86 Philcomsat v.

Alcuaz [GR 84818, 18 December 1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 12

concur, 1 took no part Facts: By virtue of Republic Act 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the
grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for
international satellite communications," the authority to "construct and operate
such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." By designation
of the Republic of the Philippines, it is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in
the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), as well as in the Convention
and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT), which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations
were collectively established by various states in line with the principles set forth in
Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the United Nationss General Assembly. Since 1968, It has
been leasing its satellite circuits to PLDT, Philippine Global Communications, Eastern
Telecom, Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT, and Capitol Wireless or their
predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by PHILCOMSAT enable
said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication
services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data,
live television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to
American or vice versa. It was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public
Service Commission, now National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
However, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 196 issued on 17 June 1987, it was
placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities
and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing said executive order, NTC
required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and
necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. On 9 September 1987,
PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC an application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining
since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications
services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates
applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a
provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the facilities,
provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. On
16 September 1987, PHILCOMSAT was granted a provisional authority to continue
operating Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was
then charging. This authority was valid for 6 months from the date of said order.
When said provisional authority expired on 17 March 1988, it was extended for
another 6 months, or up to 16 September 1988. Thereafter, the NTC further
extended the provisional authority of PHILCOMSAT for another 6 months, counted
from 16 September 1988, but it directed PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced

rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT

assailed said order. Issue: Whether the NTC is not required to provide notice and
hearing to PHILCOMSAT in its rate-fixing order, which fixed a temporary rate
pending final determination of PHILCOMSATs application. Held: The NTC, in the
exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety,
public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. The NTC
order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, without
notice to PHILCOMSAT and without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based
merely on an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
PHILCOMSAT been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in
question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the
consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and
demonstrated to NTC. The order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no
other. Reduction of rates was made without affording PHILCOMSAT the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
warranted a corresponding rate reduction. PHILCOMSAT was not even afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC
based its questioned order. While the NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such ratefixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that
such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not
perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise
provided by the applicable law. NTC has no authority to make such order without
first giving PHILCOMSAT a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent,
and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion. 87 Suntay v. People [GR L9430, 29 June 1957] En Banc, Padilla (J) : 9 concur Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr.
Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint
against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that
on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in
Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the University of the
Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to have carnal knowledge
of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an Assistant City Attorney
recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed a
letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to the
recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a
complaint for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied
for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981
[A39184]). On 20 January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco,

California, where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia

Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging Suntay with seduction which
was filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary
investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the
private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such
government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the
accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Secretary cabled the
Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San
Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to return to the
Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. However, this order was not
implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntays
counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the Court
reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied
counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari. Issue: Whether
Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may be
cancelled. Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When
discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as
the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be
dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport;
lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed
whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should
always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative
of the said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for
the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But
where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the
country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) to revoke a
passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntays suddenly leaving the country in
such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate
attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to
complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to
justice. 88 De Bisschop v. Galang [GR 18365, 31 May 1963] En Banc, Reyes JBL (J):
10 concur, 1 took no part Facts: George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was
allowed to stay in this country for 3 years, expiring 1 August 1959, as a prearranged
employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general

manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter
dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of the
Immigration Office, Benjamin de Mesa, to the effect that the Bissmag Production,
Inc., is more of a gambling front than the enterprise for promotions of local and
imported shows that it purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspected of having
evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of Immigration (Emilio L.
Galang), in a communication of 10 September 1959, advised him that his
application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied by the
Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days. Thereafter,
counsel of de Bisschop requested for a copy of the adverse decision of said Board,
but the legal officer of the Bureau of Immigration replied that, pursuant to
immigration practice and procedure and as is usual in such cases where the result is
a vote for denial, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision,
order or resolution is promulgated by the Board. Thereafter, Mr. Bisschop was simply
advised of said denial as per letter dated 10 September 1959. No request for
reinvestigation was made with the Bureau of Immigration. Instead, to forestall his
arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed
the case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition,
a writ of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Manila (with Judge Antonio Canizares presiding, Civil Case 41477) on the same
day ordering the Commissioner of Immigration to desist from arresting and
detaining de Bisschop. During the hearing, only documentary evidence were
presented. On 27 March 1961, the lower court granted the petition for prohibition
and ordered the Commissioner of Immigration to desist and refrain from arresting
and expelling de Bisschop from the Philippines unless and Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 27 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) until proper and legal proceedings are
conducted by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigrations in
connection with the application for extension of stay filed by de Bisschop with said
Board. The Commissioner of Immigration appealed. Issue: Whether the right to
notice and hearing is essential to due process in administrative proceedings, and
whether the Board of Commissioners are required to render written decisions on
petitions for extension of stay. Held: The administration of immigration laws is the
primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government.
Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration
authorities. Since CA 613 (Philippines Immigration Act of 1940) is silent as to the
procedure to be followed in these cases, the Courts are inclined to uphold the
argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative
practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This
would not violate the due process clause as, in the case at bar, the letter of
appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere
formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in
paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave
before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that

unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his
expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a
matter of right in administrative proceedings. Further, the immigration laws
specifically enumerate when the decisions of the Board of Commissioners shall be in
writing, to wit: (1) in cases of appeal from a decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
as to matters of admission or exclusion of aliens, as provided in Section 27(c) of the
Immigration Act; and (2) the decision of the Board of Commissioners in cases of
deportation under Section 37, paragraph (a) and (c). There is nothing in the
immigration law which provides that the Board of Commissioners must render
written decisions on petitions for extension of stay. Section 8 of the Immigration Act
merely refers to the number of votes necessary to constitute the decision of said
Board. 89 Var-Orient Shipping v. Achacoso [GR L-81805, 31 May 1988] First division,
Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur Facts: Var-Orient Shipping Co. Inc. and Comninos Bros.
filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office (WAAO),
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the Edgar T.
Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis, Antonio Tanio-an,
Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto Genesis, crew members of the MPV
"Silver Reefer," for having allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with
them, which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the interdiction of the
vessel by the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal,
Germany, in March 1986. After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on 4 March
1987 with both parties required to submit memoranda. Only the seamen submitted
memoranda. On 10 June 1987, the seamen filed a motion to resolve, which the
companies' counsel did not oppose. Thus, on the basis of the pleadings and
memoranda, Achacoso rendered a decision on 9 September 1987 ordering (1) the
dismissal of the case with a reprimand and against Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis,
Tanio-an, Cagon, Manela and Genesis, against the commission of the same or
similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more severe penalty; (2) exclusion of
Llanes from the case; (3) reprimanding Var-Orient Shipping Co. for failure to comply
with its obligations pursuant to POEA rules and regulations and warning against
committing the same or a similar offense otherwise it shall be dealt with more
severely; (4) archiving the case of Arsolon, A. dela Cruz, Montero and D. de la Cruz
with their names included in the POEA watchlist until they shall have voluntarily
submitted themselves to WAAOs jurisdiction; (5) payment by the companies jointly
and severally, unto Navarro, Capalad, Tumasis, Tanio-an, Cason, Manela and
Genesis the amount of P1,550.59 each, representing deductions from allotments,
plus P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and (6) payment by the companies jointly
and severally unto Bunyog the amount of US$4,680.00 or its peso equivalent at the
time of payment representing his salaries for the unserved portion of his
employment contract plus P4,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; to be tendered thru
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) WAAO, 10 days from
receipt of the decision. A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail and
delivered by the postman to the companies' counsel, then Attorney Francisco B.
Figura through the receptionist, Marlyn Aquino on 21 September 1987. Atty. Figura

alleged he did not receive the envelope containing the decision. The companies
allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ of execution was served on
them on 20 November 1987 by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Deputy
Sheriff Rene Masilungan and Attorney Wilfredo Ong. Previously, on 19 October 1987,
the seamen filed "Motion for Execution of Decision," the companies' counsel did not
oppose. On 23 November 1987, the companies, through new counsel, Atty. Quintin
Aseron, Jr., filed an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" on the ground that
the decision had not been received by them, hence, it was not yet final and
executory. On 19 January 1988, the POEA Administrator (Tomas D. Achacoso). In due
time, the companies filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the decision of
the POEA administrator has been received, rendering said decision final and
unappealable. Held: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Herein, the parties agreed that they would file their respective memoranda at
the 4 March 1987 hearing and thereafter consider the case submitted for decision.
This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the settlement of labor disputes.
Atty. Figura's affidavit involving that he has not received the decision is self-serving.
The companies failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino
explaining what she did with the decision which she received for Atty. Figura. Under
the circumstances, the Administrator's ruling that the decision had been properly
served on companies' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be
sustained. The issuance of the writ of execution is therefore not premature.