufacturing as well as research and development investment from the largesse and stimulate millions more high-paying jobs. And it
would send tremors through the fields of the Middle East and Russia. The key to converting resources to producible reserves for export lies in advancing technology.
We might even embrace the shocking idea of subsidizing this. But we cannot be an export nation without moving beyond a ball-and-chain

regulatory system including access to the vast swaths of resources under off-limits federal lands. There is no doubt the world will
use vastly more hydrocarbons in the future. The only real variables are who will supply all that fuel and thus who will enjoy the
economic and geopolitical benefits. We have the potential to be that leader. If we dont grab that chance, others will. Expanding North
American hydrocarbon production for export may be our most important opportunity for growth as well as for long-term

peace.

energy-based hegemony solves all the reasons why leadership is unsustainable --- solves extinction
Hagel 2012 [Chuck Hagel, Professor at Georgetown University, The Challenge of Change, 5/15/12,
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/challenge-change]
A new world order is being built today by seven billion global citizens. Americas responsibilities in this new world and to future generations are as enormous as they are humbling. The challenges and choices before us demand leadership that reaches into the future
without stumbling over today. They also require challenging every past frame of reference. Sensing the realities and subtleties of historic change are not always sudden or obvious. As former Secretary of State Dean Acheson recounted, Only slowly did it dawn upon us
that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the 19th century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers. Staying a step ahead of the forces of change
requires an ability to foresee and appreciate the consequences of our actions, a willingness to learn the hard lessons of history and from our own experiences, and a clear realization of the limitations of great power. Acheson and the Wise Men of that time got it right.

through strong inspired leadership, a judicious (most of the time) use of its power, and working with allies through alliances and institutions.
has helped prevent a Third World War and a nuclear holocaust . The world we face in 2012 is of a different character than
even a few years ago. Many developing nations are fragile states and are under enormous pressure from terrorism, endemic poverty, environmental challenges,
debt, corruption, civil unrest, and regional, tribal, and religious conflicts. The result is a climate of despair, and potential breeding grounds for radical
politics and extremism. A successful American foreign policy must include thinking through actions and policies, and how uncontrollable and unpredictable global forces may affect outcomes. Eleven years of invasions and occupations have
put the U.S. in a deep hole and mired us down in terribly costly commitments in blood, treasure, and prestige. Our diplomatic and security flexibility
has been seriously eroded by many of the decisions of the last eleven years. Too often we tend to confuse tactical action for strategic thinking. A matter of mutual understanding American foreign policy has always required a principled realism
that is true to our values as we face the world as it really is in all of its complexities. We need to accept the reality that there is not a short-term solution to every problem in the world. What we must do is manage these realities
and complex problems, moving them into positions of solution possibilities and resolution . American foreign policy has always dared to project a vision of a world where all things are possible. If we are
to succeed, we must understand how the world sees us. Turn on our receivers more often and shut off our transmitters. This is a vital priority for a successful 21st century
foreign policy. We must also avoid the traps of hubris, ideology and insularity, and know that there is little margin for error with the stakes so high in the world today. America must strengthen its global alliances. Common-interest alliances
will be required in a volatile world of historic diffusions of power. The great challenges facing the world today are the responsibility of all peoples of the world. They include cyber warfare,
terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, prosperity and stability, and global poverty, disease and environmental
degradation. Our allies throughout the world share these same challenges and threats and will also be just as affected by the outcomes. These will be either our common successes or our common failures. America cannot be successful with any of these
America led the shaping of the post-Second World War world order
This

challenges, without sustained partnerships and deep cooperation in the economic, intelligence, diplomatic, humanitarian, military and law enforcement fields. The centrality of alliances and multi-lateral institutions to a successful foreign policy is fundamental. Alliances
and multi-lateral institutions must be understood as expansions of our influence, not as constraints on our power. Alliances are imperfect, as are all institutions. But like process, they help absorb shocks. Beyond military solutions Alliances must be built on solid

American military
power and force structure cannot sustain its commitments without a shift to a more comprehensive strategic approach to global threats
foundations to handle both routine and sudden unforeseen challenges. Crisis-driven coalitions of the willing by themselves are not the building blocks for a stable world. We need to think more broadly, deeply and strategically.

and a more flexible and agile military. Cyber warfare is a paramount example of these new threats. The perception of American power around the world must not rest solely on a military orientation or optic. There must be an underlying commitment to engagement and
humanity. Engagement is not appeasement, nor is it negotiation. It is not a guarantee of anything, but rather a smart diplomatic bridge to better understanding and possible conflict resolution. American foreign policy must reflect the realities and demands of the global

There can be no higher priority for America than to remain economically competitive in a world
undergoing a historic diffusion of economic power. A nations strength is anchored to and underpinned by its economic strength. The
connections between Americas trade, economic, and energy policies must also be synthesized into a strategic vision for American
foreign policy that not only meets the challenges of our time, but frames the completeness of long-term policies for strategic future outcomes. Trade is a major catalyst for economic strength and growth at home and abroad, as well as a critical stabilizer for
world peace and prosperity. America must remain the global champion of free, fair and open trade. As the worlds strongest, largest and most dynamic economy, America must continue to lead world
trade. Economic strength must be as high a priority as any other foreign policy priority. Americas security and growth are connected to both the American and global economies. A centerpiece of this security is
energy security. Energy security and energy interdependence are interconnected parts of a broad and deep foreign policy
paradigm that frames the complexity of the challenges that face America and the world. A diverse portfolio of energy that is
accessible and affordable is the core of Americas energy security. Much of the worlds energy is produced in countries and regions that are
consumed by civil unrest, lack of human rights, corruption, underdevelopment, and conflict. The price of oil is driven by supply and demand and the global market. We must ensure diversification of
sources of supply and distribution networks to prevent undue dependence on any one country or region. Instability and violence disrupt supply and distribution and increase prices.
economy. The global economy cannot be shut out of foreign policy.

the plan would ends interventionary wars --- solves all the reasons why hegemony is bad
SCHWARK 2012 (Sebastian, associate director of Hill-Knowlton strategies, communications Strategist, Energy Specialist, 8/13/12,
e-Ideas (1): Politics and Walter Russell Meads Looming Energy Revolution The Energy Collective)
http://theenergycollective.com/sebastian-schwark/102696/e-ideas-1-politics-and-walter-russell-mead-s-looming-energy-revolution
This geopolitical shift will stabilize the liberal global order, stimulate global economic growth, and allow the potential rivalry between
the U.S. and China to become ever more cooperative. Because energy was critical to the first American century, Mead continues, and
since the energy abundance that propelled the U.S. to global leadership is back , a new American century is in the making.
A less Middle East-centric foreign policy will allow the U.S. to become more of the benevolent hegemon it has been after
World War II, securing the liberal capitalist global order, rather than fighting wars in the sands Iraq.

independently, energy abundance is key to prevent oil volatility which sparks great power war --- forces U.S. intervention and
goes nuclear
KING 2008 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17 )
soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war
between major powerspossibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether

Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. Energy security is now

deemed so central to national security that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter, he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at
Houstons Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, is one of the
most alarming prospects facing the current world system.7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about
the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress
that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order

A breakdown in trust for the oil markets

could spur calls for

military intervention

to drive up the price.

, these analysts fear,
government actioneven
.
The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close, Mr. Russell said. And when it does, look out.8 The World at Peak:
Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was
providing an astonishing 25 percent of the worlds oil supplya role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has
dramatically altered Americas own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the
difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the worlds unparalleled economic
boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa.
In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have

An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going
could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest . Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators
been for so long.

entirely without power. That is a reality that

for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development concluded that
the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in

Pakistan a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By
crippling the countrys economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistans power shortages could end up giving the countrys Islamic
parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. Its not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest
will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military
size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten
the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as
carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more

An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast
Iran and Venezuela top the
listare now seen as antagonists of the U nited States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries political leverage , but that
rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies.

majority of all the worlds known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments

enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound
shift as its needsand sources of energydiverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at
what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europes governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energyrestricted future will greatly enhance Russias clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russias return to power over the last
decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth

For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife , which in turn spawns images
of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumersthe U nited S tates and Chinaagainst
one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very
seriously . It doesnt require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijingnot for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One
region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an
ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldnt be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the
risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty .
(and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy.

hotspots advantage 1ac

advantage 2: hot spots
arctic drilling inevitableno barriers
Smith 2010 associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P.
(Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved
to Prevent the Really Cold War, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010)
While global warming will melt enough of the polar ice cap to make the extraction and transportation of undersea oil and gas more
readily available by 2030-2040, 69 the Russians and Norwegians have demonstrated that drilling in the Arctic is already
possible. Russia, facing harsh conditions such as temperatures as low as negative fifty degrees Celsius, is preparing to drill in Arctic offshore fields in
the Barents and Kara Seas. 70 Meanwhile, the Norwegians have successfully inaugurated the offshore fields of the bitterly cold East
Arctic. 71 Ending speculation that harsh conditions and technological limitations would prevent drilling in the Arctic for many
years to come, Norways state-owned Statoil brought offshore gas facilities online in 2007. 72 After twenty-five years of false starts,
planning and construction, the Snohvit 73 facility is fully operational in the Barents Sea. 74 Statoil expects Snohvit to yield $1.4 billion of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) each year for the next twenty-five years. 75 Snohvit demonstrates Statoils success developing the skills and technology
necessary to successfully drill in the Arctic. 76
but escalation is guaranteed absent US involvement --- plan sends a credible signal to resolve tensions which could cause global
damage
SLAYTON AND ROSEN 3/14/2014 - * Slayton is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chair of the Hoover Institution's
Arctic Security Initiative AND ** Rosen is an international and national security lawyer by training, is a senior legal adviser at CNA
Corporation (Slayton, David. Rosen, Mark. Another region where the Russian military threatens to dominate the U.S. March 14, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/14/opinion/slayton-rosen-russia-u-s-arctic/index.html)
(CNN) -- While

much of the world is focused on the Russian incursion into the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, another long-term move
may allow the former Soviet navy to dominate U.S. interests to the north: the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic Ocean is quickly
creating a new variety of challenges that have the potential to cause significant global damage if they remain
unaddressed. The Obama administration's policy correctly recognizes that the United States has profoundly important economic and
cultural interests in the Arctic but regrettably reveals very little about what the federal government will be doing outside
of the science field. While recent U.S. policies either dance around the core issues, or worse, do not acknowledge that they exist, the
Russians are taking the lead on Arctic policy. After all, the Arctic is in their backyard, too. Moreover, Russia -- as if to highlight the
value they place on their navy and renaissance as a maritime nation -- took control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula, assuring and
securing warm water Russian Navy access to the global commons. In light of these recent events, it would be wise for Washington to
seriously consider the economic potential and security vulnerabilities that exist on or near the U.S. Arctic coastline . Overwhelmingly, the U.S.
Arctic policy debate echoes past concerns of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Consequently, many in the policy community are pushing a heavy science and no-development agenda to
preserve the pristine character of the region. The

recently issued Department of Defense Arctic Strategy is a case in point: It talks extensively about
the DOD scientific mission and uses the terms "sustainable development" and preservation of the unspoiled area as important national
goals. But just saying "no" ignores the fact that the precious Arctic mineral and oil and gas resources will help assure the United
States is able, over time, to achieve and then maintain its energy independence . Science is incredibly important, as is safe and responsible
development of the Arctic, but our agencies and scientists need to approach these issues with a greater sense of urgency. Arguably, the science needs to be a component of a detailed national

Arctic policy should prioritize four things: One: Demonstrate leadership in the Arctic
and develop a strategy and policy to match. The U.S. has no leadership in the high north and Russia does, which is a great concern for
our allies. Two: Invest in infrastructure , Navy and Coast Guard to support U.S. security and commercial interests in the Arctic. The key
here is to develop the policy that drives those requirements so we are not "late to need." Three: Demonstrate leadership in the
maritime domain worldwide -- and not retreat as we are doing by default in the Arctic. Four: Facilitate and further develop
offshore natural resources in the high north/Alaska and the national, international, maritime and geopolitical governance
structures that will underpin those enterprises. Washington, in less than two years , will assume a leadership role when it becomes
Chair for the Arctic Council. Unfortunately, the DOD policy and U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 do not articulate what the U.S. Arctic leadership agenda will entail. The
reality is ignoring the issues and choosing not to participate in the Arctic will not make the issues go away. Yes, budgets are
challenging, but the Arctic is no different from any other international frontier or global common where the U.S. has interests. We
need to protect it and demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain -- not retreat. So, too, our policy makers need to be looking beyond our shores to
Moscow, Ottawa, Oslo, Copenhagen, the Arctic Council, international oil companies and Lloyds of London for help in solving this governance challenge. The last thing that any of
action, but that's only a fraction of good U.S. policy. U.S.

the Arctic states can afford is to back into a Russian-generated crisis with no resources or a plan. The time is now for more U.S.
leadership to ensure the Arctic becomes a safe, secure and prosperous region in which to live and work.
effective dispute resolution models key to de-escalate miscalculation
Smith 2010 associate with Covington & Burling L.L.P.
(Angelle C. Smith, J.D. from George Washington Law School, Frozen Assets: Ownership of Arctic Mineral Rights Must Be Resolved
to Prevent the Really Cold War, George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 41, 2010)
Forget the Cold War; the really cold war is lurking. The looming debate over the natural resources in the Arctic is primed
to explode. The glacial Arctic waters that harbored U.S. and Soviet submarines during the Cold War 1 may prove to be a
battleground again if nothing is done to determine who has jurisdiction over the vast mineral deposits in the Arctic. Allocation of
mineral rights in the Arctic is becoming increasingly important as global warming eases access to the area, the global demand for
energy continues to rise, and advances in technology make extraction of these minerals possible. 2 The harmonization of these three factors, coupled with
competing international claims to the Arctics continental shelf, may yield a dispute of epic proportions to conclusively determine
which nation, or nations, has the best claim to the untapped natural resources beneath the Arctic seabed. The Arctic region, specifically the North
Pole, contains significant oil and gas reserves. Based on recent estimates, this area may contain close to twenty-five percent of the worlds
undiscovered oil and natural gas resources. 3 Given the mineral potential of the area, the time to settle ownership of the Arctic seabed is
now. And the countries with competing claims know this. The Russian Federation recently planted a flag on the North Pole, 4 Canada plans to build
an Arctic military force, 5 and the other Arctic coastal statesDenmark (through Greenland6 ), Norway, and the United States are all seeking to
establish an Arctic presence. 7 As one commentator noted, the Arctic is a perfect storm seeded with political opportunism, national pride,
military muscle flexing, high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international law. 8 Facially, it appears that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a comprehensive international maritime treaty establishing rights, responsibilities, and procedures for settling claims in the worlds oceans
and seas, should be the proper mechanism to determine jurisdiction in the Artic. 9 UNCLOS, however, is not a viable option because not all
of the interested parties have ratified the treaty and the UNCLOS component that recommends limits of the continental shelf has not achieved
the status of customary international law . 10 While the United Nations should take steps to address these shortfalls, it is highly unlikely that any
amendment to the present regime will be proposed and accepted before anarchy on the high Arctic seas ensues. UNCLOS , therefore, is

not the answer.

Joint development zones key to resolving Arctic disputes peacefully --- best model
Jelinski 10 MA Candidate at the University of British Columbia
(Cameron, Diplomacy and the Lomonosov Ridge: Prospects for International Cooperation in the Arctic, University of British
Columbia, August, 2010, https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/28128/ubc_2010_fall_jelinski_cameron.pdf?sequence=1)
While this paper focuses on interim solutions that may help lead to final delimitation of boundaries, it is important to mention in brief
the possibilities for alternative solutions. As noted in the discussion above, the more conventional approach is for countries to enter into bilateral or
multilateral delimitation negotiations in order to determine the final boundaries between them. As Vivian Forbes asserts, [ t]he settlement of boundary
disputes involving resources has traditionally centred on the demarcation of specific lines ... dividing the disputed resource area
between the States involved. xcvi In addition to this approach, however, another option existsone that has been adopted by several countries worldwide when faced with continental shelf delimitation disagreements. Specifically, it
is possible for two or more states to effectively share jurisdiction indefinitely, by enacting arrangements that are variously called
Joint Development Zones, areas, or regimes. Joint development has been defined as cooperation between States with regard to the
exploration for and exploitation of certain deposits ... of non-living resources, which ... lie in an area of overlapping claims. xcvii
It is informative to examine in brief several existing examples of joint development before discussing the prospects of such a regime
in the central Arctic Ocean. A number of joint development regimes exist in various situations of maritime or continental shelf delimitation disputes worldwide, such that Forbes posits that these regimes have gained universal
acceptance. xcviii An oft-cited example concerns the overlapping claims to the continental shelf that existed between Australia and Indonesia, and now between Australia and East Timor. xcix After years of disagreement over control of the 29 resources in this
area, Australia and Indonesia reached in 1989 an elaborate compromise: the two sides set aside the question of permanent boundaries and agreed, instead, to the establishment of a zone of joint development under which any government revenues from
petroleum exploitation were equally shared by the two countries. c Thus, while this agreement did not determine final areas of exclusive sovereignty, it did effectively neutralize a longstanding dispute by creating an arrangement that could be adhered to
indefinitely. In other words, while final delimitation was not achieved, delimitation was no longer seen as a pressing matter as long as the joint development agreement was respected. When East Timor gained independence from Indonesia, it renegotiated the treaty
in such a way that the concept of joint development was maintained, albeit in a manner far more beneficial to this small developing country. ci In another example, Thailand and Malaysia formally created a Joint Development Area (JDA) in 1990. cii Forbes
points out that the two countries belief that hydrocarbon resources existed in the area made delimitation more difficult, but that the perceived economic benefits of exploitation was a driving factor behind the states willingness to pursue a joint development
arrangement. ciii This factor may be relevant in the case of the central Arctic Ocean, as discussed below. Finally, a third example of joint development may be mentioned this one on the southern fringes of the Arctic. In 1980, when negotiations on a maritime
boundary between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Norway) failed to delimit the continental shelf, a Conciliation Commission recommended the creation of a joint development zone for an area of the shelf which had the greatest resource potential. civ Since adopting
the recommendations, cooperation between the two states typically takes the form of joint venture contracts. cv In short, then, the concept of joint development is well-established in 30 relations between countries, and in several cases has effectively removed
from contention disputes over the continental shelf. In light of these concrete examples, it is possible to discuss the feasibility of a joint development regime as a method of defusing any disputes in the central Arctic Ocean. On the one hand, some of the factors
that seem to facilitate joint development are present in the central Arctic Ocean, including areas of potentially overlapping claims, belief that resources may be found in these areas, and a history of some cooperation. Therefore, if eventual delimitation negotiations
are found to be intractable, a joint development regime in the Arctic could attain the benefits that such regimes have facilitated elsewhere, particularly by providing a management tool in situations which otherwise would lead to disputes and confrontations.
cvi Such a regime could be established through a series of bilateral agreements, or through one multilateral agreement. On the other hand, however, it was noted above that the perceived economic benefits of joint exploitation were in at least one case a major
factor behind the push for a joint development area. cvii Given that few oil and gas resources may exist in the area of potential overlap, and that their exploitation would be very costly, the drive for a joint development zone may be less urgent along the

however, that while resource exploitation is typically the main reason for joint development regimes of shared
jurisdiction, other issues may be covered by such agreements. For example, Francisco Orrego Vicuna points out that some agreements on shared development jurisdiction have included clauses on
cooperation regarding living resources, the environment, scientific research, search and rescue, and other issues. cviii Thus, even if 31 shared resource exploitation does not present an
immediately compelling reason for pursuing a zone of joint jurisdiction, such an agreement could also increase the possibility of
cooperation on other matters in the central Arctic Ocean. It should be noted as well that as in the case of a provisional delimitation arrangement, more information on the seabed may be needed
Lomonosov Ridge in the near term. It should be noted,

 feasible. In short, then, several potential forms of political cooperation could be pursued in the
central Arctic Ocean. In an assertion that addresses potential concerns about the difficulties of diplomatic relations, Riddell-Dixon argues that [t]he prospects of dealing with [probable overlaps] in an orderly manner appear promising in light of
the high degree of cooperation evident in Canadas relations with Denmark, the United States, and Russia in the preparations of their respective submissions. cix While she does not advocate one form of
cooperation or another, by formalizing such cooperation by means of a joint or coordinated submission, through a provisional
delimitation agreement, or potentially through A Joint Development Zone in the future, the concerned states could further
in the central Arctic Ocean before the establishment of a joint development regime is

enhance the prospects of dealing with overlaps peacefully and fairly.

economics will control military escalation

Conley 12 (Heather Senior Fellow at CSIS and Director, Europe Program, A New Security Architecture for the Arctic, January,
http://csis.org/files/publication/120117_Conley_ArcticSecurity_Web.pdf)
The Arctic will experience extraordinary economic and environmental change over the next several decades. Commercial, human, and state
interaction will rise dramatically. More drilling for oil and gas in the region and growing shipping and ecotourism as new shipping routes come
into existence are just a few of the examples of increased human activity in the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic ice cap is now exceeding previous scientific and
climatic predictions. A recent study shows that September 2011 marked the lowest levels of sea ice extent ever recorded in the northern polar region.1 The polar ice cap
today is 40 percent smaller than it was in 1979,2 and in the summer of 2007 alone, 1 million more square miles of ice beyond the average melted, uncovering an area of
open water six times the size of California. While estimates range from 2013 to 2060, the U.S. Navys Arctic Roadmap projects ice-free conditions for a portion of

economics and an increasingly ice-free and hostile climatic environment are on a direct collision course, driving a
clear need for a new paradigm to meet pressing security challenges that Arctic nations have thus far been unprepared or ill equipped to address. As the

the Arctic by the summer of 2030.3 Arctic

region takes on greater economic importance, the Arctic requires a comprehensive regional and global security strategy that includes
an increase in regional readiness and border security as well as an enhancement of strategic capabilities. The security challenges are vast, including search
and rescue, environmental remediation , piracy , terrorism , natural and man-made disaster response , and border protection. Compounding
the challenge is the fact that regional players must function in an operational environment of severely limited satellite communication and hydrographic mapping. Arctic
coastal states have developed and issued national Arctic security strategies and accompanying documents that, albeit roughly, sketch out their political
and security priorities in the region. These documents describe their national security interests and the intentions these states wish to pursue and defend. Each of the five
Arctic coastal statesCanada, Denmark via Greenland, Norway, Russia, and the United Statestouts its commitment to cooperative action while simultaneously
bolstering its military presence and capabilities in the Arctic. Yet the complexity of competing national security interests is heightened by the lack of a single coherent
structure through which these concerns can be addressed. Therefore, a fresh approach is needed for addressing regional Arctic security concerns within a
global framework, while recognizing the mutual benefits of maintaining international cooperation, transparency, and stability in the Arctic. Creating a twenty-first
century security architecture for the Arctic presents the United States with a conundrum: U.S. Arctic policy must be given a significant sense of
urgency and focus at the same moment that U.S. defense budgets are being reduced and U.S. military planners consider the Arctic to be an area of low conflict.

How does one economically and militarily square this circle ? Unfortunately, while there have been some international debate and discussion on the form and
format of Arctic security cooperation, the debate has often focused on what issues related to Arctic security cannot be discussed rather than on those that can and should be
addressed. However, these institutional and policy barriers have begun to break down as actors recognize both a collective lack of operational capacity and the increasing number
of security actors that will play a role in this rapidly changing region. Arctic stakeholders have yet to discuss seriously, let alone determine, what collective security framework
Arctic states should use to address the emerging security challenges in the region, despite signing legally binding agreements on international search and rescue and negotiating
international agreements on oil spills and response. It is within this context that the following report will analyze the drivers of change in the region, examine the key Arctic

Gas As the sea ice retreats, new commercial

opportunities in the Arctic arise. Natural resources that had once been unreachable are becoming available for extraction . As the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates, the Arctic is projected to contain 13 percent of the worlds undiscovered oil resources and 30
percent of the gas resources.1 Because global production of oil and gas will not match global demand and the short-term outlook for
the price of oil and gas will increase,2 the desire to tap these resources in the Arctic will spur commercial exploration , and
multinational companies will invest and become increasingly engaged in the region. At the same time, the need to develop new technologies and approaches
for tackling the harsh and unpredictable climate for offshore drilling and transportation in the Arctic is urgent. The greater the potential profit and
security actors and institutions, and explore the potential for a new security architecture for the Arctic. Oil and

need to secure supply while maintaining, if not increasing, current production levels, the greater the tendency will be for companies to assume the greater risks inherent
in operating in the Arctic. Alaska has contributed significantly to meeting U.S. demand with oil from the oil fields on the North Slope close to the Arctic coast
transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. However, due to decreasing North Slope production and a lack of new fields, domestic pressure to explore
offshore of Alaska is rising. Royal Dutch Shell has received preliminary approval from the Obama administration for its offshore drilling plans in its acquired leases
in the Beaufort Sea. Exploratory drilling in the Beaufort Sea is expected to commence in 2012.3 Shell is also optimistic that it can begin to develop the reserves in the
Chukchi Sea in the near future, but issues with environmental leases, oil spill preparedness and response, and disputes with local communities threaten to delay the
process.4 Other Arctic coastal states are seeking similar economic advantage. In Norway, leases to the Barents Sea have been allocated, as
Norwegian oil and gas production has fallen since its peak of 3.4 million barrels per day in 20015 and is expected to decline further if no significant new fields are
discovered. Increased demand from the European market has spurred additional exploratory drilling farther north. Seismic activity by the Norwegian Petroleum
Directorate6 has already started in the maritime territory obtained after the Norwegian-Russian maritime delimitation treaty entered into effect in July 2011.7 With the
largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Arctic coast line, Russia is increasingly interested in developing its potential fields, especially on the
prosperous continental shelf next to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and in the Kara Sea. Russia is moving to increase gas production in the vast Yamal field,
which already produces 90 percent of Russian state gas, following recent discoveries of large gas fields, such as the Bovanenkovo field.8 In addition, Russia has been
active in expanding oil production in the Pechora Sea, with plans for drilling in the Prirazlomnoye oil field in early 20129a significant development as it marks the
first instance of offshore drilling in the Russian Arctic.10 Russia also plans to drill in the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea, which is projected to be three times
as large as the Prirazlomnoye, and aims to have the field developed by 2020.11 Numerous delaysfrom the large supply of gas available on the global market due
to the discovery of unconventional gas in the United States and uncertainty over Russian taxation policies have to this point prevented the development of
the worlds largest gas field, the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, forcing new technological developments and seismic exploration in other parts of

the Russian Arctic territory. All

of this activity indicates the keen interest both countries have in moving rapidly to extract these

resources from their Arctic territories.

solvency 1ac
contention 3: solvency

the plan establishes a model for international joint development zones ----- comparatively outweighs the rest of the country
BLYSCHAK 2013 practises energy and corporate/commercial law in Calgary with a focus on international transactions (Paul
Michael Blyschak, Offshore oil and gas projects amid maritime border disputes: applicable law, J World Energy Law Bus (2013) 6 (3):
210-233. doi: 10.1093/jwelb/jwt008)
KEY:
CLCS = Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
UNCLOS = United Nations Convention On the Law Of the Sea
JDA = Joint Development Agreement/Area
Offshore oil and gas projects face numerous technical and legal risks not typically encountered in onshore exploration and production
activities. Among these risks is the possibility that the relevant licence/concession area in which an oil and gas company is entitled to
explore and/or produce falls within or near an area subject to an international maritime border dispute. Maritime border disputes have
received increased attention in recent years as technological advances allow both companies and governments to evaluate the
untapped potential of offshore resources (consider, for instance, the renewed race between arctic nations to establish and expand territorial rights to the
arctic seabed, discussed further below).1 Maritime border disputes may have consequences on the extent and nature of exploration and production rights
and the corresponding ability of upstream oil and gas companies to carry out operations within the relevant licence/concession area .

Unless appropriate mitigation strategies are considered in

preparing the relevant legal documentation for such projects, not only may the border dispute decrease or nullify
the value of the licence/concession area, but may in some circumstances even result in adverse claims by
governments, joint venture partners, contractors and other interest holders . Before such risk mitigation is possible, however, a firm understanding of all potentially

Furthermore, such consequences may arise both while a dispute is ongoing and following resolution of the dispute.

applicable law is necessary. This article therefore surveys various different sources of such law, including (1) the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, being the pre-eminent international agreement pertaining to maritime territorial
disputes; (2) the law applicable to the exploration and exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources under joint development agreements negotiated amid maritime territorial disputes; and (3) the law applicable to the exploration of offshore oil and gas resources amid

No other instrument or body of

law is as fundamental to a discussion of international maritime border disputes as is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was concluded
in 1982 and entered into force in 1994.2 Among other things, UNCLOS provides that the sovereign right of each maritime State to explore and exploit the
natural resources of the seabed extends 200 nautical miles from its shoreline [referred to as that States continental shelf or
exclusive economic zone (EEZ)],3 save where such territory overlaps with the maritime territory of another maritime State. Furthermore, this is the case regardless of the distance a States continental shelf extends from its coastline. As
unresolved maritime territorial disputes pursuant to relevant international case law. Previous Section Next Section 2. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The continental shelf and the area

provided by UNCLOS Article 76(1): [t]he continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental shelf,
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.4 UNCLOS provides that coastal States need not actively explore their
continental shelf or exploit the natural resources contained therein in order to preserve their exclusive right to do so.5 UNCLOS further provides that the rights of coastal States over their continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation.6 Finally, UNCLOS provides that coastal States shall have the exclusive right to authorise and regulate oil and gas drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes.7 Part XI of UNCLOS governs resource exploration activities in what is termed
the Area, which is defined by Article 1(1) of UNCLOS to be the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, that is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Articles 136 and 137 provide that the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind and that no
State shall claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over any resources in the Area, all such rights being vested in mankind as a whole. Further, rights with respect to minerals recovered from the Area can only be claimed, acquired or exercised in accordance with Part XI.
Article 150 sets out a number of policies regarding activities in the Area that include statements that, among other policy goals, activities in the Area will be carried out with a view to the development of its resources in an orderly, safe and rational manner. In order to
accomplish these policy goals, Article 156 of UNCLOS establishes the International Seabed Authority (the Authority), an organization meant to act on behalf of mankind as a whole with regard to the administration of resources in the Area.8 The Authority is intended
to exercise control over activities carried on in the Area to ensure compliance with Part XI of UNCLOS, including the right to inspect all installations in the Area that are used in connection with activities in the Area.9 Article 82 of UNCLOS requires coastal states to
make payments or contributions in respect of the exploitation of non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from their territorial seas, which payments or contributions are to be made to the Authority.10 The Authority shall then distribute
these payments or contributions to UNCLOS parties on the basis of equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the least developed and the land-locked among them.11 Towards this end, Article 82 of
UNCLOS has inspired much question and commentary, including, in particular, in respect of how it is likely to be implemented.12 For example, as Article 82(1) is clear that resource payments to the Authority are the responsibility of the subject coastal State rather than

Numerous other
uncertainties remain , many of which result from less than precise or comprehensive drafting. Referring simply to payments and contributions to be made with respect

industry, the manner in which such payments will be recouped by States from industry seems likely to vary from State to State according to yet to be determined national policy, legislation and regulation.13

to the value or volume of production at the site, it is not clear whether UNCLOS Article 82(1)s payment obligation is intended to be interpreted as a royalty on production or some form of tax or duty.14 Similarly, if in fact a production royalty is intended to be a
gross royalty or a net royalty which allows for the deduction of certain costs before its application.15 Can it be paid in kind?16 And, in respect of oil and gas exploration and production, when will it first be due: Year 6 after first oil or Year 6 after first commercial
production of oil?17 These are matters UNCLOSs drafters and signatories would do well to clarify sooner rather than later in order to avoid potential future disputes over the interpretation and application of the Article as well as to provide certainty to industry anxious
to promote activities on the continental shelf.18 The CLCS and the Race for the Arctic Importantly, Article 76 of UNCLOS provides that in certain circumstances the continental shelf of a State may extend beyond 200 nautical miles of a baseline and thus extend the
sovereignty of a State past this point to encompass such outer-continental shelf territory. Towards this end, Article 76 establishes the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). As stated in Annex II of UNCLOS, the purpose of the CLCS is to
consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of
Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.19 Therefore, where a maritime State seeks to have its sovereign territory extend past the otherwise applicable 200 nautical mile limit, it is required by UNCLOS
to submit its arguments in this respect for determination by the CLCS.20 Claims before the CLCS may only be submitted by States which have ratified UNCLOS, and must be made within 10 years of ratification.21 In order for such a claim to be of merit, it must be

While the CLCS may make final

recommendations regarding territorial disputes, it has no actual authority or jurisdiction to finally decide such
disputes .23 These may only be resolved by bilateral or multilateral agreements between the competing states or in accordance

based on the argument that the claimed territory lies above seafloor which is a geological extension of the States continental shelf rather than a separate feature of the subsurface topography.22

with customary international law.24 This is recognized by Article 83 of UNCLOS which imposes a positive duty on signatories to enter into equitable delimitation agreements on the basis of international law and to make every
effort to enter provisional arrangements of a practical nature pending such agreements so as not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.25 That said, the intent of UNCLOS is clearly that the work of the CLCSas an impartial, objective arbiter

The work of the CLCS has received no

greater attention than in respect of the competing national claims made to the Arctic Ocean and the seabed below it .27 This is for good
cause. On the one hand, each of the USA, Canada, the Russian Federation, Denmark and Norway claim overlapping portions of the
Arctic Ocean. On the other hand, the stakes are potentially very high, while the applicable law and science do not always square
neatly.28 As a result, the clash over the Arctic has been described as a perfect storm seeded with political
proceeding along neutral scientific principleswill encourage competing States to reach final agreements on terms close to, if not specifically based on, its recommendations.26

opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international
law.29 The USA has yet to ratify UNCLOS and will therefore forego submitting any arguments to the CLCS. Norway has filed its
submissions, while Canada and Denmark have until 2013 and 2014 to do so, respectively. While Russia initially filed its submissions

in 2001, it is currently preparing a revised submission following a finding by the CLCS that its initial arguments provided insufficient
evidence to establish the claims asserted by Russia. What US non-participation by the USA in the UNCLOS process means for the outcome of the CLCSs deliberations, as well as for inclination of all five States to
abide by its recommendations, remains to be seen.30 Nonetheless, the CLCSs task is an important one. Interest in exploring and developing the oil and gas reserves of the Arctic has accelerated substantially over the last decade, and is only likely to continue for a
number of reasons. First, it is estimated that as much as 25 per cent of the worlds remaining oil and gas reserves lie under the Arctic Ocean.31 Secondly, thinning icecaps and opening waterways amid arctic islands have made exploration of the Arctics oil and gas
reserves more feasible, both economically and logistically.32 Thirdly, declining reserves in certain parts of the world have necessitated a reinvigorated campaign to discover new sources of hydrocarbons in previously undeveloped or underdeveloped regions.33 Finally,
rising oil prices as well as technological advances have made such a reinvigorated campaign more economically and practically viable.34 In the meantime, the political (as well as the economic and the environmental) sensitivity of drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic
will almost certainly ensure that no operations will be conducted in the disputed territory without the completion or settlement of a firm consensus on territorial delimitation.35 For example, similar geopolitical uncertainty has long paralyzed operations in a promising
6250 square nautical mile slice of the Beaufort Sea extending north from the maritime intersection of Alaska and the Yukon Territory claimed by both the USA and Canada.36 It is also possible that smaller sub-agreements dealing with less contentious related matters
such as environmental protection and joint marine contingency plans may precede a comprehensive agreement delimiting territorial sovereignty.37 Furthermore, contrary to common perception,38 cooperation characterizes the race for the Arctic much more so than
does competition and conflict.39 The USA and Canada, for example, have been conducting joint sub-sea mapping expeditions in the Arctic Ocean since 2008.40 In the same year all five littoral Arctic States met in IIulissat, Greenland, to affirm their commitment to
using UNCLOS and the CLCS to resolve their competing continental shelf extension claims.41 This led to the Ilulissat Declaration by which the five States noted that UNCLOS was the extensive international legal framework applicable to the Arctic Ocean, and that
UNCLOS provides a solid foundation for responsible management through national implementation and application of relevant provisions.42 Moreover, scientists from all five countries, and in particular the USA, Canada and Denmark, have been actively
collaborating with each other in sharing research and information in respect to the Arctic seafloor, including those areas composing the Beaufort Sea and the seabed north of Greenland.43 Other material provisions of UNCLOS UNCLOS also provides for the protection
of the marine environment, primarily through the provisions of Part XII, which provides that States have the right to exploit their natural resources in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.44 To this end, States are required to take
measures to control pollution of the marine environment, whether from land-based sources, vessels or installations or devices used in the exploration for and exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.45 These measures are required to include the
adoption of laws and regulations and, with respect to pollution from vessels, and acting through the appropriate international organization or general diplomatic conference, the establishment of international rules and standards.46 Article 17 gives all States the right of
innocent passage through the territorial waters of another State, which means passage that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the latter State.47 Finally, UNCLOS provides for dispute resolution mechanisms, allowing States to choose, as a means
of settling disputes, between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or another arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII or VIII to UNCLOS.48 With regard to disputes concerning activities in the Area, the
jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS includes disputes regarding the interpretation of Part XI, which relates to the Area.49 3. Resources development under joint development agreements and similar international instruments Joint development

Maritime territorial disputes do not prohibit the development of energy resources located in the disputed territory as a matter of
course. Rather, where two or more States contest the same maritime territory home to offshore oil and gas resources they may agree to
enter into a joint development agreement (JDA) to provide for the exploration and exploitation of such reserves pending
final resolution of the territorial dispute. Furthermore, joint development has become an increasingly popular method of diffusing maritime territorial disputes while all evidence suggests that this trend is likely to continue.50
While there persists some academic controversy regarding the exact legal nature and implications of such arrangements,51 JDAs can be broadly defined as a procedure under which boundary
disputes are set aside, without prejudice to the validity of the conflicting claims, and the interested States agree, instead, to jointly
explore and exploit and to share any hydrocarbons found in the area subject to overlapping claims .52 In this regard, joint development should be distinguished from
agreements

cross-border unitization for, whereas the latter typically applies in respect of specific reservoirs and deposits straddling an international boundary, the former applies in respect of one or more reservoirs or deposits within a larger geographic area the sovereign control of

States are not

required by international law to enter into a JDA where a dispute exists in respect of maritime territory in which hydrocarbons deposits
are presumed or known to exist.55 However, a significant number of international law publicists agree that there may exist a general obligation to consult and negotiate about a provisional agreement pending final delimitation.56 Several
which is disputed.53 Joint development should also be distinguished from delimitation, wherein States with a contested maritime border reach definitive agreement on the precise coordinates of the dividing line between their waters.54

decisions rendered by the ICJ and other international tribunals have also advocated the negotiation of JDAs in these circumstances.57 In the North Sea Continental Shelf58 cases, for instance, the ICJ cited with approval the success of the UK and Norway of entering into
JDAs to ensure the most efficient exploitation or the apportionment of the products extracted from hydrocarbon deposits lying on either side of a disputed maritime boundary.59 The court continued to state that it found joint development particularly appropriate when
it came to preserving the unity of a deposit.60 More recently, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration case61 concluded that international State practice dictates that Eritrea and Yemen should give every consideration to the shared or joint or unitised

There are a number of reasons why a JDA is an attractive solution to a

maritime border dispute.63 JDAs allow resources contained in the disputed territory to be exploited without prejudice to the
sovereign rights of the disputing State parties to the disputed territories. They are capable of being negotiated in potentially
far less time than would be required to finally settle the border dispute. As recognized by the ICJ, JDAs have also proved successful in a number of different past instances. That said, JDAs
are not a panacea and do not come in a one size fits all model but rather vary in scope and complexity.64 Aside from geographic scope, they may address a variety of
exploitation of any [straddling] resources (emphasis added).62 JDAs and applicable law and regulation

different issues, including (1) the applicable management structure; (2) allocation of proceeds between the State parties and their licensees; (3) the preservation of the rights of the State parties, (4) duration and termination; (5) the nature of concession rights and the types
of licences, permits or contracts involved; (6) governing law; and (7) dispute resolution.65 For example, the management provisions of a JDA may provide for the management of the joint development area by a single State, by both States or by the delegation of power
by the States to a third-party administrative body with varying degrees of authority over the exploration and exploitation of the area.66 Articles 6 and 9 of the NigeriaSo Tom and Prncipe JDA of 2001, for example, established a Joint Ministerial Council and a
Joint Authority.67 The Joint Authority is responsible to (and overseen by) the Joint Council,68 and is responsible for both dividing the joint development zone into separate contract areas and for entering into production sharing contracts with oil and gas operators in
respect of such contract areas.69 Article 10 provides that the Joint Authority is to be governed by a board consisting of four members, two of which will be appointed by Nigeria and two by So Tom and Prncipe. Similarly, in 1979 Malaysia and Thailand entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding regarding disputed maritime territory between them providing that there was to be created a Joint Authority consisting of an equal number of members from each country.70 The Joint Authority to be created in accordance with the terms
set out in the 1979 MalaysiaThailand Memorandum of Understanding shall assume all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both Parties for the exploration and exploitation of non-living resources in the joint development area, as well as the development, control
and administration of that area, and the formulation of policies in respect of the same.71 Both the NigeriaSo Tom and Prncipe and the MalaysiaThailand agreements confer significant powers to manage resources on the joint authorities that they establish, as does
the SudanSaudi Arabia JDA on the Commission created by that agreement.72 Under the SudanSaudi Arabia JDA, the Commission is a body corporate that is responsible for, among other things, considering and deciding applications for licences and concessions,
expediting the exploitation and exploration of natural resources, and making such regulations as may be necessary to discharge its functions.73 This is to be contrasted with the JDA between Japan and South Koreawhich also established a Commissionbut one
which is not a separate legal entity and that has much more limited powers, leaving more discretion in the hands of the parties to make decisions.74 The Commission created by the JapanSouth Korea JDA is generally responsible for making recommendations to the
parties regarding measures to be taken to improve the operation of the agreement, resolving disputes and solving problems that were unexpected at the time of entry into force of the agreement.75 On the other hand, the applicable law established by the JDA may include
an applicable petroleum licensing regime, regulatory matters in respect of health, safety and the environment, and surveillance, security and traffic.76 Under Article 10 of the Timor Sea Treaty,77 for example, limited liability entities are liable for damages arising from
pollution of the marine environment in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction under which the claim is brought (which could be either the law of Australia or East Timor) and in accordance with the contract, licence or other form of authority that was issued under
the Timor Sea Treaty. The Timor Sea Treaty also requires that the joint authority it creates (1) issues regulations to protect the environment and (2) establishes contingency plans for combating pollution resulting from exploration and production activities in the Joint
Development Zone (JDZ).78 With regard to the development of the Sunrise and Troubadour petroleum deposits, approximately 20 per cent of which has been agreed by Australia and East Timor to fall within the JDZ, it has been agreed that certain Australian
environmental legislation shall apply.79 Similarly, Article XX of the JapanSouth Korea JDA provides that the parties shall agree on measures to prevent and remove pollution of the sea resulting from exploration or exploitation activities in the JDZ.80 In addition,
Article XIX of the JDA provides that, as a general rule, the laws and regulations of a party will apply in the subzones of the joint development area in which the party has authorized concessionaires.81 The NigeriaSo Tome and Prncipe JDA, on the other hand,
provides generally that that the Authority shall prepare for approval by the Council regulatory and tax regime, which shall be the law applicable to the exploration for and exploitation of petroleum in the zone.82 Certain provisions of JDAs may also function to provide
clarity where the exact opposite would otherwise be the case. Jurisdiction and conflict of laws are prime examples. In the aftermath of the Ocean Ranger tragedy of 15 February 1982 at the Hibernia oilfield in the waters of Newfoundland, Canada, central difficulties
repeatedly encountered in the ensuing lawsuits included questions related to appropriate, jurisdiction and standing.83 This resulted from the fact that, although offshore Newfoundland, (1) the Ocean Ranger was located in the then high seas;84 (2) the Ocean Ranger was

Exploration International Corporation (a US registered

entity); and (5) it had been hired to Petro-Canada (a Canadian registered entity).85 Comprehensively drafted JDAs can clarify some of
these issues, including by specifying which signatories States laws will apply in specific circumstances or to specific actions, or by
granting priority to the flag of the transport vessel, drill vessel, seismic vessel, rig or aircraft involved in the matter . There are different ways by which
flagged in the United States; (3) it had been built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (a Japanese registered entity); (4) it was owned by Ocean Drilling and

States can grant the right to exploit resources, including by way of production sharing contracts or by tax and concession systems. At the time of the MalaysiaThailand Memorandum of Understanding of 1979, Malaysia employed the former while

Thailand employed the latter, a situation that led to a delay in reaching a final agreem ent.86 When an

agreement was reached in 1990, it was decided that a production sharing contract system would be used in respect of the joint development area.87 Article 8 of the MalaysiaThailand JDA stipulates, in some detail, cert ain terms that such a contract shall include, such as a royalty of 10 per cent of the gross production of petroleum and a dispute resolution mechanism.88 Other agreements may contemplate, but not require, such contracts. The NigeriaSo Tom and Prncipe JDA stat es that any petroleum activities in the JDZ must be pursuant to a petroleum development contract,89 with the term development contract being defined broadly to encompass not only production sharing contracts but also leases, licences and concessions.90 Another example is the JapanSouth Korea JDA, which employs a concession system, each of the parties only being permitted to impose taxes on their own concessionaires with respect to exploration and exploitation activities in the joint development zone.91 JDAs can also clari fy the status of licences granted in respect of disputed maritime territory prior to the resolution of the matter. In some circumstances, a JDA may provide for the continuation or termination of rights under pre-existing licences. Under Article XIII of the SudanSaudi Arabia JDA, for instance, it was agreed that the Joint Commission
would decide on the matter of certain licences previously granted by Sudan to Sudanese Minerals Limited and the West German Company of Preussag AG, so as to preserve the rights of Sudan in the context of the regime established by the JDA.92 Annex F under Article 5(A) of the Timor Sea Treaty, on the other hand, provides that contracts are to be offered to those corporations holding certain pre-existing contracts on the same terms as those pre-existing contracts, modified to take into account the administrative system created by that agreement.93 JDAs and unitization In addition to establishing the applicable law and regulatory regimes, the central function of many JDAs is to enact the means by which contested resources will be shared or unitized by the competing States. This can occur in a number of di fferent contexts, not all of which fall strictly within the category of joint development. The 1976 Frigg Agreement,94 executed by the UK and Norway in respect of the Frigg Gas Field in the North Sea, constitutes an international unitization treaty rather than a JDA and is noteworthy in that it pertains to a speci fic, pre-identifi ed reservoi r or field rather than a wider area or region. This can be contrasted with the NigeriaSo Tom and Prncipe agreement which is very much a JDA and which pertains to all oil and gas fi elds falling
within a larger joint development area, whether such fi elds have been previously identi fied or not.95 Much like the Frigg Agreement, on the other hand, is the NorwayRussia Maritime Delimitation Treaty of 2010 which both demarcates by agreement the arctic maritime boundary between the two countries as well as establishes the basic procedure according to which resources found to straddle such demarcation line will be jointly developed by the countri es and their licensees.96 Such unitization provisions vary in detail and speci ficity. Article 5 of the NorwayRussia Maritime Delimitation Treaty provides for the mandatory unitization of reservoirs which straddle the delimitation line and which are capable of being exploited from either side. The wording of this Article mirrors that found in many earlier international unitization agreements and provides that: 2. If the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shel f of one of the Parties is established and the other Party is of the opinion that the said deposit extends to its continental shelf, the latter Party may notify the former Party and shall submit the data on which it bases its opinion. If such an opinion is submitted, the Parties shall initiate discussions on the extent of the hydrocarbon deposit and the possibility for exploitation of the deposit as a unit. In the course of these
discussions, the Party initiating them shall support its opinion with evidence from geophysical data and/or geological data, including any existing drilling data and both Parties shall make their best efforts to ensure that all relevant information is made available for the purposes of these discussions. Article 5 further provides that where such a reservoi r is discovered, the parties are required to negotiate a unitization agreem ent in respect of the reservoir in accordance with Annex II to the treaty. Similar to the Frigg Agreement, Annex II then imposes several mandatory provisions for inclusion in each unitization agreement, including terms obligating the parties to consult each other with respect to applicable health, safety and environmental measures that are to be required by their respective national laws and regulations and to ensure that production installations and facilities are routinely inspected for the compliance with same.97 That said, the remainder of the unitization provisions of the NorwayRussia Maritime Delimitation Treaty remain relatively thin and are largely dependent on future agreement by the parties rather than predetermined terms and conditions. The NigeriaSo Tom JDA, in contrast, provides for unitization in three di fferent situations. This can of course be traced to the fact that, unlike the NorwayRussia Maritime
Delimitation Treaty, the NigeriaSo Tom agreement provides for joint development of resources within a large area the sovereignty of which remains contested by multiple parties, including non-signatory States. The first provision for unitization applies where a reservoir straddles the joint development zone and the exclusive maritime area of either Nigeria or So Tom. Where this is the case, the parties must endeavour to reach an agreem ent upon a fair and reasonable basis for the optimal commercial unitized exploitation of the reservoir.98 The second is where a reservoi r straddl es two different contract areas within the joint development zone. Where this is the case the Council has authority to decide the appropriate resolution of the matter.99 The third is where a reservoir straddles the joint development zone and the exclusive maritime area of a third State. Where this is the case the Authority, subject to approval by the Council, is to consider negotiations with the third State with a view to reaching a definitive agreement regarding the exploitation of the res ervoir.100 The Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia is another agreement that contemplates the unitization of petroleum deposits. This treaty created a Zone of Cooperation in connection with the disputed area, which was itself divided into three subzones known as
Areas A, B and C.101 Of thes e areas, only the petroleum exploration and exploitation activities in Area A were jointly controlled by Indonesia and Australia, whereas Areas B and C were controlled separately by Australia and Indonesi a, respectively, with the party having sole control over the area being obligated to share a proportion of the resource tax revenues it collect ed in respect of that area with the other party.102 A Joint Authority was established by the treaty which was responsible for the management of petroleum exploration and exploitation activities within Area A.103 In the case of an accumulation of petroleum that extended across a boundary line of Area A, the parties resolved to seek to reach agreement on the manner in which the accumulation shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.104 JDAs and licensees Although JDAs are executed between disputing sovereign States, they may also contain provisions directly applicable to licensees. These often mani fest in provisions of the JDA which require the State signatories to impose requirements on licensees through the terms of the licences issued in respect of the subject maritime territory, as well as through various other regul atory matters dealt with in the JDA. The Frigg Agreement, for example,
expressly provided for the participation of oil and gas companies in the development of the Frigg Field in a number of noteworthy respects. As described by Woodcli ffe at the Treatys execution, the licensees role in furthering the declared objective of exploiting the [Frigg Field] as a single unit is a crucial one, the execution of which is subject to a wide measure of government direction and control.105 Article 2 of the Frigg Agreement directly involved licensees within the delimitation and apportionment process by requiring that licensees submit to each government propos als for determining and apportioning the limits and estimated total reserves of the Frigg Field.106 Similarly, Article 4 required that licens ees submit for the approval of the two Governments a scheme to secure the conservation of the Frigg Field Reservoir for productive operations.107 The Frigg Agreement further provided that, while licensees could supplement their joint development agreements through ancillary agreements addressing certain accounting and operational matters, all such ancillary agreements (1) required notifi cation to the two governments, (2) remained subject to such amendments or further agreements as the two governments might agree to be necessary to properly secure the exploitation of Frigg Gas and (3) could only be amended with the
approval of the two governments.108 Other unitization provisions of JDAs and similar agreem ents speaking to licens ees will impose more general terms not unlike those typically found in production sharing contracts and similar licenses or concessions. These may require, among other things, that the unit operator nominated by the licens ees is subject to approval by each of the governm ents, that the licensees cannot trans fer any interest in the subject licens es without the prior approval of both governments, and that all operating agreements entered into by the licensees in respect of the subject resources must be approved by both governments and must be made expressly subject to the applicabl e JDA or unitization agreement. Still other unitization provisions of JDAs and similar agreements speaking to licensees may impose more specifi c or idiosyncratic terms. The NigeriaSo Tom JDA, for example, provides that contractors will be entitled to dispose of production subject only to any non-discriminatory restrictions the Authority may impose on landing, identity of the purchaser and verifi cation of the volumes concerned.109 This JDA also expressly grants contractors the right to acquire, construct and dispose of production infrastructure and facilities in the territory of either State party as required for development of the joint area,
subject of cours e to the applicable laws of the rel evant State.110 Unlike some other JDAs, the NigeriaSo Tom JDA also address es the procedure pursuant to which licences in the joint development zone are issued, providing that all production sharing contracts will be grant ed pursuant to licensing rounds unless decided otherwise by the Council.111 Under the MalaysiaThailand JDA, on the other hand, several mandatory conditions are imposed on licens ees such as a maximum term for contracts, being the lesser of 35 years and the term of the JDA itself.112 That JDA also states that the minimum amount that a contractor may expend on petroleum operations may be agreed to between the Joint Authority and the contractor.113 In addition, the MalaysiaThailand JDA stipulates that the Joint Authority has the option to include several other terms in contracts, including that the term of a petroleum (but not gas) contract for the purposes of exploration, development and production, shall not exceed 5 years, 5 years and 25 years, for each of those respective purpos es.114 Finally, the JDA provides that the Joint Authority has the option to include a term in a contract that it shall have title to all original data resulting from petroleum operations.115 4. Resource development amid unresolved maritime territorial disputes Regardless of the
increasing popularity of JDAs as a means of diffusing maritime territorial disputes, many such disputes continue unresolved.116 Moreover, the continuation of such disputes does not always deter one or more of the competing States from issuing exploration and development licences in respect of the contested area and oil and gas firms from proceeding with operations in respect of same. For example, despite the ongoing dispute regarding sovereignty over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, Desire Petroleum plc, a British oil and gas company, in 2010 commissioned an offshore exploration rig to drill up to 10 exploratory wells in the northern waters of the archipelago.117 This followed successful exploration operations in the area by Rockhopper Exploration. According to the Falkland Islands Department of Mineral Resources, Rockhopper Explorations Sea Lion Well was declared an oil discovery after being spudded on 15 April 2010.118 Closer to Europe, research work by a Turkish vessel under military es cort in disputed wat ers south of Cyprus to which Israel, Greece and Cyprus have also made competing claims recently raised tension in the eastern Mediterranean.119 A potentially signi ficant gas discovery by ExxonMobil off the coast of Vietnam and pursuant to a Vietnames e exploration licence in waters also claimed by China had a
similar effect in the South China Sea in October 2011.120 To the northeast, the growing standoff between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the South China Sea represents one of the more recent escalations of tension over dispute maritime territory.121 In many instances, one can only speculat e as to why States choos e to proceed with the development of contested resources unilaterally. It may be because they are unprepared to wait as long as they anticipate resolution to take, or becaus e they see resolution as potentially never occurring. They may believe they have a clearly superior claim to the territory in which the particular licence is issued. They also may not be concerned with the ability of other contesting States to marshal any threatening military or other opposition. What is cert ain, however, is that the ICJ has made clear in the TunisiaLibya cas e that granting concessions in disputed maritime territory does not bolster a countrys claim to such territory under UNCLOS. In particular, the Court held that, while the pres ence of oil-wells in an area to be delimited may, depending on the facts, be an element to be taken into account in the process of weighing all relevant factors to achieve an equitable result,122 this may only be the case where the relevant oil concession or licence is based on express or tacit

What is also clear is that unresolved maritime territorial disputes present a unique set of circumstances and considerations for oil
and gas firms considering operations in their midst. Not least of these is the risk of raising the ire of competing States as
well as the possibility of attracting liability to such States .
agreement between the competing States.123

This section therefore examines the law pertaining to the rights and obligations of oil and gas operators conducting exploration and development operations amid unresolved maritime territorial disputes. In this regard, while less than robust, such principles

have seen some noteworthy development in recent times. This includes pronouncements on (1) the obligations of States not to jeopardize resolution of the dispute, (2) the nature of exploration and development activities permitted amid unresolved territorial disputes under international law and (3) the duty of operators not to interfere with sovereign efforts to resolve maritime territorial disputes. Guyana v Suriname: the obligation of states not to
jeopardize resolution In February of 2004, amid a longstanding maritime dispute stretching back to colonial times, Guyana instituted arbitration proceedings against Suriname under UNCLOS alleging various breaches of international law by Suriname in the disputed waters between them.124 Guyana had in 1998 granted a concession in the contested area of the continental shelf to CGX Resources Inc, a Canadian exploration and development
company.125 In 1999, CGX had commissioned seismic exploration of the entirety of its concession. This prompted Suriname in May 2000 to demand that Guyana cease all exploration activities in the disputed territory and that CGX in particular immediately cease all operations beyond certain coordinates, which at that time consisted of preparatory work by an oil rig and drill ship, the C.E. Thornton.126 When the Thornton failed to depart,
Suriname sent two patrol boats to the area in June 2000.127 Through the boats, Suriname ordered the Thornton and its service vessels to vacate the area within 12 h, and the crew of the drill ship detached the oil rig from the sea floor and withdrew from the concession area, escorted by the patrol boats.128 The tribunal, registered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the purpose of the proceedings, held unanimously that Surinames
expulsion of CGX and its contractors through its patrol boats constituted a threat of the use of force in violation of UNCLOS, the UN Charter and general international law in that it was more akin to a threat of military action than mere law enforcement activity.129 Importantly, the tribunal also held that both Guyana and Suriname had failed to meet their duties under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, being the obligation to make every effort
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, pending final delimitation, and not to jeopardize or hamper efforts to reach such final agreement.130 Guyana had failed to meet this standard primarily in the run-up to the patrol boat incident, ie by not engaging Suriname in discussions regarding its drilling plans at a far earlier date.131 In particular, the tribunal held that Guyana should have (1) given Suriname official and detailed notice
of its planned activities (apparently Suriname had only become alert to CGXs operations by way of press release by the company); (2) sought the cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the proposed drilling programme; (3) offered to share the statistical and technical results of the exploration; (4) provided to Suriname the opportunity to observe the drilling programme; and (5) offered to share the financial benefits of the drilling programme with
Suriname.132 Suriname, on the other hand, was found to have violated its obligations primarily through its immediate resort to a display of force rather than a resort to softer diplomatic efforts.133 In the eyes of the tribunal, Suriname should have attempted to engage Guyana in a spirit of understanding and cooperation rather than opting for a harder stance.134 Suriname could have done this by attempting to bring Guyana to the negotiating
table, including by accepting a last minute offer of negotiation from Guyana.135 Suriname could also have made such an acceptance conditional on the immediate cessation by CGX of all its operations rather than resorting immediately to self-help in threatening the CGX rig as it did.136 Guyana v Suriname: permitted exploration and development operations amid unresolved territorial disputes Importantly, the Guyana v Suriname tribunal also
held (1) that certain types of exploratory and development works by oil companies in disputed maritime territory are acceptable under international law, and (2) that competing territorial claims should not stifle economic development of natural resources by the interested States. The tribunal held that, in the context of activities surrounding hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, two classes of activities in disputed waters are
permissible.137 These are, on the one hand, activities undertaken by the parties pursuant to provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and on the other hand, acts which, although unilateral, would not have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary.138 Pronouncing further on the scope of the latter category, the tribunal held that unilateral acts which do not
constitute a physical change to the marine environment would generally qualify, while acts that do cause physical change would not.139 This then led the tribunal to make a distinction between activities of the kind that lead to a permanent physical change, such as exploitation of oil and gas reserves, and those that do not, such as seismic exploration.140 In reaching its decision the tribunal considered the decision of the ICJ in the Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf Case concerning Greece and Turkey. In 1974, Turkey had granted exploration permits to an area of the Aegean Sea over which Greece contested the countrys sovereignty.141 When Turkey proceeded to authorize scientific exploration expeditions to the licence areas (along with guardian warships), Greece applied to the ICJ for interim measures.142 In particular, Greece claimed that the granting of the licences and the operations
of the exploration vessels constituted contraventions of its sovereign right to the exploration and exploitation of the area, and that the result was a breach of its right as a coastal State to the exclusivity of knowledge in respect of its continental shelf amounting to irreparable prejudice.143 The ICJ disagreed, holding that Turkeys actions did not justify or necessitate an interim measure of protection.144 In interpreting the ICJs decision, the Guyana
Suriname tribunal held that it was necessary to distinguish between activities of a transitory character and activities that risk irreparable prejudice to the position of the other party.145 In this regard, it highlighted that the ICJs ruling established (1) that seismic exploration does not involve any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, (2) that such activities are of a transitory character and do not involve the establishment of fixed
installations and (3) that no operations involving the actual appropriation or other use of natural resources were embarked upon.146 The tribunal therefore found that, while it should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any unilateral activity that might affect the other partys rights in a permanent manner, neither should international courts or tribunals stifle the parties ability to pursue economic development in a disputed
area during a boundary dispute, as the resolution of such disputes will typically be a time-consuming process.147 In other words, the tribunal held that, while maritime territorial disputes suspend the entitlement of the disputing States to exploit the resources within the disputed area in a permanent manner (that is, through drilling and extraction), this principle should not be taken so far as to prevent the States from undertaking less invasive or
physically disturbing development activities (namely, seismic exploration). RSM Production v Grenada: non-interference by operators Not entirely unrelated principles inform the decision of the tribunal in RSM Production Corporation v Grenada.148 Here it was essentially held that oil companies should not interfere in boundary disputes, particularly where they are unlikely to be able to contribute to resolution in any meaningful fashion, since
they have no direct rights under international law and no standing before international tribunals such as the ICJ. RSM executed a somewhat unusual contractual arrangement with Grenada in July 1996 whereby it was entitled to apply for an exploration licence from Grenada for offshore oil and gas exploration and, in the event of commercial discovery, to apply for one or more development licences, all such licences to be granted by Grenada
subject to the countrys Petroleum and Natural Gas Deposits Act 1989 and the terms of the parties agreement.149 Such terms included an arbitration agreement referring disputes to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as well as a force majeure provision.150 The latter provision was included at least in part because the subject contract area included maritime territory contested by Grenada, Trinidad and
Tobago and Venezuela. When RSM applied to Grenada in April 2004 for an exploration licence under the agreement and the 1989 Act, Grenada refused it before terminating the agreement in July 2005.151 RSM instituted arbitral proceedings seeking an order providing, among other things, (1) that the agreement remained in effect, (2) that Grenada was obligated to ensure that RSM was awarded an exploration licence pertaining to the contract
area and (3) that Grenada was prohibited from negotiating with (or granting to) third parties any exploration or development rights in respect of the contract area.152 Grenada requested as respondent, among other things, that the tribunal order RSM to refrain from: (a) interfering in any way with Grenadas foreign policy and relations with other States; (b) representing to any person or entity that it has authority to act as an agent or representative
of Grenada; and (c) asserting to any person or entity that it has any kind of licence or other rights in respect of Grenadas offshore territory or EEZ.153 If Grenadas appeals for relief strike the reader as unusual, that is because they indeed are, and because the facts of RSM v Grenada are largely composed of unusually aggressive attempts by RSM and its chief principal, a Mr Jack Grynberg, to interject themselves into the sovereign attempts by
Grenada to negotiate maritime delimitation with Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. The laundry list of pointed interruptions by RSM and Grynberg makes for interesting reading. When commissioning delimitation maps to be used by Grenada in negotiations with Trinidad and Tobago, Grynberg instructed the engineers to be purposefully favourable to Trinidad and Tobago as he would like a speedy resolution of the boundary demarcation.154
When negotiations with Trinidad and Tobago did not bring immediate results, Grynberg wrote to Grenada threatening to commence ICSID arbitration against Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of both RSM and Grenada, and stating that, should Grenada not agree, RSM would add Grenada as a defendant alongside Trinidad and Tobago.155 Not long thereafter, RSM, without the authorization of Grenada, prepared and submitted to ITLOS a boundary
resolution complaint against Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of Grenada.156 RSM then later, again falsely claiming to be acting as an authorized representative of Grenada, wrote to the Prime Minster of Trinidad and Tobago claiming that recent seismic activity undertaken by Trinidad and Tobago in the disputed area constituted a trespass onto Grenadas maritime area.157 RSMs univited involvement extended to Venezuela. On several occasions,
Grynberg sought to negotiate with Venezuela on behalf of Grenada unilaterally and without notice to Grenada, including attempted negotiations with Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.(PDVSA), the Venezuelan State-owned oil company.158 He then commenced a lawsuit in the US Federal Court in an attempt to pressure PDVSA and Venezuela into a maritime boundary settlement with Grenada.159 Furthermore, following the dismissal of the claim,
Grynberg nonetheless wrote to Grenada suggesting that the litigation had produced a concession on the part of PDVSA in favour of Grenadas ownership of the maritime territory, as if PDVSA was legally capable of making such a concession at the time.160 As one would expect, the tribunals review of RSMs and Grynbergs campaign was not favourable. The tribunal held RSMs actions in respect of Trinidad and Tobago to have caused
significant embarrassment to Grenada, and that, overall, the companys secretive, unilateral, unauthorised, crude horse-trading approach, backed up with wild threats and vexatious litigation if unsuccessful, contradicted the essential principles of maritime boundary negotiations between States.161 In respect of his engagement with Venezuela, the tribunal held that Grynbergs actions substantially hindered Grenadas negotiations with [its
neighbour] and that his unilateral attempts to negotiate with Venezuela, despite several communications to the contrary by Grenada, together with his United States lawsuit against PDVSA, did not assist in the resolution of maritime boundaries between the two States, but rather provoked outright hostility.162 The tribunal further found that there is no evidence to support Mr. Grynbergs interpretation of PDVSA having conceded Grenadian
ownership of any maritime territory, either with respect to itself or on behalf of the Government of Venezuela Nor could it have done so as a matter of international law without the express authorisation of the Government of Venezuela.163 To the extent possible, the tribunal condemned the behaviour of RSM and Grynberg, stating that they showed no appreciation of the many competing and overlapping policy objectives that a government
simply must take into account in dealing with matters as complex and sensitive as foreign relations, interstate litigation and boundary delimitation.164 This article has attempted to canvass much of the law applicable to offshore oil and gas projects amid maritime border disputes. That said, the survey conducted herein does not purport to be exhaustive, and a number of important questions remain unaddressed. For example, while Guyana v
Suriname instructs that non-permanent operations may be permissible amid an unresolved maritime territorial dispute, and while RSM Production v Grenada instructs that private oil and gas operators should not interfere in delimitation negotiation efforts between competing sovereigns, neither precedent examines what liabilities a private oil and gas firm may attract where it proceeds not only to explore for but also to develop and produce

Similarly, questions remain regarding the liability of

one sovereign to another where the first sovereign proceeds to develop and produce hydrocarbon resources located in or closely
adjacent to disputed maritime territory. Some argue that any infringement across an international boundary constitutes a violation of a states sovereign rights.166 Professor Cameron, on the other hand, suggests that unilateral
hydrocarbon resources located in or closely adjacent to disputed maritime territory. Furthermore, the extent to which this might be the case depends in part on another unclear legal question, namely whether the rule of capture applies under international law.165

exploitation in disputed territory may be conscionable where conducted appropriately. He advises as follows: In such circumstances it would be important for the initiating State to act in a reasonable and responsible manner. This could build upon the principles and

The aim would be to allow the initiating State to

commence petroleum operations but to do so in accordance with, inter alia, the principle of the unity of the deposit and good
rules in the international legal regime but also incorporate some industry practices which have emerged from unit development within a States borders.

international petroleum industry practices.167 According to Cameron, this could include establishing an escrow account into which the exploiting State would deposit a portion of revenues generated, ensuring that the exploiting
State communicates and consults with the non-exploiting State in good faith and with diligence regarding the progress of operations, ensuring that that the exploiting State maintains complete and accurate records in respect of all operations, and adjusting operations
accordingly following the negotiation of a preliminary agreement, including releasing funds held in escrow.168 Of course, establishing the law applicable to offshore oil and gas projects amid maritime border disputes will likely only be the first half of the exercise. Once
this is accomplished, the next objective will likely be to develop prudent and appropriate risk mitigation strategies for enterprises entertaining engaging in such operations. For example, oil and gas companies interested in pursuing exploration and development

169 Various
common risk mitigation and risk allocation clauses should also be considered and tailored appropriately. Ideally, a stabilization clause
would account for all or part of the applicable regulatory and/or fiscal regime, whether fixed in a JDA or whether determined by a joint commission or other third body
empowered by the JDA. Applicable force majeure clauses should also be scrutinized closely, bearing always in mind that that the tribunal in RSM
Production v Grenada made clear that States are under no obligation to settle maritime territorial disputes. 170 Finally, companies engaging
in joint operations in or closely adjacent to disputed maritime territory should consider specifically integrating risks and potential
liabilities related to the dispute into their operating agreement, including, inter alia, into management committee voting thresholds,
exclusive operations provisions, indemnification obligations and dispute resolution provisions .
opportunities in an offshore area governed by a JDA should consider the provisions of this instrument closely in structuring the terms of their participation (as well as in conducting appropriate due diligence in advance of their participation).

Only the plan solves certainty which is critical

SCHOFIELD 2009 University of Wollongong (Schofield, C. H. (2009). Blurring the lines: maritime joint development and the
cooperative management of ocean resources. Issues in Legal Scholarship, 8 (1), Article 3. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1373&context=lawpapers)
It is clear from the foregoing review that joint development has proved a popular approach and that numerous examples exist in State
practice. Fundamentally, when faced with a deadlock, States have seen the merit in cooperative arrangements that provide an
alternative when negotiations become deadlocked, enabling the parties to sidestep seemingly intractable maritime disputes. Maritime
joint development thus allows intractable and contentious disputes to be circumvented in such a way that the pragmatic development
or management of the resources or environment in the area of overlapping claims can proceed without delay. In this context it has been
argued that joint development agreements offer a means to shift the emphasis to a fair division of the resources at stake, rather than
on the determination of an artificial line.115 A potentially crucial attraction of the joint development option, either in addition to
or instead of a maritime boundary, is that it offers the benefit of removing some of the uncertainty inherent in the

delimitation of a final and binding maritime boundary.

The possible presence of valuable resources in the area to be delimited may act as an incentive for the parties to
claim a particular offshore area, but this factor can also serve to make them cautious about dividing the area of overlapping claims for fear that the resources in question may eventually be discovered on the wrong side of
the line. This scenario may be especially the case for potential seabed hydrocarbon resources where uncertainty over the precise location of reserves can serve as a major deterrent to the delimitation of a boundary line.

Entering into a joint development arrangement helps to defuse this concern as both parties are guaranteed at least a share of any
resources found. Existing State practice can be regarded as diverse, and this underscores flexibility of the joint development option. Joint development has been applied to a variety of jurisdictional zones, to both
living and non-living resources, and can also include reference to security issues. The parties to a joint development mechanism may also specify the duration of the arrangement and retain considerable flexibility both
regarding the regime that will govern activities within the specified joint zone as well as regarding the precise geographic area that that the joint regime will apply to. Concerning the latter point, however, it has been observed
that the uncritical acceptance of competing unilateral maritime claims as the limits of a joint development zone is potentially problematic, as this serves to encourage, reward and to some extent legitimise excessive claims,

The cooperative maritime arrangements reviewed above are all consistent with international law

without prejudice clauses notwithstanding.116

, especially
UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3), and include a number of common components. They all feature a formal agreement setting the terms of the arrangement, notably the specific geographical area to which it applies and
definition of the resources to which the arrangement applies together with agreement on the laws and jurisdiction governing exploration, operations and revenue sharing. Another common component of maritime joint

Such a sovereignty neutral approach allows joint activities to proceed

without compromising jurisdictional claims. In most examples it is also clear that only the parties to the agreement have claims to the area designated as a joint development zone. Where this is
development practice includes robust without prejudice clauses designed to safeguard existing claims.

not the case, for instance in respect of the joint development zones established between Japan and South Korea, parts of which are also claimed by China, developments in the joint zone may well be compromised.
Alternatively, as in the joint development area between Malaysia and Thailand, part of which is also subject to claims on the part of Vietnam, such claims will necessitate further agreements. A further crucial component for

Where seabed resource

development is contemplated it is worth considering that oil companies often embark on resource development projects with timelines
measured in decades, meaning that any joint development arrangement concluded between interested States is likely to continue, and
needs to be sustained, far beyond the lifetime of the governments that enter into it. The difficulties experienced by the Thai and Malaysian governments in converting
joint development, as for any arrangement reached through negotiations, is political will. In the case of joint development though, such political does needs to be sustained over time.

their agreement in principle on joint development into a fully functioning cooperative mechanism provides a good of example of the problems that can occur. Similarly, the Argentina-UK experience in the South Atlantic,
where the underlying sovereignty dispute has not been addressed, resources have not been discovered, and political will has waned over time is an instructive case. It has therefore been persuasively argued that joint
development should not be viewed as some kind of panacea or as a last gasp solution applicable simply because a deadlock in maritime delimitation negotiations has been reached, and that [t]he conclusion of any joint
development arrangement, in the absence of the appropriate level of consent between the parties, is merely redrafting the problem and possibly complicating it further.117 It is also worth observing that the mere existence of
a joint development mechanism does not in itself guarantee cooperation and that, furthermore, it certainly does not guarantee that sought after resources will actually be discovered in the joint zone. Nonetheless,

it is

abundantly clear that maritime joint development zones represent a valuable and arguably increasingly popular
practical means to overcome intractable maritime disputes and to blur the lines of competing maritime claims so that cooperative
development and management of ocean resources can proceed.

we solve hard and fast

IER 09 (2/11/09, Offshore Energy Exploration: Myth vs. Fact Institute for Energy Research)
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2009/02/11/offshore-energy-exploration-myth-vs-fact-2/
Further, while

there may be areas along the Atlantic coast without the significant build-out of infrastructure needed to facilitate quick
energy production, other currently unexplored areas do have that infrastructure in place, such as the eastern Gulf of Mexico. No serious
observer has ever suggested that it would take anywhere close to ten years to access those energy resources and deliver them to American

in places like California, where an infrastructure is already in place and the local community supports offshore
exploration, those resources could be available in a significantly shorter period of time.
consumers. Furthermore,

benefits of the plan would be immediate --- perception is key

Hastings 11 Doc, Chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee, "Forget 10 Years--Drilling ANWR Would Pay Off Right
Away", November 3, www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-it-time-to-drill-in-the-arctic-refuge/forget-10-years--drilling-anwr-would-payoff-right-away
Critics argue that we shouldn't drill in ANWR because it will take 10 years for the oil produced to become available. This fuzzy logic
has been used for the last 20 years by those who simultaneously argue that renewable energies like wind and solar need decades to
mature, along with billions in government subsidies. This inconsistent comparison is illogical and fails to provide equity in America's
need for an all-of-the-above energy policy. While oil from ANWR might take a couple of years to get online, the job creation and
effect on the economy would be almost instantaneous, as infrastructure and development activity could start immediately, sending
billions to the federal government and employing thousands of people.

***CASE/ADDONS***

defense of joint development zone

the plan leads to creation of joint development economic zones --- helps balance between contradictory mechanisms
Petkunaite 11 masters candidate at CUNY
(Dovile, Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes, The City College of New
York, June 2011, http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf)
It is common in maritime boundary disputes for both parties to advocate the use of completely different methods regarding division of
the area. It complicates the dispute settlement process, as both parties are unwilling to accept each others proposals . Therefore, a need for
alternative delimitation criteria arises. This thesis claims that the United States and Canada would benefit the most by settling the dispute bilaterally. The case
of the Gulf of the Maine proved that relying on the third party to resolve the dispute can result in an outcome that is not totally
satisfactory for either party. Taking into consideration the uncertainty about the techniques that the ICJ or an arbitrator might use in dividing
a resource rich area, it is highly unlikely that both parties would leave the final say on the Beaufort Sea boundary to an adjudication
process. As a result, the United States and Canada should analyze the negotiations that led Russia and Norway to cooperate and finally sign an agreement. Parties have to realize that
without making concessions, it is impossible to reap benefits . A flexible approach and concessions made by both countries are
needed when the issue of the natural resources is at stake . One possible solution to end the dispute is to adopt a modified
equidistance line, which will be based on a median line but adjusted so that an equitable result would be reached . 266 It would
acknowledge both parties claims: the equidistance line favored by the United States and the nature of Canada s coastline as a
special circumstance preferred by Canada. Both countries will be neither clear beneficiaries nor significant losers . This type of delimitation was
used solving the Barents Sea dispute, where both parties were granted approximately equal areas. The joint development concept may also be an option. Claimant countries
would jointly explore, exploit, and have shared jurisdiction over adjacent borders . 267 This solution would allow both countries to share
benefits equally and explore the region more systematically. Later this may lead to the final delimitation boundary as the resources
deposits are explored, and mined. This option is mostly considered in the disputes involving natural resources , because in such cases parties to the
dispute tend to be less flexible in defining the border line. 268 Canada and the United States have a similar culture and legal system; therefore, the option of
joint exploration and exploitation might work for them . As was indicated before, Canada and the United States have already started a joint mission aiming at exploration. If both
parties find this option acceptable, there would be several issues that will need to be resolved . 269 The parties will need to negotiate the
boundary of the joint-development zone, define how the mining will be undertaken, and how it will be administered? Moreover, the issues
of funding and profits or minerals division will need to be addressed. There might be some disagreements and tensions, but a step
forward on cooperation would already have been taken.

A2 land production solves

Off-access production is key
Bandow 12 (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, author of several books, 12/14/12, Energy to Spare Cato Institute)
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/energy-spare
To obtain this bright future government merely need reduce barriers to existing energy production. Mills posits an even more abundant
energy future, however. He asked: what would happen if policies were enacted to accelerate and encourage even greater expansion of
North American hydrocarbon production and to expand access to the vast tracts of federal lands that sit atop staggeringly large
resources? Why not push beyond self-sufficiency to energy influence, even dominance? The benefits of doing so are obvious.
Allowing an already important industry to greatly expand and turn into a significant export market would offer significant economic
rewards. Moreover, higher energy production could moderate global energy prices and reduce the reliance of other nations on the
Middle East and other unstable and/or undemocratic energy states. Concluded Mills: Economic research noted earlier finds about
$75 billion in broad economic benefits for every billion barrel of oil produced (or oil-equivalent in hydrocarbons). This would imply
that the aggregate 100 billion barrels of additional hydrocarbons extracted and sold over the next two decades in the accelerate
scenario would yield over $7 trillion of value to the North American economy, with $5 trillion of that accruing to the U.S. There are
no obvious technological or economic barriers to this future. Nor are any government subsidies required. Rather, the problem is
political, especially access to federal land . Vast tracts of hydrocarbon-rich resources are either entirely or effectively off-limits to
development, with a steady decline in new natural gas and oil leases on federal land since 2006, explained Mills. In Liberating the
Energy Economy he cited problems of regulatory complexity, creep, and capriciousness. In response he offered a deregulatory
agenda, emphasizing agency accountability, access to federal lands for exploration and development, and rationalizing legal
challenges to development. Among his suggested policy changes were removing barriers to exports and creating a single federal
portal for approval of all major energy projects, similar to that employed by Canada.

A2 us leadership in arctic not key

us leadership is key to maintain influence of the arctic
Bert 12 (Captain Melissa USCG, 2011-2012 Military Fellow, U.S.Coast Guard, A Strategy to Advance the Arctic Economy,
February, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/strategy-advance-arctic-economy/p27258)
The U nited S tates needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating an emerging Arctic economy. Nations
bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining, shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets
and shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the U nited S tates, the economic potential from the energy and mineral resources
is in the trillions of dollarsbased upon estimates that the Alaskan Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil , more
than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is unprepared to
harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to developing new governance
mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in
developing mandatory international standards for operating in Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations. Regional Flashpoints Threaten Security Like the United States, the Arctic
nations of Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark have geographical claims to the Arctic. Unlike the United States, however, they have each sought to exploit economic and strategic opportunities in the region by developing
businesses, infrastructure, and cities in the Arctic. They have also renewed military exercises of years past, and as each nation learns of the others' activities, suspicion and competition increase. When the Russians sailed a
submarine in 2007 to plant a titanium flag on the "north pole," they were seen as provocateurs, not explorers. The continental shelf is a particular point of contention. Russia claims that deep underwater ridges on the sea floor,
over two hundred miles from the Russian continent, are part of Russia and are legally Russia's to exploit. Denmark and Canada also claim those ridges. Whichever state prevails in that debate will have exclusive extraction
rights to the resources, which, based on current continental shelf hydrocarbon lease sales, could be worth billions of dollars. Debates also continue regarding freedom of navigation and sovereignty over waters in the region.
Russia claims sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which winds over the top of Russia and Alaska and will be a commercially viable route through the region within the next decade. The United States contends
the NSR is an international waterway, free to any nation to transit. The United States also has laid claim to portions of the Beaufort Sea that Canada says are Canadian, and the United States rejects Canada's claim that its
Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific is its internal waters, as opposed to an international strait. Canada and Denmark also have a boundary dispute in Baffin Bay. Norway and Russia disagree about fishing rights
in waters around the Spitsbergen/Svalbard Archipelago. U.S. Capacity in the Arctic Is Lacking Traffic and commercial activity are increasing in the region. The NSR was not navigable for years because of heavy ice, but it
now consists of water with floating ice during the summer months. As the icebergs decrease in the coming years, it will become a commercially profitable route, because it reduces the maritime journey between East Asia and
Western Europe from about thirteen thousand miles through the Suez Canal to eight thousand miles, cutting transit time by ten to fifteen days. Russian and German oil tankers are already beginning to ply those waters in the

Oil, gas, and mineral drilling, as well as

fisheries and tourism, are becoming more common in the high latitudes and are inherently dangerous, because icebergs and storms can shear apart even large
tankers, offshore drilling units, fishing vessels, and cruise ships. As a result, human and environmental disasters are extremely likely. Despite the dangerous conditions, the Arctic has
summer months. Approximately 150,000 tons of oil, 400,000 tons of gas condensate, and 600,000 tons of iron ore were shipped via the NSR in 2011.

no mandatory requirements for those operating in or passing through the region. There are no designated shipping lanes, requirements for ice-strengthened hulls to withstand the extreme
environment, ice navigation training for ships' masters, or even production and carriage of updated navigation and ice charts. Keeping the Arctic safe with the increased activity and lack of
regulations presents a daunting task. The U.S. government is further hindered by the lack of ships, aircraft, and infrastructure to enforce sovereignty and criminal laws, and to protect people
and the marine environment from catastrophic incidents. In the lower forty-eight states, response time to an oil spill or capsized vessel is measured in hours. In Alaska, it could take days or
weeks to get the right people and resources on scene. The nearest major port is in the Aleutian Islands, thirteen hundred miles from Point Barrow, and response aircraft are more than one
thousand miles south in Kodiak, blocked by a mountain range and hazardous flying conditions . The

Arctic shores lack infrastructure to launch any type of disaster

response, or to support the growing commercial development in the region . U.S. Leadership in Arctic Governance Is Lacking
Governance in the Arctic requires leadership. The U nited S tates is uniquely positioned to provide such leadership, but it is hampered by its
reliance on the eight-nation Arctic Council. However, more than 160 countries view the LSOC as the critical instrument defining conduct at sea and maritime obligations. The convention
also addresses resource division, maritime traffic, and pollution regulation, and is relied upon for dispute resolution. The LOSC is particularly important in the Arctic, because it stipulates that
the region beyond each country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) be divided between bordering nations that can prove their underwater continental shelves extend directly from their land
borders. Nations

will have exclusive economic rights to the oil, gas, and mineral resources extracted from those O uter C ontinental S helves,
making the convention's determinations substantial. According to geologists, the U.S. portion is projected to be the world's largest underwater
extension of landover 3.3 million square milesbigger than the lower forty-eight states combined. In addition to global credibility and
protection of Arctic shelf claims , the convention is important because it sets international pollution standards and requires signatories to protect the marine
environment. Critics argue that the LOSC cedes American sovereignty to the United Nations. But the failure to ratify it has the opposite effect: it leaves the United States less able to protect
its interests in the Arctic and elsewhere. The diminished influence is particularly evident at the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the international body that "operationalizes" the
LOSC through its international port and shipping rules. By remaining a nonparty, the

U nited S tates lacks the credibility to promote U.S. interests in the

Arctic, such as by transforming U.S. recommendations into binding international laws. A Comprehensive U.S. Strategy for the Arctic The United States needs a
comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. The current National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66 / HSPD-25) is only a broad policy statement. An
effective Arctic strategy would address both governance and capacity questions. To generate effective governance in the Arctic the United States should ratify
LOSC and take the lead in advocating the adoption of Arctic shipping requirements. The IMO recently proposed a voluntary Polar Code, and the United States should work to make it
mandatory. The code sets structural classifications and standards for ships operating in the Arctic as well as specific navigation and emergency training for those operating in or around icecovered waters. The United States should also support Automated Identification System (AIS) carriage for all ships transiting the Arctic. Because the Arctic is a vast region with no ability for
those on land to see the ships offshore, electronic identification and tracking is the only way to know what ships are operating in or transiting the region. An AIS transmitter (costing as little as
$800) sends a signal that provides vessel identity and location at all times to those in command centers around the world and is currently mandated for ships over sixteen hundred gross tons.
The United States and other Arctic nations track AIS ships and are able to respond to emergencies based on its signals. For this reason, mandating AIS for all vessels in the Arctic is needed. The
U.S. government also needs to work with Russia to impose a traffic separation scheme in the Bering Strait, where chances for a collision are high. Finally, the United States should push for
compulsory tandem sailing for all passenger vessels operating in the Arctic. Tandem sailing for cruise ships and smaller excursion boats will avert another disaster like RMS Titanic . To

enhance the Arctic's economic potential, the U nited S tates should also develop its capacity to enable commercial entities to operate
safely in the region. The U.S. government should invest in icebreakers , aircraft , and shore-based infrastructure . A ten-year plan
should include the building of at least two heavy icebreakers, at a cost of approximately $1 billion apiece, and an air station in Point Barrow, Alaska, with at least three
helicopters. Such an air station would cost less than $20 million, with operating, maintenance, and personnel costs comparable to other northern military facilities.
Finally, developing

a deepwater port with response presence and infrastructure is critical . A base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands,

finance the cost of its

capacity-building efforts by using offshore lease proceeds and federal taxes on the oil and gas extracted from the Arctic region. In

where ships and fishing vessels resupply and refuel, would only cost a few million dollars per year to operate. Washington could
2008, the

U nited S tates collected $2.6 billion from offshore lease sales in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas (off Alaska's north coast), and the
offshore royalty tax rate in the region is 19 percent, which would cover operation and maintenance of these facilities down the
road. The U nited S tates needs an Arctic governance and acquisition strategy to take full advantage of all the region has to offer and to
protect the people operating in the region and the maritime environment. Neglecting the Arctic reduces the U nited S tates' ability to reap tremendous
economic benefits and could harm U.S. national security interests.

A2 arctic environment turn

link turn --- drilling is inevitable but the US is key to solve
Schneider 12 (Michael, Advocacy Director Clean Air Task Force, Curb Methane Emissions, National Journal, 7-25,
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drilling-ready-f.php?comments=expandall#comments)
For several weeks now the public and the media have cast increasing attention on Arctic oil and gas drilling, specifically regarding the plans of Shell to explore in the Arctic waters off the coast of Alaska. This is, pardon the

Around the Arctic, efforts are ramping up in Russia, Norway, Greenland and Canada
to stake a claim to one of the last great reserves of undiscovered oil and gas. According to the United States Geological Survey, the Arctic holds one-fifth of
the worlds undiscovered, recoverable oil and natural gas; 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas . With Shells imminent
entrance into Arctic waters, the debate is turning from if we drill in the Arctic, to how and where we drill in the Arctic . The discussion to
date has primarily revolved around the key questions of oil spills and impacts to marine ecosystems . However, it is also critically
important to remember that this debate starts and ends with climate change. The melting of the Arctic due to global warming is what
set off the race for Arctic oil and gas. Now, it is incumbent upon the countries and the companies that intend to develop the Arctic to
make sure that it is done in the least damaging way possible, and this includes paying very close attention to the global warming
pollutants coming from the production: methane, black carbon and carbon dioxide. Pointing the way forward in a new report: (www.catf.us/resources/publications/view/170), Clean
pun, only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Arctic oil and gas development.

Air Task Force has laid out the primary climate risks and mitigation strategies of drilling in the Arctic. Here is a summary of some of the key findings of that report: While oil production is the primary focus of current
exploration and production activities due to high oil prices, natural gas is almost always produced along with oil, posing the problem of what to do with it. Crude oil usually contains some amount of associated natural gas
that is dissolved in the oil or exists as a cap of free gas above the oil in the geological formation. In some cases, this represents a large volume of gas. For example, nearly 3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) per year of gas is produced
in association with oil in Alaska. The largest (but by no means only) potential source of methane pollution is from the leaks or outright venting of this associated natural gas. Flaring, the typical way to dispose of this
stranded gas, is much better than venting, but it releases a tremendous amount of CO2. Worldwide, about 5 trillion cubic feet of gas is flared each year. Thats about 25 percent of the USs annual natural gas consumption.
This leads to the release of about 400 million tons of CO2 per year globally, the equivalent to the annual emissions from over 70 million cars. Black carbon is also emitted from flares, although measurements are lacking to
fully understand the potential burden from flaring. What we do know is that the black carbon that flaring will release in the Arctic is particularly harmful, since it is so likely to settle out on snow or ice, where the dark

Many technologies and best practices exist to reduce the impact of oil and gas production both to the Arctic
and the global climate. If we are going to extract the oil from the Arctic, we need to do it in a way that does not exacerbate the very real
problem that climate change is already posing there. In order to do so, the US must take the lead in ensuring that only the best practices
are acceptable when it comes to Arctic exploration and drilling. The technologies and practices below can dramatically reduce the
emissions associated with oil and natural gas, in some cases by almost 100%.
pollutant rapidly warms the white frozen surface.

china addon 2ac

Energy abundance solves US-China conflict over the Middle East
Mead 12 (Walter Russell, James Clark Chase Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities Bard College and Editor-at-Large
American Interest, Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century, American Interest, 7-18, http://blogs.the-americaninterest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/)
On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations . If both China and the United
States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the
U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political
pressure inside China to build up its naval forces. Oil may calm the troubled waters around Chinas shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from
Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security.
Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of
radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national
interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride. Depending on the size of Chinas unconventional domestic reserves (and some
analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabias oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washingtons
global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic
energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.

Conflict with China will escalate to global nuclear war

Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict: Possible Futures of a Confrontation between
China, Taiwan and the United States of America, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/ Hunkovic.pdf)
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war,
therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia,
India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global
economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the
possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well
as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat.
In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically
and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome,
therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

***A2 TOPICALITY***

A2 topicality its

Counter-interp: provisional affirmatives with solvency advocates for indirect action are topical --- companies directly
associated to ocean development and exploration is key
Its means associated with
Oxford 10 (Oxford Dictionary, Of,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)
Pronunciation:/ts/ possessive determiner belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified:turn the
camera on its side he chose the area for its atmosphere
Their interpretation is terrible for the topic
a. overlimiting --- crushes aff flexibility and prevents innovation on this topic, giving the neg an unfair advantage that allows
them to steal all core aff ground
b. predictable literature base --- ocean exploration
SCHOFIELD 2009 University of Wollongong (Schofield, C. H. (2009). Blurring the lines: maritime joint development and the
cooperative management of ocean resources. Issues in Legal Scholarship, 8 (1), Article 3. http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1373&context=lawpapers)
It is clear from the foregoing review that joint development has proved a popular approach and that numerous examples
exist in State practice . Fundamentally, when faced with a deadlock, States have seen the merit in cooperative arrangements that
provide an alternative when negotiations become deadlocked, enabling the parties to sidestep seemingly intractable maritime disputes. Maritime joint
development thus allows intractable and contentious disputes to be circumvented in such a way that the pragmatic development or management of
the resources or environment in the area of overlapping claims can proceed without delay. In this context it has been argued that joint development
agreements offer a means to shift the emphasis to a fair division of the resources at stake, rather than on the determination of an
artificial line.115

This isnt a voter, but a solvency press --- mixing burdens makes topicality much more arbitrary. Prefer reasonability because
competing interpretations arbitrarily shift the goal post and creates a race to the bottom

A2 topicality ocean explore/develop useful for cp competition [OCS

Mechanism]
J World Energy Law Bus (2013) 6 (3): 210-233.
doi: 10.1093/jwelb/jwt008
First published online: July 10, 2013
Paul Michael Blyschak*
* Paul Michael Blyschak is called to the bar in Alberta, New York State and New South Wales and practises energy and
corporate/commercial law in Calgary with a focus on international transactions (both inbound and outbound). Prior to practising
energy and business law, Mr Blyschak worked in commercial litigation and international commercial arbitration. He has experience in,
and has published widely on, international investment disputes, including international energy disputes. Mr Blyschak would like to
thank Theodore Stathakos, Justin Turc and Kasia Czekanska, students at law, for their assistance in the research and preparation of this
article.
Offshore oil and gas projects amid maritime border disputes: applicable law
Guyana v Suriname: the obligation of states not to jeopardize resolution
In February of 2004, amid a longstanding maritime dispute stretching back to colonial times, Guyana instituted arbitration proceedings
against Suriname under UNCLOS alleging various breaches of international law by Suriname in the disputed waters between
them.124 Guyana had in 1998 granted a concession in the contested area of the continental shelf to CGX Resources Inc, a Canadian
exploration and development company.125 In 1999, CGX had commissioned seismic exploration of the entirety of its concession.
This prompted Suriname in May 2000 to demand that Guyana cease all exploration activities in the disputed territory and that CGX in
particular immediately cease all operations beyond certain coordinates, which at that time consisted of preparatory work by an oil rig
and drill ship, the C.E. Thornton.126 When the Thornton failed to depart, Suriname sent two patrol boats to the area in June 2000.127
Through the boats, Suriname ordered the Thornton and its service vessels to vacate the area within 12 h, and the crew of the drill ship
detached the oil rig from the sea floor and withdrew from the concession area, escorted by the patrol boats.128
The tribunal, registered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration for the purpose of the proceedings, held unanimously that
Surinames expulsion of CGX and its contractors through its patrol boats constituted a threat of the use of force in violation of
UNCLOS, the UN Charter and general international law in that it was more akin to a threat of military action than mere law
enforcement activity.129 Importantly, the tribunal also held that both Guyana and Suriname had failed to meet their duties under
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, being the obligation to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature, pending final delimitation, and not to jeopardize or hamper efforts to reach such final agreement.130
Guyana had failed to meet this standard primarily in the run-up to the patrol boat incident, ie by not engaging Suriname in discussions
regarding its drilling plans at a far earlier date.131 In particular, the tribunal held that Guyana should have (1) given Suriname official
and detailed notice of its planned activities (apparently Suriname had only become alert to CGXs operations by way of press release
by the company); (2) sought the cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the proposed drilling programme; (3) offered to share the
statistical and technical results of the exploration; (4) provided to Suriname the opportunity to observe the drilling programme; and (5)
offered to share the financial benefits of the drilling programme with Suriname.132
Suriname, on the other hand, was found to have violated its obligations primarily through its immediate resort to a display of force
rather than a resort to softer diplomatic efforts.133 In the eyes of the tribunal, Suriname should have attempted to engage Guyana in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation rather than opting for a harder stance.134 Suriname could have done this by attempting to
bring Guyana to the negotiating table, including by accepting a last minute offer of negotiation from Guyana.135 Suriname could also
have made such an acceptance conditional on the immediate cessation by CGX of all its operations rather than resorting immediately
to self-help in threatening the CGX rig as it did.136

Guyana v Suriname: permitted exploration and development operations amid unresolved territorial disputes
Importantly, the Guyana v Suriname tribunal also held (1) that certain types of exploratory and development works by oil companies
in disputed maritime territory are acceptable under international law, and (2) that competing territorial claims should not stifle
economic development of natural resources by the interested States.

The tribunal held that, in the context of activities surrounding hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation, two
classes of activities in disputed waters are permissible .137 These are, on the one hand, activities undertaken by the
parties pursuant to provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and on the other hand, acts which, although unilateral, would not
have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary.138

Pronouncing further on the scope of the latter category, the tribunal held that unilateral acts which do not constitute a physical change
to the marine environment would generally qualify, while acts that do cause physical change would not.139 This then led the
tribunal to make a distinction between activities of the kind that lead to a permanent physical change, such as exploitation of oil and
gas reserves, and those that do not, such as seismic exploration.140
In reaching its decision the tribunal considered the decision of the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case concerning Greece
and Turkey. In 1974, Turkey had granted exploration permits to an area of the Aegean Sea over which Greece contested the countrys
sovereignty.141 When Turkey proceeded to authorize scientific exploration expeditions to the licence areas (along with guardian
warships), Greece applied to the ICJ for interim measures.142 In particular, Greece claimed that the granting of the licences and the
operations of the exploration vessels constituted contraventions of its sovereign right to the exploration and exploitation of the area,
and that the result was a breach of its right as a coastal State to the exclusivity of knowledge in respect of its continental shelf
amounting to irreparable prejudice.143 The ICJ disagreed, holding that Turkeys actions did not justify or necessitate an interim
measure of protection.144
In interpreting the ICJs decision, the GuyanaSuriname tribunal held that it was necessary to distinguish between activities of a
transitory character and activities that risk irreparable prejudice to the position of the other party.145 In this regard, it highlighted that
the ICJs ruling established (1) that seismic exploration does not involve any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, (2) that
such activities are of a transitory character and do not involve the establishment of fixed installations and (3) that no operations
involving the actual appropriation or other use of natural resources were embarked upon.146 The tribunal therefore found that, while it
should not be permissible for a party to a dispute to undertake any unilateral activity that might affect the other partys rights in a
permanent manner, neither should international courts or tribunals stifle the parties ability to pursue economic development in a
disputed area during a boundary dispute, as the resolution of such disputes will typically be a time-consuming process.147 In other
words, the tribunal held that, while maritime territorial disputes suspend the entitlement of the disputing States to exploit the resources
within the disputed area in a permanent manner (that is, through drilling and extraction), this principle should not be taken so far as to
prevent the States from undertaking less invasive or physically disturbing development activities (namely, seismic exploration).
OCS leasing for ocean development
BOEM 5
(Report
to
Congress:
Comprehensive
Inventory
of
U.S.
OCS
Oil
and
Natural
Gas
Resources,
2005, http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Resource_Evaluation/Resource_Assessment/2006FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongress.pdf)
The ongoing legislative and executive withdrawals mean that large portions of the OCS, covering about 611 million acres, are offlimits to oil and gas leasing, exploration and development. However, access can also be restricted to otherwise available areas of the
OCS for a variety of reasons, including administrative restrictions for other purposessuch as for national defense or for
protection of archaeological, cultural or environmentally-sensitive marine resources . New uses of the OCS could also affect the
oil and gas industrys use of the seabed for exploration and development on existing leases, as well as restrict potential development
on areas offered for lease. Many of these constraints on activity represent important and necessary regulatory or administrative
requirements to protect the environment and ensure safe and effective multiple uses of ocean resources .

A2 topicality ocean explore/develop useful for cp competition [BOEM

Mechanism]
Bureau of ocean energy management holds Leasing
Nieger 12
(Chris, What 4 More Years Means for Offshore Drilling, The Motley Fool, 11-28-2012,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/11/28/what-4-more-years-means-for-offshore-drilling.aspx)
At the end of November, the government will auction 20 million acres worth of leases in the western Gulf of Mexico, and this coming
March, about 38 million acres in the central Gulf will be available. Some of the leases in the central Gulf will be in the coveted area of
BP's Macondo well, where the 2010 disaster took place. The leases sold for the central Gulf could produce from 460 million to 890
million barrels of oil and up to 4 trillion feet of natural gas. Large projects like ExxonMobil's (NYSE: XOM ) Hadrian field and
Chevron's Jack and St. Malo projects are expected to help increase Gulf oil production by 28% by 2022, according to The Wall
Street Journal. But it's not just the Gulf of Mexico getting new offshore leases. Three lease auctions are planned for the Chukchi Sea,
Beaufort Sea, and Cook Inlet, off Alaska's shores. Royal Dutch Shell is already in the Chukchi Sea with exploratory drilling vessels,
but has failed a number of government tests that would allow it to actually drill for oil. ConocoPhillips (NYSE: COP ) is also
exploring the Arctic region, and the company is on schedule to drill its first well in the Chukchi Sea in 2014. The Foolish takeaway If
you want to know if offshore oil drilling is going to slow down, the answer is that it already has. But that's only half of the answer .
The Obama administration is offering more leases now than it has in the past, and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management plans to
hold 12 Gulf of Mexico lease auctions before August 2017.

A2 topicality ocean explore/develop useful for cp competition [Misc]

producing oil is part of exploration & development
PEW 2010 last cited in 2010, Pew Charitable Trusts Organization (Pew, http://oceansnorth.org/exploration-development-risks)
EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT RISKS What Causes Spills? Where there are people, there are mistakes. The causes of BPs Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf
of Mexico have not yet been determined. But the Exxon Valdez oil spill was caused by human error. The Montara well blowout and spill in the Timor Sea in 2009 was very likely caused by
human error in setting the cement casing. Eighty percent of spills and accidents in all industries, including oil and gas, are estimated to be caused by human error. Additionally, the

Arctic
Ocean presents an array of hazardous operating conditions. The difficulty of responding to BPs Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico was exacerbated by the difficult
conditions of extreme water depth. In the Arctic, dangerous conditions could include gale force winds, extreme fog, prolonged periods of darkness, shifting sea ice and sub-zero temperatures.
When multiple risk factors combine, accidents are even more likely to occur. For instance, the aging oil infrastructure at Prudhoe Bay is succumbing to corrosion and inadequate monitoring of
that problem has led to a spate of recent spills on the North Slope. An

increase in oil exploration and production will create oil spill risks from offshore
platforms, associated pipelines, storage tanks and shipping activities . At the same time, changing sea ice conditions are opening new shipping routes and extending
the season for existing routes. Increasing vessel traffic will only add to the potential risk of oil spills beyond the oil and gas industry.

key government ocean exploration and development agencies agree

BOLAND 2013 - Biological Oceanographer, Minerals Management Service (Boland, Greg, Oil and Gas Exploration, January 28,
2013, http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/explorations/06mexico/background/oil/oil.html)
Oil and Gas Exploration This project, funded jointly by Minerals Management Service (MMS) and NOAA Ocean Explorer (OE), will focus on

exploration, survey, and experimental work on chemosynthetic communities and hardbottom habitats located deeper than 1,000 m (3,280 ft) on the lower continental slope of the Gulf
of Mexico. The MMS is funding this study for a total of $3,291,368. As a bureau within the Department of the Interior, the MMS is responsible for the management of offshore energy and
minerals on the 1.76-billion acres of the outer continental shelf (OCS), while protecting the human, marine, and coastal environments. The MMS oversees production of about 23% of the
natural gas and 30% of the oil produced in the United States, a significant contribution to our nation's economic strength and national security. All but a small percentage of this production
comes from the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico OCS Region contains 43-million acres under lease. Since 1982, the MMS has managed OCS production of 9.6-trillion barrels of oil and
is one major act or legal mandate that serves as the basis for the offshore
program of MMS the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). This Act of 1953 called for the federal government to manage
the oil, gas, and other mineral resources of the OCS to ensure national security, reduce dependence on foreign sources, protect the
nations environmental health, and conserve the precious resources of the OCS. As a part of the mandate for environmental protection from this act and others,
more than 109-trillion cubic feet of natural gas for U.S. consumption. There

the MMS environmental studies program was started in 1971. Beginning in 1978, the program emphasis shifted focus from synthesis of existing information to research efforts directed to the
specific resource-management decisions associated with the OCS. Through FY 2003, over $750 million has been invested in OCS environmental and socioeconomic studies. With the first
discovery of the chemosynthetic communities in the Gulf of Mexico in the 1980s, the MMS recognized the special value of these communities and worked to ensure oil and gas activities
avoided impact to areas of known communities, or even areas that had the potential to have chemosynthetic communities, unless visual evidence was otherwise provided by industry. Extensive
deep-water coral communities in the Gulf have only recently been studied after the discovery of the largest known deepwater coral community during a survey for the oil and gas industry in
1990. Knowledge

of these kinds of unique deep-water communities provides critical information to estimate the potential effects of
deepwater oil and gas exploration and production and allow refinement of protective measures . Current basic understanding of chemosynthetic
communities and deep-water coral habitats in the Gulf has been largely limited to depths shallower than 1,000 m.

***A2 COUNTERPLANS***

A2 generic process cp
the cp ruins certainty, guarantees market failure
Griles 2003 (Lisa, Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior, Energy Production on Federal Lands, Hearing before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)
Mr. GRILES. Americas public lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and development of renewable and nonrenewable energy
resources. Energy reserves contained on the D epartment o f the I nteriors onshore and offshore Federal lands are very important to
meeting our current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to supply Americas energy demand. Estimates suggest that these lands contain
approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and 74 percent of the undiscovered natural gas resources. President Bush has developed a national
energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for Americas future. That strategy recognizes we need to raise domestic production of energy, both renewable and
nonrenewable, to meet our dependence for energy. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are

Now there is a
new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These
things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra . Each day, even since I have assumed
this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest
domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration.

oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also

encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges
research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOEs National Renewable Energy Lab last week
announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.* This
report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various
other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and
understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA
report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of
the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is notthere are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where
the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public
sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on
the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San

Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and
offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for
additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under
FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One

of the
areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is
coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West.
The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and
their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments
and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured.
And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas
reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are

also working
with the Western Governors Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way
corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly
identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite and have future opportunity so
that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of right-of-way permits for both pipelines and electric
transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our Nations energy and economic security. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything
you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the
holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. In the past year, scheduled

sales in several areas were either delayed, canceled, or put under

moratoria, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It undermined certainty. It made investing, particularly in the Gulf, more risky . We have approved a 5-year oil and gas
leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska by 2007.
Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting
to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled
in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. We need to encourage that exploration.
These deep wells, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and can be
developed quickly due to existing infrastructure and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a
lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic,

Vast resources of oil and

natural gas lie, we hope, beneath these sheets of salt in the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working
to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. We have sent legislation to Congress that would give the Minerals
Management Service of the D epartment o f the I nterior clear authority to lease parts of the OCS for renewable energy. The renewables could be
wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. We need this
authority in order to be able to truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy, so they can have certainty
about where to go.
and the seismic just gets distorted. So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill.

***A2 DISADS***

A2 oil price da aff oil prices resilient

oil prices are resilient --- they follow supply and demand effects
PHILIPS 5/9/2014 Bloomberg businessweek associate editor, Matthew Philips, Why Oil Prices Havent Gone Crazy,
http://peakoil.com/business/why-oil-prices-havent-gone-crazy
The oil markets have plenty of reasons to be spooked. In Libya, home to Africas largest reserves, production has fallen more than 80 percent since militias seized control
of the countrys biggest ports last summer. Most of Irans oil remains trapped as well. Sanctions aimed at punishing Iran for its nuclear weapons program have crippled its crude exports by 1.5
million barrels a day. Nigeria is in the midst of its worst oil crisis in years: Rising violence, plus rampant sabotage and theft, have knocked out about 300,000 barrels of oil output a day. In
Venezuela, which has the worlds largest oil reserves, production has remained unchanged after years of underinvestment. Political

chaos and violence are keeping 3.5

million barrels of daily oil production off the market, according to estimates by Citigroup (C). With tensions heating up over Ukraine, pressure is building for
Western countries to impose Iran-style sanctions on Russia, the worlds largest oil producer. That would likely send prices soaring and push Europe, which gets 30 percent of its oil from
Russia, into recession. Yet through all the turmoil, oil markets have been strangely complacent . The price of Brent crude oil, the most traded oil
contract in the world, fell from $110 a barrel on April 24 to $107 on May 6. The past three years have been one of the most stable periods for oil prices in recent memory, says Eric Lee, an oil
analyst with Citigroup. Last

year marked the smallest range of daily price movements in more than 10 years, according to the U.S. D epartment
of Energy. STORY: Want Cheaper Oil? Pray for Stability in Libya The oil markets remain placid because almost all the oil production lost over the past
few years has been replaced by the U.S. shale boom and increased Canadian production. U.S. shale oil production started to rise
quickly in early 2011, right as the Arab Spring was kicking off. Since then, daily oil output in the U.S. has climbed by about 3 million barrels, to more than 8 million
barrels. Canada has added more than 1 million barrels to its daily oil output since May 2011. North Americas shale boom has been a huge calming factor, says Lysle Brinker, an oil analyst at
IHS Energy. Without it, we might be seeing $150 oil right now. Its

hard to overstate the impact that rising U.S. oil output has had on global energy
trade. Imports now make up only 28 percent of all the petroleum the U.S. consumes, down from 60 percent in 2005. In 2010
the U.S. was importing about 1 million barrels a day from Nigeria; now its 38,000. Much of the oil the U.S. used to import now goes
to Asia. Thats helped keep markets well-supplied and prices immune from turmoil.

A2 oil competition da [canada-china]

keystone thumps this disad and
BLOOMBERG 5/3/2014 (Canada Finds China Option No Easy Answer to Keystone Snub, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201405-02/how-canada-s-flirtation-with-a-china-oil-market-soured.html)
Oil was top of mind. He noted that a single country -- the U.S. -- took 99 percent of Canadas exports, a situation he described as contrary to Canadas commercial interests. You know, he said, we want to sell
our energy to people who want to buy our energy. Its that simple. Chinese Juggernaut The Chinese and Canadians in attendance had long waited for Harper to embrace
the Chinese economic juggernaut. They held him up for half-an-hour posing for pictures. As he finally took his seat for a group photo with the organizers, he turned to Peter Harder, a former deputy
minister of foreign affairs and president of the Canada China Business Council. Do you think the Americans were listening? he asked. That Harper now found himself in the Peoples Republic
hawking Albertas oil spoke to the depth of his frustration with Obama. His view, according to people close to Harper who knew his thinking but arent authorized to speak, was that sensible Americans would understand the
folly of allowing Canadas massive oil sands reserves, estimated at 168 billion recoverable barrels, to be sucked up by China, a rising economic and political rival. Yet if the Americans most particularly a president inclined

The problem is that, his earlier declarations aside, it

wasnt that simple not then and not now. Important elements of his Conservative party either shared Harpers misgivings

to indulge his green base at Canadas expense - didnt pay heed, then Harper had primed the pump to do business with the Chinese.

about Chinas human-rights record and repression of religion, or were downright hostile to the country. In British Columbia, with its zest for
environmentalism, green and aboriginal groups had already emerged hostile to the idea that its pristine lands ought to be put at risk for a pipeline, known as Northern Gateway, to feed Chinas fossil-fuel-propelled growth --

This is the story of how Canadas Plan B rejoinder to Obamas repeated Keystone delays
became mired down, jeopardizing future oil-sands development and production at a cost, according to a Calgary research group, of more
never mind how supertankers might damage the provinces postcard coasts.

than C$400 billion ($365 billion) in lost economic growth over the next 25 years. It was put together after on- and off-the-record interviews with more than 60 government and industry officials, environmentalists and
aboriginal leaders. Some government officials close to Harper asked not to be identified because they werent authorized to speak. Go Forward Jason MacDonald, Harpers director of communications, said it would be
inaccurate to suggest that any one pipeline project constitutes a plan. As for Canadas long-term relationship with China, MacDonald said he expects the Harper government in due course to approve an agreement to
promote investment between the two countries. A spokesman for Chinas ambassador to Canada didnt return calls seeking comment. Harper, in a January interview, said he couldnt discuss Gateway, yet was confident that
over time, one of several projects being proposed to move oil-sands production to the Pacific or Atlantic coasts will go forward. Ultimately, Harpers cabinet has the final say as to whether the 1,177-kilometer, C$6.5 billion
Gateway project is approved. A decision is required by mid June. To kill it could undermine his arguments that Keystone ought to be built, arming anti-Keystone factions with a powerful argument that Canada isnt willing to

To approve it risks a political and legal brawl

practice what it preaches to Obama. Legal Brawl

. Some green and aboriginal groups are already sounding warnings of massive civil disobedience
and lawsuits in British Columbia if Harper says yes. To change the game with adjustments to the route and revenue sharing, for instance could conceivably buy peace, at a cost. The government is carefully examining a
Dec. 19 report by regulators on Northern Gateway, Natural Resources Minister Greg Rickford told reporters today in Ottawa. A regulatory panel recommended approving the pipeline subject to 209 conditions. The

Mixed messages to China by the Harper government have also frayed relations
between the two countries and damped Chinese enthusiasm for doing business with Canada . Raw Ambivalence Were long on

governments decision will be based on science and facts, he said.

rhetoric and short on strategic thinking and planning, said Wenran Jiang, a University of Alberta China specialist who consults to the
Alberta government and energy industry. You cant engage the second-largest economy in the world in such a way. Harpers outreach on that
February day in Guangzhou masked a raw ambivalence toward China and not just over human rights and religious repression. According to his security services, Harper also was critical of Chinas espionage activities and
intimidation of dissidents within Canada. Against this principled Harper stood Harper the realist: The oil industry, centered in his home province of Alberta, increasingly recognized it needed new markets for its oil. When first
elected prime minister, Harper had firmly embraced an anti-China wing of his party, adopting their belief that China needed Canada and its resources more than Canada needed China, according to advisers familiar with the

This led to an approach often described internally as cold

diplomacy with warm economics . Harper showed his colors on his first Asia trip in November 2006 for an Asia-Pacific summit in Hanoi. The plan was for the relatively untraveled prime minister to keep a low profile, observe

strategy who asked not to be identified because they are not authorized to speak. Cold Diplomacy

and learn, according to people familiar with the thinking. Harper, though, had a message to send. Hed said he believed previous Canadian governments had been too accommodating to China. On the first leg of the journey, he wandered to the back of the plane and told
reporters in a reference clearly aimed at China -- Canadians didnt want his government to sell out to the almighty dollar. The remark, filed by reporters during a refueling stop in Anchorage, Alaska, landed like a bombshell in Hanoi. Chinese officials had already
taken umbrage over the new Canadian government granting honorary citizenship to the Dalai Lama two months earlier. Canceled Meeting Now they canceled Harpers scheduled one-on-one with Chinese President Hu Jintao, pro-forma for a new G-8 leader. Harper
ordered his advisers to get the meeting back in the book, according to people who were there. The Chinese, still fuming, played cat and mouse before finally consenting to what diplomats call a pull-aside. If Harper wanted to meet Hu, the Chinese said, he could partake
of a brief conversation just outside the mens bathroom. The Chinese also had a message to send. Harper, as the Chinese knew, was worked up as well by the recent jailing of an ethnic Uighur imam, Husseyin Celil, a refugee from China who had emigrated to Canada in
2001 and obtained Canadian citizenship. China refused to recognize Canadas right to consular access. Outraged, Harper let no opportunity pass to press the case, broaching it directly with Hu outside the mens room. Cabinet ministers and diplomats were instructed to
protest at every meeting with a Chinese counterpart. It went on for years. Diplomats or ministers who didnt toe the line got a sharp dressing down, according to people familiar with the policy. Revised Version Six months into Harpers term, as members of the Canadian
business community with Chinese interests began to question the new tone, a special cabinet session was held to discuss internal differences over the China policy. The Foreign Affairs department, as was standard, prepared an overview to kick off discussions. A group of
young political aides in Harpers office, judging it too tame, took control of the document and told Foreign Minister Peter MacKay to substitute their version, according to people involved in the discussions. The tone was anything but accommodating: It played up fears
of Chinese territorial ambitions and reached back to 1979 to critique the one-child policy as symptomatic of a society lacking moral grounding. Both sides dug in their heels; MacKay brought forward the version by the young turks. The session exposed cabinet divisions
on China that persist to this day. As the internal debate over China continued, the second question - how to get oil to Asia - still hung out there. The trade route from the oil sands to China ran through British Columbia. It was as green as you get, being, among other
things, the birthplace of the environmental group Greenpeace. Disputed Land Also, few British Columbia aboriginal groups have settled treaties with the government, meaning the proposed Gateway route would have to traverse vast swathes of still disputed land
claimed by First Nations, as aboriginal groups in Canada are called. Gateway was the brainchild of Pat Daniel, who floated it soon after becoming Enbridge Inc. (ENB) chief executive officer in 2001 and was still on the scene in 2012, meeting Harper for the first time
on the China trip. Long before anyone else, Daniel could see what he called a big wave of oil sands crude coming towards us that the existing marketplace was unlikely to absorb. A pipeline from the Alberta oil sands to the Pacific Ocean could change all that. Even
with Keystone XL, Canadians still would not get full international pricing for their oil. Gateway goes to the real market, the world market, rather than just the U.S. market, Daniel, 67, said in a recent interview. If youre an energy superpower and youve only got one

The oil executives, however, would soon discover they had a lot to
learn about British Columbias raucous environmental and aboriginal politics. In
market, one country, youre not truly an energy superpower because people have too much control over you. Raucous Politics

August 2009, Daniel and his pipeline president John Carruthers landed in a float plane at Hartley Bay, a sprawling cove of dark water
hemmed in by fir-clad mountains. Supertankers would have to pass here from Gateways terminus point at Kitimat as they collected heavy crude for voyaging across the Pacific. The Enbridge executives were to meet the leadership of a First Nation tribe called the Gitgaat to talk up the virtues of the project. Centered in Hartley Bay, the
Gitgaat are known for three things: their courage, hospitality and a visceral love of their lands and water. Ferry Rescue One of their hosts was a local councilor named Marven Robinson. He had played a central role in a March 2006 incident when a ferry carrying 101 passengers and crew, the Queen of the North, ripped open its hull 16
kilometers (10 miles) from Hartley Bay. The Gitgaat rushed out to sea in the dead of night in small fishing boats and recreational vessels, saving all but two passengers. Robinson, who had shuttled many of the survivors to shore, now wanted Daniel to understand why his people felt the waters around the village, with their warren of
narrow channels, rocky islands and submerged reefs, constituted an inappropriate venue for supertanker traffic. Robinson, in an interview, said he told Daniel, We see exactly how this kind of thing will be dealt with and thats why were so against tankers in our territory. Historical Sites As was their custom, the Gitgaat wanted to
lavish their guests with hospitality. Daniel and Carruthers, fearing the weather was worsening, chose to get back on their Twin Otter and skipped a tour of historical sites, further alienating the locals, according to people familiar with the incident. Over the next several weeks, Carruthers, who confirmed he and Daniel left early, said he
called to ask how he could help persuade the Gitgaat to change their defiant no to Northern Gateway into a yes. The answer was he couldnt. Today, the community of 200 is plastered with no tankers signs along the wooden boardwalks. The foyer of the school is adorned with ceremonial canoe paddles, cedar-fiber weavings and
student presentations encouraging fellow residents to defend our planet against attacks by corporations like Enbridge. The depth of the disdain runs deep. British Columbia Premier Christy Clark, who has kept her distance from the project, recalled the feedback she got from a Grade 6 student when she visited a school to talk about
debating. Dear Ms. Clark. Thank you for coming and speaking to us about debating. Its really going to help me get a good mark. And also, I hope you will decide you want to hate Enbridge, the student wrote. National Interest If the Enbridge team saw its overtures rebuffed, Harpers people were faring little better in their belated
effort to get Gateway moving. In January 2012, just as Obama rejected Keystone, regulatory hearings into Northern Gateway were set to begin. Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver had already caused a stir six months earlier, in what may have been a slip of the tongue, by citing the project as being in the national interest.
Environmentalists accused the government of bias. Oliver raised the temperature further on the eve of the hearings by releasing an open letter denouncing environmental and other radical groups for trying to hijack the countrys regulatory system by exploiting any loophole they can find, stacking public hearings to ensure delays that
would kill good projects and using funding from foreign special interest groups to undermine Canadas national economic interest. Little Late Olivers broadside, at a time when the government was trying to shore up support, only fomented more criticism, both inside and outside government. By attacking all the groups that were
raising environmental concerns, those groups were branded as radicals, pretty much described as enemies of Canada, said Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, president of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. Oliver would later try, unsuccessfully, to persuade Phillip into supporting the governments resource-development agenda.
The chief told the minister, its a little late in the day. Oliver, now finance minister, said the letter wasnt him going rogue or off message. The industry has done a poor job parrying green criticisms, he said. We needed to get peoples attention and say, Well wait a minute, thats been the prevailing narrative but its simply not true.
The emerging coalition of environmentalists and aboriginals opposing the Harper governments economic imperative of getting oil-sands production to market was driving the projects proponents to distraction. They would soon be joined by celebrities. Alberta Support Progressive Conservative Alison Redford, who had won a surprise
victory in October 2011 to become Albertas premier, said in an interview that she remembered looking up at the television late one night after her victory as she puzzled over all the pipeline opposition. Shocked, she saw a trailer scrolling across the bottom of a news channel with a headline, Redford opposes Northern Gateway. An
ardent Gateway backer, Redford, who stepped down in March for unrelated reasons, said she was beside herself, fearing some remark made by her rookie team had been misconstrued. We screwed up big time, she remembered thinking. Actually, it was actor Robert Redford. All sides agree on one point. Enbridge, accustomed to oilfriendly Alberta with its capillary veins of pipe running in all directions, misjudged the temperament of British Columbia, and particularly the green, anti-oil leanings of the First Nations peoples. Non Grata In late 2012, Al Monaco replaced Daniel as Enbridge CEO. Though Calgary-based Enbridge has made subsequent overtures to the
Gitgaat and other tribes, opposition has if anything hardened. The company remains persona non grata in many quarters. Premier Clark, according to people close to her, has quietly ducked every opportunity to meet with Monaco or other Enbridge executives. Even pipeline champion Oliver has his limits. While attending an energy
conference in Houston last year, the consulate had scheduled him for a photo op with Monaco. He was willing to meet but made it clear there would be no photo, according to a person privy to the conversation. Monaco, in an interview, conceded mistakes were made. There are things we could have done differently, he said. We

On the
China front, things remained complicated. Harpers embrace of China had been long in coming and short on his normal all-in gusto. In
2008, he had taken a controversial pass on the Beijing Olympics and he did not arrive for his first visit until December 2009 -- almost
four years after coming to power. The biggest influence on his evolving attitude, say people familiar with his thinking, was the 200809 economic meltdown. It made plain that China was simply too influential to keep at arms length. Canadas share of trade and
investment were falling and the Chinese leadership had withheld an economically significant tourism designation from Canada . After the
probably should have spent more time building trust. Enbridge has adjusted how it engages communities, according to Monaco, pointing to establishing community advisory boards and taking opponents to Michigan to see how it has dealt with a serious 2010 spill into a tributary of the Kalamazoo River. First Visit

financial crisis, we recognized that China is too important not to treat more subtly, said Mark Cameron, a senior Harper policy adviser who shared the initial aversion to China. We had that luxury in the early years. The
economy was going well. Now we had to talk to them on their own terms. Settling Scores The 2009 trip started with a verbal settling of scores. This is your first visit to China and this is the first meeting between the
Chinese Premier and a Canadian prime minister in almost five years, then-Premier Wen Jiabao publicly scolded Harper. Five years is too long a time for China-Canada relations and thats why there are comments in the
media that your visit is one that should have taken place earlier. According to David Mulroney, Harpers hand-picked ambassador, China was frustrated by Canadian policy. It had invested in Australia with positive results
and wanted to diversify to Canada. It had been waiting for Harper to come around. Post-Guangzhou, Harpers changed tone had become clear. In 2007, upon a visit by the Dalai Lama, he made a big fuss over him, including a
rare photo-op in his Parliament Hill office, despite knowing it would annoy the Chinese. Now, in 2012, with the Dalai Lama again in Ottawa two months after the Guangzhou speech, Harper kept it to a private courtesy
meeting a brisk 20 minutes on a Friday afternoon. The Harper policy looked much like all those other countries beating a path to China. Nexen Drama Then came the drama over Nexen Inc. In November 2011, when
Obama phoned Harper to tell him of the Nebraska-related Keystone delay, Oliver, a former investment banker, had already had been working China both as a market and a source of investment. Word was that Harper had

immediately dispatched Oliver to China but actually, I was already there, Oliver recalled. One of the major deliverables from the February 2012 China visit had been a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement, a pact Harper hailed following a meeting with Premier Wen in the Great Hall of the People. It needed only its ts crossed and is dotted. At the same time, Oliver and a handful of energy industry CEOs were
meeting Wang Yilin, chairman of Cnooc Ltd., (883) Chinas biggest offshore oil explorer. Seven months earlier, Cnooc had purchased Opti Canada Inc., a failed petroleum producer with a minority stake in an oil-sands
project in Long Lake, Alberta. Market Principles Oliver and Wang waxed enthusiastic over possible deals, Wang assuring the Canadian that Cnooc was run on market principles. Calgary-based Nexen owned the rest of the
Long Lake project. Throughout the five-day trip, Harper hammered home the message about a new era of energy relations. Cnooc interpreted the pitch alongside Olivers effusiveness to mean the Canadian government
wouldnt stand in the way if Cnooc tried to acquire Nexen, according to a person familiar with the companys thinking. In the previous seven years, Chinese state-owned enterprises such as PetroChina Co. and China
Petrochemical Corp. (386) had put $11 billion into minority positions in oil-sands projects. Cnooc decided the time had arrived for a bold stroke. On July 23, 2012, five months after the Harper visit, the company launched a

The Conservative political base recoiled at the prospect of Canadian resources

falling into the hands of Chinese state-owned enterprises and Harpers old doubts about China resurfaced, according to people privy to
his thinking. The leading cabinet naysayer was Jason Kenney, who, first as Harpers parliamentary secretary and later immigration minister, had built enough influence through his courting of Conservative-leaning
$15.1-billion offer for Nexen, the biggest Chinese foreign takeover attempt in the world.

ethnic communities to be touted as a leading contender to eventually succeed Harper. Exceptional Circumstances He took it upon himself to investigate how Cnooc might be blocked, organizing a meeting with investment
bankers, corporate lawyers and the grandees of the oil industry at the venerable Calgary Petroleum Club. A consensus emerged that further incursions by Chinese state-owned enterprises would imperil Canadian control over
the oil sands -- jeopardizing jobs in Calgary and technological leadership over unconventional oil recovery methods. Eventually, Harper held his nose and approved the deal, worried that to kill it would send the wrong
message to other foreign investors. He made plain though that any future takeovers in the oil sands by state-owned enterprises would only be approved in the most exceptional of circumstances. To be blunt, he told a press
conference televised live, Canadians have not spent years reducing the ownership of sectors of the economy by our governments only to see them bought and controlled by foreign governments instead. China Irritant

And to date, more than two years after Guangzhou, the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement remains unratified by
the Harper government, something the University of Albertas Jiang cites as an irritant to China. Former Ambassador Mulroney says the February 2012 visit was
the high water mark of relations. While many nations struggle with how to deal with China, he said its very acute in Canada. Reflecting back on Guangzhou, he added,

strategy make .

One speech does not a

A2 oil competition da [canada canada relations impact defense]

Relations have a laundry list of alt causes and resiliency solves the impact
Andre de Nesnera, VOA News, December 11, 4, The Epoch Times, Some Trade Issues Divide US, Canada,
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24897.html
President Bush recently visited Canada, his first trip abroad since his re-election. The two neighboring countries are strong allies and have deep ties that bind them. But
there are some issues, especially dealing with trade, that still divide Ottawa and Washington. Trade is the most important component of U.S.Canada relations. Each country is the others biggest trading customer. Eighty-four percent of Canadas exports go the United States and Canada buys more than 70
percent of its imports from its neighbor. So it was no surprise that when President Bush visited Canada, trade issues - and especially contentious trade issues - were high
on the agenda in discussions with Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin. Charles Doran is Director of Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. He says one major disagreement between the two countries deals with Washingtons tariffs
on the import of Canadian softwood lumber, such as pine. There is a huge amount of trade in lumber between Canada and the United States. Canadians sell
a large amount, billions of dollars, and the argument has been on the part of a small group of producers in the United States that Canada has subsidized this. Now the
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the World Trade Organization, in dispute resolution panels, have denied that there is unfair subsidy. But in fact,
every President for some time has been unable to unravel the legal challenges and so on, to get rid of that issue, he says. Following the Bush-Martin meeting, the
softwood lumber issue remains unresolved. Professor Doran says another problem stems from the US action to ban beef imports from Canada
because of mad cow disease. There was one cow found in Alberta with this disease, but the consequence of that has been enormous in the sense that trade for
beef, for the United States and Canada has been affected and third markets like Japan and Europe. They are trying to get around this problem. They are trying to
establish common standards, but its hard to believe, its almost hard to imagine how one cow could cause that much catastrophe to this industry in North America, he
says. Canadian statistics indicate that the 18-month ban has cost the Canadian beef industry more than $4 billion in lost revenues. That issue, too, still remains to
be solved following the Bush-Martin summit. Tied to those two trade issues, is the question of security along the Canadian-American border - at
nearly 9,000 kilometers the worlds longest undefended frontier. Both countries have stepped up cooperation in the security field, especially after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Kim Nossel, Director of Political Studies at Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, says Americans and
Canadians are approaching the border security issue from different angles. From the American perspective, there is the concern about
the porousness of that long, undefended border and the ease with which one could in fact get across the border. From a Canadian perspective, the major concern
is an absolute fear that there will be a terrorist incident in the United States that will openly and manifestly have come from Canada, that will lead to, essentially, a
closing of the border. And of course that border and the openness of that border is absolutely crucial for Canadian wealth. Experts say Ottawa and Washington
have to find a delicate balance between the free flow of commerce and legitimate security concerns. Gill Troy is a U.S.-Canada expert
at McGill University in Montreal. He says despite various disagreements between the two countries, one overriding issue must be kept in mind.
Even if there is an agreement to disagree, even if the United States says: look, we cant do this because of internal constituency pressures or external trade pressures,

the awareness that nevertheless, while we might part on some issues, we are still fundamentally friends , we are still fundamentally
linked in so many ways - economically, ideologically, intellectually, culturally, socially - is important, he says. Experts agree that President
Bushs trip to Canada was an attempt to improve relations between the two countries - relations that were strained in recent years,
during the tenure of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Analysts say based on the recent Bush-Martin meeting, things are looking up.

A2 oil competition da [canada cyberterror impact defense]

No risk of cyber war
Clark 12 (MA candidate Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/12
(Paul, The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack, American Military
University)
The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and
indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a
spectrum of malicious actors (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple
sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and
shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this
infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively low cost and long range weapon
(Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyberattack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the U nited States to question
whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It
is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security
with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack
against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been
thoroughly analyzed and used as a model for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR
energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted the electrical grid has been used in
multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S.

this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of
critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state

electrical grid will serve as the target in

adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a
Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The
complexity how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will
be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For
example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the
resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available
and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon and carry over to information technology
structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is unusually complex and large and required code written in
multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a vast array of components it is one of
the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a high level
of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign
intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also
needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability
and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon
then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities , known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and

propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are incredibly difficult to find and fewer than twelve
out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can
fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is
unprecedented (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the first ever programmable logic controller
rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien
2011) all wrapped up in layers of encryption like Russian nesting dolls (Zetter 2011) including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As
the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and
hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and
required such a high degree of inside knowledge that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the
malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the
extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was
likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the
public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in
vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all
vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. Networks that are not connected to the public internet are air
gapped, a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common
safeguard for sensitive networks including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only
occur through physical means an infected disk or USB device that must be physically introduced into a possibly access controlled
environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the
probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method
that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This
assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with

the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network
configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantecs assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one
year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a
cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the
target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and
routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to
succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to
elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere,
Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is
ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or
years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed the targeted Siemens software or
programmable logic controller the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to
great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The
malwares actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and
code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the
complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discove ry, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile
weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is
concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyberweapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes
it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States has created millions of potential monsters all over the world (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside,
technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time
(Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and

works both ways and cyber-security techniques are

also evolving, and understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002).

Theohary 2010). However, this is something of a zero-sum game because knowledge

Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and
analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less
useful , this is the core of the argument that uniquely surprising stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan
Horse, the very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the son of Stuxnet
malware named Duqu by its discoverers that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by
Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and
System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not

clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere,
Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was
invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production was minimal at best.
Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no
damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified senior diplomat suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility for a few days
(Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Irans nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by
months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to
be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian
nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the
probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted
or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are a high priority target for military and
insurgents and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has increased vulnerability across
the board (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that
has been honed over many years of practical application now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and

specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased
awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public
and private sector are working together in an unprecedented effort to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security
measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

A2 oil competition da [canada terrorism impact defense]

No terror threat
Stephen M. Walt 12, Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "'America the brittle?'"
September 10, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/09/inflating_the_terrorist_threat_again
According to yesterday's New York Times, assorted "senior American officials" are upset that adversaries like al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the Somali pirates are
not simply rolling over and dying. Instead, these foes are proving to be "resilient," "adaptable," and "flexible." These same U.S. officials are also worried
that the United States isn't demonstrating the same grit, as supposedly revealed by high military suicide rates, increased reports of PTSD, etc. According to Times
reporters Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, these developments "raise concerns that the United States is losing ground in the New Darwinism of security threats, in
which an agile enemy evolves in new ways to blunt America's vast technological prowess with clever homemade bombs and anti-American propaganda that helps
supply a steady stream of fighters." Or as Shanker and Schmitt put it (cue the scary music): "Have we become America the brittle?" This sort of pop sociology
is not very illuminating, especially when there's no evidence presented to support the various officials' gloomy pronouncements. In fact,
the glass looks more than half-full. Let's start by remembering that the Somali pirates and al Qaeda have been doing pretty badly of late. Piracy in the
Gulf of Aden is down sharply, Osama bin Laden is dead, and his movement's popularity is lower than ever. Whatever silly dreams he might have had about restoring the
caliphate have proven to be just hollow fantasies. And as John Mueller and Mark Stewart showed in an article I linked to a few weeks ago, the actual record of

post-9/11 plots against the United States suggests that these supposedly "agile" and "resilient" conspirators are mostly bumbling
incompetents. In fact, Lehman Bros. might be the only major world organization that had a worse decade than al Qaeda did.

A2 oil competition da [canada trade leadership impact defense]

Trade is strong and resilient
Ikenson, 9 [Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff
Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived, March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]
Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and
the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic.
According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the
maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over
five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent
decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of
Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that
"massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates . If most developing countries raised their tariffs to
their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries
that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD
countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for
2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the
events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic
situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to
stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's
vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more
promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business
operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at
competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on
its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase
of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13v And Mexico is not
alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide
variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January
decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new
free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community

fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence
that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies,
there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the
nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to
limit choices through policy constraints.

A2 politics
The plan is key to the GOP
GRANT 2013 - David Grant, staff writer, 1/20/13, Obamas second term: Can he work with Congress? (+video), Christian Science
Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-second-term-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video, acc.
1/25/13
And the president could perhaps turn down the bellicosity on the Hill by working with some of his loudest critics (though risking the ire of
environmentalists in his political base) in one area that the deeply-red right and the president could agree: energy policy. We were encouraged by
President Obamas 2012 campaign comments supporting an all-of-the-above agenda on energy, and his statements outlining support for oil and natural gas, said Jack
Gerard, president of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil and gas industrys powerful trade association, in his annual State of American Energy address in
Washington earlier this month. But Republicans rage about a disconnect between what the president and members of his administration say they favor
and what Republicans say is foot-dragging in building the Keystone XL pipeline, exporting natural gas, or freeing up more offshore areas for energy

exploration. If the president were to get behind any of these initiatives hed likely have plenty of GOP support but that remains a large
if.

Theyre key to the agenda

GRANT 2013 - David Grant, staff writer, 1/20/13, Obamas second term: Can he work with Congress? (+video), Christian Science
Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2013/0120/Obama-s-second-term-Can-he-work-with-Congress-video, acc.
1/25/13
But if

the president is going to pass legislative fixes for weighty issues like immigration reform, changes to the nations gun laws, and the
nations troubled fiscal situation, hes going to need to work with the body he spent much of his reelection campaign railing against.

Plans a win for oil --- those lobbies control the agenda
FROOMKIN 2011 - Dan Froomkin, contributing editor of Nieman Reports, How the Oil Lobby Greases Washingtons Wheels,
HUFFINGTON POST, 4-6-11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/how-the-oil-lobby-greases_n_845720.html, accessed 6-212
With so much public opposition, why do subsidies remain? You might as well ask why there is no carbon tax, or why there was no
significant reform legislation passed after the BP oil spill. The answer is that one of the many things the industry can do with its fat
pocketbook is hire a veritable army of sharp lobbyists and back them up with big wads of cash in the form of campaign donations and
spending. The end result is that the industry has a remarkable ability to get its way on Capitol Hill . According to the Center for
Responsive Politics' website, the oil and gas industry has spent more than $1 billion on lobbying since 1998, including a jaw-dropping
$147 million just last year. For comparison's sake, $147 million is about equivalent to the total budget of 100 congressional offices.
That's more than the $103 million spent in 2010 by the financial service industry, another potent lobbying force -- but considerably
less than the $240 million spent by the pharmaceutical industry. Among major industries, Opensecrets.org ranked Big Oil fifth in
terms of lobbying dollars spent, behind only Big Pharma, electric utilities, business associations and insurance. The oil and gas
industry used its $147 million to employ 788 individual lobbyists in 2010 -- some 500 (or almost two thirds) of whom, according to
Opensecrets.org, are former federal employees who came through the revolving door particularly well versed in the ways of
government. All told, that's well more than one oil and gas lobbyist per member of Congress out there on the Hill arming allies with
talking points and briefing books, spinning the undecided and pressuring the opposition.

A2 china competition
well cooperate over oil no motive for competition
YERGIN 9 - is chairman of IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates, an energy research and consulting firm; received a Pulitzer Prize (Yergin, Daniel. It's
Still the One. October, 2009. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/its_still_the_one?page=0,1)
But the

global petroleum industry is not a go-it-alone business. Because of the risk and costs of large-scale development, companies

tend to work

in consortia with other companies. Oil-exporting countries seek to diversify the countries and companies they work with.
Inevitably, any country in China's position -- whose demand had grown from 2.5 million barrels per day to 8 million in a decade and a half -- would be worrying
about supplies. Such an increase, however, is not a forecast of inevitable strife; it is a message about economic growth and rising standards of living. It
would be much more worrying if, in the face of rising demand, Chinese companies were not investing in production both inside China
(the source of half of its supply) and outside its borders. There are potential flash points in this new world of oil. But they will not come
from standard commercial competition. Rather, they arise when oil (along with natural gas) gets caught up in larger foreign-policy issues -- most notably
today, the potentially explosive crisis over the nuclear ambitions of oil- and gas-rich Iran. Yet, despite all the talk of an "oil clash" scenario, there
seems to be less overall concern than a few years ago and much more discussion about "energy dialogue." The
Chinese themselves appear more confident about their increasingly important place in this globalized oil market. Although the risks are still there, the Chinese -- and the
Indians right alongside them -- have the same stake as other consumers in an adequately supplied world market that is part of the larger global economy. Disruption
of that economy, as the last year has so vividly demonstrated, does not serve their purposes. Why would the Chinese want to get into a
confrontation over oil with the United States when the U.S. export market is so central to their economic growth and when the two countries are so

financially interdependent?

A2 nuclear power da 2ac

Broader Arctic drilling is inevitable
OKeefe 12 CEO at the George C. Marshall Institute
(William, Decision Isn't America's Alone To Make, 7-23-2012, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-arctic-oil-drillingready-f.php)
The decision on whether Arctic oil drilling is ready for prime time is not the federal governments to make. The United States does not
have a monopoly on exploration and production in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark, Canada, Norway, Russia, and the U nited States all
have economic sovereignty in Arctic waters. The Arctic Oceans large resource potential, about 22 percent of the worlds undiscovered
conventional oil and natural gas resources based on the US Geological Survey (USGS), ensures that it will be explored. Since the
USGS believes that gas is the predominant resource there the rate of exploration is likely to be slow and deliberate because of the
abundance of on-shore gas production and its current affordable price. But, in the end, the US can either be a leader or laggard in
realizing the economic benefits of exploration. The oil and gas industry has been drilling in hostile environments for decades and in
the North Slope of Alaska since the late 1970s. Exploration there as well as in the North Sea and Iceberg Alley off the coast of Nova
Scotia has provided the experience, knowledge, and technology for drilling in the Arctic Ocean. Companies like Shell, Chevron, and
ExxonMobil, just to name a few, are engineering technology companies. They have the talent, expertise, and the commitment to
operating integrity and excellence to meet the challenges of the Arctic Ocean. Of course, much of the attention being given to the
Arctic Ocean is a result of the government continuing to prohibit exploration in Alaskas coastal plain, which might hold more oil and
gas than Prudhoe Bay where over 11 billion barrels have been produced safely. As we have seen over the past few years, domestic oil
and gas development brings about important economic benefits. While the overall economy has been struggling to create jobs, the oil
and gas industry has been creating them, 150,000 last year according to the energy consulting firm CERA. Those jobs and the
investments that make them possible produce federal and state tax benefits. And, as has been said over and over, a barrel of oil
produced here is a barrel that is not imported from unstable regions of the world. It should be remembered that the oil industry has an
excellent record in offshore exploration and production. Thousands of offshore wells, including deep-water ones, have been safely
drilled around the world. From 1969 to 2010 when the Deepwater Horizon accident occurred, there were no major accidents. That is
an impressive record. Environmental opposition to any energy development in Alaska, the Deep Horizon accident, and the general
hostility of the Obama Administration to oil and gas development are factors that ensure that exploration will be done carefully and
with an abundance of caution. Shell has no doubt demonstrated more than reasonable prudence in its engineering and operating plans
to reduce risks as much as practical. We do not live in a risk free world and no one or company can guarantee otherwise. Our
advances in technology and innovation are the result of risk taking and our standard of living is better because of it. The point made at
the beginning is worth repeating. Arctic Ocean oil resources will be developed. The only open question is by whom?
.
Nuclear power dying now
PennEnergy 12
(Nuclear power output declines in US, 12-12-2012, http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2012/12/nuclear-power-outputdeclines-in-us.html)
Nuclear power output in the United States continued to drop as of December 11, as more reactors went offline or lowered productivity,
according to Bloomberg. Production is 2.4 percent lower than at this time last year, according to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
data, and 11 of the country's 104 reactors were not operating.
Oil and nuclear power do not compete with each otherirrelevant markets
Toph and Rogner 6
(Ferenc L. Toth*, Hans-Holger Rogner Planning and Economic Studies Section, Department of Nuclear Energy, International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future, Energy Economics, 2006)
The current relationship between nuclear power and oil has become distinctly different than it was a few decades ago. At the onset of
the 21st century, nuclear and oil for electricity generation are targeting different electricity market segments with little overlap in the
longer run. Oil for electricity generation in most industrialized countries serves, where not barred for environmental reasons, more the
function of the disposal of residual oil for which no other applications can be found. However, advanced refineries converting larger
portions of the barrel into premium products and stringent environmental regulation F.L. Toth, H.-H. Rogner / Energy Economics 28
(2006) 125 5constrain the use of residual oil for power generation. Other uses of oil products include peak supply, back-up fuel, and
dispersed non-grid generation. These markets have been relative captive for oil but this may change in the future with the advent of
fuel cells. Since nuclear power has no role to play in these captive markets, growth prospects for oil are unaffected by a

nuclear presence in the electricity generating market.

A2 nuclear power da 1ar no tradeoff

Nuclear power does not compete with oil
Toth and Rogner, 6 (Ferenc (Senior Energy Economist in the IAEA's Planning and Economic Studies Section) and Hans-Holger
(Section Head, Planning and Economic Studies Section at the IAEA), Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future, Energy
Economics 28, 2006, pg. 22)
While the past expansion of nuclear energy occurred to the detriment of oil in the power sector, this is no longer the case today
and highly unlikely to reoccur in the future. The respective market structures in which nuclear and oil operate now display little
overlap and an expansion of nuclear power would not impinge on oil sales to power generation. Nuclear supplies base load to large
grid-integrated markets where oil provides some peak supply, back-up capacity, small-scale and non-grid applications. Oils main
markets are the low energy demand intensity rural and remote areas usually with little or no grid integration. In an environmentally
unconstrained future, nuclear power competes primarily against coal and possibly natural gas, depending on how closely natural gas
prices track oil market prices and whether or not gas infrastructures are in place. However, current trends towards electricity market
liberalization relying more on private sector shareholder value maximization create economic barriers to the expansion of present-day
nuclear plants because of their high up-front capital costs and long amortization periods. In the absence of public policy support and/or
the emergence of innovative reactor designs that lower the costs and further improve operating safety, nuclear powers market share
might indeed follow a downward trajectory. Yet there is some evidence to the contrary. The order of the new Olkiluoto reactor in
Finland is based on several studies, each confirming that nuclear generation is the best economic option to satisfy increasing demand
for electricity (WNA, 2004).
No tradeoff
Styles 11, Geoffrey Styles, Managing Director of GSW Strategy Group, LLC, an energy and environmental consulting firm, MBA
and BS in chemistry, 1-29-11, Displacing More Oil from Power Generation, http://energyoutlook.blogspot.com/2011/01/displacingmore-oil-from-power.html
Based on Department of Energy data

the US generated just 0.9% of our electricity from petroleum and its products in the last
43.5 million barrels of
petroleum liquids used in power generation in 2009 represented only 0.6% of the 6.9 billion barrels the US
consumed that year. When you break that sliver down by location, much of it is used for either backup generation or on islands or other remote
locations. In other words, the remaining potential to displace oil from power generation in the US is very small and not
year, with more than a third of that fueled by petroleum coke, a low-value solid byproduct of oil refining. The

necessarily well-suited to the intermittent renewable energy technologies now in favor. (That should change as electric vehicles enter the fleet by the
millions, but that prospect remains some years off, at least.)