In The United States District Court

For The Southern District Of Florida

-------------------------------------------- x

BURDA MEDIA, INC. and BURDA HOLDING

:
GmbH & CO. KG, a German Limited Partnership, :
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
- Against :
:
CHRISTIAN VIERTEL, HOT LINE DELIVERY, INC.
:
TELECOMMUNICATION PARTNERS LIMITED*,
:
TRANSVIDEO*, TV BROADCAST CENTER*, AGATE
:
REALITY*1, and JOHN LEE,
:
:
Defendants
:
-------------------------------------------- x

00-Civ-02034 JLK
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO
SEEK VACATUR OF[RICO]
DEFAULT JUDGEMENT
FOR LACK OF AB OVO
JURISDICTION

(ex parte)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A.

PREAMBLE ................................................... 2

C.

Pro Se Statement and Authority to hear the Motion .......... 7

B.
D.

HISTORIC FACTS and CULTURE ................................. 3

THIS COURTS JURISDICTION .................................. 9
i.
A Courts Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over
a Case Is Proper Grounds for Vacatur Under Rule
60(b)(4)................................................ 13
ii.

A Motion Under Rule 60(b)(4) May Be Addressed to a

Court in which the Judgment Is Registered ........... 14

iii. A Registering Court Has the Power to Vacate a Default

Judgment Entered by a Rendering Court on the Basis that
the Rendering Court Lacked Subject
Matter Jurisdiction ................................. 20
iv. This Court shall Consider Viertels Rule 60(b)(4)
Motion to Vacate the New York Courts Default Judgment
as Void................................................. 26

[*]TELECOMMUNICATION PARTNERS, TRANSVIDEO, TV BROADCAST CENTER, AGATE

REALITY, are four noms imaginaire de plume, wholesome fabrications by Plaintiffs counsel
1

E.

THE NEW YORK COURTS JURISDICTION ......................... 27

F.

FIAT UT PETITUR .......................................... 32

1.
2.

Legal Standard ...................................... 27

The New York Courts lacked original ab ovo and Subject
Matter Jurisdiction to PROCEED at all, moreover to
enter a RICO Default Judgment. .................... 29

A. PREAMBLE
This Motion presents an ostensibly unaddressed, albeit lastly

no longer escapable, mandatory question of law whether, after a

plaintiff obtains a [tripled RICO] default judgment #00,0823 in

the Southern District of New York (97-civ-7167) under more than

dubious circumstances [intra], the [RICO colored] default judgment

must be voided nunc pro tunc in the FLSD Court of Registration
for prima facie lack of ab ovo federal jurisdiction along with
lack of subject matter [RICO] jurisdiction 2?

The only correct answer is: YES.

Also, because [a] motion to vacate a default judgment as void

`may be brought at any time` Central Vermont v. Herbert, 341 F.3d

186,189 CA2 2003.

In fact, plaintiffs caliber counsel3 [most certainly not QCs]

placed a bold bet on 90+ docket entries under a pseudo case number,

Seriatim NY adjudications whether in personam jurisdiction attached to Movant Viertel under

a diverted Hague Treaty standard, or, whether 8 other defendants could have been lawfully
served is inconsequential and of strictly subordinate importance for the instant analysis.
2

NY Bar member Warren L. Feldman, WLF 4705, BAR # 1920826 self-branded caliber in
support of hefty hourly billing rates in NYSD 97-7167 to pad a self-styled RICO DEFAULT
JUDGMENT trebling unproven, unaudited and untrue losses suffered from fictitious and
3

while these 90+ entries are perfectly Mafioso free, thus RICOsterile. The conspicuous truancy of a Clerks Certificate of

Default [a routine due process prerequisite filing] speaks loudly

about the extent of scofflaw iniquities at work inside the

Courthouse, bar all BAR ethics, bar RULE 4 respect (a Summons must)
and constitutional due process, bar respect for local rules and

exceptionally bar a Rule of Law culture, but reconfirming that

Might Makes Right4.

B. HISTORIC FACTS and CULTURE

subject matter RICO statement missing

Not only because a RICO associable entry or a RICO statement

can be located on the public and PACER record, but case initiation

was botched, and placed a defective pseudo-Summons permanently on the

record, accordingly it is hereby judicially noticed [see] Exhibit

A. Plaintiffs pegging of subject matter jurisdiction [Cause:

18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act - Nature of Suit: 470

Racketeer/Corrupt Organization] was dead on arrival on 09/27/1997 at

NYSD Clerks Intake window, as a consequence. In fact, any Nature of

absurd Mafia-styled conduct, that BURDA flatly disproved in its June 1997 forensic audit,
which authoritatively certified $14+ millions of untainted income for 1995/1996, which Big Law
deep-sixed for several years to not disrupt its foreign billing scheme.

During a documented debriefing of retired, decades long NYSD staffer C.I. Pinto, a question
was put as: Why Big Law & DOJ have been permitted to play their own tunes on Southern
Districts piano, C.I. Pinto responded: Our Southern Grand is really theirs, while Chief
Clerks organize tune ups for them and provide rubberstamps of bogus clerks [i.e.
Melanie L. Lopez] as part of this sad comedy. One of many Fictitious NYSD deputy clerk,
4

Lopez, is on facebook and found here: http://bit.ly/1RnF1ne

Suit subject matter classification [or in personam jurisdiction] is

defunct without a valid Summons to lawfully initiate a civil

controversy in Federal Court. Clerical errors notwithstanding.

In Moynihans Courthouse slang: No ticky no washy [sic].
The pendency of stigma and fallout from a [hoodwinked smear]

RICO campaign, certainly fictitious, failed to raise red flags in

chambers, moreover, despite brazen absenteeism of a Plaintiffs duty

to produce a sworn RICO-Statement, judicial duty to Inquest was

abandoned-on-call, but docile trebling of judicial sanctions against

an alien and a ghost was par for the Court.

In fact, 97-7167 was brazen monetization of pseudo process in a

case that never was, but, that purloined $3+ million in legal fees 5
BURDA reported that NY counsel was TERMINATED [sic] by BURDA in 2006, but Clifford
Chance managed to linger freelance on Court records to promote its self-interest for DAMAGE
CONTROL for almost a decade until the Second Circuit in CA2: 14-2815 finally began to unglue
and TERMINATE the firm pursuant to incontrovertible pro se corporate letters:
5

DOC#32 LETTER, dated 11/04/2014, confirming that Clifford Chance US LLP does not
represent Burda Media and Burda Holding GmbH & Company, on behalf of Appellee Burda
Holding GmbH & Company, KG and Burda Media, Incorporated, RECEIVED. Service date
11/04/2014 by US mail, CM/ECF.[1387023] [14-2815] [Entered: 12/08/2014 10:37 AM]
DOC#33
DOC#42

ATTORNEY, Anthony Mathias Candido, for Burda Media, Incorporated and

Burda Holding GmbH & Company, KG, TERMINATED.[1387430] [14-2815]
[Entered: 12/08/2014 01:28 PM]
LETTER, dated 02/17/2015, regarding non-participation in this appeal, on
behalf of Appellee Burda Holding GmbH & Company, KG and Burda Media,
Incorporated, RECEIVED. Service date 02/18/2015 by US mail.[1447744]
[14-2815] [Entered: 02/26/2015 04:16 PM]

from clueless, wealthy German companies and from the pocketbook of

billionaire publisher H.E. Senator Prof. Dr. Hubert Burda (75).

The pre-judgment docket entries6 [<DOC#93] are not only silent

about RICO, but also silent, procedurally fatal, about a Clerks

Certificate of Default. This absence was and is crucial, but not a
singular event of undue process here.

Plaintiffs alleging RICO7 must file at an early stage a sworn

RICO STATEMENT or Presiders [including Pseudo-Presiders] must

dismiss RICO subject matter related claims for lack of such

statement [which BURDA officers and directors would certainly not

authenticate, BURDA confirmed]. RICO statements are jurisdictional.

BURDAs counsel did not, could not file a RICO STATEMENT, in fact,
BURDA was kept clueless as to Mafia-type mail fraud allegations

against its former President/CEO Blumenberg who headed BURDAs News

Production Center for 25 years exporting 8 American media content to

Germany. Hence, none is on DOCKET; none was filed under SEAL, as is

judicially noticed herewith.

DOC#93 PROPOSED DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINSTS DEFENDANTS CHRISTIAN VIERTEL

AND TELECOMMUNICATION PARTNERS LIMITED, [sic]
6

https://dockets.justia.com/browse/circuit-2/court-ca2/noscat-13/nos-470

Domestic, interstate MAILS was not BURDAs shipping method to Germany; Lufthansa
airfreight was, thus, 1341 mail fraud destined for Germany allegations were an absurdly
malicious fabrication by a team of RICO-greenhorn mislead by Warren Feldman.
8

The rendering Court cannot carry the burden with respect to

proof of its authority based upon a defective pamphlet which,

seemingly, was a look-alike of a 24-carat Summons dream that never

was.

Consequently, appellate practice over in personam jurisdiction[

vel non] from a [pseudo] District Opinion, issued 5-18-2004 was

without authority, ergo pseudo and without merit and precedence, but

ultra vires, thus a genuine appellate nullity, as embarrassing as it

might feel to trash an oftimes cited Pro-Plaintiff OPINION, infra,

anchored upon an empty, bogus shell. Fiat iustitia ruat caelum.

But, the Second Circuit can also act nobly at other times when

proclaiming: In the context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, a judgment

may be declared void for want of jurisdiction only when the court

plainly usurped jurisdiction . . . [i.e.,] when there is a total want

of jurisdiction and no arguable basis on which it could have rested a
finding that it had jurisdiction. Central Vermont Public Service
Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 190.

Thus, defendants9 and pseudo-defendants not only when caught in a

xenophobic jurisdiction10, are plainly entitled to attack that

judgment under color of law in the court in which it was registered

on the grounds that the court that entered the judgment lacked

limited, ab ovo federal jurisdiction altogether and consequently

lacked subject matter and all other jurisdiction over such a bogus
matter.

The rendering court (sometimes referred to as the court of

Pseudo Defendant Telecommunication Partners Limited [TPL] was plaintiffs brainchild, a fictitious
moniker, and verisimilar based upon fear that RICO trebling of losses against a single RICO judgment
debtor, Movant Viertel all by himself, might raise legal odor, thus TPL was creatively added.
9

According to local jurists of reason the Nations Mother Court, SDNY, is routinely gamed by Big Law
& DOJ outside public view. Seasoned insiders label the Court a magnet for bad people doing bad things.
10

rendition) is here the Nations Mother court, the United States

District Court for the Southern District of New York that entered
the RICO DEFAULT judgment under collateral attack here.

The court in which the RICO DEFAULT judgment was registered

and sought to be enforced was the registering court, the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(sometimes referred to as the court of registration).

C. Pro Se Statement and Authority to hear the Motion

Hence, the SDFL must first decide whether a registering court

is empowered to consider, under the All Writs Act, Rule 60 or under

other authority a Pro Se Movant inartfully, albeit excusably might
seek justice, pursuant to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct.
594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Because, a pro se submission, "however

inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and a pro se motion can only be

dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears 'beyond doubt'
that the [plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.' "Id., at 520-521, 92 S.

Ct. at 596, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct.
99, 2 L.Ed.2d

80 (1957)].

[S]ubject matter jurisdiction, because it involves a courts

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.

Consequently, defects in subject matter jurisdiction require

correction regardless of whether the error was raised in the

District Court United States v. Cotton 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
Therefore, pro se Movant, Christian Viertel, files this motion

to vacate pursuant to statutes or the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(b)(4)to invalidate a VOID RICO DEFAULT judgment

entered by a rendering court on the basis that the rendering court

was VOID of its requisite limited o r i g i n a l

ab

ovo

federal

jurisdiction, and, consequently and separately VOID of [RICO]

subject matter over any [real or pseudo] defendant for reasons

stated below and, in support thereof, demonstrated by Exhibit A.

In fact, Case 97-7167 was a pseudo case, unduly processed,

inadvertently assigned, not disowned but adjudicated by default

without an [RICO]Inquest or Statement. The Court record is replete

with copies of the pamphlet falsely labeled Summons, a blaringly
deficient draft of AO 440 Civil Summons Form. If there ever was a
False Start, this was it. One great sampler for a 1L pop-quiz.

First Page of DOC#1 was a novelty pamphlet signed off by 3 Bar

associates, who if only perfected, arguendo, could have been a

bonafide Court Attendance Notice (CAN), the legal document issued

by a court (see: judicial summons). Here, that pamphlet in the

instant matter was rendered DEAD ON ARRIVAL [DOA] on 9/27/1997 and

thus outside of administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the
United States, a pamphlet of authentic nihility.

D. THIS COURTS JURISDICTION

It is well established that a registering court has such

authority and, in this case, should exercise that authority in

particular because, Movant submits, a slanderous and continuous

googlable public record for a millions-of-dollars RICO DEFAULT

judgment remains ONLINE and on legal web-search-sites. Such

Judgments have a 20-year life, a continuing validity and

enforceability that will extend the opprobrium for 4 more years [to
05 April 2020] unless vacated now, nunc pro tunc.

Plaintiffs massive smear job over absurd Mafia allegations

continues daily gravamen and slander by negatively impacting

Movants reputational assets and must therefore be vacated now.

This Court is petitioned to examine the underlying question -

whether the rendering court had original limited and subject matter
jurisdiction [in personam is immaterial and far secondary] over a
case - and shall find that original limited and subject matter
jurisdiction was absent.

Prima facie evidenced by plaintiffs arrogant disrespect of

[sine-qua-non] Rule 4(a)(1)11 which makes (A) name the court[sic] as

a Summons must [sic] imperative in pursuit of Federal-case-start-up
compliance (inter alia other important elements).

FRCP Rule 4. Summons

(a) Contents; Amendments.
(1) Contents.
A summons must:
(A) name the court and the parties;
(B) through (G).[underline added for emphasis]
11

They say, that even lesser gifted BAR associates during hard

economic times (1997/8) must comply. These here did not. Perfection
of a SUMMONS to obtain a defectless, paradigmatic and serviceable
SDNY Court Summons is as jurisdictional as a Crime Element for

prosecution, either it is there or it is not, paralegal skills and

hubris do not fill the bill.

Original Form AO 440 was just a botched DRAFT, was unperfected

[Exhibit A], but, Plaintiffs cared less 12, surely oblivious if not
arrogant enough to commission a certified Translation in early
1998for this fatal DRAFT into an congruent French Language

ASSIGNATION [Exhibit B], word by word, and <blank> by <blank>.

Consequently, albeit worthless for Hague Treaty service, the

omission of a Name of Court rendered the French pamphlet coequally

inoperative for worldwide use and Treaty compliant purposes under
Hagues Convention for Process Service, thus, also worthless in

06230 Cap Ferrat, Movants private residence since 1985. Other Codefendants, more fictional RICO goons were, upon information and
belief, not in France and thus unserviceable by Legal Process.

A valid Summons is the quintessential element for jurisdiction.

The regrettable circumstance that BURDAS paralegals could not cut

that mustard, caused dozens of Court administrators, clerks, staff
attorneys and Federal Judiciary members to honorably trespass

boundaries of Good Faith and left rearranging the Titanics deck

chairs, and, more likely, in protection of reputational assets by

Or panicked from Angst over humiliation by a botched pamphlet and over restarting PROCESS
SERVICE, whatever the truth, Big Law counsel dogged the bullet
12

10

white-washing short comings of a white shoe firm uptown.

A court must vacate the judgment as void. Jordon v.

Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1974)(A void judgment is a
legal nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no
discretion in determining whether it should be set aside).

Thereafter, this honorable Court shall consider striking all FLSD

registration entries from the public record to meet the ends of
justice, and, consider, upon separate submission, to sanction

Plaintiffs substandard legal help in New York and Florida, if and

when willful blindness or deliberate negligence is found to have

caused abuse of judicial FLSD resources, and, decade-long abuse of

Movants reputation.

Since an invalid Summons Form suffered a Slip and Fall,

was filed and ducked required due diligence, all licensed

practitioners shall be held accountable for obsession with fee

income13 over ethical conduct owed under oath. These violations

resulted in willful failure to [not only] withdraw FLSDs bogus

registration soon after the defective Summons Form was

spotlighted in Munich in early 2001 by BURDAs Associate Board

Member, Prof. Dr.jur. Robert Schweizer.

Still, on May 21, 2001 attorney Andrew D. Zaron [FBN 965790]

filed an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

[WPB ORB 12583 Pg.698, 699] on behalf of BURDAs New York firm

Clifford Chance without looking under the carpet. Later, on May 3,

13

from a group of clueless, duped rich aliens

11

2003, Bruce A. Goodman [FBN 602302] recorded a JUDGEMENT LIEN

CERTIFICATE J02000175921 with Floridas Secretary of State against

Movants property for $2,752,278.87 coequally abusive.

Henceforth, infra, Movant hereby adopts selected quotations from

a weighty jurisprudential MEMO by outstanding Cuban-American

jurist, Hon. EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, see: 245 F.R.D. 213 (PAED 2007):
The Judge stated: This Court has subject matter jurisdiction

over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 1963, which vests jurisdiction

in district courts to register final judgments that have been

entered in other federal courts. A judgment so registered shall

have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the
district where registered and may be enforced in

like manner. Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a district

court may relieve a party of a final judgment.

Thus, this case turns on three interrelated questions.

First, is a courts lack of subject matter jurisdiction a proper

basis for a Rule

60(b)(4) motion?

Second, may a registering court entertain a Rule 60(b) motion to

vacate a judgment, or must a motion under Rule 60(b) be made to the

rendering court?

Third, drawing on the answers to the first two questions, may a

registering court, under Rule 60 (b), vacate the judgment of a

rendering court because the rendering court lacked original and

subject matter jurisdiction?

12

i.

A Courts Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over a Case Is

Proper Grounds for Vacatur Under Rule 60(b)(4).

Rule 60(b) provides that [o]n motion and upon such terms as

are just, the court may relieve a party . .

from a final judgment,

order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the judgment

is void ...Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(4). A judgment entered by a court

that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Gonzalez v.

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (Rule [60(b)] preserves parties

opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction ...); Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575
F.2d 417,422 (3d Cir. 1978) (A judgment may indeed be void, and

therefore subject to relief under [Rule] 60(b)(4), if the court that

rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter ...);

11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 2862

(2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Wright & Miller] (reporting that, under
Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void if the court that rendered it
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter).

The Court continued that If jurisdiction was absent, the

court must vacate the judgment

as void. See Jordon v. Gilligan,

500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1974) (A void judgment is a legal
nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no

discretion in determining whether it should be set aside.); Wright

& Miller 2862 (There is no question of discretion on the part of
the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4).).

Indeed, a court deciding a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(4)

13

has no discretion because a judgment is either void or it

is

not. Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 409-10 (1st Cir. 2005)

(quoting Honneus v. Donovan, 691 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982, P.C.).

There is no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment as void

under Rule 60(b)(4).[N]o passage of time can transmute a nullity

into a binding judgment, and hence there is no time limit for such
a motion. It is true that the text of the rule dictates that the

motion will be made within a reasonable time. However,... there

are no time limits with regards to a challenge to a void judgment

because of its status as a nullity... United States v. One Toshiba

Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal

citation omitted); see also Wright & Miller 2866 (Although Rule

60(b) purports to require all motions under it to be made within a

reasonable time, this limitation does not apply to a motion under

clause (4) attacking a judgment as void. There is no time limit on

a motion of that kind.).

Wherefore, Movant Viertel may now move under Rule 60(b)(4)to

vacate it as void for lack of original or subject matter
jurisdiction.
ii.

A Motion Under Rule 60(b)(4) May Be Addressed to a Court

in which the Judgment Is Registered.

Motions under Rule 60(b)(4) usually are, perhaps rightfully

so, addressed to the court that entered

the judgment. A majority of

the Circuits have held, though, that, at least in certain

circumstances, a court in which a judgment is registered under

14

1963 has the authority to hear a Rule 60(b)(4) motion attacking

another courts judgment.

Five Circuits14 have held that there are at least some

circumstances in which a registering court can hear a Rule

60(b)(4)motion.[Only one Circuit, the Seventh, has held otherwise]

Of course, whether the registering court should hear the

motion is a different question, and one that is addressed infra.

The Court continued: Although Rule 60(b)(4) motions are

usually addressed to the rendering court, because that court is

more familiar with the action, when a rendering court enters a

default judgment, the registering court seems as qualified [as

the rendering court] to determine the jurisdiction of the

rendering court, particularly when the latter is a federal court

of coordinate authority. Id. at 733.

The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that, under Rule 60(b)(4), a
registering court may void a rendering courts default judgment if the rendering court was
without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G.,
629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980), the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant
in the District of Georgia and then registered that judgment in the Eastern District of New and
the Second Circuit affirmed. When, in an enforcement proceeding, the validity of the judgment
is questioned on [the ground of lack of jurisdiction], the enforcing court has the inherent power
to void the judgment, whether the judgment was issued by a tribunal within the enforcing
courts domain or by a court of a foreign jurisdiction, unless inquiry into the matter is barred by
the principles of res judicata. Id. The district court granted the motion and vacated the
judgment.
Movant submits: In here, res judicata only touches the Hague Treaty [personal] Service
imbroglio, sole issue at bar in New York. Consequently the Summons or subject matter defect
was left unaddressed by each of the Honorables, overlooked at best, if not in conscious
avoidance and through routine kowtow to Magic Circle firms to help salvage a white-shoes
reputational assets from becoming vaporware altogether and a hugely costly refund exercise.
14

15

The Second Circuit noted that this position was in accord

with Professor Moores view: since by registering the judgment in

a particular forum the creditor seeks to utilize the enforcement
machinery of that district court [,] it is not unreasonable to
hold that the latter court has the power to determine whether

relief should be granted the judgment debtor under [Rule] 60(b).

Id. at 734 (quoting 7 Moores Federal Practice 60.28(1), at 39192 (2d ed. 1979))...In Harper MacLeod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty,
260 F.3d 389,391 (5th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff obtained a default
judgment in the Southern District of Texas and then registered
that judgment in the Eastern District

of Louisiana. The defendant

then moved the Louisiana court to vacate the judgment under Rule

60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of personal
jurisdiction because service of process had been deficient. The

district court granted the motion to vacate, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, join[ing] the majority of circuits and hold[ing] that

registering courts may use Rule 60(b)(4) to sustain jurisdictional

challenges to default judgments issued by another district
court. Id.at 395.

Though judicial efficiency and comity among district

courts often counsel a registering court to defer ruling

on Rule 60(b) motions in favor of the rendering court,
such deference is less appropriate when the challenged

judgment was issued without the benefit of argument from

one party and the basis for the 60(b) challenge is

jurisdictional. . . [A] Court of registration effectively

can tell a rendering court not to enforce a default

16

judgment when the defaulting defendant never appeared in

the court of rendition and had a valid

jurisdictional

complaint. That one district court may exercise such

authority over another is a necessary consequence of the

established rule that a defendant may challenge a

rendering courts personal jurisdiction in a court in

which enforcement of a default judgment is attempted.

Such authority also reflects the federal systems disdain

for default judgments. (Emphasis by underline not in
original).

In Morris ex rel. Rector v. Peterson, 759 F.2d 809 (10th Cir.

1985), a legal malpractice action, the Colorado district court held

that it had the authority to hear the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and that
the Kansas court lacked personal jurisdiction. Although the Tenth

Circuit reversed on the factual question of whether the Kansas court

had personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, it held, without

discussion, that a court in which a judgment is registered may grant

relief under

Rule 60(b)... In FDIC v. Aaronian, 93 F.3d 636 (9th

Cir. 1996), the defendant was able in the registering court to

attack the rendering courts judgment on the basis that the judgment
was unconstitutional for lack of

due process. The plaintiff had

obtained a judgment in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on

a contracts cognovit actionem clause, which allows a holder of a
note to obtain a judgment against the defaulting party without
notice to the

defaulting party. The defendant took no action in the

Pennsylvania court, but, when the plaintiff registered the judgment

in the Eastern District of California, the defendant moved under

17

Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the judgment on the grounds that it was

unconstitutional for lack of due

process. The Ninth Circuit held

that the Rule 60(b) motion was properly before the

California

court. A court of registration has jurisdiction to entertain

motions challenging the underlying judgment. Id. at 639.
The EDPA Court continued:

There is a second category of

cases in which courts of registration have entertained requests

presented by Rule 60(b) motions, and in this narrow category they

appear to have entertained the Rule 60(b) motions directly.

Several courts of registration have considered Rule 60(b)(4)

motions for relief from default judgments on the ground that the
judgments were void because the rendering courts lacked

jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement was sought.

Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G., 629 F.2d 730 (2d
Cir. 1980); Donnely v. Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc., 87 F.R.D.

80 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Southern Rad,

Inc. 68 F.R.D. 296 (N.D.Ga. 1975) (not expressly stating that the
motion for relief was brought under Rule 60(b)); Graciette v.

Star Guidance, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). These cases,

however, appear to rest on the principle that courts asked to
enforce foreign judgments have inherent power to void those

judgments if there was no personal jurisdiction over the judgment

debtor. They are best read as refusals of the courts of

registration to dismiss allegations that the judgments were void

18

simply because the judgment debtor raised the claim in a motion

based on Rule 60(b).See Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex

A.G., supra, 629 F.2d at 733 ("Because the court below had the
power to entertain appellees' motion to grant the relief

requested, the outcome of the appeal before us will not be

governed by the label placed upon appellees' manner of
proceeding.").

However, the First Circuit identified two narrow exceptions to

the rule that Rule 60(b) motions must be addressed to the rendering
court.8

The first is when the Rule 60(b) motion is akin to an

independent equitable action, which is expressly permitted by the

Rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment . .).

Such is not at bar here in the FLSD.

This instant Motion is predicated on 1963, not equity, and

Movant has not invoked this Courts

equitable powers.

The second exception to the general rule is for Rule 60(b)(4)

challenges to default judgments on the basis that a rendering court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Thus, the First Circuit seems to be in accord with the Second,

Fifth, and Tenth: a registering court can, under Rule 60(b)(4),

vacate a rendering courts default judgment for lack of personal

jurisdiction...Indeed, Professor Moore concurs: a void judgment may

19

be collaterally attacked . . . in any subsequent state or federal

action in which the judgment becomes relevant. 12 Moores Federal

Practice 60.44 (emphasis added).

While the First Circuit, in Indian Head, stated that Rule 60(b)

motions should be made to the rendering court, it explained that

there exist two situations in which a Rule 60(b) motion may be made
to the

registering court. And that passage of First Beverages cited

by the Seventh Circuit as evidence that the Ninth Circuit is in

accord with the Seventh is merely dicta; the Ninth Circuit felt free
to ignore First Beverages (1980) when it held in Aaronian (1996)
that a registering court could entertain a Rule 60(b) motion

challenging the constitutionality of a rendering courts judgment.

Finally, contrary to the Seventh Circuits representation, Wright &

Miller are actually in accord with the majority view. See Wright &
Miller 2865 (If a judgment obtained in one district has been

registered in another district, as provided by Section 1963 of Title

28, it is possible that the court in the district of registration
has jurisdiction to hear a Rule

60(b) motion. Indeed, several

courts have ruled that it is proper for the registration court to

entertain a Rule 60(b) motion when the basis for the motion is that

the judgment is void for a lack of jurisdiction. (Underline added)

Therefore, the EDPA continued: there are some instances in

which a registering court may entertain a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.

iii. A Registering Court Has the Power to Vacate a Default

Judgment Entered by a Rendering Court on the Basis that

the Rendering Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Hon. Robreno [EDPA] was unable to locate a case in which this

question was squarely addressed. In ruling on a courts powers

20

under the registration statute, 28 U.S.C. 1963, the Court

begins, naturally, with the language of the statute:

A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or

property entered in any . . . district court . . . may be
registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment in
any other district . . . when the judgment has become
final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or
when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for
good cause shown. . . . A judgment so registered shall
have the same effect as a judgment of the district court
of the district where registered and may be enforced in
like manner. 28 U.S.C. 1963.
Because the language of the statute provides that a judgment

registered in a registering court shall have the same effect as a

judgment entered by a rendering court, the prevailing view is that a

registered judgment provides the equivalent of a new judgment in
the

registering court.

See Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965)

(Blackmun, J.) (We have concluded that 1963 is more than

ministerial and is more than a mere procedural device for the

collection of the

foreign judgment. We feel that registration

provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the equivalent of a

new judgment of the registration court.). Under this view, 28 U.S.C

1963 provides the registering court with the same inherent powers
to enforce the judgment as possessed by the
Condaire, 286 F.3d at 357.

rendering court.

Taken to the next logical step, if the registering court has

the same powers as the rendering court to enforce the judgment,

21

then it should also possess the same power to vacate the judgment
under Rule 60(b)(4).

Moreover, Congresss purpose in enacting 1963 supports the

view that Congress intended for a registering court to have the same
authority over a judgment as a rendering court does. Congress

enacted 1963 in order to simplify the process (for both litigants

and courts) for

enforcing judgments.

Prior to 1963 a judgment

creditor had to file a new suit in the judicial district in which

the judgment debtor had assets and then litigate the new suit and

obtain a new judgment. Section 1963 was designed to streamline this

process, allowing a judgment creditor to simply register the
judgment in another judicial district, without having to

relitigate

it. Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 404 (citing S. Rep. No. 83-1917
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142); see also Condaire,
Inc. v. Allied Piping, Inc., 286 F.3d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2002)

([Section] 1963 intends to provide the benefits of a local judgment

on a foreign judgment without the expense of a second lawsuit.

(quoting Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29, 30

(5th Cir. 1958)... A comity based reason is not relevant here when a
defendant makes a Rule 60(b)(4) motion in a registering court on the
grounds that a default judgment entered by the rendering court is
void: in entering a default judgment, the rendering court

necessarily is relatively unfamiliar with the merits of the case.

The only other reason asserted for this deference is to

promote comity among the federal

district courts. There is no

issue with respect to one federal district court disturbing another

courts ruling on the issue of jurisdiction, because, under the

principle of collateral estoppel, if the rendering court ruled on

the issue of jurisdiction, then the registering court is precluded

22

from examining the merits of

that ruling. So the only aspect of

comity that is touched upon is a federal district courts interest

in seeing its judgments enforced (and not vacated by a court of
coordinate authority). [citation ended]

Here, the rendering NYSD Court ruled exclusively on in

personam jurisdiction on the basis of the Hague Treaty, and did so

ex parte, based on counterfeit USM-94 forms submitted (Exhibit

C), without any detectable exam of the Summons specimen, on

record in DOC#1 itself15, upon which the District Court relied
upon as much as 14 (!) times in its Opinion dated 5-18-2004.
The EDPA continued: This interest, however, must be

balanced against the longstanding principle that [a] defendant

is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a
default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on
jurisdictional grounds in a collateral

proceeding.

Ins.

Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456

U.S. 694,

706 (1982). The defendant is free to challenge the

rendering courts judgment in a collateral proceeding; there is

no constitutional or statutory requirement that such a

collateral proceeding must also be before the rendering

court...Finally, a litigant is usually entitled to the forum of

his choosing, so long as venue is proper. Van Dusen v. Barrack,

This District Order in 97-7167 denying a Motion for lack of in personam jurisdiction via
Hagues Treaty was (on an unfit, non-jurisdictional basis for appellate jurisdiction in pseudomatter) appealed and affirmed in 417 F.3d 292, CA2 (2005), infra.
15

23

376 U.S. 612, 633-34 (1964).

Perhaps because a defendant is permitted to suffer a default

judgment and then collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the

rendering court, four Circuits have explicitly allowed defendants to

make Rule 60(b)(4) motions to registering courts on the basis that
the rendering courts lacked

personal jurisdiction. See Harper, 260

F.3d at 391; Morris, 759 F.2d at 811; Indian Head, 689 F.2d at 249;
Covington, 629 F.2d

at 732. But does this rationale also hold true

for challenges based on subject matter jurisdiction?

Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg16 would seem to think so:

A defendant who knows of an action but believes the

court lacks jurisdiction over his person or over the

subject matter generally has

an election. He may

appear, raise the jurisdictional objection, and

ultimately pursue it on

direct appeal. If he so elects,

he may not renew the jurisdictional objection in a

collateral attack...Alternatively, the defendant may

refrain from appearing, thereby exposing himself to the

risk of a default

judgment. When enforcement of the

default judgment is attempted, however, he may assert

his jurisdictional

objection. If he prevails on the

objection, the default judgment will

be vacated. If he

loses on the jurisdictional issue, on the other hand,

his day in court is normally over; as a consequence of

deferring the jurisdictional challenge, he ordinarily
forfeits his right to defend on the merits.

See: Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 811 F.2d 1543,

16

Hon. Ass. Justice Ginsberg, allottee for the Second Circuit, has been copied with this Motion

24

1547 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Hence, the EDPA Court continues, that this view is in accord

with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: When the [defendant]

knew about the action but perceived that the court lacked

territorial or subject matter jurisdiction, he is given a right to

ignore the proceeding at his own risk but to suffer no detriment if

his assessment proves correct. Restatement (Second)of Judgments
65 cmt. B (emphasis added)...On the other hand, the rationales
underlying the requirements of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction are quite

different. Subject matter jurisdiction is

rooted in the inherent power of

the court. Federal district courts

are courts of limited jurisdiction; they can hear cases only insofar
as granted that power by Congress and Article III of Constitution.

Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S.at 702. A defendants challenge

to a courts subject matter jurisdiction is not personal to that

defendant; rather, this type of challenge is designed to alert the

court that it does not have the power to decide the case. Id. Along
this vein, a courts lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be

raised by any party (or the court sua sponte) at any stage of the

litigation; even an appellate court can dismiss a case for lack of

subject

matter jurisdiction. Id.

Indeed, subject matter jurisdiction cannot

Contd:

Personal jurisdiction raises

in the Due Process Clause of

be waived. See id.

different concerns. It is rooted

the Constitution. Id. A defendants

due process rights would be violated if a court were to hear a case

in which the court did not possess personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. But, like other personal constitutional rights, a

defendant may waive personal jurisdiction. Id.at703. In short,

25

while the parties can bring themselves within the jurisdiction of

the court (personal jurisdiction), the court must still assure

itself that it is constitutionally and statutorily empowered to

adjudicate the case (subject matter jurisdiction)...In spite of

these differences, though, the power of the registering court to

entertain Rule 60(b)(4) challenges should be the same, whether the

rendering courts judgment is allegedly void because of a lack of
subject matter or personal jurisdiction.

Movant respectfully submits that this Court, as registering

court, has authority to hear Movants instant collateral motion that

the New York court lacked not only subject matter [RICO] but
coequally lacked all federal jurisdiction over a pseudo case
amateurishly anchored upon a ruse and a pamphlet, that was

regrettably misjudged by Courthouse staff, law clerks and the

Judiciary to be a true Summons form. Therefore the default judgment

entered by the New York court against Viertel and fictitious RICO
defendant Telecommunication Partners Limited must be deemed void.

iv. This Court Must Consider Movants Motion to vacate the New
York Courts Default Judgment as Void.

The efficient administration of justice is furthered by this

Court deciding the issue. Judicial economy weighs in favor of this

Court deciding the issue.

Movant submits, that this Court has prima facie evidence what

26

Plaintiffs counsels Pamphlet [Exhibit A] and BURDAs

Translation into French Language, [Exhibit B] speak for

themselves, are self explanatory, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON RECORD, that

are no longer at risk of being doctored up and fiddled with.

Therefore, the FLSD Court must consider the merit of Viertels

motion to vacate the New York courts judgment for lack of ab ovo
and subject matter jurisdiction.

E. THE NEW YORK COURTS JURISDICTION

Now that this FLSD has solid reason for its own jurisdiction

to decide whether the Rule 60(b)(4) motion should be granted, it

can look to the merits of the motion, namely whether the New York
court had original, ab ovo and subject matter jurisdiction.
1. LEGAL STANDARD
Normally, once a defendant moves to dismiss a case for lack of

ab ovo, subject matter or personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff

bears the burden of demonstrating that the court indeed has

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the defendant. Here, that
opportunity is no longer available. And, plaintiffs BURDA

terminated their attorneys, and filed a statement of disinterest

during abandonment of the last Appeal, CA2 14-2815.
See:

Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 549 F.2d 884, 891

(3d Cir. 1977) ([Under Rule 12(b)(1),] the plaintiff [has] the
burden of proof that [subject matter] jurisdiction does in fact

27

exist.).

However, Rule 60 is silent, and the case law is unclear,

on which party bears the burden 17 after a judgment has been entered.
Movant submits, that the panel[s], at their own peril,

disregarded or misjudged facts and motives, avoided or rather

circumnavigated the Docket Record below, foremost, the overt

DEFECTIVE and FATAL Summons attempt, that should have prevented

both, the District and the Circuit from proceeding at all, let

alone believe a subsequent Hague Treaty Request that was highly

suspicious, submitted by dubious practitioners who had covertly
scissored out the USM-94 forms integrated Hagues Return

Certification (done by Big Law to obscure overt lack of Central

Authoritys authentication). In sum: more than shameful RUSES 18.
The New York Courts19 treated the Constitutions Art.III, IV, V,

For purposes of in personam jurisdiction, the Second and Seventh Circuits have
squarely placed the burden on the defendant. See Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d
292, 299 (2d Cir. 2005); Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1986)
(If the defendant, after receiving notice, chooses to let the case go to a default judgment,
the defendant must then shoulder the burden of proof when the defendant decides to
contest jurisdiction in a postjudgment rule 60(b)(4)motion.). As the Second Circuit
explained, placing the burden on the defendant reflects the concerns of comity among the
district courts of the United States, the interest in resolving disputes in a single judicial
proceeding, the interest of the plaintiff in the choice of forum, and the fear of prejudice
against a plaintiff who, owing to delay, might in subsequent collateral proceedings no
longer have evidence of personal jurisdiction that existed at the time of the underlying
suit. Burda, 417 F.3d at 299 (quoting Miller v. Jones, 779 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (D. Conn.
1991)).
17

18

which Above The Law routinely labels lawyerly lies

While no Circuit has held otherwise, several district courts and at least one commentator have
advocated leaving the burden on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Sterling Indus. Corp. v. Tel., Inc.,484 F.
19

28

XIV, the Hague Treaty and Statutory limitations as little more

than speed bumps on the ignoble road to faster white collar

shoe-super-billing-schemes favoring the Magic Circle. Later, the

last panel summarily declined the opportunity to review Movants

certified Questions on Appeal (14-2815), in particular, whether or

not Big Law was entitled to a compliance exception thus

immunizing inexpert bar members from the consequences of imperfect

respect for FRCP 4(a)(1)(A) and the must part to insert a Name
the Court.

Of course, both NY appeals turned only on the [limited]

question whether in personam jurisdiction existed, disregarding, sua

sponte, that the Supreme Courts jurisprudence strongly suggests
that the plaintiff retains the burden of demonstrating subject

matter jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of

Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (holding that the party asserting the
federal courts jurisdiction must carry throughout the litigation
the burden of showing that he is properly in court).

2. The New York Courts lacked original ab ovo

and Subject Matter Jurisdiction to PROCEED

at all, moreover to enter a RICO Default

Judgment.

Supp. 1294, 1296 (N.D. Mich. 1980); Rockwell Intl Corp. v. KND Corp., 83 F.R.D. 556, 559 n.1
(N.D. Tex. 1979); Waldman, supra, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 536 (Courts should ... requir[e] that
plaintiffs in Rule 60(b)(4) motions bear the burden of proving that the court issuing the default
judgment had proper personal jurisdiction.).

29

The draft of a pseudo COMPLAINT for the NYSD, BURDA

stated that subject matter jurisdiction was predicated on 18

U.S.C. 1964(c) and the doctrine of pending jurisdiction. But,

subject matter RICO would rank secondary to Original

Jurisdiction to duly authenticate a federal controversy by more

than a $125.00 Court fee payment. Here, in 97-7167, no

controversy was duly filed or reached a level of PACER legitimacy

required for a genuine Federal Case to proceed. Such train wrecks
can, apparently, happen when a Courts administration is

capriciously outsourced to honorarium-based Bar associates, who

print up convenient Certificates, Defaults, Orders and

[proposed) Judgments on NYSD COURT HEADERS while at 200 Park

Avenue, and while in pursuit of foreign billionaires savings
accounts.

Counsels first print job surely tanked.

BURDA caught on [see FN 4], albeit belatedly, and realized

that had been victimized by the rancid version of New York

litigation methodology and BURDA terminated legal representation

by Clifford Chance soon after Movants Counsel, in 2006, caused a

review of Rogers & Wells Hague Treaty fraud in France and New

York, and after an internal BURDA audit of legal expenses billed

for this pseudo-proceeding by their New York law firm raised
concern.

30

In fact, when BURDA unilaterally - settled a [refund]

claim against former President Fritz Blumenberg in late 1998, it

did decidedly so farthest away from 97-7167, farthest away from
absurd RICO delusions and farthest away from Pearl Streets
Courthouse, in the legal sanctuary at Germanys Consulate

General, in German language and pursuant to German civil [BGB]

law, as required by most German directorship agreements. These

strictly prohibit all foreign [New York] action, prohibit RICO

or other exaggerations, since 1992.

Exclusive Venue with Blumenberg was Munich, Germany.

The restraints of this 1992 deal with Blumenberg was best

known to Rogers & Wells German speaking partner[s] 20, who

deliberately breached their ethical and honest service duty to

clients BURDA HOLDING GmbH and BURDA MEDIA by drawing up [and
billing $1,900,000+ million] a RICO action process against

Blumenberg, the number one RICO defendant. [see: Captions in

Exhibit A, B].

BURDAs Management confirmed firstly that no directors or

officers of BURDA partook in nor authenticated a single NYSD

Court submission, and, secondly, whether a valid Mandate for any

NYSD action ever issued to Roger Wells/Clifford Chances cannot
be verified from the records at hand.

20

Rechtsanwalt Klaus Heinrich Jander NYBar # 1414358, inter alia

31

3. FIAT UT PETITUR

In view of the record, which speaks for itself, the District

Court for the Southern District of New York lacked ab ovo, ergo
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim. Therefore,

Viertels motion to vacate nunc pro tunc - the New York courts

default judgment as void shall be granted with all other relief this
Court deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 15 th day of January 2016

Christian T. Viertel, pro se

9858 GLADES ROAD
SUITE D-3 #239
BOCA RATON, FL 33434 PB
justdueprocess@aol.de
(1) 845- 260 9545
Courtesy Copy to
Hon. Grassley, Hon. Leahy, Hon. Sensenbrenner,
plus courtesy service by email upon Hon. Sen. Prof. Dr. Burda for
plaintiff Holding
Attachments: Exhibits A,B,C
U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida (Miami)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00-cv-02034-JLK
Date Filed

06/07/2000

Docket Text

Registration of Foreign Judgment from Southern District of New York against Defendants, Christian
Viertel and Telecommunication Partners Limited in the liquidated amount of: $ 2,752,278.87;
FILING FEE $20.00 RECEIPT # 823260; B-12 JJO (Former Deputy Clerk) Modified on 06/08/2000

32

Exhibit A
(1 page plus RIDER)

P.S. Exhibit A embodies the matchless specimen at center of this

MOTION. It purported to function compliant to an AO 440 Form
Summons in a Civil Case, but, is evidently defective beyond
salvage:
The Name of Court is left blank despite RULE 4s must

precondition for a bonafide Court Attendance Notice (CAN), a legal

document issued by district courts (judicial summons). The pamphlet
was docketed and filed numerous times in NYSD 97-7167, as in DOC#1,
#88, #92, #95, in identical form as shown below.

Thus, 97-7167 DOC#1 was borne a novelty pamphlet unadroitly drawn up

by Big Laws Bar team Feldman, McCloy Stephanz, Anderson of Park
Avenue, NY, and deemed sworn Officers of NY Courts.

[Until recently, District Courts too frequently faced defective 440 Forms from
scads of lawyerly dimwits to cause the Administrative Office USC to upload its

Online-Template for Form 440, which blocks save or prints, unless practitioners
selected one Name of Court from a multi-choice drop-down menu shown below ]

http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/notice-lawsuit-summonssubpoena/summons-civil-action

33

34

35

Exhibit B

ASSIGNATION DANS UNE ACTION AU CIVIL

P.S. Exhibit B is plaintiffs verbatim translation intended for a
Hague Treaty Process Notification [fr: Assignation] intended for
Process Service by the French Republics Central Authority in Paris.

This translation is verbatim to Exhibit A, the Pamphlet. It was

issued on our about late Spring 1997 and serves as PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE that Plaintiffs relied upon the deceased Pamphlet in DOC#1.
The translation was docketed/filed numerous times in NYSD 97-7167,
under #88, #92, #95, in identical form as shown here. [Whether it
reached Paris is now inconsequential]

Since a Name of Court is visibly missing < aptly left blank> from
this congruent Assignation which, plaintiffs brazenly aver in their
pleadings, was submitted to Frances CA as part of a July 14, 1998
USM-94 (Exhibit C 3). Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs lead every NY
Federal Judge, outrageously, on the proverbial garden path on which
they gamed and won based upon gullibility of Appellate Panel
Members demeaning the very system of justice itself:

36

37

Exhibit C

2 page MJ Letter plus counterfeit USM-94

Note: 3: Hague Treaty service, purportedly requested pursuant to NY

Court Officer, Mark Andersons on USM-94 forms dated July 14, 1998.
Reception and official presence of these forms dated July 14, 1998 was
flatly rebuffed by Frances Ministre de la Justice - Garde des Sceaux
simply for absence of official intake records. The French were left puzzled
when confronted by Movants attorneys with a set of unmatchable
submissions dated July 14, 1998, that conflicted with a genuine USM-94
request officially received per July, 7, 1998.
Translation of relevant sections (Page 1, Paragraph 2, middle):

... results of our investigation into our archives are, that the Central
Authority, represented by this bureau, was engaged per request dated 7 th July
1998 demanding notification of documents by MARK R. ANDERSON, esq., ROGERS &
WELLS destined for monsieur VIERTEL as representative of companies TV BROAD
CAST CENTER and TELECOMMUNICATION PARTENER LIMITED, and that notification
was executed on 6th August 1998, thereafter the acts [dossiers] were
returned to the requester in the United States. Paragraph 3: In view of
the pieces that you transmitted, in particular those (verbal) notes dated 6 th
and 12th August 1998, it appears that other acts concerning notifications
might have been in pendency during that time, but because of total absence
of other reference, we are unable to locate even a trace of these requests
in the archives of our service, and, therefore, we are unable to verify the
modalities/circumstances of apprehension/notification or the entities on
target.
This official letter clearly and convincingly demonstrates that every one of
Esquire Andersons ten July 14, 1998 (3)USM-94 submissions made on 11-121998 to Judge Sweet were counterfeit in hindsight, and that Anderson had
tried an earlier USM-94 request, dated 7 th July 1998, failed and made it
vanish from earth, most plausible because his only true service was upon a
<putative> representative for two (named) corporations [both fabrications
by Esquire Feldman] was deemed fatally unfit for a direct RICO Default
attack against <unserved> Movant Viertel, in personam. The New York Courts
failed to discharge their judicial burdens to assert that proof of

service is legitimate, odorless and not Park Avenue sewer-service by

skullduggery and shenanigans. Shenanigans trumped United States
exceptionalism in CA2: 04-3426 [Citation: 417 F.3d 292], CA2: 10-2445
(fee default) and CA2: 14-2815 (summarily affirming in personam
jurisdiction)

38

39

Page 2 of Letter dated 11-28-2006 by French Central Authority.

40

41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CAPTION:

BURDA MEDIA, INC. and BURDA HOLDING

GmbH & CO. KG, a German Limited

00-Civ-02034 JLK

Partnership,
v.

CHRISTIAN VIERTEL, TELECOMMUNICATION

PARTNERS LIMITED

CERTIFICATE OF COURTESY
SERVICE

I, Prof. Christian T Viertel, hereby certify under penalty of perjury

that on 15th January 2016, I served a copy, pdf file of this instant
MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 43 pages (total)
by email on the following party on behalf of both
unrepresented Plaintiffs:

Hon. Senator Prof. Dr. Hubert Burda at burdahu@burda.com

Signature

42