2015
David Petersona
Abstract
The belief that natural sciences are more scientific than the social sciences has been well
documented in the perceptions of both lay and scientific populations. Influenced by
the Kuhnian concept of paradigm development and empirical studies on the closure of
scientific controversies, scholars from divergent traditions associate scientific development
with increased consensus and stability. However, both the macro/quantitative and micro/
qualitative approaches are limited in key ways. This article is the first comparative
ethnography of a natural science (molecular biology) and a social science (psychology) and it
highlights important differences between the fields. Molecular biologists engage in a process
of bench-building, in which they create and integrate new manipulation techniques and
technologies into their practice, whereas psychologists have far less opportunity for this type
of development. This suggests an alternative conception of the natural/social divide, in which
the natural sciences are defined by dynamic material evolution while the social sciences
remain relatively stable.
Keywords
laboratory ethnography, science and knowledge, hierarchy of the sciences, scientific frontier
Northwestern University
Corresponding Author:
David Peterson, Northwestern University,
Department of Sociology, 1810 Chicago Avenue,
Evanston, IL 60208
E-mail: davidpeterson@u.northwestern.edu
1202
This is because we still lack a basic understanding of how the social sciences work on
the level of practices. Nearly all the work
comparing the natural and social sciences
relies on downstream phenomena like citation
patterns and professional structures as measures of cognitive consensus. Yet, relatively
little work focuses on what social scientists
do in the process of research. Ethnographers
have shed light on the practices of physicists
(Knorr Cetina 1999; Traweek 1992) and biologists (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Knorr Cetina 1999; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Lynch
1985), but we know almost nothing about the
practices of social scientists. Our lack of
knowledge surrounding social knowledge
making (Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2011)
has hobbled previous comparisons across the
hard science/soft science divide.
This article bridges the gap between two
research traditions in the social studies of science. On one side is the tradition initiated by
Merton and his students, which uses mainly
macro, quantitative studies to analyze differences in scientific consensus across fields
(Cole 1983, 1992, 1994; Hargens 1988;
Lodahl and Gordon 1972; Zuckerman and
Merton 1971). On the other side is a heterogeneous set of theories and methods typically
unified under the label constructivist (Cambrosio and Keating 1988; Pinch and Bijker
1984). These studies use ethnography and
historical case studies to investigate how consensus occurs as a matter of routine practice
(Fujimura 1992; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984;
Latour 1987; Latour and Woolgar 1979;
Lynch 1985). Although these literatures have
made important contributions, they both present incomplete understandings of how the
physical and social sciences differ.
To focus on research practices and make
comparisons across a social and a natural science, I conducted ethnographic studies of five
laboratories in psychology and one in molecular biology. I demonstrate that research practices in molecular biology are organized
around embodied knowledge and research
technologies in ways that are either absent or
greatly constrained in psychology. I argue
Peterson
1203
that the two fields have different opportunities for creating and integrating new phenomena as part of the ongoing evolution of
manipulation regimes, a process I call benchbuilding. Bench-building occurs when scientists at the unstable and ambiguous research
frontier concentrate their efforts on the production of reliable effects through an iterative
process whereby they incorporate new techniques and technologies. When successful,
bench-building extends the horizons of
inquiry and produces practical consensus as a
byproduct, as researchers incorporate new
methods to maintain their place at the cutting
edge of their field. In fields in which benchbuilding is constrained, technological integration and embodied skill remain comparatively
underdeveloped and consensus is produced
through other means. Although not a definitive statement, this article is a contribution
toward understanding how research practices
differ across these areas.
1204
Peterson
1205
Methods
I conducted ethnographies in five psychology
laboratories and one molecular biology lab
from 2009 to 2013. The psychology labs
included three developmental cognition labs
and two social psychology labs located across
three prestigious universities in the United
States, including one at a private university on
the East Coast, two at a private university in
the Midwest, and two at a large public university on the West Coast. I conducted a one-year
ethnography in a molecular biology laboratory
at the West Coast university. Additionally, I
interviewed 52 faculty members, postdoctoral
researchers, and graduate students.
I chose psychology because, unlike other
social scientists, most psychologists conduct
their research in laboratories. This provides
an important benefit to the ethnographer who
finds only silent, solitary work in most social
scientific fields (Camic et al. 2011). Previous
research has investigated social scientific
research through peer review panels (Guetzkow, Lamont, and Mallard 2004; Lamont
2009; Lamont and Huutoniemi 2011), conferences (Gross and Fleming 2011), and retrospective accounts of discovery (Koppman,
1206
Peterson
1207
researchers presented video data from experiments they had run. Both had fundamental
questions regarding what their videos meant
and both were looking for feedback from
their fellow lab members to improve their
respective studies. However, the two meetings differed in one significant aspect. After
the meeting, Beth, the social psychologist,
moved forward with her study. She used the
suggestions to develop a coding scheme and
began training research assistants to code the
50 videos. Conversely, Isobel, the biologist,
was sent back to the lab bench. She took the
suggestions she received back to the site of
data gathering to improve her experimental
technique and collect better data.
These meetings reveal a key distinction
between the two fields. The molecular biology
lab was organized around the enrichment of
data. Through the development of embodied
knowledge and the introduction of new research
technologies, molecular biologists continually
changed the conditions of their research by
creating and stabilizing new manipulations.
This resulted in an ongoing focus on both
improving embodied skill and introducing new
technologies. The psychologists I observed, on
the other hand, could do little to improve the
conditions of their data gathering and, therefore, benefited less from embodied technique
and cutting-edge technology.
The following sections detail the differences in both technique and technical development between psychology and molecular
biology.
Technique
Collins (1974, 2001), who popularized the
concept of tacit knowledge within science
studies, noted recently that the term has been
used to describe such diverse forms of behavior that there was a pressing need to clarify
the concept. He developed a typology that
included somatic and collective forms of
tacit knowledge (Collins 2010).
Somatic tacit knowledge is the paradigmatic form described in Polanyis (1958)
classic example of learning how to ride a
bike. Explicit instruction is insufficient to
1208
Peterson
1209
Technique in Developmental
Psychology: Warm Bodies
In the molecular biology lab, the term hands
was used to denote the high levels of somatic
tacit knowledge necessary to dissect animals,
build equipment, and perform experiments. In
contrast, hands is colloquially used as a
synecdoche for generic, unskilled laborers
(e.g., all hands on deck). In the developmental psychology labs, this is the role that
many members have. For instance, because
running experiments on infants requires
workers to help schedule subjects, babysit
siblings, and clean up the lab, one psychologist frequently referred to her ongoing need
for warm bodies to keep the lab running.
Because of the need for warm bodies, I
was often recruited to work in the developmental psychology labs. Although the physical skills needed to perform these tasks varied,
none could be deemed challenging. For
instance, when one of the coders did not show
up for an experiment, I was enlisted. Dr. Parker
explained my role in about 15 seconds. I was
to look at the monitor and press a button on a
computer keyboard (that someone had helpfully taped a happy face onto) when infants
were looking at the stage and release the button when they were not. That was the totality
of my role.
At another lab, I got the chance to actually
run an experiment. The task involved hiding
1210
Peterson
1211
Technology
Embodied skill is not unique to researchers in
the natural sciences. Ethnographers must
learn to behave normally so as not to disturb
natural group behavior. Quantitative sociologists learn how to navigate statistical computer programs. Outside of academia, many
vocations require workers to learn a sophisticated set of physical skills.
What differentiates embodied knowledge
in molecular biology from these other
domains is that existing somatic tacit knowledge is continually given new power through
technological innovation. In molecular biology, the body serves as an all-purpose tool in
a larger system that regularly incorporates
new research technologies. Skills like dissection and microscope technique provide the
necessary conditions for the introduction of
new technologies.
For instance, the development of genetically engineered mice occurs outside the lab
but has profound implications for a labs
research, because the mice can be specially
designed to have biological properties that
allow, for instance, for better imaging. Superior imaging allows researchers to witness
cellular interactions that were previously
invisible, and this greater vision, in turn,
gives them reason to try new manipulations
they would have been unable to evaluate
before. However, embodied skill is vital all
along this process. Introduction of these mice
would be impossible if not for the embodied
skill of animal husbandry experts, and genetic
manipulation would be irrelevant if it were
not for the existence of skills that allow
researchers to dissect retinas, maintain cells,
and produce images.3
1212
the electrode was held in place by a mechanical arm controlled by the manipulator, a
metal box with a digital readout and three
dials controlling the electrodes movement in
X, Y, and Z dimensions. Because the cells are
sensitive to trauma, the manipulator allows
researchers to make movements far more
subtle and exacting than an unaided human
could accomplish. The electrode itself sends
signals to an amplifier that magnifies the
minuscule electrical activity the tissue produces. Additional software then isolates the
signal coming from the cell of interest from
neighboring cells.
The material culture of the molecular biology lab was not only highly elaborated, it was
constantly in development. Besides the rig
that was being built while I was there, another
had been built shortly before I arrived, and
every week they discussed (and frequently
purchased) new dyes, viruses, filters, and
genetically modified mice. When I asked
Sarah about the rapid development of research
technology in their field, she told me, The
questions that we can ask are limited by the
ways that we ask them. If we have the latest
and greatest technology, we can ask more
sophisticated questions. However, this creates a culture of volatility. As Blake explained,
All the tools are advancing at the same
time. He later told me that their field pushes
hard even if we dont know where were
going and compared the constantly receding
technological frontier to the Wild West.
Peterson
1213
Scientific Progress
as the Evolution of
Manipulation Regimes
The argument that scientific communities are
primarily organized around research technology is not new. As Shapin and Shaffer
(1985:152) argue, Boyless greatest innovation was not his air pump but the air pumps
role in reorganizing the social collective
around the production of experimental findings, mobilized into matters of fact through
collective witness. The air pump may have
been an ill-designed piece of technology, but
it translated a scientific controversy from an
abstract, theoretical disagreement into a concrete problem of technological function.
Later, Collins (1994) would use this argument to explain why some fields, like sociology, had trouble becoming high-consensus,
rapid-discovery science. By integrating selfgenerating genealogies of research technologies (Collins 1994:162), the natural sciences
were able to escape the type of intractable
1214
and a peripheral interest in the latter.4 Molecular biologists are focused on enriching their
data. They are engaged in an iterative process
in which they conduct limited data gathering
followed by discussion and critique that, in
turn, is followed by a trip back to the bench to
change some feature of the experiment (see
Figure 1).5
Through repeated iterations, technique,
technology, and object become interactively
stabilized, creating a new surface of emergence (Pickering 1995). The conditions of
research have literally been altered. The
development of new skills and, relatedly, new
technologies, changes the shape of this surface and promises new horizons of emergence. The remainder of this article looks at
differences in this process between psychology and molecular biology.
Peterson
1215
I dont get it.
The y-axis on [graph] J is still making my
head hurt.
What the hell is this plot?
Its all going to depend upon density.
Whats density?
Figure 2. Bench-Building
manipulation gets refined, it changes the possibilities of research. Rather than being just
an outcome, a stable manipulation can become
integrated into the research apparatus and be
used to produce new outcomes. In this way,
the research frontier is altered.
In contrast to black boxing, which
describes the way scientific and technical
work is made invisible by its own success
(Latour 1999:304), bench-building is characterized by hyper-visibility. Technique and
technology are made into objects of scrutiny
as scientists wrangle with early manipulations
that are often ambiguous and unstable. Many
findings are presented to the lab as mysteries
rather than answers. Unstable but intriguing
outcomes are made the object of scrutiny with
the goal of simply finding some solid ground,
some way to produce the outcome with acceptable regularity. As Cole (1992) would predict,
I found the research frontier in both biology
and psychology characterized by low levels of
consensus. However, molecular biologists
engaged with this ambiguity to a much greater
degree than did the psychologists.
For instance, every six weeks or so, the
molecular biology lab would hold a journal
club where they would review a recent article. The first time I attended one, I was
shocked that they could spend two hours discussing a five-page article. However, this
time investment became understandable as I
came to see how even experienced members
of the lab struggled to understand cuttingedge work from other labs. The following
quotes are all taken from the head of the lab
during my first journal club:
1216
Limits to Bench-Building in
Psychological Science
Bench-building is not completely absent in
psychology laboratories. I participated in several informal sessions where researchers
would try out new methods or experiments
on each other to make sure they elicited the
desired response. One advanced graduate
student in cognitive psychology had a hypothesis about word order affecting fluency in a
reading task. He read it to the group to get
their impression. It did not create the effect he
wanted so he decided to develop a better
stimulus. In another case, a graduate student
was demonstrating a memory task for toddlers involving cups with toys in them taped
to a Lazy Susan. However, she told her
adviser that the infants were getting distracted
by the tape and would not engage with the
experiment. The advisor said, Let me be a
baby. How does this work? They then went
through the experiment together slowly and
developed a number of suggestions, including
putting a more desirable toy in the cups and
replacing the distracting tape with velcro.
However, this sort of bench-building is
severely limited in many psychological fields.
Word order can only be rearranged in a few
ways. There is only so much you can do to
hold a toddlers attention. Repeated trips to
the bench offer diminishing returns. Logical
and clever experimental designs are important
Peterson
1217
The answer has both ethical and ontological dimensions. On one hand, the ethics of
experimenting on human subjects limits the
types of strategies social scientists can use.
The development of embodied knowledge in
science involves an intimate relationship
between researchers, tools, and objects of
study, and anything that constrains the evolution of this relationship will constrain benchbuilding. Certainly, there are good reasons for
this oversight, but it is not surprising that
some of the most famous and illuminating
studies in social sciencefrom the Milgram
and Stanford Prison Experiments to Humphreys Tearoom Tradewere also the most
ethically questionable. The very methods that
tell us the most about human behavior are the
ones that are the most immersive, invasive,
and manipulative.
The effects of these restrictions were especially evident in psychology labs studying
infants and toddlers. Due to legal and ethical
protections, researchers were limited in their
control over subjects. In many experiments,
children were expected to remain seated on
their parents lap looking at a stage; researchers then directed their attention toward the
stimulus so their faces could be recorded for
coding. However, the children would often
get antsy and begin to stand on their parents
legs or lean out of frame. Because the experimenters will was mediated through the parents hands, flawless adherence to protocols
was sacrificed for the comfort of the child.
Researchers had few options to remedy this
so they simply adjusted. They would give the
parent and child breaks in the middle of an
experiment if the subject was getting fidgety.
When the child leaned out of frame, the coders could no longer see the face to measure
looking-time. Yet, they continued coding
based on the position of the body or some
other cue. Because control of the subject was
limited, environmental control was frequently
compromised as well.
However, even if social scientists could
attain better experimental control, they would
still face an ontological challenge: they deal
with objects of study that are abstract and
1218
Conclusions: Scientific
Growth as Creative
Destruction
Scholars in the philosophy of social science
have provided a justification for social science based on hermeneutics (Habermas 1967,
1968; Taylor 1985) and interpretation (Geertz
1973) in contrast to the objectification used
by natural sciences. The distinction between
experimental and interpretive fields has
been cited publicly by social scientists to
argue that their ultimate value and validity
emerges from a different source than the natural sciences (e.g., Gieryn 1999).
However, despite this conceptual critique
of treating humans as natural objects, the
experimental method remains the basis for
much of the research in social science (Jackson and Cox 2013). This raises important
questions about whether treating human
beingswho are laden with biography, history, and cultureas natural objects affects
the epistemic culture of the experimental
social sciences. If humans do present particular problems to the experimenter, how does
this change the field at the level of practices?
Ultimately, these questions can only be
addressed through comparative research that
Peterson
1219
1220
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jeremy Freese, Chas Camic, Gary
Fine, and the anonymous reviewers for their detailed and
insightful comments. I also want to thank the lab heads,
post docs, and graduate students who allowed me to
observe and interview them. Finally, I would like to
express gratitude to my informant AF who ensured the
accuracy of my descriptions of molecular biology.
Notes
1. Sociologists advocating theories of paradigm development have repeatedly mistaken cognitive consensus for the vital prerequisite of mature science
rather than a byproduct of research practice. This
inability to understand what separates high-consensus
social science, like economics, from physics has led
to misguided suggestions for making the social sciences more scientific through social control and
socialization (for similar claims, see Best et al.
2001; Fuchs and Turner 1986). Lamont (2009) and
Pfeffer (1993) argue that political science did just
this. The rest of this article highlights why these
sorts of strategies are flawed.
2. In practice, the distinction between the somatic and
collective forms of tacit knowledge may be less
clear than Collins suggests. Even basic somatic
skills may be infused with collective meaning (e.g.,
throwing like a girl [Young 2005]). And, although
weaving a bicycle through traffic may require different knowledge than simply learning to ride, the
development of self-driving cars indicates that this
sort of skill is not as insurmountably tacit as Collins
suggests. However, for the purposes of this argument, the basic distinction between somatic and
collective tacit knowledge is a useful heuristic.
Peterson
1221
References
Alac, Morena. 2008. Working with Brain Scans: Digital Images and Gestural Interaction in fMRI Laboratory. Social Studies of Science 38(4):483508.
Almond, Gabriel A. 1989. A Discipline Divided: Schools
and Sects in Political Science. Newbury Park, CA:
Sage Publications.
Arsenault, Darin J., Laurence D. Smith, and Edith A.
Beauchamp. 2006. Visual Inscriptions in the Scientific Hierarchy: Mapping the Treasures of Science.
Science Communication 27(3):376428.
Ashmore, Malcolm, Steven D. Brown, and Katie Macmillan. 2005. Lost in the Mall with Mesmer and
Wundt: Demarcations and Demonstrations in the
Psychologies. Science, Technology & Human Values
30(1):76110.
Bargh, John A. 2012. Nothing in Their Heads. PsychologyToday.com. Retrieved March 29, 2013
(http://web.archive.org/web/20120309182006/http://
www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-natural-uncons
cious/201203/nothing-in-their-heads?).
Bargh, John A., Mark Chen, and Lara Burrows. 1996.
Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects
of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on
Action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71(2):23044.
Begley, Sharon. 2012. In Cancer Science, Many Discoveries Dont Hold Up. Reuters.com. Retrieved March
27, 2013 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/
us-science-cancer-idUSBRE82R12P20120328).
Bem, Daryl J. 2011. Feeling the Future: Experimental
Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on
Cognition and Affect. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 100(3):407425.
Ben-David, Joseph, and Randall Collins. 1966. Social
Factors in the Origins of a New Science: The Case
of Psychology. American Sociological Review
31(4):45165.
Best, Lisa A., Laurence D. Smith, and Alan Stubbs. 2001.
Graph Use in Psychology and Other Sciences.
Behavioural Processes 54(13):15565.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
1222
Collins, Harry M. 1974. The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge
and Scientific Networks. Science Studies 4(2):16586.
Collins, Harry M. 1985. Changing Order: Replication
and Induction in Scientific Practice. London, UK:
Sage Publications.
Collins, Harry M. 2001. Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the
Q of Sapphire. Social Studies of Science 31(1):71
85.
Collins, Harry M. 2010. Tacit and Explicit Knowledge.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Collins, Randall. 1994. Why the Social Sciences Wont
Become High-Consensus, Rapid-Discovery Science. Sociological Forum 9(2):15577.
Collins, Randall. 1998. The Sociology of Philosophies:
A Global Theory of Intellectual Change. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Cozzens, Susan E. 1985. Comparing the Sciences: Citation Context Analysis of Papers from Neuropharmacology and the Sociology of Science. Social Studies
of Science 15(1):12753.
Danziger, Kurt. 1990. Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, James A. 1994. Whats Wrong with Sociology?
Sociological Forum 9(2):17997.
Doing, Park. 2004. Lab Hands and the Scarlet O:
Epistemic Politics and (Scientific) Labor. Social
Studies of Science 34(3):299323.
Doing, Park. 2008. Give Me a Laboratory and I Will
Raise a Discipline: The Past, Present, and Future
Politics of Laboratory Studies in STS. Pp. 27995
in The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies,
3rd ed., edited by E. J. Hackett, O. Amsterdamska, M.
Lynch, and J. Wajcman. Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press
Doyen, Stphane, Olivier Klein, Cora-Lise Pichon,
and Axel Cleeremans. 2012. Behavior Priming:
Its All in the Mind, but Whose Mind? PLoS One
7(1):e29081. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081
Economist. 2012. The Roar of the Crowd: Crowdsourcing is Transforming the Science of Psychology. The
Economist. Retrieved February 26, 2013 (http://www
.economist.com/node/21555876).
Evans, John H. 2007. Consensus and Knowledge Production in an Academic Field. Poetics 35(1):121.
Fanelli, Daniele. 2012. Negative Results Are Disappearing from Most Disciplines and Countries. Scientometrics 90(3):891904.
Ferguson, Christopher J. 2012. Can We Trust Psychological Research? Time.com. Retrieved October
17, 2012 (http://ideas.time.com/2012/07/17/can-wetrust-psychological-research/).
Fourcade, Marion. 2009. Economists and Societies: Discipline and Profession in the United States, Britain,
and France, 1890s to 1990s. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Fourcade, Marion, Etienne Ollion, and Yann Algan. 2014.
The Superiority of Economics. MaxPo Discussion
Paper 14(3):126.
Peterson
1223
1224
Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Towards
a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Porter, Theodore M. 1995. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit
of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Price, D. J. de Solla. 1970. Citation Measures of Hard
Science, Soft Science, Technology, and Non-Science. Pp. 322 in Communication among Scientists
and Engineers, edited by C. E. Nelson and D. K. Pollack. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.
Reed, Isaac. 2008. Justifying Sociological Knowledge:
From Realism to Interpretation. Sociological Theory
26(2):101129.
Rose, Nikolas. 1998. Inventing Our Selves: Psychology,
Power, and Personhood. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Rosenberger, Robert. 2011. A Case Study in the
Applied Philosophy of Imaging: The Synaptic Vesicle Debate. Science, Technology, & Human Values
36(1):632.
Satel, Sally L. 2013. Primed for Controversy. New
York Times, February 24, retrieved February 26, 2013
(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/psychology-research-control.html?_r=1&).
Savage, Mike, and Roger Burrows. 2007. The Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociology. Sociology 41(5):88599.
Shapin, Steven. 1989. The Invisible Technician. American Scientist 77(6):55463.
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Shaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the
Air Pump. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shwed, Uri, and Peter S. Bearman. 2010. The Temporal
Structure of Scientific Consensus Formation. American Sociological Review 75(6):81740.
Simonton, Dean K. 2004. Psychologys Status as a Scientific Discipline: Its Empirical Placement within an
Implicit Hierarchy of the Sciences. Review of General Psychology 8(1):5967.
Smith, Laurence D., Lisa A. Best, D. Alan Stubbs, Andrea
B. Archibald, and Roxann Roberson-Nay. 2002.
Constructing Knowledge: The Role of Graphs and
Tables in Hard and Soft Psychology. American Psychologist 57(10):74961.
Smith, Laurence D., Lisa A. Best, D. Alan Stubbs, John
Johnson, and Andrea B. Archibald. 2000. Scientific
Graphs in the Hierarchy of the Sciences: A Latourian
Survey of Inscription Practices. Social Studies of
Science 30(1):7394.
Smyth, Mary M. 2001. Certainty and Uncertainty Sciences: Marking the Boundaries of Psychology in
Introductory Textbooks. Social Studies of Science
31(3):389416.
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1994. Disintegrated Disciplines
and the Future of Sociology. Sociological Forum
9(2):27997.
Sudnow, David. 1978. Ways of the Hand: The Organization of Improvised Conduct. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1985. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Traweek, Sharon. 1992. Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The
World of High Energy Physicists. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Vertesi, Janet. 2012. Seeing Like a Rover: Visualization,
Embodiment and Interaction on the Mars Exploration
Rover Mission. Social Studies of Science 42(3):393
414.
Von Wright, Georg H. 1971. Explanation and
Understanding. London, UK: Routledge and
Kegan Paul.
Vygotsky, Lev S. [1927] 1997. The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology: A Methodological
Investigation. Pp. 233344 in The Collected Works
of L. S. Vygotsky, Vol. 3, edited by R. W. Rieber and J.
Wollock. New York: Plenum.
Wade, Nicolas. 2010. Harvard Finds Scientist Guilty
of Misconduct. NYTimes.com. Retrieved October
17, 2012 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/21/
education/21harvard.html).
Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan, Ruud Wetzels, Denny Borsboom, and Han L. J. van der Maas. 2011. Why
Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze
Their Data: The Case of Psi: Comment on Bem
(2011). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100(3):42632.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, Calestous Juma, Evelyn F. Keller,
Jurgen Kocka, Domenique Lecourt, V. Y. Mudkimbe,
Kinhide Miushakoji, Ilya Prigogine, Peter J. Taylor,
and Michel-Rolph Trouillot. 1996. Open the Social
Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on
the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Palo Alto,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Waquant, Loic. 2004. Body and Soul: Notebooks of an
Apprentice Boxer. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Weinberg, Robert A. 1985. The Molecules of Life. Scientific American 253(4):4857.
Winch, Peter. 1958. The Idea of a Social Science and Its
Relation to Philosophy. London, UK: Routledge.
Woodward, James. 2005. Making Things Happen: A
Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Yong, Ed. 2012a. Replication Studies: Bad Copy.
Nature 485(7398):298300.
Yong, Ed. 2012b. Nobel Laureate Challenges Psychologists to Clean up Their Act. Nature.com. Retrieved
March 27, 2013 (http://www.nature.com/news/nobellaureate-challenges-psychologists-to-clean-up-theiract-1.11535).
Yong, Ed. 2012c. A Failed Replication Draws a Scathing Personal Attack from a Psychology Professor.
Discovermagazine.com. Retrieved March 27, 2013
(http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/2012/03/10/failed-replication-bargh-psychol
ogy-study-doyen/#.UVMv9JMQZvl).
Peterson
1225