Fortune
FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32
of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA
7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at
55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55%
provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654,
Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion,
Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune)
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when
RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were
already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway
with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of
the rule violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her
part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss
that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
one responsible for her acts. She also contended that
the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying
the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article
32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
*Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued
in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
HELD: On the first issue, the general rule is that a
public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance
of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have
been caused to another, as it would virtually be a
charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent.
However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in
bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
immunity for official actions. Specifically, under Sec.
PSBA v. CA
Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the
second floor premises of the schools by assailants
who were not members of the schools academic
community. This prompted the parents of the
deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for
damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. The
defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the
suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of
action and not within the scope of the provision of
Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial
court overruled the petitioners contention and its
decision was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court
primarily anchored on the law of quasi-delicts is
valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the
decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition
of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree
to the premises of the appellate courts ruling.
The Facts
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old
son of the Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera
van owned by LG Foods Corporation (LG Foods)
and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of
the accident. An information for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide was filed against the driver
before the Bacolod MTCC. Before the trial could be
concluded, however, the accused driver committed
suicide. The case was then dismissed. On June 23,
1999, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against LG Foods alleging that as
employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. In their
defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to
have exercised such diligence and prayed for
dismissal for lack of cause of action. Also in their
motion to dismiss, they argued that the complaint was
a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer
under A1035, RPC and, as such, there must first be a
judgment of conviction against their driver to hold
them liable. Since such condition
was not fulfilled due to the latters death, they argued,
the spouses had no cause of action. The trial court
denied the motion for lack of merit. Also, it denied
the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG
Foods then went on certiorari to the CA alleging
grave abuse of discretion of the part of the trial judge.
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision ruling
that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to
be based on subsidiary liability since the basic
elements of such liability, such as conviction and
insolvency of the accused employee, were not even
alleged in said complaint. It then said that the
complaint purports to exact responsibility for fault or
negligence under A2176, CC, which is entirely
separate and distinct from civil liability arising from
negligence under the A103, RPC. Liability under
A2180, CC is direct and immediate, and not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.
The Issue
Whether the cause of action of the Vallejera spouses
is founded on CC or RPC.
The Ruling
The case is a negligence suit brought under A2176,
CC to recover damages primarily from LG Foods as
employers responsible for their negligent driver
pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed by
A2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees.
The Ratio
First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint
suggests that the LG Foods are being made to
account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did
not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary
liability of an employer under said provision.
Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was
for damages based on quasi-delict, it alleged gross
fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the
failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary
diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of their employees,
which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented
the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of
their 7-year old son. Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action
as the "act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to
an obligation which may come from law, contracts,
quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily,
an act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the partof
the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law; the intentionaltorts;14 and culpa
aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct from