Yes. The labor arbiter can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer,
respondent Zamboanga Wood products.
It was held that the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. By
opinions of the court: Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court
and is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed, must be conferred
by law in words that do not admit of doubt.
Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statute now in force. The law in presidential Decree 1691
which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Article 217 of the Labor code
returned the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the labor arbiters.
Provided for explicitly, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge
then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages,
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike that was squarely within the
express terms of the law. Any deviation cannot therefore be tolerated.
However pending resolution, a suit for replevin (Civil Case 4031), was filed
by Private Respondent against petitioners with the RTC Branch 2 of
Cagayan. Private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and
forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers of the DENR
allegedly have no power to perform these acts under the law. They insisted
that only the court is authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used
in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the second
paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent
provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area
where the timber or forest products are found.
It has been the constant ruling of the Court and the words of the ponencia of
Justice Moreland still call for obedience that "The first and fundamental duty
of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."
Private respondent further contended that the seizure is illegal, as the truck
was not used in the commission of the crime (of qualified theft under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable under Section 68), as
allegedly admitted by the Regional Executive Director, releasing the latter
from criminal liability.
Paat vs. CA
Facts:
On May 19, 1989, while on its way to bulacan from san jose Baggao
Cagayan, private respondents truck was seized by the DENR personnel
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Layugan of CENRO issued
an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days to submit
an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. However, private
respondents failed to submit an explanation. Thus, DENR Regional
to give way to the clear intention of the law which allows the DENR authority
in cases of violation of the code.
In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect
to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the
light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
Yes. The Secretary of DENR and his representatives are empowered to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest
products in favor of the government. It should be noted that the truck was
seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without
the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. The court ruled
that the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible
Decision
The Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside and reversed the
decision of Court of Appeals and directed the Secretary of DENR to resolve
the controversy.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAPA
FACTS:
Defendant Mario Mapa, was accused of a violation of Sec. 878 in connection
with Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amend by C.A. No.
56 and as further amended by R.A. No. 4 which is the illegal possession of
firearm of one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number,
with six rounds of ammunition.
Defendant admitted the possession of firearms, provided evidences for his
appointment as secret agent of Hon. Feliciano Leviste, Governor of
Batangas, and cited the case of People v. Macarandang as his defense.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentencing him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. The appeal was elevated to the Supreme
Court for the question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether an appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to
the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution
for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition?
HELD:
No. The court held that the law is explicit and clear. No provision is made for
a secret agent to legally possess a firearm. The accused reliance on People
v. Macarandang is misplaced since Macarandang was a secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaign which sufficiently
put him within the category of a peace officer covered by the exemption.
It is not within the power of the Court to set aside the clear and explicit
mandate of a statutory provision for the first and fundamental duty of courts
is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them.
Thus, the conviction of the accused must stand.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the
respondent judge: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners".
The minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and
Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code which provides
that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children
or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family
unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce
an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to
the policy of the law. The respondent court ruled in favour of spouses
Agonoy.
ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified
to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No. The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise,
the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be
the subject of statutory construction
The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and,
as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. To
add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would
violate the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally
exclude what is not included".
The intention of the law is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare
of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy
life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. Under the
law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification
to adopt.
The petition is denied.
Paras v. Comelec
FACTS:
A petition for recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters
of Barangay Pula, Cabanatuan City against petitioner, Danilo Paras, who
won in the 1994 barangay elections. Acting on the petition for recall, public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the
petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered
voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
However, Comelec deferred the recall election to December 16, 1995 in view
of petitioners opposition.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special Proceeding Civil Action
2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should
not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the Comelec, for the third time, rescheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that
the recall election is now barred as there would be a Sangguniang Kabataan
elections on the first Monday of May 1996; citing Sec. 74 (b) of R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Petitioner also cited the case of Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo
to support the argument, in which the Court considered the SK election as a
regular local election.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular local election.
HELD:
No. The Sangguniang Kabataan election is not a regular local election
construing so would defeat the purpose of the law for there will never be
recall election rendering the provision inutile. In the interpretation of a
statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, must be considered together with
the other parts, and must be kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
Petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the
court cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that
vivifieth The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its
spirit and intent.
However, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become
moot and academic. The recall is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Sec. 74(b) of the Local Government Code considering the next
regular election involving the barangay office officials was scheduled on May
1997, seven months away.
The court ruled that the nature of petitioners complaint is not compensation
based on Workmens Compensation Act, but a complaint for damages.
Under compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation
benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is workconnected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the
fault of the employer. Whereas, damages are awarded to one as a
vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person,
property or relative rights, through the act or default of another. In the
allegation of the petitioners, there was no complaint that the employee died
from accident arising out of and in the course of their employment to
constitute compensation under WCA. Instead, petitioners alleges gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the
lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting
in the death of the employees working underground. It is a given that a
contractual relationship exist between Philex and the deceased employees,
the alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount
to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it
may be held liable for damages.
Yes. The court held that the petitioners have the right to choose between
availing the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages, but
cannot simultaneously pursue both course of action. However, in the case
were petitioners have already recovered damages on WCA which was
based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, if the regular courts awarded greater
amount than they received, payments made under the WCA should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor to prevent
the instance of double jeopardy.
In hearing of the case, divergent opinions of amici curiae where submitted in
their respective memoranda. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured
employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint
to recover damages with the regular court on the basis of negligence of an
employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions and not compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Atty. Angara believes otherwise and
submitted that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury
or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. While Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is
selective; that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for
higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty.
Bocobo agreed on Atty. Bacungan s stand and adds that once the heirs
elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to
avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by filing an
action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
No. In allowing the petitioners to sue in regular courts, the Court held that it
did not legislate but instead merely applied and gave effect to the
constitutional guarantees of social justice. Under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. This
was restated by the Court through the late Chief Justice Castro in People vs.
Licera that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions,
although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Mandated by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge
or court shall decline to render judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of laws, the court argued that in some cases it must legislate.
In the language of Justice Holmes, the court in certain cases do and must
legislate to fill the gaps of the law; because the mind of the legislator, like
all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases
to which the law may apply nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to
anticipate all situations.
Republic vs. CA and Molina (GR 108763, 13 February 1997)
FACTS
This a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio,
on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
born. In the petition, she alleged that Reynaldo had shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred spending more
time and squandering his money with his friends; depending on his parents
for assistance; being dishonest in their finances; and being unable to support
and abandoning them as the head of the family. The couple lived separately
for more than three years when she lived with her parents in Baguio City.
During the pre-trial Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
Evidences which consisted of testimonies of the respondent wife, her friend,
a social worker and a psychiatrist were presented to the court attesting the
psychological incapacity of the respondents husband. The latter did not
present any evidence as he only appeared during the pre-trial
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts erred in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity as opposing or conflicting personalities.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals and RTC of La Trinidad Benguet erred in their
liberal interpretation of psychological incapacity. In Santos vs. CA, it was
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor
physical) incapacity . . . It is clear intendment of the law to confine the
meaning to the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly
demonstrate an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must also exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated and must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In the present case, it was not proven that the psychological defect spoken
of is an incapacity. The court ruled that it appears to be more of a "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. The
mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
Decision
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
and remains valid.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner can be considered as an insurance agent without
reference to the second paragraph and only in accordance with the first
paragraph of Sec. 189 of Insurance Code.
HELD:
No. The respondent courts ruling that under the second paragraph of
Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an
insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity
that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an
insurance agent is wrong.
A complaint was filed against B & B Forest Development Corporation for the
collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court
declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the
reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or
Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. the plaintiff sought the
garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served
on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Petitioners resisted two
orders from the court which compel him to inform the court within 5 days of
receipt of order whether or not there is deposit in CBC of B&B Forest
Development Corporation and if there is any deposit to hold the same intact
and not allow any withdrawal until further order of the court. Hence,
Petitioners instituted the petition and cited provisions of Republic Act No.
1405 as follow:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in
the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of
the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,
except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment,
or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution
to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof
any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an
imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
Petitioners claimed that in complying with the court order, under the
aforementioned provisions, Tan kim Liong will be held criminally liable and
the bank may be exposed to a possible damage suit by B&B Forest
Development Corporation
Issue:
Whether, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, a banking
institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the
bank deposit of a judgment debtor.
HELD:
No. The court clarified that the intention of the lawmakers in passing RA
1405 was not to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy
a final judgement. Since the purpose is for garnishment to insure a
satisfaction of judgement and not real inquiry to the bank deposit, the
Supreme Court held that the order of the lower court are to be affirmed.
11. Board of Administrators of the PVA v. Bautista (GR L-37867, 22
February 1982)
FACTS:
Calixto Gasilao, a war veteran of good standing, filed his claim for disability
pension on October 19, 1995 under RA 65 Sec. 9, but was disapproved by
the board of administrator of PVA. He again filed for disability pension but
was disapproved on December 18 1955 die to petitioners failure to complete
supporting papers.
On august 8, 1968 his claim was approve and requested respondents that
his claim be made retroactive as of the date when his original application
was filed or disapproved in 1955. Petitioner, PVA did not act on respondent
Gasilaos request so he instituted a case with the CFI Manila. Respondent
Court granted Gasilaos request that retroact his pension benefits. Hence,
the petition.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the retroactivity of Gasilaos
pension.
HELD:
No. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant
veterans the proper recognition since it is a governmental expression of
gratitude to those who rendered service for the country. The spirit and intent
of the law must prevail. Congress made the law to retroact prior to the
application since its purpose is to compensate a class of men who suffered
in the service for the hardships they endured and the danger they
encountered, and most particularly to those who have become incapacitated
for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty.
Thus, Gasilaos claim was sustained.
12. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSC (GR L-15045, 20
January 1961)
Facts:
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with the Social
Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and
charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly,
wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,"
be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request
was based on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover
religious and charitable institutions but is limited to businesses and activities
organized for profit. The request was denied, hence the appeal.
The legal provisions of the Social Security Law defined the term employer"
as any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the
Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind
and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards
the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by
the Government", an "employee" refers to "any person who performs
services for an 'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts
are used and who receives compensation for such services", while
"Employment", covers any service performed by an employer except those
expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the Government,
or any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities including
corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domestic service in
a private home, employment purely casual, etc
Issue:
Whether the act is a labor law and does not cover religoues & charitable
institutions that is limited only to businesses and activities organized for
profit.
Held:
No. The Social Security Law also covers religious and charitable institutions
and was enacted by the legislative in pursuant to the policy of the Republic
of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security
system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death. It is an enactment that affords
protection to labor and in full accord with the constitutional provisions on
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of
all the people.
It is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less
permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those
expressly excluded. In the case at bar, the court ruled that the definition of
the term "employer" is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, This is made more
evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or
entities are not included. It is also significant to note that when Republic Act
No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in the employ of institutions
organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of
said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8).
That portion of the law, however, has been deleted by express provision of
Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that
the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within
the scope of the law.
13. David vs. Comelec, 271 SCRA 90
Facts:
Alex David, in his capacity as barangay chairman of Caloocan City
(barangay 77 zone 7), filed a petition for prohibition of the holding of the
barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of 1997.
The Court further resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they
raised basically the same issue, worded differently: How long is the term of
office of barangay officials?
Issues:
1. Whether the local government code of 1991, RA 7160, governs the term
of office of the officials.
On June 15, 1970 a parcel of land, lot No. 27 and 149 sqm portion of lot No.
26, was bought by respondents, spouses Lino Longalong and Pacienca
Mariano from Venancio Salvatierra, who inherited the said land from his
brother Enrique Salvatierra; that died intestate and was survived by his
legitimate brothers,
Tomas, Bartolome, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela.
It was discovered in 1982, that the 149 sqm portion of lot No. 26 was outside
the respondents fence; and that Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a
title of the whole lot 26, 749 sqm, in his name. Efforts to settle the matter at
the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra (widow of
Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to the
latter the disputed portion of land. Thus, respondents, Longalong, filed a
case with the RTC for the reconveyance of the said portion of Lot 26. The
court a quo dismissed the case on the following grounds: 1) that Longalong,
et al. failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question, and
2) that the prescriptive period of four (4) years from discovery of the alleged
fraud committed by defendants predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within
which plaintiffs should have filed their action had already elapsed
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents, longalong,
and stated that a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized
to sell. As to the co-owner of a piece of land, he can of course sell his pro
indiviso share therein to anyone, but he cannot sell more than his share
therein.
Petitioners, Salvatierra, are ordered to reconvey to respondents, Longalong
the 149-sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26 registered in the name of Anselmo
Salvatierra; and petitioners are furthermore ordered to pay respondents, the
amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Hence, petitioners in this case filed a petition for certiorari assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether private respondent, Longalong, is entitled to reconveyance of the
149 square meters in Lot 26.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that private respondent, Longalong, is
entitled to reconveyance of the 149 square meters in Lot 26.
The Court established that Anselmos act of registering the whole Lot No. 26
in his name was intended to defraud Venancio who was then legally entitled
to a certain portion of said lot by the extrajudicial partition. Thus, according
to the New Civil Code if property is acquired through mistake or fraud the
person obtaining it is by force of law considered a trustee of an implied trust
so the prescribe time of ten (10) years should be assumed. The complaint
for reconveyance was filed by the Longalong spouses on November 22,
1985, only five (5) years after the issuance of the title over Lot No. 26 in the
name of Anselmo Salvatierra. Hence prescription has not yet set in.
The Court finds no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extra judicial
partition. The terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the
literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. Pursuant to Article
1370 of the Civil Code, If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.
No reversible errors can be attributed to the findings of the respondent Court
of Appeals because the decision herein assailed was properly supported by
substantial evidence on record, which were not in any way impugned by the
petitioners.
15. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company (GR
L-25316, 28 February 1979)
Facts:
In a mandamus petition, petitioner claim that according to RA 2023, loans
granted by the credit union to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll
collection from the respondents employees wages and salaries.
their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared so but it
only compel the employer to make deduction. It has been repeated time and
time again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is
nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as
to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.
Thus, the appealed decision must be affirmed.
16. Abellana v. Marave (GR L-27760)
Facts:
Petitioner, Francisco Abellana, driving his cargo truck, hit a motorized
pedicab resulting in injuries to its passengers. A criminal case against him
was filed with the city of court of Ozamis which found the accused guilty as
chared, damages in favour of the offended parties are likewise awarded. The
accused, now petitioner, filed an appeal to such decision with the Court of
First Instance. Another separate and independent civil action for damages
allegedly suffered by respondents was also filed with another CFI of Misamis
Occidental, where Crispin Abellana, the alleged employer was included as
defendant. Both of the petitioners sought the dismissal of such action
principally on ground that there was no reservation for the filling thereof in
the City Court of Ozamis, arguing that it was not allowable at the stage where
the criminal case was already on appeal. Respondent judge was not
persuaded, thus the motion to dismiss was denied.
Issue:
Whether a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the judge after his
decision to deny the motion to dismiss of the petitioners.
No. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge on which his decision upheld the substantive right of the petitioner.
The restrictive interpretation of the petitioner of the civil action for recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to institute it
separately should be avoided as it result in its emasculation and give rise to
serious constitutional question.
No. The judgment in this case has already become final and executory and
as such the prevailing party as a matter of right is entitled to a writ of
execution. NLRCs delayed submission of the Report of Examiner gave way
to negotiations on how judgement may be executed. The quit claims and
releases signed by the employees are considered null and void.
In their obvious attempts to derail the implementation of the Court's decision
which had long become final and executory as far back as over six years
ago on October 21, 1981, private respondents endlessly belabored the
Court's ruling finding them guilty of contempt.
Thus, the Court enjoined the respondent NLRC to fully implement the Court's
Resolution dated October 27,1983.
19. IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong (GR L52415, 23 October 1984)
Yes. The Secretary if labor exceeded his authority when he set aside the
decision of final judgement of a quasi-judicial body. A final judgement once
given cannot be annulled or modified otherwise it will result to endless
litigation thereby rendering the law inutile.
Facts:
On 20 June 1975, petitioner filed a complaint before the National Labor
Commission against respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay.
Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was
certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975.
On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, ruled in favour of the
petitioner and ordered the respondent bank to pay wages to all its employees
for all regular holidays since November 1, 1974. Respondent bank complied
to the order of Arbiter Soriano by paying their holiday pay up to and including
January 1976. PD 850 was promulgated amending Article 94 of the Labor
Code on the right to holiday pay. Consequently. On February 16, 1976 by
authority of article 5 of the same code, the Ministry of Labor promulgated
rules and regulations which contain a section that define who will receive
holiday pay; thus the respondent bank stopped the payment of holiday pay
to its employee. The petitioner filed a motion for writ of execution to enforce
arbiters decision but the respondent filed an appeal and was later dismissed
by the Labor Arbiter. Respondent then filed with the Minister of Labor and
got a favourable response. Hence, the petition.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the public
respondent which denied the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim
for premium and overtime pay differentials basing the decision on Sec. 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No.
9, which respectively provide:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.
Issue:
Whether respondent, Amado G. Inciong, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he set aside on
appeal, the decision of Labor Arbiter even though it has already become final
and had been partially executed on the basis of an Implementing Rule &
Policy Instruction by the Ministry of Labor.
Held:
Held:
Yes, while it is true that the minister has the authority to perform and
implement guidelines to clarify the labor code, it is limited and the Court
can declare it null and void if proven to be erroneous. An administrative
interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the
statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires. Article 4 of the Labor
Code, states that 'All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor. Petitioner were not among those excluded
by PD 850 from the benefits of such holiday pay.
Thus, The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Ministers order,
and reinstated the decision of the NLRC affirming the resolution of the Labor
Arbiter.
21. Victorias Milling v. Social Security Commission (GR L-16704, 17
March 1962)
Facts:
The records showed that a day before the death of Marcelino, he reported
as usual to the Constabulary Computer Center at Camp Crame, Quezon City
and performed his duties not only as code verifier but also handled
administrative functions, computer operation and typing jobs due to shortage
of civilian personnel. Although he was complaining of chest pain and
headache late in the afternoon of December 11, 1975, after a whole day of
strenuous activities, Marcelino was still required to render overtime service
until late in the evening of the same day, typing voluminous classified
communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary
of Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police personnel
throughout the country for distribution on or before December 15, 1975. He
went home late at night and due to fatigue, he went to bed as soon as he
arrived without taking his meal. Shortly thereafter, Marcelino was noticed by
his mother, the herein petitioner, gasping for breath, perspiring profusely,
and mumbling incoherent words. The petitioner tried to wake him up and
after all efforts to bring him to his senses proved futile, she rushed Marcelino
to a hospital where he was pronounced dead at 5:30 o'clock in the morning
of December 12, 1975, the cause of death was acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis.
Facts:
Petitioner, Domna N. Villavert, mother of the late Marcelino N. Villavert who
died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis, employed as a Code Verifier in the
Philippine Constabulary, filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her
son under P.D. No. 626 as amended with the Government Service Insurance
System. The said claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance
System on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an
occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show that there
was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino N. Villavert
and the nature of his employment.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefits.
Held:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to her sons death benefits.
The Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that
the exact cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite
extensive researches in this field, although most research data are agreed
that physical and mental stresses are strong causal factors in the
development of the disease. From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear
that Marcelino N. Villavert died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was
directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder
verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary.
... The loss of a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones
of the wrist....
Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there
being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by
him was not covered by his policy. Thus, plaintiff sued the defendants in the
Municipal Court of this City but was denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether plaintiff is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the
disability of his left hand.
Held:
No. While the Court sympathize with the plaintiff, the Court cannot go beyond
the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define
partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of
the wrist." There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was
found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical
injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand." Note that
the disability of plaintiff's hand was merely temporary, having been caused
by fracture of the index, the middle and the fourth fingers of the left hand.
The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the
parties.As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only
amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an
interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. For
obscure words or stipulations should be interpreted against the person who
caused the obscurity, and the ones which caused the obscurity in the cases
at bar are the defendant insurance companies.
39.De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance (GR L-21574, 30 June 1966)
Facts:
This is an appeal by the Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, ordering it to indemnify
therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the death of the latter's son, to pay the
burial expenses, and attorney's fees.
300 degrees Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which has a flash point below 300
degrees Fahrenheit was stored therein.
capacity to sue. The court ruled that the contracts could not be validated by
the subsequent procurement of the license.
Issue:
Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the forfeiture of claims
under the insurance policy
Held:
No. The appellant insurance company avers, that the insured violated the
"Hemp Warranty" provisions of policy, against the storage of gasoline, since
appellee admitted that there were 36 cans (latas) of gasoline in the building
designed as "Bodega No. 2" that was a separate structure not affected by
the fire. But gasoline is not specifically mentioned among the prohibited
articles listed in the so-called "hemp warranty." The cause relied upon by the
insurer speaks of "oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their
liquid products having a flash point below 300o Fahrenheit", and is decidedly
ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils" mean "lubricants"
and not gasoline or kerosene.And how many insured are in a position to
understand or determine "flash point below 300 Fahrenheit.
By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms
and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
the insurer and liberraly in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture
Insurance is, in its nature, complex and difficult for the layman to understand.
Policies are prepared by experts who know and can anticipate the hearing
and possible complications of every contingency. So long as insurance
companies insist upon the use of ambiguous, intricate and technical
provisions, which conceal rather than frankly disclose, their own intentions,
the courts must, in fairness to those who purchase insurance, construe every
ambiguity in favor of the insured.
41.
Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines (GR L-34382, 20 July
1983)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari the decisions of the CFI of Manila
dismissing the complaints of plaintiff-petitioner on the ground of lack of
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in holding that the contracts entered into by
Home Insurance could not be validated by the subsequent procurement of
license.
Held:
Yes. By obtaining the necessary license to conduct business in the
Philippines, petitioner already has the legal capacity to sue. It has long been
the rule that a foreign corporation actually doing business in the Philippines
without license to do so may be sued in our courts. The Court distinguish
between the denial of a right to take remedial action and the penal sanction
for non-registration. Insofar as transacting business without a license is
concerned, Section 69 of the Corporation Law imposed a penal sanctionimprisonment and a penalty for transacting business without registration.
And insofar as litigation is concerned, the foreign corporation or its assignee
may not maintain any suit for the recovery of any debt, claim, or demand.
However, the Corporation Law is silent on whether or not the contract
executed by a foreign corporation with no capacity to sue is null and void ab
initio.
There is no question that the contracts are enforceable. The requirement of
registration affects only the remedy. The objective of the Corporation Law
was to subject the foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of our courts. It must
be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not
hamper the development of trade relations and which fosters friendly
commercial intercourse among countries.
42. CO v. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Facts:
Petitioner, Lee Cho who was born in China of Chinese parents and who
came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921, filed for naturalization
before the CFI of Cebu without first complying with the requirement of filing
a declaration of intention to become a Filipino Citizen.
He alleged that he possess all the qualification continuous residence in the
country for at least 30 years, educated in a government recognized school,
speaks and writes English and Cebu dialect, cleared of tax liability, and hold
an alien certification and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.
Petitioner married a Chinese national with whom he had 13 children born in
Cebu, all of which are issued alien certificate with the exception of Lourdes
Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan. At
present, his children are studying in private schools and colleges recognized
by the government with the exception of William Lee who is not of school
age, Angelita who rendered only grade five and Lourdes who stopped in third
year high school.
However, the Government disputed the claim contending that petitioner has
failed to comply with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford
primary and secondary education to all his children because he failed to give
such education to his daughters Angelita Lee and Lourdes Lee.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for
naturalization.
Held:
No. Evidences in petitioner acts portrayed betrayal of his sincerity because
two of his children did not receive the required teaching of Philippine Civics
because of unsatisfactory reasons such as early marriage of Angelina Lee,
and an admittance in the open court that in spite of illness, Lourdes Lee,
continued her study in an unrecognized Chinese school by the government.
Philippine History and Philippine Government, subjects that are precisely
Held:
No. from the records it was established that the private respondents status
is agricultural tenants under the legal definitions.
The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a
person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by
another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the
former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both. (Section 3, Republic
Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)
Beside the agreement on 1973 which clearly indicate a tenancy relationship
exist. Respondent Benitez has physically possessed, cultivated and lived on
the landholding continuously from 1969 until he was ejected from it. A hired
laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the
same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more
consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure
under the law.
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship is the agreement
to share the produce or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing
in favor of the petitioner-landowners.
The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives
a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the
other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His
share is necessarily dependent on the amount of harvest.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms
seeks to abolish agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship
governing farmers and landowners in the country. But the petitioners'
45.
Bello v. CA (GR L-38161, 29 March 1974)
Rules of Court
Facts:
Petitioners spouses were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay
for allegedly having misappropriated a lady's ring received by them from Atty.
Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were
convicted and sentenced under respondent city court's decision.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the Respondent City Court, Court of
First Instance of Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss
appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance and the trial in the
city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary
Act, Republic Act 296, as amended.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's dismissal motion and invoking the
analogous provision of Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals
in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall
certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the
grounds therefor," prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the
appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify the same "to either
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
The respondent city court did find that the appeal should have been taken
directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and
remand of the records to the city court "for execution of judgment."
Petitioners then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the
People and respondent city court to prohibit the execution of the judgment
and to compel respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the
Respondent Court of Appeals.
Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may
have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it
held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as
principal party respondent and thus it could not grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities
Issue:
Whether the formal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the
challenged order of dismissal was indispensable.
Held:
No. although respondent court recognized the error of the respondent city
court,
The former gravely erred in holding that it could not "correct" the respondent
city courts "wrong action" and grant the relief sought of having the appeal
elevated to it since said court's presiding judge "who should have been-made
under Rule 65, sec. 3 10 herein principal party respondent, but he was not."
as the court ruled in Torre vs. Ericta, a respondent judge is "merely a nominal
party" in special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
that he "is not a person "in interest" within the purview (of Rule 65, section 5
12)" and "accordingly, he has no standing or authority to appeal from or seek
a review on certiorari" of an adverse decision of the appellate court setting
aside his dismissal of a party's appeal and issuing the writ of mandamus for
him to allow the appeal.
It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of first instance or
presiding judge who issued the challenged order or decision is but a nominal
party, the real parties in interest being "the person or persons interested in
sustaining the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the duty
of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in their own behalf and
in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings." Hence, the
formal impleading of the court of first instance which issued the challenged
order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be "overlooked in the
interest of speedy adjudication."
The Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always
cautioned against "narrowly"interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose
of the legislator" and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or
absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results". In the construction of its own
Rules of Court, this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them
to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void
that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule to eliminate
repugnancy and inconsistency by holding as it does now that courts of
first instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss
misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate
court.
interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases
cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is
one of the most delicate exercise of government authority. It is to be watched
with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property
of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions
of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and
to protect it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations
to take property be expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken
specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for its
exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th
Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil.,
411.)
47. Villanueva v. Comelec (GR L-54718, 4 December 1985)
Facts:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice
Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his
companion Mendoza, who withdrew candidacy with an unsworn letter in his
own handwriting, upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election with
a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent
Lirio's 2,660 votes) but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and
proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that
Petitioners candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent because
petitioners name does not appear in the Comelecs certified list of candidate.
Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was
dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendozas
unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioners candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not
withdraw after January 4, citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered
withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office which received the
certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate
with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter
qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for
which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before
midday of election ...
Issue:
Whether Mendozas informal withdrawal is a ground to disqualify petitioner.
Held:
No. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality
which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner
as the substitute candidate. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be
under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to
observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity. In
fact, Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election
registrar without protest nor objection.
Furthermore, the Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's
substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the
substance and spirit of the Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.
Since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of
registered candidates, because the election was only four days away,
petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy
to all chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in
compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager.
The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned
Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vicemayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly
elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said
office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is
made immediately executory.
48. In RE Tampoy (GR L-14322, 25 February 1960)
Facts:
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will
and testament of one Petronila Tampoy. The trial court denied the petition
on the ground that the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
the testatrix.
Hence the appeal. Petitioner alleged that although the first page of the will
does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses
her true intention to give the property to her whose claims remains
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any to the
opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not
bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her
thumbmark and both pages were signed by the three testimonial witnesses.
Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed, the
three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the
document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether the trial Court erred in denying the petition.
Held:
No. The contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express
provision of the law. Thus, Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires
that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which
requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. This requirement
is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will.
Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed.
A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements;
otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective
execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to super
add other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statutes.
49. Capati v. Ocampo, GR L-28742, April 30, 1982)
Facts:
Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, contractor of the
Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur, on May
23, 1967, entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr. Jesus Ocampo,
a resident of Naga City.
The contract agreement stipulated that, construction must be completed
before June 5 1967, and that all actions arising out, or relating to this
contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
Defendant Ocampo finished the construction only on June 20, 1967 thus
plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery
of consequential damages.
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
venue of action was improperly laid but Plaintiff filed an opposition to the
motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court of First
Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of EO 546 provides that the
Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy
Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an
economist. The Executive Order took effect on 24 September 1979 .
However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice.
Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC.
6. Historical milieu of the NTC: Opinion of Justice Secretary (Puno)
entitled to great weight but not conclusive upon the courts
The opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight. However,
the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts. The Puno Opinion
that the NTC is not a collegial body is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does
not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body, and neither does it
provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such
provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the
context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and
Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said
Rules, the BOC (now the NTC), a case before the BOC may be assigned to
and heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and
promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership
of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least 2 of the membership
of
the
BOC
is
necessary
for
a
valid
Decision.
7. Historical milieu of the NTC: BOC Rules are NTC Rules, Philippine
Consumers
Foundation
vs.
NTC
While it may be true that the BOC Rules of Procedure was promulgated
before the effectivity of Executive Order 546, however, the Rules of
Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the
NTC when it was established under Executive Order 546. This was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131
SCRA 200 when it declared that: The Rules of Practice and Procedure
promulgated on 25 January 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of NTC govern the rules of practice and procedure
before the BOC then, now NTC.
8.
Commission
defined
A Commission is a body composed of several persons acting under lawful
authority to perform some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal
Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261
and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. The fact that
implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be
a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations
are an erroneous interpretation of EO 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
13.
Courts cannot refrain from duty to nullify illegal regulations
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null
and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of EO 546 that
constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of
striking
down
such
illegal
regulations.
14.
Only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar are indispensable
parties
in
the
action
for
certiorari
In its certiorari action before the Court of Appeals, BellTel was proceeding
against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the formers adherence and
defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC
and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties.
After all, it is they whom BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the
court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
15. Oppositors not absolutely necessary in an action for certiorari, as
the action does not go into merits of the case; Claim of non-joinder of
indispensable
parties
untenable
The oppositors in NTC Case 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the
final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTC
because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor
General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the
NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause could not be
significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of
discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are
interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the
merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of
at least two members of the commission. All that Court of Appeals passed
upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so the Supreme Court
must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the appellate
court on this score, and this score alone.
16.
Mandamus
does
not
control
discretion
Jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing a quasijudicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for
adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this
discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office of the
special civil action of mandamus. It is elementary legal knowledge, after all,
that mandamus does not lie to control discretion. Herein, when the Court of
Appeals directed Commissioners to meet en banc and to consider and act
on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said
court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial
body, and the subject of the deliberation of the 3-man commission would be
the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be
taken on BellTels application for a provisional authority. The appellate court
did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application.
17. No evidence proffered that working draft was obtained by BellTel
was
obtained
through
illegal
means
The working draft was said to have been prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante
of the Legal Department of the NTC; initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr.
Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. No
one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or
declared it to be spurious. Petitioners have not proffered a single piece of
evidence to prove the charge that the working draft of the order granting
provisional authority to BellTel was obtained by the latter through illegal
means. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is
more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant
proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.
51. Alfon v. Republic (GR L-51201, 29 May 1980)
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte filed a petition praying
that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon for the following reasons:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same
name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy
and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Issue:
Whether a legitimate or legitimated children are required to use the surname
of their father.
Held:
No, the word "principally" as used in Art. 364 of the Civil Code is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it
is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court held in Haw Liong vs. Republic
The following may be considered, among others, as proper
or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a
petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the
change is necessary to avoid confusion
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades
up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid
and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
52. Rura v. Lopena (GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985)
Facts:
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts
of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol. The five cases were jointly tried and a single
decision was rendered.
Petitioner applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation
officer of Bohol on the ground that petitioner is disqualified for probation
under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law thereof which disqualifies from
probation those persons:
On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for
illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent
NHC and On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R.
Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by
respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case
against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the
charges against him. Hence, the conclusion d that the dismissal was illegal
as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.
On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on
March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.[10]
Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed
the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.
Held:
No. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and
/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not
by the Labor Code. Hence,
Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:
"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees,
including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall
be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations x x x.
The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:
FACTS:
Private respondents, National
Resettlement
and
Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) created under R.A. 1160, thru its Board of
Directors, on January 15 1960, under Resolution No. 13 appoint petitioner,
Bruno Appari, as the General Manager of office of subject to approval
of the President.
The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general
manager is provided for in paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160
(approved June 18, 1954), to wit:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of
Directors shall have the following powers and duties: ...
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager ..., subject to the
recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of
the President of the Philippines, .... The Board, by a majority vote of all
members, may, for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic
Coordination and with the approval of the President of the Philippines,
suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General
Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
On March 15, 1962, the Board approved Resolution No. 24 wherein
the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the
incumbent General Manager up to March 31, 1962.
Thus Petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on March
29, 1962 , a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction praying that
the resolution of NARRA be annulled and the Board be commanded to allow
petitioner to continue office until he vacates said office in accordance with
the law,
On October 21, 1963 the then CFI of Manila dismissed the petition for the
case has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) which abolished the NARRA
and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority and thereby
dismissing the instant petition without pronouncement as to costs"
On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal affirmed the
decision of the lower court in dismissing the petition for mandamus
Hence the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or
dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that hat the term of office of the petitioner expired on
March 31, 1962. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. It
is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of
statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject
to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner.
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit
of the public. The right to hold a public office under our political system is
therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and
by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. There
is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary.
The new municipality of Sebaste in Antique province held its first election of
officers November 14, 1967, with the petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the
respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting
as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised
Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return
from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were
registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the
municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of
October 30, 1997.
At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the
objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then
proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The
resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles.
Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of
Sebaste.
Petitioner, challenged the right of the two board members to sit considering
that they are re-electionist. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of
Petitioner. However, Galido asked for reconsideration, stating that the said
board members in question were disqualified only when the board was
acting as a provincial but not as municipal and that the COMELEC
resolution annulling the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued
without giving him an opportunity to be heard.In light of this, Respondent
Commission reversed its previous decision.
Galido was proclaimed and the respondent Commission held "that the
canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Demafiles, after failing to secure a reconsideration of the latter resolution
filed a petition. Hence the case.
Galido, argued that the case is moot because he had taken his oath and
assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870 section 2 of
the statute which reads:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of Sebaste
shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have
qualified
Facts:
Issue:
(1) Whether the case is moot and academic.
(2) Whether the provincial board members, who were candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board.
Held:
(1)No. The court ruled that the last portion of the provision "and shall have
qualified" is devoid of any meaning; it is unmitigated jargon in or out of
context, and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office
of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation. It is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But
here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense
of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from
supplying. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration.
Accordingly, the general rule is that the term of office of municipal officials
shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so the
assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic
issues in this case, which we need not reach and resolve.
(2) Yes. From the clear provisions of Sec 28 of the Revised Election Code
which provides that any member of the provincial board who is a candidate
for an elective office shall be incompetent to act in said board in the
performance of its duties in connection with the election.
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a
provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal
canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none.
Thus The court ordered that the resolutions of the Commission on Elections
are set aside, proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido is annulled.
The respondent Commission on Elections was directed to appoint new
members of the board of canvassers and to immediately thereafter to order
the board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes
including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance
with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates.
56.Arabay vs CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, 66 SCRA 617
Facts:
The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and
petroleum based products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other
petroleum products, filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte a complaint against the City of Dipolog, contesting the validity of such
on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under
Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities may not impose
tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.
the court a quo rendered judgment upholding the validity of the questioned
provision of Ordinance No. 53, as amended, essentially on the grounds that
the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence that the tax provision in question
imposed a sales tax, and the tax prescribed therein was, moreover, not a
specific tax on the products themselves but on the privilege of selling them.
Issue:
Whether the questioned tax provision imposes a sales tax.
Whether the Arabay, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only because the character of the
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance was admitted by the parties below, but
as well because the phraseology of the said provision reveals in clear terms
the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline and other petroleum
products. Thus, the ordinance provides: "There shall be charged for the
selling and distribution of refined and manufactured oils ... based on the
monthly allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for sale ...
by the Company or supplier to any person ... whether as dealer ... or as
operator of any station ... the following tax payable monthly: ..." It is quite
evident from these terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is
directly dependent upon or bears a direct relationship to the volume of sales
which the owner or supplier of the itemized products generates every month.
The ordinance in question therefore exacts a tax based on sales; it follows
that the Municipality of Dipolog was not authorized to enact such an
ordinance under the local Autonomy Act.
(2) Even if the prohibition contained in section 2 of RA 2264 applies only to
municipalities and not to chartered cities; the obligation of the City of Dipolog
to refund the sum collected under the void provisions of an ordinance
enacted while it was still a municipality, is not open to doubt. The court ruled
that ruled that the legality of an ordinance depends upon the power of the
municipality at the time of the enactment of the challenged ordinance.
The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local sales taxes it had paid
under the questioned ordinance may not, however, include those levied on
its gasoline sales. The relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy
Act states:
... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall,
in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes
on articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code:
No, the Court cannot give merit to the justification of the COMELEC under
the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated
in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind being made of that kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
Constitution. The Court could not adhere to a ruling which would nullify a
constitutional right as free speech.
Thus, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited
from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid
order banning the use of political taped jingles.
64. People v. Manantan, GR L-14129, July 31, 1962
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged
with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. which provided the
following:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.
The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice
of the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code but the lower court denied the motion holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54.
A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it
was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and
pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused
upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the
appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code?
Held:
No. the court ruled that a justice of the peace is not included in the prohibition
of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The maixim "casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est" is invoked by the defendant-appellee , under the said
rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to
have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then
indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law,
or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges." To accept the defense contention is to render ineffective a
policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
65. Lopez v. CTA,GR L-9274, February 1, 1957)
Facts:
Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg, Germany.
The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs
duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said
customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment,
additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and
imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the
reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed
to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal,
filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax
Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of
Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court.
From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking a
reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125 should be adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals from
decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected by a
decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of appealing the said
decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the literal meaning of Section 11 of RA 1125 should be adopted
and that the Court of Tax Appeal has concurrent jurisdiction over the
decisions of Collector of Custom.
Held:
No. Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand, section 11 of the
same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may
appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling
of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of
Customs. The court ruled that a clerical error was committed in section
11, mentioning therein the Collector of Customs. It is more reasonable
and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature meant
and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of
Collector of Customs.
The two remedies suggested by petitioners are entirely different, one
from the other; an appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely
administrative, whereas, appeal to the Court of Tax Appeal is
manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before one resorts to the
Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be
exhausted.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter but rather the
spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important and which
matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal
import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would
contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter
of the law.
66. Sanciangco v. Rono , GR L-68709, July 19, 1985
Facts:
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz
City. Later, he was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of and was
appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City's
Sangguniang Panlungsod. Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental but was
not successful.
under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the
consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of
Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195. Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion
of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the
Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there
be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election
received the highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office.
Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs,
the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a
provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the
consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180,
the Revised Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Laxamana has the right to assume office.
Held:
Yes. the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the
executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the
courts.
the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the
principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular
provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act
190). In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the
office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to
vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may
be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.4 "Where one statute
deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the
same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if
possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of
whether it was passed prior to the general statute."
It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular
case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in
its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include
the cases embraced in the special law. . . . It is a canon of statutory
construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly
repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions, of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18
Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396.)
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the
terms of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the
special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular
71.
Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan (GR L-21516, 29 April 1966)
Facts:
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative
franchise under Republic Act No. 399 for an electric light, heat and power
system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan,and was also issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service
Commission on 18 March 1954. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances
numbered 11, 131 and148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts
of any business operated in the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the
validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the
obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due
process of law. On the other hand, Respondent maintained that it was vested
with the power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and
special purposes as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950.
Issue:
Whether the city of Butuan can authorized to tax the franchised Butuan
Sawmill.
Held:
No. Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the
franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the City of Butuan within
the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power
of taxation of the city under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be
taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise,
since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power.
Be it noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18
June 1949 while the city's charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the
terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception
to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case
72.
Arayata vs. Joya, 51 PHIL 654
FACTS:
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots, and he started paying the Government
for such. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed
some of the lots to respondent F. Joya as administrator. Cecilio died before
fully paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner,
was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision
on conjugal property. The court then sought to deliver the property to
Florentino for liquidation and distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act
1120, Sec. 16, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon
compliance with requirements of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act
1120s full conveyance of the property to the widow.
HELD:
Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition,
disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil
Code. The Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The
special law must prevail.
73.
City of Manila vs. Teotico, 2 SCRA 267
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico, was about to
board a jeepney, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or
manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, he suffered several injuries
in the different part of his body and was brought to a hospital for treatment.
Thus, he filed , with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. The CFI dismissed the complaint and on appeal was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals under Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
City of Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for
the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the
entire Philippines.
Hence the case.
Issue:
Whether the applicable code in the present case us RA 409.
Held:
No. The Court ruled that it is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a