THIRD DIVISION

BSB
INC., represented
President,
Mr.
BANGAYAN,

GROUP,
by
its
RICARDO

G.R. No. 168644

Present:

employed
as
cashier
by
said
complainant at the time of the
commission of the said offense and as
such she was entrusted with the said
amount of money.
Contrary to law.[9]

Petitioner,
Promulgated:
-versus-

SALLY GO a.k.a.
GO-BANGAYAN,

February 16, 2010

SALLY

Respondent
.
x-----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600[1] dated April 20, 2005,
which reversed and set aside the September 13,
2004[2] and November 5, 2004[3] Orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36[4] in Criminal
Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft. The said orders,
in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by
herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the
testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a
Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized
domestic
corporation
presided
by
its
herein
representative,
Ricardo
Bangayan
(Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred
to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayans
wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier,
and was engaged, among others, to receive and account
for the payments made by the various customers of the
company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila
Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified
[5]
theft against
respondent,
alleging
that
several
checks[6] representing
the
aggregate
amount
of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys customers in
payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned
over to the companys coffers, indorsed by respondent
who deposited the same to her personal banking
accountmaintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
(Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. [7] Upon a
finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted,
the assistant city prosecutor recommended the filing of
the Information for qualified theft against respondent.[8]
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an
Information, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime
during the period comprised (sic)
between January 1988 [and] October
1989, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent [to] gain and
without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away cash money in the total amount
of P1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB
GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by
RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage
and prejudice of said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50,
Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the
said offense, said accused acted with
grave abuse of confidence, being then

Respondent entered a negative plea when

arraigned.[10] The trial ensued. On the premise that
respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks
and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her
personal banking account, the prosecution moved for the
issuance
of
subpoena duces
tecum
/ad
testificandum against the respective managers or records
custodians of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as
of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila
Branch.[11] The trial court granted the motion and issued
the corresponding subpoena.[12]
Respondent filed a motion to quash the
subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to
Metrobank, noting to the court that in the complaintaffidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention
made of the said bank account, to which respondent, in
addition to the Security Bank account identified as
Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the proceeds
of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent
characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to the
case,
she,
in
the
same
motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy o
f the Security
Bank account mentioned in the same complaintaffidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to
address the allegations with respect thereto. [13]
Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued
for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground
that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two
checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an
account with the said bank. [14] To this, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely
confidential nature of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405. [15] The trial
court did not sustain respondent; hence, it denied the
motion to quash for lack of merit.[16]
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present
in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan),
the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell,
Marasigans testimony sought to prove that between
1988 and 1989, respondent, while engaged as cashier at
the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks
issued to the company by its customers, endorse the
same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her
personal deposit account with Security Bank. In the
course of the testimony, the subject checks were
presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as
the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and
then deposited in her personal account with Security
Bank.[17] But before the testimony could be completed,
respondent filed a Motion to Suppress,[18] seeking the
exclusion of Marasigans testimony and accompanying
documents thus far received, bearing on the subject
Security Bank account. This time respondent invokes, in
addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality
under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion
in its September 13, 2004 Order.[19] A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed, but it was also
denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004. [20] These
two orders are the subject of the instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision.
[21]
The decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders
dated September 13, 2004 and
November 5, 2004 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC
representative is ordered stricken from
the records.

SO ORDERED.[22]
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same
issues as those raised before the lower courts.
[23]

In this Petition[24] under Rule 45, petitioner

averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had
seriously erred in reversing the assailed orders of the trial
court, and in effect striking out Marasigans testimony
dealing with respondents deposit account with Security
Bank.[25] It asserted that apart from the fact that the said
evidence had a direct relation to the subject matter of the
case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under
one of the exceptions to the coverage of confidentiality
under R.A. 1405.[26] Petitioner believed that what
constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in
this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004
Order of the trial court, which declared to be erroneous
the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was
contained in the information.[27]
For her part, respondent claimed that the money
represented by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because nothing in the
criminal information suggested that the money therein
deposited was the subject matter of the case. She
invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal
Information which averred that she has stolen and carried
away
cash
money
in
the
total
amount
of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term
cash money stated in the Information was not
synonymous with the checks she was purported to have
stolen from petitioner and deposited in her personal
banking account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution
had Marasigan identify, as well as the testimony itself of
Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at
least for violating respondents right to due process.
[28]
More in point, respondent opined that admitting the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence
pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the
secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405.[29]
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of
the allegations in the criminal Information for qualified
theft, as the same has sufficiently alleged the elements of
the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigans
testimony, the Court would be able to establish that the
checks involved, copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, had indeed
been received by respondent as cashier, but were,
thereafter, deposited by the latter to her personal
account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the
checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent
and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the
cash amount represented by the checks supposedly
stolen by respondent, but also the checks themselves. [30]
We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the
parties that the issue for resolution is whether the
testimony of Marasigan and the accompanying
documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they
are also violative of the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A.
No. 1405. The question of admissibility of the evidence
thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative
estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all
criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the
offense must be established with unwavering exactitude
and moral certainty because this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt. [31] Theft is present when a
person, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, takes the
personal property of another without the latters
consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as
alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of
confidence.[32] The prosecution of this offense necessarily
focuses on the existence of the following elements: (a)
there was taking of personal property belonging to
another; (b) the taking was done with intent to gain; (c)
the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d)
the taking was done without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it
was done with abuse of confidence. [33] In turn, whether
these elements concur in a way that overcomes the
presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass

the test of relevancy and competency in accordance with

Section 3[34] Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence sought
to be suppressed in this case the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the checks purported to have been
stolen and deposited in respondents Security Bank
account are relevant, is to be addressed by considering
whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence; or
whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by
process of logic, an inference may be made as to the
existence or non-existence of the fact in issue. [35]
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent
has taken away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50
from the coffers of petitioner. In support of this
allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of
the elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that
respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989,
deposited some of its checks to her personal account with
Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence
between the allegation of theft of cash in the Information,
on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had
first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her
banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon
the Court that there obtains no difference between cash
and check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for
theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes
deprivation of personal property of one by another with
intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen
because the deprivation relative to the offended party
has already ensued from such act of execution. [36] The
allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates that
evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that
the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to
another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in
attempting to draw a connection between the evidence
subject of the instant review, and the allegation of theft in
the Information by claiming that respondent had
fraudulently deposited the checks in her own name. But
this line of argument works more prejudice than favor,
because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission,
not of theft, but rather of some other crime
probably estafa.
Moreover, that there is no difference between
cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by
conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is
cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal
allegation in an information for that offense; a check,
after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally
accepted under commercial usage as a substitute for
cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary
value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in
this respect that what the offender does with the check
subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes
material inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.
[37]
In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the
prosecution may establish its cause by the presentation
of the checks involved. These checks would then
constitute the best evidence to establish their contents
and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of
the proposition that the offender has indeed indorsed the
same in his own name.[38]
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus,
for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses
respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to
establish that respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the
proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not
only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that score,
inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the
admission of Marasigans testimony on the particulars of
respondents account with Security Bank, as well as of
the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly
deposited in said account, constitutes an unallowable
inquiry under R.A. 1405.
It is conceded that while the fundamental law has
not bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing
privacy rights relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate
expectation of privacy governing such accounts. The
source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is
found in R.A. No. 1405,[39] otherwise known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1955. [40]

R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes

to discourage private hoarding and at the same time
encourage the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of
authorized loans and thereby assist in economic
development.[41] Owing to this piece of legislation, the
confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a basic
state policy in the Philippines. [42] Section 2 of the law
institutionalized this policy by characterizing as
absolutely confidential in general all deposits of whatever
nature with banks and other financial institutions in the
country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of
whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its
political
subdivisions
and
its
instrumentalities,
are
hereby
considered
as
of
an
absolutely
confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by
any person, government official, bureau
or
office, except upon
written
permission of the depositor, or in cases
of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or
in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.

Subsequent
statutory
enactments[43] have
expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the
secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule,
falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of
privacy.[44] There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing
these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner
that would authorize unbridled discretion, whether
governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions
as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank
accounts. It is then perceivable that the present legal
order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits.[45]
The measure of protection afforded by the law
has been explained in China Banking Corporation v.
Ortega.[46] That case principally addressed the issue of
whether the prohibition against an examination of bank
deposits precludes garnishment in satisfaction of a
judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court
found guidance in the relevant portions of the legislative
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it
held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405
actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or
investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or
investigation is merely to determine the existence and
nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given
bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of
or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the
law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the
court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for purposes of the
garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold
the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until
further order. It will be noted from the discussion of
the conference committee report on Senate Bill No.
351 and House Bill No. 3977which later became
Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of
the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the
reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. Thus:
x x x Mr. Marcos:
Now, for purposes of
the record, I should like the Chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual
has a tax case. He is being held liable by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)] or,
say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and
because of this the deposit of this
individual [has been] attached by the
[BIR].

Mr. Ramos:
The attachment
will only apply after the court has
pronounced
sentence
declaring
the
liability of such person. But where the
primary aim is to determine whether
he has a bank deposit in order to
bring about a proper assessment by
the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed
by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules
of procedure and under the Civil Code, the
attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for
instance that there is a preliminary
attachment which is for garnishment or
for holding liable all moneys deposited
belonging to a certain individual, but such
attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such
deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos:
It is only prohibited
to the extent that the inquiry... is made
only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability
already
declared
for
the
protection of the right in favor of the
government; but when the object is
merely to inquire whether he has a
deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by
the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits
a
mere
investigation
into
the
existence and the amount of the
deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the
nature of such deposit. x x x[47]

very

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the

confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits
that the account maintained by respondent with Security
Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has
fraudulently appropriated to herself and, thus, falls under
one of the exceptions in Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 that
the money kept in said account is the subject matter in
litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers,
citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., [48] that
the subject matter of the action refers to the physical
facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands,
chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is
prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the
money deposited in the Security Bank account. [49] On the
surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is
valid to a point, yet a deeper treatment tends to show
that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because,
while Mathay did explain what the subject matter of an
action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether
the class suit in that case was properly brought to the
court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in
litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has
been pointedly and amply addressed in Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [50] in which the Court
noted that the inquiry into bank deposits allowable under
R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the
money deposited in the account is itself the subject of
the action.[51] Given this perspective, we deduce that the
subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be
determined from the indictment that charges respondent
with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by
the prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the
criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent,
unqualifiedly and in plain language, is charged with
qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and
confidence
and
stealing
cash
in
the
amount
of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual
allegation that in some material way involves the checks
subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence
sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in
said Information make mention of the supposed bank
account in which the funds represented by the checks
have allegedly been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the
indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the
ostensible subject of the prosecutions inquiry. Without
needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged

in the Information, the subject matter of the action in this

case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to
have been stolen by respondent, and not the money
equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted
in evidence. Thus, it is that, which the prosecution is
bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial
and documentary evidence relative to respondents
Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to
establish the existence of such account, its nature and
the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the
prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank
deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which is
protected by law. On this score alone, the objection
posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should
have indeed put an end to the controversy at the very
first instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan
on the particulars of respondents supposed bank account
with Security Bank and the documentary evidence
represented by the checks adduced in support thereof,
are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation
of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case,
inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical and
reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent
for qualified theft. We find full merit in and affirm
respondents objection to the evidence of the
prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct
in reversing the assailed orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the
right of privacy extends its scope to include an
individuals financial privacy rights and personal financial
matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny
given by courts and legislators to laws infringing such
rights.[52] Should there be doubts in upholding the
absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits against
affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then
such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. This
attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse
the general state policy respecting the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.[53]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600
dated April 20, 2005, reversing the September 13, 2004
and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 36 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191392

March 14, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLLY SORIAGA y STO. DOMINGO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the November 27 2009 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03108,
which affirmed the finding of guilt by the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC), in Criminal Case No.
03-4031, convicting accused Rolly Soriaga (Soriaga) of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165.2The Information filed against him reads:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 2003, in the
City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport
Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride,
weighing zero
point zero five (0.05) gram, which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of one hundred (P100.00) pesos, in
violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In the afternoon of October 15, 2003, Barangay Captain

Manuel Adao of the Makati Anti- Drug Abuse Council
Cluster 2 (MADAC) received an information about
Soriagas unbridled selling of illegal drugs on Arellano
and Bautista Streets, Barangay Palanan, Makati City.
Consequently, a joint buy-bust operation was conducted
by the police headed by PO3 Henry Montes (PO3
Montes) and the MADAC represented by Herminia
Facundo (Facundo) and Leovino Perez(Perez). Facundo
was designated as the poseur-buyer.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the target area
accompanied by their informant. Facundo and the
informant met Soriaga at the corner of Arellano and
Bautista Streets. Soriaga asked the informant, "Okay ba
yan, pre?" The informant assured Soriaga, "Barkada ko
yan, okay to." Soriaga then asked Facundo how much she
was going to buy, and the latter replied, "Piso lang."
Thereafter, Soriaga took the P100.00 marked-money from
Facundo
and
placed
it
in
his
front
pocket.
Instantaneously, Soriaga took out a plastic sachet with
crystalline substance from his left pocket and handed it
over to Facundo. The latter immediately gave the prearranged signal by throwing a lighted cigarette and the
rest of the buy-bust team rushed to the scene. PO3
Montes ordered Perez to empty the pockets of Soriaga
and recovered the P100.00 marked-money. Facundo
marked the plastic sachet that Soriaga gave her with the
letters "RSD." Facundo placed the same initials on the
recovered money.
Soriaga was placed under arrest and brought to the office
of the Anti-illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force. The
evidence
seized
was
turned
over
to police
investigator PO2 Reynaldo Juan. An examination was
conducted on the contents of the plastic sachet which
tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride. 4
In addition to the above-mentioned charge, Soriaga was
also indicted for illegal use of dangerous drugs under
Section 15, Article II, also of R.A. No. 9165. On July 14,
2007, the RTC rendered a decision acquitting Soriaga of
this charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs but finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegally selling dangerous drugs. The fallo of said decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, Judgment is
rendered in these cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-4031, finding accused
Rolly Soriaga y Sto. Domingo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Art. II,
RA 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in
the amount of P500,000.00. Said accused shall
be given credit for the period of his preventive
detention.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-5007, acquitting the
said accused Rolly Soriaga y Sto. Domingo from
the charge of Violation of Section 15, Art. II, R.A.
No. 9165, upon a reasonable doubt.
It is further ordered that the dangerous drugs subject of
Criminal Case No. 03-4031 be transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the
latters appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.5
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the July 14, 2007
Decision of the RTC.6
When the case was elevated to this Court, Soriaga,
through the Public Attorneys Office, and the Office of the
Solicitor General, both manifested that they would no
longer file their respective supplemental briefs and,
instead, they would adopt all the arguments in their briefs

filed before the CA. In his Appellants Brief, Soriaga

presented the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED
SHABU.7
The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
"A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution
of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is
legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken."8
Soriaga argues that the buy-bust team failed to comply
with the requisites of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 and its implementing rules requiring the immediate
inventory and photograph of the items seized in the buybust operation. Further, Soriaga proceeds to question the
chain of custody of the seized shabu.
First of all, what is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, plus the
presentation of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the
elements essential to the crime of illegal sale of
prohibited or dangerous drugs are: (i) the accused sold
and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and (ii) he
knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
prohibited drug.9
The RTC and the CA both found the above elements to
have been satisfactorily proved by the prosecution in the
present case. Soriaga sold and delivered the shabu
for P100 to Facundo, the poseur buyer. Facundo herself
testified that there was an actual exchange of the
marked-money and the prohibited drug. Certainly,
Soriaga was aware that what he was selling was illegal
and prohibited. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the
subject drug was seized, marked and subsequently
identified as a prohibited drug. At the trial, the same drug
with the identifying marks intact was presented in
evidence. Coupled with the unwavering testimony of
Facundo who had no reason at all to falsely accuse
Soriaga and who was only doing her job, the prosecution
convinced the RTC to render a judgment of conviction.
In the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant
facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been
misapplied or overlooked, the Court can only accord full
credence to such factual assessment of the trial court
which had the distinct advantage of observing the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses at the trial.10
Absent any proof of motive to falsely charge an accused
of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the findings of the
trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall
prevail over his bare allegation.11

On the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed

procedures in the inventory of seized drugs, the rule is
that it does not render an accused's arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. 12 The
requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) are not inflexible. What is
essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused."13 Thus, in the case of People v.
Domado,14 it was written:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not
beating any new path by holding that the failure to
undertake the required photography and immediate
marking of seized items may be excused by the unique
circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we
already
stated
that
"marking
upon
immediate
confiscation" does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be at the police station or office of the
apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana,
People v. Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the
apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the
police station and not at the place of seizure.
Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the
evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the items seized had been preserved.1avvphi1 To
reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are not
always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to
the procedural requirements; what is important is to
ensure the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we
held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21
of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and
the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized,
will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids
its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence
must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight
that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or
in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of
the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The
issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight
evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said
evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.15
Following the consummation of the sale and the arrest of
Soriaga, Facundo proceeded to mark the sachet received
from Soriaga with the initials "RSD" while still at the crime
scene. At the police station, the marked sachet was
turned over to PO2 Reynaldo Juan. Thereafter, a letter
request together with the marked sachet was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory of the
Southern Police District for a laboratory examination of
the contents of the marked sachet. Thereafter, the
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Crime Laboratory, Police
Inspector Richard Allan S. Mangalip issued his report
confirming that the specimen from the sachet marked
"RSD" contained or tested positive for shabu. 16
With the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the
CA that the chain of custody was unbroken thereby
ensuring the integrity of the corpus delicti. Necessarily,
the conviction of Soriaga must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]
ROSENDO
HERRERA, petitioner, vs.
ROSENDO
ALBA, minor, represented by his mother
ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTAVILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
DECISION

the Order, and to submit the results thereof within

a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The
parties are further reminded of the hearing set on
24 February 2000 for the reception of other
evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3
February 2000 Order. He asserted that under the
present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to
take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive
process
to
obtain
the
requisite
specimen,
unconstitutional.
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[6]

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review [1] to set aside the
Decision[2] dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of
Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The
appellate court affirmed two Orders [3] issued by Branch 48
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP
No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed
Rosendo
Herrera
(petitioner)
to
submit
to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing, while
the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration.

On 18
July 2000, petitioner filed
before
the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the
trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February 2000
and 8 June 2000 in excess of, or without jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner further contended
that there is no appeal nor any [other] plain, adequate
and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the
taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the
following grounds to support his objection:
1.

Public
respondent
misread
and
misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of
Appeals (270 SCRA 2).

2.

Public respondent ruled to accept DNA

test without considering the limitations
on, and conditions precedent for the
admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring
the serious constraints affecting the
reliability of the test as admitted by
private respondents expert witness.

3.

Subject Orders lack legal and factual

support, with public respondent relying
on scientific findings and conclusions
unfit for judicial notice and unsupported
by experts in the field and scientific
treatises.

4.

Under the present circumstances the

DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to
take will be inconclusive, irrelevant and
the coercive process to obtain the
requisite specimen from the petitioner,
unconstitutional.[7]

The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo
Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory
recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On
7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological
father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking
of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she
testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La
Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was
also head of the University of the Philippines Natural
Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis
laboratory. She was a former professor at the University
of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she
developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught
Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that
the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing
paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court
granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the
petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals,
namely: the petitioner, the minor child, and
respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity
testing in a laboratory of their common choice
within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a
decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court
stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial
courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an
available remedy for an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against selfincrimination because the right applies only to testimonial
compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that
petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the
DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Petition
is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE,
and

ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders of

the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.

look like his biological father.[19] This kind of evidence

appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In the present case, the trial court encountered

three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondents
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she
asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father.
Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the
trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of
letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied
Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual
relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is
Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered
petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent
and petitioner side by side, to show how much they
resemble each other.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the

appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23 May
2001.[9]
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a
valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which
DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial
system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA
test results in a paternity suit.[10]
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court
gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the trial
court to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to
determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to
ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official
recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals and
the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect
of [sic] its implementation.[11] Petitioner maintains that
the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.[12]

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become

credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and
governing jurisprudence to help us determine what
evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation
are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide
as follows:

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity
testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a
paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We
shall consider the requirements of the Family Code and of
the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, [13]support
(as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There
are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie
case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father
and child.[14]
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that
she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the
burden forward and shift it to the putative father.[15]
There are two affirmative defenses available to the
putative father.
The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because
of either physical absence or impotency. [16] The putative
father may also show that the mother had sexual
relations with other men at the time of conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate.[17] The childs legitimacy
may be impugned only under the strict standards
provided by law.[18]
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative
father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a
paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a
function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula
that could quantify how much a child must or must not

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their

illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1)

The record of birth appearing in

the civil register or a final
judgment; or

(2)

An admission of legitimate filiation

in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the

legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)

The
open
and
continuous
possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or

(2)

Any other means allowed by the

Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions

pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

on

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The

act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The word pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding

pedigree.The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to
the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles
or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.
This
Courts
rulings
further
specify
what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,[20] a case petitioner often cites,
we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the
claim of filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father.[21] A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence.[22] Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of
the putative father cuddling the child on various
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation.[23] However, a student permanent record,
a written consent to a fathers operation, or a marriage
contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot
be taken as authentic writing.[24] Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism[25] nor family pictures[26] are
sufficient to establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly
limit evidence of paternity and filiation to incriminating
acts alone. However, advances in science show that
sources of evidence of paternity and filiation need not be
limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost
universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests
are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on
paternity.[27]
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,[28] the result of the
blood grouping test showed that the putative father was a
possible father of the child. Paternity was imputed to
the putative father after the possibility of paternity was
proven on presentation during trial of facts and
circumstances other than the results of the blood
grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the child, the
mother, and the putative father agreed to submit
themselves to a blood grouping test. The National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted the test, which
indicated that the child could not have been the possible
offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held
that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive
on the non-paternity of the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We
are now asked whether DNA analysis may be admitted as
evidence to prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons
entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells
and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic
identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can
determine his identity.[30]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted
from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern,
or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample

is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person,

except for identical twins.[31] We quote relevant portions
of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint
called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive
to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg),
and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a
component of every cell in the human body, the
DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his
or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body
parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases.
They
are
known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine)
and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases
appear in an individuals DNA determines his or
her physical makeup. And since DNA is a doublestranded molecule, it is composed of two specific
paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are
called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base
pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This
gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere
in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections
that differ.
They are known as polymorphic
loci, which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing
(profiling, tests, fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA
fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In
other
words,
DNA
typing
simply
means
determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may
proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are
five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They
are:
the RFLP
(restriction
fragment
length
polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm
loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; mtDNA process; VNTR (variable
number tandem repeats); and the most recent
which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats)
method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most
forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can
match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical
error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just
like
in
fingerprint
analysis,
in DNA
typing, matches are determined. To illustrate,
when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify
a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected
from
the
crime
scene
is
compared
with
the known print. If a substantial amount of the
identifying features are the same, the DNA or
fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then,
even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint
is different, it is deemed not to have come from
the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA
show variations between people. In each of these
regions, a person possesses two genetic types
called allele, one inherited from each parent. In
[a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual
to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to

determine which half of the childs DNA was

inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his
profile, which match the paternal types in the
child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the
DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.[32] (Emphasis in the original)
Although the term DNA testing was mentioned in
the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[33] it was
only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of
Appeals[34] that more than a passing mention was given
to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas
corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners
youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence
and physical resemblance were used to establish
parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification
and
parentage
testing.
The
University
of
the
Philippines
Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when completely obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in
this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it
would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo[35] discussed
DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a 180
degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA
testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,[36] where we stated that
DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts.
In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken
from the rape victim matched the accuseds DNA profile.
We affirmed the accuseds conviction of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.[37]
Vallejo discussed
the
probative
value,
not
admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no
longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA
analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according official recognition to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in
conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a
significant
impact
on
jurisprudence
on
DNA
testing: People v. Yatar[38] and In re: The Writ of
Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.[39] In Yatar, a
match existed between the DNA profile of the semen
found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood

sample given by appellant in open court. The Court,

following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the conviction of
appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by
circumstantial evidence, showed appellant guilty of rape
with homicide.
In De Villa, the convict-petitioner
presented DNA test results to prove that he is not the
father of the child conceived at the time of commission of
the rape. The Court ruled that a difference between the
DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile
of the victims child does not preclude the convictpetitioners commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by
petitioner and respondent refer to two United States
cases to support their respective positions on the
admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v. U.S.
[40]
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
[41]
In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of
murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result
of a systolic blood pressure deception test [42] made on
defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Fryes
conviction and ruled that the systolic blood pressure
deception test has not yet gained such standing and
scientific
recognition
among
physiological
and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in
admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made.
The Frye standard of general acceptance states as
follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the
line
between
the
experimental
and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.
In
1989, State
v.
Schwartz[43] modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was
charged with stabbing and murder. Bloodstained articles
and blood samples of the accused and the victim were
submitted for DNA testing to a government facility and a
private facility. The prosecution introduced the private
testing facilitys results over Schwartzs objection. One of
the issues brought before the state Supreme Court
included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal
proceeding. The state Supreme Court concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic
DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the
scientific community, we hold that admissibility of
specific test results in a particular case hinges on
the laboratorys compliance with appropriate
standards and controls, and the availability of their
testing data and results.[44]
In
1993, Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[45] further modified the FryeSchwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability
case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the
admissibility of an experts testimony because it failed to
meet the Frye standard of general acceptance. The
United States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials,
the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded
the Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence,
while Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of
evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. Relevant evidence is defined as that
which has any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible,
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Daubert cautions
that
departure
from
the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean
that the Federal Rules do not place limits on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge
must ensure that the testimonys reasoning or method is
scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue.
Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1)
whether the theory or technique can be or has been
tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known
or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the techniques
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is
generally accepted in the scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v.
Carmichael,[46] further modified the Daubert standard.
This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which
now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge,
skill,
experience,
training,
or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this
jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither
the Frye-Schwartz standard
nor
the DaubertKumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.[47] At
best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive
effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not
otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.
[48]
Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the
admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess may be received in
evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the
admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends
in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.[50]

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely

refer
petitioner
to
our
decisions
in Tijing,
Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is
admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive
tests
for
admissibility
established
by FryeSchwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the
evidence.
Probative Value of
DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility,
trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA
analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement
in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.[51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA
analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at
a number of these variable regions in an individual
to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his
profile, which match the paternal types in the
child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the
DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.[52]
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile
matches that of the putative father. A complete match
between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile
of the putative father does not necessarily establish
paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard
adopted in an American jurisdiction,[53] trial courts should
require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the
Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of
paternity of a putative father compared to the probability
of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An
appropriate reference population database, such as the
Philippine population database, is required to compute for
W. Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions,
W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W
estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and
child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those
conducted between the putative father and child alone. [54]
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from
paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If
the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA
analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence.
If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity.[55] This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to
the Vallejo standards.
Right Against
Self-Incrimination

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution

provides that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining
samples from him for DNA testing violates his right
against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to
testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions
of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a
criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity
case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this
action, will not violate the right against selfincrimination.
This privilege applies only to
evidence that is communicative in essence taken
under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513,
1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right
against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from
his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs.
Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for
acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil.
145); morphine forced out of the mouth was
received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil.
735); an order by the judge for the witness to put
on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs.
Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a
woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62),
since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on testimonial compulsion.[56]
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule
on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his
or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law,
rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the
Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by
Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]
PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON
M.
LUMALANG,
SR.,
MELITON
D.
EVANGELISTA,
SR.,
and
NELSON
B.
MELGAR, complainants,
vs.
ATTY.
NORBERTO M. MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino,
Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D.
Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty.
Norberto M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and
Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that

respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge,
abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of
his paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn,
married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn
dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly
as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his
paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn
dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two
daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986,
making it appear that their two children are legitimate,
while in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent
declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in
respondents certificate of candidacy for the 1998
elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such
declarations in the birth certificates of his children and in
his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting
falsification of public documents; and respondents acts
betray his lack of good moral character and constitute
grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states
that complainants, who are his political opponents in
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to
exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal
charges against them; complainants illegally procured
copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are
inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not participate
in the preparation and submission with the local civil
registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never
declared that he had two wives, as he has always
declared that he is separated in fact from his wife,
Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have used this
issue against him during elections and yet, the people of
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor,
hence, respondent has not offended the publics sense of
morality.
The administrative case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter,
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted
hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and
Romeo M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct
testimony and were subjected to cross-examination by
respondents counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as
follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in
Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a
practicing lawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court
Judge. Respondent has been cohabiting openly and
publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing
themselves to be husband and wife, and from their
cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in
1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a
concerned citizen, informing him that respondent was
married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan, on
January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to
cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente. Attached to the letter
was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the Civil
Register attesting to the marriage between respondent
and Felicitas Valderia. He also received information from
concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legally
married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.
Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed
with the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married
to Felicitas Valderia. In respondents Certificate of

Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared

his civil status as separated.
Respondent has
represented to all that he is married to Marilyn dela
Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where
respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of
the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said
newspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the
father of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna
Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as
follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and
respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not
respondent who told him about the alleged immoral
conduct subject of the present case. Although he
received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the
immoral conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he
did not immediately file a case for disbarment against
respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal
case for falsification against him that he decided to file an
administrative case against respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified
that there were people who were against the open
relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
as respondent had been publicly introducing the latter as
his wife despite the fact that they are both still legally
married to other persons, and so someone unknown to
him just handed to their maid copies of the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and Myrra Khrisna
Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was
adopted as his direct testimony, is practically identical to
that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness
Laygo testified that he was not the one who procured the
certified true copies of the birth certificates of Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just
gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was a
municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a
concerned citizen regarding respondents immorality was
sent to Melgar, but he did not take any action against
respondent at that time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary
evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted
by respondents counsel to be faithful reproductions of
the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a
letter of one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of
respondents immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local
Civil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the
celebration of the marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna
Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza, [6] the Birth Certificate of
Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, [7] the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9,
1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated
March 25, 1998,[9]Certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27,
1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated between
Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10] and the
editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999
issue),[11] wherein it was stated that respondent has two
daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present
any evidence and merely submitted a memorandum
expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of
complainants witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said
testimonies and their documentary evidence have no
probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the
IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as
follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED
and
APPROVED,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution
as
Annex
A;
and,
finding
the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of
law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no
longer cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and
has abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the abovequoted Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of
immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar
and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed
under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b)
their documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits
A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did
not formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent
opted not to present his evidence anymore because
according to him there is none to rebut vis--vis the
evidence presented by the private complainants.
Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through
counsel to argue his position. As can be seen from the
comment and memorandum submitted, respondents
counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated
since complainants are political rivals of respondent and
that the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1 which
were offered to show that respondent sired the children
namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and
Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his
cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible
because they were allegedly secured in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of
the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according
to respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants
herein, on the other hand, categorically state in their
affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph
2 that Respondent has been cohabiting openly and
publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente, representing
themselves to be husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of
said affidavits the witnesses also categorically state that
respondent has even represented to all and sundry that
Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical
statements made under oath by complainants are not
hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not
to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by
respondent shows that respondent is married to one,
Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a marriage
certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon
G. Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have
been presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that
they are competent and relevant evidence and
admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule
which bars admission of illegally obtained evidence
applies more appropriately to evidence obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case
cannot be analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A
person who violates Rule 24 of Administrative Order No. 1
Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of
imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make
the document so issued inadmissible as evidence

specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits

D and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates
are therefore competent evidence to show paternity of
said children by respondent in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary.

presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic)

that good moral character necessary as a condition for
him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He
is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the
practice of law.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of

the testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo
Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will
show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his
wife and that out of said cohabitation respondent sired
two children. These facts we repeat have not been
denied by respondent under oath since he chose to just
argue on the basis of the improper motivations and the
inadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the
documents presented. Complainants have presented
evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeed
respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person
who is not his wife. The evidence taken together will
support the fact that respondent is not of good moral
character. That respondent chose not to deny under oath
the grave and serious allegations made against him is to
our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped his
position before the Commission. As between the
documents and positive statements of complainants,
made under oath and the arguments and comments of
respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were
not verified under oath by respondent himself, we are
inclined and so give weight to the evidence of
complainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and
statements of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo that
respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la
Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted
that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a certain
Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would
respondent admit that to complainants) but the witnesses
did state clearly in their affidavits under oath that
respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who
is not respondents wife. Again their categorical
statements taken together with the other documents, are
enough to convince us and conclude that respondent is
not of good moral character.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP

to be fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on
record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that

possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
The continued possession of good moral character is a
requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law
[Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs.
Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181
SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes mockery of the inviolable social institution
of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made
a mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage.
Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F that he is
separated from his wife. This fact and statement without
any further explanation from respondent only contributes
to the blot in his moral character which good moral
character we repeat is a continuing condition for a
member to remain in good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Respondent has violated this rule against
engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the
pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA
622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private
persons particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their
rancor on members of the Bar through unjust and
unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the
charges can hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust
based on the evidence presented. The evidence

The evidence presented by complainants reach that

quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had
been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife
is corroborated by the contents of an article in
the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of
Naujans public servants, and stating therein that
respondent has been blessed with two beautiful children
with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It should be noted
that said publication is under the control of respondent,
he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it
could be reasonably concluded that if he contested the
truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews,
or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela
Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered that the
damning portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the
credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by
the fact that they are motivated by revenge for
respondents filing of criminal cases against them, we
opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygo are so
motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be
discounted as they are fully supported and corroborated
by documentary evidence which speak for themselves.
The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its
records of an entry of a marriage between respondent
and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980,
arepublic documents and are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein, as provided for under Article
410[14] of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth
certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having been
obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be
kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on
the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person
authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever
absolutely necessary in administrative,
judicial or other official proceedings to
determine the identity of the childs
parents or other circumstances surrounding
his birth; and

c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of

kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at
least two months or a fine in an amount not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or both in
the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D.
603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or
these rules. There could be no dispute that the subject
birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only
question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules
provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates
allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons
violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in
violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised
Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of
evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches
and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that
said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is
meant only to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state.[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we
explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of
Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its
agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental
power and protects the individual against any aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be
extended to the acts complained of in this case. The
alleged warrantless search made by Roque, a coemployee of appellant at the treasurers office, can hardly
fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on
unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not
provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public documents are,
therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into
consideration in the resolution of this administrative case
against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein
respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas
Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent.
Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he
fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the
fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia
at that time.

generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is

held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law.
In Zaguirre
vs.
Castillo,[18] we
definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

reiterated

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or

shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community.
Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a
member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that
siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of
every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before
us. The fact that respondent continues to publicly and
openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife,
thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral
character. Respondent should keep in mind that the
requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but
is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good
standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte,
Jr.,[21] we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity
and good moral character of members of the Bar. They
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one
of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he
has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on
respondent at his last known address and entered in his
record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and
the Court Administrator be furnished also a copy of this
resolution for their information and guidance as well as
for circularization to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was

defined thus:
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion

the

ERNESTO M. FULLERO,

Petitioner,

Present:

-versus
Promulgated:
September
12,
2007
PEOPLE
OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,[1] petitioner Ernesto
M. Fullero seeks to set aside the Decision[2] dated 19
October 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No.
28072, affirming in toto the Decision[3] dated 9 October
2003 of the Legazpi City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding petitioner
guilty of falsification of public document as defined and
penalized in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In an Amended Information [4] dated 14 October
1997, petitioner was charged with falsification of public
document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in 1988, in the
City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent
to prejudice and defraud, being then
the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City
Telecommunications
Office,
while
acting in said capacity and taking
advantage of his official function, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify and/or caused to be
falsified a genuine public document,
that is when he prepared his CSC 212
(Personal Data Sheet) for submission to
Bureau of Telecommunication Regional
Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it
appear that he passed the Civil
Engineering Board Examinations given
by Professional Regulation Commission
on May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of
75.8%; however, upon verification
issued by PRC, said accused took the
examination in May 1984 and another
one [in] May, 1985 with general ratings
of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.
When arraigned on 5 January 1998, petitioner,
with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded Not
Guilty to the charge.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.

Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region

5, LegazpiCity.[9]
Upon
inquiry
made
by Florenda B. Magistrado (Magistrado), a subordinate of
petitioner in the BTO, Iriga City, with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), it was verified that
petitioner never passed the board examination for civil
engineering and that petitioners name does not appear
in the book of registration for civil engineers. [10]
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the
subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the
30-31
May
1985 board
examination for
civil
engineering. He likewise disowned the signature
and thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the
stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from
the stroke of his genuine signature.[11] He added that the
letters contained in the PDS he accomplished and
submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his
typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the
subject PDS could not be his because it had both small
and capital typewritten letters.
Moreover,
petitioner
claimed
that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case
against him because he issued a memorandum against
her for misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City.[12] He further
argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try him there
being no evidence that the alleged falsification took place
in Legazpi City.[13]
After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a
Decision dated 9 October 2003 finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of falsification. Thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the
accused Ernesto M. Fullero is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime ofFalsification defined
and penalized under Art. 171 (4) of the
Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment
of
six
(6)
years
of prision correccional maximum to ten
(10) years of prision mayor medium as
the maximum and to pay a fine of three
thousand
P3,000.00
Pesos. Costs
against the accused.[14]
Petitioner
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Appeals. On 19 October 2005, the appellate court
promulgated
its
Decision
affirming in toto the
assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision. The appellate court
decreed:
In sum, the Court finds that
the
prosecution
has
successfully
established all the elements of the
offense of falsification of a public
document and that the trial court
correctly rendered a judgment of
conviction against appellant.
WHEREFORE, the appeal at
bench is DISMISSED for lack of merit
and
the
appealed 09
October
2003 decision is AFFIRMED.[15]

Culled from the records are the following facts:

In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph
operator at the Bureau of Telecommunications Office
in Iriga City (BTO, Iriga City). In 1982, he became the
Acting Chief Operator of the same office until 1994.[6]
A
Personal Data
Sheet (PDS)
[Civil Service
Form 212]
dated 8
January
1988,
purportedly
accomplished and signed by petitioner, states that he
passed the Civil Engineering Board Examination given on
30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%. [7] It
appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau of
Telecommunications
Regional
Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City).[8]
A letter dated 7 March 1988 and signed by
petitioner shows that he applied for the position of either
a
Junior
Telecommunications
Engineer
or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor with the Regional

On 21 November 2005, petitioner lodged the

instant petition before us citing as errors the following:
I.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SAID LOWER COURT
CONVICTED THE ACCUSED IN THE
ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE I.E.,
PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED
ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE ACT OF
FALSIFICATION HE IS ACCUSED OF;
II.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE

FACT THAT, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT
ACCUSED
FILLED
UP
THE
PERSONAL
DATA
SHEET
(PDS)
INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE IS
A LICENSED ENGINEER, ACCUSED WAS
UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO STATE SAID
DATA AND NO CRIMINAL INTENT WAS
SHOWN.
III.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SAID RTC ADMITTED
EVIDENCES NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED
AND THEREAFTER CONSIDERED THE
SAME IN DETERMINING THE ALLEGED
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED;
IV.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE VENUE
SHOULD
HAVE
BEEN
IN
THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CI
TY, WHERE THE ALLEGED PERSONAL
DATA SHEET WAS ACCOMPLISHED NOT
IN THE RTC OFLEGAZPI CITY.
Apropos the first issue, petitioner maintained
that none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw him
accomplish and sign the PDS; that the prosecution failed
to establish that he took advantage of his position in
falsifying the PDS; that a person need not be an Acting
Chief Operator to be able to falsify a PDS; that he never
became the custodian of the PDS nor did he have any
special access to it by reason of his office; and that the
identity of the person who falsified the PDS has not been
established by the prosecution.[16]
In establishing its charge of falsification against
petitioner, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses,
namely: Magistrado,
Joaquin
C. Atayza (Atayza), Romeo Brizo (Brizo), Emma Francisco
(Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir (Avenir).
Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the
BTO, Iriga City, testified that prior to the filing of the
instant case against petitioner, she sued the petitioner for
unjust vexation as the latter kissed her on one
occasion. While the case for unjust vexation was
pending,
her
lawyer,
Atty.
Mariano Baranda,
Jr.
(Atty. Baranda), asked her if petitioner was indeed a
licensed civil engineer since some persons simply
referred to petitioner as Mr. Fullero whereas in the
BTO, Iriga City,
petitioner
was
known
as
Engineer Fullero. Suspicious of the true status of
petitioner, she went to the Records Office of the
BTO, Legazpi City, and requested therein if she can see
petitioners PDS. Upon being shown petitioners PDS, she
observed that, under Item No. 18 thereof, petitioner
appears to be a licensed civil engineer having passed the
board examination for civil engineering given on 30-31
May 1985. Unconvinced of the veracity of petitioners
statement in the PDS that he is a licensed civil engineer,
she
sought
the
advice
of
Atty. Baranda. Atty. Baranda then proceeded to the main
office of the PRC in Manila to check the records of
petitioner. Subsequently,
Atty. Baranda obtained
a
certification from the PRC attesting that petitioner never
passed
the
board
examination
for
civil
engineering. Atty. Baranda showed the said certification
to her. Thereafter, she instituted the instant case against
petitioner.[17]

because he regularly received petitioners daily time

records and other documents bearing petitioners
signature. He confirmed that the signature appearing in
petitioners PDS was the signature of petitioner.[19]
Francisco was the Officer-In-Charge of the
Records Section of the PRC, Manila. She declared that
petitioners name was included in the master list of
examinees in the May 1984 civil engineering licensure
examination where petitioner obtained a failing grade of
56.75%. She affirmed that petitioners name also
appears in the list of examinees for the 30-31 May 1985
and May 1990 civil engineering licensure examinations
where he got failing marks.[20]
Avenir was the Special Investigator III in the
Legal Affairs Division of the CSC, Regional Office No.
5, Legazpi City. As the duly authorized representative of
the Regional Director of the said office, Avenir brought to
the court the letter of petitioner applying for the position
of either Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor, and a certification
submitted by the petitioner stating that the latter is a
licensed civil engineer. Avenir stated that the letter and
the certification were taken from the records of their
office and that these documents were being kept as part
of the records of an administrative case of petitioner with
the said office.[21]
The prosecution also presented documentary
evidence to bolster the foregoing testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) a certification issued by
Jose A. Arriola, Director II, PRC, Manila, attesting that
petitioners name is not registered in the book of registry
for licensed civil engineers; (2) certifications issued by
Francisco affirming that petitioner failed in the 30-31
May 1985 board examination for civil engineering;[22] (3)
the PDS where petitioner stated that he passed the 30-31
May 1985 board examination for civil engineering with a
rating of 75.8% and which was signed by him; [23] (4)
certifications issued by Francisco attesting that petitioner
failed the May 1990 board examination for civil
engineering;[24] (5) transcript of stenographic notes in the
perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado which
states that, during the trial thereof, petitioner affirmed
before the court hearing the case that he is a licensed
civil engineer;[25] (6) a letter signed and submitted by
petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Regional
Office No. 5, Legazpi City, claiming to be a licensed civil
engineer and applying for the position of either a Junior
Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor;[26] (7) an Order dated 20 December
2001 of the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, finding petitioner
administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and imposing upon him a penalty
of six months suspension for falsifying his PDS which is
also the subject matter of the instant case; [27] (8) a
certification submitted by the petitioner to the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, showing that he is a
licensed civil engineer;[28] (9) the daily time records
of Magistrado signed
by
petitioner
as
the formers superior;[29] and
(10)
other
documents
bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.[30]
On the other hand, the defense presented
petitioner as its sole witness. No documentary evidence
was proffered.

Atayza,
Regional
Director
of
the
PRC
in Legazpi City, testified that petitioner is not registered
as a board passer for the civil engineering examination
given on 30-31 May 1985.[18]

Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support

his contentions. Petitioner denied that he executed and
submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that
he
passed
the
board
examinations
for
civil
engineering. He likewise disowned the signature
and thumbmarkappearing therein. He averred that the
PDS he accomplished and submitted was typewritten in
capital letters since his typewriter does not have small
letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since the
letters were typewritten in small and capital letters; that
the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs
from
the
stroke
of
his
genuine
signature;
that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case
against him since he issued a memorandum against her
for the latters misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City; that he
is not a licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished
a different PDS in the BTO, Iriga City.

Brizo, Human Resource Management Officer

and Acting Records Officer of the BTO, Legazpi City,
testified that his duty as acting records officer was to
safeguard the records and files of the BTO, Iriga City, and
BTO, Legazpi City. He said he personally knows the
petitioner and is familiar with the latters signature

Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the

exact date when he issued the alleged memorandum
against Magistrado[31] and when during the trial of his
perjury case against Magistrado, he claimed that he is a
licensed civil engineer.[32] He cannot also remember if he
submitted a letter to the CSC, Regional Office No.

5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior

Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor[33] and the fact that he submitted
therein a certification that he is a licensed civil engineer.
[34]

The initial query to be resolved is whose

evidence between the prosecution and defense is
credible.
Case law dictates that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by
the prosecution.[35] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
if:
(a)

There is more than one

circumstance;

(b)

The facts from which the

inferences are derived are proven;
and

(c)

The combination of all the

circumstances is such as to
produce
a
conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[36]

Although none of the prosecution witnesses

actually saw the petitioner falsifying the PDS, they,
nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with
the
petitioners
handwriting
and
signature. Magistrado testified that, being a subordinate
of petitioner, she is very familiar with petitioners
signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his
signature on her daily time records for September 1987
to May 1988.[37] Brizo testified that he is also familiar with
petitioners signature because he personally knows
petitioner and that he regularly received petitioners daily
time records and other documents bearing petitioners
signature.[38] Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the
signature in the PDS belongs to petitioner.
The foregoing testimonies are consistent with
the
documentary
evidence
submitted
by
the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the
testimonies of Magistrado and Brizo as trustworthy and
believable.
More significant are the documentary evidence
consisting of petitioners signature in certain authentic
instruments which are apparently similar to the signature
in the PDS. The RTC and the Court of Appeals have
compared petitioners signatures in Magistrados daily
time records and petitioners signature in his application
letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, with
that of petitioners alleged signature in the PDS. They
observed that the slant position of the writing, as well as
the stroke and the last rounding loop of the signature in
the PDS, does not differ from petitioners signatures
in Magistrados daily time records and in petitioners
application letter.[39] They noted that petitioners
signatures in the said documents are strikingly similar,
such that through the naked eye alone, it is patent that
the signatures therein were written by one and the same
person. The observation of the Court of Appeals is worth
noting, viz:
Appellants allegation that he
did not execute the subject PDS is
unavailing. First,
the informations entered in the PDS,
such as his accurate personal data and
precise
employment
history,
are
matters which only the accused could
have known. Second, a visual analysis
of appellants
signatures in
the
Certificate of Arraignment and Notice of
Hearing, vis-a-vis his signature in the
PDS would show no significant disparity,
leading to the conclusion that appellant
himself prepared the PDS and affixed
his
signature
therein. Third,
the
signature of appellant in the PDS and in
the Daily Time Records (Exhibits J to
Q)
of
prosecution
witness Florenda Magistrado,
were
glaringly identical. x x x.[40]

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial

court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. [41] This
is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.[42]
In absolute disparity, the evidence for the
defense is comprised of denials. Petitioner denied having
accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that
someone else had filled it up. However, aside from this
self-serving and negative claim, he did not adduce any
convincing proof to effectively refute the evidence for the
prosecution.
It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare
denials and positive testimony on affirmative matters, the
latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight. [43]
The subsequent matter to be determined is
whether the elements of falsification for which petitioner
is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, provides:
ART. 171. Falsification
by
public
officer,
employee
or
notary or ecclesiastic
minister.
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:
xxxx
4.
Making
untruthful
statements in a narration of facts.
The elements of falsification in the above
provision are as follows:
a)
b)
c)

the offender makes in a

public
document
untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; and
the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false.[44]

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must

also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when (1) he has the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a
document; or (2) he has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies.[45]
All of the foregoing elements of falsification of
public documents under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.
First, petitioner was a public officer, being then
the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga City, when he
accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January
1988 at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is settled that a PDS
is a public document.[46] He stated under Item No. 18
of his PDS that he passed the civil engineering board
examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a
rating of 75.8%. Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS
to the BTO, Legazpi City.
Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan,[47] we ruled
that the accomplishment of the PDS being a requirement
under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in
connection with employment in the government, the
making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore,
intimately connected with such employment. Hence, the
filing of a PDS is required in connection with promotion to
a higher position and contenders for promotion have
the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise,
enhancing their qualifications by means of false

statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the

same position.[48]

their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on

the following reasons:

Petitioner was legally obliged to disclose in the

PDS that he is not a licensed civil engineer since, as
evidenced by his application letter, he was applying for
positions to be occupied only by licensed civil
engineers. Further, petitioner was also legally obliged to
make truthful statements in his PDS since he affirmed
therein under the penalty of perjury that his answers to
the queries are true and correct to the best of [his]
knowledge and belief.[49]

(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the

PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that petitioners
name does not appear in the registry books of licensed
civil engineers, was not properly identified during the
trial. The proper person to identify the certification should
have been the signatory therein which was PRC Director II
Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually
witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution
witness Atayza, who was not present when the
certification was executed, had identified the certification
during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are
mere hearsay; (2) Exhibit C, which is, according to
petitioner, a machine copy of the PDS, does not show that
it was the petitioner who prepared and submitted the PDS
to BTO, Legazpi City. There was nothing in the PDS which
requires a periodic submission of an updated
PDS. Prosecution witness Brizo does not know whether
petitioners
PDS
was
personally
delivered
or
mailed. Hence, the identification and subsequent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the PDS are
mere hearsay; (3) Exhibit F, which is the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury
case filed by petitioner against Magistrado where
petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer,
lacks proper identification as the stenographer or records
officer was not presented in court; (4) Exhibit G, which
is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director
of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the
position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I,
which is a machine copy of a certification allegedly issued
by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil
engineer and which was allegedly submitted by petitioner
to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region
5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying for the
aforesaid positions, are merely machine copies and the
loss and unavailability of their original were not
proven; and (5) Exhibits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R,
which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by
petitioner and which were offered to compare petitioners
alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are
devoid of factual basis. Petitioners signatures in the said
exhibits are, with the use of naked eye, not the same as
his signature in the PDS. The Legazpi City RTC should
have submitted these documents to a handwriting expert
for examination instead of relying on the testimony
of Magistrado.[56]

Third, petitioners statement in the PDS that he

passed the civil engineering board examination given on
30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%
is absolutely false. As Officer-in-Charge of the Records
Section of the PRC, Manila, Francisco declared that
petitioner was included in the master list of examinees in
the May 1984 civil engineering licensure examination
wherein petitioner obtained a failing grade. She affirmed
that petitioners name also appears in the list of
examinees for the May 1985 and May 1990 civil
engineering licensure examinations where petitioner also
got failing marks. She also submitted certifications and
authentic
documents
in
support
of
her
statements. Further, petitioner admitted that he never
passed the board examination for civil engineering.[50]
Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is dutybound to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS
pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
[51]
Were it not for his position and employment in the
government, he could not have accomplished the
PDS. In People v. Uy,[52] Santiago Uy, a field agent of the
National Bureau of Investigation, was charged with
falsification of public document under paragraph 4,
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for making false
statements in his Personal Information Sheet. We ruled
therein: [T]hat the defendant (Santiago Uy) took
advantage of his position may be gathered from
the fact that he himself filled the information sheet
which obviously was to be submitted by each and
every officer or employee of the NBI. In the same
vein, petitioner also had the responsibility to prepare,
accomplish and submit his PDS at the time he made a
false statement therein that he is a licensed civil
engineer. Hence, it is clear that petitioner took advantage
of
his
position
as
Acting
Chief
Operator
of
BTO, Iriga City when he falsified his PDS.
Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that
being a licensed civil engineer is not a qualification for
him to hold office and such is not a requirement for his
promotion; that the false statement caused no prejudice
to any private person as he did not have any competitor
in his position nor was the government damaged by such
false statement; that the false statement would not in
any way redound to his benefit and, as such, no criminal
intent could have impelled him to make such false claim;
and that no evidence was produced showing that he had
intent to cause injury.
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part
of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential
element of the crime of falsification of public document.
[53]
It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of
public or official documents, whether by public officers or
private persons, it is not necessary that there be present
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for
the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly
proclaimed.[54] In
falsification
of
public
documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the
public character of a document; and the existence of any
prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent
to cause such damage becomes immaterial.[55]
The fact that the petitioners false statement in
the PDS did not redound to his benefit, and that the
government or any private individual was not thereby
prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear and decisive
in this case is that petitioner made an entry in his PDS
that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination
for civil engineering despite his full awareness that such
is not true.
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended
that the prosecutions documentary evidence, consisting
of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R and

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of or comes from his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his
perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to
what he merely learned from others either because he
was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof
of the truth of what he has learned. [57] This is known as
the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific
exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is
the entries in official records made in the performance of
duty by a public officer.[58] In other words, official entries
are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the
officer or person who made them was presented and
testified
in
court,
since
these
entries
are
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are
necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in
the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the officials
attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. This will also
unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance
of official duty by a public officer.[59]
Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC
dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II
of the PRC, Manila.[60] AlthoughArriola was not presented
in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said
certification, such certification is considered as prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore
presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not
present
any
plausible
proof
to
rebut
its
truthfulness. Exhibit
A is therefore admissible in
evidence.
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, provides that an evidence is admissible when it

is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or

rules. Exhibit C, which according to petitioner is the
machine copy of the PDS, is very relevant to the charge
of falsification and is not excluded by the law or rules. It
was offered precisely to prove that petitioner committed
the crime of falsification by making false statements in
the PDS. Further, the information specifically accuses
petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit
Cwould show that it is the very PDS which petitioner
falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by
petitioner. Being the original falsified document, it is the
best evidence of its contents and is therefore not
excluded by the law or rules.[61]
Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript of the
record of the proceedings made by the official
stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as
correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct
statement of such proceedings.
Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit
F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March
1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner
against Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted
that he is a civil engineer, is not what it purports to be.
Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier
elucidated, one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is
the entries in official records made in the performance of
duty by a public officer. Exhibit F, being an official entry
in the courts records, is admissible in evidence and there
is no necessity to produce the concerned stenographer as
a witness.[62]
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, provides that when the original of a document
is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of
petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region
5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior
Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications
Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is the machine
copy of a certification allegedly issued by the PRC
attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and
which was allegedly submitted by petitioner to the
Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as
his credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are
certified true copies of their original documents recorded
or
kept
in
the
CSC,
Regional
Office
No.
5, Legazpi City[63] and, thus, admissible to prove the
contents of their originals.
Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time records
of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were
offered to compare petitioners alleged signature in the
PDS with the said exhibits, are admissible in evidence
since they are relevant and material to the charge of
falsification
against
petitioner. The
signatures
of
petitioner in the said exhibits, the authenticity of which
were not denied by petitioner, were presented to prove
that these signatures were similar to petitioners
signature in the PDS where he made the alleged
falsification.
Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to
handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting
experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.
[64]
This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person
may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person, because he has seen the
person write; or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or has been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Moreover, the opinion of a non-expert
witness, for which proper basis is given, may be received
in evidence regarding the handwriting or signature of a
person with which he has sufficient familiarity. [65]
The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged
to put a handwriting expert on the witness stand and
direct the latter to examine petitioners signatures in the
foregoing exhibits before ruling on their admissibility. It
can, as it did, rely on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses
who
are
familiar
with
petitioners
handwriting/signature in determining the admissibility of
the aforesaid exhibits. It can, by itself, also compare
petitioners signature in the PDS with the petitioners
signatures in the subject exhibits with or without the aid

of an expert witness and thereafter rule on the

admissibility of such exhibits based on its own
observation. In short, it can exercise independent
judgment as regards the admissibility of said exhibits.
As to the fourth issue, petitioner argued that
since none of the prosecution witnesses testified that
they actually saw him fill up the PDS, then there is no
evidence showing that the alleged falsification took place
in Legazpi City; that when the PDS was allegedly falsified,
he was stationed at BTO, Iriga City, and was a resident
of Iriga City; that, even assuming without admitting that
he filled up the PDS, the same was, in all probability,
filled up in Iriga City and, as such, the crime of
falsification
was
consummated
therein;
that,
consequently, the instant case should have been tried in
the Iriga City RTC and not in the Legazpi City RTC.[66]
There are three important requisites which must
be present before a court can acquire jurisdiction over
criminal cases. First, the court must have jurisdiction
over the offense or the subject matter. Second, the court
must have jurisdiction over the territory where the
offense was committed. And third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. [67] There is no
dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense and over the person of petitioner. It is the
territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the
petitioner impugns.
The territorial jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or
information as regards the place where the offense
charged was committed.[68] It should also be emphasized
that where some acts material and essential to the crime
and requisite to its consummation occur in one province
or city and some in another, the court of either province
or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood
that the court first taking cognizance of the case will
exclude the others.[69]
In the case at bar, the information specifically
and positively alleges that the falsification was committed
in Legazpi City. Moreover, as heretofore discussed, the
testimonies and documentary evidence for the
prosecution have sufficiently established that petitioner
accomplished and thereafter submitted the PDS to the
BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing circumstances clearly
placed
the locus criminis in Legazpi City and
not
in Iriga City.
We find no reason to disturb the prison term and
fine imposed on petitioner by the Legazpi City RTC and
the Court of Appeals, as they are in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 19
October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147196. June 4, 2004]
PEOPLE

OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
EDGAR DUMADAG y CAGADAS, appellant.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
Branch 8, finding appellant Edgar Dumadag yCagadas,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder; sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as
civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
The Indictment

The appellant was charged with murder in an

Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, the accusatory portion of which is herein
quoted:
That on or about the 24th day of June 1999, in the
afternoon,
at
Barangay Impalutao,
Municipality
of Impasugong, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill by means of treachery,
armed with a sharp bladed weapon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and
stab FERNANDO PRUDENTE, inflicting upon the latter a
mortal stab wound which caused the instantaneous death
of FERNANDO PRUDENTE, to the damage and prejudice of
the legal heirs of FERNANDO PRUDENTE in such amount
as may be allowed by law[2].
The Evidence of the Prosecution[3]
June 24, 1999 was the feast of St. John. Fernando
Ondo Prudente,
with
his
friends,
including Marlyn Meliston,
agreed
to
meet
at
the Gantunganswimming
pool in Impalutao, Impasugong, Bukidnon, to celebrate
the occasion.[4] At about 5:00 p.m., Ondo and his friends
headed back home. By then, there was heavy
downpour. They decided to take shelter at the store of a
certain Mr. Salvaa. Jovy Baylin, who had just come from
the house of his sister, Enecita Abacajin, approximately
one hundred (100) kilometers away, was also in the store.
[5]
Two men, one of whom was the appellant, were having
some drinks.[6] When they saw Ondo, the appellant and
his friend offered him a drink of Tanduay. [7] Ondo,
declined, saying Bay,
I
am
not
drinking
now.[8] Thereafter, Ondo left. The
appellant
was
peeved. He rose from his seat and followed Ondo. The
appellant then took hold of Ondosright shoulder, took out
a stainless knife and stabbed the latter on the breast.
[9]
The appellant left the scene, walking towards the
direction of the lower area of Cagayan de Oro.
[10]
Jovy Baylin, who was about five meters from the scene
of the crime, was stunned, and was unable to do
anything.[11]Ondos companions saw the stabbing and
immediately flagged down a vehicle.
Mortally wounded, Ondo ran towards the vehicle
and fell inside it.[12] Ondos companions brought him to
the Bethel Baptist Hospital, Inc., inMalaybalay City, where
he was pronounced dead on arrival.[13] Dr. Leslie Joan
M. Arcadio signed Ondos death certificate and indicated
that the cause of death was stab wound, right chest.[14]
The Evidence of the Appellant[15]
The appellant denied the charge. He testified that
in the afternoon of June 23, 1999, he was at Vista
Villa, Sumilao, Bukidnon,[16] looking for some way to get
money. He saw Richard Masicampo, Sr., the owner of
a 2.5 hectare riceland in the same sitio and borrowed
money from him.[17] The latter agreed, but required the
appellant to cut the grass in his riceland the next day.
On the aforesaid date, the appellant, along with
Richard, cut grass in the ricefield. At around 11:00 a.m.,
they stopped and had lunch in Richards house.
[18]
Because it rained the whole afternoon, they were
unable to go back to the ricefield. They stayed in the
house and had drinks.[19] After consuming five (5) bottles
of fighter wine, the appellant fell asleep. At 5:30 p.m.,
he woke up and went home. He returned the next day to
finish the job.[20]
The appellant was arrested in his house on July 4,
1999. He denied knowing Ondo and Jovy Baylin.[21]

On November 21, 2000, the trial court rendered

judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is entered (sic) finding accused
Edgar Dumadag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of murder qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim
Fernando Prudente the sum of P50,000.00 and moral
damages of P50,000.00.[22]
The Present Appeal
On appeal, the appellant asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER AND IN
DISREGARDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI BECAUSE IN THE WORDS OF THE TRIAL COURT
ALIBI IS ONE OF THE WEAKEST DEFENSE AND EASY TO
CONCOCT.
II
ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT ACCUSED
IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATH OF FERNANDO PRUDENTE, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER INSTEAD OF SIMPLE HOMICIDE.[23]
The appellant insists that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt. He asserts that although his defense of alibi is
weak, he should be acquitted because the evidence of
the prosecution is also weak.
The appellant, likewise, contends that, assuming
that he is guilty of the crime charged, he can only be
convicted of homicide because the prosecution failed to
prove
beyond
reasonable
doubt
the
qualifying
circumstance of treachery. He avers that he could not
have deliberately and consciously adopted a plan to kill
the victim because they never knew each other. Citing
our ruling in People vs. Aguiluz,[24] the appellant points
out that where the sudden attack is not preconceived and
intended as the means, but is merely triggered by the
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of
an act of the victim, or where the meeting is purely
accidental, the killing would not be attended by treachery.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that
the
prosecution,
through Baylins direct
and
straightforward testimony, proved that the appellant
stabbed the victim to death. The OSG asserts that the
appellants defense of denial and alibi are weak and
cannot
be
given
probative
weight
in
light
of Baylins testimony, and that the admission made by
the appellant during the pre-trial that he was at the scene
of the crime belied his alibi.
The OSG, however, agrees that the appellant is
guilty only of homicide because the prosecution failed to
prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery. It posits
that the altercation between the appellant and the victim
that preceded the commission thereof forestalled the
attendance of treachery.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant
stabbed the victim.
Time and again, we have consistently ruled that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties, as well as its
conclusions on its findings, are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect.[25] This is because of the unique

advantage of the trial court to observe, at close range,

the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witnesses
as they testify.[26] In this case, the trial court gave
credence and probative weight to the testimony
of Jovy Baylin. After a careful review of the records of this
case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the trial
courts findings that the appellant stabbed the victim.
As long as it is positive, clear and credible, the
testimony of a single prosecution witness on which
judgment
of
conviction
is anchored, is
sufficient. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a
prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies.[27]
The trial court found Baylin to be a credible witness.
The denial and alibi of appellant cannot prevail over the
positive identification and eyewitness account of Baylin.
[28]
Baylin testified, thus:
ASST. PROS. TORIBIO: (continuing)
Q: After
Edgar Dumadag invited Ondo Prudente to
have
a
drink
of
Tanduay,
what
did Ondo Prudente do, if any?

Q: When for (sic) the first time you saw the

knife of Dumadag?
A:

When he held the shoulder (sic).

Q: Where did he get the knife?

A:

From his side.[29]

On the other hand, the appellants alibi is weak. It is

settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
appellant must prove with clear and convincing evidence
not only that he was some place else when the crime was
committed, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate
vicinity when the crime was committed.[30] To prove his
alibi, the appellant testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Dumadag, you said that you borrowed
money from Richard Masicampo, [Sr.]
from where is this Richard Masicampo?
A:

From our sitio.

Q: Meaning to say at Kibenton?

A:

He declined the offer.

A:

No, from our place.

Q: How did Ondo Prudente decline the offer

of Dumadag?

Q: What place?

A:

A:

He said, Bay, I am not drinking now, and

then he left.

Q: After Ondo Prudente left, what happened

next, if any?
A:

Dumadag followed Prudente, held his right

shoulder and stabbed him.

Q: Now,
how
many
time[s]
did
this Dumadag stabbed (sic) Ondo Prudent
e?
A:

Once.

Q: Was Prudente hit?

A:

Yes.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q: What part of his body?
A:

On his breast.

Q: What did the accused use in stabbing?

A:

A stainless knife.

ASST. PROS. TORIBIO

Q: Now,
when
this Dumadag followed Ondo Prudente aft
er he declined the offer, did you see
already Dumadag carrying with him a
knife (sic)?
A:

No, he was running.

Kilabong.

Q: Vista Villa, Sumilao, Bukidnon?

A:

Yes.

Q: Mr. Dumadag, from Kilabong, Vista Villa

going to Impalutao, how many minutes or
hours it will (sic) take you when you ride?
A:

I do not know because the distance is far.

Q: Can
you
not
estimate thirty
minutes or one hour?
A:

(30)

No.

Q: Even two hours?

A:

I do not know.

Q: From Vista Villa to Dalirig, how many

kilometers?
A:

Six (6) kilometers, more or less.

Q: From Dalirig to Impalutao,

kilometers?
A:

how

many

I do not know.[31]

However, the appellant failed to prove that it was

physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime, considering his claim that he was only a few
kilometers away when the stabbing occurred.
Moreover, during the pre-trial conference held
on November 4, 1999, the appellant, assisted by his
counsel, admitted that he was at the place of the incident
at the time of the commission of the crime. The

same was reduced into writing, signed by the appellant,

approved by the trial court and formed part of the records
of the case.[32] Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8493,
otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,
stipulations entered into during the pre-trial which were
approved by the Court shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of
action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.[33]
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
We agree with the appellant and the OSG that the
prosecution failed to prove treachery in the commission
of the crime.
Treachery is not presumed.[34] Treachery must be
proven as clearly and as cogently as the crime itself.
[35]
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.[36] Two conditions must
concur for treachery to be present, viz: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and, (2) the said means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.[37] Treachery cannot be appreciated
if it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the assailant did not make any preparation to kill the
victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make
it impossible or difficult for the victim to defend himself.
[38]
The prosecution must prove that the killing was
premeditated or that the assailant chose a method of
attack directly andspecially to facilitate and insure the
killing without risk to himself.[39] The mode of attack must
be planned by the offender and must not spring from the
unexpected turn of events.[40]
In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on
the suddenness of the attack on the unarmed and
unsuspecting victim to justify treachery. As a general rule,
a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or
from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was
deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving
the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule
does not apply if the attack was not preconceived but
merely triggered by infuriation of the appellant on an act
made by the victim.[41] In the present case, it is apparent
that the attack was not preconceived. It was triggered by
the appellants anger because of the victims refusal to
have a drink with the appellant and his companions.
For failure of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the appellant can only be
convicted of homicide. The penalty of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances
attendant, the
maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range
of the penalty next lower in degree, namely, prision
mayor. Thus, the appellant may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.[42]
Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 by way of
civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim Fernando
Ondo Prudente. However, the award ofP50,000 for
moral damages should be deleted, there being no proof

that the heirs of the victim suffered wounded feelings,

mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury. The said heirs
are, instead, entitled to an award of P25,000 as
temperate
damages,
conformably
to
current
jurisprudence.[43]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon,
Branch
8,
is
AFFIRMED
WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The
appellant
Edgar Dumadag y Cagadas is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years,
Eight (8) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as maximum. The appellant is
ORDERED to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil
indemnity and Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000) as
temperate damages to the heirs of the victim. The award
of moral damages is deleted.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103547. July 20, 1999]
PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ROMEO MALLARI y SANCHEZ, accusedappellant.

SYNOPSIS
Accused- appellant herein was charged with
murder for stabbing to death one Alfredo Mendoza. Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Whereupon,
trial on the merits ensued. After trial, the court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and indemnity. In this appeal, appellant raised
several assignments of error for which the Court was not
persuaded.
The Supreme Court found nothing to indicate that
the witness falsified the truth or that his observation has
been inaccurate. As to inconsistency in the description of
the weapon, suffice it to say that the alleged
inconsistency, assuming there was one, was not fatal to
the case at bar. Even without the description, all the
elements of the crime of murder have already been
satisfactorily established. The decision of the trial court
finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty ofreclusion perpetua was affirmed with the
corresponding indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
SYLLABUS
1.

REMEDIAL
LAW;
EVIDENCE;
DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION;
EVIDENCE
WILLFULLY
SUPPRESSED WOULD BE ADVERSE WHEN
PRODUCED; NOT APPLICABLE WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IS MERELY CORROBORATIVE; CASE
AT BAR. The disputable presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced is not even applicable in the instant case.
It is extant from the records that the prosecution has
satisfactorily established its case against accused-

appellant through the sole testimony of Wilfredo

Eyas. Hence, there is no more necessity to present
Borja as his testimony would only be corroborative,
if not cumulative. In People vs. Pagal (G.R. Nos.
112620-21, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 449) this Court
has ruled that the adverse presumption arising
from suppression of evidence is not applicable when
the evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative
and/or likewise available to the defense. In the
instant case, Borja was not a material witness but
merely a corroborative one.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE; NOT
PRESENT
WHEN
THE
CORROBORATIVE
WITNESSES WERE NOT PRESENTED IN COURT.
In People vs. Jumanoy, (G.R. No. 101584, April 7,
1993, 221 SCRA 333, at 344) this Court held: The
prosecutions failure to present the other witnesses
listed in the information did not constitute, contrary
to the contention of the accused, suppression of
evidence. The prosecution has the exclusive
prerogative to determine the witnesses to be
presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution
has several witnesses, as in the instant case, the
prosecution need not present all of them but only as
many as may be needed to meet the quantum of
proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the
other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with
for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court
has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses would not constitute suppression of
evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecutions
case.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS; WHEN
FOUND POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE IS SUFFICIENT
TO PRODUCE A CONVICTION. Well-entrenched
is the rule that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
found positive and credible by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a conviction especially when
the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously,
naturally and in a straightforward manner. It has
been held that witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered; hence, it is not at all uncommon to reach
a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of
a single witness. For although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the
appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number and conviction
can still be had on the basis of the credible and
positive
testimony
of
a
single
witness.
Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion
that the witness falsified the truth or that his
observation had been inaccurate.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARSAY RULE; INDEPENDENTLY
RELEVANT STATEMENT, AS AN EXCEPTION;
CASE AT BAR. When Pfc. Obrero said they were
informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Eyas was one
of the drinking companions of the victim, he was
only testifying that they were able to talk to a
certain Aling Vicky. In so saying, he was not
asserting that Eyas was present at the crime scene.
Under our Rules of Evidence, this is considered an
independently relevant statement and an exception
to the hearsay rule. In People vs, Cusi, Jr. (No. L20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 945-946) this
Court had occasion to rule that (w)hile the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made
by another person, if intended to establish the truth
of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly
hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or
the tenor of such statement.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF THE

TRIAL COURT; ACCORDED DUE WEIGHT AND
RESPECT. It is well-entrenched that when the
issue boils down to credibility, the findings of trial
courts is accorded due weight and respect because
of its unique position to properly observe the
deportment of every witness during trial.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES.
Inconsistencies
in
the
testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy their credibility.
Such
minor
inconsistencies
even
manifest
truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.
7.CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE;
TREACHERY; PRESENT WHEN THE OFFENDER
EMPLOY MEANS, METHODS OR FORMS IN THE
EXECUTION, WITHOUT RISK TO HIMSELF; CASE
AT BAR. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crime against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
(People vs. Mario Villanueva y Faustino, G.R. No.
122746, January 29, 1999) In the instant case,
accused-appellant stealthily approached the seated
Mendoza from behind while the latter was pouring
beer into his glass. The stabbing was executed
swiftly and lasted less than a minute. The
suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack even
failed to forewarn or arouse any alarm from
Mendozas drinking companions. Because of the
suddenness by which the crime was committed,
Mendoza did not have any opportunity to defend
himself. Accused-appellant deliberately approached
Mendoza from behind to avoid any risk for himself
and to ensure its execution. Clearly, the attack was
treacherous.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Romeo Mallari y Sanchez, also
known as Romy Toyo or Meo, was charged with
murder in an information that reads as follows:
That on or about December 9, 1990, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon one ALFREDO
MENDOZA Y ESTRELLA, by then and there stabbing the
latter with a bladed weapon on the chest thereby
inflicting the latter mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.[1]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty. Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented Wilfredo Eyas, an alleged
eyewitness; Pfc. Norberto Obrero of the Investigation
Division and Dr. Marcial Ceido, Medico Legal Officer,
both of the Western Police District. The defense, on the
other hand, presented accused-appellant himself and his
father Pedro Mallari.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
At 8:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990, Alfredo
Mendoza, Wilfredo Eyas, and Ricardo Borja were having a
drinking spree at the corner of Claro M. Recto and Elcano
Streets, Binondo, Manila.[2] Eyas sat in front of Mendoza
about an armslength away while Borja sat on his right.
[3]
About four (4) meters away was the pushcart owned by
a certain Aling Vicky where they bought beer.[4] Mendoza,

Eyas and Borja were drinking for more or less thirty (30)
minutes and consumed six (6) bottles of beer.[5] While
Mendoza was pouring beer into his glass, accusedappellant suddenly appeared from behind Mendoza and
stabbed him on the chest once with a pointed weapon.
[6]
After stabbing Mendoza, accused-appellant casually
walked away and then fled from the scene.
Eyas ran after accused-appellant but when the latter
saw Eyas running after him, he turned around and ran
after Eyas instead. Afraid, Eyas retraced his steps and
returned to where he left his wounded comrade.[7]
Mendoza, by then, had already been brought to
Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival. The guard on duty called up the homicide
section of the Western Police District and reported the
stabbing incident. Responding to the call, Pfc. Norberto
Obrero and Pat. Henry Nuez went to the hospital where
they saw Bartolome Castro and Joey Angeles who claimed
to have been likewise stabbed by Romy Toyo on C.M.
Recto and Elcano Streets, Binondo, Manila. They likewise
learned that a certain Alejandro Quintana was also
stabbed dead by Romy Toyo on the same street corner.
At around 9:30 in the evening of December 9, 1990,
the police investigators went to the crime scene where
they were informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Wilfredo
Eyas was one of the drinking companions of the
victim. They sought Eyas but the latter only told them
his name and address and did not give any statement
regarding the incident. Eyas knew accused-appellant was
then still at large and a notorious killer.

Accused-appellant claimed he only met Ricardo

Borja, who was then also detained at the City Jail, for the
first time when he appeared before the trial court in
connection with his case.[17]
Pedro Mallari, father of accused-appellant, testified
that he accompanied his son to the police station and
pleaded with Pfc. Obrero to help his son. However, Pfc.
Obrero told him the case was already out of his
hands. He admitted offering money to the policeman for
the dropping of the cases against his son.[18]
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of Alfredo Mendoza in the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.[19]
The
accused-appellant
assignment of errors:

Accused-appellant denied knowing Alfredo Mendoza

or killing him. He confirmed being called Romy Toyo by
his family and friends but denied being called
Meong.[11] He claimed he was resting in his house at J.P.
Rizal St., Makati on the day the stabbing occurred.[12]
Accused-appellant also testified that he was invited
to the Makati Police Station where he was informed of the
charge of murder against him.[13] He admitted being made
to join a police line-up twice in the Western Police District
Station but denied that Eyas pointed or identified
him. He further alleged that he did not even see Eyas
during the police line-up. [14] He claimed that the police
officers maltreated him while in detention and forced him
to admit the charges filed against him.[15]
In addition, accused-appellant alleged that Pfc.
Obrero demanded money supposedly for the dropping of
charges against him. Since the money given by his father
and sister was not enough, only three (3) out of five (5)
charges against him were dropped.[16]

following

THE FAILURE TO PRODUCE BORJA TO TESTIFY IS

TANTAMOUNT TO A SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER
RULE 131 WHILE BEING AT THE SAME TIME A GROSS
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO COMPULSORY PROCESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT TO WITNESS EYAS TESTIMONY.
A]

B]

On January 7, 1991, operatives of the Patrol Division

of the Western Police District apprehended accusedappellant in connection with a robbery with homicide
case.[10] Apprised of the apprehension, Pfc. Obrero asked
Eyas and Borja to identify him. Eyas pointed to accusedappellant in a police line-up of seven persons as the killer
of Alfredo Mendoza. On the basis of the identification,
accused-appellant was formally charged for the killing of
Alfredo Mendoza.

the

I.

Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Marcial Ceido autopsied

the cadaver of Mendoza. According to him, Mendoza died
of a penetrating stab wound right anterior thorax
appearing at the right ventricle of the heart. [8] In his
opinion, the relative position of the wound would be more
in line with the theory that the assailant could have been
standing when he attacked his seated victim.[9]
Based on the information gathered, Pfc. Obrero
prepared the Advance Information naming Romy Toyo
or Meo as the suspect.

raises

WITNESS EYAS ACCOUNT OF THE

STABBING DOES NOT JIBE WITH THE
MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE MEDICOLEGAL OFFICER AND IT FURTHERMORE
DEFIES HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

TREACHERY NECESSARILY WAS NOT PROVEN.

C]

THERE WAS FAILURE TO PROVE EYAS

PRESENCE AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT.

D]

THE LACK OF PROOF OF ILL-MOTIVE ON

EYASS PART IS NOT REQUIRED IN THIS
CASE CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION.

E]

EYAS TESTIMONY IS INCREDIBLE, AND

FRAUGHT WITH INCONSISTENCIES.
III

THE FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS

PERFORCE EQUALLY ERRONEOUS.[20]
This Court is not persuaded. Consequently,
accused-appellants conviction stands.
First: Contrary to the assertion of the defense, the
prosecution is not guilty of suppression of evidence. The
disputable presumption that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced is not even applicable in
the instant case. It is extant from the records that the
prosecution has satisfactorily established its case against
accused-appellant through the sole testimony of Wilfredo
Eyas. Hence, there is no more necessity to present Borja
as his testimony would only be corroborative, if not
cumulative.
In People v. Pagal[21] citing People v. de Jesus,[22] this
Court has ruled that the adverse presumption arising

from suppression of evidence is not applicable when the

evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative and/or
likewise available to the defense. In the instant case,
Borja was not a material witness but merely a
corroborative one. If at all, Borja would only confirm the
matters already testified to by Eyas. It should be noted
that Borja was a drinking companion of Mendoza and
Eyas and in all likelihood, would only testify on what he
saw during the incident which would not have been
substantially or significantly different from what Eyas had
testified on. In any event, it was within the prerogative of
the prosecution whom to present as witness.
More importantly, Borja was at the disposal of both
the prosecution
and
the defense. Both
parties
subpoenaed Borja but the latter failed to appear at both
times. The defense did not proffer proof that the
prosecution prevented Borja from testifying. There is
therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution
is guilty of suppression of evidence.
The defense was not short of alternative remedies
for their failure to compel Borja to appear before the
court. They could have asked that Borja be cited for
contempt, or if they were really desperate to disprove the
eyewitness account of Eyas, they could have summoned
other witnesses aside from Borja because, to borrow the
words of the defense, there are of course others who
have witnessed the crime.[23] In People v. Jumanoy,
[24]
this Court held:
The prosecutions failure to present the other witnesses
listed in the information did not constitute, contrary to
the contention of the accused, suppression of
evidence. The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative
to determine the witnesses to be presented for the
prosecution. If the prosecution has several witnesses, as
in the instant case, the prosecution need not present all
of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the
quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of
the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for
being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has
ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence
and would not be fatal to the prosecutions case.
Regardless, the well-entrenched rule is that the
testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a
conviction especially when the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered
spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner. It has been held that witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all uncommon
to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a single witness. For although the number
of witnesses may be considered a factor in the
appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number and conviction can
still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is
deemed necessary only when there are reasons to
warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth
or that his observation had been inaccurate. [25] The lower
court found nothing to indicate that Eyas falsified the
truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.
Second: The defense posits that it was highly
incredible for accused-appellant to have stabbed his
victim in the manner described by Eyas without him
leaning back or touching the shoulders of his
victim. Accused-appellant argues, (t)o produce that
mortal wound by using only one hand and without
touching the other parts of the body of the intended
victim, the wielder of the knife must first lean back in
order to gain enough momentum to produce the force
required to inflict such kind of a stab wound. Either that

or hang on to any part of the victims body with one hand

and then plunge the knife at (sic) the chest with the
other. In this case, no such leaning back was shown by
the witness nor was there any proof given by the witness
showing that the killer clinged (sic) to the victim before
delivering the fatal blow.[26]
This reasoning is flawed. It presupposes that the
demonstration in the trial court as to how accusedappellant supposedly stabbed the victim was squarely
and exactly the same on all points with the actual
stabbing. The defense exaggerates the point that
accused-appellant did not lean back before plunging the
pointed instrument nor did so without touching the
shoulders of the victim in order to forcefully deliver the
fatal blow. Suffice it to say that the cold pages of the
records of this case do not graphically convey every
minute detail that transpired in the lower court. Not
every fearful glance or guilty sigh of the accused nor the
resigned and restrained anguish of the victim is reflected
and given life in the records. This is precisely the reason
why this Court has often relied on the factual findings of
the trial courts. Corollary to this, the court a quo found:
After a minutiose and incisive consideration and
judicious assessment of the evidence marshalled by the
Prosecution, more particularly the testimony of Wilfredo
Eyas, the Court found, and so holds that, indeed, the
Prosecution was able to prove that it was Accused who
stabbed the deceased, Alfredo Mendoza, on the chest
which caused the latters death (Exhibits G and H and
H-I). Wilfredo Eyas was barely armslength from in front
of Alfredo Mendoza and positioned himself on the side of
the latter and then stabbed Alfredo Mendoza on the
chest, once, with a five-inch knife (minus the
handle). The place where the stabbing occured was
illumined by the light emanating from the 100-watt bulb
hanging from the pushcart of Aling Vicky behind Wilfredo
Eyas where the latter, Ricardo Borja and Alfredo Mendoza
were having a drinking spree. Considering the proximity
of Wilfredo Eyas to the deceased when the Accused
stabbed the latter and the lighting conditions in the
vicinity at the time, there is no scintilla of doubt in the
mind of the Court of the identification of the Accused as
the perpetrator of the macabre stabbing. Wilfredo Eyas
has pointed to and identified the Accused in a police lineup of seven (7) persons on January 9, 1991, at the
Homicide Section of the Western Police District as the
person who stabbed Alfredo Mendoza (Exhibits J and JI). When Wilfredo Eyas testified before the Court, he
spontaneously and unerringly pointed to and identified
the Accused when asked by the Assistant City Prosecutor
to identify and point, from among the persons inside the
courtroom, to be the person who stabbed Alfredo
Mendoza.
There is no shred of evidence in the record and the
Accused adduced none to prove that Wilfredo Eyas had
any pernicious or devious motive to fabricate and concoct
the charge against the Accused and tergervisate (sic) his
testimony before the Court. The barefaced fact that
Wilfredo Eyas and Alfredo Mendoza are friends is not
enough to taint the testimony of Wilfredo Eyas. Absent
such ill-motive, the testimony of Wilfredo Eyas must be
accorded by the Court full credit and probative value.[27]
Besides, the medical findings corroborated the
testimony of Eyas particularly on the manner by which
the
stabbing
was
committed. Eyass
narration
complemented the medical findings description of the
wounds inflicted upon the victim. In addition, the finding
that the victims stomach contained a liquid substance of
alcoholic odor confirmed the fact that the victim was
drinking beer when accused-appellant suddenly and
unexpectedly lunged at him.
Third: The defense argues that Eyass presence at
the crime scene was not proven considering that Aling

Vicky, supposedly the policemans source of information,

was not presented before the Court thereby making the
policemans testimony of doubtful credibility for being
hearsay. We disagree. When Pfc. Obrero said they were
informed by a certain Aling Vicky that Eyas was one of
the drinking companions of the victim, he was only
testifying that they were able to talk to a certain Aling
Vicky. In so saying, he was not asserting that Eyas was
present at the crime scene. Under our Rules of Evidence,
this is considered an independently relevant statement
and an exception to the hearsay rule. In People v. Cusi,
Jr.[28] this Court had occasion to rule that (w)hile the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person, if intended to establish the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such
statement.
Besides, there was no need to present Aling Vicky as
Eyas himself categorically testified that he was at the
crime scene at the time it was committed and positively
identified accused-appellant as the lone assailant. The
trial court believed Eyass version finding him more
credible than accused-appellant. The Court sees no
reason to disturb this finding. It is well-entrenched that
when the issue boils down to credibility, the findings of
trial courts is accorded due weight and respect because
of its unique position to properly observe the deportment
of every witness during trial.
Fourth. The inconsistencies referred to by the
defense were inconsequential and trivial. The points that
mattered most in Eyass testimony were his presence at
the crime scene, his identification of accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime, and his credible and
corroborated narration of accused-appellants manner of
stabbing Mendoza. The inconsistencies pointed out by
the defense referred only to events occurring after the
commission of the crime.
As to Eyass apparent inconsistency in his
description of the weapon, suffice it to say that the
alleged inconsistency, assuming there was one, is not
fatal to the case at bar. In fact, Eyass account that a
bladed weapon was used corresponds with the medicolegal officers finding that the fatal thrust was delivered
using a pointed instrument. Be that as it may, the
description of the weapon used in perpetrating the crime
was not essential in establishing the guilt of accusedappellant. Even without said description, all the elements
of the crime of murder have already been satisfactorily
established. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do
not destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies
even manifest truthfulness and candor and erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[29]
Fifth: The trial court correctly found that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crime
against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. [30] In the
instant case, accused-appellant stealthily approached the
seated Mendoza from behind while the latter was pouring
beer into his glass. The stabbing was executed swiftly
and lasted less than a minute. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack even failed to forewarn or
arouse
any
alarm
from
Mendozas
drinking
companions. Because of the suddenness by which the
crime was committed, Mendoza did not have any
opportunity
to
defend
himself. Accused-appellant
deliberately approached Mendoza from behind to avoid
any risk for himself and to ensure its execution. Clearly,
the attack was treacherous. In People v. Mario Villanueva
y Faustino[31] this Court held:

The victim was shot from behind by one who proceeded

stealthily and quickly. The victim was not aware of any
impending attack against his person, and even Adelfa
Nacional, who had seen MARIO approach her husband,
was surprised by the suddenness with which MARIO shot
her husband. Under these circumstances, the victim was
clearly deprived of an opportunity to defend himself, thus
ensuring the execution of the offense without risk to
MARIO. Hence, there was treachery.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 44, Manila, finding accusedappellant Romeo Mallari y Sanchez GUILTY of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Mendoza
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
CONCEPCION CHUA GAW,
Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 160855

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
,
Chairperso
n,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

SUY BEN CHUA and

FELISA CHUA,
Responden
Promulgated:
ts.
April 16, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This
is
a
Petition
for
Review
on Certiorari from the
Decision[1] of
the Court
of
Appeals (CA)
in
CA-G.R.
CV
No.
66790
and
Resolution[2] denying the motion for reconsideration. The
assailed decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in a Complaint for Sum of Money in favor of
the plaintiff.
The antecedents are as follows:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the
founders of three business enterprises[3] namely: Hagonoy
Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood
Industries. The couple had seven children, namely,
Santos Chua; Concepcion Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy
Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita Chua.
On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan
Chi and his seven children as his only surviving heirs. At
the time of Chua Chins death, the net worth of Hagonoy
Lumber was P415,487.20.[4]
On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a CoHeir[5] (Deed of Partition, for brevity), wherein the heirs
settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: onehalf (1/2) thereof will pertain to the surviving spouse,
Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and
the other half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided
among Chan Chi and the seven children in
equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each.
[6]
In said document, Chan Chi and the six children
likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their
shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir,
Chua Sioc Huan.
In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw
and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy
Ben Chua, to lend themP200,000.00 which they will use
for the construction of their house in Marilao,
Bulacan. The parties agreed that the loan will be payable
within six (6) months without interest.[7] On June 7, 1988,
respondent issued in their favor China Banking
Corporation Check No. 240810[8] forP200,000.00 which he

delivered to the couples house in Marilao, Bulacan.

Antonio later encashed the check.
On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests
in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of P255,000.00 in
favor of respondent.[9]
Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the
amount they borrowed from respondent within the
designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand
letter,[10] dated March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle
their obligation with the warning that he will be
constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they
fail to do so.
Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw
with the RTC. The complaint alleged that on June 7, 1988,
he extended a loan to the spouses Gaw for P200,000.00,
payable within six months without interest, but despite
several demands, the couple failed to pay their obligation.
[11]

In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim),

the spouses Gaw contended that the P200,000.00 was
not a loan but petitioners share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber, one of her familys businesses. According to the
spouses, when they transferred residence to Marilao,
Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an accounting,
and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital
Sawmills
Corporation,
Columbia
Wood
Industries
Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that
respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego
her demand as it would offend their mother who still
wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To
insure that she will defer her demand, respondent
allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits
of Hagonoy Lumber.[12]
In his Reply, respondent averred that the
spouses Gaw did not demand from him an accounting of
Capitol Sawmills Corporation, Columbia Wood Industries,
and Hagonoy Lumber. He asserted that the spouses Gaw,
in fact, have no right whatsoever in these businesses that
would entitle them to an accounting thereof. Respondent
insisted that the P200,000.00 was given to and accepted
by them as a loan and not as their share in Hagonoy
Lumber.[13]
With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an
Answer (with Amended Compulsory Counterclaim)
wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the
compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy
Lumber, which the respondent has arrogated to himself.
They claimed that, despite repeated demands,
respondent has failed and refused to account for the
operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to deliver her share
therein. They then prayed that respondent make an
accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber and to
deliver to petitioner her one-sixth (1/6) share thereof,
which
was
estimated
to
be
worth
not
less
than P500,000.00.[14]
In his Answer to Amended Counterclaim,
respondent explained that his sister, Chua Sioc Huan,
became the sole owner of Hagonoy Lumber when the
heirs executed the Deed of Partition on December 8,
1986. In turn, he became the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber when he bought it from Chua Sioc Huan, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990.[15]
Defendants, in their reply,[16] countered that the
documents on which plaintiff anchors his claim of
ownership over Hagonoy Lumber were not true and valid
agreements and do not express the real intention of the
parties. They claimed that these documents are mere
paper arrangements which were prepared only upon the
advice of a counsel until all the heirs could reach and sign
a final and binding agreement, which, up to such time,
has not been executed by the heirs.[17]
During trial, the spouses Gaw called the
respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section
10, Rule 132. On direct examination, respondent testified
that Hagonoy Lumber was the conjugal property of his
parents Chua Chin and Chan Chi, who were both Chinese
citizens. He narrated that, initially, his father leased the
lots where Hagonoy Lumber is presently located from his
godfather, Lu Pieng, and that his father constructed the
two-storey concrete building standing thereon. According
to respondent, when he was in high school, it was his

father who managed the business but he and his other

siblings were helping him. Later, his sister, Chua Sioc
Huan, managed Hogonoy Lumber together with their
other brothers and sisters. He stated that he also
managed Hagonoy Lumber when he was in high school,
but he stopped when he got married and found another
job. He said that he now owns the lots where Hagonoy
Lumber is operating.[18]
On cross-examination, respondent explained
that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill
when he sold his shares of stock to the other stockholders
on January 1, 1991. He further testified that Chua Sioc
Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of
Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn,
became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought
the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale
dated August 1, 1990. [19]
On re-direct examination, respondent stated that
he sold his shares of stock in Capitol Sawmill
for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He
also paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy
Lumber in cash, which payment was not covered by a
separate receipt as he merely delivered the same to Chua
Sioc Huan at her house in Paso de Blas, Valenzuela.
Although he maintains several accounts at Planters Bank,
Paluwagan ng Bayan, and China Bank, the amount he
paid to Chua Sioc Huan was not taken from any of
them. He kept the amount in the house because he was
engaged in rediscounting checks of people from the
public market. [20]
On December 10, 1998, Antonio Gaw died due to
cardio vascular and respiratory failure.[21]
On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of the respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all
the foregoing, the Court hereby renders
judgement
ordering
defendant
Concepcion Chua Gaw to pay the
[respondent] the following:
1. P200,000.
00 representing the
principal
obligation
with legal interest
from judicial demand
or the institution of
the
complaint
onNovember
19,
1991;
2.
P50,00
0.00 as
attorney
s fees;
and
3.
Costs
of suit.
The defendants counterclaim
is hereby dismissed for being devoid of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[22]

The RTC held that respondent is entitled to the

payment of the amount of P200,000.00 with interest. It
noted that respondent personally issued Check No.
240810 to petitioner and her husband upon their request
to lend them the aforesaid amount. The trial court
concluded that the P200,000.00 was a loan advanced by
the respondent from his own funds and not
remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber
nor petitioners advance share in the profits of their
parents businesses.
The trial court further held that the validity and
due execution of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of
Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy
Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was never
impugned. Although respondent failed to produce the
originals of the documents, petitioner judicially admitted
the due execution of the Deed of Partition, and even
acknowledged her signature thereon, thus constitutes an
exception to the best evidence rule. As for the Deed of
Sale, since the contents thereof have not been put in
issue, the non-presentation of the original document is
not fatal so as to affect its authenticity as well as the
truth of its contents. Also, the parties to the documents

themselves do not contest their validity. Ultimately,

petitioner failed to establish her right to demand an
accounting of the operations of Hagonoy Lumber nor the
delivery of her 1/6 share therein.
As for petitioners claim that an accounting be
done on Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood
Industries, the trial court held that respondent is under no
obligation to make such an accounting since he is not
charged with operating these enterprises.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA, alleging
that the trial court erred (1) when it considered the
amount of P200,000.00 as a loan obligation and not
Concepcions share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber; (2)
when it considered as evidence for the defendant,
plaintiffs testimony when he was called to testify as an
adverse party under Section 10 (e), Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court; and (3) when it considered admissible mere
copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove
that respondent is now the owner of Hagonoy Lumber.[24]
On May 23, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of
the RTC. [25] The appellate court found baseless the
petitioners argument that the RTC should not have
included respondents testimony as part of petitioners
evidence. The CA noted that the petitioner went on a
fishing expedition, the taking of respondents testimony
having taken up a total of eleven hearings, and upon
failing to obtain favorable information from the
respondent, she now disclaims the same. Moreover, the
CA held that the petitioner failed to show that the
inclusion of respondents testimony in the statement of
facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her
defense and counterclaims. In fact, the CA noted that the
facts testified to by respondent were deducible from the
totality of the evidence presented.
The CA likewise found untenable petitioners
claim that Exhibits H (Deed of Sale) and Exhibit I
(Deed of Partition) were merely temporary paper
arrangements. The CA agreed with the RTC that the
testimony of petitioner regarding the matter was
uncorroborated she should have presented the other
heirs to attest to the truth of her allegation. Instead,
petitioner admitted the due execution of the said
documents. Since petitioner did not dispute the due
execution and existence of Exhibits H and I, there was
no need to produce the originals of the documents in
accordance with the best evidence rule.[26]
On December 2, 2003, the CA denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [27]
Petitioner is before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari, raising the following errors:

I.

II.

III.

THAT
ON
THE
PRELIMINARY
IMPORTANT
RELATED ISSUE, CLEAR AND
PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS
BEEN COMMITTED IN THE
APPLICATION
AND
LEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RULE
ON EXAMINATION OF ADVERSE
PARTY OR HOSTILE WITNESS
UNDER SECTION 10 (d) AND
(e) OF RULE 132, CAUSING
SERIOUS DOUBT ON THE
LOWER COURTS APPEALED
DECISIONS
OBJECTIVITY, ANNEX C.
THAT ON THE IMPORTANT
LEGAL ISSUE RELATIVE TO THE
AFORESAID TWO OPPOSING
CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT AND
PETITIONER,
CLEAR
AND
PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS
BEEN COMMITTED UNDER THE
LOWER
COURTS
DECISION ANNEX C AND THE
QUESTIONED DECISION OF
MAY 23, 2003 (ANNEX A)
AND THE RESOLUTION OF
DECEMBER 2, 2003, (ANNEX
B) IN DEVIATING FROM AND
DISREGARDING
ESTABLISHED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS ENJOINING
COURTS NOT TO OVERLOOK
OR MISINTERPRET IMPORTANT
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES,
SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, AND WHICH ARE OF
GREAT WEIGHT AND VALUE,
WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE
RESULT OF THE CASE AND
ARRIVE AT A JUST, FAIR AND
OBJECTIVE
DECISION.
(Citations omitted)
THAT FINALLY, AS TO THE
OTHER
LEGAL
IMPORTANT
ISSUE RELATIVE TO CLAIM OR
OWNERSHIP
OF
THE
HAGONOY LUMBER FAMILY
BUSINESS,
CLEAR
AND
PALPABLE LEGAL ERROR HAS
BEEN COMMITTED ON THE
REQUIREMENTS AND CORRECT
APPLICATION OF THE BEST
EVIDENCE
RULE
UNDER
SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT.[28]

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner contends that her case was unduly
prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination
by his own counsel as part of her evidence. Petitioner
argues that the adverse witness testimony elicited
during cross-examination should not be considered as
evidence of the calling party. She contends that the
examination of respondent as adverse witness did not
make him her witness and she is not bound by his
testimony, particularly during cross-examination by his
own counsel.[29] In particular, the petitioner avers that the
following testimony of the respondent as adverse witness
should not be considered as her evidence:

Hereditary Rights in favor of a

Co-Heir (EXH. I);
(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the
HAGONOY LUMBER business
is located were acquired by Lu
Pieng from the Santos family
under the Deed of Absolute
Sale (EXH. J); that Lu Pieng
sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in
1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that
Chua Siok Huan eventually
became owner of the 3 Lots;
and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan
sold them to RESPONDENTAppellee (EXHS. Q and P); that
after he acquired the 3 Lots,
he has not sold them to
anyone and he is the owner of
the lots.[30]
We do not agree that petitioners case was
prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.
If there was an error committed by the RTC in
ascribing to the petitioner the respondents testimony as
adverse witness during cross-examination by his own
counsel, it constitute a harmless error which would not, in
any way, change the result of the case.
In the first place, the delineation of a piece of
evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other
is only significant in determining whether the party on
whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to
meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the
burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the
plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of
evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness
of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely matters who
with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court
will have to consider the entirety of the evidence
presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is
then determined by considering all the facts and
circumstances
of
the
case,
culled
from
the
evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the adverse party does not
necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound
by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at
his instance that his adversary was put on the witness
stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may
impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party,[32] except by evidence
of his bad character. [33] Under a rule permitting the
impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling
party does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is
nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not
contradicted or remains unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is,
therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in the
sense that he may contradict him by introducing other
evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the
witness testifies on.[35] A rule that provides that the party
calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his
testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be
given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party
shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or
from impeaching him.[36] This, the petitioner failed to do.

That
RESPONDENT-Appellee
became
owner
of
the
HAGONOY LUMBER business
when he bought the same
from Chua Sioc Huan through
a Deed of Sale dated August
1, 1990 (EXH.H);

In the present case, the petitioner, by her own

testimony, failed to discredit the respondents testimony
on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property. The
petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition
but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Chua
Siok Huan was only temporary. On cross-examination, she
confessed that no other document was executed to
indicate that the transfer of the business to Chua Siok
Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that,
after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any
action concerning Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in her
counterclaim in the instant that, for the first time, she
raised a claim over the business.

(11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on

the other hand, was acquired
by the sister Chua Sioc Huan,
by virtue of Extrajudicial
Partition and Renunciation of

Due process requires that in reaching a decision,

a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented.
[37]
All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered
bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting
from the evidence.[38] As already mentioned, in arriving at

(11.a)

a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be

considered, regardless of the party who offered them in
evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not
whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to
one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite
probative weight by the court. The testimony of an
adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be
given its proper weight, and such evidence becomes
weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or
contradict his testimony.
Significantly,
the
RTCs
finding
that
the P200,000.00 was given to the petitioner and her
husband as a loan is supported by the evidence on
record. Hence, we do not agree with the petitioners
contention that the RTC has overlooked certain facts of
great weight and value in arriving at its decision. The RTC
merely took into consideration evidence which it found to
be
more
credible
than
the
self-serving
and
uncorroborated testimony of the petitioner.
At this juncture, we reiterate the well-entrenched
doctrine that the findings of fact of the CA affirming those
of the trial court are accorded great respect, even finality,
by this Court. Only errors of law, not of fact, may be
reviewed by this Court in petitions for review
oncertiorari under Rule 45.[39] A departure from the
general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact
of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the
evidence on record.[40] There is no reason to apply the
exception in the instant case because the findings and
conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the
trial court. These findings are buttressed by the evidence
on record. Moreover, the issues and errors alleged in this
petition are substantially the very same questions of fact
raised by petitioner in the appellate court.
On the issue of whether the P200,000.00 was
really a loan, it is well to remember that a check may be
evidence of indebtedness.[41] A check, the entries of which
are in writing, could prove a loan transaction. [42] It is pure
naivet to insist that an entrepreneur who has several
sources of income and has access to considerable bank
credit, no longer has any reason to borrow any amount.
The petitioners allegation that the P200,000.00
was advance on her share in the profits of Hagonoy
Lumber is implausible. It is true that Hagonoy Lumber
was originally owned by the parents of petitioner and
respondent. However, on December 8, 1986, the heirs
freely renounced and waived in favor of their sister Chua
Sioc Huan all their hereditary shares and interest therein,
as shown by the Deed of Partition which the petitioner
herself signed. By virtue of this deed, Chua Sioc Huan
became the sole owner and proprietor of Hagonoy
Lumber. Thus, when the respondent delivered the check
for P200,000.00 to the petitioner on June 7, 1988, Chua
Sioc Huan was already the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber. At that time, both petitioner and respondent no
longer had any interest in the business enterprise; neither
had a right to demand a share in the profits of the
business. Respondent became the sole owner of Hagonoy
Lumber only after Chua Sioc Huan sold it to him on
August 1, 1990. So, when the respondent delivered to the
petitioner the P200,000.00 check on June 7, 1988, it could
not have been given as an advance on petitioners share
in the business, because at that moment in time both of
them had no participation, interest or share in Hagonoy
Lumber. Even assuming, arguendo, that the check was an
advance on the petitioners share in the profits of the
business, it was highly unlikely that the respondent would
deliver a check drawn against his personal, and not
against the business enterprises account.
It is also worthy to note that both the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale were acknowledged before
a Notary Public. The notarization of a private document
converts it into a public document, and makes it

admissible in court without further proof of its

authenticity.[43] It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.[44] A notarized document carries evidentiary weight
as to its due execution, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption
of regularity. Such a document must be given full force
and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof
of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects
recognized by law.[45] A public document executed and
attested through the intervention of a notary public is,
generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear
unequivocal manner.[46]
Petitioner, however, maintains that the RTC
erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best
evidence rule. In addition, petitioner insists that the
Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide negotiations
between a true seller and buyer.
The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule
130, Section 3,[47] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
applies only when thecontent of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
whether such document was actually executed, or exists,
or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial
evidence
is
admissible.
Any
other
substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without
need to account for the original.[48] Moreover, production
of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts
discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.[49]
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule
is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no
dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC
correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two
deeds. The petitioner never even denied their due
execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition.[50] As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in
effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when
she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required
by the rules.[51] The petitioner merely claimed that said
documents do not express the true agreement and
intention of the parties since they were only provisional
paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.
[52]
Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the
contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a
contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of
Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the
parties is the formal expression of the parties rights,
duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the
intention of the parties.[53] The parties intention is to be
deciphered from the language used in the contract, not
from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the
parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the
contract.[54] Thus, when the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
[55]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition

is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 66790 datedMay 23, 2003 and Resolution
dated December 2, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.