stability

Kyed, H M and Gravers, M 2015 Integration and Power-Sharing: What are

the Future Options for Armed Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace
Process? Stability: International Journal of Security& Development, 4(1):
57, pp.120, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gt

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Integration and Power-Sharing: What are

the Future Options for Armed Non-State
Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process?
Helene Maria Kyed* and Mikael Gravers
Myanmar is confronted with a contested peace process after over six decades of
armed conflict between the national army and around 20 ethnic Armed Non-State
Actors (ANSAs) in the countrys resource rich borderlands. Although a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight ANSAs in October 2015,
other groups have not, and fighting continues in some areas. A key controversy
is insecurity about the future political and economic positions of the ANSAs,
along with mistrust in the armys commitment to peace. In this article we discuss five re-integration options for ANSA members, including not only economic
integration, but also integration into political parties, local government, civil
society organisations and the security sector. We argue that conventional DDR
programming is unrealistic in Myanmar, because the ANSAs are strongly opposed
to any disarmament and demobilization before a far reaching political settlement
towards federalism is reached. This calls for a more flexible sequencing of DDR
that begins with reintegration options or what has been called RDD. In addition,
reintegration efforts should not only be technical exercises, but be firmly embedded in disaggregated power-sharing guarantees, including for lower- and middle-
ranking ANSA members at the local level. This will not only support more sustainable
peace, but also help build more trust in the peace process. We conclude the article
by considering the role of the international community.
Introduction
In Myanmar/Burma a core preoccupation
is the ongoing peace process that will end
65 years of armed conflict in the resource-rich
borderlands populated by ethnic minorities.
This takes place alongside a transition from
totalitarian military rule towards democracy
* Danish Institute for International Studies, DK
hmk@diis.dk
Aarhus University, DK
etnomg@cas.au.dk

and a rapid influx of international aid agencies and investors. In this article we engage
with the wider debate about Demobilization,
Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)
programmes and argue that in the present Myanmar peacebuilding context it is
highly unlikely that conventional DDR programmes will suffice to support stability
and sustainable peace (Jensen& Stepputat
2014; Munive& Jakobsen 2012; Munive
2013; Muggah 2005; McMullin 2013b). This
is because of the predominant focus in DDR

Art.57, page2 of 20

programmes on disarmament, as a first step

in the process, and on economic incentives to
successful integration. In Myanmar this DDR
template overlooks key political motives
behind both the causes of conflict and the
demands of the peace negotiations. For six
decades 20 ethnic armed organisations have
fought for self-determination and have, to
varying degrees, enjoyed considerable statelike control over ethnic territories and peoples. For this reason ethnic Armed Non-State
Actors (ANSAs) are strongly against laying
down arms before a comprehensive political settlement is reached. A core demand
of ANSA leaders is a federal system that not
only gives them political positions but also
allows them to retain arms in the different
ethnic nationalities areas.
Overall, the Myanmar situation raises the
question of whether conventional DDR in
some contexts should be substituted by what
is now referred to as third generation DDR
or RDD (reintegration, demobilization and
disarmament) (Sedra 2003). Reversing the
conventional sequence, RDD begins with
incentives economic and political for
reintegration and only ends with some form
of disarmament or arms control (Munive&
Jakobsen 2012: 362). It is increasingly realized that sequencing flexibility may be
needed to adapt DDR to particular contexts.
A UNDPO report (2010: 28) highlights that,
[p]rioritizing reintegration before starting
disarmament and demobilization may be
advantageous in cases where political will
is lacking for disarmament. Reintegration
opportunities, including non-material incentives such as political recognition, can serve
to move a stagnant peace building process
along and may also provide incentives to
financially motivated combatants of lowerranks (ibid). There are also matters of security and trust at play, as Walter (1999: 1545)
argues: because combatants are likely to
become highly fearful and insecure as they
demobilize, they can gain an added sense of
safety if they are not forced to disarm fully,
especially not before the political terms of an
agreement have been fulfilled.

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

In this article we similarly argue that the

lack of political will to disarm in Myanmar
calls for an exploration of potential (re)integration options for ANSAs as a starting point
for discussing DDR. This, we suggest, will not
only help obtain sustainable peace but also
increase trust in what currently is a contested
peace process. Given that a political agreement is still in the process of being reached,
it is equally necessary to ground a discussion
of reintegration within a wider framework
of conflict resolution (Walter 1999; Zartman
2001; Ramsbotham et al 2012). This means
framing integration options as an element
of disaggregated power-sharing guarantees
(economic, political and military), which can
help create trust in the peace agreement
(Walter 1999).
On 15 October 2015 eight ANSAs signed a
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with
the government and the head of the national
Burmese army after two years of intensive
negotiations. However, the remaining seven
ANSAs who were invited to sign have not
done so, and another three ANSAs have been
excluded from the NCA by the government.
Fighting between government and ANSA
forces also continues in some ethnic areas
and even the groups that have signed are
internally split on the NCA. The peace process therefore remains contested. At a higher
political level this reflects insecurity regarding whether the government and the army
will commit to a federal system. At the lower
level armed actors are insecure about their
future options, including their sources of
income, recognition and security, which creates mistrust in the peace process. The peace
negotiations have so far left out any open
discussions of what will happen to the many
thousand middle- and lower-ranked soldiers
and officials once an agreement is reached.
Instead the current draft agreement focuses
on high-level political and military aspects,
including a promise to hold a political dialogue regarding changing the political system. While these high-level settlements will
clarify the overall framework for the future
possibilities of ex-combatant integration,

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

more concrete options and guarantees also

need to be discussed at this current stage of
conflict resolution. As Walter (1999) argues,
the incentives to accept and implement a
peace agreement depend not only on resolving the root causes of conflict and agreeing
on the overall political system, but also on
more disaggregated security and powersharing guarantees. These can help mitigate
the enormous uncertainties that rival parties
face in the implementation of peace treaties: e.g. fear of attacks, of losing income and
positions and of being excluded from future
government arrangements. Power-sharing
guarantees can include the distribution of
specific posts to ex-combatants in government, administration, service delivery and
security forces, including at the local level.
It may also imply interim arrangements
whereby ANSAs are allowed to maintain
administrative and security roles in the territories they have controlled until integrated
institutions are established. Hartzell&
Hoddie (2003) further add the importance
of economic power-sharing guarantees,
especially in contexts where certain identity
groups have a history of being economically
marginalised. Apart from providing an incentive to sign an agreement, these guaranties
are also important for sustainable peace.
This argument emanating from the debate
on conflict resolution is closely related to the
integration aspects of DDR programming.
In light of these insights, this article discusses integration options for the ANSAs:
what exit options do ANSA members have
after decades of conflict and how do they
envision their future as armed actors, civil
servants, politicians, businessmen or something else? In addressing this question we
draw on semi-structured individual and
group interviews held in Mon and Karen
states as well as in Yangon in January 2014
and on prior research.1 We discuss five different integration options. These consist of a
combination of different forms of political,
economic, civil society and security sector
integration. The options are of our own creation but are inspired by the DDR literature

Art.57, page3 of 20

and our interviews in Myanmar. They are in

no way exhaustive but should be read as an
initial contribution to the debate about reintegration in Myanmar. In fact, we make a call
for a more in-depth analysis of the armed
groups, their incentives and motivations, not
as a homogenous group but as a complex
and dynamic set of actors. It is important to
note that the integration options will overall
depend on what kind of political settlement
is reached, including important power-sharing arrangements and the possibilities for
building trust and ensuring security in the
implementation process. It is therefore necessary to firstly provide a short background
to the conflicts and to discuss the main elements and challenges of the nationwide
ceasefire negotiations in Myanmar. We conclude the paper by reflecting on the role of
international aid agencies in the peace process, with Myanmar representing a rather
exceptional case of very low international
involvement.
From Armed Conflict to Contested
Peace
Myanmar has been blighted by civil war,
ethno-nationalist conflict and outbreaks of
communal and religious violence since colonial times. Thirty-three per cent of its 51.4
million residents belongs to ethnic minorities
and the remainder to the Burman majority.
There are today an estimated 20 active ethnic
ANSAs, including numerous splinter groups,
which represent the different ethnic minority groups (e.g. the Shan, Karen, Kachin, Mon,
Chin, Kayah, Rakhine, Wa, Pao-o, Naga, Lahu,
Lisu and Palaung, each with various subgroupings) (Smith 1999).2 These groups have
fought the national army to obtain a federal
constitution since 1949, two years after independence from the British. Most of them
also have political wings, their own flags and
uniforms. Over different periods they have
administered their own micro-states. Some,
like the Karen National Union (KNU), have
their own departments of education, health,
justice, forestry and local defence. Today the
ANSAs can muster an estimated 100,000

Art.57, page4 of 20

soldiers. The size is difficult to access, but

it ranges from the large United Wa State
Army (UWSA), with an estimated 2025,000
troops, to the Karen National Union (KNU),
with approximately 46000 troops, and the
New Mon State Party (NMSP), with 500700
soldiers (Gravers& Ytzen 2014).
The political economy of the ANSAs has
been tied to a shadow economy, linked to
cross-border trade, especially with China and
Thailand, and income from the borderlands
natural resources such as minerals, gems,
timber and opium (Woods 2011). ANSAs are
also known for taxing ethnic populations
and larger ANSAs have received substantial
donations from the ethnic diaspora as well
as from donors and religious organisations.
Over the course of the armed conflict, access
to and control over trade and resources have
played a strong role, along with identity politics. Shifting military operations and trade
alliances with China and Thailand have also
influenced the strength of the ANSAs. For
instance, in the 1970s80s the KNU was
regarded as the de facto authority by Thailand
at the local level in the border region, but
in the 1990s the Thai commander-in-chief
struck a deal with the Burmese military government to gain access to agricultural and
mineral businesses in Karen state and dams
and ports in Mon state. This substantially
undermined the ANSAs (Oh 2013).
The armed conflict in Myanmar has
resulted in establishing the borderlands as
a segmented society where military organisation and a shadow economy amalgamate
in an ethno-nationalist semi-state polity.
Weapons have remained crucial to protect
civilian supporters as well as businesses
against Burmese army attacks and economic
incursions. In addition competition between
and within ethnic organisations has been
strong.
History of conflict and previous
ceasefires

The seeds for the ethnic-based armed conflict

were already sown during British Colonial
rule. Ethnicity was reified and politicised

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

and a new order of classification and administration divided subjects according to not
only ethnicity, but also culture and religion
(Furnivall 1956: 304307). Apart from ethnicity, religious diversity has been central
in the conflict, which had begun during the
British conquests in the 1800s when ethnic minority Christian converts helped the
British fight Burman rebels led by Buddhist
monks.3
During World War II Christian Karen and
Kachin states cooperated with the British
forces against the Japanese army, alliances
that resurrected tensions between the ethnic
minorities and the Burman majority. During
the negotiations leading to independence
ethnic minorities expected their loyalty to
the British to be rewarded with autonomy.
A conference in Panglong was organised in
1947 with the main ethnic group leaders,
and here a federation was discussed that
would grant autonomous administration to
the ethnic minorities (Gravers& Ytzen 2014).
However, the federal principles of the 1947
constitution never materialised. This laid
the roots for the long civil war. The Kayah
rebelled in 1949, followed by KNU, which
almost managed to take over the then-capital city, Rangoon (now Yangon).4 The KNU
retreated to the hills of present Karen state
(established in 1952) where it established
the de facto government of the Kawthoolei
(Old Country) state. The Mon took up arms
with the KNU in 1950 and, after a ceasefire
agreement, rebelled again in 1958 with the
formation of the NMSP (South 2003). The
Kachin and other groups followed in 1961.
In 1962 General Ne Win staged a coup,
overthrowing Prime Minister U Nu, who had
promised states to the Rakhine and Mon
groups. Fearing that other ethnic groups
would secede, Ne Win took power and
launched a military offensive, demanding
unconditional surrender from the ANSAs.
His idea of order was a corporate state of one
nationality and he created a one party socialist union. Major military offensives during
his rule weakened many of the ANSAs territorial control. After pro-democracy protests

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration

Council took over power from Ne Win and
initiated the first ceasefires with at least 17
ANSAs (between 1989 and 1997).5 These
ceasefires focused on economic and military
matters, excluding any political settlements
towards federalism. For this reason some
ANSAs, like the KNU, did not agree to a ceasefire. Those who agreed were allowed to keep
their weapons and were given lucrative local
trade deals, territorial control over specified
ethnic areas and even industrial and international trade concessions, in exchange for
giving up the armed struggle (Oh 2013: 10).
The 1990s ceasefires split up many of the
ANSAs due to internal disagreements, fatigue
from fighting and conflicting economic interests. For instance in 1994 many Buddhist soldiers in the mainly Christian-led KNU/KNLA
mutinied to form the Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army (DKBA), under the leadership of a Buddhist monk.6 The DKBA signed
a ceasefire with the government and cooperated with the army to take over the KNU
headquarters. In exchange, DKBA was given
logistical, military and financial assistance
as well as permission to conduct businesses
(South 2011: 19). After the DKBA exit, more
splinter groups from the KNU appeared, led
by officers who were fed up with the struggle and looking after their own business
interests and the interests of their supporters. This reflected the general emphasis on
economic incentives in the 1990s ceasefires.
While they did bring some development projects that improved the lives of villagers, they
also ended up strengthening the illicit businesses of ceasefire groups and the national
army. Rather than create sustainable peace,
they allowed for the expansion of the armys
territorial control and counter-insurgency
strategies (Oh 2013: 11).
In 2009 the ceasefire groups from the
1990s became subject to the Border Guard
Force (BGF) initiative, which followed the
2008 constitutions demand for a single
army. It was an open strategy for military
integration of the ANSAs as special units
under the command of the National Defence

Art.57, page5 of 20

Services (Keenan 2013). The deal involved

stable salaries, social benefits and continued
armament for the ethnic soldiers. Whereas
this arrangement resembles reintegration
elements from DDR programs elsewhere, it
involved neither disarmament nor demobilisation, and came with no political settlement.
Consequently, many ANSA leaders refused
the deal, resulting in renewed cycles of fighting and tensions.7 Like the 1990s ceasefires,
the BGF initiative has been criticised not only
for undermining ethnic political demands,
but also for exacerbating abuses of villagers, illicit business and land-grabbing by BGF
forces (Keenan 2013: 34). Until 2011, joining the BGF was made a precondition for any
peace talks with the government.
The BGF initiative was implemented after
a longer political process beginning in 2003
with the military government declaring a
seven step roadmap to disciplined democracy, which in 2008 led to a referendum for
the new constitution, followed by general
elections in 2010. Both events were allegedly
marred with fraud. The military proxy Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was
declared the overall winner of the elections,
which in 2011 brought President U Thein
Sein into power. He introduced a surprising
political and economic reform agenda based
on fundamental rights of citizens. He also
made a peace process with the ANSAs a top
priority. By early 2012 ceasefires had been
signed with the majority of the ANSAs, followed by negotiations towards a nationwide
agreement.
Nationwide peace negotiations
obstacles and challenges

In December 2013 a National Ceasefire

Coordination Team (NCCT), comprised of 16
ANSA members, began the process of drafting a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)
together with the Union Peace-Making Work
Committee (UPWC), representing the government and army. The main political demands
of the ANSA leaders are a federal constitution, the protection of the rights of ethnic
nationalities and a federal army into which

Art.57, page6 of 20

the ethnic ANSAs are integrated. Legal reform

that regulates land ownership, development
projects and control of the drug trade is also
on their agenda. This last demand is closely
related to the fear of unequal economic
power and should be understood against the
background of the large-scale development
projects initiated by the government during the ceasefires, which ethnic communities have associated with land-grabbing and
counter-insurgency. Importantly, the ANSAs
are against disarmament before a political
settlement and most envision this settlement
to include some form of continued armament. A major change for the government is
that since 2013 it no longer demanded that
ANSAs first surrender weapons before entering into political dialogue; it also agreed to
discuss federalism.
In August 2015 the NCCT agreed on a final
NCA text with the government, which on 15
October 2015 was signed by eight ANSAs,
including, among others, the KNU and two
other Karen armed groups. However, the
remaining ANSA members of the NCCT
including the influential KIA in Kachin state
and the NMSP, representing the Mon ethnic
group decided not to sign. The large UWSP,
representing the Wa group, which is not
member of the NCCT, also rejected an invitation by the government to sign. The official
argument is that they do not want to sign
unless the NCA is all-inclusive and therefore
genuinely national. At the heart of this matter is the governments refusal to include
three ANSAs that are in open combat with the
army in the Kokang area (the Taang National
Liberation Front [Palaung], the Arakan Army
and the Kokang Army [Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army]) and three others regarded as too small and insignificant.
However, apart from dissatisfaction with lack
of full inclusiveness, the unwillingness of
some ANSAs to sign the NCA indicates continued insecurities and mistrust about the
future.
The NCA that was signed on 15 October
guarantees an end to all hostilities, provisions for a military code of conduct and

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

the promise of establishing a union based

on the principles of democracy and federalism, which can be seen as a major step
towards power-sharing and decentralisation.
However, the guarantee of a change of the
political system will depend on the outcomes of an inclusive political dialogue also
involving civil society and political parties, as
well as on constitutional amendments. The
political dialogue will only begin in early
2016. As such the NCA does not include any
concrete and disaggregated power-sharing
guarantees, such as positions to ANSA members in government, the administration and
security forces, which, as argued by Walter
(1999) can be a very significant incentive to
sign a peace agreement. The text does mention that political dialogue should include
discussing a union army that will represent all ethnic nationalities, but it makes
no concrete guarantees for the continued
armament of ANSAs. In terms of economic
power-sharing such as the equal distribution of resources and land rights (Hartzell&
Hoddie 2003), the NCA also does not provide any concrete guarantees. It only provides guidelines for ensuring that ANSAs
and local communities are consulted before
the government rolls out major projects in
the ceasefire areas. Although this could help
counter the widespread fear that the government and the army will use the NCA to
penetrate ethnic areas to make economic
and political gains, such guidelines provide
no legal guarantees in themselves. This is
likely an area of concern, especially for larger
ANSAs like the KIO, which controls areas
with many natural resources and lucrative
trade with China.
Although the NCA text illustrates that the
parties have come a long way in agreeing
on basic principles and in increasing trust
between ANSA leaders and USDP government
representatives, there are still many uncertainties when it comes to implementation and
power-sharing guarantees. A main concern is
also mistrust in the national army to commit
to political changes and to end attacks, even
after the signing of the NCA.

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

Deep issues are at stake that make the conflicts in Myanmar extremely difficult to end,
despite progress in the NCA process. If we
look at the three dimensions contradictions,
behaviour and attitudes outlined by Galtung
and others in the peacebuilding and conflict
resolution literature (Ramsbotham et al 2012),
we can identify some of the most important
stumbling blocks.
The ethnic contradictions are still emphasized by all parties. The army and the USDP
government adhere to a singular Myanmar
national identity while the ANSAs m
aintain
that they are independent ethnic nationalities.
There is also fundamental political disagreement about a federal constitution. The
current constitution provides the military
with 25 per cent of the seats in the two
houses of parliament and grants the
president power to appoint ministers from
the ethnic states. Proposed amendments
to these two parts of the constitution were
rejected by the parliament in June 2015 due
to opposition from the military. This sent a
strong signal that the military is not committed to federalism. The army also insists
upon upholding the Unlawful Association
Act, which makes those ANSAs that have
not yet signed the NCA illegal organisations
and makes any contact with them illegal.
Moreover, there are contradictory economic
interests, as mentioned above, as it is widely
believed that the army wants to gain control
of natural resources in ethnic areas. The army
now insists on a DDR plan with a focus on
ANSA disarmament as part of implementing
the NCA, whereas the ANSAs want to
keep weapons. All these are fundamental
structural contradictions impeding an
all-inclusive settlement. Thus integrative
measures and structural transformations
during the peace process remain difficult
(Ramsbotham et al 2012: 175176).
Attitudes have changed very little.
Nationalism and ethno-nationalism are still
dominant ideologies.8 Related to these ideologies and the long history of violence is
a general and profound mistrust among all
parties. The presence of mistrust and fear

Art.57, page7 of 20

means that the non-compromise factions

in the ANSAs and the army remain influential. There is an internal elite struggle within
most ethnic nationalities and their organisations (Naing 2015; Gravers 2015a), including
within those ANSAs that have signed the NCA.
In fact not everyone in the KNU supports the
15 October signing. Those against the NCA
particularly worry about the future status and
power of the ethnic groups. The army works
as a corporate unit but also seems divided
between hardliners and liberal officers.
Factionalism is therefore a major problem
(Ramsbotham et al 2012: 174). However, the
idea of marginalising sceptics and spoilers
will only lead to further conflicts (ibid: 186;
Gravers 2015a). Importantly, the ANSA leaders as well as their middle- and lower ranks
worry about their future positions, which is
further complicated by the fact that there are
no concrete guarantees for inclusive integration in the current NCA.
Fighting during the NCA negotiations has
demonstrated that behaviour has changed
very little. More than 40 clashes between
ANSAs and the army occurred from January
to August 2015 in Kachin and Shan states,
and further fighting intensified in the last
few days before the NCA signing. The armed
actors on the ground stick to their old
ways, which are the values of armed struggle, despite trust building at the leadership
level. One positive step is the creation of liaison offices, which establishes direct contact
between combatants. Nevertheless, substantial transformation of behaviours will take
time and depend on political results, which
remain unclear.
Future peacebuilding through the implementation of the NCA is, as elsewhere, even
more complicated (see Ramsbotham 2012
et al) but if it is successful from the perspective of ethnic groups in the areas covered
by those ANSAs that have signed already,
other groups may follow in signing. During
the NCA negotiations none of the parties
involved wanted to include international and
third party mediation, and it is still unclear
if the international community will be

Art.57, page8 of 20

invited to play a role in monitoring the NCA

implementation. As argued by a number of
scholars, third-party commitments to assist
ceasefire implementations can be important
to create trust in peace agreements (Walter
1999; Zartman 2001). They can help reduce
fear among combatant groups that the most
powerful party to a conflict will fully take
hold of government power as agreements are
being implemented. In Myanmar, international aid agencies have only so far been officially invited to support with development
projects and reconciliation in NCA areas. As
a former British colony, Myanmar guards its
independence and sovereignty and the military has always been suspicious of human
rights, considered Western ideas. Although
the EU was invited to sign the NCA as a witness, along with the UN and neighbouring
countries, the government did not agree to
the ANSAs suggestion to also include specific European countries, like Norway and
the UK. The government only agreed to
include these countries as observers. As witnesses and observers, the international community does not as such stand as a guarantor
of the NCA process.
A final and important area of concern is the
current political changes in Myanmar, influenced especially by the 8 November 2015
elections. Rather than waiting for all ANSAs
to be included, the president and the ruling
party, USDP, have undeniably pushed for
the NCA before the elections so as to secure
more votes. Conversely, those ANSAs that
did sign were likely fearful that the negotiation process would drag on too long if they
waited until after the elections. It is unclear
how the National League for Democracy
(NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, which has
won an approximately 80 per cent majority in both Houses of Parliament, will stand
in relation to the ANSAs once it takes over
the government in March 2016. The party
has declared its support for federalism, but
how much power it will concede or decentralize to the ethnic states remains unclear.
In addition, the military still retains veto
power over constitutional changes, which

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

would be necessary to get a federal system,

and it also continues to have 25 per cent of
the seats in both houses of parliament and
the power over three important ministries
(defense, home affairs, and border affairs).
Aung San Suu Kyi did not herself participate
in the NCA signing in October 2015, which
may indicate reluctance to support the current agreement. In the minds of those ANSAs
that have already signed, the negotiation
process had come to be perceived as what
is often defined as a hurting stalemate in
conflict resolution literature, which indicates
ripeness to sign an agreement (Ramsbotham
et al 2012). Others may hope that they can
get a better deal with the NLD, but this
remains to be seen.
Another current political challenge for the
ANSAs is the growing number of new ethnic political parties, who also claim to represent ethnic minorities (Hiebert & Nguyen
2014). Although these lost most seats in
the November 2015 elections to the NLD
they still stand as alternative ethnic political forces that may question the role of the
armed groups as legitimate stakeholders in
the political dialogue that follows the NCA
(South 2014). The ANSAs may become more
marginalized in the political process, and
there is a risk that this can lead to renewed
cycles of armed conflict, especially if ANSA
members are not able to strike a deal that
also benefits them, politically and in terms
of economic survival.
Against this background, the different
ANSAs incentive to sign and not to sign
the NCA stands between what could be an
urgent need to strike a deal before they
potentially lose political clout and the fear
that the current NCA will not assure the
ANSAs significant positions, due to a lack of
any concrete power-sharing guarantees. In
line with Walker (1999), we argue that the
lack of such guaranties creates insecurity
about what the NCA will mean in practice,
including for the middle- and lower-ranks.
This calls for the need to discuss concrete
(re)integration options, even if at this point
conventional DDR is not a realistic first step.

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

We therefore approach the debate about

reintegration options in the next section as
not only important to sustainable peace, but
also an urgent matter to increase trust in the
conflict resolution process.
Future Options for the Armed
Actors
Interviews in Mon and Karen states confirmed the strong conviction that the ANSAs
are not ready to disarm before any comprehensive political settlement. This was also
the view of CSOs such as Mon Womens
Organisation: the people do not want the
armed groups to disarm, because they need
them to protect their identity and freedom,
adding that this is also a military power issue
because as long as there are only Burmans
in the top army positions, the ANSAs do not
accept the army proposals (group interview,
16 January 2014). Keeping arms was not
only seen as reflecting insecurities about
the military position of ANSAs, but also as
necessary to protect ethnic civilians due to
mistrust in the army. However there was
also concern that the ANSAs are losing their
popularity among civilians as armed actors.
This legitimacy threat puts pressure on the
ANSAs to explore alternatives to reinvent
themselves as serving roles other than just
armed protectors. Other interviewees also
argued that the ANSAs will not be satisfied
with only economic incentives to disarm: To
have peace the government has tried to give
the armed groups opportunities like land,
cars and business, but the groups still do not
trust them. The leaders need to be given high
positions. They hold onto arms still because
they want a federal state (pastor, Karen state,
17 January 2014). This reflects, as discussed
earlier, ANSA members political ambitions
and the need for power-sharing guarantees
as incentives to engage in and commit to the
peace process.
In this section we consider five integration options for the ANSAs. Integration here
refers to the process through which fighters change their identity from combatant
to civilian, and change their behaviour by

Art.57, page9 of 20

ending the use of violent means and increasing activities that are sanctioned by the mainstream community (Torjesen 2013).9 Already,
there are some examples of ANSA members
in Myanmar who have voluntarily disarmed
or self-integrated, for instance as members
of political parties or civil society organisations (CSOs). While we draw on these examples, the options given below are of our own
creation. As argued in the introduction we
do not see these integration options as only
following on from a process of disarmament
and demobilisation, but also as an input to
discuss more concrete and disaggregated
power-sharing options, including military,
political and economic, as part of the political settlement and implementation of the
NCA. This goes beyond national level agreements on political institutions, like federalism or proportional representation, to also
include local level positions. As Walter (1999:
142) argues, the more political, military and
territorial power can be disaggregated, the
more enforceable and credible promises to
share power will be. For instance, as we discuss below, federalism and democratic institutions are not in themselves a guarantee
that warring factions will obtain positions
(ibid: 140). In line with Hartzell& Hoddie
(2003) we further add the economic dimension to this equation, also considering livelihood survival and distribution of resources.
The five options are: 1) integration into the
security sector, including community policing; 2) political parties; 3) civil service and
local government positions; 4) economic
integration through job creation and skills
training as well as the formalisation of largescale businesses run by ex-combatants and;
5) CSOs. We consider the obstacles to and the
dilemmas of these options.
Security sector integration: military,
police and village defence

In contrast to the dominant view of DDR

programmes that disarmament is a precondition for political stability, experiences from
elsewhere show that military integration
can work to create stability and pave the

Art.57, page10 of 20

way for integration (Spear 1999; Mutengesa

2013; Berdal& Zaum 2013). For fighters who
had known little else other than rebel life,
Mutengesa (2013) argues, military integration can be a way to decompress and make
the transition to civilian life. It can also build
confidence and give ex-combatants a much
needed sense of employment security (ibid:
343). Conversely, hasty disarmament can
mean reintegration into poverty or, at worst,
engagement in illicit activities or re-mobilisation into militia units because employment
opportunities are scarce (ibid: 342).
According to the current NCA a good number of the ANSA members will likely be integrated into some form of restructured Union
Army, ensuring ethnic nationalities representation. It seems that stability will depend on
the development of relatively independent
ethnic armed factions where ANSA commanders are given equivalent ranks and/
or where the army is based on ethnic state
divisions. This would be an important powersharing guarantee, reducing the fear that the
Burman army would take over full military
power (Walter 1999: 141). Trust-building
will likely also depend on giving ANSA commanders the guarantee to control their wartime armed units in the ethnic territories. In
Tajikistan, for instance, such an arrangement
was combined with positions in government
for ANSA political leaders, resulting in considerable stability and trust in the peacebuilding process (Torjesen& Macfarlane
2007). However, due to a lack of political
regulation of illicit economies, such stability came at the cost of sustainable economic
development because commanders used
their positions for personal enrichment (ibid:
327). There are thus important political-economic issues to consider with such forms of
military integration.
In general we suggest that military integration should be combined with wider
Security Sector Reform (SSR), including the
police and the judiciary, as these institutions
are also extremely important for de facto
power-sharing. This can involve the integration of ANSAs into national and regional

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

police branches as well as into more local

level village defence or community policing
(Knight 2009). Shared control of the judiciary and consideration of local level justice
and dispute resolution mechanisms in ANSA
areas are also important steps in reconciliation. Although SSR has yet to be discussed
in Myanmar as part of the post-NCA political dialogue, the ANSAs are proposing federal police forces for the ethnic nationality
states as well as recognition of ethnic justice
systems.
As Knight (2009) notes, integration into
the police is less straightforward than military integration, as it requires radically different skills and education than does the
military. There is thus a need for comprehensive training and careful recruitment among
ex-combatants if human rights abuses by
police and/or their political instrumentalisation by former leaders are to be avoided.
Moreover police integration and SSR more
broadly need to take into consideration
that even if the national police and courts
are not present, there is seldom a complete
security vacuum in conflict or ceasefire areas;
armed and non-armed local security forces,
with varying levels of legitimacy and effectiveness, usually exist. This is the case in
Myanmar, although knowledge is needed on
how these forces operate, are structured and
relate to or overlap with the ANSAs (UNDP
2012; McConnachie 2014). Such knowledge could inform potential efforts to align
local-level security provision with the integration of ex-combatants into more formalised village defence or community policing
schemes that work with civilians and create
partnerships with the police over time, as
is the case, for instance, in Liberia (Hill&
Bowman 2006). This also gives ex-combatants an occupation and a sense of worth in
the community. However, experiences from,
for example, Afghanistan warn against allowing such groups to remain armed as this can
run the risk of them becoming independent
militias who are not adequately accountable
to their communities (Kumar& Behlendorf
2010: 13).10

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

Political parties

Transformation of ANSAs into their own

political parties as well as political integration of ex-combatants into existing political
parties predominantly targets ANSA leaders.
However, it can also give lower- and middleranks a conduit for political expression so as
to realise personal, social and economic goals
through non-violent means (Mitton 2008:
202). Most of our interviewees supported
political integration as an option in Myanmar
but there were also concerns. One Buddhist
monk stated: The leaders [of ANSAs] are not
ready to be politicians in a democracy. They
are not educated and civilised, but speak in
a too rough manner like military way. They
do not understand that democracy is to be
representative of the people (Interview,
January 12, 2014).
In general it cannot be assumed that ANSAs
already have the required political and technical skills to operate party apparatuses and
engage in parliamentary politics. Thus in
other post-war contexts political integration
has commonly been supported by international aid agencies who provide capacity
building (ibid: 198). Conversely, Nilsen&
Tnnesen (2013) argue that the problem of
adequate skills also concerns already existing
political parties in Myanmar, and therefore a
transformation of ANSAs into parties should
be seen as part of a wider democratisation
process. Likely successful political integration
will depend on a demilitarisation of the political culture of ANSAs and beyond. Otherwise
political integration could risk reproducing
patronage politics and the mobilisation of
military networks within electoral politics.
Yet these issues cannot be generalised across
all the ANSAs in Myanmar; the larger ANSAs,
like the KNU, already have entrenched political structures and some internal democratic
procedures in place, whereas smaller splinter
groups do not.
A core challenge to political integration in
Myanmar is the great complexity and heterogeneity of already existing parties that represent the same ethnic minorities. It is not clear
to what extent current parties represent the

Art.57, page11 of 20

ANSAs, or if individual ANSA members support them or would be willing to lay down
arms to join them. Potentially, political integration could involve motivating combatants and commanders to join these existing
parties, especially those that represent their
political goals (like self-determination for
ethnic nationalities). Some of the existing
party representatives suggested that alliances could be built between ANSA parties
and existing ones. A minister for the Karen
Peoples Party (KPP) asserted: the KNU leaders can become party officials in the KPP or
they could make their own party [...] and
then we can make an alliance. This would
mean a strong constituency because KNU
has support in the villages and KPP is strong
in towns (interview, 15 January 2014). A key
challenge now is that ethnic political parties
can only get real national influence and adequate representation in the current political
system if they create broad alliances (Nilsen &
Tnnesen 2013). This is not only due to the
ethnic groups being a minority, but also
because the current single member constituency voting system favours larger parties.
Entering elections is therefore no guarantee
of de facto power positions for the ANSAs.
A related concern is the political legitimacy
of the ANSAs in the ethnic constituencies.
According to South (2012) many Karen communities in KNU-controlled areas display
strong support for the KNU, yet there is concern that this is not the case in other Karen
constituencies. Some ANSA leaders fear losing popular support and control over client
populations during the current peace process, especially as civilians resettle in government-controlled areas. Transformation into
political parties as part of a peace settlement
and disarmament process will arguably only
be attractive to the ANSAs if they believe
they are able to mobilise enough votes. Even
if federalism and democratic decentralisation were agreed on in the political dialogue,
these institutional arrangements would
not be a de facto power-sharing guarantee
to the ANSAs (Walter 1999). In other contexts, such insecurity for ANSAs has led to a

Art.57, page12 of 20

combination of political integration in the

form of electoral competition with the guarantee of specific positions to ANSA members
within the government and state apparatus
(Torjesen 2013; Mitton 2008). The question
is whether the incoming NLD government
and other ethnic representatives would agree
to such privileged positions for the ANSAs in
Myanmar.
Political integration also needs to consider
the potential power games for positions
among top and mid-level ANSA members,
which may also affect lower ranks (Torjesen
2013: 6). If lower ranks do not feel that they
benefit and are represented through the
political integration there can be a risk of
violent remobilisation (Christensen& Utas
2008). According to Spear (2007) one of the
problems in other post-war contexts is that
many ANSA members do not regard being
in the political opposition as providing for
them economically, at least not sufficiently.
This calls for a consideration of the heterogeneity of incentives to give up fighting and
thus for different integration options.
Civil service and local government
positions

Another possible option for ANSA members

is positions within local government service provision and administration, based on
already existing experiences and structures.
As studies have shown the ANSAs, along
with a range of ANSA-linked CommunityBased Organisations (CBOs), have to varying
degrees had quite extensive administrations
as well as social service delivery in the areas
of health, education, agriculture, land tenure
and so forth (Jolliffe 2014). Instead of viewing these as oppositional to state-building,
they should be seen as an asset in consolidating and improving service delivery during the peace agreement implementation.
According to Jolliffe (2014: 10), cooperation
between ANSA-linked service providers and
the government can also contribute to reconciliation in the long term. This is already
seen with the NMSP education sector, which
has been successful in introducing Mon

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

language into government schools through

corporation with the Ministry of Education
(ibid). Such cooperation can be contrasted
with the fact that the rolling out of government schools and clinics, staffed only by
Burmans, in ethnic areas during the ceasefires has created antagonisms and fears that
the government is taking over control before
a political settlement is reached. It also
sends a signal that ethnic representatives are
excluded from government, underpinning
mistrust in the peace process and in governance reform in general.
Apart from job creation for ex-combatants,
local government integration could already
be part of a disaggregated power-sharing
guarantee in the implementation of the NCA,
allowing the ANSAs to continue to administer the ethnic areas they control. This would
mitigate fears that the government and
army will take full control during the NCA
implementation. Ceasefire negotiations have
already discussed interim arrangements
that could include ANSA structures at the
local government level until official government institutions and services are rolled out,
but the details regarding how this will play
out are not yet clear and there are no direct
guarantees in the NCA. Naturally, the longerterm institutional developments within this
field will also depend on the extent to which
federalism is accepted.
Local government integration needs to
carefully consider already existing power
arrangements at the local level, so as not to
lay the ground for future tensions. Not only
do local governance setups vary across the
ethnic minority states due to the shifting contours of the conflict, but there are also areas
with mixed local government, for instance
areas where government-appointed village
leaders and ANSA leadership structures coexist, sometimes alongside village leaders
accountable to other armed factions, like
smaller splinter groups (Interview, KPF leader,
January 2014). Against this background the
post-NCA political dialogue should early on
include a dialogue about what will happen
with existing personnel within the various

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

local government setups and the power positions they hold. This will be very important
to the successful implementation of the
NCA. South (2012) questions the governance
capacities and technical expertise of existing
personnel from the ANSAs, but adds that this
also applies to government officials. As experiences from elsewhere (e.g. Aceh, Indonesia)
show, it is important that not only ANSA
leaders, but also rank-and-file combatants
and civilians from other ethnic groups, are
included in local government initiatives, so
as not to produce new forms of dominance
(Ansori 2012).
Economic integration: job creation,
education and training

In DDR programmes economic integration

is understood as a process whereby combatants are moved from livelihood support mechanisms associated with military
networks to employment in formal and
informal sectors (UN 2008). This covers a
range of mechanisms like vocational and
agricultural training, job placement, education for ex-combatants, income generation
with microcredit schemes, and public works
schemes (McMullin 2013a). Apart from providing an income that moves them away
from combat or criminality, a job can also
give ex-combatants a sense of pride in supporting their families and thus aid their psychological and social reintegration (Specht
2003). In previous years DDR programmes
have also begun to involve whole communities in joint community development and
reconstruction work, where civilians and excombatants participate and get on-the-job
training (such as the rebuilding of schools,
clinics, roads and wells) (Munive& Jakobsen
2012: 362; UNDPO 2010). This also potentially lessens distrust and increases tolerance between different conflict-affected
groups, thereby also supporting reconciliation (Specht 2003: 96).
Myanmar is already experiencing large
investments and new businesses (the country is opening up to foreign investors and
the economy is being liberalised). This could

Art.57, page13 of 20

also benefit the economic integration of excombatants. However, as experiences from

elsewhere show, this will likely be more
realisable if ex-combatants are given heightened skills and education as part of, for
instance, internationally-funded skills training. Specht (2003) also suggests that there
may be a need for the government to lobby
potential employers and give them concrete
incentives (like tax reductions) to recruit excombatants, as it cannot be assumed that private businesses will necessarily be willing to
hire them.
Economic integration should not only
be seen as a technical exercise of post-war
employment creation, however, but also as
an integrated element of the conflict resolution process. This implies framing integration within wider economic power-sharing
guarantees, including share of resources
and access to business concessions, as part
of the peace agreement (Hartzell& Hoddie
2003). It also implies establishing incentives
to enter an agreement that will outweigh the
benefits of war economies for combatants
(Zartman 2001). According to interviewees, a
real worry in Karen and Mon states is that the
new businesses, which are predominantly
owned by the Burman majority or by foreigners, will not hire local Karen and Mon, but
import Burman labourers. This tendency will
not only make it difficult for ex-combatants
and returning IDPs to get jobs, but also challenge the consolidation of economic power
by the ethnic minorities in their own areas.
This is also why the ANSAs demanded in the
NCA negotiations a guarantee that all larger
development and business projects planned
for the ethnic areas only be approved on the
basis of consultations with the ANSAs and
local communities. However, to what extent
this will be cherished in the implementation
of the NCA in Karen state remains to be seen
and may set an example for the Mon armed
group, the NMSP, which has still not signed.
ANSAs also fear losing economic power
themselves as a consequence of the implementation of the NCA. This concern is likely
more acute among those groups that control

Art.57, page14 of 20

large natural resources and trade, like the

KIO, and is deeply embedded in what Woods
(2011) has defined as ceasefire economies.
These include the many economic activities that ANSAs have developed in the territories they were granted control over
through bilateral ceasefires, ranging from
cross border trade, mineral extraction and
plantations to illegal drugs and gambling.
They also include the Burmese militarys economic incursions into ANSA territories and
the borders around them. Economic reintegration should consider such economies,
which are deeply embedded in networks
of power and contestations over control of
territories and resources. Key combatants
have often enjoyed the benefits of the war
or ceasefire economy and this position can
be hard to break. Some of our interviewees
stated that a key challenge is that the armed
conflict has created a kind of lost generation of people who have known little but
military conduct and who see few opportunities to join the licit economy. Specht (2003)
speaks about creating a political economy
of peace, which involves closing off illicit
routes to economic gain. Another option is
to formalise ex-combatants existing agricultural or mineral businesses and other forms
of trade and grant them land and business
concessions. This option already has historical roots in Myanmar. For instance the Karen
Peace Force General used his ceasefire deal
with the government in 1995 to commence
large-scale agricultural and infrastructural
projects, which also benefitted the population in his area. These experiences point
towards a potential entry point to economic
(re)integration via economic power-sharing
between government and ANSAs. However,
it is important to mitigate the risk that such
a deal involves the personal enrichment of
ex-combatants at the expense of other members of the local populations. This calls for a
more concrete dialogue in the near future on
ways to regulate and formalise the informal
economic activities of ANSAs so that they
serve the economic rights of ethnic communities at large.

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

Civil Society Organisations

Civil society organisations (CSOs) enjoy an

expanding space for operation in Myanmar
and with the increase in international donor
flows inside the country there is a growing
demand for local NGOs as partners in development. In one respect such new CSOs could
be seen as challenging the ANSAs local
legitimacy because many of them claim to
represent those civilians who did not participate in the armed struggle. Conversely,
many of those operating in the ethnic states
still need the protection of the ANSAs and
therefore have deep alliances. The possibility
of CSOs becoming spaces for ex-combatant
integration into civilian life is not something
one reads about in the DDR literature, but
in Myanmar could be relevant. This became
clear in Mon state when we met the Ramanya
Peace Foundation (RPF), established after
the 2012 NMSP ceasefire. Two of its founders were former NMSP members and essentially had self-integrated by setting up the
RPF, which now receives considerable international donor funding to support the peace
process by doing projects in the areas of water
and sanitation, womens empowerment and
leadership training in NMSP ceasefire areas.
Their work is ground-breaking because, as
one of the first CSOs, it was registered with
the government and allowed to carry out
development projects in NMSP areas. The
two founders already had some skills to enable them to re-invent themselves as a development CSO because they had been part of
the NMSPs education department. Similar
examples exist in other ethnic states.
Conclusion
In this article we have argued that there is
a need in Myanmar to begin a discussion
on future (re)integration options for ethnic
ANSAs, rather than highlight disarmament
and demobilisation as the first steps in a DDR
process. This alternative sequencing of DDR
is already being discussed in the international DDR debate, where it has been argued
that in contexts where there is a lack of political will to disarm it may be more sustainable

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

to begin with (material and non-material)

reintegration initiatives (UNDPO 2010;
Thruelsen 2006: 36). This RDD approach
could be a valuable option for Myanmar.
However, we have also argued that there is
a need to frame reintegration options within
the wider debate on conflict resolution and
peace negotiations (Walter 1999; Zartman
2001), rather than confine it to the technical
aspects of DDR or RDD programming. This
means framing integration options as part of
more disaggregated power-sharing (political,
military and economic) guarantees already
during peace negotiations. Such guarantees
can help create incentives to reach agreements as well as build trust in the implementation of agreements.
As discussed in this article, the ANSAs in
Myanmar will not lay down arms before the
political system changes towards a federal
one, and even talks about disarmament at
the moment can be detrimental to the peace
process. Conversely, economic incentives
to reintegration that focus on employment
opportunities will likely only satisfy some
ANSA members unless combined with political positions and guarantees that ensure the
distribution of resources to ethnic groups.
The strong emphasis on power-sharing guarantees should be seen in light of the exceptionally long history of ethnic-based armed
conflicts in Myanmars borderlands under
repressive military regimes which have,
despite the growth of war economies, always
been embedded in strong ethno-political
agendas. Moreover there is currently a fear
among the ANSAs, including members of
those that have signed the NCA, that a peace
agreement could be used by the government
and military to take full control of the ethnic areas, through development projects and
the expansion of state institutions that do
not include ANSA members and the ethnic
populations, but the Burman majority. This
is a fear also reflected in other peace negotiation processes, as shown by Walter (1999),
who argues that such fear can be a strong
disincentive to commit to peace agreements.
One solution to this impasse is to include

Art.57, page15 of 20

in agreements more disaggregated powersharing guarantees, such as positions in local

government and security forces. Hartzell&
Hoddie (2003) further add economic powersharing guarantees, such as the distribution
of resource control and access to state funds.
Although eight ANSAs have now signed the
nationwide agreement, there is still much
concern among the remainder of the ANSA
leaders, as well as among middle- and lowerranks about their future options and positions. This also regards members of those
groups that have already signed the NCA,
such as the KNU, which is internally split on
the agreement. As reflected in a media statement by a general of the KNUs armed wing,
many combatants feel that there is a need
for a concrete political roadmap in the NCA,
including specific guarantees, rather than
the promise alone of a political dialogue
(Karen News August 26, 2015).
In this article we have discussed five different integration options that combine
concerns for military/security, political and
economic power-sharing, and which also
consider middle- and lower-ranks. Thus we
have also focused on local-level positions,
such as in service delivery and sub-national
administration, along with political parties
and civil society organisations. It is clear
that there are no quick solutions or blueprints. The modalities need to be based on
particular contextual understandings and
a consideration that armed actors are not
homogenous groups. So far in Myanmar
the incentives of lower- and middle-ranked
armed actors to transform themselves have
been silenced in the peace talks. Experiences
from elsewhere show that such kind of exclusion can run the risk of creating autonomous
spheres of violence and predation (Derksen
2014; Spear 2007). In Myanmar it has also
meant continued mistrust in the peace process by over half of the ANSAs. Mid-level
commanders are particularly important to
consider here because they often enjoy considerable local power and access to informal businesses (Spear 2007: 181; Derksen
2014). In Myanmar such commanders have

Art.57, page16 of 20

for years run de facto local micro-states.

These positions they hold raise questions
not only about future economic reintegration options, but also about politics and
power-sharing. As Derksen (2014: 2) argues,
it is important that a political settlement also
involves translating national power-sharing
into local arrangements that give the main
local actors access to power and resources.
In this light, we suggest that the post-NCA
high-level political dialogue about federalism should immediately include considerations of concrete integration options at the
local level. This is much more important than
rushing into DDR programming with its ultimate focus on disarmament and demobilisation. Equally important at the moment is a
military code of conduct and inclusive monitoring mechanisms that will ensure effective
implementation of a nationwide ceasefire
and reduce the fear that fighting will continue. Right now a key concern is exactly that
open combat between ANSAs and the army
has not ended in all areas. Before this happens political talks may be futile. Civil society involvement is crucial in monitoring and
in future reconciliation measures, including
in dealing with traumas and repatriation of
IDPs and refugees.
The remaining question is what role the
international community, including development agencies, can play in the future peace
process and the implementation of the NCA.
According to conflict resolution scholars
like Walter (1999) and Zartman (2001), third
party mediators and external commitment
to assist peace agreement implementation
e.g. through peace keepers are key ingredients to successful peace processes. Mediators
can provide credibility to ceasefire incentives
(Zartman 2001: 300) and third party actors
can help enforce commitments to demobilisation and power-sharing arrangements,
thereby increasing trust and reducing fears
that either of the parties will cheat (Walter
1999: 137). In Myanmar international agencies have not been invited to become third
party mediators and at the signing of the
NCA foreign representatives, including the

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

EU, the UN, Japan and neighbouring countries, only acted as witnesses and observers.
It is still unclear to what extent international
actors will take part in any implementation
and monitoring of the NCA, but a peace
keeping mission is highly unthinkable. This
meagre international involvement comes
despite the massive influx of development
agencies since the country opened up in
2011. The advantage is that the peace process
can be seen as more home-grown and locally
or nationally owned rather than internationally driven. However, there is also cause for
concern that current donor modalities can
undermine, rather than support, the peace
process. This is because currently the vast
majority of donors are principally involved in
supporting the government-led reform process, along with providing humanitarian aid.
They are already engaging in state-building,
before and on the side-line, of the peace
process.
In Mon and Karen states there was a
strong view that until a political settlement
is reached between the government and
ANSAs, international donors should avoid
supporting government development initiatives (including schools, clinics, etc.) in
ethnic areas. Such initiatives have until now
been seen as boosting the legitimacy and
control of the USDP government as well as
undermining the ethnic political agenda.
Although it is likely that an NLD government
will be more trusted by the ethnic minorities,
it is still important that donors are considerate of being inclusive of ethnic nationalities
concerns when they are operating through
government agreements. There must at least
be a strong awareness among internationals
about their potential damaging effects on
creating trust in the peace process.
Having said this, there are clear openings
for support, especially after the signing of
the NCA, have also in October 2015 launched
a Joint Peace Fund earmarked for development projects and reconciliation in ceasefire
areas. Moreover, ethnic CSOs are welcoming
donor funds for development assistance to
areas still marked by conflict. International

Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

agencies could also support ex-combatant

reintegration and provide assistance to institution and capacity building that supports
agreed-upon power-sharing arrangements
(Walter 1999). This also means being sensitive
to ethnic inclusion more broadly in government institutions, including administration,
police and so forth. However, as suggested
in the critical DDR literature, such support
should not take the form of export models
but be based on careful contextual analysis that is sensitive to the power dynamics
and heterogeneity of the ANSAs (Munive&
Jakobsen 2012; Spear 2007; Torjesen 2013;
Muggah 2005; McMullin 2013b).
Competing Interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Notes
1
The interviews were distributed as follows. In Karen State: two Karen Buddhist
monks, two Karen political party representatives, one ward administrator in the
DKBA area, one KNU Liaison officer and
ex-combatant, one KNU splinter group
leader, one leader of Karen development
CSO and three group interviews (Karen
ANSA ex-combatants in village for disabled, two Karen youth and environmental networks). In Mon state: two Mon
political party leaders, two NMSP liaison
officers, one Mon womens group organisation, one Mon/NMSP development
CSO, and two religious leaders. In Yangon
we interviewed representatives from the
Myanmar Peace Center and the Myanmar
Peace Support Initiative as well as had
several informal conversations with academics and journalists.
2
See list of ANSAs in Gravers& Ytzen
(2014: 16872).
3
Today 8090 per cent of the Chin and Kachin
are Christian and about 2025 per cent
of the Karen are Christian.
4
On the long Karen struggle and its complexity, see Thawnhmung (2012) and
Gravers (2015a).

Art.57, page17 of 20

On the ceasefires see Kramer (2010),

Zaw& Min (2007), Callahan (2007) and
M. Smith (2006).
6
For details on the DKBA and the Buddhist
Munk, U Thuzana, see Gravers (2015b)
7
The United Wa State Party (UWSP) and
the Kachin Independence Organisation
(KIO) also refused the deal. In effect this
meant that these groups broke their prior
ceasefire agreements with the government (Keenan 2013: 1).
8
This is equally reflected in the recent
anti-Muslim riots and laws against interfaith marriages supported by nationalist
Buddhist monks, which seem to have
gained widespread support in the population (Gravers& Ytzen 2015).
9
We have decided to use the concept of
integration rather than reintegration as
used in the DDR literature. This is because
in Myanmar the prefix re is somewhat
of a misnomer. It suggests that armed
actors were totally separated from family and community life during the armed
conflict and it downplays the fact that
ANSAs have not exclusively used violent
means but also governed by other means
and partially lived civilian lives (Torjesen
2013: 3).
10 Kyed& Gravers (2014) also discuss the
option of integration into the private
security sector, which is growing towns
and cities of Myanmar due to massive economic investments and developments.
5

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How to cite this article: Kyed, H M and Gravers, M 2015 Integration and Power-Sharing: What are
the Future Options for Armed Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process? Stability: International
Journal of Security& Development, 4(1): 57, pp.120, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gt
Published: 03 December 2015
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