296

Prejudice, Terrorism, and Behavior Therapy

S t e v e n C. Hayes, Reville Niccolls, A k i h i k o M a s u d a , a n d Alyssa K. Rye, Universit~ o f N e v a d a
Behavior therapy is relevant not just to the needs of victims of terrorism, but also to the understanding and modification of psychological tnvcesses that lead to the perpetration of terrorist acts. A key'process of this kind is prejudice. In this p a p ~ human prejudice is defined as the objectification and dehumanization of people as a result of their participation in evaluative verbal categories. Prejudice
is difficult to deal with because (a ) the same verbal processes that give rise to prejudice are massively reinforced in dealing with the external environment; (b) virtuaUy all cultures openly amplify this process with stigmatized groups; (e) humans are historical beings
and verbal/cognitive networks once formed tend to maintain themselves; and (d) many of the things humans do to change or eliminate undesirable verbal categorical processes are either inert or prone to making these processes more resistant to change. Mindfulness,
cognitive defusion, acceptance, and valued action are suggested as alternative methods offighting the war behavior therapy needs to
help human society win: not just a war on terrorism, but a war on prejudice.

~ ~EPTEMBER 11" is clearly a phrase that will echo

down t h r o u g h the 21st century. The events it has
l a u n c h e d are still in play, a n d we do n o t yet have the
sense of perspective that time alone will provide, b u t it is
obvious that "September 11" will have lasting m e a n i n g in
m a n y spheres a n d to many disciplines. It will specify a
constellation of forces a n d events that are geopolitical,
sociological, economic, religious, military, historical, a n d
cultural. And, yes, psychological.
O t h e r papers in this series will focus o n what behavior
therapists know a b o u t how to help the victims of such
horrible violence. Those aspects are clearly psychological,
a n d they are important. But the psychological d i m e n s i o n
applies as well to the perpetrators. How is it that people
can prepare for months, or even years, to learn to fly (but
n o t to land) a commercial airliner, to take a plane by violence, a n d then kill themselves, everyone o n that plane,
a n d thousands more by flying into the side of a huge, occupied office building? These are actions of whole h u m a n
beings, with histories, motives, thoughts, a n d feelings.
These are psychological actions.
Behavioral scientists need to u n d e r s t a n d such e v e n t s - what they are, how to prevent them, a n d how to change
these destructive behavioral processes once they begin.
In an era of D S M hegemony, perhaps this will seem too
bold to some empirical clinicians. It might he easy to say
"this is not o u r job." After all, there is n o "terrorism disorder" in our diagnostic nosology. T h e r e are n o "TD"
clinics. No one is c o m i n g into our clinics asking for treatm e n t for "TD."
Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 9, 2 9 6 - 3 0 1 , 2002
1077-7229/02/296-30151.00/0
Copyright 2002 by Association for Advancement of Behavior
Therapy. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

['~ Continuing Education Quiz located on p. 328.

Behavior therapists c a n n o t duck this task so easily,

however. Behavior therapy is a b r a n c h of the behavioral
sciences that uses the principles of h u m a n action, cognition, a n d e m o t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d a n d change psychological events for the better. Naturally, historians, political scientists, military experts, a n d so o n will have a great deal
to say about the perpetrators at their particular level of
analysis, b u t these levels are n o t the psychological levels.
If behavior therapy has n o t h i n g to say at that level a b o u t
such important behavioral events as these, then our entire
field is m u c h less relevant to h u m a n affairs than we claim.
The barrier to considering the psychology of perpetrators is n o t merely professional, h o w e v e r - - i t is also deeply
personal. W h e n first faced with the events of September
11, people had a hard time facing what had h a p p e n e d .
Some of the most c o m m o n phrases heard in casual discourse in those first few days were, "I c a n ' t believe it" or
"This is insane." The actual sight of a commercial airliner
flying into a skyscraper was beyond c o m p r e h e n s i o n , a n d
the event was made even more i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e when
one realized that the plane was b e i n g piloted by a h u m a n
being who trained to kill himself a n d thousands of innocents. It was as if the entire citizenry f o u n d comfort in the
idea that this was an event that could n o t be u n d e r s t o o d
a n d had n o t h i n g to do with n o r m a l h u m a n beings. Most
especially, it had n o t h i n g to do with that h u m a n b e i n g
one sees every m o r n i n g in the mirror.
O u r politicians have since actively supported this process of rejection of personal relevance. The political discourse has progressed from describing these horrible acts
as being "evil," which they surely are, to the "evildoers,"
which clearly applies as well, a n d finally to the "evil ones."
By the time we get there, the perpetrators have n o t h i n g
to do with us. They are in a different category, more like
monsters than h u m a n beings, d o i n g i n c o h e r e n t , monstrous, evil things b e c a u s e . . , well, because they are evil.

Prejudice, Terrorism, and Behavior Therapy

Behavior therapists c a n n o t accept this sleight of hand.
It is a truism of behavioral psychology that a b n o r m a l behavior is o n a c o n t i n u u m with n o r m a l behavior. If it is deceptive to label a b n o r m a l behavior a n d then reify that
label into a cause, t h e n it is just as deceptive to explain
acts of terrorism by an appeal to h u m a n evil.

The Chill of Recognition

While the violent outcome revealed o n September 11
is repulsive a n d extreme, the behavioral processes that
created this outcome seem to be available to every one of
us. We can see parallels of these processes every day in the
clinic, b u t more than that, we can see them every day in
o u r own thoughts if we are b u t willing to listen. Osama
Bin Laden has given dozens of interviews explaining his
views a n d actions. O n e has only to listen carefully a n d
openly to his statements to feel the chill of recognition.
What we see if we listen is a h u m a n b e i n g e n t a n g l e d in
cognitive categories a n d evaluations, a n d compelled to
attack others in order to m a i n t a i n consistency with these
categories a n d evaluations. The categorical a n d evaluative labels flow like water from a spring. In his tapes, Bin
Laden says, " U n d e r n o circumstances should we forget
this enmity between us a n d the infidels . . . we must be
loyal to the believers . . . . We should r e n o u n c e the atheists
a n d infidels." He terms the September 11 attack "a
blessed attack against the global infidels" a n d says "We
ask Allah to make him [Taliban leader Mullah Mohamm e d Omar] victorious over the forces of infidels a n d tyranny, a n d to crush the new Christian-Jewish crusade"
(http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp).
What we see, in a word, is prejudice. It is cast in the
language of God a n d religion, b u t the fruits of Bin
Laden's thoughts are n o t those of faith. The fruits are n o t
love, vitality, transcendence, peace, or harmony. The
fruits are hate, a n d violence, a n d the d e h u m a n i z a t i o n of
others. The fruits are the fruits of prejudice.
T h e dictionary defines prejudice as "a feeling, favorable or unfavorable, towards any person or thing, prior to
or n o t based o n actual experience" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1984, p. 1275). Prejudice in that sense is built
into all learning. A small dog who barks at m e n because
of prior m i s t r e a t m e n t at the h a n d s of a harsh male master is "prejudiced," in the dictionary sense, because the
dog's negative arousal does n o t come from actual experience with the targets of his barking. But prejudice is so
greatly exacerbated by h u m a n language a n d cognition,
that it hardly seems worth n o t i n g until those h u m a n processes are involved.
The usual view of prejudice seems to be that we are
b o r n without prejudice, a n d it is only a sick culture that
somehow pours prejudice into us. Often the West, or
America, or capitalism, or class divisions, or some other

297

cultural force is b l a m e d for the illness. O n e has only to see

i n n o c e n t children playing together to u n d e r s t a n d how
that idea could be so widely believed, b u t the data suggest
that it is largely false. Prejudice, we would argue, is built
into h u m a n beings because it is built into language itself.
The core of h u m a n language is the ability to derive relations a m o n g events based o n arbitrary cues rather than
formal properties of the related events, a position known
as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, &
Roche, 2001). For example, a n o r m a l h u m a n adult who
arbitrarily learns that x goes with 3 also now knows without explicit training that y goes with x. Relations a m o n g
events are bidirectional (though often n o t symmetrical).
These bidirectional relations in t u r n c o m b i n e into networks of relations. A n o r m a l h u m a n adult who learns
that q goes with y a n d that p goes with y will derive that q
goes with p a n d that p goes with q. Derived relations of
this kind are relatively primitive behaviors, evident even
with young h u m a n infants (Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993).
They are central to how h u m a n s use w o r d s - - i f a r o u n d
object is a "ball," t h e n a "ball" is that r o u n d o b j e c t - - a n d
a variety of studies suggest that h u m a n language is dep e n d e n t on these processes (see Hayes et al., 2001, for a
review).
With derived stimulus relations comes a greatly increased ability to acquire functions indirectly. A child can
be told a b o u t the attributes of verbal categories without
having to experience all of these features firsthand. Verbal categorization a n d attribution is such a powerfully
useful process that it is very difficult to slow down, a n d virtually impossible to stop. F u r t h e r m o r e , because it can be
controlled by arbitrary cues, it goes on with very little env i r o n m e n t a l support.
The power of this process can be shown in a short
d e m o n s t r a t i o n described in o u r book o n language a n d
cognition (Hayes et al., 2001). Start by picking three
single-digit numbers (you can repeat numbers). Write them
down in r a n d o m order. Now answer the following question, using the first n u m b e r to pick the word in the first
c o l u m n , the second n u m b e r to pick the word in the seco n d c o l u m n , a n d the third n u m b e r to pick the word in
the third c o l u m n .
How is a . . .
(e.g., banana) (e.g., more than a)

(e.g., candle?)

h
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

h
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

banana
race car
kangaroo
foreman
priest
football
hat
computer
TV

h
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

like
unlike
better than
different from
worse than a
the father of
the cause of
the p a r t n e r of
the opposite of

prostitute?
war?
chair?
candle?
house plant?
book?
m u d hole?
baby?
garbage disposer?

298

Hayes et al.

Now attempt to answer the question you have created.

Generate as many answers as you can. Be prepared to justify each answer. (The present article will be more understandable if you actually do this exercise before reading on.)
It is unlikely that any of these questions have ever been
asked of the reader before. Yet with some thought, every
question can be "answered." As verbally competent humans begin to generate answers, they will usually be able to
justify them, supposedly on the basis of the formal properties of the related events. A person answering the question,
"How- is a TV the opposite of a garbage disposer?" may have
said the TV brings garbage into the house, while the disposer takes it away. The physical "truth" of that answer
once it is given may make it appear that the relation was
not arbitrary at all. Formal properties cannot explain the
ability to answer all 729 questions, however, even though
physical properties will be appealed to in virtually every answer. These n o u n s and relations were selected randomly. It
is simply not possible that the world is so arranged that every object in the world is in fact (i.e., nonarbitrarily) related to every other object in the world in every possible
way. Rather, this exercise shows that verbally competent
h u m a n s can categorize, evaluate, a n d compare arbitrarily,
but that they learn to justify these relations based on the
verbally abstracted nonarbitrary features of related events.
The implications for h u m a n prejudice are profound.
As we apply h u m a n categorical/attributive/evaluative processes to other h u m a n beings, we begin to justify these relations by an appeal to various features. In so doing, we
begin to ignore the dynamic, historical, contextual, developmental aspects of an individual h u m a n b e i n g in favor of evaluated attributes a n d collective categories more
suited to objects than to h m n a n s . The evaluative verbal
categories that are applied to groups of people tend to be
generalizations, with features that extend far beyond the
direct experience with any given indMdual. The more
o n e reacts to others on the basis of evaluative verbal categories, the more o n e risks losing contact with their
u n i q u e h u m a n qualities. In other words, h u m a n beings
who are the tbcns of categorization a n d evaluation are
d e h u m a n i z e d a n d objectified by that process.
This p o i n t shows the psychological limitations of blaming prejudice on a sick cuhure. It is true that categorical,
attributive, a n d comparative processes are harnessed by
the culture to produce c o m m o n sets of attributes and stereotypes of various stigmatized groups, a n d it is true that
some cultures engage in this process with more vigor
than others. Even if the culture was n o t involved in the
use of prejudicial terms, however, we would quickly reinvent other ones. A person is n o t just a person, a person is
also fat, wrinkled, ugly, stupid, or any of a myriad such labels. Because these events are arbitrarily applicable, the
cues that control them can b e c o m e more a n d more subtle. A p a r e n t with a teenager will be shocked into remem-

brance of how subtle the cues are that differentiate someone who is cool from s o m e o n e who is a nerd. With adults,
this same process can lead to more serious consequences.
In N o r t h e r n Ireland it can be a life-and-death matter
whether a city is called L o n d o n d e r r y or Belfast, because
these serve as cues for supposedly i m p o r t a n t verbal categories, such as "Catholic" or "Protestant." In Afghanistan,
it was a life-and-death matter whether you grew your b e a r d
l o n g if you were a m a n , or w h e t h e r you covered your
face if you were a woman, because these small features
supposedly distinguished believers from infidels.
The core of h u m a n prejudice is the objectification and de-

humanization of human beings because of their participation in

verbal evaluative categories. Prejudice, defined this way, is a
kind of cognitive entanglement. We usually use the term
when the categorical terms have negative evaluative connotations, but a m o m e n t of reflection shows that this is not
a defining feature. Seemingly positive categories, such as
"hot" or "babe," can be as d e h u m a n i z i n g as negative ones.
Prejudice, defined this way, is both shockingly comm o n a n d shockingly difficult to deal with. Prejudice is difficult to deal with because:

1. The same verbal processes are massively reinforced in dealing with the external environment. In o u r RFT account of
language a n d cognition (Hayes et al., 2001), h u m a n reasoning a n d p r o b l e m solving are argued to d e p e n d u p o n
the same relational frames as seem to be involved in h u m a n
prejudice. Indeed, within the field of prejudice itself there
is evidence that stereotypes have "positive" effects in reducing the b u r d e n of p r o b l e m solving a n d u n d e r s t a n d ing a complex social e n v i r o n m e n t (e.g., Macrae, Milne, &
B o d e n h a u s e n , 1994).

2. Virtually all cultures openly amplify this process with stigmatized groups. Cultural practices exist in the present day
on the basis of their past ability to be passed o n within
groups, m u c h in the same way that genes exist based on
their impact on survival. The creation of "in-groups" that
will protect cultural practices is almost universal within
cultures for that reason. Categorization a n d stereotyping
help rationalize a n d justify the existence of an in-group
to which one belongs (e.g., Hewstone,Jaspars, & Lalljee,
1982; Spears & Manstead, 1989), as well as the in-group's
t r e a t m e n t of those in the out-group (Tajfel, 1982). Even
when groups are formed randomly, h u m a n s will act to try
to benefit the groups to which they b e l o n g (Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971), in part because there are imp o r t a n t consequences attached to group m e m b e r s h i p
(Gaertner & Insko, 2000). This same process applies
whether the categorical unit involved is called a tribe, a
religion, or a class. For example, the more religious people
consider themselves to be, the more negative their attitudes
are toward nonreligious others (Jackson & Hunsberger,
1999), despite the many religious precepts that teach the
opposite.

Prejudice, Terrorism, and Behavior Therapy

3. We are historical beings and verbal~cognitive networks
onceformed tend to maintain themselves. W h e n new networks
o f verbal relations are f o r m e d it is easy to show that old
ways o f thinking will quickly r e e m e r g e if the new ways o f
thinking are n o t constantly successful (e.g., Rehfeldt &
Hayes, 2000; Wilson & Hayes, 1996). F u r t h e r m o r e , new
relations are resisted if the new material conflicts with
o l d e r stereotypes (Moxon, Keenan, & Hine, 1993; Watt,
Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991), as c o m p a r e d to similar
l e a r n i n g that a p p e a r s to be n e u t r a l (e.g., Barnes &
Keenan, 1993; Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991). Perhaps as a result, stereotyped information tends to be better
r e m e m b e r e d (Bodenhausen, 1988) a n d ambiguous information tends to be construed as stereotype-confirming
(Duncan, 1976). We all learn the c o m m o n stereotypes,
a n d once learned, these stereotypes never truly d i s a p p e a r
(Devine, 1989).
4. Many of the things humans do to change or eliminate undesirable verbal categorical processes are either inert or prone to
making these processes more resistant to change. T h e c o m m o n sense m e t h o d s p e o p l e use to solve prejudice are largely
useless o r worse. O n e c o m m o n s e n s e t e n d e n c y when conf r o n t e d with prejudicial attitudes is to correct t h e m directly t h r o u g h education. Unfortunately, these m e t h o d s
have virtually no i m p a c t ( T h o r n t o n & Wahl, 1996; Wahl
& Lefkowits, 1989). A n o t h e r c o m m o n s e n s e a p p r o a c h is
to caution against negative attitudes, d e m a n d correct behaviors, o r to vigorously protest misrepresentations o f
stigmatized populations. Unfortunately, this m e t h o d is
n o t only often inert; it can p r o d u c e paradoxical effects
(Corrigan et al., 2001). F o r example, creating conditions
that d e m a n d c o r r e c t behaviors (e.g., "Do n o t stare at
the physically disabled") can paradoxically increase the
avoidance o f stigmatized persons (Langer, Fiske, Taylor,
& Chanowitz, 1976). A n o t h e r m e t h o d is to try to suppress
negative thoughts directly (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, &
White, 1987), internally scolding o n e s e l f for prejudicial
words o r concepts a n d trying to k e e p t h e m o u t o f mind.
D o i n g so, however, makes these thoughts m o r e f r e q u e n t
a n d m o r e behaviorally impactful (Macrae, B o d e n h a u s e n ,
Milne, &Jetten, 1994; Smart & Wegner, 1999). For example, actively suppressing negative stereotypes results in
more, n o t less, behavioral avoidance o f stigmatized
groups (Macrae et al., 1994). T h e failure o f these m e t h o d s
makes all the m o r e p o i g n a n t the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n we are
facing. Prejudice will n o t be d e f e a t e d by logic, rules, finger wagging, o r simple goodwill. It will take more. Behavior therapists are a m o n g the few who are well p o s i t i o n e d
to learn what that might be.

A War A g a i n s t P r e j u d i c e
As this article is being written, Americans are fighting
a war against terrorism, but the essence of these attacks

seems largely to have b e e n missed. T h e World Trade Center towers fell in a terrorist act, b u t they also fell as an extension o f religious extremism a n d e t h n i c a n d religious
prejudice. Seen in that light, the war on terrorism s h o u l d
also be a war against h u m a n prejudice.
A war against p r e j u d i c e is n o t an easy o n e to fight,
however. It is n o t a simple m a t t e r o f military campaigns,
o r o f killing one's enemy. It is a war to be f o u g h t within
the h u m a n heart.
Behavior therapists may be able to b r i n g some n e e d e d
wisdom to these matters. W h e n clients e n t e r into a verbal
world in which life is n o t worth living, o r n o t h i n g they
touch is safe from poison, o r their anxiety is too high to
c o p e with, or they n e e d a d r i n k to survive, they are engaging in verbal processes n o t unlike those that create a
world in which infidels have defiled a holy l a n d a n d
t h e r e f o r e must die. A l t h o u g h the c o n t e n t is different, the
processes may be similax:
T h e r e is growing evidence that the i m p a c t o f difficult
thoughts a n d feelings can be r e d u c e d significantly by
teaching those who are suffering to notice their thoughts
a n d e m o t i o n s without b e c o m i n g e n t a n g l e d in them. Acceptance a n d C o m m i t m e n t T h e r a p y (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) takes this a p p r o a c h , a n d has b e e n
shown to r e d u c e the negative behavioral i m p a c t o f even
such horrific c o n t e n t as delusions a n d hallucinations,
without these symptoms themselves having to first disa p p e a r (Bach & Hayes, in press). Similar evidence exists
for the related a p p r o a c h e s used in Mindfulness-Based
Cognitive T h e r a p y (Segal, Matthews, & Teasdale, 2002),
Dialectical Behavior T h e r a p y (Linehan, 1993), a n d similar forms o f intervention.
Mindfulness, cognitive defusion, a n d a c c e p t a n c e can
be powerful m e a n s o f removing the fangs from cognitive
e n t a n g l e m e n t . It is n o t too m u c h o f a stretch to i m a g i n e
that these same m e t h o d s c o u l d be helpful in alleviating
h u m a n prejudice. Perhaps behavior therapists c o u l d
teach others to step back from prejudicial thoughts, to
watch t h e m dispassionately w i t h o u t e n t a n g l e m e n t , a n d
to allow m o r e flexible a n d fluid m o d e s o f t h i n k i n g to
e m e r g e with r e g a r d to stigmatized populations. T h e r e is
evidence that this a p p r o a c h might be helpful. For example,
teaching children to be m o r e mindful o f their thoughts
a b o u t h a n d i c a p p e d p e o p l e resulted in less p r e j u d i c e d behavior a n d lower levels o f avoidance o f the h a n d i c a p p e d ,
even t h o u g h there was no a t t e m p t to c e n s o r or suppress
the subjects' knowledge o f stereotypes (Langer, Bashner,
& Chanowitz, 1985).
It seems possible that the "war on prejudice" m i g h t be
a war that is won m o r e by the psychological equivalent o f
soldiers leaving the field than by the psychological equivalent o f powerful military hardware. Would t h e r e still be
a cognitive war if no o n e showed u p to fight it? Would
there be prejudice if verbal categorization a n d evaluation

299

300

Hayes et al.
o f h u m a n b e i n g s w e r e m e r e l y a n a u t o m a t i c p r o c e s s to b e
w a t c h e d , as o p p o s e d to b e i n g a m e t h o d f o r s t r u c t u r i n g
t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h we live?
In ACT these methods of acceptance and defusion are
always f o l l o w e d b y c o m m i t t e d a c t i o n l i n k e d to c h o s e n
values, a n d so t o o d e f e a t i n g p r e j u d i c e involves a positive
agenda of human connection, friendship, and alliance.
E x p o s u r e to c o l l a b o r a t i v e , e q u a l status i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h
m e m b e r s o f s t i g m a t i z e d g r o u p s is k n o w n to p r o d u c e dec r e a s e s in p r e j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e s e g r o u p s (Desf o r g e s e t al., 1991). I n t h e c u r r e n t c o n t e x t , p a r t o f t h e w a r
on prejudice might involve forming deeper and more
human relationships with Muslim neighbors, or working
to p r o t e c t a local M o s q u e f r o m h a r m .
It is t r u e o f c o u r s e t h a t O s a m a B i n L a d e n is u n l i k e l y to
s e e k o u t h e l p in r e d u c i n g his p r e j u d i c i a l beliefs e v e n if a
t e c h n o l o g y f o r d o i n g so was available. F o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e
is a m o r e r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e t a r g e t close at h a n d . A w a r o n
p r e j u d i c e c o u l d c e r t a i n l y safely s t a r t w i t h t h e p e r s o n o n e
sees w h e n b r u s h i n g o n e ' s t e e t h . We c o u l d s t o p r u n n i n g
from our own objectification and dehumanization of
others, and admit the presence of these everyday cognitive p r o c e s s e s . A c c e p t a n c e a n d d e f u s i o n , c o m b i n e d w i t h
p o s i t i v e s t e p s to r e a c h o u t to o t h e r s - - n o t as o b j e c t s , b u t
as h u m a n b e i n g s - - c o u l d p r o v i d e a way f o r w a r d w i t h o u t
t h e f a i l u r e s a n d risks o f m o r e c o m m o n s e n s e m e t h o d s
t h a t a r e useless, d a n g e r o u s , o r b o t h .
If A m e r i c a tries o n l y to f i g h t a m i l i t a r y w a r o n t e r r o r ism, a g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r h u m a n a d v a n c e m e n t will
h a v e b e e n m i s s e d . B e h a v i o r t h e r a p i s t s h a v e a r o l e in t h e
war t h a t s h o u l d b e f o u g h t : d e v e l o p i n g a n d t e s t i n g m e t h o d s
f o r r e d u c i n g h u m a n p r e j u d i c e . To t a k e u p t h a t chall e n g e , h o w e v e r , we n e e d first to realize t h a t this f i g h t is
n o t s i m p l y w i t h t h e O s a m a w h o m a y b e h i d i n g i n a cave in
a c o u n t r y far away, b u t also w i t h t h e O s a m a w h o is surely
h i d i n g w i t h i n o u r o w n skin.

References
Bach, E, & Hayes, S. C. (in press). The use of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to prevent the rehospitalization of psychotic
patients: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology.
Barnes, D., & Keenan, M. (1993). A transfer of functions through
derived arbitrary and nonarbitrary stimulus relations.Journal of the
Experimental Anab;sis of Behavior, 59, 61-81.
Bodenhausen, G. V. (1988). Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing process models of stereotype use.Journal
of Personalit~ and Social Psycholog); 55, 726- 737.
Corrigan, E W., River, L. P., Lundin, R. K., Penn, D. L., UphoffWasowski, K., Campion,J., Mathisen,J., Gagnon, C., Bergman, M.,
Goldstein, H., & Kubiak, M. A. (2001). Three strategies for changing attributions about severe mental illness. Schizophrenia Bulletin,
27, 187-195.
Desforges, D. M., Lord, C. G., Ramsey, S. L., Mason,J. A., Van Leewen,
M., West, S., & Lepper, M. (1991). Effects of structured cooperative contact on changing negative attitudes toward stigmatized
social groups.Journal of Perso*mlit'f and Social Psychology, 60, 531-544.

Devine, E G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and

controlled components. Journal of Personalit,l and Social Psychology,
56, 5-18.
Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential social perception and attribution
of intergroup violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyping of
Blacks. Journal of Personalit'f and Social Psychology, 34, 590-598.
Gaertner, L., & Insko, C. A. (2000). Intergroup discrimination in the
minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation, or fear?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 77-94.
Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (Eds.). (2001). Relational
Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Hayes, S. C., Kohlenberg, B. S., & Hayes, L.J. (1991). The transfer of
specific and general consequential functions through simple and
conditional equivalence relations. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 119-137.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and Com,
mitment Therapy.: An experiential approach to behavior change. New
York: The Guilford Press.
Hewstone, M., Jaspars, J., & Lalljee, M. (1982). Social representations,
social attribution and social identity: The intergroup images of
"public" and "comprehensive" schoolboys. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 12, 241-269.
Jackson, L. M., & Hunsberger, B. (1999). An intergroup perspective on
religion and prejudice.Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 38,
509-523.
Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of
lay inference: Effects on impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping and numerical anchoring.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 448-468.
Langer, E.J., Bashner, R. S., & Chanowitz, B. (1985). Decreasing prejudice by increasing discrimination.Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 49, 113-120.
Langer, E.J., Fiske, S., Taylor, S. E., & Chanowitz, B. (1976). Stigma,
staring, and discomfort: A novel-stimulus hypothesis. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 12, 451-463.
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Cognitive behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. New York: The Guilford Press.
Lipkens, G., Hayes, S. C., & Hayes, L.J. (1993). Longitudinal study of
derived stimulus relations in an infant.Journal of Experimental Child
Ps~;chology, 56, 201-239.
Macrae, C. N., Bodenhausen, G. V., Milne, A. B., &Jetten, J. (1994).
Out of mind but back in sight: Stereotypes on the rebound.Journal of Personality and Social Ps~chology, 67, 808-817.
Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes
as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox.Journal of Personalitv and Social Psychology, 66, 37-47.
Moxon, R D., Keenan, M., & Hine, L. (1993). Gendei~role stereotyping
and stimulus equivalence. The Psychological Record, 43, 381-394.
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. (1984). Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press.
Rehfeldt, R. A., & Hayes, L.J. (2000). The long-term retention of generalized equivalence classes. The Psychological Record, 50, 405-428.
Segal, Z. V., Matthews, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. D. (2002). Mindfulnessbased cognitive therapy for depression. New York: The Guilford Press.
Smart, L., & Wegner, D. M. (1999). Covering up what can't be seen:
Concealable stigma and mental control.Journal of Personalit~ and
Social Psycholog3; 77, 474-486.
Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. (1989). The social context of stereotyping
and differentiation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 101121.
Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual
Review of P~ychology, 33, 1-39.
Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy, R. R, & Flament, C., (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Ps~chol0gy, 1, 149-177.
Thornton,J. A., & Wahl, O. E (1996). hnpact of a newspaper article on
attitudes toward mental illness.Journal of Community Psychology, 24,
17-25.
Wahl, O. E, & Lefkopwits, J. Y (1989). Impact of a television film on
attitudes toward mental illness. American Journal of Communit~ Psychology, 17, 521-528.

Prejudice, Terrorism, a n d B e h a v i o r T h e r a p y

Watt, A., Keenan, M., Barnes, D., & Cairns, E. (1991). Social categorization and stimulus equivalence. ThePsychologicalRecord,41, 33-50.
Wegnei, D. M., Schneidei; D.J., Carter, S., III,& White, L. (1987). Paradoxical effects of thought suppression. Journal of Personalit~ and
SocialPsychology,53, 409-418.
Wilson, K. G., & Hayes, S. C. (1996). Resurgence of derived stimulus
relafions.Journal of theExperimentaIanalysis ofBehavi~ 66, 267-281.

Address correspondence to Steven C. Hayes, Department of Psychology/

296, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557-0062; e-mail: hayes@scs.
unr.edu.

Received: February27, 2002

Accepted: April 5, 2002

301