MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI vs. THE HON. NELSONIDA T.

ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial

Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
55684.
The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:
In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and
Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of
Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. UlatMarredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.
When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok,
Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly established a
checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it
did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his companions admitted they have
no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi,
and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution" on
the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.
In a Resolution dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated September 27, 1999.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684
assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.
On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that respondent judge did not
commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the search conducted without warrant by the police
officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a Resolution5 dated April 11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe that the subject vehicle
was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.

In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to privacy against unreasonable
intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure
constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.6
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap, we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be
conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is
the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet, and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, we ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or
fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace officers.
The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger jeepney
with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted
vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day,
the police spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad.
A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut
and transport the same.
In People v. Vinecarao, we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down
by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to
justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the
vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of
Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when she ruled that the warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BERNARDO TUAZON Y NICOLAS
For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas," affirming the Decision2 dated 14 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Antipolo
City, Branch 71, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The Information filed against appellant alleged:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses BERNARDO TUAZON y NICOLAS of the crime of Violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A.
6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of March, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each containing 97.92 grams,
95.46 grams, 40.47 grams, 5.36 grams, 5.41 grams, 2.95 grams and 3.17 grams for a total weight of 250.74 grams of white crystalline

substance, which after the corresponding laboratory examination conducted gave positive result to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4
Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.5
The prosecutions version of the case relied heavily on the testimony of PO3 Glenon Bueno (PO3 Bueno) who testified that in the
morning of 7 March 1999, the Antipolo City Police Station received through telephone, a confidential information that a Gemini car
bearing plate number PFC 4116 would deliver an unspecified amount of shabu in Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City. Acting on said tip,
Antipolo City Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana dispatched a team of policemen to the area to conduct a surveillance. When the
team arrived in Marville Subdivision, they saw the said Gemini car and immediately flagged it down. The driver of the car pulled to a
stop and opened a window of said vehicle giving the policemen the opportunity to identify themselves as members of the Antipolo City
Police Station. It was then that PO1 Manuel Padlan (PO1 Padlan) saw a gun tucked on appellants waist. PO1 Padlan inquired about
the gun and appellant allegedly replied it did not belong to him nor could he produce any pertinent document relating to said firearm.
This prompted PO3 Bueno to order appellant to get down from the car. As soon as appellant stepped down from the vehicle, PO3
Bueno saw five plastic sachets on the drivers seat, the contents of which appellant allegedly admitted to be shabu. Appellant was
thereafter immediately brought to the police station.
In the Joint Affidavit executed by PO3 Bueno and PO1 Padlan, it was stated that when they frisked appellant, they discovered "2 big
plastic bag (sic) and 5 medium size plastic (sic) and a 9 mm. pistol marked Parabellum bearing serial number C-9890 with one loaded
magazine with eleven ammunition."7
The white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant was then forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City for examination. The test conducted on the specimen turned over to the crime laboratory yielded the
following:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 through A-7 contains Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.8
Expectedly, appellant presented a vastly different account of the events that led to his indictment. According to him, he used to work as
a caretaker of "Curacha," a beer house/videoke bar located along Circumferential Road, Marville II Subdivision and owned by a certain
Bong Reyes. On 6 March 1999, he reported for work at six oclock in the evening. Later that night, unidentified men walked up to him.
One of these men asked him regarding the ownership of the car parked outside the bar. He allegedly accompanied the men outside so
he could confirm the identity of the owner of the car that the men were inquiring about. Thereupon, the men pointed to him a green
colored Isuzu Gemini car which according to him was driven by his employer, Reyes. After revealing this information to the unidentified
men, the latter purportedly pointed guns at him and ordered him to board an owner-type jeepney. The men allegedly asked him
regarding the whereabouts of Reyes and threatened to include him in whatever trouble Reyes was in. A few hours passed and he was
then brought to the police headquarters where he was asked regarding his address and the name of his employer. After two days, he
was allegedly forced to admit that he was in fact the owner of the Gemini car as well as of the shabu and the gun recovered from said
vehicle. He learned later on that he was charged with violations of Republic Act No. 6425 for illegal possession of shabu and
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearm. The latter case was eventually dismissed. At the end of his direct
examination, appellant reiterated that he should not have been the one charged with illegal possession of shabu, but Reyes who was
driving the Gemini car.
The trial court found the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to support a guilty verdict and imposed upon appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On 17 September 2003, we resolved to accept the appeal interposed by appellant, the records of the case having been forwarded to
this Court by the RTC, Antipolo City, Branch 71. We also required the parties to file their respective briefs.
In addition to the required brief, appellant filed a supplementary pleading in which he questioned the validity of his arrest and the
admissibility of the evidence presented against him. He contends that at the time of his warrantless arrest, he was merely driving within
Marville Subdivision. He had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime which could have justified his
apprehension. He goes on to argue that even if he had waived the issue regarding the validity of his arrest by his failure to raise the
matter before entering his plea, such waiver did not affect the unlawfulness of the search and seizure conducted by the police.
Appellant claims that as the confidential informant had been cooperating with the police for three weeks prior to his arrest, the

authorities were already informed of his identity and his alleged illegal activities. They should have conducted a prior surveillance and
then sought a search warrant from the court. Absent said warrant, the shabu seized from him should be excluded from evidence.
On 23 February 2005, we ordered the transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals conformably with our decision in People v. Mateo,
which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court with respect to direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the October 14, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo City, in Criminal Case No. 99-16114, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals found PO3 Buenos testimony to be "clear and unequivocal"14 and should therefore
prevail over appellants defense of denial.15 The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants contention that he was a victim of
frame-up as this defense has been viewed with disfavor and has become a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.16 It also took note of appellants failure to give any credible reason why the police singled him
out considering that they were strangers to one another prior to the date of the incident.
Appellant is again before this Court pleading his innocence by making a lone assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 16, ARTICLE
III, REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED.
Appellant contends that the trial courts reliance on the prosecutions evidence was erroneous considering that he, as a mere grade
school graduate, could not have concocted his narration of the events that led to his arrest. He also maintains that he was an easy
target of police operatives, since he was a new employee in the videoke bar and was therefore unfamiliar with the people who
frequented said establishment. In addition, he insists that the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty required for
conviction and that the trial court should not have applied the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties on the part of the
police officers.
Appellant likewise points out the trial courts supposed failure to substantiate the factual and legal bases for his conviction. He notes
that the court a quos evaluation of the facts and evidence was contained in only two paragraphs and was utterly lacking in substantial
discussion, in contravention of this Courts edict that the decisions must distinctly and clearly express their factual and legal bases.
On 19 February 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. On 17 April 2007, appellant
filed a Manifestation stating that he would no longer file a supplemental brief as all relevant matters for his defense were already
discussed in his previous pleadings.22 The Office of the Solicitor General likewise manifested that it would no longer file a
supplemental brief.
The appeal must fail.
In insisting that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Bueno, appellant is basically making an issue
about a witnesss credibility. In this regard, we reiterate the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb factual findings of the trial
court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying.24 Thus, unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or
circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal.25 Our careful review of the records of this
case reveals that the trial court did not err in relying on the testimony of PO3 Bueno. In open court, PO3 Bueno recounted their
encounter with appellant as follows:
PROS. LUNA: Thank you, your honor.
Q: Mr. Witness, where were you assigned as police officer sometime in the month of March 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know accused Bernardo Tuazon?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did you come to know him?

A: Because we arrested Bernardo Tuazon.
Q: If the accused in this case is present before this Court, will you please point him out?
A: He is that person wearing yellow T-shirt.
LEGAL RESEARCHER ACTING AS INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to a male person inside the courtroom when confronted give his name as Bernardo Tuazon.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: Do you recall where were you at about 12:10 in the morning of March 7, 1999?
WITNESS:
A: At the Antipolo Police Station, sir.
Q: What were you doing then at that time?
A: We were doing our duty as police investigator, sir.
Q: Who were your companions at that time?
A: PO1 Manuel Padlan, and CA Ronald Naval, sir.
Q: While performing your functions, do you remember any unusual incident at that time?
A: One of our confidential agents gave an information thru telephone, sir.
Q: About what?
A: About delivery of shabu of undetermined amount in the area of Marville Subdivision, Antipolo City, sir.
Q: Do you know that person involved or who is the person supposed to deliver an undetermined amount of "shabu"?
A: The asset did not say who will deliver the shabu but he only said on the telephone that the car is a Gemini bearing plate number PFC
411 who will deliver at said place.
Q: Upon receipt of said information what did you do next?
A: We informed our Chief of Police Major Rene Quintana, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of Major Quintana?
A: Our Chief of Police told us to do surveillance in the area.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We immediately recorded the dispatch and we boarded a marked vehicle and proceeded to the area in Marville Subdivision, sir.
Q: Where is this located?
A: In Barangay San Roque fronting along the highway in Antipolo City.
Q: Upon reaching that place what happened?
A: When we arrived in the subdivision we saw a Gemini car with plate number PFC 411, sir.
Q: If a picture of that car would be shown to you would you be able to identify it?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: I am showing to you a picture already marked as Exhibit B,. B-1 and B-2. What relation has this to the one you mentioned?
A: This is the car where the accused was then on board, sir.
Q: Upon seeing the car what did you do?
A: We immediately conduct a check point, sir.
Q: Specifically, what did you do?
A: We flagged down the vehicle, sir.
Q: What happened after flagging down the car?
A: When we flagged down the vehicle, we identified ourselves as police officers, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver of the vehicle?
A: The driver opened the window and we identified ourselves as members of the Antipolo City Police Station, sir.
Q: What was the reaction of the driver?
A: When he opened the window, PO1 Padlan saw a gun tucked on his waist.
Q: What did you do next? In your case what did you do?
A: We identified ourselves as policem[e]n.
COURT:
Q: Did you know what Padlan did?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: He questioned his gun and it turned out that there is no pertinent document for his gun.
Q: What do you mean "he was asked"? Who was asked?
A: The driver, Bernardo Tuazon, sir.
PROS. LUNA:
Q: What was the reaction of Bernardo Tuazon?
WITNESS:
A: He said that the gun is not his.
Q: Upon hearing that the gun was not owned by Bernardo Tuazon what did you do as police officer?
A: I ordered him to get down from the car.
COURT:
Q: After he got down from the car, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: I saw five (5) plastic bags on the drivers seat.

Q: Upon seeing that plastic bag what did you do?

A: I asked him the contents of that plastic and he replied that it contained shabu, sir.
Q: What did you do upon hearing the answer of the accused?
A: We immediately brought him to the headquarters together with the evidence, sir.
Q: What did you do with the "shabu"?
A: We brought it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, sir.
Q: What was the result of the examination, if you know?
A: It gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride sir.26
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing testimony of PO3 Bueno establishes beyond reasonable doubt appellants
culpability. His testimony regarding the circumstances that occurred in the early hours of 7 March 1999 from the moment their office
received a confidential tip from their informer up to the time they accosted appellant deserved to be given significance as it came from
the mouth of a law enforcement officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are
presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary or that they were moved by ill-will.
Appellants bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. It is wellsettled that positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.28 A defense of denial which is
unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters.29 Denial is
an inherently weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
We shall now resolve the issue raised by appellant regarding the admissibility of the physical evidence presented against him. No less
than our Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This right is encapsulated in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Complementing this provision is the so-called exclusionary rule embodied in Section 3(2) of the same article
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
It is recognized, however, that these constitutional provisions against warrantless searches and seizures admit of certain exceptions, as
follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
In the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing,32 this Court had the occasion to elucidate on the rationale for the exemption of searches of
moving vehicles from the requirement of search warrant, thus:
[T]he rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of
smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add
that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to moving vehicles does not give the police authorities
unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional
stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could amount to outright harassment. Surely, the
policy consideration behind the exemption of search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police

authorities. In recognition of the possible abuse, jurisprudence dictates that at all times, it is required that probable cause exist in order
to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,34 the term "probable cause" was explained to mean
[A] reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause
that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of the case.
When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
In this case, we hold that the police had probable cause to effect the warrantless search of the Gemini car driven by appellant. A
confidential informer tipped them off that said car was going to deliver shabu at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo
City police sent a team to Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer turned out to be correct
as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it was said to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun
tucked in appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of said firearm which all the more
strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing
white powdery substance. These circumstances, taken together, are sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless search of
the Gemini car and the eventual admission into evidence of the plastic packets against appellant.
In any case, appellant failed to timely object to the admissibility of the evidence against him on the ground that the same was obtained
through a warrantless search. His failure amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by the police. It was only proper for the trial court to admit said evidence.
Appellant also faults the trial court for its failure to abide by the Constitutional requirement that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." Again, we disagree.
Faithful adherence to the aforementioned constitutional provision is a vital component of due process and fair play. The rule takes an
even more important significance for the losing party who is entitled to know why he lost so that he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision needs to be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who
is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
In this case, we find that the assailed decision of the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of the Constitution. The
decision contained a summary of the facts of the case as presented by the prosecution and by the defense. It likewise contained an
explanation as to why it found appellant guilty as charged. Admittedly, the decision is brief but to our mind, it sufficiently informed
appellant as regards the bases for his conviction. It readily informs appellant that the trial court disregarded his defense of bare denial in
favor of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties enjoyed by police officers.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01799 dated 31 July 2006, finding
appellant Bernardo Tuazon y Nicolas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BELEN MARIACOS

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant
Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport, deliver
7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or
office. CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted from a passenger jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to
the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence of
marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena
Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police
station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The
group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the
checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to
conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network
who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The
agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He
then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice
who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself
as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police
station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor
arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round
bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The
laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellants turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney
bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her
neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she

was persuaded later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed
accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2
Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When they were at the police
station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags
which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained
in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in
the presence of the Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite
its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc
when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that
PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched
earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending police
officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990,
which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The
said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after
seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative,
who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt
on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items
allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and
the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from
their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued
that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" upon
arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the bricks of
marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that
physical inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was
practicable.
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.12 It held that the
prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the
police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that
contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was
already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant
carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc
looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no
one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal
drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network,
PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the
ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents
of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the
motor vehicle had already left the locality.
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years,
this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper
and which are not.
Appellants main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She claims that her
constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of
appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to
justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Bagista, the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to
a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible
for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid
only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary
that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of
probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the
articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where
moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him
to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellants arrest, the police received information that marijuana was
to be transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of
October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the
packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the
Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to
carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug,
without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another." There is no definitive moment when an accused
"transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation
itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support
a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.
Moreover, appellants possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption that she is the owner
of the packages and their contents. Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she
had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry
some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant
said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him
the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged that the
apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The
dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as

well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police station. At the station, the police
requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of
appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag
yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley
Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no
representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with
Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station where she stayed
while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and
sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of
custody from the time of appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not
necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain
unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.38 Even assuming
that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have
moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on
the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they
are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.
In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellants guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

RODEL LUZ y ONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 dated 18 February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to
flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost
in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in
size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon
his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two
(2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner
testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs committed on 10 March 2003.
It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found his defense of
frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and
destruction in accordance with law. SO ORDERED.
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a
Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed
its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED
UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there
was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even
assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for
violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the
City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time
when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the
part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their
presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the
said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire
case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse
the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making
the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:

SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and
issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension
and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during
the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in
hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable:
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention
to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not
fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of
the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if
any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once
having stopped, to drive away without permission.
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the
doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that
powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he sees a
policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while
the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation,
which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators
the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police.
To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in
deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any
suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic
stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California
v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is

subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections
prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of
the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and
neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner
here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or
charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made
for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation
and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for
the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into
confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the
individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after
the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the
drugsas he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk"
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to ap
lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was
merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the

State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning,
accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes
suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein
held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only
conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these
underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from
issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial
arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of
the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic
stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal
arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating
evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at
110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full
fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and
protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any
passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032,
1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial
arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence.
Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained.
No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of
the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during
the illegal warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming
the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2009 Decision 1 and the March 9, 2010
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957, which affirmed the September 1, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City, (RTC) in Criminal Case No .. C-73029, finding petitioner Margarita Ambre y Cayuni (Ambre)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
THE FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against Ambre, and co-accused, Bernie Castro (Castro) and Kaycee Mendoza (Mendoza), before
the RTC charging them with illegal possession of drug paraphernalia docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73028, and illegal use of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-73029. The Informations indicting the
accused read:
Criminal Case No. C-73028
That on or about 20th day of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) rolled aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE), one (1) folded aluminum foil strip containing traces of white crystalline substance, (METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE) and two (2) disposable plastic lighters, knowing the same are paraphernalias instruments apparatus fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous drug (METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE) into
the body.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. C-73029
That on or about the 20th of April 2005 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use and sniff Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), knowing the same to be a dangerous drug
under the provisions of the above-cited law.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, Castro and Mendoza pleaded guilty to both charges. Consequently, they were meted the penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months and a fine of P25,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-73028. For their
conviction in Criminal Case No. C-73029, the RTC ordered their confinement at the Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents (CUREDD) for a period of six (6) months.

Ambre, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.7 Trial on the merits ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), PO1 Ronald Allan Mateo (PO1 Mateo), PO2
Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), and P/Insp. Jessie dela Rosa (P/Insp. dela Rosa), it appeared that on April 20, 2005, the Caloocan
Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a
certain Abdulah Sultan (Sultan) and his wife Ina Aderp (Aderp) were engaged in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential
compound in Caloocan City; that the buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao (Tagoranao);
that Sultan ran away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in the
course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, the police operatives found Ambre, Castro
and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre, in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be shabu in a rolled up
aluminum foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal
use of shabu.
The items confiscated from the three were marked and, thereafter, submitted for laboratory examination. Physical Science Report No.
DT-041-05 to DT-043-05 stated that the urine samples taken from Ambre and her coaccused were positive for the presence of shabu
while Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 showed that the items seized from them were all found positive for traces of shabu.
The Version of the Defense
Ambre vehemently denied the charges against her. Through the testimonies of Ambre, Mendoza and Lily Rosete (Rosete), the defense
claimed that on the afternoon of April 20, 2005, Ambre was inside the residential compound in Caloocan to buy malong; that her mother
asked Rosete to accompany her because Rosetes daughter-in-law, Nancy Buban (Buban), was a resident of Phase 12, Caloocan City,
an area inhabited by Muslims; that when they failed to buy malong, Rosete and Buban left her inside the residential compound to look
for other vendors; that ten minutes later, the policemen barged inside the compound and arrested her; that she was detained at the
Caloocan City Jail where she met Castro, Mendoza and Tagoranao; and that she was not brought to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory for drug testing.
Rosete further testified that after she had left Ambre inside the compound to find other malong vendors, she returned fifteen minutes
later and learned that the policemen had arrested people inside the compound including Ambre.
Mendoza, who was convicted in Criminal Case No. C-73029, claimed that no pot session took place on the afternoon of April 20, 2005.
She averred that she and Ambre were merely inside the residential compound, when policemen suddenly came in and pointed guns at
them.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 1, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of
Ambre for illegal use of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The RTC, however,
acquitted her of the crime of violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for failure of the prosecution to prove with particularity the
drug paraphernalia found in her possession. The trial court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. C- 73028, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI not guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 12,
Article II, RA 9165;
2) In Crim. Case No. C-73029, finding accused MARGARITA AMBRE Y CAYUNI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 15, Art. II RA 9165 and hereby sentences her to be confined and rehabilitated at the government rehabilitation center
in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for a period of six (6) months. The six (6) month period of rehabilitation shall commence only from the
time that she is brought inside the rehabilitation center and its promulgation by this court for which the accused shall be notified.
The shabu subject of these cases is hereby confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with the rules
governing the same.
Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, Ambre appealed the judgment of conviction before the CA professing her innocence of the crime. On November 26, 2009,
the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 123, Caloocan City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ambre's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its March 9, 2010 Resolution. Hence, she filed this petition
THE ISSUES
Ambre raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER ON APRIL 20, 2005 (THAT
YIELDED ALLEGED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA) CONFORMED WITH THE MANDATED LEGAL PROCEDURES IN CONDUCTING A
BUY-BUST OPERATION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARREST OF AND THE SEARCH DONE AGAINST THE PETITIONER WERE PART AND PARCEL OF
THE DISMISSED AND DISCREDITED BUY-BUST OPERATIONS OF THE POLICE AND/OR "FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE"
AND HENCE, WERE ILLEGAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE THAT WERE SEIZED DURING THE ILLEGAL BUY-BUST OPERATION
ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE EXCLUSION OR DISREGARD OF THE FAVORABLE TESTIMONY OF PETITIONER'S WITNESS,
HER CO-ACCUSED, KAYCEE MENDOZA, ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER EARLIER PLED GUILTY TO SUCH ILLEGAL
USE, HAD VIOLATED THE RULE ON INTER ALIOS ACTA UNDER SECTION 26, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S PENALTY OF SIX (6) MONTHS REHABILITATION IN A GOVERNMENT CENTER IS
A NULLITY GIVEN THE LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST AS REQUIRED UNDER R.A. 9165 ("COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT OF 2002").
A perusal of the pleadings filed by the parties leads the Court to conclude that the case revolves on the following core issues:
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid; and
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence.
Essentially, Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no offense was being
committed at the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of Sultan. She argues that
the alleged "hot pursuit" on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a
pot session, was more imaginary than real. In this regard, Ambre cites the April 29, 2005 Resolution of the Prosecutor's Office of
Caloocan City dismissing the case against Aderp and Sultan for insufficiency of evidence because the April 20, 2005 buy-bust
operation was highly suspicious and doubtful. She posits that the items allegedly seized from her were inadmissible in evidence being
fruits of a poisonous tree. She claims that the omission of the apprehending team to observe the procedure outlined in R.A. No. 9165
for the seizure of evidence in drugs cases significantly impairs the prosecutions case. Lastly, Ambre maintains that she was not
subjected to a confirmatory test and, hence, the imposition of the penalty of six months rehabilitation was not justified.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision for failure of Ambre to show
that the RTC committed any error in convicting her of illegal use of shabu. The OSG insists that Ambre was lawfully arrested in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. It is of the opinion that the credible and compelling evidence of the
prosecution could not be displaced by the empty denial offered by Ambre.
THE COURT'S RULING

The conviction of Ambre stands.

Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search
and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law,
it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence
is search incident to a lawful arrest.15 In this exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and
his belongings. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and, thus, can be
lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by
Castro.17 Ambre, however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is
specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even
granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful
the arrest of Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly, PO2
Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal
use of methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
To write finis to the issue of validity and irregularity in her warrantless arrest, the Court holds that Ambre is deemed to have waived her
objections to her arrest for not raising them before entering her plea.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise lawful.
After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Ambre, together with Castro and
Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were found positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in
Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05. It was likewise found that the items seized from the three were all positive for
traces of shabu as contained in Physical Science Report No. D-149-05 dated April 21, 2005. These findings were unrebutted.
Ambre's assertion that her conviction was incorrect, because the evidence against her was obtained in violation of the procedure laid
down in R.A. No. 9165, is untenable.

While ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible
to obtain an unbroken chain.20 This Court, however, has consistently held that the most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.21 In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drug paraphernalia had not been compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to
submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's
arrest illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible.
Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following items were confiscated from them: one (1)
unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded
piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon
arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned over the seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of
the former. All the pieces of evidence were placed inside an improvised envelope marked as "SAID-SOU EVIDENCE 04-20-05." With
the Request for Laboratory Examination, PO2 Hipolito brought the confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory and delivered them
to P/Insp. dela Rosa, a forensic chemist, who found all the items, except the disposable lighters, positive for traces of shabu. Verily, the
prosecution had adduced ample evidence to account for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized items.
Even if the Court strikes down the seized drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu as inadmissible, Ambre will not be exculpated from
criminal liability. First, let it be underscored that proof of the existence and possession by the accused of drug paraphernalia is not a
condition sine qua non for conviction of illegal use of dangerous drugs. The law merely considers possession of drug paraphernalia as
prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, ingested or used a dangerous drug and creates a presumption that he has
violated Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165.
Secondly, the testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the commission of the crime charged
in the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. At this juncture, the Court affirms the RTC's finding that the police
officers' testimonies deserve full faith and credit. Appellate courts, generally, will not disturb the trial court's assessment of a witness'
credibility unless certain material facts and circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.23 The Court finds no reason
to deviate from this rule in this case.
Likewise, the Court upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The presumption remains because the
defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were
inspired by an improper motive. The presumption was not overcome as there was no showing that PO3 Moran, PO1 Mateo, PO2
Hipolito, and P/Insp. dela Rosa were impelled with improper motive to falsely impute such offense against Ambre.
As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the defense of denial offered by Ambre must simply fail. Bare denials
cannot prevail over positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses.24 Besides, this Court has held in a catena of cases that
the defense of denial or frame-up has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard
ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Finally, Ambre contends that the penalty of six months of rehabilitation in a government center imposed on her was a nullity, in view of
the alleged lack of confirmatory test. The Court is not persuaded.
It must be emphasized that in no instance did Ambre challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of confirmatory drug test conducted
on her. Ambre only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed her conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day for her
to do so. Wellentrenched is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic
rules of fair play and justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed November 26, 2009 Decision and the March 9, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31957 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Belocura
The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession of marij11ana under Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, depends on the integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its
presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The Case

Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in violation of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime charged on April 22,
2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P 500,000.00.1
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction on January 23, 2006.2 Hence, this final appeal for his acquittal.
Antecedents
Belocura was charged on April 13, 1999 by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with a violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, in the Manila RTC through the information:
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) plastic bag colored red and white, with label "SHIN TON
YON", containing the following:
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 830.532 grams;
One (1) newspaper leaf used to wrap one (1) brick of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 959.291 grams.
With a total weight of 1,789.823 grams, a prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.3
After Belocura pleaded not guilty,4 the State presented three witnesses, namely: Insp. Arlene Valdez Coronel, Chief Insp. Ferdinand
Ortales Divina, and SPO1 Gregorio P. Rojas. On the other hand, the Defense presented Belocura as its sole witness.
I. The States Evidence
On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the Western Police District
(WPD) on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a call from a male person who refused to identify himself for fear of
reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior
officer, he was immediately ordered to form a team composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the
Special Weapons and Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before 1:00 pm. Chief Insp.
Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type
jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of
the car plate were painted white. The driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for
verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocuras jeep until they blocked its
path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached the
jeep and introduced themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas
confiscated Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine when
he could not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate. They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the drivers seat. Chief Insp. Divina directed PO2 Santos
to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and
the red plastic bag with its contents to the General Assignment Section for proper disposition.5
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were in civilian clothes at the
time; that it was PO2 Santos who recovered the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the
contents of the bag in his presence.6
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation.7 He conceded that he was not present when the red plastic bag containing the bricks
of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time only at the police station.8
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received from the General Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic bag
labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually wrapped in newspaper at about
12:30 pm of March 23, 1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed 830.532 grams while the other bore the marking "RB2" and weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823 grams. She conducted a chemical examination of the marijuana bricks

pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of three
qualitative examinations that the submitted specimen tested positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug.9
II. Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied the charge. His version, which differed from that of the Prosecution, was as follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of duty from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm.
At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-type jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He
introduced himself to them as a police officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him, and confiscated the
memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members
of the CIS. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where they locked him up in a room that looked
like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged involvement in a robbery hold-up. They informed him of the drugrelated charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for the first time only in court.
He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found under the drivers seat of his jeep on account of the
clearance from the flooring being only about three inches. At the time of his arrest, he was in Type-B uniform (i.e., blue pants with white
side piping and blue T-shirt) because he was reporting to work that afternoon. Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly
because he had incurred the ire of a superior; that it was not unusual for a policeman like him to incur the ire of a superior officer or a
fellow policeman; that he had arrested a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct 2, but the suspect turned out
to be the nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that on the day following the
arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release of the suspect (ina-arbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain
Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn
that the suspect had already been released.10
Belocura did not personally know Chief Insp. Divina prior to his arrest,11 or the other arresting policemen. He mentioned that his ownertype jeep had been assembled in 1995, and that he had attached the plate number assigned to his old vehicle pending the registration
of the jeep despite knowing that doing so was a violation of law; and that the incident involving the arrest of the nephew of Captain
Sukila was the only reason he could think of why charges were filed against him.12
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did not see the bricks of marijuana whether at the time of his arrest, or at the police
precinct, or during the inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that while the drivers seat were fixed to the jeep, the bricks of
marijuana could nevertheless be placed under the drivers seat only if pressed hard enough, but in that case the wrappings would get
torn because the wirings of the car underneath the seat were exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks of marijuana were
intact.13
On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine
of P 500,000.00.14
As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.
Issues
Belocura now submits that:16
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PHYSICIAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE DRIED BRICKS OF MARIJUANA PLACED UNDER THE
DRIVERS SEAT (sic).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE
TO THE ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal use of a

government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against
illegal search and seizure protected under Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17 and that the bricks of
marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Belocuras arrest and the ensuing search of the jeep were valid, the search
being incidental to a valid, albeit warrantless, arrest; that the arresting policemen had a reasonable ground to effect his warrantless
arrest; that it became their duty following the lawful arrest to conduct the warrantless search not only of the person of Belocura as the
arrestee but also of the areas within his reach, which then resulted in the recovery of the dried bricks of marijuana from under the
drivers seat; and that any irregularity attendant to the arrest was cured by Belocuras failure to object to the validity of his arrest before
entering his plea and by his submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC when he entered his plea and participated in the trial.18
Ruling
After a meticulous examination of the records, the Court concludes that a reversal of the conviction is justified and called for.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of
personal security and privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in
Section 2 of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are
circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may be
lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following exceptions,
namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;19 (b) seizure
of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk
situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search
warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating bricks of marijuana were in
violation of his aforementioned rights under the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the illegal use of
a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no probable cause to search his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code).21
In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive
identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves
the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."22 Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a crime

in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under the first
category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became
cloaked with the authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his
reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the
arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest
could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.23
In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the fact of
possession of the marijuana bricks. An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of
the crime charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the accused is in possession
of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.24 What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of
the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness,
being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2 Santos, a member of the team, who had discovered
and had actually recovered the red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep.
The Prosecution also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided no direct evidence about the possession by
Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and actually stated that he did not witness the recovery of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura.
On further examination, SPO1 Rojas reiterated that he did not actually witness the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocuras
possession.
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict
him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their
testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts
that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own perception.31
Indeed, only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocuras illegal possession of the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divinas account
was to be believed. Surprisingly, the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos as a witness
against Belocura.
Nonetheless, the OSG contends that the State had no need to present PO2 Santos because his testimony would only be corroborative;
and that the testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas sufficed to establish Belocuras guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSGs contention is grossly erroneous.
As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the marijuana bricks from Belocuras vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow
arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecutions only witness who could have reliably established the recovery from Belocura of
the marijuana bricks contained in the red plastic bag labeled as "SHIN TON YON." Without PO2 Santos testimony, Chief Insp. Divinas
declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red plastic bag from under the drivers seat of Belocuras jeep was worthless. The
explanation why none of the other police officers could credibly attest to Belocuras possession of the marijuana bricks was that they
were at the time supposedly performing different tasks during the operation. Under the circumstances, only PO2 Santos was competent
to prove Belocuras possession.
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The omission
naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were
planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence
from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That account goes to the weight of evidence.32
It is not enough that the evidence offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to and
tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection with the

transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of
evidence are important.33
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from
Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court. That linkage
was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination
were the same marijuana allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to
the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that
unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose core was the confiscated
prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.371wphi1
The chain-of-custody requirement ensures that all doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.38The requirement has
come to be associated with prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002),39 by reason of
Section 2140 of Republic Act No. 9165 expressly regulating the actual custody and disposition of confiscated and surrendered
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors, essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia, and laboratory equipment. Section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 issued by the Dangerous Drugs Board pursuant to its mandate
under Section 94 of Republic Act No. 9165 reiterates the requirement, stating:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
That this case was a prosecution brought under Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, did not matter. The chain-of-custody requirement applied under both laws by virtue of the universal need to competently and
sufficiently establish the corpus delicti. It is basic under the Rules of Court, indeed, that evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon,
or have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be established by one party or disproved by the other.41 The test of relevancy is
whether an item of evidence will have any value, as determined by logic and experience, in proving the proposition for which it is
offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue, or corroborate other relevant
evidence. The test is satisfied if there is some logical connection either directly or by inference between the fact offered and the fact to
be proved.42
The chain of custody is essential in establishing the link between the article confiscated from the accused to the evidence that is
ultimately presented to the court for its appreciation. As the Court said in Mallillin v. People:43
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of
custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise
obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words,
the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise
notdictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.44
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura of the red plastic bag said to contain the
marijuana bricks. The first link was immediately missing because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only person with
direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks. Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were
really taken from the jeep of Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by PO2 Santos to another
officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp. Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the
marijuana bricks were turned over to the General Assignment Section for investigation. That was all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas

testimony contributed nothing to the establishment of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from
Belocura. As for the subsequent links, the records45 showed that the marijuana bricks were forwarded to the General Assignment
Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution did not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who
received the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from whom the receiving officer received the marijuana
bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of the marijuana bricks,46 which were
thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the
marijuana bricks from the arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or the day following
Belocuras arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person from whom
Chief Insp. Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.
Sadly, the Prosecution did not establish the links in the chain of custody. This meant that the corpus delicti was not credibly proved.
This further meant that the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks might easily be open to doubt and suspicion, and thus the
incriminatory evidence would not stand judicial scrutiny.
Thirdly, Belocuras denial assumed strength in the face of the Prosecutions weak incriminating evidence. In that regard, Belocura
denied possession of the marijuana bricks and knowledge of them as well.
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt,
no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. Every evidence favoring him must be duly considered. Indeed, the
presumption of innocence in his favor was not overcome. Hence, his acquittal should follow, for, as the Court fittingly said in Patula v.
People:48
xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of
the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not
anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence,
the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for
as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying
the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.49
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 23, 2006; ACQUIT accused REYNALDO
BELOCURA y PEREZ for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; DIRECT the immediate release from
detention of REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, unless he is also detained for some other lawful cause; and ORDER the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections to forthwith implement this decision upon receipt and to report his action hereon to this Court within 10 days
from receipt. No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Martinez vs People
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Centiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the June 30, 2011 Decision2 and September
20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. (unreadable part) which affirmed the April 30, 2009 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 2 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08(unreadable part) convicting petitioner Ramon Martinez y
Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez (Ramon) of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Factual Antecedents
At around 9:15 in the evening of December 29, 2007, PO2 Roberto Soque (PO2 Soque), PO2 Alejandro Cepe(PO2 Cepe) and
PO3Edilberto Zeta (PO3 Zeta), who wereall assigned tothe Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) Section of the Malate Police Station 9
(Police Station 9), conducted a routine foot patrol along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila. In the process, they heard a man shouting
"Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" Forpurportedly violating Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (Manila City
Ordinance)which punishes breaches of the peace, the man, later identified as Ramon,was apprehended and asked to empty his
pockets. In the course thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a small transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected to beshabu.PO2 Soque confiscated the sachet and brought Ramon to Police Station 9 where the
former markedthe item with the latters initials, "RMG." There, Police Superintendent Ferdinand RicafrenteQuirante(PSuptQuirante)

prepared a request for laboratory examination which, together with the specimen, was brought by PO2 Soque to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.
Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Erickson Calabocal (PSInspCalabocal)examinedthe specimen which contained 0.173 gram of
white crystalline substanceand found the same positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Consequently, Ramon was charged with possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165 throughan
Information dated January 3, 2008 which states:
That on or about December 29, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law to possess
any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ONE SEVEN THREE (0.173) gram of white crystalline
substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as SHABU, a dangerous drug.5
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and gave his version of the incident. He narrated that on December 29, 2007, at around 4:00 in
the afternoon, whilewalking alongBalingkit Street to borrow a welding machine from one Paez Garcia, a man in civilian clothing
approached and asked him if he is Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was immediately handcuffed by the man who
eventually introduced himself as a police officer. Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar) wherethe said officer asked him if he was
carrying illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter, PO2 Soquepropositioned Ramon
and asked for P20,000.00 in exchange for his release.When Ramons wife,AmaliaGoco, was unable to produce the 20,000.00 which
PO2 Soquehad asked for, he (Ramon) was brought to the Manila City Hall for inquest proceedings.
The RTC Ruling
In its April 30, 2009 Decision, the RTCconvicted Ramon of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs as charged, finding all its
elements tohave been established through the testimonies of the prosecutionsdisinterested witnesses. In this relation,it alsoupheld the
legality of Ramons warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City Ordinance during
the time of his apprehension. Consequently, Ramon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment oftwelve (12) years and one
(1) day as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum and to pay a fine of 300,000.00. Aggrieved, Ramon
elevated his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its June 30, 2011 Decision,the CA denied Ramons appeal and thereby affirmedhis conviction. Itupheld the factual findings of the
RTC which found that the elements of the crime of possession of dangerous drugs were extant, to wit: (1) that the accused is in
possession of a prohibited drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.6
Likewise, the CA sustained the validity of the body search made on Ramon as an incident of alawful warrantless arrest for breach of the
peace which he committed in the presence of the police officers, notwithstanding its (the case for breach of the peace)subsequent
dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Moreover, the CAobserved that every link in the chain of custody of the prohibited drug wassufficiently establishedfrom the time
PO2Soque took the sameup to its actual presentation in court.
Finally, it did not give credence to Ramons claim of extortion as his asseverationsfailed to overcome the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the police officers official duties.
The Issue
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC convicting Ramon of the crime
of possession of dangerous drugs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Enshrined in the fundamental law is a persons right against unwarranted intrusions by the government. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) states that:
Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by government authoritiesin
contraventionof the foregoingarerendered inadmissible in evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute and rigid one.7 As found in
jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches,8 searches of moving vehicles,9 seizure of evidence in plain view,10
consented searches,11 "stop and frisk" measures12 andsearches incidental to a lawful arrest.13 This last-mentioned exception is of
particular significance to this case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court14 which requires that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arresta person
caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure,the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.15 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.16 In this
light, the determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents.
Records show that PO2 Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance which provides as
follows:
Sec. 844. Breaches of the Peace. No person shall make, and, countenance, or assist in making any riot, affray, disorder,
disturbance, or breach of the peace; or assault, beat or use personal violence upon another without just cause in any public place; or
utter any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibit or display any emblem, transparency, representation,
motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; or do any act, in any public place, meeting or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturbance or disquiet any congregation
engaged in any lawful assembly.
PENALTY: Imprisonment of not more than six (6) months and / or fine not more than Two Hundred pesos (PHP 200.00)
As may be readily gleaned, the foregoing ordinancepenalizes the following acts: (1) making, countenancing, or assisting in making any
riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; (2) assaulting, beating or using personal violence upon another without just
cause in any public place; (3) uttering any slanderous, threatening or abusive language or expression or exhibiting or displaying any
emblem, transparency, representation, motto, language, device, instrument, or thing; and (4) doing any act, in any public place, meeting
or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot, or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose, or
disturbance or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly. Evidently, the gravamen of these offenses is the disruption
of communal tranquillity. Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the same, it must be established that the apprehension was
effected after a reasonable assessment by the police officer that a public disturbance is being committed.
Clearly, a perusal of the foregoing testimony negates the presence of probable cause when the police officers conducted their
warrantless arrest of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of shouting in a thickly-populated place, with many people conversing with each other on the
street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance as above-quoted. Ramon was not
making or assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or using personal
violence upon another; and, the words he allegedly shouted "Putanginamo! Limangdaannabaito?" are not slanderous, threatening or
abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street
was still teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, it bears stressing that no one present at the place of arrest ever complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the public. On the
contrary, a disinterested member of the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal) even testified that Ramon was merely standing in
front of the store of a certain MangRomy when a man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2 Soque, approached Ramon,
immediately handcuffed and took him away.19

In its totality, the Court observes that these facts and circumstances could not have engendereda well-founded belief that any breach of
the peace had been committed by Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was effected. All told, noprobable cause existedto
justify Ramons warrantless arrest.
Indeed, while it is true that the legality of arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or functionary to whom the law at
the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his
liberty,20 this should not be exercised in a whimsical manner, else a persons liberty be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. Aslaw enforcers,
it is largely expectedof them to conduct a more circumspect assessment of the situation at hand. The determination of probable cause
is not a blanket-license to withhold liberty or to conduct unwarranted fishing expeditions. It demarcates the line between legitimate
human conduct on the one hand, and ostensible criminal activity, on the other. In this respect, it must be performedwisely and
cautiously, applying the exacting standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed rightslie at
the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be (unreadable portion)
Consequently, as it cannot be said that Ramon was validly arrested the warantless search that resulted from it was also illegal. Thus,
the subject shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is inadmissible in evidence for being the (unreadable portion)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011 Decision and September 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. (unreadable part) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y Martinez is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Rom
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 9 August 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 affirming with modification the
Decision2 dated 24 June 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062, CBU55063 and CBU-55067, finding herein appellant Vicente Rom guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 153 (illegal sale of
shabu), 15-A4 (maintenance of a drug den) and 165 (illegal possession of shabu), Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.6 In Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063, for
respectively violating Sections 15 and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court imposed on the appellant the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium period ranging between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months, as maximum. While in Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, that is for violating Section 15-A, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the trial court sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua and he was likewise ordered to pay a
fine of P500,000.00. The Court of Appeals, however, modified and reduced the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU55063 to an imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In three separate Informations7 all dated 1 September 2000, the appellant was charged with violation of Sections 15, 15-A and 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The three Informations read:
Criminal Case No. CBU-55062
That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about 10:30 P.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [herein appellant], with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there sell, deliver or give
away to a poseur buyer one (1) heat sealed plastic packet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 gram locally known as "shabu",
containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug.8 (Emphasis and italics supplied).
Criminal Case No. CBU-55063
That on or about the 31st day of August 2000, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [appellant], with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in [his] possession and
control or use the following:

Four (4) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing 0.15 gram locally known as "shabu", containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.9 (Emphasis and italics
supplied).
Criminal Case No. CBU-55067
That on the 31s[t] day of August, 2000, at about 10:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [appellant], with deliberate intent, did then and there knowingly maintain a den for regulated users along the interior portion of
Barangay T. Padilla in violation to (sic) the provision of Sec. 15-A of Art. III of RA 6425.10 (Emphasis supplied).
On arraignment, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY11 to all the charges. A pre-trial
conference was conducted on 2 April 2001, but no stipulation or agreement was arrived at.12 The pre-trial conference was then
terminated and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer 2 Marvin Martinez (PO2 Martinez), the designated poseur-buyer; PO3 Franco
Mateo Yanson (PO3 Yanson); and Police Senior Inspector Marvin Sanchez (P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez), the team leader of the buy-bust
operation against the appellant. They were all assigned at the Vice Control Section of the Cebu City Police Office (VCS-CCPO). The
testimony, however, of P/Sr. Insp. Mutchit G. Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas), the forensic analyst, was dispensed13 with in view of the
admission made by the defense as to the authenticity and due existence of Chemistry Report No. D-1782-200014 dated 1 September
2000 and the expertise of the forensic analyst.
The prosecutions evidence established the following facts:
Two weeks prior to 31 August 2000, the VCS-CCPO received confidential information from their informant that alias Dodong, who
turned out later to be the appellant, whose real name is Vicente Rom, was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu and also maintained a
drug den at his residence in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City. Thus, the VCS-CCPO, particularly PO2 Martinez, conducted surveillance
and monitoring operation.15
On 31 August 2000, at around 10:15 p.m., P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez, Chief of VCS-CCPO, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
against the appellant. The buy-bust team was composed of PO2 Martinez (poseur-buyer), Senior Police Officer 1 Jesus Elmer
Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez), PO3 Yanson, PO3 Benicer Tamboboy (PO3 Tamboboy), PO3 Jaime Otadoy (PO3 Otadoy) and P/Sr.
Insp. Sanchez (team leader). Being the designated poseur-buyer, PO2 Martinez was provided with a P100.00 peso bill and a P10.00
peso bill buy-bust money bearing Serial Nos. AD336230 and AM740786, respectively, and both were marked with the initials of PO2
Martinez, i.e. "MM." The former amount would be used to buy shabu while the latter amount would serve as payment for the use of the
drug den.16
After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target area and upon arrival there at around 10:20 p.m., PO2 Martinez proceeded
directly to the appellants house, which was earlier pointed to by their informant, who was also with them during the buy-bust operation.
The rest of the buy-bust team strategically positioned themselves nearby. Once PO2 Martinez reached the appellants house, he
knocked on the door, which the appellant opened. PO2 Martinez subsequently told the appellant that he wanted to buy shabu worth
P100.00. The appellant looked around to check if PO2 Martinez had a companion. Seeing none, the appellant took out his wallet from
his pocket and got one heat-sealed plastic packet containing white crystalline substance, later confirmed to be shabu, and gave it to
PO2 Martinez. The latter, in turn, gave the P100.00 peso bill marked money to the appellant. While this sale transaction was going on,
PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez were only five to eight meters away from PO2 Martinez and the appellant. P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez
clearly witnessed the sale transaction as it happened right outside the door of the appellants house.17
Afterwards, PO2 Martinez told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the shabu, so the latter required the former to pay an additional
amount of P10.00 as rental fee for the use of his place. After paying the said amount, the appellant allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his
house. Once inside the house, PO2 Martinez was directed by the appellant to proceed to the room located at the right side of the sala.
Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three persons, later identified to be Jose Delloso (Delloso), Danilo Empuerto
(Empuerto) and Arnie Ogong (Ogong), already sniffing shabu.18
Thereupon, PO2 Martinez made a missed call to P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez, which was their pre-arranged signal, to signify that the whole
transaction was consummated. After the lapsed of about 10 to 15 seconds, the rest of the team, who were just few meters away from
the appellants house, barged in and identified themselves as police officers. PO2 Martinez then told PO3 Yanson to hold the appellant.
PO3 Yanson grabbed the appellant and made a body search on the latter that led to the recovery of four heat-sealed transparent plastic
packets containing white crystalline substance, which were inside the appellants brown wallet that was tucked in his pocket; the buybust money consisting of P100.00 peso bill and P10.00 peso bill; and P280.00 consisting of two P100.00 peso bills, one P50.00 peso
bill and three P10.00 peso bills believed to be the proceeds of the appellants illegal activities. The one heat-sealed plastic packet of
shabu bought by PO2 Martinez from the appellant remained in the possession of the former.19

The appellant, Delloso, Empuerto and Ogong were informed of their constitutional rights and were later brought by the buy-bust team to
their office, together with the confiscated items, for documentation. At the office of the buy-bust team, the confiscated items were given
to their investigator, SPO1 Fernandez, who marked the one heat-sealed plastic packet containing white crystalline substance, which
was the subject of the sale transaction, with VRR-8-31-2000-01 (buy-bust) while the other four heat-sealed plastic packets containing
white crystalline substance, which were recovered from the appellant, were similarly marked with VRR-8-31-2000-02 to VRR-8-312000-05. The "VRR" in the markings are the initials of the appellant, i.e., Vicente Ramonida Rom.20
Thereafter, all the five heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance, together with the Request for Laboratory
Examination, were brought by PO3 Yanson to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which
examination yielded positive results for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu,"21 as evidenced by Chemistry
Report No. D-1782-2000.22
For its part, the defense presented the appellant and Teresita Bitos, whose testimonies consist of sheer denials. Their version of the 31
August 2000 incident is as follows:
At around 10:15 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. of 31 August 2000, the appellant was at the house of his daughter, Lorena Cochera (Lorena), in
Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as Lorena had asked her father to get the monthly house rental fee from Teresita Bitos, whose
nickname is "Nene." While the appellant and Nene were talking, the police officers suddenly barged in. The appellant noticed that PO2
Martinez proceeded to the inner portion of the house and opened the door of the rooms. Nene stopped them but the police officers told
her to just keep quiet. The police officers went on opening the door of the two rooms, where they saw three male persons. The police
officers frisked the appellant and the three other men. The police officers likewise took appellants wallet containing P360.00. The
appellant then requested Nene to tell his daughter that he was arrested. Thereafter, the police officers brought the appellant and the
three other men to the police station.23
The appellant denied that he sold shabu to PO2 Martinez. He also denied that he was maintaining a drug den and that he allowed
persons to sniff shabu inside the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, in exchange for a sum of money. The appellant likewise
denied that he knew the three other men who were arrested inside the room in the said house. The appellant claimed instead that he
knew PO2 Martinez prior to 31 August 2000 because the latter usually stayed at the house to apprehend snatchers. Also, a week
before 31 August 2000, he and PO2 Martinez had a conversation and he was asked to pinpoint the "fat fish," which is the code for the
big time pusher. When he said that he does not know of such pusher, PO2 Martinez got angry. The appellant maintained that on 31
August 2000, he was no longer living in the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, as his daughter had already brought him to
Minglanilla, Cebu, as early as July 1999. On the said date, Nene was already occupying the house and had subleased one of its rooms
as his daughter Maya told him so. The appellant admitted that a year prior to 31 August 2000, and before he transferred to Minglanilla,
he was apprehended for illegal possession of shabu.24
The narration of the appellant was corroborated by Nene on all material points.
Testifying on rebuttal, PO2 Martinez denied that he knew the appellant prior to 31 August 2000. PO2 Martinez clarified that he came to
know the appellant only on the night that they conducted the buy-bust operation.25
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible, competent and convincing as they were able to satisfactorily prove
all the elements of the offenses charged against the appellant, the trial court, in its Decision dated 24 June 2002, held the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 15, 15-A and 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The trial
court disposed of the case as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, the Court finds the [herein appellant] for
1) Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, for violating Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. There being no
mitigating nor any aggravating circumstance proven, the Court hereby imposes the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in the
MEDIUM PERIOD ranging between TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum[,] to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum;
2) Criminal Case No. CBU-55063, for violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. In the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court imposes the penalty of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in the MEDIUM PERIOD
ranging between TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS,
as maximum; and
3) Criminal Case No. CBU-55067, for violating Section 15-A, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, GUILTY. The court hereby
imposes upon the [appellant] the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00)
PESOS.

The five (5) heat-sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as
shabu, are hereby CONFISCATED in favor of the government and shall be destroyed in accordance with the law prohibiting said
drug.26 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
The appellant appealed the trial courts Decision to this Court via Notice of Appeal.27 However, pursuant to this Courts decision in
People v. Mateo,28 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
On 9 August 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Decision affirming with modification the ruling of the trial court. Its
decretal portion reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC, Branch 10, Cebu City in Criminal Cases No. CBU-55062, CBU55063 and CBU-55067 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION concerning Criminal Cases No. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063, for
which [the herein appellant] is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.29
The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of the appellant on all the charges against him as the prosecution was able to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt since all the essential elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu were duly proven by the
prosecution. As to the charge of maintaining a drug den, the same was also established by the fact that PO2 Martinez himself paid
P10.00 to sniff the shabu in one of the rooms of the appellants house. The appellants denial, therefore, cannot prevail over the
evidence hurled against him.
The Court of Appeals, however, deemed it necessary to modify the penalty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-55062 and CBU-55063. It
explained that the sale of less than 200 grams of shabu is punishable with a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal, depending on the quantity. In this case, the quantity of shabu illegally sold to the poseur-buyer by the appellant was 0.03
gram. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 20,30 Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the proper penalty to be
imposed for the illegal sale of 0.03 gram of shabu would be prision correccional. Also, in this case, the appellant had in his possession
0.15 gram of shabu, which is punishable also with imprisonment of prision correccional. Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the appellant must be sentenced to an imprisonment of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of
prision correccional, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-55062, as well as in Criminal Case No. CBU-55063.31
Still unsatisfied, the appellant appealed the Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via Notice of Appeal.32
Both the appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General manifested33 that they would no longer file their respective supplemental
briefs as the issues have already been fully discussed in their respective appeal briefs34 with the Court of Appeals.
The appellants assignment of errors as stated in his Appellants Brief are as follows:
I. The Regional Trial Court erred in convicting the [herein appellant] notwithstanding the inherent incredibility of evidence for the
prosecution;
II. The Regional Trial Court gravely erred in allowing the evidence of the prosecution despite the indubitable evidence that the
[appellant] i[s] innocent of the crime[s] charged; [and]
III. The Regional Trial Court erred in convicting the [appellant] in spite of the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
[appellant] beyond reasonable doubt.35
The appellant avers that the testimony of the poseur-buyer was absurd, illogical, contrary to reason and highly incredible for no person
who is engaged in an illegal transaction would leave the door of the house open after such transaction. Moreover, no person would sell
shabu to a buyer when he knew all along that the said buyer was a police officer as it was ridiculous to expose oneself to the danger of
being caught and arrested.
The appellant similarly holds that the entry in the house was illegal and there was certainly no transaction that took place therein. The
search and the seizure made in connection thereto were also invalid. Thus, the pieces of evidence allegedly obtained by the police
officers were inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree." The same cannot be used against him in violation of his rights.
The appellant believes that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as their testimonies as to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case were contrary to human conduct, especially with regard to the allegation that he knowingly
maintained a drug den, since he was no longer the owner of the house, which was the subject of the search, and he did not live there
anymore.
The appellants contentions are devoid of merit.

In essence, the issues in this case hinge on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are
accorded with respect, more so, when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason behind this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.36 The
rule finds an even more stringent application where the trial courts findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.37
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to overturn the findings of both lower courts,
which were adequately supported by the evidence on record.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following essential elements must be duly established: (1)
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.38
Succinctly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer, as well as the receipt of the marked money by the seller, successfully
consummates the buy-bust transaction. Hence, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.39
In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the above-enumerated elements beyond moral certainty. The prosecution
witnesses adequately proved that a buy-bust operation actually took place on which occasion the appellant was caught red-handed
giving one heat-sealed plastic packet containing white crystalline substance to PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
P100.00. PO2 Martinez, being the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant in open court to be the same person who sold to him
the said one-heat sealed plastic packet of white crystalline substance for a consideration of P100.00,40 which when examined was
confirmed to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu per Chemistry Report No. D-1782-2000 issued by P/Sr. Insp. Salinas,
Head, Chemistry Branch, PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office 7. Upon presentation thereof in open court, PO2 Martinez duly
identified it to be the same object sold to him by the appellant as it had the marking "VRR-8-31-2000 (buy-bust)," which SPO1
Fernandez had written thereon in their presence.41 This testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez, who was
just five to eight meters away from the former and the appellant during the sale transaction.42
Evidently, the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants guilt for the offense of illegal sale of shabu in
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
We already had occasion to show the unacceptability of the contention of the appellant that the testimony of the poseur-buyer was
absurd, illogical, contrary to reason and highly incredible for no person who is engaged in an illegal transaction would leave the door of
the house open after such transaction. In case after case, we observed that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any prospective
customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, the drug pushers have become
increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the
buyer and the seller or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement and the acts constituting the sale and the delivery of
the prohibited drugs.43
With regard to the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, like shabu, the following elements must be proven: (1) the accused
is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.44 All these elements have been established in this case.
On the occasion of the appellants arrest for having been caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, PO3 Yanson conducted a body
search on the former resulting to the recovery of four more heat-sealed plastic packets containing white crystalline substance inside his
wallet that was tucked in his pocket with an aggregate weight of 0.15 gram, which were later confirmed to be methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Yanson identified in open the court the said four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu with markings
"VRR-8-31-2000-02" to "VRR-8-31-2000-05" written thereon by SPO1 Fernandez to be the same objects recovered from the
appellant.45 PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, corroborated this testimony of PO3 Yanson.46
Definitely, the records do not show that the appellant has the legal authority to possess the four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu.
Settled is the rule that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. As such, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi,47 which the appellant in this case miserably failed to do.
There is also no truth on the appellants claim that the entry in the house was illegal making the search and the seizure in connection
thereto invalid, rendering the pieces of evidence obtained by the police officers inadmissible for being the "fruit of a poisonous tree."
This Court in Dimacuha v. People48 clearly states:

The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains
the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In People v. Chua Ho San [citation omitted] we pointed out that the interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute and that warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances:
(1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant
to an equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest
of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of
information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the
subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule
that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore, admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.49 (Emphasis
supplied).
To repeat, the appellant, in this case, was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu, thus, he was lawfully arrested. Following Dimacuha,
the subsequent seizure of four heat-sealed plastic packets of shabu in the appellants wallet that was tucked in his pocket was justified
and admissible in evidence for being the fruit of the crime.
With the foregoing, this Court is fully convinced that the prosecution had likewise proved beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt that the
appellant is guilty of the offense of illegal possession of shabu in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
Going to the charge of maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the
prosecution had also established appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence may be proved not
only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of
the house, or its general reputation among police officers.50 In this case, this fact was proven by none other than the testimony of PO2
Martinez, the poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the same to which the latter
responded by requiring the former to pay a rental fee of P10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his house and
directed him to proceed to one of the rooms located at the right side of the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three
other persons already sniffing shabu.51 This testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez.52
Moreover, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, several peso bills were found in the appellants wallet, including three P10.00
peso bills, which circumstances bolstered the prosecutions assertion that the appellant has indeed allowed his house to be used as a
drug den for a fee of P10.00 per person.53
In his attempt to exonerate himself, the appellant vehemently asserts that he was no longer the owner of the house in Barangay T.
Padilla, Cebu City, and he was no longer residing therein. The defense also presented Teresita Bitos to corroborate this claim of the
appellant.
The testimony of Teresita Bitos corroborating the appellants testimony was not credible.1wphi1 She herself admitted that the
appellant requested her to testify in his favor.54
Also, considering the seriousness of the charges against the appellant, he did not bother to present his daughter, who is the alleged
owner of the house in Barangay T. Padilla, Cebu City, to bolster his claim.
Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts
due to the ease with which it can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the light of positive identification of
the appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is such that it does not
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of the prosecution
witness who testified on affirmative matters.55 Moreover, there is a presumption that public officers, including the arresting officers,
regularly perform their official duties.56 In this case, the defense failed to overcome this presumption by presenting clear and
convincing evidence. Furthermore, this Court finds no ill motive that could be attributed to the police officers who had conducted the

buy-bust operation. Even the allegation of the appellant that PO2 Martinez got angry with him when he failed to pinpoint the big time
pusher cannot be considered as the ill motive in implicating the appellant on all the three charges against him for this is self-serving and
uncorroborated.
Given all the foregoing, this Court sustains the appellant's conviction on all the charges against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00579 dated 9 August 2010 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

People vs Cogaed
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow
citizens to evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle
against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what
could have been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
Squarely raised in this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers
identified the alleged perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as to the accuseds
whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that
allegedly contained the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having been
fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable
suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights by the accused was not done intelligently,
knowingly, and without improper pressure or coercion.
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
There being no possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
I. According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the
San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin
Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion
of San Gabriel, La Union.4
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1
Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for
San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac
approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did
not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed]
and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective bags"16 inside the
station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to
empty their bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayaos yellow
bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the
objects obtained were indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24
The marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A
total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos bags.27

According to Cogaeds testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him"28 to the Poblacion of
San Gabriel so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brothers friend.30 Upon arrival at
the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaeds] help in carrying
his things, which included a travelling bag and a sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the market.33 This was
when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied that he
did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1
Taracatac arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These facts were corroborated by an
eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was apprehended.37
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew
what was inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with
a total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43
The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal liability under the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21,
2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be
considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to
such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."50
Cogaed appealed51 the trial courts decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.52
The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellants brief:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant;
(2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused.
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous
drugs unnecessary.55

We find for the accused.

II. The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its
dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general
rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the
existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must be established by the
judge after asking searching questions and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and
the things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to
lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances
of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
III. One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with
searches incidental to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure
that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v.
Court of Appeals65 was similar "to a stop and frisk situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual
or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the "stop
and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should
be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may
be undoubtedly based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with
criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe

whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When
they arrived, one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion
increased when the man avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion.79 After stopping him, the police officers found
an unlicensed "homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents
could not possibly have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and
walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian
in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police
officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer
should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects.
IV. Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause.
In Posadas v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis
supplied)
For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88
Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere
suspicion.90 It has to be a "genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.93 (Emphasis supplied,
footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious
circumstance.95 There should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on
only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for
warrantless arrest. The person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin
Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the
bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his
belongings without a valid search warrant.
V. Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine
reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in
Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The
informant pointed at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and
they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal.109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded
Arutas arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the polices informant, who informed the police that
Cogaed was "suspicious."
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a
tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he
was disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudins bag and found bundles of what turnedout to
be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving information that the
accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug
dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and parked"123 at the
hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He
was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in
the juice box he was holding.128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chuas situation when the police apprehended him and ruled
that "[t]here was no validstop-and-frisk."
VI. None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do not
qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should
be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two
elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police
officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

VII. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaeds constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him
to open his bags. As this court previously stated:
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.132 (Citations omitted) Cogaeds silence or lack of aggressive objection
was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officers excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and
free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or
be known as a police officer.1wphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his orher part
will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer
must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must
be anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a persons
constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII. The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from
Stonehill v. Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of
that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the
resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our societys fundamental values
enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is
being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Sanchez vs People
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse and set aside the July 25, 2012 Decision1 and the November 20, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 31742 filed by petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili (Sanchez), affirming the
April 21, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC), which convicted him for Violation of Section 11,
Article l l of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a
fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.
Sanchez was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, in the Information,5 dated March 20, 2003, filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 10745-03. The
accusatory portion of the Information indicting Sanchez reads:

That on or about the 19th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody, 0.1017 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
When arraigned, Sanchez pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on
the existence and due execution of the following pieces of evidence: 1] the request for laboratory examination; 2]certification issued by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);3] Dangerous Drugs Report; and 4] transparent plastic sachet containing small transparent
plastic sachet of white crystalline substance.6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)in its Comment7 on the petition is
as follows:
Around 2:50 pm of March 19, 2003, acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano, aka "Intang," was selling drugs to tricycle drivers,
SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to
Barangay Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a
tricycle carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested
Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box.
SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found
a small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was a regulated drug,
the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police station.
On March 20, 2003, Salud M. Rosales, a forensic chemist from the NBI, submitted a Certification which reads:
This certifies that on the above date at 9:25 a.m. one PO1 Edgardo Nario of Imus, Mun. PS, PNP, Imus, Cavite submitted to this office
for laboratory examinations the following specimen/s to wit:
White crystalline substance contained in a small plastic sachet, marked "RSC," placed in a plastic pack, marked "Mar. 19, 2003." (net
wt. = 0.1017 gm)
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen/s gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE.
Said specimen/s were allegedly confiscated from RIZALDY SANCHEZ y CAJILI and DARWIN REYES y VILLARENTE.
Official report follows:
This certification was issued uponrequest for purpose of filing the case.
Version of the Defense
In the present petition,9 Sanchez denied the accusation against him and presented a different version of the events that transpired in
the afternoon of March 19, 2003, to substantiate his claim of innocence:
On 24 February 2005, the accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand. He testified that on the date and time in question, he,
together with a certain Darwin Reyes, were on their way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where they transported a passenger,
when their way was blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and Darwin.
He protested and asked what offense did they commit. The arresting officers told him that they had just bought drugs from Alapan. He
reasoned out that he merely transported a passenger there but the policemen still accosted him and he was brought to the Imus Police
Station where hewas further investigated. The police officer, however, let DarwinReyes go. On cross-examination, the accused
admitted that it was the first time that he saw the police officers at the time he was arrested. He also disclosed that he was previously
charged with the same offense before Branch 90 of this court which was already dismissed, and that the police officers who testified in
the said case are not the same as those involved in this case.10
The Ruling of the RTC

On April 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision11 finding that Sanchez was caught in flagrante delicto,in actual possession of shabu.
It stated that the police operatives had reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in possession of the said dangerous drug and
such suspicion was confirmed when the match box Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu. The RTC lent credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1 Amposta) because there was no showing that he had been impelled by
any ill motive to falsely testify against Sanchez. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered convicting accused Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) years and to pay a
fine of Php300,000.00. SO ORDERED.12
Unfazed, Sanchez appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA. He faulted the RTC for giving undue weight on the
testimony of SPO1 Amposta anchored merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the said arresting officer.
He insisted that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA found no cogent reason to reverse or modify the findings of facts and conclusions reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the
conviction of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was probable cause for the
police officers to believe that Sanchez was then and there committing a crime considering that he was seen leaving the residence of a
notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they received, illegal drug activities were being perpetrated. It concluded that the
confiscation by the police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on to write
that non-compliance by the police officers on the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the
conduct of inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not fatal to the prosecutions causesince its integrity and evidentiary value
had been duly preserved. The falloof the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite dated April 21, 2005 and Order dated October 1, 2007
in Criminal Case No. 10745-03 finding accused appellant Rizaldy C. Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 25, 2012 Decision, but it was denied by the CA in its November 20, 2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
Bewailing his conviction, Sanchez filed the present petition for "certiorari"under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and anchored on the
following
GROUNDS:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO, HENCE,A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NO LONGER NECESSARY; AND
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21, PARAGRAPH 1,
ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RENDER THE SEIZED ITEMS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE.14
Sanchez insists on his acquittal. He argues that the warrantless arrest and search on him were invalid due to the absence of probable
cause on the part of the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. He also
contends that the failure of the police operatives to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 renders the seized
item inadmissible in evidence and creates reasonable doubt on his guilt. By way of Comment15 to the petition, the OSG prays for the
affirmance of the challenged July 25, 2012 decision of the CA. The OSG submits that the warrantless search and seizure of the subject
narcotic were justified under the plain view doctrine where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The Courts Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
proper remedy to question the CA judgment,final order or resolution, as in the present case, is a petition for review on certiorari, which
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.16 By filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before, had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 45, in
accordance with the liberal spirit and in the interest of substantial justice, particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the reglementary
period for filing a petition for review; (2) errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.17 The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites and, hence, there is ample justification to treat this petition for certiorari as
a petition for review. Besides, it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition and
the character of the relief sought.18 Here, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," the petition actually avers errors of
judgment rather than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects of a petition for review on certiorari.
Going now into the substance of the petition, the Court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
Although it is true that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and not
to be disturbed on appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court
with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. But an
exception exists if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would have affected the case.19 After going over the records of the case at bench, the Court finds some
facts of weight and substance that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which cast doubt on the
guilt of Sanchez.
In sustaining the conviction of Sanchez, the CA ratiocinated that this was a clear case of an in flagrante delicto arrest under paragraph
(a) Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. In this regard, the CA wrote:
In the case at Bar, the acquisition of the regulated drug by the police officers qualifies as a valid search following a lawful operation by
the police officers. The law enforcers acted on the directive of their superior based on an information that the owner of the residence
where Sanchez came from was a notorious drug dealer. As Sanchez was seen leaving the said residence, the law enforcers had
probable cause to stop Sanchez on the road since there was already a tip that illegal drug-related activities were perpetrated in the
place where he came from and seeing a match box held on one hand, the police officers action were justified to inspect the same. The
search therefore, is a sound basis for the lawful seizure of the confiscated drug, arrest and conviction of Sanchez.
The case of People vs. Valdez (G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999) is instructive. In that case, the police officers, by virtue of an
information that a person having been previously described by the informant, accosted Valdez and upon inspection of the bag he was
carrying, the police officers found the information given to them to be true as it yielded marijuana leaves hidden in the water jug and
lunch box inside Valdezs bag. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial courts ruling convicting Valdez declared that:
In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest.1wphi1 A crime was actually
being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a
search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime. The
cited case is akin to the circumstances in the instant appeal as in this case, Sanchez, coming from the house of the identified drug
dealer, previously tipped by a concerned citizen, walked to a parked tricycle and sped towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. The
search that gave way to the seizure of the match box containing shabu was a reasonable course of event that led to the valid
warrantless arrest since there was sufficient probable cause for chasing the tricycle he was in. (Underscoring supplied)
A judicious examination of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the search incidental to a lawful arrest withthe stop-and-frisk principle, a
wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state so, the CA labored under the confused view that
one and the other were indistinct and identical. That confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the petitioner's conviction. The
Court must clear this confusion and correct the error.
It is necessary to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry20 stop- and-frisk search is entirely different from and should not be
confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v. Court of Appeals21:

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit
of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk"
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.22
In the case at bench, neither the in flagrante delictoarrest nor the stop- and-frisk principle was applicableto justify the warrantless
search and seizure made by the police operatives on Sanchez. An assiduous scrutiny of the factual backdrop of this case shows that
the search and seizure on Sanchez was unlawful. A portion of SPO1 Ampostas testimony on direct examination is revelatory.
A search as an incident to a lawfularrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.24 It bears emphasis that the law requires that the search
be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings;
the process cannot be reversed.25
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined under
Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. Under Section 2, of the same rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.26 Even casting aside the petitioners version and basing the resolution of
this case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police operatives upon the person of Sanchez
before conducting the search on him. It appears from the above quoted testimony of SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up with the
tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he requested
Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box, to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of
Sanchez was made only after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened in this
case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the search.
Even granting arguendo that Sanchez was arrested before the search, still the warrantless search and seizure must be struck down as
illegal because the warrantless arrest was unlawful. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules
on lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallly committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 (in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer.27 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of
Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has committed it.
These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.
The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of
the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the
police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit,
Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at
the veryleast appeared suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police officers to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
It has not been established either that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 have been complied with in this
warrantless arrest. When the police officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu
from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held to
signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.28 The police officers in this case had no inkling
whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides, nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it
show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police officers to draw a
reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In
other words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in thiscase was more imagined than
real.
In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" search in the case at bench. Elucidating on what constitutes "stop-and-frisk"
operation and how it is to be carried out, the Court in People v. Chua29 wrote:
A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.30
In this jurisdiction, what may be regarded as a genuine reason or a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop-and-frisk search had
been sufficiently illustrated in two cases. In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,31 a policeman chanced upon Manalili in front of
the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs as he was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen and when approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried
to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policeman had sufficient reason to accost Manalili
to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that the area was a haven for
drug addicts.
In People v. Solayao,32 the Court also found justifiable reason for the police to stop and frisk the accused after considering the
following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions; the fact that his companions fled whenthey saw
the policemen; and the fact that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons where
roaming the vicinity. Seemingly, the common thread of these examples isthe presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity,
which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity. It was not so in the case at bench.
The Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that
would justify a stop-and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more,
were innocuous movements, and by themselves alone could not give rise in the mind of an experienced and prudent police officer of
any belief that hehad shabu in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There was
even no allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner. There was
no showing either that he tried toevade or outmaneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when the police officers approached
him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not have engendered any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
officers that a criminal activity had taken place or was afoot.

In the recent case of People v. Cogaed,33 where not a single suspicious circumstance preceded the search on the accused, the Court
ruled that the questioned act of the police officer did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk operation. Cogaed was a mere passenger
carrying a blue bag and a sack and travelling aboard a jeepney. He did not exhibit any unusual or suspicious behavior sufficient to
justify the law enforcer in believing that he was engaged in a criminal activity. Worse, the assessment of suspicion was made not by the
police officer but by the jeepney driver, who signaled to the police officer that Cogaed was "suspicious." In view of the illegality of the
search and seizure, the 12,337.6 grams of marijuana confiscated from the accused was held as inadmissible.
The OSG characterizes the seizure of the subject shabu from Sanchez as seizure of evidence in plain view. The Court disagrees.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.34 The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the
law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.35
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does notfall within the plain view
exception. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, subject shabu was not
inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box being
thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand from
Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant is in violation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, there being no
lawful warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused
must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Furthermore, the Court entertains doubts whether the shabu allegedly seized from Sanchez was the very same item presented during
the trial of this case. The Court notes that there wereseveral lapses in the law enforcers handling of the seized item which, when taken
collectively, render the standards of chain of custody seriously breached.
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.36 The function of the
chain of custody requirement is to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.37 Thus, the chain of custody requirement has a two-fold purpose:
(1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the
identity of the evidence.38
In this case, the prosecution failed to account for each and every link in the chain of custody of the shabu, from the moment it was
allegedly confiscated up to the time it was presented before the court as proof of the corpus delicti. The testimony of SPO 1 Amposta
was limited to the fact that he placed the marking "RSC" on the seized drug; and that he and the three other police officers brought
Sanchez and the subject shabu to their station and turned them over to their investigator. The prosecution evidence did not disclose
where the marking of the confiscated shabu took place and who witnessed it. The evidence does not show who was in possession of
the seized shabu from the crime scene to the police station. A reading of the Certification, dated March 20, 2003, issued by Forensic
Chemist Salud Rosales shows that a certain PO I Edgardo Nario submitted the specimen to the NBI for laboratory examination, but this
piece of evidence does not establish the identity of the police investigator to whom SPO 1 Amposta and his group turned over the
seized shabu. The identities of the person who received the specimen at the NBI laboratory and the person who had the custody and
safekeeping of the seized marijuana after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court were also not disclosed.
Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, a serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized shabu that the prosecution
introduced in evidence. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and
confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence cannot pass judicial scrutiny. WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 25, 2012 Decision and the November 20, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 31742 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rizaldy Sanchez y Cajili is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the Court orders the immediate release of the petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to
inform the Court of the date of his release, or reason for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.
SO ORDERED.

Villanueva vs People

We resolve the Petition1 filed by Danilo Villanueva y Alcaraz from the Decision2 dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution3 dated 18 October
2011 issued by the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information4 reads:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.63 gram knowing the same to [be a] dangerous
drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On 15 July 2004, the accused, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5
PROSECUTIONS VERSION
Four witnesses testified for the prosecution: (1) Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Albert Arturo, (2) Police Officer (PO) 3 Jonathan Coralde,
(3) PO2 Reynante Mananghaya, and (4) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Antonio Asiones.6 Their testimonies reveal that a Complaint
was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo Villanueva for allegedly shooting the former along C-3 Road, Navotas City. After recording the
incident in the police blotter, PO3 Jonathan Coralde, SPO3 Enrique de Jesus, SPO2 Henry Martin and SPO1 Anthony Asiones,
together with Resco, proceeded to the house of Villanueva. They informed Villanueva about the Complaint lodged against him. They
invited him to the police station. There, he was subjected to a body search and, in the process, a plastic sachet of shabu was recovered
from the left pocket of his pants. PO3 Coralde marked the sachet with the initial "DAV 06-15-04", and PO2 Reynante Mananghaya
brought it to the National Police District Scene of the Crime Operatives (NPD-SOCO) for examination.7 DEFENSES VERSION
The accused testified that at the time of the incident, he was at home watching TV when PO3 Coralde, along with three others, invited
him to go with them to the police station. Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, the accused was then
frisked and detained at the police station.8
RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 127 of Caloocan City, in its Decision9 dated 6 April 2009, convicted petitioner of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused DANILO VILLANUEVA y ALCARAZ, GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II,R.A. 9165. Henceforth, this Court hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as the minimum to seventeen (17) years and eight (8)
months as the maximum and to pay the fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of this case is ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with
the law.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA reviewed the appeal, which hinged on one issue, viz:
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS ILLEGAL THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WARRANTLESS ARREST
AND SEARCH.11
RULING OF THE CA
On 4 May 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No.
70854 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
On 27 May 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which the CA denied in a Resolution14 dated 18 October 2011.

Hence, the instant Petition, which revolves around the following lone issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE ARREST AND THE LAPSES ON THE PART OF
THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE HANDLING OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG.15
Petitioner claims that his arrest does not fall within the purview of valid warrantless arrests, since it took place on the day of the alleged
shooting incident. Hence, to "invite" him to the precinct without any warrant of arrest was illegal. The evidence obtained is,
consequently, inadmissible. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment16 stating that the shabu confiscated from petitioner
was admissible in evidence against him; that the search conducted on him was valid; and that he cannot raise the issue regarding the
apprehending officers non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 for the first time on appeal.
OUR RULING
We find the instant appeal meritorious.
Accused-appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, lays down the
basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The circumstances that transpired between accused-appellant and the arresting officer show none of the above that would make the
warrantless arrest lawful. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one
who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest.17
The warrantless search conducted is not among those allowed by law.
A waiver of an illegal arrest, however, is not a waiver of an illegal search.18 Records have established that both the arrest and the
search were made without a warrant. While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not
deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements on when a warrantless search can be conducted.1wphi1 These searches include: (1)
search of a moving vehicle; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop-and-frisk situation;
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest and (7) exigent and emergency circumstance.19
The search made was not among the enumerated instances. Certainly, it was not of a moving vehicle, a customs search, or a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. There could not have been a seizure in plain view as the seized item was allegedly found inside the left
pocket of accused-appellants pants. Neither was it a stop-and-frisk situation. While thistype may seemingly fall under the consented
search exception, we reiterate that "[c]onsent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence."20
Consent must also be voluntary inorder to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent mustbe unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.21 In this case, petitioner was merely "ordered" to take out the
contents of his pocket.
The evidence obtained is not admissible.
Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."23 Without the seized item, therefore, the conviction of accused appellant cannot

be sustained. This being the case, we see no more reason to discuss the alleged lapses of the officers in the handling of the
confiscated drug.
As a final word, we reiterate that "[ w ]hile this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set
by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means."24
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 4 May 2011 and Resolution dated 18 October 2011 issued by the
Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 32582 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.