Introduction
Elgin (1996, 2008, 2009) advanced a theory of understanding according to which
it is a system of cognitive commitments in reflexive equilibrium (ER). The theory has
many virtues. Among them, that fictional and metaphorical elements may enhance
understanding, and that the notions of truth and objectivity are replaced by the notions
of tenability, truth enough and acceptability. It also admits something seldom
discussed in epistemology, namely that emotions can, when linked to other
commitments in a system, strengthen, deepen, and modulate a persons understanding
of herself and the world (2008, p. 48). However, emphasis on the need for adjustments
through reflection seems to rule out the possibility that some emotions carry with them a
kind of understanding that is not brought about through reflection. We intend to show
that there are non-reflexive capacities linked to emotions that enable and enhance
reflexive equilibrium.
1. A turn in epistemic investigations
The contemporary epistemic tradition tends to think of our cognitive condition as
guided by the search for understanding as well as knowledge. From this point of view,
notions earlier important in epistemology such as those of truth, objectivity, and
justification were not thrown away but connected to other notions such as those of
tenability and acceptability that have value in the enhancement of understanding. The
way the latter notions were inserted into the vocabulary of epistemology was
determined by the view one has of understanding. One of the most influential current
views of understanding is the one put forth by Catherine Elgin.
2. The objects of understanding
Elgin argues that the kind of understanding that matters for epistemology is the
one that exhibits epistemic success (a cognitive or informational grasp). There are kinds
that are irrelevant for epistemology: for example, when someone says, I understand the
pain youre going through, the word understand conveys empathy. In the cases that
do matter, understanding enables an epistemic entitlement: a cognitive or informational
grasp. Often this is explained by comparison with cases of knowledge. When someone
says, I know that the abolition of slavery came late in Brazil, an epistemic authorization
is issued (that person knows that Brazil was the last country to abolish slavery or
something to that effect). In cases of understanding, the person who understands this
seems to grasp not only a proposition but also a wider body of information, such as the
inhumane nature of slavery, the economic interests that were involved, peoples racism
at the time, the political context, etc. In understanding, Elgin says, the proposition
derives its epistemological status from a unified, integrated, coherent body of
information (Elgin, 2009, p. 2).
The sort of understanding of interest to epistemology then is in the first
instance a cognitive relation to comprehensive, coherent sets of cognitive
commitments. The understanding encapsulated in individual propositions
derives from an understanding of larger bodies of information. I understand
that the Comanches dominated the southern plains, because I grasp how that
proposition fits into and is justified by reference to a more comprehensive
understanding that embeds it. (2009, p. 3)
would not be there without them, and they thus change the global pattern or structure of
thought.
By focusing attention, emotions even effect refinements in sensory
discrimination. To the uninitiated, babies cries sound pretty much alike. But
parents who are dismayed over their infants distress and concern alleviate it
learn to discriminate among cries. They acquire the ability to differentiate the
sounds of hunger, pain, frustration, and fear. What we hear depends on what
we listen to and what we listen for. (Elgin, 2008, p. 154)
In-group cohesion behavior and conflict with other groups seem to have played a
relevant evolutionary role, and tend to be resistant to reflexive adjustment. But this is
not too much of a problem for Elgins theory of understanding, since these kinds
emotions (such as xenophobia) are not too common or widespread. A system of
understanding may contain peripheral falsehoods.
social, intellectual and artistic behavior. Satisfaction brings about the need to rekindle
past circumstances of ones life and to integrate them into new thoughts about oneself
and the world (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2010). Gratitude stimulates reflection and
reconceptualization of ones experiences, inclines towards reciprocating behavior, and
may increase ones concern for the prospects and desires of others. In morality and
personal interactions, experiments have shown that positive emotions increase attention
towards others and softens the distinction between others and I, or between groups.
This seems to happen at a sub-personal level. But insofar as it structures thought and
regulates ones focus, positive emotions are cognitive and informative, even when they
operate autonomously.
What these cases suggest is that: (1) emotions are not only special internal
operations that mutually adjust propositions and values in a system. They also operate
at a pre-reflexive level: there seem to be discrimination capacities associated with
emotions that operate non-consciously. This limits what reflexive equilibrium can
achieve. (2) But it does not entail that there are no reflexive mechanisms guided by
affective processes. Mental operations at a personal reflexive level can be enhanced by
emotional operations at a sub-personal affective level.
Conclusion
Elgin emphasized the role of emotions in the formation of beliefs and epistemic
commitments. The evidence discussed here is not conclusive regarding the nature of
emotions, but nonetheless seem to indicate that there are autonomous emotional
operations that enhance the reflexive equilibrium in Elgins model. Since emotions that
seem impermeable to reflexive equilibrium are not too many, and since most emotions
seem to influence reflexive equilibrium positively at pre-reflexive level, we conclude that
Elgins model can be nicely extended by admitting autonomous emotional mechanisms
that influence the choice of a coherent system of beliefs.
References
[1] According to Elgin, Kvanvig assumes that the kind of understanding that matters to
epistemology comprises a coherent body of beliefs. However, coherence alone is not enough,
because a body of false beliefs makes no understanding. Kvanvig insists that we cannot
understand a subject matter unless most of the propositions and all of the central propositions
that constitute our coherent take on that subject matter are true. He allows that a few peripheral
falsehoods might degrade ones understanding of a subject matter, but not destroy it. (Elgin,
2009, p. 5). Elgin argues against Kvanvig that understanding must be thought as a grasp of a
comprehensive general body of information that is grounded in fact, is duly responsive to
evidence, and enables non-trivial inference, argument, and perhaps action regarding that
subject the information pertains to it (Elgin, 2009, p. 11).
[2] Linda Zagzebski maintained that understanding is fundamentally a matter of grasping how
various pieces of information relate to one another; it is a matter of making connections among
them, of seeing how they hang together (see Grimm, 2006, p. 517).
[3] Knobe and Sinnott-Armstrong point out that understanding intentional action, causation and
doing and allowing are influenced by moral judgments. How we assess people having
intentions, causing events and actively doing or passively allowing something would not be
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