G.R. No.

109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a)
the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b)
the Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said
case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She
alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which
provides that "(b)ona fidecandidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo,
pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice
Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at
8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there
was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of
particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48).
The motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the
application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it
lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the
names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the
two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
the motion for the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution
stated categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated
March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting
the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds
within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32
Amended Informations was set for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated
March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from
sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court
and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication
of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged"
the validity of the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to
change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he
sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the
July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July
11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a
"perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding
Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going
abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some
of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned
to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus.
Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what
Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a
lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse
morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds
objectionable, reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending
of her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is
charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at
Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having
favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program
nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having
favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order
was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative
functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of
the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as
uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity
and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in
court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the
letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have
been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against
the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the
Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among
the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606,
Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's
fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v.
Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by
reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her,
while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information
was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo,
p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case.
In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors
inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled
because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original
information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the

January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory
process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor
Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned
to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the
investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case
was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of
the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review,
normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in
March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case
No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in
the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in
not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of
her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No.
324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of
Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons
qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused
"undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party,
including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable
element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed
by petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We
also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the
furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant,
which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case,
and hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued
crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind
that the concept ofdelito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult
as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal

purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in
reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent
or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the
following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos,
67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same
coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974]
).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
(People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time
he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the
attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA
156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same
motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection
were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975
[1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956
(People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on
two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936.
The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose

or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil.
354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure
of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June
1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People
v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections
from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following
up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special
laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the
Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special
laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single
offense or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed
American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking
of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and
place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also
abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion to prosecute the
accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37
ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the
different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done
on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson,
81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee
against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could

be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii)
was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each
amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that
they would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32
aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded
categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists
of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of
32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In
this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through
counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations
but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval
of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke
of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars
that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated
November 13, 1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only
by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse
effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one
offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172716

November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause
to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved
to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC
effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained
him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent
Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight
physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to
separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not
to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party
and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance
at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the
protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8
of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a prearraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and

jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court
granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death
sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from postarraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does
not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs
refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of
the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the
same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the
"same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense
from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person
who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided
in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the
penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to
death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this
hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 12); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and
9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features
of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points
of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes);
(2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming
them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that
by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as
a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition

behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For
each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for
reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter
could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen
that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful
crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case
for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to
trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x
[but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in
1939. Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasicrimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of
committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of
lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related
branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring
second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or
acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless
act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars

Subsequent Prosecution for the Same

Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such
quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a
full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution
was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was
brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in
the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28(promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano
v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33(promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of
"slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same
act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the
pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor
vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts
on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite
his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,"
arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals
had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war
case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of
People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the
result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not
sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision
dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage
to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed
that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act
caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more
fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz
progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in
two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal
of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles
driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been
dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same
justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the
vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of
these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were
acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose
Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a
duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The

motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in
the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial
Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On
appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case
was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time
thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount
of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.
One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge
if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the
lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted
the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have
been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence,
Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined the invitation,
thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for
Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the
Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the
Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The
Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts
of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a
delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other,
this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap
v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and
(2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted
this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but
"the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a
single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts
and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence
resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is
obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework
apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the
single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under
Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved
the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its
multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand,
resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent
Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now exclusive
original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a
single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article
365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365,
and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365,
articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.
1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power
to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasicrimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion
of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand
for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in
1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not
bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of
the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared
by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the
Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court
of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant
in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged
and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article
48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of nonprosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006
and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the

Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006
RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK
BANSALES,Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002,
suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the
Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National
High School in President Roxas, Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne
Declarador was stabbed to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural
Health Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that the
victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different parts of the body. 2
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the Family Court. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 oclock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in CabugCabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the
latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the
immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances
of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering that the attack was

made by the accused using a long knife which the latter carried along with him from his
house to the school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless at that time
and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. 3
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment
on May 20, 2003 finding Bansales guilty of murder. However, the court suspended the
sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for
Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution,
the court finds CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of
Yvonne Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorneys fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and unearned income of One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand
Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the
Cabug-Cabug National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable
in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the
classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the
Child in conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private
Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for
Youth, Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003
with the Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge
of the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would turn 18
on June 3, 2003. 5

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that portion of the decision of the trial courts
decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation
center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law),
the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an
offense punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of
this Court in People v. Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since Bansales was charged with
murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the
benefits of a suspended sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition,
considering that the offense charged is a public crime brought in the name of the People of
the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition
in court assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He
further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles the accused to an automatic
suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center;
hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondents sentence cannot be suspended since he was
charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the
entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence
actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as
provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the
petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition
with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of
respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for the
Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and
the offended party, he has sufficient personality to file the instant special civil action for
certiorari. 8 This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of
Court in order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the

petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the nullification of the assailed portion of
the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify
an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. 10 A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of
certiorari may be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. 11 This is an established policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts
docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance
of the issues raised and in the interest of speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the
Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover, this
Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and
the application of the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of
either evident premeditation or abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for
the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing
the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing
judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that
the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may
suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by the
government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years
of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports
and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the
government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has been
committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the
court may require the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and
submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the
court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the
Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph
3, Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. The sentence shall
be suspended without need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court
shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation
of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile,
and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the
following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:
care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group
counseling and similar activities; Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the
DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of
DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the
compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with the disposition measure and shall
submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family
Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable,
of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed
necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who
has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of
promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified from availing the benefits of a
suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to
punishment; liable to be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." 15 The word

"punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be punished" as

specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17 the Court defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for,
punishment." Thus, the term refers to the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is
concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty
therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty
imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite
the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of
the sentence meted against him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38
of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 021-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192
of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who
have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their
sentences suspended.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one
uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the

existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference
thereto. 19Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy. 20
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the
respondent Judge suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MAKILANG, accused-appellant.

ERLINDO

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Appeal from the decision[1] dated December 28, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
25), Bian, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 9624-B, finding Erlindo Makilang guilty of the crime
of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the victim, his
12-year old daughter Evelyn Makilang, P100,000.00 by way of moral damages.
The Information[2] against accused Erlindo Makilang reads:

That on or about July 30, 1996, in the Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Erlindo G.
Makilang, with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said
Evelyn Makilang y Corino, a twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused pleaded not guilty.[3] Thereafter, trial commenced. The
prosecution presented as evidence the testimony of Evelyn Makilang and the NBI Medico-Legal
Report.
The version of the prosecution as summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief
is reproduced hereunder:

On July 29, 1996, Evelyn Makilang, daughter of appellant, grade six in the
elementary school and twelve years old at that time, accompanied her mother, Salve
(appellants live-in partner) to Bian, Laguna. Appellants family maintained their

residence in Paraaque, but since appellant was employed in the Olivarez Tri-Cinema
construction project in Bian, Salve, who was engaged in selling cooked food,
decided to do business there for a few days. Evelyn went along to help her cook and
sell food (pp. 9-10, 29 33, tsn, June 10, 1997).
Evelyn and Salve, just like in their past visits with appellant, stayed with him in the
construction barracks. The barracks is a small sleeping quarter for workers who
were temporarily working there. Except for appellant and his family, there were no
other persons inside the structure on the day of the incident (pp. 10, 33, Ibid). They
slept on the floor, with Salve in the middle of appellant and the victim (p. 43, Ibid).
It had been the appellants habit, when he goes home to Paraaque, to transfer to his
daughters side, after his wife (who is an early riser) leaves their sleeping
quarters. Appellant would then embrace Evelyn. This behavior was not lost to Salve,
who was always worried whenever appellant goes home. Evelyns maternal
grandmother likewise noticed appellants action. She had warned Evelyn and Salve
that something untoward might happen. Still trusting at that time, Evelyn simply
ignored her (pp. 34, 38-40, Ibid).
In the morning of July 30, 1996 at around five oclock, Evelyn awoke when she felt
someone was going on top of her. It was appellant and he was naked (p. 12, tsn, June
10, 1997). She realized that she no longer had her cycling shorts and underwear
which she had worn the night before. Her bra, which opens in front and not at the
back, was already opened, exposing her breasts. With one hand, appellant mashed her
breasts, with the other, he fingered her vagina (pp. 11-15, tsn, June 20, 1997; pp. 4855, June 17, 1997). Evelyn felt appellants finger on her vagina for 9-10 seconds (p.
2, tsn, June 17, 1997). She felt pain. She tried to fight appellant off by pushing him
with her hands. Appellant simply tightened his grip on her hands (pp. 6-13, tsn, June
17, 1997).
Appellant then held his penis with his hand to insert it inside Evelyns vagina. She
felt pain at the entrance of her vagina. After subsiding for a while, a more severe pain
was felt by her, when appellant once more tried to insert his penis (pp. 12-14, tsn,
June 17, 1997). At this point, Evelyn was able to summon her strength and gave a
hard push to appellant who was thrown off to his side. Seizing the chance, Evelyn
hurriedly put her cycling shorts, but without her panties, on (p. 13, tsn, June 10, 1997).

Evelyn slipped away from the barracks and ran towards her mother who was about
20 meters away. Salve had already been up since four in the morning preparing the
food she would sell (pp. 41-43, tsn, June 10, 1997). Evelyn told her mother what
appellant had done to her. Salve scolded appellant. Mother and daughter immediately
went back to Paraaque (p. 11, tsn, June 17, 1997). [4]
The results of the medico-legal examination conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Soliman of the
NBI Medico-Legal Division disclosed the following findings:

General Physical Examination:

Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory. Breast, developed,
hemispherical, doughy. Areolae, brown, measures 3.5 cm. in diameter. Nipples,
brown, protruding, measures 0.5 cm. in diameter. No extragenital physical injury
noted.
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, fine, short, scanty. Labia majora and minora, coaptated. Fourchette,
tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen moderately thick, moderately tall,
intact. Hymenal orifice, measures 2.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, tight.
Rugosities, prominent.
Conclusions:
1. No evident sign of extra genital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time
of examination.
2. Hymen intact and its orifice small (2.0 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration
by an average-sized adult male organ in full erection without producing hymenal injury. [5]

Erlindo Makilang denied committing the crime charged, claiming that he could not have
raped his daughter in the morning of July 30, 1996 at Bian, Laguna because he was then at the
construction site of a project in Tagaytay City.[6] It was only later, or on August 10, 1996, after the
completion of the Tagaytay project, when he transferred to Bian. [7] On that day, he visited his
family in Paraaque and gave money to his children. Without his knowledge, his wife Salve and
daughter Evelyn followed him to Bian to confront Beng, his live-in partner. Evelyn attacked
Beng with scissors, so he pushed her (Evelyn) by hitting her buttocks with a piece of
wood. Enraged, Salve shouted at him, uttering we will not stop until and unless you are

incarcerated. He surmised that this incident could have motivated Salve and Evelyn to file the
instant complaint against him.[8]
Gemma Makilang, accuseds sister-in-law, testified that he worked as a mason in a
construction project in Tagaytay City from March 1995 to August 1996. During that period, he
lived with her at the barracks near the project site. On July 29, 1996, the accused spent the night
there.[9] Then, at six oclock the next morning, she asked money from the accused because her
youngest daughter was sick.[10] It was only on August 10, 1996 when they transferred to Bian,
Laguna.[11]
On December 28, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, [12] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused ERLINDO MAKILANG GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating and aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the
victim the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The Provincial Warden is hereby directed to commit the person of accused Erlindo
Makilang to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Appellant now interposes the instant appeal, assigning to the trial court the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DISCREDIT THE TESTIMONY
AND QUESTION THE CREDIBILITY OF THE COMPLAINANT, EVELYN
MAKILANG; and
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROVISION
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE THAT PARDON BY THE OFFENDED PARTY IS
ONE OF THE WAYS OF BARRING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.[14]

After a meticulous and thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we find no
compelling reason to depart from the trial courts finding on appellants culpability of the crime
charged.

Evelyns testimony is plausible in its entirety, narrating chronologically how appellant

committed the dastardly act complained of, thus:
Q

Now, at that point in time while you were sleeping at Olivarez Tri-cinema with your father,
where was your mother?

She was cooking the rice, sir.

Where was she cooking at the time?

The place where she was cooking was far from the barracks, sir.
xxx

Now, aside from your father and you, was there any other person inside the barracks at 5:00
oclock in the morning of July 30, 1996?

None, sir.

Now, you said you were sleeping at that time. Do you recall if there was any unusual incident
that happened while you were at the barracks on July 30, 1996 at about 5:00 oclock in the
morning?

Yes, sir.

What was that unusual incident?

When I was sleeping, I felt somebody was on top of me, sir.

Now, when you felt that there was somebody on top of you, what did you do?

I looked at it, sir.

What did you see after you looked?

I saw my father with his hands mashing my breasts, sir.

Why, what were you wearing at the time Madam witness when you felt that somebody was on
top of you?

I was wearing a blouse, sir.

What about your lower portion, what were you wearing?

None, sir.

You mean to say you do not have panty at the time you felt that somebody was on top of you?

Yes, sir.

You said that you saw your father on top of you mashing your breasts. What was he
wearing at that time while she was mashing your breasts while on top of you?

None, sir.

When you said he was mashing your breasts, what did you do next, if any?

I pushed him, sir.

Why did you push him?

Because, he was mashing my breast and he wanted to insert his organ to my organ, sir.

Why did you say that your father was trying to insert his penis to your vagina?

I felt it, sir.

What did you feel when you say you felt it?

I just felt pain, sir.

When you said organ, Madam witness, you are referring to your private part or vagina?

Yes, sir.

How long your father tried to insert his penis to your vagina?

At around five (5) minutes, sir.

Now, when this incident was happening, what was the light condition at that time inside the
barracks?

There was light, sir.

xxx

You said that you pushed him after your father was trying to insert his penis to your
vagina. What happened to him when you pushed him?

He went to the side, sir.

What did you do after pushing your father?

I wore my shorts even though it is not a panty, sir.

After that what happened next, Ms. Witness?

I went downstairs and looked for my mother, sir.[15] (Emphasis ours)

From the foregoing testimony of Evelyn, there was indeed no full penetration of appellants
penis into her vagina. Nonetheless, appellant, undoubtedly, tried to gain penile penetration at
the entrance of her vagina for around five (5) minutes. That explains why Evelyn complained
of having felt pain in her private part. She repeatedly complained of this pain, thus:
FISCAL
Q

Just one question your honor. You said Lady Witness, that your father was trying to insert his
penis in your vagina, my question is, what did you feel?

I felt pain sir because he was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.

On what part of your body you felt pain when your father was trying to insert his penis to your
vagina?

Atty. ARELLANO
We Object your honor. That is improper to redirect your honor. This should have been done
during the examination in chief.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A

At the entrance of my vagina, sir.

COURT
Q

How many times did you feel the same?

Twice your honor.

Are you telling this Court that your father attempted to insert his penis inside your vagina for two
(2) times?

What I mean to say your honor is that, in the first instance that he wanted to insert his penis
to my vagina we were in the position that he was holding my right hand by his left hand and he

was trying to insert his penis, then I felt pain. And then the pain was gone, and then again, I
felt pain when he tried again to insert his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q

And when your father was trying to insert his penis inside your vagina for the second
time, that was the time when you pushed him very hard?

Yes your honor.

Because you felt pain once more?

Yes your honor.[16] (Emphasis ours)

The intense pain Evelyn suffered could be nothing but the result of penile penetration into
the labia of her pudendum, or the bombardment of the drawbridge sufficient to consummate
rape.[17] Jurisprudence abound that full or complete penetration of the vaginal orifice is not
required to consummate rape, for what is essential is the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum, no matter how slight. [18] In People v. Villanueva,[19] this Court emphasized: In
order that the crime of rape may be consummated, the successful penetration by the rapist of the
females genital is not indispensable. Penile invasion, it has often been held, necessarily
entails contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts under circumstances of force,
intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be
rape in our jurisprudence.
Coming now to the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the rape story was merely
concocted by Evelyn and her mother, who both despise him for being a womanizer. To discredit
the value of Evelyns testimony, he questions her moral character claiming that her daughter is
not a young ordinary lass whose story no one could doubt. [20] He cited the following testimony
of Evelyn:
ARELLANO (appellants counsel):
xxx
Q

Now, immediately after you woke up and you felt your father was on top of you, what was your
father doing immediately after you woke up?

He was mashing my breasts and he fingered my vagina, sir.

How did you learn this fingering my vagina at your tender age?

I heard that word from adults especially from men, sir.

You were telling us, you were mingling with men talking about fingering?

FISCAL:
Misleading your honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A

I have male friends but they were not the ones talking about fingering, sir. I have male friends
because we are playing basketball.[21] (Emphasis ours)
xxx

ARELLANO
Q

Because of that, you hated your father?

I have forgiven my father, sir, because it is natural for a man to have concubine as long as he
will not neglect his family.[22] (Emphasis ours)

Appellant argues that Evelyns familiarity with lustful and immoral acts like fingering of
the vagina and maintaining a concubine as being natural for a man, unveiled her corrupted
morals.[23] As such, appellant submits that the court a quo erred in giving credence to Evelyns
testimony.
We disagree.
The victim was a hapless twelve-year old girl when her father raped her. She was not the
loose and promiscuous girl appellant wants this Court to believe. Antithetically, Evelyn was an
intelligent lass as shown by her sharp recollection of her harrowing experience. Unfortunately,
she was already exposed to the dark realities of life at a tender age. And this she sadly learned
and saw from her very own father. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General:

Moral depravity cannot be imputed against Evelyn simply because her juvenile
though intelligent mind recognizes and adopts societal tolerance for men who
maintain mistresses.
That young children are aware of this social phenomenon should not exactly be a
source of great wonder, certainly, not in the face of late twentieth century more.
Appellant himself is the major contributor to his daughters untimely encounter with

reality. He admitted that he has concubine (p. 13, TSN, July 19, 1997). From the
records, he seems to have two or three more (p. 43, TSN, June 16, 1997).
He is not yet even married to Evelyns mother, nor does he appear to be married to
anyone at all (p. 7, TSN, July 19, 1997). All these were not hidden from Evelyn. It is
thus perplexing as to how appellant could expect convent-bred innocence from his
daughter when he is a regular destabilizer of conventional marital norms. [24]
That Evelyn spoke of fingering and concubines in the course of her testimony is not
fatal so as to tarnish her credibility as victim-witness of her fathers bestiality. To our mind, her
being vocal about these matters portrays candid, albeit bold, admission of her flamboyant mind
which all the more strengthens the veracity and spontaneity of her testimony. She could have
deliberately veiled this personality if only to generate and ensure sympathy from the trial
court. Yet, Evelyn remained sincere and outspoken on any question propounded to her. We note,
with sadness and disdain, the proliferation of rape cases where fathers molest and defile the
innocence of their own flesh and blood. Worse, they still have the audacity to malign and slight
their daughters reputation if only to exonerate themselves from their unspeakable deed, as in the
case at bench.
We likewise reject appellants theory that Evelyn and her mother fabricated the rape
story. This Court has consistently held that no young and decent lass will publicly cry rape,
particularly against her father, if such were not the truth. [25] Courts usually give greater weight to
the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, and particularly in
cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial, along
with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation, were it not to
condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. [26] Even when
consumed with revenge, it would take a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman, like Evelyn, to concoct a story which would put her own father for most of his
remaining life in jail, if not put him to his death, and drag herself and the rest of her family to a
lifetime of shame.[27] Too, it is highly unnatural for a mother, virtuous or not, [28] to use her own
daughter as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her daughter to embarrassment and
even stigma.[29]
Neither are we persuaded by appellants alibi. We have consistently held that for alibi to
prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed, but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [30] Further, alibi must be supported by the
most convincing evidence since it is an inherently weak defense which can easily be fabricated.
[31]

Here, appellant utterly failed prove the physical-impossibility requirement of alibi. He

insists that he was working at the project site in Tagaytay City when the crime was committed in
Bian, Laguna. But this fact does not preclude his presence at the locus criminis as revealed by
his very own corroborating witness, Gemma Makilang. On cross-examination, she declared that
appellants employer also owned another project in Bian, Laguna, [32] and that he was one of the
workers frequently transferred to the Bian project site when there were rush jobs to be done.
[33]
Significantly, she said that the distance between these two project sites can easily be
negotiated in a matter of only over an hour by a public transportation, and when the company
truck is used to transport the workers, the trip would only take one (1) hour.[34] Thus, it was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. His defense of alibi becomes completely worthless for he was positively identified
by the victim as the author of her defloration.
Anent the second assigned error, appellant argues that assuming he committed the crime, he
should nonetheless be entitled to an acquittal since Evelyn herself categorically declared that she
had already forgiven her father.[35] Suffice it to state that in cases where the offended party is
a minor, the pardon must be given by both the parents and the offended party.[36]Here, while it
appears that Evelyn forgave appellant, the records are bereft of any similar act from her
mother. Thus, appellants plea that he was effectively pardoned must fail.
We will not disturb the trial courts imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua against
appellant. The concurrence of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender is a
special qualifying circumstance which must be both alleged in the Information and proved
during the trial with certainty.[37] True, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of minority
of the victim as well as her relationship to the offender. However, while the circumstance of
minority was specifically alleged in the Information, this was not so with respect to the fact of
relationship between the offender and the offended party. Such defect in the Information is fatal
and effectively bars conviction of the appellant for rape in its qualified form which is punishable
with death.[38]
Finally, we rectify the error committed by the court a quo with respect to the award of
damages. The victim was awarded P100,000.00 by way of moral damages. That is not in line
with the prevailing jurisprudence,[39] which fixed the award of moral damages to P50,000.00. In
addition, an amount of P50,000 should be awarded Evelyn as indemnity ex delito.[40] Since the
fact of relationship between the offender and the victim is an aggravating circumstance, the
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is also in order. [41] the Court, speaking
through Justice Jose C. Vitug, clarified that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting Erlindo Makilang of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby
AFFIRMED. Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the appealed decision is
MODIFIED. Appellant is ordered to PAY the victim, Evelyn Makilang, P50,000.00 as
indemnity ex delito; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-77969 June 22, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PATRICK DE LUNA, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
David G. Ompoc for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Two main issues are raised by defendant-appellant in his appeal from the decision of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City: (1) Whether or not the defendantappellant entered a valid plea of guilty to the offense as charged in the information; and (2)
Assuming that there was a valid plea of guilty, whether the accused may waive the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution.
Charged with Murder before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, under the
following information,
That on or about the 17th day of December 1986, at about 7:00 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Tricia by punching and kicking her on the
different parts of her body thereby inflicting upon her the following physical
injuries:
CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST, SECONDARY TO SEVERE MULTIPLE
INJURIES, TRAUMATIC.

and as a consequence of said injuries Tricia died in the next day.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

defendant-appellant Patrick de Luna, assisted by Counsel-de Oficio Atty. David Ompoc,

when arraigned on December 23, 1986, entered a PLEA OF GUILTY with the qualification
that "hindi ko sinasadya." 2
The five-page transcript of stenographic notes taken on the day of the arraignment reveals
the following:
INTERPRETER: (TO ACCUSED)
(After reading the Information)
Q: Do you understand the charge which I have just read to you?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
A: Yes, I understand but I have no motive to kill her. I was drunk at that time.
INTERPRETER: (TO ACCUSED)
Q: What do you say to this charge, are you guilty or not?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
A: I am guilty but" hindi ko sinasadya ang nangyari." I was so drunk.
COURT:
Companero, did the accused understand that this is a capital offense?
ATTY. OMPOC: (Explaining to the accused)
Do you understand that this is a capital offense?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
A: Yes, but' hindi ko sinasadya ang nangyari.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:

Under the law, the Rules of Court, the prosecution will have to present
evidence in order to determine the culpability of the accused in this heinous
charge of Murder.
(TO ACCUSED):
What does the accused say, do we have to present evidence for the
prosecution?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
A: No more evidence. No more presentation of evidence. I accept my fault but
I want the court to know that I have no motive to kill her.
ATTY. OMPOC:
The accused your honor categorically stated that he does not want evidence
to be presented but he accepts his fault, but according to him, he did not
intend to commit the crime, "hindi sinasadya."
COURT: (TO ACCUSED)
So you admit the charge against you? You understood the charge of Murder
filed against you and you admit you are guilty?
ACCUSED DE LUNA:
Yes, I am guilty but I have no intention to kill the child.

Thereupon, the court a quo rendered a decision dated December 23, 1986 convicting
defendant-appellant of the crime of Murder. The decision reads, thus:
When this case was called for arraignment, Atty. David G. Ompoc, appointed
Counsel-de-Oficio for the accused Patrick de Luna lengthily conferred with
the accused and after such lengthy conference with the accused, accused
Patrick de Luna, upon arraignment registered his plea of Guilty to the charge
of Murder with the qualification that 'hindi niya sinasadya.
Being informed of the charge and having understood the said accusation, the
accused waived his right that the prosecution present its evidence in order to
determine for this court the degree of culpability of the accused under the
present charge.

Aside from the plea of Guilty, the records is [sic] replete with evidence
strongly and indubitably showing that on the 17th day of December, 1986 at
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused, with deliberate intent, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one little, small [sic] girl
named Tricia by punching and kicking her on the different parts of her body
thereby inflicting upon her the following physical injuries:
Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Secondary to Severe Multiple Injuries, Traumatic'
and as a consequence of said injuries, Tricia died the next day.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Patrick de Luna Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the came of Murder and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty plus his manifestation to this court that he did
not intentionally want it to happen that way, the court hereby sentences
accused Patrick de Luna to Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to
indemnify the heirs of Tricia the sum of P 30,000.00.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. 4

Not satisfied therewith, the defendant-appellant interposed this appeal alleging that the trial
court committed the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FOR MURDER WHICH
WAS NOT PLEADED OR ADMITTED BY THE ACCUSED, BECAUSE OF HIS
QUALIFICATION TO HIS PLEA, THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT THE CRIME
INTENTIONALLY.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE PROPER PENALTY FOR THE CRIME
INVOLVED.
In his first assigned error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court misappreciated
the plea of guilty made by him. Appellant contends that what he admitted was the
commission of the crime of Homicide and not Murder because of the repeated qualification
to his plea that he did not commit the crime intentionally. He denied the allegations of
treachery and evident premeditation in the information which are necessary to sustain a

charge and subsequent conviction for Murder. He questions the appreciation by the trial
court that what was proved by the qualification 'hindi ko sinasadya' was only the mitigating
circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong" recited in paragraph 3, Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code, and claims that in truth and in fact his plea was that of guilt of
the lesser offense of Homicide, not Murder.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and
with a full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information. 5
While it is true that a plea of guilty admits all the allegations in the information including the
aggravating and qualifying circumstances, 6 the repeated and emphatic qualification stated
by the defendant- appellant as regards his plea of guilty should have drawn the attention of
the trial court that the plea was made without a full knowledge of its consequences.
Apparently, counsel failed to advise him as to the meaning and effect of the technical
language used in the information qualifying the acts constituting the offense.
In order to be valid, the plea must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such
nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend himself from said charge, thus leaving
the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law. 7
Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant's qualified plea of guilty is not a valid
plea of guilty.
Thus, this Court has ruled that:
An accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt,
provided that a certain penalty be imposed upon him. In such cases, the information
should first be amended or modified with the consent of the fiscal if the facts so warrant,
or the accused must be considered as having entered a plea of not guilty. 8

While this Court has had the occasion to rule that it is permissible for an accused to enter a
plea of guilty to the crime charged with the reservation to prove mitigating
circumstances, 9 considering, however, the gravity of the offense charged in the case at bar,
the more prudent course for the trial court to follow is to reject the plea made by the
appellant and direct the parties to submit their respective evidence.
Even assuming that the plea was in fact to the lesser offense of Homicide and not Murder,
as stated by appellant in his appeal, 10 this Court cannot sustain appellant's earnest request
for an immediate reduction of the penalty imposed by the trial court. This procedure would
run contrary to the explicit provisions of Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which states:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.-The accused, with the consent of

the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Emphasis supplied.)
The consent of the fiscal and the offended party is necessary. If the plea of guilty to a lesser
offense is made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party, the conviction of
the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former information. 11
On the second assigned error, it is the contention of appellant that the trial court, after a
plea of guilty to a capital offense (Murder), should have required the prosecution to present
its evidence to determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
The Court sustains the appellant on this score.
This Court has had the opportunity to formulate this proceedings as early as People vs.
Apduhan, Jr." and a long line of cases thereafter. 13
In People vs. Camay, 14 this Court has ruled that:
The procedure to be followed in a situation like this where the accused, with
assistance of counsel, voluntarily pleads guilty to a capital offense is explicitly
laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated by the Court, and which went into effect on January 1, 1985.
This new rule states:
When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf.
The amended rule is a capsulization of the provisions of the old rule and
pertinent jurisprudence. We had several occasions to issue the caveat that
even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the court must still require the
introduction of evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the
degree of culpability of the defendant.
xxxxxxxxx

Under the new formulation, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after
a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the accused:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3 The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
This rule is, therefore, mandatory.
After a plea of guilty in capital offenses, it is imperative that the trial court requires the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution to enable itself to determine the precise
participation and the degree of culpability of the accused in the perpetration of the capital
offense charged.
In his Manifestation, in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General, in fact, made the
following observation:
Herein trial court's recognition and admission of appellant's purported waiver of his right
that the prosecution present further evidence ... is rather odd. For it is the duty of the trial
court to take evidence in capital cases where accused enters a plea of guilty ... 15

Thus, notwithstanding the waiver made by the appellant as to the presentation of evidence
by the prosecution, the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any
room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as
to the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the
accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise
of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. 16
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 23, 1986 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The case is remanded to said court for a new arraignment and further proceeding.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.