Can Ghani Make Peace with the Taliban in Afghanistan?

Answer lies in Pakistans willingness to end support for militants, says Atlantic Councils
James B. Cunningham

By Ashish Kumar Sen

Representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, and the United States are meeting in
Islamabad this week to draw up a roadmap for peace talks with the Taliban.

James B. Cunningham, a former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and current Khalilzad

Chair on Afghanistan and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, discussed the prospects
of peace in an interview with the New Atlanticists Ashish Kumar Sen. Here are excerpts
from our interview.

Q: Peace talks fell apart last summer following news that Taliban leader Mullah Omar
had been dead for more than two years. What has kept the talks from getting back on
track?

Cunningham: The revelation that Omar had died two years before had several negative
implications. The Afghans thought that they were in the process of establishing a
discussion with Omar. News that the Taliban leader had been dead for two years brought
into focus the mistrust that exists towards Pakistan because obviously the Pakistani
intelligence services would have known that Omar was deceased. It also caused a split in
the Taliban leadership with the naming of Omars successor [Mullah Akhtar Mohammad
Mansour] who was not accepted by all members of the Taliban. So there had to be time
for all of this to settle and be digested.

Afghanistans friendsthe United States and otherswere of the view that when
possible the effort should be resumed notwithstanding all the problems that were created.
That required several things to take place to reopen channels of communication and a

decision by [Afghan] President [Ashraf] Ghani that he wanted to resume the effort to
bring the Taliban to the table through Pakistan as well as other efforts that are underway
to engage the Taliban.

Ghanis decision to go to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia meeting and to meet with
[Pakistani] Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to discuss how they might resume this process
and what Pakistans role, including the crucial role of its military and intelligence
services, might be, led to the conclusion that it was worth trying to resume this effort. The
Prime Minister made clear that Pakistan would respect Afghanistans sovereignty, which
was important. It was also clear that the United States and China were both willing to be
sponsors of this process. [Pakistani Army Chief] Gen. Raheel Sharifs visit to Kabul right
after Christmas solidified the process that was coming together. All this led to the
meeting taking place in Islamabad.

Q: What are your expectations from the meeting in Islamabad?

Cunningham: Expectations have to be modest. But I am hopeful that the discussions

between the four parties will lead to a clear understanding on a way ahead that the
Afghans and Pakistanis are willing to pursue.

Part of the new equation that didnt exist last summer is clarity, finally, that the United
States is going to remain militarily engaged in Afghanistan in a significant way for some
time. That is a very important new factor in the equation.

Another is that there is a growing sense among Afghanistans partners that in order for a
peace discussion to be a real phenomenon Pakistan needs to obstruct the ability of the
Taliban to live, plan, and organize in Pakistan.

This new combination of factors will, I hope, work to change the dynamic that has
existed up until very recently. There is, clearly, disagreement within the Taliban about
how to proceed. As we argued in the report released by the Atlantic Council in October,
one needs to change the strategic calculation of the Taliban and demonstrate that the
goals that they have are not achievable through violence and terrorism. That seems to me
to be one of the principal strategic objectives going forward. .

Q: The Taliban today is not a cohesive group under a unified leadership. To what
extent is this going to complicate efforts to restart peace talks?

Cunningham: There is a school of thought that believes that a united Taliban leadership
is necessary to negotiate. I have never really thought that that is the case. I have always
thought that the United States should support Afghanistan negotiating with any Taliban
who are willing to reconcile and come off the field.

If there is a possibility of beginning a discussion with the Taliban who will represent
which groups of people? The way things stand right now, it seems that there likely will
not be a unified approach, but it would certainly be a good thing if a genuine discussion
about ending the violence in the first place and then creating lasting peace could begin
with a leadership that represents as much of the Taliban as possible.

The goal for everybody, I hope, will be to bring the violence to as much of a halt as
possible and then turn to a political process for dealing with the issues that need to be
resolved. That could certainly take place even if there are those who reject the process.

Q: Mansour, Omars right-hand man, was leading the Taliban at the time when peace
talks were underway and before Omars death was made public. Is Mansour more
favorably inclined towards peace negotiations?

Cunningham: It is hard to speculate about his views. He was clearly representing the
Taliban in the absence of Omar. He was at the helm when the process began last summer.
I would hasten to note that sitting down and talking is not the same as actually
negotiating and trying to find a solution. Thats where the role of Pakistan will be
important.

The Taliban will be encouraged to negotiate seriously by the knowledge that their support
structure is not going to remain as it has been in the past, and by the knowledge that the
United States and our partners are going to keep assisting the Afghan security forces.

It is too early to say how that will develop in the coming months, but at least in the past
one assumes that Mansour was willing to begin at least sitting at the table with the
Afghans. That is the first step.

Q: Has the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan complicated efforts to make peace with
the Taliban, which may now be reluctant to give up territory that could be seized by
ISIS?

Cunningham: I dont think that any Afghan is going to willingly cede territory to Daesh
[another name for the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham]. Its presence in Afghanistan
certainly does complicate things by bringing a vicious external actor into the scene.
Daesh is not present in a dominant way, so far, but it is there.

It gives the wrong message to suggest that Daesh doesnt matter because it is a
rebranding of disaffected Taliban, which is what it seems to be along with some foreign
fighters. But, as we have seen in Libya and probably will see elsewhere, these local
groups, when they identify with the Daesh movement, if they establish themselves in
occupied territory they then make the connection with [ISIS] central leadership. That is
the danger in Afghanistan.

Another reason for a certain amount of urgency and focus on trying to create a political
process is that over time this phenomenon will replicate itselfnot that Daesh will take
over and reject the Taliban as the Taliban rejects Daesh now, but that it will establish
itself nonetheless, which will make it a danger in that part of the world. The ideological
home of Daesh is in what they call Khorasan, which is Afghanistan and northern Iran.

Q: The Taliban today controls more territory today than at any point since it was
ousted from Kabul in the 2001 US-led invasion. In the past six months it has
conducted high-profile operations in Kunduz and Kandahar. Is Mansour trying to
assert his leadership and come to the negotiating table from a position of strength?

Cunningham: That is probably part of it, but it was also expected that 2015 was going to
be a very difficult year because it was clear that with the end of the international mission
and the US combat role in Afghanistan the Taliban would press very hard into the Afghan
security forces.

Some observers believe that one of the Talibans aims was to establish a territorial
sanctuary within Afghanistan from which they could operate, instead of operating from
within Pakistan. That hasnt happened. The Afghan forces, while they have taken a lot of
losses, have fought and are learning lessons. The knowledge that the United States and
our partners are going to be there and providing not just training and assistance, but also
critical enabling support that the Afghans dont have available, will provide more clarity
about the security situation going forward as the Afghans learn and address the
shortcomings that have been exposed in Kunduz and the fighting in Helmand.

As long as there is Afghan will to resist, which there is; international support to
compensate for shortcomings, which we have now made clear will be thereand I hope
that we will emphasize that message; and things that are already underway, such as
building up the Afghan air force, come into being, it will become clear that the Afghan
forces are becoming better and not worse and the Taliban will not be able to occupy
significant amounts of territory.

It is undoubtedly true that the Taliban occupies more territory than in the past, but it is not
crucial territory and when they have occupied territory often it has been taken back.

Q: President Ghani staked a lot of his political capital early in his presidency on an
outreach to Pakistan. That didnt pay off. Can it now? Are you seeing a different
approach from Pakistan, especially its military, in light of Gen. Raheel Sharifs visit to
Kabul last month?

Cunningham: I havent seen a change in their approach yet except in the limited sense
that they have resumed the dialogue at a very high level. I hope they realize how difficult
this is politically for the Afghan government.

President Ghani is again expending political capital based on the premise that there is a
positive way to move forward with Pakistan. That remains to be proven. The rhetoric has
improved. The symbolism and the political gestures from [Pakistans] civilian
government as well as the military have improved. But the proof will be in what actually
happens.

Q: Is it important that groups like the Haqqani Network are part of a peace effort?
Cunningham: There are many people who have felt that the Haqqanis, because they are
as much a criminal group as anything else, are not reconcilable, and that they have
temporal and financial interests that they are trying to secure. They have, in the past,
pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar. Now Siraj Haqqani, who is the operational head of
the network, is a deputy of Mansours. The Haqqanis have always had representatives in
the Taliban leadership, but this is a qualitative step up. What the implications of that will
be at the end of the day remain to be seen.
Ashish Kumar Sen is a staff writer at the Atlantic Council.