Jorge Canestri
a
Rome
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.
To cite this article: Jorge Canestri (2002) Commentary by Jorge Canestri (Rome), Neuropsychoanalysis: An
Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 4:1, 27-31, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2002.10773375
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2002.10773375
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Ronald Britton
30 December 2001
In his introduction to the section ``A Psychoanalytic Concept of the Self'' of his paper, David
Milrod underlines how in psychoanalytic literature there is a great deal of confusion around the
meaning of terms such as ``the ego'', ``the self''
and ``the self representation''. Does the term
``self'' refer toI quotethe individual or
person, his ego as a psychic structure, to both of
these equally, or to something else? I agree with
the author on the fact that there is confusion, and
I think that his theory, based on a careful
examination of the concept within the framework
of ego psychology, is a step forward in the right
direction, i.e., of clarication within a psychoanalytic model. It represents the rst stage of the
theoretical analysis of a discipline. ``This stage
(internal or intragural analysis) requires the
model or theory to be coherent, with a solid
conceptual system; it should not be contradictory
but, rather, should be able to take into account a
certain number of factors. Every intragural
analysis can improve the internal consistency of
a theory . . . The second stage calls for a
confrontation between two or more theories by
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``self''. The idea of subject, although it derives
from the Latin subietum (subjected to, subject),
has its modern roots in the evolution of the
Renaissance society and in the birth of scientic
thought. A very supercial review of Western
thinking on this matter shows us that the concepts
of person, of identity and of consciousness are
present in Locke, Berkeley, Descartes and in
others; but the specic concept of subject is linked
to the name of Kant and his concept of a
``transcendental subject''. Kant's subject draws
its consistency from the mere fact of being, not of
appearing to itself with certain characteristics
(1780, Kritik der reinen Vernunft). Although one
can obviously reject the transcendental denition
of Kant's subject (and there are good reasons for
doing do so), it is interesting to note that in his
thinking there is the rst seed of an uncertainty, a
void and a negativity that endanger the possibility
of conceiving a subject that is complete and
unitary. This will reappear in psychoanalysis in
the concept of unconscious, of the slaveries and
the splittings of the ego and of identication as an
incomplete and interminable process. We can
perhaps say that, contrary to Kant, Freud linked
the sentiment of self (Selbstgefuhl) to certain
forms of self representation, but he maintained in
his concept a certain proximity to the negativity
of Kant's idea, inasmuch as his denition of
subject (on the other hand never entirely formulated) does not coincide completely either with
the Selbstgefuhl or Ichgefuhl, or with the representations of the self, or with self-consciousness
(Selbstbewusste).
In his attempt to give specicity and clear
limits to the concept of self within the school of
ego psychology, Milrod cannot help dragging
along all the ambiguities and diculties that the
history of Western thinking has encountered
when trying to dene the subject. When he
repeats the denition by Hartmann (1950):
``However the opposite of object cathexis is not
ego cathexis, but the cathexis of one's own
person, that is self cathexis . . .'' or when he says
that: ``The self is a term that refers to that
tangible, substantive, individual, etc'', it is dicult not to think that the term ``person'' has
origins that are juridic and of social identityin
that it regards responsibility for one's own
actionsand has also the meaning of theatrical
maskin that it represents the objective aspect of
the recognition of the self. William James knew
something about this when classifying the self
(material, social, spiritual) according to the aspect
that was being considered, while dierentiating it
from the transcendental valence of the ``pure
ego''. The same thing could be said about the
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term ``individual''. I would only like to clarify
that without adhering to those analysts who
``advocate the abolition of the term because in
their view it is detrimental to psychoanalytic
theory'' I have the impression that the problem
relative to the self, to self representation and to
the construction of a satisfactory psychoanalytic
theory of the ``subject'' is a rather complex topic
on which I will not dwell further.
I would now like to comment on the author's
use of certain neuroscientic concepts, as he
admits being fascinated by the fact that these
scientists needed the concept of ``self'' in order to
give coherence to their models.
Milrod says that neuroscientists use the term
``self'' in a sense that is dierent from the
psychoanalytical sense, even though, he adds,
neither neuroscientists nor psychoanalysts use it
with the same meaning within their respective
disciplines. In view of this by no means unimportant premise, the essential question is whether
there any point in expecting another discipline to
enlighten us on a concept that we know to be
dierent from the one that interests us. Each
discipline creates concepts that are specic to a
certain stage, that are relevant for that particular
level of exploration and that require equally
specic languages, special annotation systems,
etc. Using concepts or languages of a dierent
stage from the one that interests us or belonging
to other disciplines can give rise to signicant
misunderstandings. I agree with M. Reiser (1985)
when he says that: ``. . . the idea of ``shared''
interdisciplinary boundaries may be misleading.
[. . .] foci of concern, questions addressed, parameters studied, methods of study, levels of
abstraction represented in conceptualizations,
and languages used may be quite dierent
certainly not interchangeable across disciplines''.
Pankseep studies aects in animals and uses
his results, Milrod says, ``to extrapolate to man''.
The fact that animals have feelings does not
necessarily mean that they are also ``conscious'' of
their feelings, or at least it would be useful to say
which denition of consciousness is being referred
to (Damasio and Pankseep do so in their
writings). In Milrod's text there are no specications on the type of animal that is being referred
to: what applies to the larger apes, for example,
does not apply to another mammal.
When the author says that Pankseep ``binds
consciousness and the self closer and closer
together in his work'' we cannot help recognizing
the old proposal by Locke (1690) that also
constituted his limit: the awareness that denes
a person is self-consciousness, the person is the
self. Person, as I take it, is the name for this self''
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Freud. The self hypothesized by both the authors
recalls the ``material self'' of W. James (a disciple
of Locke), with the addition of the neuroscientic
knowledge that James did not possess and that is
fundamental. But is the self of Damasio's selfconsciousness dierent from James' ``spiritual
self''? This is a problem that concerns us as
psychoanalysts.
I agree with Milrod when he says that in the
descriptions that these neuroscientists make of the
self, many analysts will certainly nd echoes of
topics that are known to them. And this is
precisely what worries me. I think that this way of
confronting the intersection between neurosciences
and psychoanalysis may not be doing a service to
either of the disciplines involved and could
unfortunately contribute to producing terminological and conceptual confusion.
From the psychoanalytical angle, by far the
most signicant of the paper, I must say the
contrary. The careful examination of the concepts
of the self, sense of self and self representation
deals with eliminating conceptual vagueness and
discriminating the terms used. One may not agree
with the model proposed, that of ``ego psychology'', but it is coherent. For lack of space, I can
make only a few observations from this point of
view. Two in particular I think could lead to a
fruitful exchange, even though remaining within
the author's model.
When he talks about the dynamic interaction
between the self representation and the wished for
self image, a concept in his opinion that is
neglected in literature, he reminds us that Sandler
et al. (1963) labelled the same concept ``ideal ego''
or ``ideal self''. He continues saying that: ``From
this we can see that the importance of the concept
has been underscored by a number of authors.
But none have chosen to elaborate on it''. On this
particular statement I should like to dissent. The
concept of ideal ego, if it is the same concept of
wished for self image, as Milrod says, is not a
concept created ex novo by Jacobson or Sandler,
but the re-elaboration of a concept outlined by
Freud. In ``On Narcissism: an Introduction''
(S.E., vol. XIV, pp. 9394) Freud writes: ``We
can say that the one man has set up an ideal in
himself by which he measures his actual ego,
while the other has formed no such ideal. (. . .)
This ideal ego (Idealich) is now the target of the
self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the
actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its
appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego,
which, like the infantile ego, nds itself possessed
of every perfection that is of value. (. . .) He is not
willing to forego the narcissistic perfection of his
childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is
Jorge Canestri
disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the
awakening of his own critical judgement, so that
he can no longer retain that perfection, he seeks
to recover it in the new form (in der neuen Form)
of an ego ideal (Ichideal). What he projects before
him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost
narcissism of his childhood in which he was his
own ideal''. I apologize for the long quotation,
but it clearly shows that Freud sees two stages
and two forms of the ideal: rst of all the ideal ego
appears, and subsequently, in a new form, the ego
ideal. The latter is the consequence of the
admonitions of others and the awakening of a
critical judgement, while the former is totally
narcissistic. However, it must be remembered that
the two forms are the heirs of infantile narcissism
and as such are subject to regression and
degradation, as Freud himself shows us in
``Group Psychology . . .'' We also know that
Freud did not subsequently develop this dierence between ideal ego and ego ideal and that
many psychoanalysts reject it. However, French
psychoanalysis (and not only French) has given it
great relevance and dozens of works could be
quoted. I will mention only some of the authors
who have dealt with this matter: D. Lagache, B.
Grunberger, F. Pasche, P. Marty, A. Green, G.
Rosolato, G. Diatkine, etc. We cannot therefore
say that the concept has not been elaborated.
What should be said is that the concept of ideal
ego and the concept of wished for self image are
not identical nor do they overlap, if only for the
reason that every concept acquires a completed
value within a particular system. The system of
ego psychology concedes to the formation of the
wished for self image an autonomy and a capacity
of ``mature select identication'' that neither
Freud or French (and other) psychoanalysis
would allow it. Personally, I can say that words
like ``idols'' and ``heros'' induce us to think that
disguised forms of narcissistic identication are at
work that I consider to be always present and at
the root of those regressive processes that Freud
refers to when speaking of mass psychology. The
suspicion about a disguised form of narcissistic
identication, even if in an evolute solution, is not
avoided by reference to the hard work the ego
does, even with careful respect of ``reality''. The
fact that the ego develops considering reality
instead of phantasizing (magic thought, etc.) does
not mean that narcissistic (primordial, original,
regressive) expectations are not present in the
content of this kind of identication. But it is
worth remembering again that ego psychology
concedes to the ego much more maturity and
autonomy than other psychoanalytical theories
are willing to recognize.
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Jorge Canestri
Rome, 8/10/01
In his article, Milrod examines the self and selfrepresentation mainly from the psychoanalytic
standpoint. I have taken another approach to the
problem of the nature of the self through the
study of patients with brain damage who have
neurological perturbations of the selfconditions
in which a change in the brain transforms the
boundaries of the self, the relationship between
the self and the world, the self to other people and
the self to itself (Feinberg, 1997, 2001). By
studying these patients, and relating the area of
brain damage to the change in the self, one hopes
to learn which areas of the brain contribute to the
self, and in what manner they do so.
Neurological Perturbations of the Self
One condition that alters self-representation is
known as asomatognosia (Feinberg, Haber and
Leeds, 1990). The patient with asomatognosia
fails to recognize a part of his or her own body.
Indeed, asomatognosic patients often totally
reject and disown the body part. Asomatognosia