Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Aristotles biological works as scientific literature

Sabine Fllinger
Universitt Marburg, Germany

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Available online 17 March 2012
Keywords:
Dialogical elements/Discursive style
(dialogische Elemente/diskursives
Vorgehen)
Argumentative strategies
(Argumentationsstil)
Medium of literature (Medium der
Literatur)
Dialectical method (dialektische Methode)
Acquiring knowledgepresenting
knowledge (Wissensgewinn
Wissensvermittlung)
Fact-oriented representationadresseeoriented representation (sachorientierte
Darstellungrezipientenorientierte
Darstellung)

a b s t r a c t
This contribution deals with the question of where and why in his biological writings Aristotle uses dialogical elements, examining which dialogical structures can be found and what the meaning of the dialogical structures is in respect of the argumentative strategies used in literature. This discursive style has
to be seen in relation to the importance of the dialectical method which was practiced in the Platonic
Academy and on which Aristotle reflected in his Topics. For Aristotle the dialectical method also becomes
the method of the investigator researching for himself. But more than that one can see the reason for the
dialogical structures in Aristotles writings in his attempt to combine the way of acquiring knowledge
with the way of presenting knowledge. It can thus be said that at the moment in which the dialectical
procedure is translated into the medium of writing, a fact-oriented presentation is also an addressee-oriented representation. Nowadays we are more accustomed to a technical literature which, after completing the first step of the deduction of knowledge, presents the results in a systematic and hierarchical way
in its literary representation; in such technical literature, normally an individuals thought process is not
set out in writing. Admittedly, with the application of the dialectical method and with the attempt to set
down ones own thought process in the medium of writing, other elements also come in.
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1. Introduction to the problematic nature of Aristotles

specialist literature
This contribution deals with one aspect of Aristotelian science
which links the content and form of his biological writings. It concerns the question of which characteristics show Aristotles biological works to be scientific literature, and why. How can the special
characteristic style of his observations be explained? Arthur Schopenhauer, in his Kleine philosophische Schriften criticised Aristotles style of writing in general in the following way: Er
handelt Dinge ab, wie sie ihm einfallen, ohne sie vorher durchdacht
und sich ein deutliches Schema entworfen zu haben: er denkt mit

der Feder in der Hand, was zwar eine groe Erleichterung fr den
Schriftsteller, aber eine groe Beschwerde fr den Leser ist. Daher
das Planlose und Ungengende seiner Darstellung; daher kommt
er hundert Mal auf das Selbe zu reden, weil ihm Fremdartiges dazwischen gelaufen war; daher kann er nicht bei der Sache bleiben,
sondern geht vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste; daher fhrt er, wie
oben beschrieben, den auf die Lsung der angeregten Probleme
gespannten Leser bei der Nase herum; daher fngt er, nachdem
er einer Sache mehrere Seiten gewidmet hat, seine Untersuchung
derselben pltzlich von vorne an mit kabxlem otm akkgm aqvgm
sg1 rjewex1, und das sechs Mal in einer Schrift, daher mit Einem
Wort, ist er so oft konfus und ungengend.1 This strict reproach by

E-mail address: foelling@staff.uni-marburg.de

Schopenhauer (1988/1851) pp. 55ff.: He deals with things, as they occur to him, without having thought over them beforehand and having drawn up a clear pattern: he
thinks with his quill in his hand, which is, it is true, a great deal easier for the writer, but a great inconvenience for the reader. Hence the aimlessness and inadequacy of his
description; that is why he comes to talk about the same thing a hundred times, because something strange has cropped up in between; that is why he can not keep to the point,
but rambles from one subject to another; that is why he leads the reader, who is looking forward to the solution of the problems raised, up the garden path; that is why, after he
has devoted himself to a matter for several pages, he suddenly starts his examination of the same thing afresh with kabxlem otm akkgm aqvgm sg1 rjewex1, and that six
times in one work, that is why, with one word, he is so often confused and unsatisfactory.
1

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S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

a reader who has been led up the garden path does contain quite
correct observations on Aristotles manner of representation, such
as the to-and-fro in his train of thought, a new beginning in the
argumentation, etc.I shall return to this later. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer is not correct in his appraisal of his observationsfor
instance when he substantiates it with Aristotles superficiality and
compares him with a child who can not remain long with one plaything. How can the special structure of Aristotles written style be
explainedthe reflections which are presented here are thus
intended to be a contribution to the understanding of this problem.
My focus in this connection is on Aristotelian biology2 and within
that procreation and genetics. The examination of what characterises Aristotles biological works as scientific literature appears
important for three reasons: 1) Firstly, with the writing of the biological works we experience the coming into being of a genuinely
scientific literature such as had not previously existed.3 2) Secondly,
ones understanding of the investigations which Aristotle conducted
and the results which he arrived at deepens if one looks into the way
they were set down in writing. 3) Thirdly, the conclusions which one
can draw from the way in which Aristotle used the medium of literature in the context of the acquisition and imparting of knowledge
contribute towards a better understanding of the current question
of how knowledge can be acquired and passed on. In the past two
decades,4 increased attention has been accorded to the formal
aspects of Greek scientific literature of the 6th to 4th centuries, to
the pre-Socratic literature above all, and also to the Hippocratic
writings. This is the consequence of a research approach which does
not proceed in accordance withthe sometimes unclearaesthetic
divisions into literary prose and artless prose, but which examines
the writings in accordance with their construction, their structural
and linguistic peculiarities, and in accordance with pragmatic
linguistic aspects, such as the intended readers, the publication situation etc., in order to also gain ideas about the context of the
circumstances of their origin. In this connection, as Philip van der
Eijk explains,5 approaches asking about the respective didactic
function of a work and the origin of its manner of representation
have been fruitful. It was more easily possible to do justice to the
character of individual works in this way than with a division into
literary and unliterary.
Questions about the exact structure and manner of representation, and the readership of the texts have also not yet been satisfactorily answered for Aristotles specialist scientific works, the
pragmateiai. In contrast to the dialogues, which Aristotle wrote

for a wider readership and which, according to classical opinion,

have a comprehensible style, the pragmateiai are more awkward
to read. The difficulties which the modern reader had and has with
understanding Aristotles diction are attributable to the in part
elliptic style, but also to redundancy on the one hand and lack of
explanation on the otheras Schopenhauer complained, to what
one might call the fruits of a spontaneous idea. The fact that the
written remarks sometimes require explanation was justified by
the fact that they had not been intended for reading, but for listening, thus for a reception situation in which the lecturer would give
oral explanations about things. As is well known, Werner Jaeger
was of the opinion that these writings had developed from the
practice of the lecture,6 that they had been written in the school,
for the school.7 As a result they were and are commonly called
lecture notes which did not constitute literature.8 In response
to this, it has to be said that in the past few years, in connection with
the increased occupation with classical specialist literature, doubts
have occasionally been voiced about this designation of lecture
notes, or at least about its unrestricted use for all Aristotles pragmateiai.9 Van der Eijk advanced general doubts on principle to the use of
such vague terms.10 Eckard Schtrumpf reached the conclusion in a
pilot study in 1989 that there are certainly artistically stylised
passages in the pragmateiai which can be compared with the masterpieces of Attic prose of the fourth century BC, and that the term
lecture notes cannot in every case be retained for all the pragmateiai;11 I myself have done some research on oral elements in
Aristotles writings.12 Ralf Lengen13 looked into passages from
various texts as examples and come to the conclusion that there
are considerable differences in the form of representation of the
various pragmateiai. Problem-oriented ways of representation, such
as those seen in the Nicomachean Ethics and also the biological work
De partibus animalium, are contrasted with the result-oriented form
of presentation of the Rhetoric, which was suitable for consultation
by the reader.14
Thus, some things appear to be in a state of flux as far as the
evaluation of Aristotles written form is concerned. In order to
arrive at really exact propositions, an examination would have to
be carried out systematically, work by work, as Lengen has done
for some works,in part there are forms of representation of
differing character side by side in the writingsin order then also
to be able to propose more reliable premises about their contextual
embedding. However, such detailed examinations have still to
be carried out.

For Aristotles importance for the genesis and history of biology cf. Kullmann (1998); S. Fllinger, Discursivity in Aristotles biological writing, forthcoming.
Aristotle is not the first scientific author, but he is the first to have produced an extensive biological oeuvre by following a genuine scientific programme. Scientific literature
represents a major part of the ancient literature that has come down to us. It belongs to the field that is described as ancient specialist literature, whereby, as Wolfram Ax
recently brought out, specialist literature is an imprecise concept, as there is neither an ancient genre theory nor a generally valid modern definition for it, rather works of
different form and also different function are subsumed under specialist literature. What is more, on the one hand the term specialist arouses associations which do not
necessarily apply to the content of ancient specialist literature. On the other hand, the concept literature is problematic. Because one can not refer to the distinction between
plain and literary prose, or specialist prose and literary prose as a criterion for ancient specialist literature, because ancient specialist authors, as is well known, endeavoured in
many cases to produce an elaborate stylea classification in accordance with aesthetic aspects then becomes quite problematic, for instance in the case of the didactic poem. The
forms themselves are of the most diverse kinds: Apart from the didactic poem, we find letters (Epicurus), dialogues, speeches, manuals (technai), eisagogai, synagogai, aphorisms,
commentaries. One may possibly gain more information if one asks a question about a works intention. Then, to quote Ax, specialist literature can be defined as eine Textsorte
. . ., deren Autoren in erster Linie belehren und informieren wollen und sich in dieser Absicht bestimmten Adressaten zuwenden (a text type . . ., whose authors primarily want
to enlighten and inform and, with this intention, turn to certain readers) (Ax, 2005 p. 119). A differentiation into specialist literature and factual literature, as made by modern
literary theory, is difficult to make for antiquity (cf. Fllinger, 2005, pp. 222 ff.)
4
Kullmann & Althoff (1993), Kullmann et al. (1998); cf. the Introduction.
5
Van der Eijk (1997).
6
Jaeger (1912), p. 187. Cf. W. Jaeger (1955).
7
Jaeger (1912), p. 187.
8
Jaeger (1912), p. 133, Dirlmeier (1962), p. 12.
9
Cf. Flashar (2004), p. 180. See also Taub (2008), p. 18.
10
Cf. van der Eijk (1997), p. 92-93; Taub (2008), pp. 19-20.
11
Schtrumpf (1989).
12
Fllinger (1993).
13
Lengen (2002).
14
A piece of luck, as it were, for the study is the circumstance that Aristotle presents the conception of luck in different works (EN I, Rh. I 5 and Pol. VII 1-3) so that a comparative
study is possible.
3

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In the course of the following, we will take a look at a characteristic manner of representation which is to be found in large parts of
Aristotles writings and can be described as discursive. This is intended to show how Aristotle uses the medium of literature for
the purpose of achieving a scientific finding. In conclusion, I would
like to evaluate what I call Aristotles writing strategy in accordance with the criteria of modern research on writing.
2. Characteristics of the writing strategies to be observed in
Aristotles works
a) General
As already stated, the Aristotelian style of writing in some
works can be described as discursive and argumentative (diskursiv-argumentierend), particularly if, for example, one compares
the De generatione animalium with the manner in which Aristotle
proceeds in De historia animalium, but also, for instance in the Rhetoric. In an early work, Dirlmeier already spoke of the oral style
which the pragmateiai display. Aristotle was basically speaking in
a dialogue in these internal (so-called esoteric) writings, he
noted, not a monologue ex cathedra.15 However, one can go beyond
his results in the description and the classification of these writings.
The manner of representation produces the impression of being
present in a dialogue. But no imitation of a dialogue takes place, as
in Platos works or in Aristotles dialogues, the exoteric writings
which he produced for a wider audience and of which, as is well
known, only fragments have survived. Rather, the to-and-fro of
the argumentation conveys the impression to the reader that an
exchange is taking place with an imaginary interlocutor. All in
all, the action is procedural, which means that in many cases results are not presented, but elaborated in a process. In this context,
the discussion often takes an aporia as its starting point.
Now in my opinion, Aristotles form of representation or writing
strategy is not an indication of literary incompetence, but should be
seen as being methodically based in the dialectic method, as it was
applied in the school conversations of Platos Academy. Aristotle
presents the dialectic method in his Topics. To put it briefly, the dialectic conversation follows a certain pattern: the starting point for
the exchange between the person questioning and the person
answering is a problema, and thus a question with two sides, for
one of which one must decide. The problem is framed in the form
of a double question formulated with pseqom. The questioner
proposes the problem, the person answering chooses one of the
two sides as his position. The person questioning takes on the other
and now has the task of refuting the position of the person answering. For this purpose he asks questions, the protaseis. He must select
them so skilfully that, as a consequence of the answers, the required
result, namely the side of the problem represented by the questioner from the outset, comes out as the answer. According to
Top. I 2. 101a 25-36, the dialectic has a threefold benefit: firstly, it
is an intellectual exercise (gymnasia)a point which refers back
to the exercises of the academic school conversations.16 It is an
aid for argumentation with people from the crowd (enteuxeis), and
it helps in finding the truth; as in the case of a problem it enables
the arguments to be gone through from both sides and in this way

15

239

to find out more easily what is true and what is false. In the case of
this third point, help in finding the truth, one can thus speak of an
internalisation of the dialectical proceedings, because this procedure,
which in fact takes place between the interlocutors, becomes the
method of the investigator researching for himself. The advantage
which the researcher draws from it lies above all in its privative benefit: by eliminating wrong solutions, one reaches the correct result.
Aristotle chooses this internalisation of the dialectic proceedings as
a theme in De caelo II 13. Here he states that the investigator
researching for himself would raise objections inherent to the genre
for himself until he could no longer contradict himself. Thus the
transfer is not made, as Dirlmeier believed, from the innermost psychic debate with the innermost psychic opponent to the debate with
external opponents17, but the procedure designed for and dependent on an interlocutor is transferred to the conversation with
oneself.
If this procedure is now followed in the medium of writing, it
serves to facilitate ones own acquisition of knowledge. Thus within the written form itself, an ordering of knowledge takes place,
especially as longer argumentation processes can be followed,
and as the factual material which is integrated into the argumentation can be absorbed. The integration of empirical material is,
of course, quite important for biology. This procedure thus allows
one to gain knowledge.
At the same time, however, this procedure also serves for
imparting knowledge. The question is why, because it does not
obviously appear very reader-friendly to a modern audience. It is,
however, a good means for imparting knowledge for Aristotle because it makes the way the investigator has arrived at his conclusion comprehensible for the recipient. Thus in De caelo I 10 he
explains why he begins the question about the eternity of the world
with a discussion of other opinions (279b7-9, translation Guthrie):
. . . lkkom m eg pirs s lkkomsa kevhrerhai pqoajgjori s sm luirbgsomsxm kcxm dijailasa. T cq
qlgm jasadijferhai dojem ssom m lm pqvoi
ja cq de diaisgs1 kk oj msidjot1 emai so1
lkkomsa1 skgh1 jqmeim jam1.

. . . the arguments which are to follow will inspire more confidence if the pleas of those who dispute them have been heard
first. It will not look so much as if we are procuring judgement
by default. And indeed it is arbiters, not litigants who are wanted
for the obtaining of an adequate recognition of the truth.

It is thus here a matter of the situation in which knowledge is imparted. In a decontextualised situation, in which there are not two
interlocutors facing one another but a speaker or writer and his
recipients, for reasons of integrity, the author must also list the
opponents arguments. With the we the author also includes his
recipients. Ultimately, he does, it is true, make the decision as to
which opinion is the correct one, but, thanks to the transparency
which arises from the discussion of other views, the recipient is intended to be able to share his decision and thus the result that has
been achieved. Objectivity analogous to that of court proceedings
is thus guaranteed.
It can thus be said that at the moment in which the dialectic
procedure is translated into the medium of writing, a fact-oriented
representation is also a recipient-oriented representation.18 Thus

Dirlmeier (1962), p. 12.

Cf. Schickert (1977).
Dirlmeier (1962), p. 13.
18
This in turn is connected with the fact that certain linguistic characteristics that are to be observed can be assessed as being both dialectical and rhetorical. Because the pieces
of methodological advice, which Aristotle gives in refutation in Topics, Analytics and Rhetoric, coincide in principle. All the same, the speaking situations in which they are applied
differ in each case (cf. Schickert (1989), p. 1) and, as a result, the premises: the premises in dialectic discussion are endoxa, those in the context of a proof are facts, those in
rhetoric are probabilities. For this reason, it is not surprising that in the transformation into writing in the case of a dialectical procedure, the same expressions are to be found as
in rhetorical contexts. This is also true for the formulation aporeseien an tis (someone could ask). For this reason, the fact that Aristotle uses this formulation is not, as Lengen
(2002), p. 227 thinks, a counter-argument against the thesis that Aristotles way of description had its origin in academic school discussions.
16
17

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S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

the deduction of knowledge on the one hand and the presentation of

knowledge on the other hand coincide. Niklas Luhmann has pointed
out that these two have to be seen separately.19 And nowadays we
are more accustomed to a technical literature which, after completing the first step of the deduction of knowledge, presents the results
in a systematic and hierarchical way in its literary representation,
but we do not set down our own thought process in writing. Admittedly, with the application of the dialectic method in the medium of
writing other elements also come in.
In general, the following characteristics of the transformation
into writing can be distinguished.20
1) A direct or indirect question-and-answer structure is to be
found, consequently direct and indirect speech, from time
to time also an abrupt change from indirect into direct
speech. In the written representation, the syntactic units of
a conditional construction can correspond to the roles which
are allocated to the interlocutors in the conversation: the
protasis brings the premise, which results from the interlocutors position, the apodosis the refutation. The apodosis can
state a reductio ad absurdum or, what plays an important role
in the biological context, a counterargument from empirical
experience. It can be formulated as a declarative statement
or, as a rhetorical question.
2) The author calls for a certain problem to be examined, either
in the form of a verbal adjective or with the 1st person
plural.
3) Through the formula poqreiem m si1 (someone could
ask), an imaginary interlocutor is brought into the game.
This serves to bring a new question or a new perspective into
a discussion already in course.21
4) The fact that the investigator conducts an internal dialogue,
in which, according to Topics VIII 14. 163b9-12, he himself
quotes the arguments for and against a position, results in
him, as author, having to play various roles. This leads to a
(from time to time abrupt) change of perspectives inasmuch
as the premises of different positions are quoted in the form
of conditional sentences, or the point of view is changed
within a direct to-and-fro. This not explicitly marked
change of speakers requires the recipient to follow the train
of thought with particular alertness.
5) Often there is not just one counterargument, but Aristotle
quotes several at once in order to make his refutation of a
certain position more compelling. The passage in the Topics
already mentioned (VIII 14. 163b4-9) recommends this
manner of procedure within a dialectic conversation.
6) The treatment of a question is sometimes not subject to
strict planning, even if its introduction, for example in the
form of a prepared list of questions, suggests this. Rather, a
new approach is suddenly undertaken from a different perspective, a question connected with the topic is opened, or,

19

after a question seems to have been dealt with, further confirmation or justifications are also added (cf. Schopenhauers
criticism cited at the outset above). Precisely this point, the
heterogeneity in the implementation, shows how writing as
a medium of discursive thinking leads to a further development of oral and dialectical approaches, for instance in the
form of a hierarchic list of questions put forward at the
beginning of the investigation, and how at the same time a
certain spontaneity and the immediacy of the thinking process is maintained.
7) Premises are not disclosed in detail.
8) However, it is precisely this discursiveness of the thinking
which the recipient also includes in the authors internal
dialogue; that means that the reader has the impression of
participating in the to-and-fro of the authors selfreflection22
9) Apart from the structural features, the semantics also points
to an oral style of argumentation. Thus terms taken from the
field of dialectics are to be found, such as logon labein, logon
hypechein, tithenai, lyein etc.23
These characteristics are typical for a Sprache der Nhe (language of proximity), to use the terminology introduced by the Romance scholars Koch and Oesterreicher.24 Its distinctive features are
its dialogicity, process-oriented character and abruptness. They must
be considered independently of the written or oral medium, that
means if such characteristics do arise, it is not necessarily due to
the fact that the text is also being presented orally. Thus in Aristotles
case they have a methodological value, without one having absolutely necessarily to conclude a lecture context from this. Thus, these
characteristics are not signs of a lack of literary ability, as Schopenhauer, Jaeger and Dirlmeier pronounced: they are not, to use Dirlmeiers assessment, a residuum of an original oral presentation
which breaks through the literature victoriously again and again.25
But it is also not a fictive oral presentation as Dirlmeier also called
it,26 because, of course, no mimesis of a dialogue takes place, such as
in Platos and Aristotles dialogues. In order to name the phenomenon
of this oral presentation, elsewhere I have designated it Imaginierte
Mndlichkeit (imagined oral presentation).27
b) Biology
The manner of proceeding in elaborating a result in writing by a
so-called agonistic process is thus also to be found in Aristotles
biological writingspecifically in those places where it is a matter
of attempting to recognise general conformity with laws or to integrate individual knowledge into causal connections, thus about the
ordering of knowledge. This means it is not to be found in collections of material, thus not in the Historia animalium, but in works
dealing with aetiology, thus in De partibus animalium, but above
all in De generatione animalium.28

Cf. Luhmann (1990), p. 135.

Cf. Fllinger (1993), p. 167-168.
21
The fact that this formulation is also found in rhetorical contexts is not surprising in view of the close affinity of dialectic and rhetoric (thus the Stoa only distinguished
dialectics and rhetoric formally), cf. above, note 18.
22
Cf. Dirlmeier (1962), p. 12.
23
Cf. Krmer (1971), pp. 19ff.
24
Koch and Oesterreicher (1985).
25
Dirlmeier (1962), p. 17.
26
Dirlmeier (1962), p. 16: Willen zur Fiktion.
27
Fllinger (1993), p. 280.
28
Among Aristotles biological works are to be reckoned Historia animalium, a collection of zoological facts, the work De partibus animalium, the first book of which has been
called the programmatic work of zoology (Dring, 1966 p. 509), then De generatione animalium, which presents Aristotles views on procreation, genetics and ontogenesis. As
the works De partibus animalium and De generatione animalium often refer to Historia animalium, it can be said that Historia animalium represents the reservoir of facts from which
the other two works can draw. In contrast to the Historia animalium, whose manner of presentation, in keeping with its intention, has more of a descriptive,documentary
character, De partibus animalium and to an even greater extent De generatione animalium argue discursively.
20

S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

De generatione animalium I 17.721 a 3018. 722 b 629

In his work De generatione animalium Aristotle uses the factual material which he propagates meticulously and precisely
in his Historia animalium with the objective of producing connected statements of explanation by attributing the biological
details to the principles of his elementary science or attempting
to bring them into agreement with it. That means that what
matters to him is linking his four-cause theory with biology.
Books I-III deal with the different means of reproduction of living creatures divided up according to animal classes. In opposition to other, pre-Socratic and Hippocratic theories, Aristotle
develops his own theory of procreation, starting out from the
difference between the male and female contribution to procreationthe ovum was still not discovered until long afterward,
therefore there was generally a great deal of speculation in classical antiquity about the female contribution to procreation. In
Book IV, Aristotle develops his theories on genetics and on various hereditary transmission processes and on the process of
sexual differentiation in ontogenesis, in order then to devote
himself in Book V to the development of secondary attributes
which form in the course of life.30
In De generatione animalium 17-18, Aristotle deals with the
question of what the female contribution to procreation consists
in. As already mentioned, it was still a long time before the female
egg cell was discovered, and predecessors and contemporaries of
Aristotle, thus some adherents of Hippocrates, held the view that
the females (using this designation because we are in a biological
context here) possessed a seed, and to this they linked the opinion
that the seed came from all parts of the body of both sexual partners, by means of which they wanted to explain the similarity of
parents and children, the so-called pangenesis theory. The following text shows extracts how Aristotle refuted this pangenesis
theory.
At the beginning is the differentiation of the list of questions.
The problematic questions are followed by the questions of the
nature of the seed and the catamenia (721 a 30b 13; Translation:
A.L. Peck):
T lm cq pqoesai uameq1 rpqla sm fxm oom ra
asm maila sm urim rs, s d msola ja s lakjia
posqx1 dgkom. rse soso hexqgsom
pseqom pmsa pqoesai rpqla s qqema o pmsa,
ja e l pmsa, di sm asam s lm s d o
ja s hkea d pseqom rtlbkkesai rpqla si o,
ja e l rpqla, pseqom od kko ohm, rtlbkkesai lm si, o rpqla d.
si d ja s pqolema rpqla s rtlbkkesai di so
rpqlaso1 pq1 sm cmerim rjepsom ja kx1 s1 rsim
so rpqlaso1 uri1 ja sm jakotlmxm jasalgmxm, ra sasgm sm cqsgsa pqoesai sm fxm.
Some animals discharge semen plainly, for instance those which
are by nature blooded animals; but it is not clear in which way Insects and Cephalopods do so. Here then is a point we must consider:
Do all male animals discharge semen, or not all of them?
and if not all, why is it that some do and some do not?
Do females contribute any semen, or not?
and if they contribute no semen, is there no other substance
at all which they contribute, or is there something else which
is not semen?

29
30
31
32

241

(And there is a further question which we must consider):

What is it which those animals that discharge semen contribute
towards generation by means of it? and generally, what is the nature of semen, and (in the case of those animals which discharge
this fluid) what is the nature of the menstrual discharge?
The hierarchic arrangement of the list of questions as well as
the systematic way in which these questions are gone through
shows a degree of planning which one can describe as the fruit
of the transformation of oral and dialectic approaches into written
form.31 However, this list is not strictly adhered to in what follows.
With the exhortations hexqgsom (theoreteon) and rjepsom
(skepteon), attention is already called to the procedural aspect of
the following comments, as well as the involvement of the readers
in accordance with De caelo I 10. Following the list of questions,
Aristotle lists the arguments of the advocates of the pangenesis
theory in detail, in order then to refute them individually, in which
references to empirical facts, which contradict his opponents opinions, play a central role. In this connection, the advice given in the
Topics to use several parallel arguments at the same time in order
to eliminate all possible objections from the outset is followed. The
particle eti (besides) is the indicator of a parallel argument.
In the next piece of text quoted, Aristotle proves the impossibility of a seed coming from one of the two constituent parts of the
body (722 a 16ff.). The two parts which constitute the body according to Aristotle are the anhomoiomere and homoiomere. In Aristotles
opinion, homoiomere, similar parts, are the constituent parts of
the body in which each part consists of the same thing, for instance
fat, blood, flesh and sinews. In the case of the anhomoiomere, not
every part is the same as the whole, these are thus, for instance,
the head, hands, eye. The anhomoiomere consist of homoiomere.
After the introductory eti follows the question in the form of a
problema question (a 16-18):

si pseqom p sm loioleqm lmom pqvesai u

jrsot oom p raqj1 ja rso ja meqot, ja
p sm moloioleqm oom pqorpot ja veiq1;
Here is a further question. Is the semen drawn only from each of the
uniform parts of the body, such as flesh, bone, sinew, or is it drawn
from the non-uniform parts as well, such as face and hand?
Now the individual possibilities are proved to be untenable (a
18ff.):

e lm cq p jemxm lmom,
32
<oijmai dei jema lmom> ojari d lkkom
sasa so1 comeri s moloioleq oom pqrxpom ja
veqa1 ja pda1 epeq om lgd sasa s p pams1
pekhem, s jxkei lgd jema s p pams1 pekhem
loia emai kk di kkgm asam;
e d p sm moloioleqm lmom
ojotm p pmsxm. pqorjei d lkkom p jemxm
pqseqa cq jema ja rcjeisai s moloioleq n
jemxm, ja rpeq pqrxpom ja veqa1 ccmomsai
oijse1 osx ja rqja1 ja mtva1.
e d p luosqxm,
s1 sqpo1 m eg s1 cemrex1; rcjeisai cq j sm
loioleqm s moloioleq rse s p sosxm pimai
s p jemxm m eg pimai ja s1 rtmhrex1;
(1) The semen may be drawn from the uniform parts only. If so,
(then children ought to resemble their parents in respect of
these only),but the resemblance occurs rather in the

Cf. also the study of the passage in Bolton (1987).

Book V was originally probably an independent work; it takes up topics dealt with in PA II-IV (cf. Liatsi, 2000, pp. 13-25).
Cf. Koch and Oesterreicher (1985), p. 20.
Suppl. Peck (1942).

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S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

non-uniform parts such as face, hands, and feet. Therefore if even these resemblances in the non-uniform parts
are not due to the semen being drawn from the whole
body, why must the resemblances in the uniform parts
be due to that and not to some other cause?
(2) The semen may be drawn from the non-uniform parts only.
This means that it is not drawn from all the parts. Yet it is
more in keeping that it should be drawn from the uniform parts, because they are prior to the non-uniform,
and the non-uniform are constructed out of them; and
just as children are born resembling their parent in face
and hands, so they resemble them in flesh and nails.
(3) The semen may be drawn from both uniform and non-uniform parts.
The question then arises: What can be the manner in
which generation takes place? The non-uniform parts
are constructed out of uniform ones assembled together;
so that being drawn from the non-uniform parts would
come to the same thing as being drawn from the uniform
parts plus the assemblage of them.
...
The first possible position of the problema-question is refuted by
empiricism: If the seed were to come from the homoiomere, the
children would have to look similar to the parents with respect
to these, thus, for instance, with respect to fat and sinews. However, empiricism shows that they resemble each other with respect
to anhomoiomere, i.e. the face, etc. The second refutation is made
through a reductio ad absurdum: if the seed were to come from
the anhomoiomere, it would not come from all parts of the body.
But this contradicts the premise.
It is interesting to observe now how distinctive features of
shaping in writingon the one hand a greater planning effort in
the form of the disjunctions made, on the other hand syntactic
ellipsis through the omission of the verb in all three protaseisgo
hand in hand with the previously discussed elements that are typical for a language of proximity. Thus the aposiopesis in the case of
the first refutation is typical for the direct train of thought. Here it
is not explained linguistically that, in the case of the assumption
that the seed came from the homoiomere, the children would have
to resemble the parents in them. Rather, by omitting this idea, only
the empirical phenomenon is explicitly explained, that is the children resemble the parents more with regard to the anhomoiomere.
This probably caused Peck to make the addition <oijmai dei
jema lmom> (then children ought to resemble their parents in respect of these only). However, this does not agree with the premise,
as is also not further elaborated. In the case of both refutations, a
further confirmation of the result is attached (eiper etc. and prosekei) which is logically not really necessary. This parallel argumentation is intended to make the refutation more compelling. The
discussion of a third assumption, as now follows, serves the same
purpose; strictly speaking it is inadmissible in the case of a probl
ema question and was also not included in the preceding list of
questions. Rather, this possibility is inserted subsequently. The
argumentation is intensified, so to speak, into a concentrated counterattack on the position to be rejected.
The next section comes from the examination of the question of
how, if one accepts the pangenesis theory, one has to imagine the
separate existence of the individual parts in the seed. In this context, he goes over to the direct question form (722 b 3-6):

si e lm dierparlma s lqg m s rpqlasi

p1 f;
e d rtmev
fom m eg lijqm.
ja s sm adoxm p1;

o cq loiom s pim p so qqemo1 ja so hkeo1.

Further, if the parts of the body are scattered about within the
semen,
how do they live?
If on the other hand they are connected with each other,
then surely they would be a tiny animal.
And what about the generative organs?
because that which comes from the male will be different from that
which comes from the female.
As one can see, the sentences become shorter, everything goes
quickly. Thus the first refutation is formulated as a question which
already contains the untenability of the assumption: furthermore,
if the parts do already exist separated in the seed, how do they live?
Thus this passage conveys the spontaneity of a discussion which
really draws the recipients into a court trial on the different positions and serves to provide clarity about the way in which Aristotle
derives his own view.
A second example is that of Aristotles research on bees, or to
put it more precisely, on the question of the sex of the different
types of bees and how procreation takes place. This question
proved to be a mystery for the whole of Antiquity and was only satisfactorily resolved in the 20th century. Aristotle deals with the
problem in three passages of his work. Two are to be found in
the Historia animalium (HA V 21.553a17ff. and IX 40. 624b12ff.),
and one in his writing De generatione animalium (III 10. 759a8ff.).
In accordance with the different character of these works, in the
HA he brings variousin part also contradictorypieces of information alongside one another, because in both chapters of HA Aristotle quotes various items of information about the behaviour of
bees which he evidently obtained from beekeepers. As a result,
he simply quotes various opinions which partially contradict one
another (with phasi), without discussing and evaluating them. This
is in keeping with the fact that HA represents a collection of material. In GA, by contrast, his first step in a long discussion is to refute
all other views and then, using a discursive procedure, he develops
his own opinion on how things stand in relation to the procreation
and the sex of bees. This manner of proceeding is in keeping with
the aetiological character of GA. In GA he develops his result over
the course of a long process. I would like to present this result
briefly: Aristotle distinguishes three groups of bees (gene): kings
or leaders (as is well known, for almost the whole of Antiquity
the leaders of a colony of bees were male) (basileis or hegemones),
worker bees (melittai or ergtides), drones (kephenes). He comes to
the conclusion that the kings procreate themselves and the worker
bees, the worker bees the drones, while the drones themselves do
not procreate. There are no separate sexes in any of the groups, and
the procreation takes place without copulation. This is possible because the worker bees have combined both male and female attributes in themselves, and are thus, so to speak, hermaphroditic.
This also applies for the kings, even if Aristotle does not explicitly
say so.
Aristotle begins the first part of the explanation which involves
a discussion of the facts, with the declaration that the procreation
of bees is an aporia, meaning a problem which requires discussion
(759a8):

d sm lekissm cmeri1 vei pokkm poqam.

epeq cq rsi ja peq so1 vh1 soiasg si1 cmeri1
mxm rs met vea1 cemmm, soso rtlbameim oije
ja peq s1 lekssa1 j sm uaimolmxm.
The generation of bees is a great puzzle.
If it is a fact that certain fishes are generated without copulation,
the same probably occurs among bees as wellor so it seems from
appearances.
The discussion now following proceeds in the form of a series of
conclusions. Other opinions (quoted with tines) are refuted by

S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

showing their incompatibility with established premises. However,

these premises are not endoxa as in dialectics, but are zoological
observations of a general or special kind. Aristotle himself explains
this method of dialectic procedure with premises from empiricism
(759a24ff.):
We have only to bring before our minds the special and particular facts concerning bees, on the one side, and on the other the
facts more generally applicable to other animals, to see that all of
these theories are impossible.
All preceding theories prove to be untenable if one draws conclusions from the facts concerning the bees behaviour and from
general zoological observations. The theory to be developed must
be in accord with a (supposedly) empirical fact, that bees procreate
without copulation (nuptial flight!). The result must thus be in
accordance with this premise and also will be so.
If one looks at the text, then one can see that Aristotle first
quotes the different opinions on the procreation of bees in a kind
of catalogue. Then he refutes the (in his view) wrong opinions,
firstly that bees would bring their brood from elsewhere (759a27b1), for example with the generally immutable law that all living
creatures only take care of their own brood. Again the written form
is that the protasis of a conditional sentence gives the premise
which results from the interlocutors position, the apodosis the refutation. Then (from 759b1) follow the refutations of individual
opinions on the sex of bees. Linguistically, the wrong opinion is first
quoted with ouk eulogon (meaning not well-founded; this expression comes actually from dialectics), then a sentence introduced
with gar (therefore, or namely) substantiates the incorrectness,
in that the untenability of the opposing opinions is proved in view
of general zoological tenets. These contradictory observations are
mainly introduced by de or nun de (meaning but). After refutation
of the wrong opinions, the solution is introduced with leipetai (it
remains . . . ). This eliminative procedure as the way to the perception is justified in the Topics (VIII 14. 163a36ff.).
After the conclusion of this discursive procedure begins the
aetiological part (aition dhoti: 760a 4). General immutable laws
are indicated here by anagke, anagkaion, to kata physin, tei physei.
And we find an aporia provided (sex of the kings) and empirical
proofs (evidence) (760b15ff). Finally Aristotles famous concluding
sentence (760b27ff.)33 makes it clear that he himself sees his whole
result as provisional, as new empirical findings could throw everything over board.
3. Classification of these findings in accordance with the criteria
of modern research on writing. (Schreibforschung)
To sum up, it can be said that Aristotles manner of presentation
is a reflection of his thinking, but at the same time also makes the
procedure transparent for the recipient. Literature is thus the med-

243

ium of the research, because writing helps to order the ideas. In

this way, however, Aristotles scientific literature can be classified
even more precisely in accordance with criteria which modern theoretical studies of writing have developed. These are presented in
the volume Wissen und Textproduzieren34 edited by Gunter Eigler
and others with regard to factually oriented texts. Writing research
examines the possible interactions between knowledge and writing,
and thus whether writing itself has repercussions on knowledge.
Bereiters model35 has been an important classification aid for classifying the findings which I have presented. This model works with
the term Schreibstrategien (writing strategies) which I have
adopted for Aristotle. According to this model, writing is seen as
an Wechselspiel von absteigenden und von aufsteigenden Prozessen (interplay of descending and ascending processes36). A final
step in the development of writing is taken when it is recognised
that the text or the writing are themselves a medium in which thinking takes place. Thus ist das Schreiben zu einem integralen
Bestandteil des Denkens geworden . . . Umgekehrt kann dann aber
auch ein solches Schreiben bewut und instrumentell eingesetzt
werden, um Beziehungen zwischen Elementen des eigenen Wissens
zu klren und zu przisieren, ja um neue Beziehungen herzustellen.
Schreiben ist zu einer Form des Weiterverarbeitens des Wissens, sei
es klrend-przisierender Art, sei es umstrukturierender Art geworden 37 (writing has become an integral part of thinking . . . But conversely then, such writing is also employed consciously and
instrumentally in order to clarify and specify relations between elements of ones own knowledge, indeed to create new relations. Writing has become a form of further processing knowledge, either in a
clarifying and specifying manner, or in a restructuring manner).
The term epistemisches Schreiben (epistemic writing) has become established for this kind of writing.38 The model by Scardamalia and Bereiter from 1985, that regards writing as a dialectic
process, expresses something similar, stating: the ultimate text
and the knowledge of the producer of the text develop in the transition from mental to linguistic work, and from linguistic to mental
work.39 Such a writing strategy is to be found above all in the case
of authors who are still fighting with their findings: All in all, they
show a behaviour that can be described as problem solving, a gradual procedure, the formation of intermediate goals at a factual level,
but precisely embedded in at first global processes, then with the
progress of the clarification process in the course of working on
the text, more specific ones.40 These distinctive features apply for
what I have tried to bring out in Aristotles texts.41
For modern scientific writing Frederic Holmes42 shows that
there is an interdependence between writing and investigation:
that experimental scientists commonly begin writing up their papers during the investigations those papers are intended to report,
and that the writing helps us to guide the further course of the
investigation.43 For mathematics Bettina Heintz44 showed how

33
This, then, appears to be the state of affairs with regard to the generation of bees, so far as theory can take us, supplemented by what are thought to be the facts about their
behaviour. But the facts have not been sufficiently ascertained; and if at any future time they are ascertained, the credence must be given to the direct evidence of the senses more
than to theories,and to theories, too, provided that the results which they show agree with what is observed.
34
Eigler and et al. (1990).
35
Bereiter (1980).
36
Eigler et al. (1990), p. 15.
37
Eigler et al. (1990), p. 18.
38
Cf. Eigler et al. (1990), p. 18.
39
Eigler et al. (1990), p. 53.
40
Eigler et al. (1990), p. 53:, Insgesamt zeigen sie ein Verhalten, das als Problemlsen beschrieben werden kann, schrittweises Vorgehen, Zwischenzielbildungen auf sachlicher
Ebene, aber eben eingebettet in zunchst globale, dann mit Fortschreiten des Klrungsprozesses im Zuge des Arbeitens am Text spezifischere Prozesse Cf. also p. 57.
41
Eigler et al. (1990), p. 37: Spoken language is under a compulsion to act, written language has a far more distant relationship to the situation in which something is
verbalised to the reader. This leads to the spoken language giving a far-reaching insight into the processing process, into the struggle for the appropriate formulation, whereas the
written language, by contrast, rather conceals the processing process, only showing the polished product.
42
Holmes (1987).
43
Holmes (1987), p. 226.
44
Heintz (2000).

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S. Fllinger / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43 (2012) 237244

important for the certainty of a demonstration writing is: Oft

stellen Mathematiker erst beim Aufschreiben fest, dass die ursprngliche Gewissheit trgerisch wardass die Beweisidee nicht umsetzbar ist, ein wichtiges Resultat, das man leicht zu beschaffen glaubte,
doch nicht so einfach zu haben ist, oder ein Ergebnis, auf das man
sich sttzte, falsch ist. . . . Erst mit dem Aufschreiben des Beweises
wird subjektive Gewissheit in Sicherheit berfhrtund genau darin
liegt auch dessen epistemologische Bedeutung.45 (Often mathematicians first notice through the act of writing that their original
certainty was illusory, that their idea for a proof is not feasible, an
important result believed easy to obtain was not so simple to
achieve, or that a result on which it relies is false . . . Only with the
writing out of the proof is subjective certainty reliably establishedand it is precisely therein that the epistemological significance lies.)
It is as a result of this ordering while writingthat means to say
the merging of knowledge production and presentation of knowledge in Aristotlethat the text is not in our sense drafted as didactic literature. Aristotle thinks with his quill in his hand46, as
Schopenhauer put it, but this procedure is not the product of ineptitude, but a method in the sense of a means of constituting knowledge and, to close with a remark by Dirlmeier, this makes up das
innere Leben des aristotelischen Pragmatien-Stils (the internal life
of the style of the Aristotelian pragmateiai).47
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