8. [G.R. No. L-24153. February 14, 1983.

]
TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES
LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in
representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, Petitioners-Appellants, v. HON.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and
EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, Respondents-Appellees.
Joaquin P. Yuseco, Jr. for Petitioners-Appellants.
Leonardo L. Arguelles for Respondent-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICE POWER OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORDINANCES BASED ON THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE SUSTAINED BY THE COURTS; ATTACK AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE 4964 CANNOT
SUCCEED. The objectives behind the enactment of Ordinance 4964 are:" (1) To be able to impose payment of the
license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an
entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." This Court has been
most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, a
1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which
"delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. This clause has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such,
it is well to recall, is the progressive view of the Philippine Jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be. There
is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality
based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of
petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It
shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons
in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber
shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same
person." 1 As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this
ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did
not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2
Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondentsappellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are:" (1) To be able to impose payment of
the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767,
an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers." 3 This Court
has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a
1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which
"delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally
construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." 5 As it was then, so
it has continued to be. 6 There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
cralawnad

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.
Aquino, J., did not take part.

9. AGUSTIN vs EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle
car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could

serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as
well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation
Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to
Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles.
Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction were considered valid and constitutional?
HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and
regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and
signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety
signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.
Petition is DISMISSED.

10. Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.
Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board
of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as
Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of
the BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive due process, equal
protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they
question the issuance of the Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position
papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not
to other transportation services.
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators and/or other persons
affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab operators or persons who may
be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is
only one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a sixyear ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles affected
uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in
Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected
to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the
Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under the equal protection
clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would
be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide
range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process.
Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing
the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information
that may be desired by the BOT.

11. BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection Clause)
FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of
private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being
allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine,
confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is
likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain
constitutional rights.
HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution,
wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of
police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely
affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which
contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions
therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

12. Gancayco Vs City Government of QC and MMDA

Gancayco v. Senate of the Philippines, GR 177807 (2011)
Facts:
In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land in (EDSA), Quezon City. Sometime in 1956,
the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for
Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and
Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey
wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.
Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height
of 5.00
Under this particular ordinance, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line,
thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use
as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance was amended several times and as a result some properties were exempted from the construction of
arcades. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco
sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No.
2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancaycos request and issued a Resolution subject to
the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of
said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon
City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils Resolution. The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to
clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal
structures and obstructions.[8]
On 28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated
the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the
portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA. [10]
Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to
demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. At the time of the
demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.

On 29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11] with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City
Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property.
In his Petition he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just
compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter
property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it
allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to
Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and
the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the
ordinance valid.
The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of
property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.

Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already
violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned
property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely
implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.
The RTC rendered tis decision in favor of Gancayo by holding the assailed ordinance as unconstitutional. Upon appeal, The
CA, partly granting the appeal, upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right
of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also
ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in
their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property,
since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property. Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went
beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice
Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or
abate nuisances.
Issue/s:
1.

WON the issuance of Ordinance No. 2904 is a valid exercise of police power.

2.

WON the wing wall of justice Gancaycos Building is a public nuisance.

3.

WON MMDA legally demolished the property of justice Gancayo

HELD:
1.
Ordinance no. 2904 is a valid exercise of Police power. It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city
government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter
of Quezon City,[24] which states:
To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful
fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly
provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected
within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city
council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and
safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for
commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of
the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.
2.
The wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice
Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not
nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The

fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when
Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the
building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have
warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine
whether a thing is a nuisance.
3.

MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco.

MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice
Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear
the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and
obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No.
2904 as amended.
However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order
the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official.
Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed
buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment. The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is
the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.

13. ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989]
Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case:
a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 asqualified farmers
under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO
229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under thecoverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of
whatever lands they may own inexcess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there isconcurrence of the lawful subject and the method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to
achieve it.
14. DECS v San Diego
FACTS:
Roberto Rey San Diego, the private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it

as many times.
San Diego, private respondent graduate of UE (Zoology), took NMAT 3 times and flunked 3 times. The fourth time he will
take NMAT, he was rejected by DECS and DCEM for the rule that:
A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall
not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
Ramon Guevarra then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
He invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education.
By agreement of the parties, herein defendant was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the
outcome of his petition.
In an amended petition filed with leave of court, San Diego squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No.
12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong ruled that the MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 was invalid and
held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power.
ISSUE:
Petition whether the private respondent who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again as it is a requirement for admission to any Medical School in the
Philippines. He invoked of his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education, squarely
challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972.
HELD:
The private respondent cannot take the NMAT again and pursue his medical profession because of the
following grounds:
1.

For the purpose of gauging at least initially by the admission test and by the three-flunk rule, a

student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT again after three successive failures.
2.

The State ensures that medical profession is not permeated by incompetents to whom patients

may unwarily hand over their lives and health.

3.

It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution,

while one has the right to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have the constitutional right to be a
doctor; one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
4.

The conflict that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken.

Conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, a law does not have to operate with
equal force on all person or things.

15. VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA, JR.

FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by the municipal government. They were ed to lease
the said land through a municipal council resolution in 1961.
The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently issued a new resolution revoking the right
previously granted to the vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking space for the town plaza.
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging that they have the right to use the said lang
because the resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between them (vendors) and the municipal
government.

CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from the area. But such eviction was not enforced
and the number of stall owners even grew.
After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making them lawful lessees of
the land
2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was previously used as a town plaza and being such it is
considered as beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. The
petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises.
2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area such as
>
>
>
>

the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible of fire endangering public safety
said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation problems
the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic

3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for public use), the petitioners must yield to the
police power exercised by the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid contract may be cancelled if it
causes danger to the public.

16. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
POLICE POWER/Public Health; THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE A PROFESSION
Facts:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful examinees in the Medical Licensure
Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful
examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry
and Obstetrics and Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from Fatima
College of Medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions.
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to
give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21
charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the
Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to allow the respondents to take the
physicians oath and to register them as physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised
by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid
such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police
power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As
such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of the candidates
for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a
physicians license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he
has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the
privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The petition is
therefore granted.

17. Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al
G.R. No. 157882

March 30, 2006

FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either
technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining
Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC
(later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya including Brgy.Didipio. After the passage of the
law, DENR rolled out its implementing Rules and Regulations. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the Rules and
Regulation to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40.Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining
Limited to form a single companythat now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation
(CAMC), thecontrolling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals. Petitioners filed a demandletter addressed
to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional. Petitioners thus filed
the present petition forprohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR Rules and Regulations are valid for sanctioningan unconstitutional
administrative process of determining just compensation?
2. Whether or not the State, through Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA,abdicated its primary responsibility to
the full control and supervision over naturalresources?
3. WHETHER

OR

NOT

THE

1987

CONSTITUTION

PROHIBITS

SERVICECONTRACTS?

HELD:
1. The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are:(1) the expropriator must enter
a private property;(2) the entry must be for more than amomentary period;(3) the entry must be under warrant or color
of legal authority; (4)Theproperty must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
orinjuriously affected;(5)the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a wayas to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid.
Indeed there is takinginvolved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for justcompensation as
well as section 107 of the DENR Rules and Regulations. Furthermore,mining is a public policy and the government can
invoke eminent domain to exerciseentry, acquisition and use of private lands.
2. It has been ruled that the State may likewise compel the contractors compliance withmandatory requirements on mine
safety, health and environmental protection, and the useof anti-pollution technology and facilities. Moreover, the
contractor is also obligated toassist in the development of the mining community and to pay royalties to the indigenous
peoples concerned. Cancellation of the FTAA may be the penalty for violation of any ofits terms and conditions and/or
noncompliance with statutes or regulations. Overall,considering the provisions of the statute and the
regulations, the State definitelypossesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in the operation of
theenterprise, set directions and objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by thecontractor; likewise, it has
the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions,should the occasion therefore arise.In other words, the FTAA
contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get awaywith it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government
line if it wants to stay inthe enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government morethan a
sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations.
3. As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the Constitution allowsthe continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors whowould invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises,
subject to the full controland supervision of the State sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear:to
develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large scale for theimmediate and tangible benefit of

the Filipino people.The instant petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 ofRepublic Act No.
7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO
96-40 insofar as they relate tofinancial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2
ofArticle XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

18. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

19. Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or
the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right
to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they
employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la
Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which
is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such
a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.