1. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT
a. Krivenko Doctrine
HALILI v CA
FACTS:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died
sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, David Rey Guzman,
both of whom are also American citizens. On August
9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
assigning, transferring and conveying to David Rey
all her rights, titles and interests in and over six
parcels of land which the two of them inherited
from Simeon.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said
parcel of land to defendant-appellee Emiliano
Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was
cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in
the latters name.
Petitioners (Celso and Arthur Halili), who are the
owners of adjoining lot, filed a complaint w/ the RTC
of Bulacan questioning the validity of the 2
conveyances between Helen and son, and the
latter and
Cataniag and claiming ownership
thereto based on their right of LEGAL REDEMPTION
under Art. 1621, CC (only refers to rural lands NOT
exceeding 1 hectare).
RTC: Dismissed Halilis complaint. Guzmans waiver
of inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to
the constitutional prohibition against sale of land to
alien. And on legal redemption, such land was urban
thus cannot be s.t such right.
HELD:
(1) Land was urban hence no right of legal
redemption. Located therein likewise were the
Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three
gasoline stations, apartment buildings for
commercial purposes and construction firms. There
is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a
commercial area thriving in business activities. Only
a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be
noted that in the Tax Declaration in the name of
Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed
agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to
defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991,
the Land Regulatory Board attested that the subject
property is commercial and the trend of
development along the road is commercial.
LEGAL REDEMPTION: both lands must be rural
(2) Sale to Cataniag VALID
True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in
which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the
property she had inherited from her husband -collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7
of which provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Krivenko doctrine was reiterated in Ong Ching Po v
CA where the COurt held:
The capacity to acquire private land is made
dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
EXCEPTION. In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or
hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession.
The lower court correctly ruled that the defendantappellee Chong had at the time of the execution of
the contract, the right to hold by lease the property
involved in the case although at the time of the
execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese
national
NO OPTION TO BUY. In the present case, it has been
established that there is only one contract and there
is no option to buy the leased property in favor of
Chong. Neither is there under the terms of the said
contract to indicate that the ownership of the
Llantinos of the leased premises has been virtually
transferred to the lessee
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a
reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an
alien the right to buy real property on condition that
he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from use of
lands for residential purposes. Since their residence
in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted
temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they
desire to remain here forever and share our fortune
and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible
to acquire.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs (Petitioners) leased to defendant who was
then a Chinese National and went by the name of Co
Liong Chong for a period of 13 years for P6, 150.00
for whole period.
However, respondent informed petitioners that he
had already constructed a commercial bldg on the
land worth P 50,000.00 and that lease contract was
for a period of 60 years counted from 1954 ; and
that he was already a Filipino.
This claim of Co Liong Chong came as a surprise to
the petitioners because they did not remember such
agreement of lease.
Hence, Llantinos filed a complaint to quiet title w/
damages w/ RTC of Catanduanes.
Chong was naturalized in 1961 and new name was
Juan Molina.
HELD:
RULING: AFFIRMED
FACTS:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino
citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed
a deed of sale of a parcel of land located in the same
city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc., corporation sole
organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a
Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
When deed of sale was presented to RD, the latter
required said corp sole to submit an affidavit
declaring 60% of the members thereof were Fil
citizens. (Note, the totality of the Catholic
population of Davao would become the owner of
the property bought to be registered.
FACTS:
FACTS:
FACTS:
HELD:
Yes. The contract of lease, as in this case, cannot be
sustained. However, to be sure, a lease to an alien
for a reasonable period was valid, so was an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property on
condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.
NOTE: article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an
exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely
prohibited, and the prohibition by law is designed
for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public
policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has
paid or delivered." Also, the original parties who
were guilty of a violation of the fundamental charter
have died and have since been substituted by their
administrators to whom it would be unjust to
impute
their
guilt.
POLICY WOULD BE DEFEATED IF GENERAL RULE ON
PARI
DELICTO
SHOULD
BE
APPLIED.
But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also
an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose
of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
became clear that the arrangement was a VIRTUAL
TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP WHEREBY the owner
divested himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum total
of which make up ownership. It was just as if today
the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use,
the next day, the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made
up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this was
just exactly what the parties in this case did within
this pace of one year, with the result that Justina
Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines,
is
indeed
in
grave
peril.
RULING: The contracts in question are annulled and
set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts