Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs.

SSS
1. SOCIAL SECURITY; COVERAGE; EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP NECESSARY. The coverage of the
Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to
employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND NON-PROFIT ENTITIES
INCLUDED IN TERM "EMPLOYER". The term "employer" in the
Social Security Law is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious
and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its
meaning. This is evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which
said institutions or entities are not included. Had the Legislature intended
to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it
would not have defined an "employer" in such a way as to include the
Government and yet make an express exception of it.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DELETION OF PERTINENT PORTION OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 1161 CLEAR INDICATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The
fact that the portion of Republic Act No. 1161 which provides that services
performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or
charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from
coverage thereof (sec. 8, par (j) sub-pars. 7 and 8), is clear indication that
the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions
within the scope of the law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SOCIAL SECURITY LAW LEGITIMATE EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER. The Social Security Law is a legitimate exercise of
the police power of the State. It affords protection to labor, especially to
working women and minors, and is in full accord with the constitutional
provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation,
compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living conditions of
the working class, the extent of its provisions cannot arbitrarily be
delimited to relations between capital and labor in industry and
agriculture.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF FUNDS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM. The funds contributed to the System created by
the Social Security Law are not public funds, but funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the Government. hence, the
inclusion of religious organization under the coverage of the law does not

violate the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds

for the use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by
the Church.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW NOT
IMPAIRMENT OF CHURCH RIGHT. The enforcement of the Social
Security Law does not impair the right of the Church to disseminate
religious information, because all that the law requires of the Church is to
make monthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its
employ. These contributions are not "in the nature of taxes on
employment." Together with the contributions imposed upon the
employees and the Government, they are intended for protection of said
employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death
in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure
to well being and economic security of all the people.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM
GENERIS; WHEN APPLICABLE. The principle of ejusdem
generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works (La), 160 So. 499).
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. vs. SSS
Constitutional Law; Social Security System; Membership therein is not
the result of a contractual agreement but a legal imposition.
Membership in the Social Security System is not the result of a bilateral,
consensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are
defined by and subject to their will. Republic Act 1161 requires
compulsory coverage of employers and employees under the system. It
is actually a legal imposition on said employers and employees, designed
to provide security to the working men. Membership in the Social Security
System is, therefore, in compliance with a lawful exercise of the police
power of the State, to which the principle of nonimpairment of the
obligation of contract is not a proper defense.
Same; Statutes; Effectivity of laws; Amended rules take effect upon
approval by the President.Under Article 2 of the New Civil Code, the
date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the
purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do
not so provide. When the original Rules and Regulations of the Social
Security System specifically provide that any amendment thereto
subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of

its approval by the President, the delayed publication of the amended

rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity,
which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President.
Raro vs. ECC
1. LABOR LAW; EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION; OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES; SICKNESS NOT COVERED THEREIN; POSITIVE PROOF
NECESSARY TO BE COMPENSABLE. Section 1 (b), Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are
entitled. It provides: "SECTION 1. . . . "(b) For the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions." The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a
positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say
that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the
obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be
adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be
presumed. In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R.
No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a
disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life,
employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of
cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes,
nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
2. ID.; ID.; OLD WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW DISTINGUISHED
FROM PRESENT SCHEME UNDER THE NEW LABOR CODE. On
January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a
novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded,
among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security
principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance
agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System under the Employees' Compensation Commission.
The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's
obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to
receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. Instead of an
adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we
now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid

by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to
those who can prove entitlement.
3. ID.; ID.; NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PRESENT LAW EXPLAINED.
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings
is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a
widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against
the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be
given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the
trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to
claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its
employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is
spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the
disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution
which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund
against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this
time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition,
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working
conditions. The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other
important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All
covered employers throughout the country are required by law to
contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for
their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the
amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were
undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would
probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the
stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system can pay
benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts
fixed by law.
4. ID.; ID.; PREVIOUS DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF "PRESUMPTION OF
COMPENSABILITY" SUPERSEDED. For the guidance of the
administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, this decision
expressly
supersedes
the
decisions
in Panotes
v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [128
SCRA
473
(1984)]; Mercado v. Employees'Compensation Commission [127 SCRA
664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156
SCRA
21
(1987)]; Nemaria
v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions
different from the instant case.

5. ID.; ID.; COURTS WITHOUT POWER TO LEGISLATE TO INCREASE

NUMBER OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES. If increased contributions
or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now
excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper
actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such
a complex subject with such far reaching implications. We trust that the
public respondents and the Social Security System are continually
evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In
this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be
included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may
be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of
employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove
entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to
accomplish.
CMC Estate Inc. vs. SSS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAW; SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT; PURPOSE FOR THE ENACTMENT, PROMOTION OF
GENERAL WELFARE. The Social Security Law was enacted pursuant
to the policy of the government "to develop, establish gradually and
perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of
the people throughout the Philippines, and shall provide protection
against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (Sec. 2,
RA 1161, as amended) It is thus clear that said enactment implements
the general welfare mandate of the Constitution and constitutes a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the State.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FUNDS CONTRIBUTED BELONG TO THE
MEMBERS. The taxing power of the State is exercised for the purpose
of raising revenues. However, under our Social Security Law, the
emphasis is more on the promotion of the general welfare. The Act is not
part of our Internal Revenue Code nor are the contributions and
premiums therein dealt with and provided for, collectible by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. The funds contributed to the System belong to the
members who will receive benefits, as a matter of right, whenever the
hazards provided by the law occur.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT. Should each
business venture of the employer be considered as the basis of the
coverage, an employer with more than one line of business but with less
than six employees in each, would never be covered although he has in
his employ a total of more than six employees which is sufficient to bring

him within the ambit of compulsory coverage. This would frustrate rather
than foster the policy of the Act. The legislative intent must be respected.
In the absence of an express provision for a separate coverage for each
kind of business, the reasonable interpretation is that once an employer
is covered in a particular kind of business, he should be automatically
covered with respect to any new line of business he may subsequently
undertake even under a new name. Any interpretation which would
defeat rather than promote the ends for which the Social Security Act was
enacted should eschewed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMENDATORY LAW NOW PROVIDES FOR AUTOMATIC
COVERAGE OF EMPLOYER. Petitioner contends that the
Commission cannot indiscriminately combine for purposes of coverage
two distinct and separate businesses when one has not yet been in
operation for more than two years thus rendering nugatory the period of
stabilization fixed by the Act. This contention lacks merit since the
amendatory law, PA 2658, which was approved on June 18, 1960,
eliminated the two-year stabilization period as employers now become
automatically covered immediately upon the start of the business. Sec.
10 (formerly Sec. 9) of RA 1161, as amended byRA 2658 now provides:
"Sec. 10 Effective date coverage. Compulsory coverage of the
employer shall take effect on the first day of his operation, and that of the
employee on the date of his employment." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, in
the case at bar, the records indubitably show that petitioner started its
real estate business on December 1, 1952 while its logging operation
was actually commenced on April 1, 1957. Applying the provision of Sec.
10 of the Act, petitioner is subject to compulsory coverage as of
December 1, 1952 with respect to the real estate business and as of April
1, 1957 with respect to its logging operation.
SSS vs. Davac
1. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM; NATURE OF BENEFITS UNDER THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; VALIDLY DESIGNATED BENEFICIARY
ENTITLED TO BENEFITS. The benefit receivable under the Social
Security Act is in the nature of a special privilege or an arrangement
secured by the law, pursuant to the policy of the State to provide social
security to the workingmen. The amounts that may thus be received
cannot be considered as property earned by the member during his
lifetime, and, hence, do not form part of the properties of the conjugal
partnership or of the estate of the said member. They are disbursed from
a public special fund created by Congress pursuant to the declared policy
of the Republic "to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social

security system which . . . shall provide protection against the hazards of

disability, sickness, old age and death." (Section 1, Republic Act No.
1792.) Consequently, if there is a named beneficiary and the designation
is not invalid, it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to
receive the benefits, unless they are the designated beneficiaries
themselves. It is only when there is no designated beneficiary or when
the designation is void that the laws of succession become applicable.
The Social Security Act is not a law of succession. (See Tecson vs. Social
Security System, G. R. No. L-15798, December 23, 1961.)
Dabatian vs. GSIS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAW; EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION ACT; COVERAGE; COMPENSABLE AILMENTS
CONTRACTED AFTER JANUARY 1, 1975, THE DATE OF
EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. 442 (NEW LABOR CODE); CASE AT BAR.
The records show that petitioner died on July 3, 1976 when the old
compensation law had already been abrogated. No competent evidence
whatsoever was submitted to prove that Dabatian's ailment was
contracted prior to January 1,1975 in order to bring it under the protective
mantle of the old compensation law. There are no medical findings,
affidavits, reports or any other evidence that deceased suffered from pain
or any discomfort prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. No
allegation was even made to this effect. True it is, that strict rules on
evidence do not apply in cases such as this and that all doubts should be
resolved in favor of labor. However, We cannot over-extend the limits of
such rules. Justice and fair play dictate otherwise. The new law on
compensation should be applied to this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY AND RULE ON
AGGRAVATION OF ILLNESS ABOLISHED; REASON AND PURPOSE.
The present Labor Code, P.D. 442 as amended, abolished the
presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness
caused by the nature of employment, the reason being "to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability . . . ." It was found, and rightly so, that the
old law, the Workmen's Compensation Act, destroyed the parity or
balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with
respect to workmen's compensation. The balance was tilted unduly in
favor of the workmen since it was possible to stretch the work-related
nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF COMPENSABLE ILLNESS OR DISABILITY

OR DISABILITY UNDER THE NEW LABOR CODE. Under the present
law, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits,
the sickness or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted
from either a) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or b) any illness caused by employment
subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AILMENT CONTRACTED BY DECEASED NOT
COMPENSABLE IN CASE AT BAR. Since peptic ulcer is not included
in the list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then
petitioner has the burden of proving that the nature of her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Aside from the undisputed
fact that the deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his way of
warding off sleepiness, no evidence was ever adduced by petitioner to
bolster the theory that her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the ailment. Being a heavy coffee drinker may have
aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of an illness is no longer a
ground for compensation under the present law. This Court takes notice
of the fact that the conditions in this case are not peculiar to the work
mentioned herein. Many, if not most, employees are equally exposed to
similar conditions but have not been victims of peptic ulcer.
Gamogamo vs. PNOC
1. LABOR LAWS; RETIREMENT; EXPLAINED; CREDITABLE SERVICE;
RECKONING POINT. Retirement results from a voluntary agreement
between the employer and the employee whereby the latter after
reaching a certain age agrees to sever his employment with the former.
Since the retirement pay solely comes from Respondent's funds, it is but
natural that Respondent shall disregard petitioner's length of service in
another company for the computation of his retirement benefits.
Petitioner was absorbed by Respondent from LUSTEVECO on 1 August
1979. Ordinarily, his creditable service shall be reckoned from such date.
However, since Respondent took over the shipping business of
LUSTEVECO and agreed to assume without interruption all the service
credits of petitioner with LUSTEVECO, petitioner's creditable service
must start from 9 November 1977 when he started working with
LUSTEVECO until his day of retirement on 1 April 1995. Thus,
petitioner's creditable service is 17.3333 years.

2. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7699; PETITIONER CANNOT AVAIL OF

THE BENEFITS UNDER THE LAW; PRINCIPLE OF TACKING OF
CREDITABLE SERVICE; TOTALIZATION OF SERVICE CREDITS
RESORTED TO ONLY WHEN RETIREE DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR
BENEFITS IN EITHER OR BOTH THE SSS AND GSIS. Petitioner's
contention that the principle of tacking of creditable service is mandated
by Republic Act No. 7699 is baseless. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
7699 reads: SEC 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, a covered worker who
transfer(s) employment from one sector to another or is employed in both
sectors, shall have his creditable services or contributions in both
systems credited to his service or contribution record in each of the
Systems and shall be totalized for purposes of old-age, disability,
survivorship, and other benefits in case the covered employee does not
qualify for such benefits in either or both Systems without totalization:
Provided, however, That overlapping periods of membership shall be
credited only once for purposes of totalization. Obviously, totalization of
service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for
benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here, petitioner is qualified to
receive benefits granted by the Government Security Insurance System
(GSIS), if such right has not yet been exercised. The pertinent provisions
of law are: SEC. 12 Old Age Pension. (a) . . . (b) A member who has
rendered at least three years but less than fifteen years of service at the
time of separation shall, upon reaching sixty years of age or upon
separation after age sixty, receive a cash payment equivalent to one
hundred percent of his average monthly compensation for every year of
service with an employer (Presidential Decree No, 1146, as amended,
otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1977).
SEC. 4. All contributions paid by such member personally, and those that
were paid by his employers to both Systems shall be considered in the
processing of benefits which he can claim from either or both Systems:
Provided, however, That the amount of benefits to be paid by one System
shall be in proportion to the number of contributions actually remitted to
that System (Republic Act No. 7699). In any case, petitioner's fourteen
years of service with the DOH may not remain uncompensated because
it may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the aforequoted Section
12, as may be determined by the GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled
to some benefits from the GSIS, he cannot avail of the benefits
under R.A. No. 7699.
3. ID.; ID.; QUITCLAIMS, NOT PER SE INVALID OR AGAINST PUBLIC
POLICY; EXCEPTIONS, NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. It may

also be pointed out that upon his receipt of the amount of P512,524.15
from Respondent as retirement benefit pursuant to its retirement scheme,
petitioner signed and delivered to Respondent a Release and
Undertaking wherein he waives all actions, causes of actions, debts,
dues, monies and accounts in connection with his employment with
Respondent. This quitclaim releases Respondent from any other
obligation in favor of petitioner. While quitclaims executed by employees
are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are
ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the employees' legal
rights, there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and
reasonable settlement of laborers' claims which should be respected by
the courts as the law between the parties. Settled is the rule that not all
quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person; and (2) where the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on their face. We discern nothing from the record that
would suggest that petitioner was coerced, intimidated or deceived into
signing the Release and Undertaking. Neither are we convinced that the
consideration for the quitclaim is unconscionable because it is actually
the full amount of the retirement benefit provided for in the company's
retirement plan.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; DOES NOT COVER
GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
WHICH HAS NO ORIGINAL CHARTER. We cannot uphold petitioner's
contention that his fourteen years of service with the DOH should be
considered because his last two employers were government-owned and
controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. It is not at all
disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are governmentowned and controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence
they are not under the Civil Service Law. In Philippine National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we ruled: . . . "Thus under the present state of the law, the
test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled
corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law are (sic) the manner of its
creation, such that government corporations created by special charter(s)
are subject to its provisions while those incorporated under the General
Corporation Law are not within its coverage." Consequently, Respondent
was not bound by the opinion of the Civil Service Commission of 18 May
1993.
GSIS vs. CSC & Baradero & Belo

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; RETIREMENT BENEFITS;

"PER DIEM" RECEIVED WHICH WAS ACTUALLY PAID FOR IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY AND NOT
AS THE PER DIEM REFERRED TO IN G.S.I.S. ACT, CREDITABLE. A
review of the circumstances surrounding payment to respondent Belo of
the per diems in question convinces us that her motion is meritorious. We
are convinced that the "per diem" she received was actually paid for in
the performance of her duties as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a holdover
capacity not as the per diem referred to be Section 1 (c) of R.A. No.
1573 which amended Section l(c) of C.A. No. 186(Government Service
Insurance Act). A closer look at the aforecited provision, moreover,
reveals a legislative intent to make a clear distinction between salary, pay
or compensation, on one hand, and other incidental allowances,
including per diems on the other. Since it is generally held that an
allowance for expenses incident to the discharge of an office is not a
salary of office, it follows that if the remuneration received by a public
official in the performance of his duties does not constitute a mere
"allowance for expenses" but appears to be his actual basepay, then no
amount of categorizing the salary as a "per diem" would take the
allowances received by private respondents from the term service with
compensation for the purpose of computing the number of years of
service in government. Furthermore, it would grossly violate the law's
intent to reward the public servant's years of dedicated service to
government for us to gloss over the circumstances surrounding the
payment of the said remunerations to the petitioner in taking a purely
mechanical approach to the problem by accepting an attached label at
face value. What ought to be controlling in the cases at bench therefore,
should be the nature of the remuneration rather than the label attached to
it. While there is no dispute that the law excepting per diemsfrom the
definition of compensation is clear and requires no interpretation,
however, since the term per diem may construed either as compensation
or as allowance, it would be necessary for us to inquire whether the
term per diem in the GSIS Law refers to one or the other signification. As
explained above, it is plainly obvious that per diem as compensation, is
not what the law contemplates. The clear intent of the Government
Insurance Law was to exclude those extra incidental expenses or
incurred on a daily basis covered by the traditional definition of the
term per diem. An important fact missed from our earlier decision was
that, while respondent Belo was paid a fixed salary, which apparently
rectified an otherwise anomalous situation. The services rendered by

respondent Belo having been continuous, the disputed period should be

credited for purposes of retirement.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "PER DIEM"; DEFINED. In the sense in which the
phrase "per diem" is used under the Government Service Insurance Law,
a per diem is a daily allowance given for each day an officer or employee
of government is away from his home base. This is its traditional
meaning: its usual signification is as a reimbursement for extra expenses
incurred by the public official in the performance of his duties. Under this
definition the per diem is intended to cover the cost of lodging and
subsistence of officers and employees when the latter are on duty outside
of their permanent station.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN CONSIDERED A COMPENSATION OR
REMUNERATION ATTACHED TO AN OFFICE; APPLICATION IN CASE
AT BAR. On the other hand, a per diem could rightfully be considered
a compensation or remuneration attached to an office. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case of respondent Belo the per
diems received by her during the period that she acted in holdover
capacity obviously were in the nature of compensation or remuneration
for her services as Vice Governor of the Province of Capiz, rather than as
a reimbursement for incidental expenses incurred while away from her
home base. The same could be said of the services rendered by
respondent Baradero, who, before and after the period in question had
an unblemished record of service to the government as a member of the
army and as a medical officer of the Philippine Medicare Commission.
The disputed period was served on a full-time basis regardless of the
denomination given to the compensation received by him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. Retirement benefits given to government
employees in effect reward them for giving the best years of their lives to
the service of their country. This is especially true with those in
government service occupying positions requiring management skills
because the years they devote to government service could be spent
more profitably in lucrative appointments in the private sector. In
exchange for their selfless dedication to government service, they enjoy
security of tenure and are ensured of a reasonable amount of support
after they leave the government. The basis for the provision of retirement
benefits is, therefore, service to government. While a government
insurance system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to
keep this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on
contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the fact
that these contributions are minimal when compared to the amount of

retirement benefits actually received shows that such contributions, while

necessary, are not absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for
those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit system.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF GSIS TO DEDUCT FROM EMPLOYEES
MONTHLY CONTRIBUTION; NOT FAULT OF EMPLOYEES. It cannot
be convincingly asserted that private respondents could not avail
themselves of the benefits of the policy because no deductions were
made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid
on a per diem basis. In respondent Belo's case, before and after that
short interregnum, she was paid a fixed salary. She was not duly
informed that that short period was not to be credited in computing the
length of her service for retirement purposes. She assumed in all good
faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits
considering that in fact and in practice the deductions are virtually and
mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially
involuntary basis. Similarly, had respondent Baradero been informed of
the need to pay the required deductions for the purpose of qualifying for
retirement benefits, he would have willingly paid the required sums. In a
sense, the contract made between the GSIS and the government
employee is done on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, that is, it is a virtual
contract of adhesion which gives the employee no choice but to
involuntarily accede to the deductions made from their oftentimes meager
salaries. If the GSIS did not deduct, it was by its own choice:
contributions were exacted from private respondents before and after the
disputed period. To assert that private respondents would have been
made entitled to benefits had they opted for optional deductions at that
point misses the principal fact in issue here, which is the question as to
whether or not the disputed periods should be credited as service with
compensation for the purposes of retirement. Moreover, the source of
GSIS benefits is not in essence merely contractual; rather, it is a social
legislation as clearly indicated in the "whereases" of Presidential Decree
No. 1146.
Vda. De Consuegra vs. GSIS
Government Service Insurance System; Designation of beneficiaries in
life insurance differs from that in retirement insurance.When
Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not
have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the
beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on
retirement insurance under the_GSIS came about only when Com. Act
186 was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June 16, 1951. Hence, it cannot

be said that because appellants were designated beneficiaries in

Consuegras life insurance they automatically became the beneficiaries
also of his retirement insurance. The provisions of subsection (b) of
Section 11 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Rep. Act 660,
clearly indicate that there is need for the employee to file an application
for retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a member of the
GSIS, and he should state in his application the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance. Hence, the beneficiary named in the life insurance
does not automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement
insurance unless the same beneficiary in the life insurance is so
designated in the application for retirement insurance.
Same; Benefits offered to members.The GSIS offers two separate and
distinct systems of benefits to its membersone is the life insurance and
the other is the retirement insurance. These two distinct systems of
benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate funds that are
maintained by the GSIS.
Same; Beneficiaries in life insurance.In the case of the proceeds of a
life insurance, the same are paid to whoever is named the beneficiary in
the life insurance policy. As in the case of life insurance provided for in
the Insurance Act (Act 2427, as amended), the beneficiary in a life
insurance under the GSIS may not necessarily be an heir of the insured.
The insured in a life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary
unless disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in
the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the
proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of the insured.
Same; Beneficiaries in retirement insurance.Retirement insurance is
primarily intended for the benefit of the employeeto provide for his old
age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a
required number of years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement,
he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance. The
beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the
employee failed or -overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement
insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be
given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life
insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
Civil law; Succession; Rights to retirement benefits when there exists two
marriages.The respondent GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that

the proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra

should be divided equally between his first living wife Rosario Diaz, on
the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her
on the other; and the lower court did not commit error when it affirmed the
action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second marriage
of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in good faith. The
Supreme Court, in construing the rights of two women who were married
to the same man, held that since the defendants first marriage has not
been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by
that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code,
entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage
or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the
property in dispute. And with respect, to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, the only just and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her
husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.
Lledo vs. Lledo
No syllabus
Rabor vs. CSC
1. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW; REVISED
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE ACT OF 1977 (P.D. 1146); EXTENSION OF SERVICE OF
RETIREES; DOCTRINE IN CENA CASE (211 SCRA 179 [1992]),
DISCUSSED. While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old,
the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the
theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the
same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government
service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the
Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his
government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill

up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court
also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one
vested in the head of the agency concerned. The Court reached the
above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary
meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. The Court went on to rely
upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in
respect of retirement statutes. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in
verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative
issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that
may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of
age. The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which states in part, "Any request for the
extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement all be allowed only to permanent
appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for
a period not exceeding one (1) year." The second administrative
issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President,
dated 14 June 1988 provides: 'Officials or employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained
in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months.' Medialdea, J. resolved the
challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by,
firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and,
secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum
Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES; SUBORDINATE RULE-MAKING BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PERMISSIBLE AND VALID. It will be
seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum
No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rulemaking by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. That
restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde, where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said: "It is well
established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a nondelegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to

the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. All that may be reasonably demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative
regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied
in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
and to this test we now turn.
4. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE LAW AND P.D. 1146; STATUTES GOVERNING
EXTENSION OF SERVICE OF RETIREES. We consider that the
enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present
Civil Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order
No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as theAdministrative
Code of 1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the
"Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of
extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of
age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section
11(b) of P.D. No. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many
provisions of the present civil service law.
5. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 27 LIMITING EXTENSION OF
SERVICE OF RETIREES TO ONE YEAR, AN EXERCISE OF ITS
AUTHORITY AS THE CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY OF THE
GOVERNMENT. It was on the bases of Section 12 (2, 3, 10, 14, 17
and 19) of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service
Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so,
the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the
government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines
for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government." It was also discharging its function of "administering the
retirement program for government officials and employees" and of
"evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." In addition, the Civil Service
Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing
leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified
and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the
"enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to
retirementand the regulation for the effective implementation of the
retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 27, DECLARED

VALID AND EFFECTIVE; DOCTRINE IN CENA CASE (211 SCRA
179 [1992]), MODIFIED. Our conclusion is that the doctrine
of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically
paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11
(b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with
Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding
in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested
with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of
an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this
discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the
provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NO
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CIVIL SERVICE RESOLUTION
NO. 92-594 DISMISSING APPEAL OF PETITIONER REQUESTING
FOR EXTENSION OF SERVICE BEYOND THE RETIREMENT AGE.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant
case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594
dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and
affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991,
must be upheld and affirmed. Accordingly, for all the foregoing, the
Petition for Certiorari is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Profeta vs. Drilon
1. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW;
LAW
ON
PUBLIC
OFFICERS; PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE
NO.
1146 (REVISED
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE ACT OF 1977); OLD AGE PENSION
BENEFIT;
REQUISITES.

Under Presidential
Decree
No.
1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one of the benefits
provided for qualified members of the GSIS is the old-age pension
benefit. A member who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service
and is at least sixty (60) years old when separated from the service, is
entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than five (5)
years. On the other hand, a member who has rendered less than fifteen
(15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of service and is
sixty (60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to a
cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the average
monthly compensation for every year of service.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBER WHO REACHED THE AGE OF

COMPULSORY RETIREMENT, ALLOWED TO CONTINUE SERVICE TO
COMPLETE FIFTEEN (15) YEARS REQUIREMENT. However,
retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixtyfive (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of service. If he has less
than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen (15) years, to avail of the old-age pension
benefit.

1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain in the service
until she has completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement.
Between the period of 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner
should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to
complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement; she was prepared to
render services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
therefore, be entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments
during said period (16 October 1991 30 April 1992).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENSION DEFINED. To a public servant, a pension is

not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for services
performed and his right to it commences to vest upon his entry into the
retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon
fulfillment of all conditions under which it is to be paid.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MEMBER WHO IS DEEMED TO HAVE COMPLETED

SERVICE REQUIREMENT, CAN NO LONGER BE REINSTATED.
However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her former position to
enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement for
retirement purposes is no longer possible, considering that she is
deemed to have completed the said service requirement as of 30 April
1992.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETIREMENT BENEFITS, CONSTRUED. Retirement

benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or
employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in
establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in
public employment and render faithful and efficient service while so
employed.
5. ID.; ID.; RETIREMENT LAWS, LIBERALLY INTERPRETED IN FAVOR
OF THE RETIREE. Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of
the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance and
hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and
well-being of government employees may be enhanced.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; WITH
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ISSUES ON
QUALIFICATION TO OLD-AGE PENSION. It is the GSIS which has
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is
qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.
1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the
government. The computation of a member's service includes not only
full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may
be included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The order of the Office of the
President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October

Santiago vs. COA

1. PUBLIC OFFICERS; DOUBLE APPOINTMENTS NOT PROHIBITED;
REQUISITES. In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, this Court held that double
appointments are not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not
incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot
receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized
by law.
2. ID.; HONORARIUM DISTINGUISHED FROM SALARY IN CASE AT
BAR. The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the
additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely an
honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall
under the provision of Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966 and so
should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits.
We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something
given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for services
rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit
of no compensation in money. The additional compensation given to the
petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was received by him as
a matter of right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even
Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the
petitioner's "salary differential."

3. ID.; ACCEPTED LEGAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN APPOINTMENT

AND DESIGNATION. There is an accepted legal distinction between
appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection by the
proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a
given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in
the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment (or election). Thus,
the appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory
designation, a member of the National Economic and Development
Authority. A person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as
when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a
permanent appointee thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular
incumbent. In the absence of the permanent Secretary, for example, an
undersecretary is designated acting head of the department.
4. ID.; SECTION 9 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 966 CONSTRUED.
We agree with the petitioner that the term "appointment" was used in a
general sense to include the term "designation." In other words, no
distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive
Order No. 966. We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation,
especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary
rate "compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity."
This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment. A
contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law,
not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit seeks to extend the
maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of
his many years of loyal and efficient service in the government. As thus
interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated
Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration in the
office order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The position
was then vacant and could be filled either by permanent appointment or
by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was
only an extension of the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the
Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for
his designation thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from
his position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he
rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which,
following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included in his
highest basic salary rate.
5. ID.; RETIREMENT LAWS; INTERPRETATION THEREOF; IN FAVOR
OF RETIREE; REASON THEREFOR. Retirement laws should be

interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to

provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no
longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting
the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the
appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a
generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of
his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his
work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his
bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should
be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was
rewarded for it.
GSIS vs. Montesclaros
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); Pensions; Definition of
Dependent; Under P.D. No. 1146 the primary beneficiaries are (1) the
dependent spouse until such spouse remarries and (2) the dependent
children.Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are: (1) the
dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the dependent
children. The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and
legitimate descendants except dependent children. The law defines
dependent as the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged
natural or illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one years of age but
physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support. The
term also includes the legitimate spouse dependent for support on the
member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for
support.
Same; Same; In a pension plan where employee participation is
mandatory, the prevailing view is that the employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment.In a pension plan where employee participation is
mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to
compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to
government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain
qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to
government employees reward them for giving the best years of their
lives in the service of their country.

Same; Same; Due Process; Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause; No law can deprive such person of
his pension rights without due process of law that is without notice and
opportunity to be heard.Where the employee retires and meets the
eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under preexisting law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that
have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees
pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be
heard.
Same; Same; Same; A widows right to receive pension following the
demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146
also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is
one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive
pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands
contractual compensation.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; A statute based on
reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the law; Requirements for a Valid and Reasonable
Classification.A statute based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat
and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are
real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
Same; Same; Same; The proviso in question does not satisfy these
requirements.The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse
who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before
the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before
the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague.

There is no reasonable connection between the means employed and

the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or
purpose for such a prohibition.
GSIS vs. Cuanang
Employees Compensation; Myocardial Infarction; If a death which
occurred almost four and one half years after retirement was held to be
within the coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, with more
reason should a death which occurred within one year after retirement be
considered as covered under the same law.We take our bearings from
our pronouncements in the case of Consorcia F. Manuzon v. Employees
Compensation Commission, et al. In said case, the Employees
Compensation Commission denied petitioners claim because the cause
of death of her husband, an assistant professor at the Mindanao State
University, which was myocardial infraction, came four and one half years
after his retirement. We held: We believe otherwise. The evidence clearly
shows that during his employment, the deceased suffered from a stroke,
a cardio vascular accident. It was caused by thrombosis or blockage of
the arteries. He had to retire because of paralysis caused by that cardio
vascular attack or myocardial infraction. Stated otherwise, the cause of
his compulsory retirement due to paralysis arising from cardio vascular
accident is closely related to the cause of his death, which was also a
cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. That heart disease
developed when he was still working as a professor. It caused his
paralysis and his total permanent disability. The disease was work
oriented because of the nature of his employment as a professor. The
same disease eventually caused his death, contrary to the conclusion of
both the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission. The
Court holds that the heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they
are claiming. In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year
after her retirement. Clearly, the period between her retirement and
demise was less than one year. Indeed, if a death which occurred almost
four and one half years after retirement was held to be within the
coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case,
with more reason should a death which occurred within one year after
retirement be considered as covered under the same law. A claim for
benefit for such death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of separation
from service.
Same; Same; Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test
of proof in compensation proceedings.Further, we agree with the
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that there was substantial

evidence to support respondents claim. Hence, the degree of proof

required under PD 626 was satisfied, i.e., such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.
Same; Same; Doctors; No physician, who is aware of the far-reaching
and serious effects that his statement would cause on a money claim
filed with a government agency, would issue a certification
indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection.
In the case at bar, the requisite substantial evidence came from the
expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate in Internal
Medicine who issued the Death Certificate, thus: Acute Myocardial
Infarction generally occurs with the abrupt decrease in coronary blood
flow that follows a thrombotic occlusion of a coronary artery previously
narrowed by astherosclerosis. It is common knowledge among medical
practitioners that hypertension is one major risk factor among multiple
coronary risk factors that can precipitate an acute coronary occlusion.
(Harrisons Principle of Internal Medicine, 14th ed., pp. 1066, 1110) Mrs.
Carmen Cuanang was hypertensive and also had bronchial asthma.
Therefore Acute Myocardial Infarction which she suffered can be a
consequence also of her chronic hypertension vis--vis her rheumatic
heart disease. The aforequoted expert opinion deserves credence
considering that we have previously held that no physician, who is aware
of the far reaching and serious effects that his statement would cause on
a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue a certification
indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Myocardial infarction, also known as
coronary occlusion or just a coronary, is a life-threatening condition.
Myocardial Infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a
coronary, is a life threatening condition. Predisposing factors for
myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery
Disease, and these factors include stress. Stress appears to be
associated with elevated blood pressure. It is of common knowledge that
the job of a teacher can be very stressful. Carmen Cuanangs
responsibilities were never limited to the four corners of the classroom.
Aside from teaching students, she also prepared lesson plans, attend
seminars, conferences and other school activities, within and outside the
school premises, such as tree planting for the beautification of the school
premises and the community, sportsfest programs and parades, year
after year throughout her almost 26 years in government service. During

election periods, she was also deputized by the Commission on Elections

to act as an election registrar. In addition, in going to and from the school,
she was constantly exposed to the ravages of the natural elements such
as heat, rain and dust. Needless to say, the collective effect of all these
factors can indeed be very stressful especially for someone afflicted with
Rheumatic Heart Disease as Carmen Cuanang. It goes without saying
that all these conditions contributed much to the deterioration of her
already precarious health.
Same; Same; Notwithstanding the abandonment of the presumption of
compensability established by the old law, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social legislation
the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in
light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987
Constitution vivifies and enhances.Notwithstanding the abandonment
of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the
present law has not ceased to be an employees compensation law or a
social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working
man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to
implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a
liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards
labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated,
a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself
under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic
approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants. Verily, the
policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees
compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits,
there-under. Therefore, claims falling under the Employees
Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a
social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman
in our society. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning
and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in
Article 4 of the New Labor Code, which states that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code
including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in
favor of labor.
Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. WCC

1.LABOR LAWS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; GRANT OF

AWARD FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT; SCOPE OF TERM "EMPLOYMENT." Employment
includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing,
with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work
by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's
premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is
reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin
when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises
where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means
of ingress and agrees with the express or implied consent of the
employer" (Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72 L. ed. 507, Feb. 20,
1928).
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY AN EMPLOYEE IN AN
"ACCESS AREA" WHICH MAY BE TREATED AS PART OF THE
EMPLOYER'S PREMISES, COMPENSABLE; CASE AT BAR. That
part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the
employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the
employee's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's
premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the
company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDEGO
premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDEGO uses it, if
extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the
road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of
lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDEGO was under
obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against
dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these
dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDEGO is
liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
Belarmino vs. ECC

1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION;

DEATH
RESULTING
FROM
EMPLOYMENT
ACCIDENT;
COMPENSABLE. The illness, septicemia post partum, which resulted
in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an
occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom
teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that
ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the
conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The
condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall
and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent
abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her
pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom
floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall
therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an
unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. Mrs. Belarmino's fall
was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it:
her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her
septicemia post partum, and death, are compensable.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE;
OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. The Government is not entirely
blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty.
Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people
from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II,
1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for
the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty
shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their
economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the
means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every
humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By
their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of
his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government,
and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Hinoguin vs. ECC
Labor Law; Labor Standards; Death Benefits; Work-Connected Injuries;
The work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was
not precluded by the fact that he was on an overnight pass at the time he
was accidentally shot by a fellow soldier.Turning to the question of

whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he

sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that
the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion
Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin
had occurred in line of duty. It may be noted in this connection that a
soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status
and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days
a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which
Sgt. Hinoguin was not). Thus, we think that the work-connected character
of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the
simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home
of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not
effectively cease performing official functions because he was granted a
pass. While going to a fellow soldiers home for a few hours for a meal
and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in
the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us
that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is
shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or
condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. Even
vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by
superior orders.
Same; Same; Same; From the very nature of his occupation, a soldier
assumes the risk of being accidentally shot or fired upon by his fellow
soldiers.More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept
certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to
the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only risk that he
is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession
as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also
members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a
soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his
fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent
in his employment as a soldier.
Same; Same; Same; The death of Sgt. Hinoguin which resulted from the
accidental discharge of his fellow soldiers firearm, is work-connected and
therefore, compensable.We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt.
Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the
M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and
in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Labor Code provisions must

be given interpretation most likely to effectuate their beneficient and
humanitarian purposes.It may be well to add that what we have
written above in respect of performance of official functions of members
of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific
purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related
regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent
possible, be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the
beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.
GSIS vs. CA & Alegre
1. POLITICAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; GOVERNMENT SERVICE AND
INSURANCE SYSTEM; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION;
GUIDELINES ON COMPENSABILITY IN CASE OF DEATH. Under
the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that
"for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have
been performing his official functions; (3) If the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer." DAEaTS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICE OFFICERS; TREATED SIMILARLY TO
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. Owing
to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the
risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of
their deaths. Thus, echoing, Hinoguin v. Employee's Compensation, a
case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier,
we heldEmployees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, that
members of the national police are by the nature of their functions
technically on duty 24 hours a day" because policemen are subject to call
at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed
citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.
The matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his
death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and
unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior officer. That he may be called upon at any time

to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty

and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the
conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation
where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman.
In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already
complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as
applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact
validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines
rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give
rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a
police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty,
are nonetheless basically police service in character. c
Valeriano vs. ECC & GSIS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION; DISABILITY BENEFITS; TO BE COMPENSABLE, THE
INJURY AND THE RESULTING DISABILITY MUST HAVE
NECESSARILY RESULTED FROM AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF
OR IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. Disability benefits are
granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness
resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial,
disability. For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable,
they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and
in the course of employment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONER'S INJURIES AND CONSEQUENT
DISABILITY WERE NOT WORK CONNECTED AND THUS NOT
COMPENSABLE. Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of
"work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the
resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable
regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven
that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview
of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or
incidental thereto. Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate
solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had
suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal
and social function having dinner with some friends is clear from
the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place;
nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope
of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we
agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries

and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not

compensable.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO REASONABLE CONNECTION BETWEEN
PETITIONER'S INJURIES AND HIS WORK AS A FIRETRUCK DRIVER.
We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our
society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be always on
alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which
may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the
present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura.
Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be
applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work
place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an
accident. But the more important justification for the Court's stance is that
he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver,
or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We
cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work
as a firetruck driver. While we sympathize with petitioner's plight, we
cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy is to extend the applicability
of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many qualified employees as
possible, but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of
denying undeserving claims for compensation. Considering the
circumstances in petitioner's case, he cannot be deemed qualified for
disability benefits under the law.
Alano vs. ECC
1. LABOR
AND
SOCIAL
LEGISLATIONS;
EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION ACT; CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION; DEATH
COMPENSABLE WHERE IT OCCURRED AT A POINT REASONABLY
PROXIMATE TO PLACE OF WORK WHILE GOING TO AND FROM HIS
WORK; CASE AT BAR. The petitioner alleges that the deceased's
accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The
respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the
present provision of law on employment injury is different from that
provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is
"categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at
the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer."
We rule in favor of the petitioner. It is not disputed that the deceased died
while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the
petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to
reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal

about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was
there because her employment required her to be there.
2. ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM; PROPER
PARTY IN COMPENSATION CASES AND FAILURE TO IMPLEAD IT IS
CONSIDERED NOT FATAL. As to the Government Service Insurance
System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was
not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up
to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413)
and recently, Clemente v.Government Service Insurance System (G.R.
No. L-47521, August 31, 1987), this Court has ruled that the Government
Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation
cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees'
Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law
and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee
compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of
Implementing Rules)."
Lazo vs. ECC
1. LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION; INJURIES
SUSTAINED DUE TO VEHICULAR ACCIDENT ON THE WAY HOME
FROM WORK; COMPENSABLE; BALDEBRIN vs. WCC (132 SCRA
510), CITED. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and
was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin vs. WCC (132 SCRA 510)
case, where the employee ". . . figured in an accident when he was going
home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at
Aurora Zamboanga del Sur . . ." In Baldebrin, the Court said: "The
principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of
and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of
employment.' (Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine
Engineer's
Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora
S. Martin
and
Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that `where an
employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a
service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus
attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck,
resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in
the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable.
The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee
boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been
notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running
at a great speed.' And, in a later case,Iloilo Dock & Engineering

Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We

ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work,
but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the
employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent
of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's
premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be
in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one
arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it
had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place
of its performance.'" In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left
his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off,
because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on
overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no
evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular
homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS THEREOF; LIBERALLY INTERPRETED IN
FAVOR OF EMPLOYEES; RATIONALE. While the presumption of
compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may
have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that
the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists.
As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and
secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work connection to the accident. This kind of interpretation
gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as
embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts
in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor." The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree
(PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.
This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor. There is no reason, in principle,
why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time
prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before
reaching or after leaving the employer's premises.
Enao vs. ECC

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAW; CLAIM FOR

COMPENSATION INCOME BENEFITS; ALLEGED SELF-SERVING
STATEMENTS OF CLAIMANT AND WITNESSES NOT REFUTED BY
ANY EVIDENCE; INJURIES SUSTAINED CONSIDERED WORKCONNECTED. We find no basis at all for the findings made by the
Employees' Compensation Commission in its decision that the statement
of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations
because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support
such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from
accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's
witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be
established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such
statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the
multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which
caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital
from August 1, to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and
later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are
definitely work-connected.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO THE AWARD; INJURIES
SUSTAINED DEEMED TO HAVE ARISEN OUT OF AND IN IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT IN CASE AT BAR. As it can be rightfully
ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official
functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was
then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working
hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in
proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would
necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be
during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that
the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to
be so. The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling
than the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation
Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a
significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from
a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from
Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental, where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was
therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from
her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of
her employment."

Davao Gulf Lumber vs. Del Rosario

1.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; 15-DAY PERIOD
FOR APPEAL" WHEN APPLICABLE. The period of fifteen days for
appeal provided in Section 50 of Republic Act No. 772 refers to appeals
from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission to the
Supreme Court, and not to appeals from the decision of one
Commissioner to the Commission en banc.
2.ID.; ID.; COMPENSABLE ACCIDENTS. Accidents which are caused
by the worn-out condition of the motor vehicles, are compensable.
3.ID.; ID.; NON-REGISTRATION OF VEHICLE, IMMATERIAL. Nonregistration of the truck in the Motor Vehicle Office is not the concern of
the driver.
4.ID.; ID.; NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE; PRESENCE OF MEMBERS OF
DRIVERS FAMILY IN VEHICLE. Although in violation of the company's
regulations, the driver cannot be considered negligent by having the
members of his family in the vehicle, where it is not certain that such
presence caused the accident. As his wife and children were present, the
driver must have been extremely careful, not reckless.
Menez vs. ECC
Workmens Compensation; Occupational disease defined.An
occupational disease is one which results from the nature of the
employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of
a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident
of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which
distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the
hazard attending the employment in general (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy
Corp., 12 N. E. 2nd 311; italics supplied).
Same; Same.To be occupational, the disease must be one due wholly
to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and
characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which
science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker
in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the
danger of contracting a particular occupational disease ((Seattle Can
Co. vs. Dept of Labor, 265, p, 741; italics supplied).
Same; Rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are occupational diseases
of public high school teachers.From the foregoing definitions of

occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis

can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school
teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but
overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional
strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers,
especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extracurricular or non-academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson
plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding
superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is
heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is
situated in a tough area-Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and
other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution
and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de
la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to
such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school
teachers is further accentuated by poor diet, for they can ill-afford
nutritious food.
Same; Same.It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of
the Raja Soliman High School which is located in the heart of Binondo
District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and
congestion (squatters area) characteristic of the area. She was not only
exposed to the elementsvarying degrees of temperature throughout the
day and nightbut also had to withstand long hours of standing while
performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long
trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her
residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to
another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.
Same; Same; Evidence; Judicial notice is taken that our country is in the
typhoon belt and ill-nourished teachers are thus susceptible to
pneumonia.Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that
our country is in a typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential
rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to
Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and
getting wet from downpours or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible
to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in contact
with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory
diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves inadequately
nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested area. And
adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition or
under-nourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other

source of income takes toaside from the poor mans staple diet of tuyo,
daing, and ricelegumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible
seeds which contain much uric acid.
Same; Arthritis and Gout defined.Acute arthritis is inflammation of a
joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of
rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for
Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation of the
joints, an excessive amount of uric acid in the blood. Poor mans gout is
caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may
thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from
excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers are subject by
reason of their duties.
Same; Pneumonia is included in the ECC list of compensable diseases.
Significantly, also, the Employees Compensation Commission, in its
Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and
July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the provisions of
the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and
diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial
infarction, pneumonia and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al.,
L-46290, Aug. 25, 1978).
Same; Approval of optional retirement shows that claimant is suffering a
disability.Furthermore, it must be stressed that the approval of
petitioners application for retirement is a clear indication that she was
physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic,
L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC. et al., supra). Petitioner was
allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975
at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be
recommended for approval only when the employee applicant is below
65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient
service. Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments.
Same; The Magna Charta for Public School Teachers requires
employment.Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the that
teachers he protected against the consequences of Magna Charta for
Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these
factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve
physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers
when it directed in one of its provisions that Teachers shall be protected
against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with

existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the
teachers health shall be recognized as compensable occupational
diseases in accordance with laws
Orate vs. CA
1. LABOR
AND
SOCIAL
LEGISLATION;
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION; LAW GOVERNING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
CLAIMS IS DETERMINED BY THE DATE WHEN CLAIMANT
CONTRACTED THE DISEASE; CASE AT BAR. In workmen's
compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when
the claimant contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened
prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be
governed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while
those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by
the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626. Corollarily, where the
claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No.
626 without any showing as to when the disease intervened, the
presumption is that the disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D.
No. 626. The "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under
the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioner's claim
for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts
in this field to rule that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to
January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. DTCSHA
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR BREAST CARCINOMA TO BE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE LABOR CODE. In the case at bar,
petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995.
No evidence, however, was presented as to when she contracted said
ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D.
No. 626 was already the governing law. For breast carcinoma and
resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by
substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the
risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working
conditions.
3. ID.; ID., ID.; ID.; NEED FOR SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ILLNESS AND WORKING
CONDITIONS; CASE AT BAR. There is no dispute that cancer of the
breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the
Rules on Employees' Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden

of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her

illness and her working conditions. Substantial evidence means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. In the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS
and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting of
heavy objects increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In
addition, she contended that her job in the winding department exposed
her to cancer-causing dyes used in coloring threads. . . . Regrettably,
however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not
constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship
between her illness and her working conditions. Awards of compensation
cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove
a positive proposition. A perusal of the records reveals that there is no
evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she
was dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company
where she worked did not implement measures to control the hazards
occasioned by the use of such chemicals.
NFD International Manning Agents vs. Illescas
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Words and Phrases;
Accident, Defined.Blacks Law Dictionary defines accident as [a]n
unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does
not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably
anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not
attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct. The
Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word accident as [t]hat which
happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and
which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. Accident, in its
commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been defined
as: [A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and
unexpected by the person to whom it happens x x x. The word may be
employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an
undesirable or unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury
resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any unpleasant or
unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some
untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.
Same; Same; Same; Where the injury resulted from the performance of a
duty, like carrying heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, it cannot be said

to be the result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap,

occurrence, or fortuitous eventit is common knowledge that carrying
heavy objects can cause back injury.The Court holds that the snap on
the back of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by
respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which
injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result
of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous
event, because the injury resulted from the performance of a duty.
Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common
knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what
happened in this case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual
under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term accident
as defined above.
Same; Same; Same; A claimant may dispute the company-designated
physicians report by seasonably consulting another doctor. In such a
case, the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the
labor tribunal and the court based on its inherent merit.In HFS
Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar, 585 SCRA 315 (2009), the Court held that a
claimant may dispute the company-designated physicians report by
seasonably consulting another doctor. In such a case, the medical report
issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court
based on its inherent merit. In this case, petitioners never questioned the
weight given by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals to the findings
of respondents independent doctor in regard to the disability of
respondent.
Vda. De Inguillo vs. ECC
1. LABOR
AND
SOCIAL
LEGISLATION;
WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION; CLAIMS COVERED BY LAW IN FORCE AT TIME OF
ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION. In workmen's compensation
cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant
contracted his illness.(Rosales vs. ECC [G.R. No. 46443, June 28,
1988]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Considering, however, that the
deceased was confined in the hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June
1978, and that he later died on 20 June 1978, and absent any evidence
as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code that
becomes the governing law. As specifically provided in Article 208 of said
Code, its provisions cover "injury, sickness, disability or death occurring
on or after January 1, 1975."

3. ID.;
EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION;
COMPENSABILITY OF DISEASES; RULE ON CONTROVERSION,
PRESUMPTION OF COMPENSABILITY AND PRINCIPLE OF
AGGRAVATING, DISCARDED. The concepts relied on by petitioner
[the rule on controversion, the presumption of compensability, and the
principle of aggravation] under the former Workmen's Compensation Act,
therefore, have ceased to apply, having been expressly discarded under
the compensation scheme in the new Labor Code (Sarmiento vs. ECC, et
al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
4. ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
CANCER
AILMENTS,
GENERALLY NOT
COMPENSABLE. In the recent case of Raro vs. Employees'
Compensation Commission (G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989), it was held
that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable. It
is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's
employment appears to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government
Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988), this Court
further elucidated that unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer
is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we can not conclude that it was the
employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PNEUMONIA, A QUALIFIEDLY OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE; COMPENSABLE IN CASE AT BAR. Under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a
qualifiedly occupational disease. The decedent's complaint of "difficulty in
swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains,
difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly
some of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by itself can
also be a killer disease (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th
ed., pp. 802-804). Further, a review of the deceased's work activities, as
janitor, will show that they included the regular use of "deleterious
substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which are inhaled
when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and unclogging of toilet
pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also performed other
varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school
corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of dust, lifting heavy
objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school
programs, as well as going to and from his place of work thus exposing
him to occasional "wetting and chilling' from downpours and rains. The
combination of all these, coupled with the fact that the decedent was
working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area characterized by

unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must have lowered his

resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of
contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased by his working
conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability.
While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to consider
pneumonia compensable do not concur, there is substantial compliance
therewith, added to the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent
technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who
has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta vs. Employees'
Compensation Commission, L-55464, November 12, 1981, 109 SCRA
209).
Quisora vs. Denholm Crew Management
Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Disability Benefits; Granting that
the provisions of the 2000 Philippine Overseas and Employment
Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) apply, the
disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to
just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to
overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness.
Granting that the provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the
disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to
just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to
overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness.
Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to
be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he
suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of
his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of
proof belongs to respondent company.
GSIS vs. Calumpiano
Employees Compensation; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Glaucoma;
Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between
blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which leads the
Supreme Court (SC) to conclude that respondents glaucoma developed
as a result of her hypertension.Respondent served the government for
30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, [h]er duties were no
doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her
ailment, hypertension which is a listed occupational disease, contrary
to the CAs pronouncement that it is not. And because it is a listed
occupational disease, the increased risk theory does not apply again,

contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is required. It can

also be said that given respondents age at the time, and taking into
account the nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as
court stenographer which requires her to faithfully record each and
every day virtually all of the courts proceedings; transcribe these notes
immediately in order to make them available to the court or the parties
who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and transcribe
them; and type in final form the judges decisions, which activities extend
beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay
all these contributed to the development of her hypertension or
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as petitioner would call it.
Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of
vision in both eyes due to advanced to late stage glaucoma, which
rendered her legally blind. Contrary to petitioners submissions, there
appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of
glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondents glaucoma
developed as a result of her hypertension.
Same; Probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
cases.The Court is well guided by the principles, declared in
Government Service Insurance System v. Baul, 497 SCRA 397 (2006)
and Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro, 593 SCRA 155
(2009), that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees
welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims
for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be
received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any
determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job
are as important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and
social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the
injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence
or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law
on employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the
benefits thereunder.
GSIS vs. Jum Angel
Employees Compensation; Requisites for an injury and the resulting
death to be compensable.Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury
must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the
following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his

work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his
official functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee
must have been executing an order for the employer.
Same; The requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course
of employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the injury must be
the result of an accident.It is important to note, however, that the
requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of
employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the injury must be
the result of an accident.
Same; Words and Phrases; Accident; Definition of an Accident.The
term accident has been defined in an insurance case. We find the
definition applicable to the present case. Thus: The words accident and
accidental have never acquired any technical signification in law, and
when used in an insurance contract are to be construed and considered
according to the ordinary understanding and common usage and speech
of people generally. In substance, the courts are practically agreed that
the words accident and accidental mean that which happens by
chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition that has usually
been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes
place without ones foresight or expectationan event that proceeds
from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known case, and
therefore not expected. An accident is an event which happens without
any human agency or, if happening through human agency, an event
which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the
person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which
happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without
his design, consent, or voluntary cooperation.
Same; Same; Same; Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding
that the death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the
sergeants willful intention to kill himself.Paraphrasing the above ruling,
we find that the proceedings before the Philippine Army which finally
resulted in the issuance by the Chief of Staff of General Order No. 270
that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status may not be used
as basis for the finding that the widow of Sgt. Angel is entitled to
compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Death in
line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted from an
accident and was not occasioned by the sergeants willful intention to kill
himself. It is not enough, as erroneously pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the

sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not
arrested but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which
was part of x x x official duties to cooperate with the inquiry being
conducted by the Philippine Army. There must be evidence that the
sergeant did not take his own life considering the fact that he was found
hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck.
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines vs. SSS
1. LABOR LAWS; COMMISSION AGENTS, STATUS OF. Where an
agent is not required to work exclusively for his employer, is not subject
to definite hours or conditions of labor, is free to work at any time at his
own pleasure, and is only paid commission from his actual sales, his
status is more of an independent contractor under Art. 1713 of the Civil
Code, than of an employee within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
2. ID.; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT; MASTER AND SERVANT
RELATIONSHIP. Although the specific question of when does
"employer-employee relationship" exist for purposes of the Social
Security Act has not yet been settled in this jurisdiction, in other
connections wherein the term is used, the so-called "control test" has
been applied by the Supreme Court following American jurisprudence,
that is to say, where the element of supervisory power of the employer to
control the method and detail of performance of service by the employee
is present, such element is indicative of an employer-employee
relationship, and the absence thereof indicative of that of an independent
contractor.
3. ID.; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS BEYOND THE COVERAGE OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT. Considering the simmilarity between
the definition of "employee" in the Social Security Act of the United States
after which our own Social Security Act is admittedly patterned, and
considering that prevailing American decisions on the subject the control
test is being applied, such jurisprudence may well be accorded
persuasive force. The logic of the situation indeed dictates that where
compensation is measured not by the labor performed but by the result
thereof, employer-employee relationship does not exist, and the ruling of
respondent Social Security Commission to the effect that commission
agents are within the compulsory coverage of the Social Security Act
must be reversed and set aside.
SSS vs. CA

1. LABOR LAW; STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT; EXISTENCE OF

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; HOW DETERMINED. In
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
following elements are generally considered, namely:(1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees' conduct
although the latter is the most important element (Viaa vs. Al-Lagadan
and Piga, 99 Phil. 408, 411, as cited in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs.
Ople, et. al., No. L-37790. March 25, 1976).
2. ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS; FACTORS CONSIDERED
IN DETERMINING THE CARRYING ON OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS.
An independent contractor is one who exercises independent
employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own
methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to
the result of the work (Mansal vs. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 941,
as cited in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, et. al.). Among the
factors to be considered are whether the contractor is carrying on an
independent business; whether the work is part of the employer's general
business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term
and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of the
work to another; the power to terminate the relationship; the existence of
a contract for the performance of a specified piece of work; the control
and supervision of the work; the employer's powers and duties with
respect to the hiring, firing, and payment of the contractor's servants; the
control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools,
appliances, material and labor; and the mode, manner, and terms of
payment (56 C.J.S. 46)
3. ID.; ID.; UNDER THE PEDDLING CONTRACT IN INSTANT CASE,
PEDDLERS ARE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS AND NOT
EMPLOYEES OF THE RESPONDENT. In determining whether the
relationship is that of employer and employee or whether one is an
independent contractor, each case must be determined on its own facts
and all the features of the relationship are to be considered (56 C.J.S.
45). Conformably to the case of Mafinco vs. Ople that on the basis of the
peddling contract, no employer-employee relationship was created, the
peddling contract involved in the instant petition makes the peddler an
independent contractor.
Manila Golf & Country Club vs. IAC

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; RES ADJUDICATA; REQUISITES;

CERTIFICATION PROCEEDING A MERE NON-ADVERSARIAL FACTFINDING INVESTIGATION. The more controlling consideration would
seem to be that, however final it may become, the decision in a
certification case, by the very nature of that proceeding, is not such as to
foreclose all further dispute between the parties as to the existence, or
non-existence, of employer-employee relationship between them. It is
well settled that for res adjudicata, or the principle of bar by prior
judgment, to apply, the following essential requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) said judgment or order must
be on the merits; (3) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be between
the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of
cause of action. Clearly implicit in these requisites is that the action or
proceedings in which is issued the "prior Judgment" that would operate in
bar of a subsequent action between the same parties for the same
cause, beadversarial, or contentious, "one having opposing parties; (is)
contested, as distinguished from an ex parte hearing or proceeding. . . .of
which the party seeking relief has given legal notice to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it." and a certificate case
is not such a proceeding, as this Court has already ruled: "A certification
proceeding is not a `litigation' in the sense in which this term is commonly
understood, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding
character, in which the investigating agency plays the part of a
disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of the
employees as to the matter of their representation. The court enjoys a
wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair
and free choice of bargaining representatives by the employees."
2. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS;
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. As long as it is, the list made in the appealed decision detailing
the various matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the
petitioner's regulations, does not, in the mind of the Court, so
circumscribe the actions or judgment of the caddies concerned as to
leave them little or no freedom of choice whatsoever in the manner of
carrying out their services. In the very nature of things, caddies must
submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying the privilege
of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever
club they do their work in. For all that is made to appear, they work for the
club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but, on the other
hand, also without having to observe any working hours, free to leave

anytime they please, to stay away for as long as they like. It is not
pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, any
discipline may be meted them beyond barring them from the premises
which, it may be supposed, the Club may do in any case even absent
any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their
part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of
employment. The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the
rate of fees payable by the players to the caddies as still another
indication of the latter's status as employees. It seems to the Court,
however, that the intendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that
the Club has not the measure of control over the incidents of the caddies'
work and compensation that an employer would possess. The Court
agrees with petitioner that the group rotation system so-called, is less a
measure of employee control than an assurance that the work is fairly
distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply
losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the last number for
the day.
Republic vs. Asiapro Cooperative
Jurisdictions; Appeals; Power of Review of the Supreme Court; Although
as a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive and binding on the Court, said rule is not without
exceptions.Although as a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court, said rule is
not without exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions in which
factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions
finds application in this present case which is, when the findings of fact
are conflicting. There are, indeed, conflicting findings espoused by the
petitioner SSC and the appellate court relative to the existence of
employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative
and its ownersmembers, which necessitates a departure from the oftrepeated rule that factual issues may not be the subject of appeals to this
Court.
Labor Law; Labor Relations; Employer-Employee Relationship;
Elements; In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and
engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever
means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall

consideration. The most important element is the employers control of

the employees conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done,
but also as to the means and methods to accomplish.In determining
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following
elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the
workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the
latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important
element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as
to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and
methods to accomplish. The power of control refers to the existence of
the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof. It is not
essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties
of the employee; it is enough that the employer has the right to wield that
power. All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract,
when the terms and surrounding circumstances show otherwise. The
employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not
by what the parties say it should be.As previously pointed out by this
Court, an employee-employer relationship actually exists between the
respondent cooperative and its owners-members. The four elements in
the four-fold test for the existence of an employment relationship have
been complied with. The respondent cooperative must not be allowed to
deny its employment relationship with its owners-members by invoking
the questionable Service Contracts provision, when in actuality, it does
exist. The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be
negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and
surrounding circumstances show otherwise. The employment status of a
person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it
should be.
Cooperatives; A cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its
registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board
of Directors, which directs and supervises its business; meaning, its
Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and management
of its affairs. With that, a cooperative can be likened to a corporation with
a personality separate and distinct from its owners-members.It bears
stressing, too, that a cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its
registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board
of Directors, which directs and supervises its business; meaning, its

Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and management

of its affairs. With that, a cooperative can be likened to a corporation with
a personality separate and distinct from its owners-members.
Consequently, an owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of
the latter and an employer-employee relationship can exist between
them.
Same; The management of the affairs of the respondent cooperative is
vested in its Board of Directors and not in its ownersmembers as a
whole. Therefore, it is completely logical that the respondent cooperative,
as a juridical person represented by its Board of Directors, can enter into
an employment with its ownersmembers.In the present case, it is not
disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the
Cooperative Development Authority, as evidenced by its Certificate of
Registration No. 0-623-2460. In its by-laws, its Board of Directors directs,
controls, and supervises the business and manages the property of the
respondent cooperative. Clearly then, the management of the affairs of
the respondent cooperative is vested in its Board of Directors and not in
its owners-members as a whole. Therefore, it is completely logical that
the respondent cooperative, as a juridical person represented by its
Board of Directors, can enter into an employment with its ownersmembers.
Sta. Rita vs. CA
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; STATUTORY RIGHT; COMPLIANCE
WITH THE RULES, REQUIRED. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail
of the right must comply with the rules. (Spouses Gil and Elma del
Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113890 [1995]) These rules,
particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and
for orderly discharge of judicial business. (Bank of America, NT & SA vs.
Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 [1994]) Petitioner's failure to seasonably file the
Petition and its failure to comply with the aforequoted Circulars of the
Court necessitate the denial of the Petition.
2. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY DOLE AND SSS; NATURE AND
PURPOSE THEREOF. Respondent appellate court correctly upheld
the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement entered into between the
DOLE and the SSS. Upon the one hand, contrary to the trial court's

finding, the Memorandum of Agreement was approved by the Social

Security Commission per the Commission's Resolution No. 437, dated 14
July 1988. Upon the other hand, the Memorandum of Agreement is not a
rule or regulation enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the
latter's quasi-legislative authority under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 1161, as
amended, which reads as follows: "Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of the
Commission. For the attainment of its main objectives as set forth in
section two hereof, the Commission shall have the following powers and
duties: (a) To adopt, amend and rescind, subject to the approval of the
President, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions and purposes of this Act. . . ." What the Memorandum of
Agreement did was to record the understanding between the SSS on the
one hand and the DOLE on the other hand that the latter would include
among the provisions of the Standard Contract of Employment required
in case of overseas employment, a stipulation providing for coverage of
the Filipino seafarer by the SSS. The Memorandum of Agreement
is not an implementing rule or regulation of the Social Security
Commission which, under Section 4(a) abovequoted, is subject to the
approval of the President. Indeed, as a matter of strict law, the
participation of the SSS in the establishment by the DOLE of a uniform
stipulation in the Standard Contract of Employment for Filipino seafarers
was not necessary; the Memorandum of Agreement related simply to the
administrative convenience of the two (2) agencies of government. It is
worthy of special note that by extending the benefits of the Social
Security Act to Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels, the individual
employment agreements entered into with the stipulation for such
coverage contemplated in the DOLE-SSS Memorandum of Agreement,
merely give effect to the constitutional mandate to the State to afford
protection to labor whether "local or overseas." (Article XIII, Section 3,
1987 Constitution) Nullification of the SSS stipulation in those individual
employment contracts, through nullification of the Memorandum of
Agreement, constituted serious reversible error on the part of the trial
court. That petitioner should seek to deprive his countrymen of social
security protection after his foreign principal had agreed to such
protection, is cause for dismay and is to be deplored.
3. ID.; R.A. NO. 1161 (SOCIAL SECURITY LAW), AS AMENDED;
COVERAGE THEREOF EXTENDED TO FILIPINO SEAFARERS ON
BOARD FOREIGN VESSELS. The Court finds no merit in petitioner's
contention that Section 8(j)(5) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended, absolutely
exempts Filipino seafarers on board foreign vessels from the coverage of
the SSS statute. Section 8(j)(5) simply defines the term "employment"

and does not in any way relate to the scope of coverage of the Social
Security System. That coverage is, upon the other hand, set out in
Section 9 of R.A. No. 1161 as amended, which defines the scope of SSS
coverage in the following terms: "Sec. 9.Compulsory Coverage. (a)
Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over
sixty years of age and their employers; Provided, . . . (b) Filipinos
recruited in the Philippines by foreign-based employers for employment
abroad may be covered by the SSS on a voluntary basis." (As amended
by Sec. 2, P.D. No. 177, S-1973 and Sec. 6, P.D. No. 735-S-1975) It will
be seen that the Memorandum of Agreement is in line with paragraph
9(b) of the Social Security statute quoted above. The Memorandum of
Agreement provides, inter alia, that: ". . . NOW THEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto agree and
stipulate that one of the conditions that will be imposed by the
Department of Labor and Employment in the contract for overseas
employment is the registration for coverage of seafarers with the Social
Security System, through the manning agenies as the authorized
representatives of the foreign employers in conformity with Section 9,
paragraph (b) of the Social Security Law (R.A. No. 1161, as amended),
subject to the following terms and conditions: . . ." Thus, the Standard
Contract of Employment to be entered into between foreign shipowners
and Filipino seafarers is the instrument by which the former express their
assent to the inclusion of the latter in the coverage of the Social Security
Act. In other words, the extension of the coverage of the Social Security
System to Filipino seafarers arises by virtue of the assent given in the
contract of employment signed by employer and seafarer; that same
contract binds petitioner Sta. Rita or B. Sta. Rita Company, who is
solidarily liable with the foreign shipowners/employers. It may be noted
that foreign shipowners and manning agencies had generally expressed
their conformity to the inclusion of Filipino seafarers within the coverage
of the Social Security Act even prior to the signing of the DOLE-SSS
Memorandum of Agreement.

evidence for the prosecution; and the second is where the criminal
proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial. (People v. Quizada , 160 SCRA 516
[1988]) Neither situation exists in the case at bar. There is no legal
impediment to the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. Q-92-35426
against petitioner Sta. Rita.

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT AGAINST

DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN NOT VIOLATED; CASE AT BAR.
The Court of Appeals properly held that the reinstatement of the criminal
case against petitioner did not violate his right against double jeopardy
since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been effected
at his own instance. (Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court) There are only
two (2) instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the
fact that the case was dismissed with the express consent of the
accused. The first is where the ground for dismissal is insufficiency of

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Classifying dependent

spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on
whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the
other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no
relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burdensuch
classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid

Dycaico vs. SSS

Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause; Labor Law; Social
Legislation; Retirement; Social Security System; Social Security Law
(R.A. No. 8282); Words and Phrases; The proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of RA No. 8282 violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.For reasons which
shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for Valid
Classifications.A statute based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the
law. With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security
law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions that draw lines in
classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in
this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged
under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for
making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests.
However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with
respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to
all members of the same class.

policy objective.The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not
bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date
of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in Section 12B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional
concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for
the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was
apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by
persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse. This concern is concededly valid.
However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their
entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was
contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless
of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the achievement
of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to
members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden. The nexus of the classification to the policy
objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of
dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If it were the intention
of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered into in
contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a
definite duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship as
one of the requirements for entitlement to survivors pension.If it were
the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in
contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a
definite duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship as
one of the requirements for entitlement to survivors pension. For
example, in the United States, a provision in their social security law
which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and
stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective
relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months prior to his
death, was declared valid. Thus, nine months is recognized in the United
States as the minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having
been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to
survivorship pension.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Classification of
dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to
the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement
for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real

and substantial distinctions.The classification of dependent spouses on

the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were
contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of
entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial
distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because
the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies
the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS
member were contracted after the latters retirement as primary
beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or
were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing
upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices
the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats the
avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest in their retirement benefits.As earlier
opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, the
Court characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree.
We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where employee participation is
mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment. Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits
that is protected by the due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law. Further, since pursuant to the pertinent
law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a
widows right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is
also part of the husbands contractual compensation. Although the
subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits
under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 covering government employees, the pronouncement therein that
retirees enjoy a protected property interest in their retirement benefits
applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282.
This is so because the mandatory contributions of both the employers
and the employees to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the
latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed
individuals, like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory

coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 are not mere gratuity because they are
required to pay both the employer and employee contributions. Further,
under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors
pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving
spouses right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or
husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters contractual
compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; The
proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives
the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS
members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors
benefitsit has created the presumption that marriages contracted after
the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of
securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282, a conclusive presumption
that does not afford any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit
purpose; The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is
unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or
universally true.The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section
12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it
outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to
the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of
their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due
such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective
marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement,
the proviso as of the date of his retirement qualifying the term primary
beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survi-vors pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement
date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the
benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is
conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as
it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it
presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United
States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an irrebuttable
presumption and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause.
Judicial Review; The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the

casethe question of the constitutionality of the proviso in Section 12B(d) of R.A. No. 8282 is absolutely for the proper resolution of the
present case.The Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the
issue of the validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary
to a decision of the case. However, the question of the constitutionality of
the proviso is absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the
present case. Accordingly, the Court required the parties to present their
arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice
to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves
to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the death of her
husband.
Sygney vs. SSS
Administrative Law; In proceedings before administrative bodies,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not binding.It is a wellknown rule that in proceedings before administrative bodies, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not binding. The important
consideration is that both parties were afforded an opportunity to be
heard and they availed themselves of it to present their respective
positions on the matter in dispute. It must likewise be noted that under
Section 2, Rule 1 of the SSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the rules of
evidence prevailing in the courts of law shall not be controlling.
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Under the principles of statutory
construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits,
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 is very clear. Hence, we need only
apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or
verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

Same; Same; The Social Security System (SSS) law is clear that for a
minor child to qualify as a dependent, the only requirements are that
he/she must be below 21 years of age, not married nor gainfully
employed.Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law
should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Since
petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and because the deceased
has no legitimate child, it follows that the dependent illegitimate minor
children of the deceased shall be entitled to the death benefits as primary
beneficiaries. The SSS Law is clear that for a minor child to qualify as a
dependent, the only requirements are that he/she must be below 21
years of age, not married nor gainfully employed.
Bartolome vs. SSS
Administrative Agencies; Appeals; Generally, findings of fact by
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. However, in the extant case, the
ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner
Cornelios death certificate. Based on Cornelios death certificate, it
appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only
less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4,
1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has
already passed away.
Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law.This Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune
Tobacco Corporation, 559 SCRA 160 (2008) that: As we have previously
declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions
of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always
be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied) Guided by this
doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees

Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial

deviation from Article 167(j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the
phrase dependent parents to refer to legitimate parents.
Dependent Parents; Words and Phrases; Plainly, dependent parents
are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.The term parents in the
phrase dependent parents in the aforequoted Article 167(j) of the Labor
Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase
dependent parents should, therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the
law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent
parents are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; As jurisprudence
elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. In other words, the concept of equal
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. The concept of equal
protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
Legitimate Parents; Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
legitimate parents pertain to those who exercise parental authority over
the employee enrolled under the Employees Compensation Program
(ECP).Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that legitimate
parents pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the

employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision
wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo
that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted
Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner
can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary. True, when Cornelio, in
1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key
detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. Johns minority at
the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

support upon the other cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage
alone; A wife who left her family until her husband died and lived with
other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support, financial or
otherwise, during the entire period.Although respondent was the legal
spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his
primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement
of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio. Social Security
System v. Aguas, 483 SCRA 383 (2006), is instructive in determining the
extent of the required dependency under the SS Law. In Aguas, the
Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged to support each
other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other
cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. Further, Aguas
pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived
with other men, was not dependent upon her husband for support,
financial or otherwise, during the entire period.

Civil Law; Adoption; Succession; Biological Parents; It is apparent that

the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption.It is apparent that the
biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at
least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those
by adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so
too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance at a better life under the care of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end.
Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority
resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the
adopted child.

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT;

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR DEATH BENEFITS WHERE THERE IS
FAILURE TO MAKE TIMELY REPORT TO SSS DURING LIFETIME OF
EMPLOYEE. Under Section 24 (a) of the Social Security Act, the
employer is liable for the payment of death benefits to the legal heirs of
its deceased employee by virtue of its failure to make a timely report to
the SSS during the lifetime of said deceased that the latter was in its
employ and had qualified for compulsory coverage in the System.

SSS vs. De Los Santos

Social Security Act; Death Benefits; Although a husband and wife are
obliged to support each other, whether one is actually dependent for

Machuca Tile Co., Inc. vs. SSS

2. ID.; ID.; COVERAGE OF ACT; OBLIGATIONS OF EMPLOYER. An

employer has two distinct obligations under the Social Security Act, to wit,
the obligation of making a timely remittance of premiums under Section
22(a) and the obligation of making a timely report of its employees'
names and other personal data, including the Social Security number
assigned to each employee, for coverage under Section 24(a).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF POSTHUMOUS REMITTANCE OF
DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S PREMIUMS. The posthumous remittance
of the deceased employee's premium served but to extinguish the
employer's liability therefor and to free it from the imposition of the 3%
monthly penalty from the date the contribution falls due until actually paid.
These accrued premiums were legally due to the System as the
contribution of both employer and employee under Sections 18 and 19 of
the Act and the death of the employee did not extinguish employer's

liability to remit the same. There is no justification for employer's claim

that respondent should be held in estoppel for having retained them.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO MAKE TIMELY REPORT
OF EMPLOYEE'S DATA. For failure to make a timely report of the
employee's name and personal data excludes the employee from the
System's coverage and the Act therefore shifts to the erring employer the
responsibility of paying the Social Security benefits "to which the
employee or his heirs would have been entitled had his name been
reported on time by the employer to the System."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF TIMELY REPORT BUT PREMIUMS NOT
REMITTED. Where the employer has, however, timely and properly
reported the employee's name for coverage but has failed or refused to
pay or remit the premiums, such failure or refusal, by express provision of
the Act in Section 22(b) "shall not prejudice the right of the covered
employee to the benefits of the coverage." The Act, in such cases as
above stated, exacts the lesser liability of payment of the delinquent
premiums with a 3% monthly penalty.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTEREST ON DEATH BENEFITS. Payment by
petitioner of the death benefits in the sum of P810.00 awarded to the
legal heirs of the deceased employee under the Social Security
Commission's Resolution of May 18, 1965 has been delayed pending this
unjustified appeal. It is only just and in accordance with law that the sum
due said heirs bear legal interest of six (6%) per cent per annum from
June 4, 1965, date of receipt of said Resolution by petitioner.
Gabionza vs. CA

Criminal Procedure; Amendments of Complaint or Information; The test

as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of
a Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or
Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as amended.
After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be
allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the
rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information is when a
defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint
or the Information as amended.
Same; Same; An amendment which merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original
information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at any
time.On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with
additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at any
time. Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as: (a) it
does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription; (b) it
does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged; (c) it
does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to
require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his
defense; (d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call
for a higher penalty; and, (5) it does not cause surprise nor deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment.
Same; Same; The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a
matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense.In the
case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and
not of substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is
a matter of form, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is
not even necessary to state in the Information the precise time the
offense was committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that
the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the
actual date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or
Information will permit.

Same; Same; No surprise, ergo, no violation of rights, could spring from

merely replacing the original period, more so with one that is shorter and
included within the same.The last two (2) cases involved changes in
dates which were so far removed from each other that substituting one
for the other would clearly work to the detriment of the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against
him. This is not so in the present case. For one, a comparison of the
amended Information (January 1991 to May 1992) and the original one
(January 1991 to May 1993) shows that the period stated in the former is
even shorter than and is included within the latter. Also, the averment in
or about and during the period gives a sufficient approximation of the
date of the commission of the offense. Therefore, the first Information had
adequately informed petitioner of the period of time when the crime was
committed. No surprise, ergo, no violation of rights, could spring from
merely replacing the original period, more so with one that is shorter and
included within the same.
Same; Same; Social Security Law (Republic Act 1161); A reading of
Section 28, par. (e), Republic Act 1161, shows that it penalizes, among
others, the failure or refusal of a compulsorily covered employer from
remitting compulsory contributions to the Social Security System, and
neither time nor duration of the offense charged is a material ingredient of
the offense.Moreover, the imposable penalty will not increase as a
result of the amendment. A reading of Sec 28, par. (e), RA 1611, shows
that it penalizes, among others, the failure or refusal of a compulsorilycovered employer from remitting compulsory contributions to the SSS.
Neither time nor duration of the offense charged is a material ingredient
of the offense. In fact, the penalty imposed for this violation is constant at
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, regardless of the
number of infractions.
Same; Same; Words and Phrase; Laches, Defined; The principle of
laches is inapplicable in this case, as Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is explicit that amendments as to form may still be
made after arraignment or during trial.Petitioner contends that because
of the lapse of time between the filing of the Information and the
amendment laches had set in. We find no merit in this argument.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that a
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

As the Solicitor General correctly pointed out, the principle of laches is

inapplicable in this case. The provision in Sec 14, Rule 110, of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure is explicit that amendments as to form may still be
made after arraignment or during trial. Since the questioned amendment
was made during trial, the same was made seasonably notwithstanding
the lapse of four (4) years.
Same; Same; Certainly the prosecution cannot be faulted for not filing the
amendment earlier where trial was suspended during the pendency of
the accuseds recourse to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
It may also be noted that even before the prosecution had the chance
to present its principal evidence petitioner moved for the suspension of
trial because he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the denial of his motion to dismiss. Pre-trial was held only on
11 November 1997. As can be seen from the records, the prosecution did
not unnecessary waste time in filing the Motion for Leave of Court to
Amend Information. Again, before the prosecution had the opportunity to
present evidence, trial was suspended because of the filing of the instant
case. This, coupled with the many postponements and resettings
requested by petitioner, satisfactorily explains the reasonable delay in the
amendment of the Information. Certainly, the prosecution cannot be
faulted for not filing the amendment earlier since trial was suspended
during the pendency of petitioners recourse to the Court of Appeals and
to this Court. Petitioner should not then bewail the delay in the
amendment because such delay was principally upon his own behest.
Kua vs. Sacupayo
Labor Law; Social Security Law (R.A. No. 8282); Failure to Remit SSS
Contributions; The Elements of Criminal Liability Under Section 22(a),
Republic Act (RA) No. 8282.The elements of criminal liability under
Section 22(a) are: 1. The employer fails to register its employees with the
SSS; 2. The employer fails to deduct monthly contributions from the
salaries and/or wages of its employees; and 3. Having deducted the SSS
contributions and/or loan payments to SSS, the employer fails to remit
these to the SSS.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; While the recommendation of the
public prosecutor of the ruling of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.On more than one
occasion, we have declared that while the recommendation of the public
prosecutor of the ruling of the DOJ Secretary is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts. Here, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and

refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law, which is the

independent resolution of the issue of probable cause. It is the courts
bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and the
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
The trial court failed in that regard.
Buenaobra vs. SSS
1. LABOR AND
SOCIAL LEGISLATION; P.D.
626 (LAW
ON
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION); THREE YEARS PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD FOR FILING OF CLAIMS; EXCEPTIONS; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. The issue of prescription in the case at bar is
governed by P.D. No. 626, or the Law on Employees' Compensation. Art.
201 of P.D. No. 626 and Sec. 6, Rule VII of the 1987 Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation both read as follows: "No claim for
compensation shall be given due course unless said claim is filed with
the System within three years from the time the cause of action accrued."
This is the general rule. The exceptions are found in Board Resolution
93-08-0068 and ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and Disposition of
Employees' Compensation Claims. Board Resolution 93-08-0068 issued
on 5 August 1993, states: "A claim for employee's compensation must be
filed with System (SSS/GSIS) within three (3) years from the time the
cause of action accrued, provided however, that any claim filed within the
System for any contingency that may be held compensable under the
Employee's Compensation Program (ECP) shall be considered as the
EC claim itself. The three-year prescriptive period shall be reckoned from
the onset of disability, or date of death. In case of presumptive death, the
three (3) years limitation shall be counted from the date the missing
person was officially declared to be presumptively dead." In addition,
Section 4(b), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and
Disposition of Employees' Compensation Claims, reads: "RULE 3.
FILING OF CLAIM, Section 4. When to file. (a) Benefit claims shall be
filed with the GSIS or the SSS within three (3) years from the date of the
occurrence of the contingency (sickness, injury, disability or death). (b)
Claims filed beyond the 3-year prescriptive period may still be given due
course, provided that: 1. A claim was filed for Medicare, retirement with
disability, burial, death claims, or life (disability) insurance, with the GSIS
within three (3) years from the occurrence of the contingency. 2. In the
case of the private sector employees, a claim for Medicare, sickness,
burial, disability or death was filed within three (3) years from the
occurrence of the contingency. 3. In any of the foregoing cases, the
employees' compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS or the SSS

within a reasonable time as provided by law. We agree with the petitioner

that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be considered
as the Employees' Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and
reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed
with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC.
Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which Employees'
Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner,
when she filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS under the SSS
law, she had already notified the SSS of her employees' compensation
claim, because the SSS is the very same agency where claims for
payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.
Section 4(b)(2), Rule 3 of the ECC Rules of Procedure for the Filing and
Disposition of the Employees' Compensation Claims, quoted above, also
provides for the conditions when EC claims filed beyond the three-year
prescriptive period may still be given due course. Section 4(b)(2) states
the condition for private sector employees, requiring that a claim for
Medicare, sickness, burial, disability or death should be filed within three
(3) years from the occurrence of the contingency. In the instant case the
petitioner was able to file her claim for death benefits under the SSS
law within the three-year prescriptive period. In fact, she has been
receiving her pension under the SSS law since November
1988. CSaHDT
2. ID.; ID.; SHOULD BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE
BENEFICIARIES; RATIONALE. The evidence shows that the System
failed to process her compensation claim. Under the circumstances, the
petitioner cannot be made to suffer for the lapse committed by the
System. It is the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislations
liberally in favor of the beneficiaries. This court has time and again upheld
the policy of liberality of the law in favor of labor. Presidential Decree No.
626 itself, in its Art. 166 reads: "ART. 166. Policy. The State shall
promote and develop a tax-exempt employees' compensation program
whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of workconnected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income
benefit, and medical or related benefits." Furthermore, Art. 4 of P.D. No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
which P.D. No. 626 forms a part of, reads as follows: "ART.
4.Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Particularly, the
policy of liberality in deciding claims for compensability was given
emphasis by this court in the case of Employees' Compensation

Commission vs. Court of Appeals, where it held that: ". . . the liberality of
law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails and the official
agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of
social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of compassionate
policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.
Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than
the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and
sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants;
or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor
of the employee or laborer. Verily the policy is to extend the applicability
of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder." Claims falling under the Employees'
Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a
social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman
in our society. . . . To reiterate that P.D. No. 626, as amended, is a social
legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection
to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other
contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Thus, as the official agents
charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by
the Constitution, the ECC and the SSS should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially
where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with
the illness of injury, as the case may be. It is only this kind of
interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate
spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which
states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.
3. ID.; ID.; DEATH IS COMPENSABLE ONLY WHEN IT RESULTS
FROM WORK-CONNECTED INJURY OR SICKNESS; MYOCARDIAL
INFARCTION, INCLUDED; JUSTIFICATION. Under the law on
employees' compensation, death is compensable only when it results
from a work-connected injury or sickness. In the instant case, the cause
of petitioner's husband's death was myocardial infarction and it must be
considered work-connected. While it is true that myocardial infarction is
not among the occupational diseases listed under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, the Commission, under
ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977, laid down the conditions
under which cardio-vascular or heart diseases can be considered as
work-related and thus compensable, viz: (a) If the heart disease was

known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that
an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by
reasons of the nature of his/her/her work: (b) The strain of work that
brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be
followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to
constitute causal relationship. (c) If a person who was apparently
asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his/her work and
such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal
relationship. Myocardial infarction is also known as heart attack. It results
in permanent heart damage or death. A heart attack is called myocardial
infarction because part of the heart muscle (myocardium) may literally die
(infarction). This occurs when a blood clot blocks one of the coronary
arteries (the blood vessels that bring blood and oxygen to the heart
muscle). When the heart muscle does not obtain the oxygen-rich blood
that it needs, it will begin to die. The severity of a heart attack usually
depends on how much of the heart muscle is injured or dies during the
heart attack. Heart attack accounts for 1 out of every 5 deaths. It is a
major cause of sudden death in adults. Heavy exertion or emotional
stress can trigger a heart attack.
Mendoza vs. People
Social Security Act; Condonation; The clear intent of the law is to grant
condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending
cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the
six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions
does not suffice.We note that the petitioner does not ask for the
reversal of his conviction based on the authority of RA No. 9903; he
avoids making a straightforward claim because this law plainly does not
apply to him or to others in the same situation. The clear intent of the law
is to grant condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or
pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies
within the six (6)-month period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid
contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within, the six
(6)-month availment period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.
Same; Same; By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner
effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903.
The petitioners case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was
passed. Unfortunately for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions
in 2007. By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner
effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA No. 9903.

This is how the law is written: it condones employers and only those
employers with unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who
pay within the six (6)-month period following the laws date of effectivity.
Dura lex, sed lex.
Same; Same; Two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the
Social Security System (SSS) contributions of their employees; Laws
granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the
governments part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly
construed against the applicants.RA No. 9903 creates two
classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS contributions

of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay within the six
(6)-month period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent employers
who pay outside of this availment period (the latter group). The creation
of these two classes is obvious and unavoidable when Section 2 and the
last proviso of Section 4 of the law are read together. The same
provisions show the laws intent to limit the benefit of condonation to the
former group only; had RA No. 9903 likewise intended to benefit the latter
group, which includes the petitioner, it would have expressly declared so.
Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the
governments part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly
construed against the applicants.