Jordanian Society
Living Conditions in
the Hashemite Kingdom of
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Fafo
Institute for Applied Social Science
P.O.Box 2947 Tøyen
N-0608 Oslo
http://www.fafo.no/engelsk/
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Authors:
Marie W. Arneberg
Taleb Awad
David Drury
Jon Hanssen-Bauer
Laurie Blome Jacobsen
Nawaf Kalaldeh
Hiam Omar Kalimat
Abdelhalim A. Kharabsheh
Sa’ad Kharabseh
Sami Khoury
Issa Nassar
Jon Pedersen
Sara Randall
Teleb Abu Sharar
Siri Størmer
Åge A. Tiltnes
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Jordanian Academics
Taleb Awad
Nawaf Kalaldeh
Hiam Omar Kalimat
Sa’ad Kharabsheh
Sami Khoury
Issa Nassar
Teleb Abu Sharar
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Contents
Preface .................................................................................................. 9
List of Figures ............................................................................................... 12
List of Tables ................................................................................................. 21
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................... 25
Arabic terms used ......................................................................................... 26
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Preface
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that has benefited from the insights and competence of close to two hundreds of
professionals in the country.
The Jordan Department of Statistics has already issued a first report provid-
ing the core tabulations of the results (DOS 1997). UNICEF has published the main
findings concerning mothers and children in their country analysis (UNICEF 1997),
and equally UNDP has made use of several indicators from the survey (UNDP
1997). Fafo has presented the results concerning Palestinian refugees and displaced
persons in a separate report (Arneberg 1997). It is with great pride that we hereby
introduce in-depth analysis of the results that completes the reporting from the
project. It is our hope that this book will serve as a baseline for future studies of
Jordanian living conditions.
We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the
Government of Jordan for inviting us to do the present study, and in particular to
His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan for his interest and support. We are thank-
ful to Her Excellency Dr. Rima Khalaf, Minister of Planning, for her encourage-
ment and follow-up. She has chaired the project’s Advisory Board on behalf of the
Government. We have enjoyed generous hospitality during our frequent visits to
the country.
We are profoundly indebted to Dr. Abdulhadi Alawin, Director General of
the Department of Statistics, for his efforts to guide the project to a successful end,
and to all his staff for their collegial and professional work. The DOS team was
directed first by Dr. Abdallah Abdelaziz Zou’bi and later by Mr. Abdelhalim
Kharabsheh. A full list of our contributing colleagues is given overleaf. We would
like to commend the Department of Statistics for the outstanding work it has de-
livered in the implementation of the fieldwork and for the resulting quality of the
data set.
We are thankful to Dr. Hussein Shakhatreh, Director for the Human Reso-
urces Planning Department in the Ministry of Planning, for his kind support during
the initial phases of the project. The positive support from the Department for
Refugee Issues and Mr. Abdelkarim Abulhaija has been of great help.
We also thank the Governments of Norway and Canada for financial sup-
port and encouragement. We have enjoyed the cooperation with the Middle East
Desk in Oslo, and we have always felt welcome and supported by the Norwegian
and the Canadian embassies in Amman. Tove S. Kijewski always kept her embassy
and residence open to us and shared emphatically our high spirits as well as more
taxing moments. We are grateful to our partners and friends in IDRC and UNICEF
Amman for their day to day follow-up, their project steering and professional con-
tributions. In particular we would like to mention Area Representative Dorrit Ale-
opaeus-Ståhl and her predecessor Victoria Rialp, as well as Program Officer
Dr. Ayman A. Abulaban and Senior Programme Assistant Mrs. Muna Idriz. We are
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also deeply grateful to Senior Programme Officer Dr. Anwar Islam in IDRC for his
interested and valuable contributions.
Our very special thanks go to our eight Jordanian colleagues. They delivered
the first drafts on very short time, and contributed substantially to the quality of
this report. We are very happy for the trustful relationship we have experienced with
colleagues in Jordan, that, in the end, made this cooperation possible across national,
institutional and professional borders.
On the Fafo side, the project has been directed by Research Director Jon
Hanssen-Bauer. Through dedicated and hard work he has contributed to the high
professional standard of the project. Researcher Åge A. Tiltnes has been a dedicat-
ed, stable and able contributor all over the project’s lifetime. Research Director Jon
Pedersen is to be credited for raising the quality of the survey to high professional
standards through his invaluable input to almost all areas. We thank Ms. Ruba
Atallah who made a tremendous job as project assistant in the critical phases of the
study, as well as Coordinator Akram Atallah for his highly professional input. The
Publication Department at Fafo, and in particular Premraj Sivasamy, must be com-
mended for a very demanding work of editing the manuscript for printing.
Lastly, we would like to mention our former Director General Terje Rød-
Larsen, who designed the project at the outset and made the necessary contacts in
Jordan, and former head of the Center for International Studies, Geir O. Pedersen,
who backed the launching of the project work in 1993.
In spite of all contributions and support, it goes without saying that any error
or misunderstanding in this report is the sole responsibility of Fafo and the editors.
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List of Figures
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Figure 2.27: Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. .................. 84
Figure 2.28 Percentage of governorate residents born in governorate by age ...................... 86
Figure 2.29: Percentage of governorate residents born in West Bank,
the Gaza Strip or Israel ........................................................................................................... 87
Figure 2.30 Percentage of governorate residents by residence 5 years previously ................. 88
Figure 2.31 Age specific migration rates in last 5 years: all movements by sex ...................... 89
Figure 2.32 Main activity in place of migration ......................................................................... 89
Figure 2.33: Age specific migration rates: females by movement since 1991 ......................... 90
Figure 2.34 Age specific migration rates: males by movement since 1991 .............................. 90
Figure 2.35 Working male migrants and total population by education ................................ 91
Figure 2.36 Female age structure of relatives abroad ............................................................... 92
Figure 2.37 Male age structure of relatives abroad ................................................................... 93
Figure 2.38 Residence country of relatives abroad .................................................................... 00
Figure 2.39 Female relatives: main reason for being overseas by region ................................ 95
Figure 2.40 Male relatives: main reason for being overseas by region .................................... 96
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Chapter 4 Education
Figure 4.1 Percentage of households in walking distance of schools .................................... 133
Figure 4.2 Satisfaction with availability of schools in the neighbourhood ........................... 134
Figure 4.3 People ever enrolled in school, by age group, sex and urban-rural ..................... 135
Figure 4.4 Illiteracy by age group, sex and urban-rural ........................................................... 136
Figure 4.5 Highest level of education completed or currently enrolled ................................ 138
Figure 4.6 Distribution of currently enrolled students by level and sex ................................ 140
Figure 4.7 Secondary school enrolment in the Academic and Vocational streams ............... 141
Figure 4.8 Distribution of students by type of school and level ............................................. 142
Figure 4.9 Type of basic school attended, by income group ................................................... 143
Figure 4.10 Students who are enrolled or have completed Basic school (age 6-16) or
Secondary school (age 17-18): Percentage by age and other measures .......................... 145
Figure 4.11 Reasons for not being enrolled in school ............................................................. 146
Figure 4.12 Do you expect your child to complete Basic school? ........................................... 149
Figure 4.13 Expectations for the child after completing the Basic cycle ................................ 150
Figure 4.14 Parents’ preferences for vocational vs. academic secondary school ................... 151
Figure 4.15 Main reason for preferring Academic or Vocational
secondary education: Parents who expect their children to attend secondary school .. 152
Figure 4.16 Expectations about the highest level of school the child will reach .................. 155
Figure 4.17 Support for women’s education, and expectations about children’s highest
education level (If going on to secondary school: ............................................................. 156
Figure 4.18 Where higher education was completed, by sex (B.A., M.A., Ph.D.),
High Diploma ........................................................................................................................ 157
Figure 4.19 Satisfaction with the development of public schools:
All randomly selected individuals ....................................................................................... 158
Figure 4.20 Quality of education in the school your child now attends:
Parents with children in Basic school .................................................................................. 159
Figure 4.21 Parents’ opinions about improvements needed in their child’s Basic school .... 161
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Figure 5.8 Smoking habits by sex: regularity of smoking; average number of cigarettes
smoked daily among regular smokers; and average age when started smoking ........... 177
Figure 5.9 Prevalence of regular smokers by sex and age groups; RSI 15 years or older ..... 178
Figure 5.10 The adult population according to seven indicators of
psychological distress ........................................................................................................... 180
Figure 5.11 Men and women according to the reported number
of symptoms of psychological distress ................................................................................ 181
Figure 5.12 Individuals of three income groups according to the
reported number of symptoms of psychological distress; RSI 15 years or older ............. 181
Figure 5.13 Prevalence of acute and severe acute illness or injury. ‘Severe’ is defined as
preventing the person from carrying out normal duties .................................................. 182
Figure 5.14 Place of consultation following acute illness or injury by Palestinian
refugee status, yearly household income and health insurance coverage ..................... 183
Figure 5.15 Reason for not seeking professional help during acute
illness or injury by yearly household income ..................................................................... 184
Figure 5.16 Cost per consultation by yearly household income,
type of place consulted and health insurance coverage ................................................... 185
Figure 5.17 Cost for medication by yearly household income,
type of place consulted and health insurance coverage ................................................... 185
Figure 5.18 Households with various health services within five to ten minutes walking
distance from dwelling by urban rural status .................................................................... 187
Figure 5.19 Households with at least one health centre, hospital or
physician within five to ten minutes walking distance from dwelling
by type of residential area ................................................................................................... 187
Figure 5.20 Households with certain health services within five to ten
minutes walking distance from dwelling by geographic region ..................................... 188
Figure 5.21 Individuals covered by health insurance, by type of insurance .......................... 190
Figure 5.22 Health insurance coverage by type of insurance and geographic region .......... 190
Figure 5.23 Individuals’ health insurance coverage by type of insurance, and according to
urban-rural status, Palestinian refugee status, and yearly household income ............... 191
Figure 5.24 Households’ satisfaction with local health services, according to whether they
have any health centre or physician or not within their immediate living area ............ 192
Figure 5.25 Respondents stating that the public health system has developed poorly, by
highest level of education completed ................................................................................ 193
Figure 5.26 Respondents saying that the public health system has developed
excellently, by level of satisfaction with local health facilities ......................................... 193
Figure 5.27 Households’ opinion about treatment and service given by selected health
institutions following acute illness or injury ...................................................................... 194
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Figure 7.15 Industry structure for women. Percent of employed women by education ...... 246
Figure 7.16 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Men ................................. 246
Figure 7.17 Industry structure by refugee status and citizenship. Women ............................ 247
Figure 7.18 Occupational structure for men. Percent of employed men by education ........ 248
Figure 7.19 Occupational structure for women. Percent of employed
women by education ............................................................................................................ 248
Figure 7.20 Occupational structure for men, by refugee status and nationality .................. 249
Figure 7.21 Occupational structure for women, by refugee status and nationality ............. 249
Figure 7.22 Distribution of actual weekly working hours in all jobs.
Percent of employed persons .............................................................................................. 250
Figure 7.23 Percent of employed persons with irregular working hours,
by industry and employment status .................................................................................... 252
Figure 7.24 Clustering of bad working conditions. Cumulative percent of employed persons
by number of hazards and industry .................................................................................... 253
Figure 7.25 Job training .............................................................................................................. 254
Figure 7.26 Person or institution who paid for the training. Percent of those who
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Figure 8.15 Help given and received, by kind of help and status of other person. .............. 282
Figure 8.16 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by sex. ................................................. 287
Figure 8.17 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by age group ..................................... 287
Figure 8.18 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by level of
completed education ........................................................................................................... 288
Figure 8.19 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by income group ............................... 288
Figure 8.20 Financial help and transfers given and received during the last year,
by income groups ................................................................................................................. 289
Figure 8.21 Households receiving remittances from relatives and households receiving
retirement pensions and/or social security from the Government, by importance as
income source ....................................................................................................................... 290
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Appendix 1
Figure A1.1 JLCS sample number of households compared to total number of households 382
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List of Tables
Chapter 4 Education
Table 4.1 Illiteracy (did not attend Basic school) by sex, 1961 to 1995 ................................... 136
Table 4.2 Gross enrolment by school cycle and sex, 1992-93 and 1995-96 ............................. 145
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Appendix 1
Table A1.1 Respondents in JLCS ................................................................................................. 383
Table A1.2 Notation .................................................................................................................... 387
Table A1.3 Non-response categories in JLCS ............................................................................. 390
Table A1.4 Non-response rates in JLCS ...................................................................................... 391
Table A1.5 Response rates for sub groups in the survey .......................................................... 392
Table A1.6 Notation for non-response adjustment .................................................................. 393
Table A1.7 Sampling errors for selected household variables ................................................. 397
Table A1.8 Sampling errors for selected variables pertaining to individuals ........................ 403
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CHAPTER 1 CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations
ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
TV Television
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinien Refugees in the
Near East
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CHAPTER 2 CONTENTS
Introduction
In this report, the main results from the Jordan Living Conditions Survey (JLCS)
are analysed and presented. It offers an overview of the living conditions of the
population of Jordan, as seen through interviews with a representative sample of
6,000 households from all over the country. These interviews were conducted dur-
ing the first quarter of 1996. To date, the survey is the most comprehensive attempt
made in Jordan to describe the living conditions of individuals and households along
all major dimensions in one single analytical operation. In that sense, the present
study is intended as a baseline that summarises the situation in 1996 and on which
future studies can build.
Since Jordan acquired its independence in 1946, the country’s history and
development has been intimately influenced by the Israeli-Arab conflict and the
various wars that the Middle East has endured over the past half century. Following
the 1948 war, the country became host to a huge number of Palestinian refugees.
The West Bank was annexed and united with the East Bank in 1950, and all West
Bankers were given full Jordanian citizenship and representation in the Parliament.
As a result of the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel and
received a new wave of refugees and so-called “displaced” from the Occupied
Territories. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent war,
large numbers of work migrants to the Gulf States were expelled and returned. This
occasioned the third major population influx into Jordan. Jordan agreed to send a
joint Jordanian and Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference in
Madrid in 1991 and became the second Arab country after Egypt to sign peace with
Israel three years later. According to the 1994 census, the population totalled 4.2
million persons, and the JLCS shows that 44 percent of the population consisted
of Palestinian refugees and displaced in 1996.
In the midst of the turmoil of international politics, Jordan has been build-
ing its democratic institutions and the country has experienced significant economic
development. Measured by the most commonly used indicators of social and eco-
nomic welfare, Jordan fares well when compared to other countries.
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The overwhelming majority of the population has access to basic infrastructure like
safe water, sanitation and electricity. Although the housing standard appears mod-
est on average and the majority of the families are living under crowded conditions,
there is little evidence of precarious housing and squatter-like areas. The education
system has been given priority, and it currently provides the young generation, girls
and boys alike, with access to primary and secondary schooling.
While half of the households report that they have an annual income of less
than approximately JD 2000, only one percent report that they earn more than JD
9600, and around 20 percent seem to be economically vulnerable. Even though total
fertility rates are still fairly high, at 4.3 in 1995, they are falling. Life expectancy
has risen in recent years, and now stands at around 70 years. Infant and child mor-
tality has fallen, and under-5 mortality is now at 32 deaths per 1,000 births, which
is lower than the average for other middle-income economies (39 in 1995). The
study finds some indications of malnutrition of children.
This report undertakes a systematic and detailed account of the situation as
per 1996. Before presenting the various contributions to the report, we will describe
the conceptual bases for the study and provide some background information about
the survey and the data set.
The concept of ‘living conditions’ (NOU 1993, Ringen 1997) has guided this sur-
vey. In the following, we will explore this concept through making four observa-
tions: The first observation is that in studying welfare and the distribution of wel-
fare in a society we need to distinguish between subjective satisfaction and some
observable “reality”. Second, the concept of living conditions is constructed on a
notion of choice and of equality of access to resources. The third point concerns
the multidimensional nature of the measures. Lastly, we will discuss the issue of
defining the unit of observation when measuring living conditions.
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subjective levels of satisfaction for the two. The conditions under which our lives
unfold are interpreted and coloured by our individual aspirations for a good life,
by our experience and by our expectations. What is good housing for one family
may be unacceptable to others, even if the two families seem to have the same basic
needs.
One tradition within this field of research tries primarily to measure the
subjective satisfaction that individuals are able to draw from life. We call this the
Quality of Life tradition. Researchers within this tradition are concerned about how
the constitution of the personality and the self interact with external structures to
produce a sense of quality of life.
The Living Conditions tradition takes another approach, putting most
emphasis on the mapping of more easily observable conditions, although the
respondents’ evaluations of the living conditions also form part of what is being
surveyed. One reason for this emphasis is that the results are better suited for mak-
ing policy. Policy makers are more concerned about observable conditions than
about the satisfaction that an individual may derive from them. Taste and aspira-
tions differ, and we cannot reasonably make choices on behalf of others. Individu-
als should be left to make their own choices. Rather, policy makers should limit
themselves to issues that seem to be similarly interpreted across broad segments of
the population and focus on improving conditions that most people would agree
are sub-standard. There are two reasons for this. The first is the problem of meas-
uring individual satisfaction. The other is that individual values – such as satisfac-
tion – belong to the domain of the political process itself.
However, this distinction between subjective evaluations and opinions on
the one hand, and “objective” conditions on the other, is far from easy to make. To
some extent, all survey results based on interviewing are presentations of opinions,
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as they portray what respondents believe to be the case. In some instances, we are
more willing to consider those opinions as objective facts.
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way that creates entry barriers for some, as well as creating mechanisms for une-
qual distribution of the “revenues” on the invested capital. It may not be sufficient
for society to ensure that girls have equal access to education, if young women are
marginalised in the labour market or receive less pay for the same work.
The living conditions tradition focuses our attention on resources and the
characteristics of social arenas, as well as on how the respondents perceive their sit-
uation and on what they get out of their various investments, choices and projects.
Such outcomes must form an important part of the analysis of living conditions. If
we conceptualise the outcomes as various living conditions components, such as
housing, political influence, education, income etc., they may be related in three
different ways.
First, the various components of living conditions may be linked in a way
that creates heaping or clustering. This means that poor conditions along one com-
ponent may be systematically linked to poor conditions along another. We may
imagine that poor education is linked with poor income and poverty, as well as with
poor working conditions and poor health – or that all good things come together.
Second, living conditions components may be linked in a way to compen-
sate for one another. Poor housing may be compensated by relatively low cost and
better access to well-paying workplaces. Other people may have low initial educa-
tion, but have stimulating work with good access to training.
Third, the components may be independent of each other and show no
particular pattern of interaction.
In addition to these three points we may add a forth consideration, namely
the strength of the differences among persons and groups. If differences are large,
then heaping, compensation and independence become much more important
considerations than if they are small.
For policy purposes, we are interested in all three relations between living
condition components. We are interested in negative heaping where one liability
tends to be linked with several others, thus adding to the total negative exposure.
Targeted policy measures are needed to address such pockets of highly exposed areas,
or vulnerable groups. However, we are just as interested in the heaping of living
conditions assets. Groups that exhibit positive heaping are building up human
resources that may be exploited or serve as examples in development. If we can spot
pockets of such rich assets that are under-utilised by society, this will be of interest
for policy formulation.
The compensatory linking of living conditions components also gives im-
portant messages to policy makers, in that they provide information on the kinds
of strategies that people employ in order to cope with difficult situations. How a
given household exploits the range of resources it has in order to compensate for,
say, the income loss because a member of the household has fallen ill, may give
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insights into areas where a little help from public policy may make huge differences
in the household’s ability to cope.
When living conditions components are distributed randomly in relation to
each other, they also tell an important story to policy makers. The different com-
ponents have to be considered as independent, and action with regard to one will
not necessarily have effects on others.
The points we have raised here imply a definition of welfare or living con-
ditions that centres around notions of human choice and human participation. We
are mainly concerned with “the individual’s command over resources (...) by the help
of which the individual can control and consciously direct his conditions of life”
(Titmus 1958). We are concerned with measuring the “degree to which people can
participate in social, political and economical decision-making and can work crea-
tively and productively to shape their own futures” (UNDP 1993).
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adjustment. The appropriate policy would be to raise the general income level while
at the same time trying to avoid reducing the income of any household.
On the other hand, we may think that poverty is multifaceted, that many
factors combine to create the situation. If this is the case, there will be no single
indicator that can “measure adequately all the dimensions of the hardship people
in poverty face” (World Bank 1994: 3). Then, policy concerns would have to be
directed at alleviating specific sector problems. To focus only on income gaps will
not yield the desired results.
The living conditions tradition takes the latter stand as the starting point.
It refuses to assume that all dimensions may appropriately be reduced to one, and
asserts that the interdependence or independence of living conditions liabilities is
an empirical question, i.e. one that has to be tested. To do this, we need instruments
that are able to measure the various dimensions and their correlations. Therefore,
we design instruments that link indicators across sectors in order to search for heap-
ing, for compensation and for independence. In this way the living conditions sur-
vey acts as a valuable complement to sector surveys, because it can provide a view
across sectors in addition to the depth that topical instruments provide into a giv-
en sector. The living conditions survey can also provide a useful baseline to link the
various indicators into a broad picture at a given point in time.
This approach has both strengths and weaknesses. One advantage is the
potential for broad analysis, and the fact that economic measures become one set
of factors among others. The living conditions tradition normally puts less effort
into constructing a poverty line and into assessing in detail whether given house-
holds fall below or above this line. We are less preoccupied with the prevalence and
depth of poverty, than with the analysis of association between poverty and other
kinds of hardship. Thus, we also become less dependent on exact measures of in-
come and expenditure, and we leave this issue to special purpose surveys.
A disadvantage is the size of the survey that may be needed. We often wish
to include too much in the same instruments. Eager to cover the whole range of
indicators, we end up choosing between slim measures of each component or a huge
questionnaire. This is the reason why it is essential to bring producers and users of
the statistics together. In order to strike the best balance, we need to discuss the most
important policy issues that we want to explore, so that we can prioritise more ef-
ficiently.
Unit of Analysis
Let us now turn to the last point, namely what we should take as the unit of analysis.
We have so far mainly considered living conditions as they affect the individual.
We certainly can talk about the individual’s living conditions. On the other hand,
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if the only focus is the individual, we lose important dimensions. Many of our
conditions of life are influenced by or mediated through the household or the family,
through the neighbourhood or through social networks of which the individual is
a member. The building standard of a house affects all the persons living in it.
Environmental problems like water shortages affect large segments of the popula-
tion. When one family member loses his or her job, the burden affects the whole
household, as the jobless will be dependent on the others. The family shares living
conditions and the individual seldom makes life choices independent of her or his
social bonds and obligations.
Therefore, it becomes natural to measure living conditions both on the in-
dividual and on the household level. In some situations, however, to interview one
representative of the household is enough, because this individual will tell us how
the situation is for the whole household. We can ask the person to represent the
household for some questions, and for others, we can ask more individually-ori-
ented questions to the person.
Having presented the main concepts that guided the design of the Jordan
Living Conditions Survey, we now turn to a description of how the project was
implemented and how the concepts were transformed into a Jordanian project.
Discussions on the project began in 1992 and the main contract was signed in Feb-
ruary 1993. The project was approved by the Government of Jordan in a ministe-
rial council meeting on 7 March 1993. In this meeting the Advisory Board – the
ministerial committee which supervised the project execution, headed by the Min-
ister of Planning – was also nominated. Implementation of the project started in
1994, when the funding was ensured in principle. During the second half of 1994,
the Jordan Department of Statistics and Fafo defined the main parameters for the
study, such as the statistical content, the sample design, the budget, schedule and
organisation plan for survey. They also applied formally for the required funding.
The results of this work were summarised in a Survey Definition Report that was
presented to the Minister of Planning in January 1995 and formally agreed by the
partners on 1 April. Figure 1.4 shows how the different tasks of the project were
executed over time.
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The survey design was completed during 1995. The sample was prepared from June
to August (see Appendix 1). The aim of the sample was to ensure representative-
ness with a very cost-effective sample. In order to enable reporting for six major
geographical areas in Jordan, referred to as reporting domains, 900 households of
the total sample were allocated to each of these domains, except for Amman to which
1,500 were allocated. All in all the sample of approximately 6,000 households is
fully representative for the country, but it requires weighting during the statistical
analysis.
The draft questionnaires were discussed in detail by the project team in a
series of workshops held in Amman over the summer and the autumn. The pur-
pose was to adapt existing models to the Jordanian reality. The models used were
the various Nordic living conditions surveys, as well as similar Fafo studies. Fafo
had earlier made such surveys in different areas like the West Bank and Gaza
(Heiberg and Øvensen 1993), in the Baltic (Hernes and Knudsen 1991, Aasland
1996) and in Russia (Hansen 1994). Particular efforts were taken to review the avail-
able statistics and studies in Jordan and to adapt experience, models and results into
the design of the JLCS. The questionnaires were prepared in English and then
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translated into Arabic. The project team also prepared the field manuals for super-
visors and interviewers, as well as training materials.
The instruments were tested in the field in November-December 1995. After
training of the field staff, 144 interviews were conducted and the results and expe-
rience were analysed by the project team. Under the direction of the technical com-
mittee, the questionnaires were revised and finally approved by the Advisory Board
and the Minister of Planning in January 1996.
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The fieldwork started first in Amman, Balqaa, Zarqa, Madaba and Irbid (25 April
1996), and thereafter extended gradually to the remaining Governorates (Jerash 2
March, Kerak 9 March, Ajloun 10 March, Tafiela 14 March, Maan 17 March, Aqaba
20 March and Mafraq 23 March). The main fieldwork was completed on 18 April
1996, after 65 days of work. Another 20 days were spent in revisiting uncontacted
households or persons who were absent during the main phase. Data entry started
three weeks after the start of the fieldwork and was completed on 12 May. The result
of the fieldwork was a response rate of 94.7 percent (5,919 households) of the 6,251
households in the sample. There were only 25 refusals, and for 301 households no
contact was established. A comprehensive description of the work processes is pub-
lished by Department of Statistics (DOS 1997).
The electronic files were subsequently analysed and cleaned during several
months of testing and preliminary analyses. During this phase, special analyses were
made by joint Fafo and DOS teams to provide UNICEF with data required for their
country analysis of Jordan (UNICEF 1997). After approval by the Prime Minister
of Jordan in November 1997, the complete data set was released to Fafo to facili-
tate the main analysis.
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Department of Statistics, 1997, The Jordan Living Conditions Survey, Tabulation Report,
Amman: Department of Statistics
Arneberg, Marie W. 1997, Living Conditions for Refugees and Displaced in Jordan, Fafo
report nr. 237, Oslo: Fafo.
according to themes, the participants studied the preliminary tables and provided
their comments, ideas and guidance for the analysis and for the tabulation report.
This guidance was reviewed by the project teams in a one-week workshop
in Oslo in February 1997. Here the final analysis plan for the tabulation report was
agreed upon, and the available tables were discussed in detail. The full draft of the
tabulation report was submitted to a final review by Fafo researchers in Amman in
June 1997, before the report was edited for publication and issued in December
1997 (DOS 1997).
Fafo prepared and published a special report on the results concerning Pal-
estinian refugees and displaced living in Jordan (Arneberg 1997). The report was
published after presentation to a meeting of the Refugee Working Group in Aqaba
in December 1997.
The Oslo workshop also defined the outline of the present analytical or
baseline report. The Department of Statistics recruited the Jordanian authors of the
report in May and their work started immediately. With the support of DOS, which
produced all tables requested by the local academics for their analysis, the authors
prepared the first drafts of the report during the summer. Fafo undertook the ex-
tension and editing of these chapters in August 1997. The final drafts were submitted
to a final review by the Jordanian authors at the turn of the year, and were later also
reviewed by DOS technical staff. In June 1998, the National Director Dr. Abdul-
hadi Alawin, Director General of DOS, approved the publication of this book.
41
CONTENTS
The purpose of the present publication is to portray the living conditions of the
Jordanian population as captured by the survey during the first quarter of 1996.
Our goal in this book is to give an overview of the general results concerning the
population of Jordan, covering all the major topics included in the survey. In gen-
eral, we have chosen to follow the dimensions defined as modules in figure 1.3 to
structure the content of the book. In the following we present a summary of the
different chapters.
42
CONTENTS
The results of the JLCS show that most urban and rural households have water piped
into their living quarters, 99 percent have electrical power services, and 81 percent
have a paved road to the house. Basic housing and sanitation amenities are widely
available for the population as a whole, but some areas and groups of people are
better served than others. People are generally satisfied with their housing, but
housing cost and living space get lower approval ratings. Water supply is a matter
of concern for people in urban fringe and rural areas. There are high levels of con-
cern about environmental issues, in particular regarding air and water quality.
Basic services, like mosques and churches, grocery stores, basic and second-
ary schools, and health centres, are available to most people within walking distance.
However, post offices, banks, police stations and cultural centres are more seldom
available close to home. Respondents were generally satisfied with their neighbour-
hoods, but people in urban areas are much more likely to be concerned about traf-
fic and children’s safety. Lower income groups and rural people were less satisfied
with public transport and shopping. All segments of the population expressed
dissatisfaction about the lack of work and business opportunities and cultural
institutions in the vicinity. About 19 percent of the sample say they plan to move
during the next two years.
43
CONTENTS
higher education for women. There is also a growing tendency for middle and upper-
income families to send their children to private schools.
As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placed
special emphasis on vocational education in recent years. Currently about 20 percent
of all secondary school students are enrolled in the vocational stream. Low-income
children, boys, and refugees have relatively high rates of vocational enrolment; rural
children are under-represented. Vocational education remains an unpopular choice
among parents, although that may change now that it has become possible to con-
tinue on to higher education after taking a vocational secondary degree.
For the most part the Jordanian public is satisfied with the nation’s school
system, and that is true of parents who have children now attending basic school
also. Among the general public, urban people, men, richer and better-educated
respondents tended to be more critical. Among parents, those with children in pri-
vate schools gave the highest ratings; UNWRA schools received mixed evaluations
from respondents. About 60 percent of all parents with children in the Basic cycle
offered suggestions about improvements needed in the schools. The problems men-
tioned most often concerned teachers’ lack of qualifications or skills, overcrowd-
ing in the classroom, and the quality of textbooks and curricula.
In chapter five, the health of the population and the availability and use of
health services are examined by Sa’ad Kharabseh and Åge A. Tiltnes. They find that
nearly four out of five adult respondents believe that their general health is very good
or good. Less than 5 percent describe it as bad or very bad. More men than women
perceive their health to be very good, and health is poorer in urban areas and in the
densely populated Palestinian refugee camps than elsewhere. Seven percent of the
population has some kind of a lasting health problem and 3.5 percent have a severe
problem. The health indicators point to increasing health problems with increas-
ing age, but also to the fact that individuals in the lower-income social strata suffer
from more health problems than people belonging to higher-income groups.
Twenty-four percent of all persons above the age of fifteen are daily smok-
ers, 44 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women. Moreover, 67 percent of all
dwellings inhabited by children under fifteen years of age are used for regular smok-
ing. This might indicate that passive smoking is a big national health problem.
The survey’s measures of anxiety and depression indicate that psychologi-
cal distress is somewhat more widespread among women than among men, and is
higher in the poorer segments of the population.
Eleven percent of the persons more than five years old had been acutely ill
or suffered from an injury during the two weeks preceding the interview. Four
percent had been affected so severely that they were prevented from carrying out
‘normal duties’. Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought help from the
health care system. While 39 percent consulted the private health sector, 55 percent
44
CONTENTS
visited a public health centre or hospital. The rest went to an UNRWA clinic or to
a pharmacy. Individuals tend to pay the same for consultation and medication across
income groups.
Physical access to health services seems to be good, as 67 percent of all
interviewed households have at least one physician, health centre or hospital with-
in five to ten minutes walking distance from their living quarters. The situation is
best in the densely populated governorates as well as in the refugee camps. Fifty-
five percent of Jordanian nationals and 20 percent among non-Jordanians are cov-
ered by health insurance. The coverage is poorest in the most heavily populated areas,
such as Amman, and in the lowest income groups. Seven out of ten families assert
that they are very satisfied or rather satisfied with the local health services regard-
less of type of health institution.
45
CONTENTS
complain about income losses. The construction boom that followed the influx of
Gulf workers to Jordan seemed to be over by the time of the survey, and households
depending on employment in the construction sector were among those with
economuic problems. As Palestinian refugees are found in greater numbers in these
sectors and less in the public sector, they have experienced reduced incomes some-
what more commonly than other Jordanians.
Income mobility appears to be low, and income differences may be increas-
ing over time. Poorer households more often report that their income declined
during the year prior to the interview. They also have lower expectations for the
future, and their pessimism increases with the duration of their poverty. Education,
again, gives cause for more optimism among the poorer households.
In chapter seven, the subject is labour force participation and employment,
analysed by Taleb Awad and Marie W. Arneberg. They find that the labour force in
Jordan includes only 25 percent of the population, and 44 percent of all adults. This
is small compared to other countries, due to the large proportion of the popula-
tion that is under working age and low participation in the work force by women.
Only 15 percent of adult women are in the labour force, as most women stop
working when they enter marriage. Higher education is the most decisive factor for
keeping women in the labour force as 50 percent of women with higher education
continue to be economically active after marrying. Attitudes towards women and
social restrictions also influence female economic activity. For men, a health prob-
lem is the most important reason for dropping out of the labour force. Women not
only have lower labour force participation rates than men, but also are more likely
to work part time and more often unemployed.
While the general unemployment rate is 17 percent, it is 15 percent for men
and 27 percent for women. Unemployment for men drops when education increases,
but this is not the case for women as more than 30 percent of women with higher
education are unemployed. Female unemployment lasts longer than for men, and
the majority of unemployed women have never worked.
Unemployment is also high among the young, with 25 percent of men and
48 percent of women in the age group 15 to 24 years. In the refugee camps, unem-
ployment rates are 26 percent for men in general and nearly 40 percent for men
below 25 years of age. For elderly people, part-time work is common, as 20 percent
of employed men and nearly 40 percent of employed women above 55 years of age
work part time.
A lack of jobs appears to be the most important reason for unemployment.
There also is some frictional unemployment among highly-educated men and wom-
en without education, due to incompatibility between the jobs offered and the
person’s available skills. Although low-status occupations are predominantly sign
46
CONTENTS
of low education, they also include some 8 percent of men with higher education -
an indication of under-utilisation of skills in the Jordanian labour market.
The public sector is the largest employer in Jordan, and 20 percent of all
employed men work in public administration. Among male Jordanian non-refu-
gees with any education, as many as 37 percent work in public administration.
Women predominantly work in education and health services (44 percent of all
employed women). Among non-Jordanian workers, men work mainly in the con-
struction sector, while women are cleaners and housemaids.
Employees in the service sector are the least exposed to dangerous working
environments, while construction workers most often report exposure to work-
related dangers. These workers seldom have access to equipment to protect them-
selves against accidents and exposure to hazards. Less than 15 percent of the
employed population receive updated, job-relevant training paid by the employer.
Most of these employees work in the public sector.
47
CONTENTS
48
CONTENTS
channels during the week before the interview; 15 percent watched Israeli news;
while 2 percent followed news put on the air by western TV stations.
49
CONTENTS CHAPTER 2
– with youth from higher income families participating more in social, educational
and sporting activities than lower income groups. Youth from low-income families
are also more likely to drop out of school. The probability of dropping out of basic
school is almost two times higher among this group than children from other income
groups.
50
CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 3 CONTENTS
Summary
Introduction
The population of Jordan has a history of sudden shocks and changes to its com-
position. The 1948 war resulted in an influx of refugees from present day Israel.
The 1967 war resulted in the loss of the West Bank, as well as substantial displace-
ment of West Bankers across the river to the East Bank of Jordan. Economic devel-
opment in the Gulf resulted in both Jordanians and refugees leaving on long term
migration to Kuwait and other Gulf countries. When the 1990 Gulf crisis erupted,
200-300 thousand persons arrived in Jordan in the course of a few months. While
Jordan has been a major provider of labor for the Gulf countries, it has also seen
labor migration into the country, principally of Egyptians. As for its internal
development, Jordan has substantially reduced mortality levels in recent years,
51
CONTENTS
though some of the decline may have levelled off. There are clear signs that fertility
has started to decline.
The size of the Jordanian population has been estimated at various times by
several agencies, including the Jordanian Department of Statistics, The World Bank,
UNPD and US Bureau of the Census. Prior to the 1994 census, no census had taken
place since 1979. Given both the unpredictable migration patterns and a more rapid
fertility decline than anybody expected, it is not surprising that many estimates of
the 1994 population missed the mark completely. The 1994 census found a
population of 4.139 million (Department of Statistics 1997). In contrast, UNPD
(1995) in their 1994 revision of population projections estimated the population
in 1995 to be 5.44 million (up from 4.26 in 1990), and the World Bank (Bos et al.
1994:286) a much lower one of 4.41 million in 1995 (up from 3,278 million in
1990). The US Bureau of the Census had estimated the 1994 population to be 3.87
million Jordanians (i.e. not including foreigners), while the census found 3.82
million Jordanians (Adlakha 1997). The Department of Statistics in Jordan had
estimated the population to be 4.152 million (Department of Statistics 1997:17).
Current estimates of the historical development of the population of Jordan are given
in figure 2.1.
Although no direct data were available on the demographic dynamics of the
Jordanian population as measured by the JLCS, by combining the fertility and
mortality data examined in detail below, the crude birth rate was estimated at 33.5
Figure 2.1 Size of the population in Jordan 1979 to 1994. 1979 and 1994 are census years.
Other years are estimates. Source: Department of Statistics 1995: 16
52
CONTENTS
per thousand, the crude death rate at 4.251 per thousand and the natural increase
at 2.9 percent. This compares with the most recent figures of a crude death rate of
5.0 and growth rate of 3.5 percent produced by the Department of Statistics
(Adlakha 1997) based on the 1994 census2.
Age-Sex Structure
The pyramidical age-sex structure is a classic example of a population with past high
fertility and mortality (figure 2.2) and current high growth rates partly because of
rapidly growing numbers of women of reproductive age. The structure is very sim-
ilar to the 1994 census with the sharp decline in cohort size for men between 25–
29 and 30–34, presumably caused by outmigration in the older age group. It is
interesting that the more or less equal sizes of the youngest three cohorts shown by
the 1990 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS, figure 2, p11) is
Figure 2.2 Age and sex structure
1
Crude Birth Rate estimated using the age specific fertility rates for 1995 combined with
observed age structure of the population at survey. Crude Death Rate estimated by combin-
ing infant and child mortality measures (1990-95) with adult mortality estimates from the
widowhood data (approx. 1990-95), using routine COMBIN from MORTPAK-LITE (UN Popu-
lation Division, 1990) and the Coale Demeny West Life Table, to produce male and female
life tables.
2
The Crude Birth Rate has so far (November 1997) not been estimated from the 1994 census.
53
CONTENTS
not reflected in either the census or the JLCS, suggesting possible underreporting
of younger children in the JPFHS.
Dependency Ratios
This broad based pyramid has repercussions for the dependency ratios, which are
dominated by dependents under 15 (42.5 percent) rather than old people (2.9
percent). The dependency ratio (here defined as population under 15 and 65+
divided by those aged 15-64) can be considered in various ways: the overall depend-
ency ratio in the population; the proportion of the population living in households
with a high dependency ratio, and the proportion of households with a high
dependency ratio. All three of these ratios are shown in table 2.1, from which it can
be seen that the lowest dependency is in Amman, followed by Balqa and Madaba,
whereas the highest is in Jarash and Ajloun and is largely a consequence of the higher
fertility in this area (see fertility section). In table 2.1, if column 3 is smaller than
column 2 then households with a high dependency ratio are also large households
- to be expected when the major cause of high dependency is high fertility. The
exception to this pattern is for female headed households, where a higher percent-
age of households have high dependency, but the percentage of individuals in highly
dependent households is lower. Rural areas have higher dependency ratios than urban
54
CONTENTS
areas, both because of more under 15s (urban 41.8 percent, rural 44.9 percent) and
more elderly people (urban 2.9 percent, rural 3.1 percent). Refugees do not differ
from non-refugees.
The overall dependency ratio here is identical to that published for Jordan
by IPPF (Population Reference Bureau: IPPF, Arab World Region) and very simi-
lar to that for the Arab world as a whole (42 percent under 15, 54 percent 15-64, 4
percent 65+).
Sex Ratios
Sex ratios by age are extremely constant at around 106 (figure 2.3). The lower sex
ratios between ages 30 and 50 are probably a function of male outmigration (see
section on migration). The irregularities around age 55 are probably a function of
age misreporting3 and have been smoothed accordingly. A decrease in sex ratios at
older ages is usually expected, with the ratios being substantially below 100 for the
over 60s, reflecting lower female mortality in older ages. This decrease is not observed
here. This is either a function of underreporting of elderly women, or a past legacy
of excess female mortality - something which has been observed in other Arab
3
There was a substantial deficit of women reported as age 54 and an excess of those aged
55. This is a consequence of the fact that those aged 54 had to answer the woman’s
questionnaire whereas those aged 55 didn’t.
55
CONTENTS
populations (Tabutin 1991). However, given current mortality patterns (see mor-
tality section) with much lower female mortality at older ages, past excess female
mortality would have had to have been extremely high, and underreporting of old-
er women is more likely.
Marital Status
Until recently, marriage was universal for both men and women with low incidence
of both divorce and separation. Proportions of widows start to rise significantly after
age 50 for women, and most women are widows after age 80 (figure 2.4); most men
once married, remain married (figure 2.5).
5.6 percent men are polygamous, the majority with two wives. Polygamy is
more frequent at older ages with 11 percent married men over 70 being polygamous.
It is not clear whether this is a function of the life cycle - men over 70 have had
more opportunity to marry more wives, or whether it is a legacy from higher
polygyny rates in the past. 6.3 percent women are in polygamous unions, the
proportions being fairly constant, with between 8-10 percent women in a polyga-
mous marriage, in each age group between 30 and 70. For both sexes polygamy is
far more frequent amongst those with no schooling. 12 percent men with no school-
ing are polygamous compared to less than 3 percent of those with secondary
schooling or more. The percentages of women in polygamous marriages by educa-
tional achievement are similar to those of men. There is clearly an interaction with
56
CONTENTS
age - more of the uneducated are older - but it is an indication that polygamy as an
institution may be declining.
57
CONTENTS
Figure 2.7 Proportions of women single by age. Sources: JFS 1976, JFFHS 1983, JPFHS 1991 6
6
References to the surveys mentioned here and later in this chapter are the following: Jordan
Fertility Survey 1976: Department of Statistics 1979, Jordan Fertility and Family Health Survey
1983: Department of Statistics 1984, Jordan Population and Family Health Survey 1990: Zoubi
et al 1992.
58
CONTENTS
Figure 2.9 Proportions men single at time of the survey and 10 years earlier
59
CONTENTS
proportions single 10 years earlier7 (figures 8 and 9), show a significant shift,
especially for women, where 15 percent of 25-29 year olds were single in 1986, but
30 percent were single in 1996. This suggests that the past pattern of universal mar-
riage may be changing - something which has already been observed among neigh-
bouring Palestinians of the Occupied Territories (PCBS 1996).
7
This was estimated using reported age at first marriage. Where age at first marriage was
missing, cases were omitted from both numerator and denominator. Missing data were most
marked for older people.
60
CONTENTS
masses. In general, women with higher education are more likely to remain single
into their late 40s than less educated women (figure 2.11). Between 1986 and 1996,
the increases in proportions single were most marked for those with basic and sec-
ondary education, and rather surprisingly, least marked for those with higher edu-
cation (figure 2.12), particularly at younger ages.
Women in the labour force have a higher mean age at marriage than those
not in the labour force (figure 2.13) and this group shows a substantial shift in
proportions single over the last decade, especially in the late twenties and thirties
61
CONTENTS
(figure 2.14). These women are however dominated by women with higher educa-
tion. 51 percent women in the labour force have higher education although only
10.5 percent of the total female population have higher education, and 50 percent
of those with higher education are in the labour force compared to 3.6 percent of
those with basic education who make up the majority of women.
62
CONTENTS
Fertility
In the JLCS the fertility measures were derived from birth histories. Each married
woman between 15 and 54 years of age were asked to give details of every child that
she had delivered. In the birth history the interviewer recorded each child born to
the woman, the date of birth, the sex, and if the child was still alive.
The Jordan Living Conditions Survey provides further evidence of the Jor-
danian fertility decline documented by various recent studies (see table 3.1 in JP-
FHS report). Annual TFRs calculated from JLCS data show a decline from above
6 in 1985 and 1986 to a low of 4.3 in 1995 (figure 2.15). The data from the JLCS
give similar results to estimates from earlier surveys (table 2.2).
From the age specific fertility schedules (figure 2.16) it can be seen that this
decline is occurring at all ages, although it has been most marked for women aged
25-29, and least marked for those aged 30-34: evidence of a shift also to later child-
bearing in recent years.
There is substantial variation in total fertility, both by region and by socio-
economic sub group (table 2.3). Differences by region and socio-economic char-
acteristics appear to be diminishing over time. The regions had much more homog-
enous fertility in 1995 compared to 1985-9, the minor differences by refugee status
had disappeared, and urban-rural differentials are reduced due to a much more rapid
fertility decline in rural areas.
Fertility is commonly measured by the Age Specific Fertility Rates and the Total
Fertility Rate (TFR). Age specific fertility rates are the yearly average number of
children to which women in each age group give birth. The total fertility rate is
the number of children a woman would give birth to if she were to live the re-
productive period having the current age specific fertility rates at every age. The
number of children that a woman has at a given time is referred to as her parity.
63
CONTENTS
64
CONTENTS
It is not possible to calculate total fertility rates before 1985 because of truncation.
However a comparison between final achieved parity for women aged 45-54 (women
whose childbearing was largely during the high fertility years) and the total fertility
(reflecting recent current fertility rates) shows the extent of fertility decline. The
decline is widespread and occurs throughout Jordan. All regions show a decline of
over 3 children, refugees and non-refugees, urban and rural (figure 2.17). The only
subgroup to show little change is women with higher education. Older women with
Figure 2.15 Total fertility rates 1985-95
65
CONTENTS
Figure 2.17 Total fertility 1995 and completed parity by region and socioeconomic
characteristics
66
CONTENTS
higher education have a completed fertility of around 4 children, and current total
fertility is very similar. Fertility for women with secondary education has also
declined less than for other groups. This stability of completed fertility for the best
educated suggests that the fertility decline might well stabilise out at a total fertili-
ty of around 4 rather than declining further towards replacement. This is further
confirmed by an examination of ideal family size below.
A comparison of Jordanian fertility in 1995 with that measured by the
Jordanian Fertility Survey in 1976 shows the extent of the fertility decline but also
the interaction with education of women (table 2.4). Twenty years ago the indirect
correlation of total fertility and education was linear and very marked. The same
direction of association is present in the JLCS but is less marked. Fertility for those
with no schooling and those with basic education has declined considerably, but at
the same time the dominant educational group has become those with basic edu-
cation, compared to those with no education twenty years ago. This reinforces the
decline at a national level. However at secondary and higher educational levels the
picture is rather different. The tiny minority (2 percent) of ever-married women with
higher education in 1976 have swelled to 17 percent of ever married women and
their fertility has increased. When they were extremely unique in terms of their
educational behaviour, they were similarly very different in fertility behaviour; now
the personal or family requirements to achieve such a high educational level are no
longer so different to the rest of society, and as this subgroup of society becomes
less special, fertility behaviour becomes more like that of the rest of the population.
A similar increase in fertility at higher educational echelons as higher education
became more ubiquitous was also observed amongst Palestinians of the Occupied
territories (Randall 1998)
67
CONTENTS
slightly higher than the African Arab countries, but is clearly in the lower fertility
grouping of Asian Arab countries.10
Figure 2.18 Recent estimates of Total Fertility Rates in Arab countries.
Male Fertility
The JLCS also provide some data for a smaller sub-sample on male fertility. These
data are not in birth history format but in the simpler Brass type questions (children
ever born, children surviving etc). Reported parity for males (figure 2.19) shows the
later pattern of family building for men - a reflection of later age at marriage, and a
slightly higher completed fertility than women (on average). This is probably a func-
tion of time - more of these men had their children during the past high fertility
period. Higher levels of polygamy for men at older ages have a minor effect on fer-
tility: reported parity for polygamous men over 55 was 11.17, and for monogamous
men was 8.81 but since only around 10 percent men are polygamous this has little
effect on population level fertility.
10
The data in figure 18 for the following countries are UN estimates for 1985-89 and there-
fore may be rather too high: Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE. The data for West Bank
and Gaza Strip are from the Palestinian demographic survey 1995 (PCBS 1996).
68
CONTENTS
Men’s fertility is highest in their early thirties, and is low after the mid fifties (figure
2.20), closely reflecting ages at marriage and spousal age differences. There is an
apparent inconsistency in the reported fertility, with the male total fertility (7.4)
for the year before the survey (from question on births in the last year) being sub-
stantially higher than that of women (4.4) for 1995 (based on birth history data
for 1995). Several reasons combine to create this phenomenon. Men were asked
about all births, which could include illegitimate births, plus, in the case of polyg-
amy, births from either wife. There may have been problems with the reference
period for men11. The main effect however is an artefact of the way total fertility is
calculated. This gives equal weight to each age specific rate irrespective of the cohort
size, and the fact that more male cohorts than female cohorts have children can
increase the TFR substantially.
Data on fertility are not available for enough men for detailed examination
of socio-economic or regional groupings. Parity by educational achievement shows
the same pattern as for females, with some irregularities due to small numbers,
especially for those with no schooling (figure 2.21) . Men with higher education
have higher fertility than women at that level, and as far as one can tell, education
has a less marked effect on male fertility than on that of women.
11
Matched data for 1499 couples where the man was a randomly selected individual showed
very close correlation between the births reported by each.
69
CONTENTS
70
CONTENTS
71
CONTENTS
thus have little influence on current childbearing patterns. However even those with
higher education show a high proportion of non-numerical responses. All educa-
tional groupings (except none) of both sexes have a modal ideal family size of 4,
suggesting that the fertility decline may plateau out once 4 children is reached, as
it has done for those with higher education. Although women with only basic
education (the majority) have slightly higher ideal family sizes than those with
secondary or higher education, for men, educational achievement has little effect
on the ideal family size at present with the exception of those with no education.
In terms of future fertility trends however, ideal family size will only have
any meaning if people actually try and achieve it through using family planning.
People who provided data on both ideal family size and on contraceptive use fall
into four categories:
Figure 2.23 Ideal family size by education, women
72
CONTENTS
• those with more living children than their ideal family size;
• those with exactly the same number of living children as their ideal family size;
• those with less children than their ideal family size; and
73
CONTENTS
Table 2.5 Contraceptive use by ideal family size: men and women
% currently % currently % Not using All n
using modern using contraception
contraception traditional
contraception
Men
> ideal 47.4 6.3 46.4 12.3 105
= ideal 40.3 11.7 48.0 22.9 212
< ideal 31.5 10.3 58.2 33.2 414
non-numeric 22.7 8.6 68.7 31.7 302
Total 32.7 9. 6 57.7
Women
> ideal 48.7 21.6 29.7 21.3 20 0
= ideal 51.4 17.3 31.3 28.6 32 1
< ideal 33.0 21.4 45.6 35.5 51 6
non-numeric 26.4 19.3 54.3 14.6 157
total 39.4 20.0 40.6 - -
>ideal: Has more living children than stated ideal family size
=ideal: Has ideal family size
<ideal: Has less living children than ideal family size
Non-numeric: Non-numeric ideal family size
The data (table 2.5) suggest a sizeable unmet need for family planning, but also some
discrepancies between male and female behaviour. It should be noted that the male
and female responses are not from the same couples so some difference is expected.
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CONTENTS
that women are using contraception without the knowledge of their husbands. Even
where men did report contraceptive use, in 70.1 percent cases their wife initiated
use, suggesting that despite their moderate ideal family sizes, men are less prepared
to turn these ideals into practice than women. Both men and women report simi-
lar levels of discussion with their spouses about the number of children they would
like (table 2.6). However the fact that around 30 percent contraceptive users report
no discussion suggests that despite the relative high levels of contraceptive knowl-
edge and use, and the rapid fertility decline, such topics are not always easily dis-
cussed between spouses.13
Table 2.6 Discussion with spouse about desired number of children by reported contracep-
tive use
% men reporting % women reporting
discussion with wife discussion with husband
Using modern contraception 73.9 66.4
Using traditional contraception 64.7 74.0
No contraceptive use 59.5 60.3
13
The rather narrow definition of the question may however be the reason for the 30 per-
cent reporting no discussion, since the question was about ideal number of children rather
than contraceptive use.
75
CONTENTS
(b) Indices
Marriage Contraception Postpartum Model Estimate
Cm Cc infecundability TFR
Ci
Jordan Fertility 0.745 0.782 0.8 7.13
Survey1976
JLCS 1996 0.569 0.557 (women) 0.728* 3.65*
0.649(men) 0.889# 4.17(men)
(4.46)#
14
The post-partum non-susceptible period is influenced mainly by postpartum abstinence and
breastfeeding behaviour. It is assumed in this population that breastfeeding is generally long-
er than post-partum abstinence, and therefore the latter can be ignored.
15
Here we assume there is no induced abortion.
16
Data for Jordan 1976 taken from Bongaarts 1982, tables 2 and 3.
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CONTENTS
17
Breastfeeding data in both surveys have some problems. The 1976 survey had very substan-
tial heaping on multiples of six months (Jordan Fertility Survey: figure 8.1) and the JLCS
contained a number of inconsistencies.
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CONTENTS
use have been important in the Jordanian fertility decline but changes in postpar-
tum infecundability are small. This pattern is similar to that observed in several other
Arab countries which have fertility rates similar to those of Jordan. Marriage and
postpartum infecundible indices are similar to the other Arab countries, and con-
traceptive prevalence is similar to Algeria, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria. As Rashad says
“marriage is playing a key role in bringing down fertility in the Arab countries con-
sidered” (1997: 14) and Jordan is no exception to this (table 2.9).
It is also possible to examine the levels of the different Bongaarts indices by
socio-economic and regional subgroup. Although interesting in their own right, they
are in general little help in explaining the observed differentials in total fertility.
Marital, contraceptive and breastfeeding behaviour is remarkably homogenous across
the spectrum of Jordanian society (table 2.10).
The index of marriage, Cm is particularly homogenous with two notable
exceptions. Marital status is the main explanation for the fertility differences between
Table 2.9 Bongaarts indices for Arab countries with moderate fertility
TFR Cm Ci Cc
North Africa
Algeria 4.40 0.53 0.77 0.53
Egypt 3.93 0.69 0.74 0.54
Sudan 4.60 0.64 0.64 0.91
Tunisia 4.50 0.5 0.7 0.65
West Asia
Bahrain 4.19 0.56 0. 8 0.54
Qatar 4.49 0.49 0.8 0.74
Syria 4.20 0.57 0.75 0.63
Jordan 4.38 0.57 0.74 0.58
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CONTENTS
those women in, and not in the labour force, suggesting that those who work do so
in great part because they are not married. Those with higher education also have a
lower Cm - but there is a close correlation between higher education and labour force
participation and further analysis is needed to disentangle their relative importance.
Contraceptive use is also remarkably constant throughout the country. Rural use is
lower than urban, but not much, and education has little systematic effect on con-
traceptive use (but see footnote to table 2.10). The similar levels of fertility and
indices for refugees and non-refugees is all the more surprising when one considers
that the populations whence come the refugees have much higher fertility, especially
in Gaza (see figure 2.18), despite having higher educational participation than Jor-
dan (Randall 1998). This suggests that it is neither geographical origins nor the fact
of being a refugee which is important in determining fertility, but the wider socio-
political context.
Thus not only does the Arab world tend to be somewhat homogenous and
synchronous in its fertility behaviour, but Jordan itself is now internally rather similar.
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CONTENTS
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CONTENTS
of contraception for increasing birth intervals and slowing the pace of childbear-
ing. The reduction in very short intervals will also have beneficial repercussions for
child welfare.
Mortality
Two sources of data are available on mortality in the JLCS. The birth histories for
women allow for direct computation of infant and child mortality and indirect
questions on orphanhood and widowhood allow for estimates of adult mortality.
Table2.12 Infant mortality (1q0) and child mortality (5q0) by selected characteristics: 1990-95
1
q0 5
q0
All Jordan 28.1 32.0
Sex
Male 29. 2 33.1
Female 27.0 30.8
Urban 29.3 33.3
Rural 24.3 27.9
Refugee status
Not refugee 31.2 36.4
Refugee 23.9 25.8
Maternal education
Not attended 40. 7 46.0
Basic 26.5 29.7
Secondary 28.5 33.7
Higher 22. 5 25.5
Domain
Amman 23.3 28.2
Zarqa & Mafraq 24.6 25.7
Balqa & Madaba 34.8 37.4
Irbid 31. 1 36.0
Jerash & Ajloun 21.2 30.7
South 43.3 45.3
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CONTENTS
rank order of mortality in the regions changes with each five year period, probably
all that can be said with certainty is that Amman has lower child mortality than
much of the rest of Jordan. Female infant and child mortality is now lower than
that of males, but in 1985-89, female neonatal mortality was lower and postneo-
natal mortality higher than for boys. In the five year period prior to that, female
mortality was higher throughout the early childhood period.
Probably the most surprising factor is the higher mortality observed amongst
the non-refugee population compared to the refugees and the fact that overall, under
five mortality has been lower for refugees since 1980. However the components of
the differences change, with apparently lower postneonatal mortality in the 1980’s
and lower neonatal mortality in the 1990s. This is all the more surprising when one
considers that in all the other demographic measures the two subpopulations are
now indistinguishable, although in the recent past (1985–94) fertility was also high-
er amongst the non-refugees (table 2.3). In the different regions there is little
correlation between fertility and mortality; Jerash and Ajloun have the highest
fertility, but the lowest infant mortality, whereas South has moderately low fertili-
ty but very high infant mortality. Children of mothers with no education are at great-
est risk of dying, and those of women with higher education have the lowest risk.
Until 1990, secondary education or more conferred a significant child mortality
advantage over those with basic education, but in the last five years child mortality
has apparently risen for the better educated and fallen for those with basic educa-
tion, making the groups indistinguishable. Some of this may be an artefact of small
numbers of events, some of it a function of the rapid declines in fertility observed
amongst the less well educated, although birth intervals have increased for all sub-
groups and remain very similar.
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CONTENTS
Adult Mortality
Questions on orphanhood and widowhood allow indirect estimates of adult
mortality (United Nations 1983). Probably the most informative measure to emerge
from such estimates is e20 (the expectation of life at age 20), and these estimates can
be given approximate time locations in order to detect trends. Unfortunately, the
nature of the orphanhood estimates means that they refer to periods more than 10
years prior to the survey. Estimates from widowhood are more recent, but depend
on reports of proportions widowed for younger age groups of married men and
women. Mortality in these age groups is now so low in Jordan that the proportions
never widowed is close to 1 (table 2.13), and it is impossible to do the estimates for
any population subgroups because too many age groups have no widows or widower.
Estimates were made using ORPHAN and WIDOW19 (from the programme
MORTPAK.LITE, United Nations 1990). Figure 2.26 shows that female life
expectancy at age 20 is considerably higher than that of men, a difference in the
order of 7-9 years (average e20 for the four most recent age groups, using the West
model life table, e20 female= 57.9, e20 male=50.9). The orphanhood and widowhood
estimates for women are broadly consistent, suggesting a moderate increase in e 20
over the last 15 years. Male orphanhood estimates slightly lower mortality than male
widowhood, but there is still a considerable difference by sex.
Comparable estimates from the 1976 Jordan Fertility Survey (using data from
tables 6.5 and 6.6, Jordan Fertility Survey, 1976, Principal report, Volume 1) sug-
gest that improvements in female adult mortality are greater than those for men in
the period since the late 1960s and early 1970s (figure 2.27). Then the difference
19
This method is very sensitive to the values of SMAM used, and assumes relatively stable
marriage patterns in the past decades. We know that this assumption is violated here (see
section on marital status above), but that much of the change in proportions single is very
recent. Thus instead of using the SMAM from the survey date (28 for men and 24.6 for
women), the SMAM for 10 years prior to the survey (1986) were used (26.6 for men and 22.65
for women). The mortality estimates using the latter were much more consistent with the
orphanhood estimates.
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CONTENTS
Figure 2.26 Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. West Model
Life Table, men and women
Figure 2.27: Life expectancy at age 20 from orphanhood and widowhood data. West Model
Life Table, men and women, JLCS and Jordan Family Survey 1976
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CONTENTS
between the two e20 was around 5 years. This, coupled with the more rapid decline
in female infant and child mortality for females means that the life expectancy at
birth shows substantial differences between the sexes (table 2.14). This female life
expectancy is rather high, but is an indication of the extent of mortality decline in
this population. The difference in life expectancy between the sexes from the JLCS
is greater than from some other sources (e.g. National Population Commission
1991) because they used infant and child mortality to estimate adult mortality.
Clearly this is inappropriate in Jordan, where the female advantage is much greater
for adults than for children. A recent estimate based on household reports on deaths
during the 12 months prior to the census using the so-called Brass Growth Balance
Method also found a smaller difference between the sexes (Adlakha 1997:12).
Table 2.14 Life expectancy at birth (e0); JLCS and other sources
Source Males e0 Females e0
JLCS (1990-95) 20 67,4 76,9
10% sample survey 1994 21 67,6 69,5
22
National Population Commission 1990 64,0 68,0
20
Estimated using COMBIN (Mortpak.lite) combining the measures of infant and child mor-
tality from the birth histories, with the mean e20 of 4 age groups estimated using widow-
hood, and using the UN General Standard.
21
Source: Adlakha 1997:12, using Brass Growth Balance method for adult mortality and Chil-
dren Ever Born/Children Surviving for infant and child mortality.
22
Source: National Population Commission 1991. Only estimates of infant mortality rates were
used to obtain life expectancies
Migration
There are two sources of data in the JLCS on migration. Both sources have problems
and can provide only a partial and approximate picture of Jordanian migration. From
the questions on people’s place of birth, and place of residence five years before the
survey, it is possible to look at some aspects of net migration. The questions on close
family members living abroad provide some more, rather limited and biased infor-
mation on international migration. Our understanding of motivations and genu-
ine processes of migration is limited by the nature of the evidence, and thus this
section will restrict itself to an overview of the flows and the characteristics of movers.
Any examination of migration in Jordan is further complicated by the issue of
Palestine. Most Palestinian refugees are entitled to Jordanian citizenship, whilst this
is true of some their kin remaining in Gaza or West Bank. The nature of the Pales-
tinian conflict has meant that a substantial proportion of the population has un-
dertaken a lifetime move, but the nature of this move is not one of choice often
associated with migration. Much of the analysis below treats people born in the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip or present day Israel separately, to try and distinguish between
85
CONTENTS
these two obviously different types of migration. Migration was only considered
above the governorate level; people who moved within the governorate are here
considered to be non-movers.
Lifetime Migration
Questions on birthplace give evidence of movements within the country and from
outside. In all governorates around 90 percent of those under 15 were born in the
governorate (figure 2.28). This homogeneity is lacking at other ages, with Amman,
Figure 2.28 Percentage of governorate residents born in governorate by age
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CONTENTS
Zarqa and to a lesser extent Balqa and Aqaba having over half of some age groups
born elsewhere. Ajloun, Karak and Maan are the governorates who have received
the lowest proportions of migrants from elsewhere. However, once one takes account
of Palestinian migration (figure 2.29), most of the variation is accounted for, with
around 70 percent of those over 50 in Amman and Zarqa being born in the West
Bank, the Gaza Strip or Israel. Many of these are refugees from the Occupied
territories, but others probably migrated before 1948 and do not consider them-
selves displaced or as refugees.
A question on place of residence 5 years before the survey allows for an
examination of more recent migration. However it must be remembered that on
the international scale this includes return migrants - in particular people who
returned because of the Gulf war, and in-migrants to Jordan who have been there
less than 5 years. From figure 2.30 it is clear that the population is not very mobile,
with around 10 percent of each governorate having lived somewhere else 5 years
previously. Surprisingly Amman the capital does not contain noticeably more
migrants than other Governorates. These recent migrants have been subdivided into
people who were in:
Figure 2.29: Percentage of governorate residents born in West Bank, the Gaza Strip or Israel
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CONTENTS
With the exception of Amman and Zarqa where most movers were previously in
the Gulf, the majority of movers were internal to Jordan. Few people have come or
returned to anywhere in Jordan from outside the Arab world. Age specific migration
rates (figure 2.31) - which are not proper rates, but the proportion of people by age
at survey who lived elsewhere 5 years previously, show very similar patterns for males
and females up to their early 20s - reflecting family moves and moves in relation to
education. Then, during the prime working years male rates increase up to 18 per-
cent in their mid twenties, decreasing linearly until old age. Women lag about 5
years behind men, reflecting the fact that a majority of women move to accompa-
ny their spouse (figure 2.32) and this tendency is more pronounced at older ages.
Age specific migration rates differ for both sexes according to where people
came from 5 years previously (figures 33 and 34). Rates for Gulf returnees are sim-
ilar for all ages, because of the nature of the return, precipitated by the Gulf crisis,
rather than people choosing to leave. Probably many of these would not have
returned without the crisis. Internal and movers from overseas peak for both men
and women in their late twenties and early thirties, a typical age pattern of migra-
tion reflecting the many changes that occur then: finishing studies, marriage and
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CONTENTS
establishing a career. Women appear to have more diverse motives for movement
than men (figure 2.32) most men were either students or working. These working
men are of interest because, with the exception of students, they are probably the
prime stimulus to movement; women following spouses or family only move
because of others’ moves.
Figure 2.31 Age specific migration rates in last 5 years: all movements by sex
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CONTENTS
The best index for encapsulating the socio-economic characteristics of moving men
is their educational achievement - occupation is too fluid and diverse. Figure 2.35
shows the education profile of the total male population over 15, and that for men,
working 5 years ago and who have since moved. Internal migrants differ little from
the national profile but with slightly more men with higher education. Men previ-
ously in the Gulf are better educated than the average Jordanian, reflecting the
Figure 2.33: Age specific migration rates: females by movement since 1991
Figure 2.34 Age specific migration rates: males by movement since 1991
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CONTENTS
Figure 2.35 Working male migrants and total population by education (movement since 1991)
demand for trained and skilled workers in the Gulf. Seventy-three percent of these
Gulf migrants are Jordanian and are probably return migrants, 16 percent are Iraqi
and have presumably come to Jordan for work. The migrant group who differs most
from the national education profile is those who were overseas other than the Gulf
5 years ago; these are dominated by those with no education. Further examination
reveals that these are not Jordanians returned home, but migrant workers in Jor-
dan. Only 7 percent are Jordanian, 7 percent Syrian and 83 percent are Egyptian.
Thus a disproportionate number of in-migrants to Jordan are poorly educated
manual labourers.
• Jordanian families who have migrated permanently overseas with their fam-
ilies are less likely to have relatives behind to report them than single tem-
porary labour migrants.
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CONTENTS
92
CONTENTS
from the West Bank and Gaza, which also show a large number of relatives in Jordan.
Young adults overseas are preponderant, with substantially more men than wom-
en, and very few children. This is a very typical migration specific age pattern,
especially for non-Palestinians, suggesting that much of the outmigration from
Jordan may be temporary, for study or work.
Relatives living in the West Bank, Gaza and Israel were excluded from the
following graphs and discussion because they had probably not emigrated there.
Rather, it is more likely that the respondent was an immigrant to Jordan although
there is some migration to the West Bank and Gaza for reasons of marriage, family
reunification and also returnees because of the peace process.
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CONTENTS
Figure 2.38 Residence country of relatives abroad (excluding West Bank, Gaza Strip and
Israel)
see below for Syria). Eastern Europe (including Russia) receives many men most of
whom are there for study.
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CONTENTS
Figure 2.39 Female relatives: main reason for being overseas by region
more probably of migrants into Jordan (now with Jordanian citizenship) reporting
on those they have left behind. This group is dominated by people in Syria. Men
elsewhere in the world have gone either for work or study, and women to accom-
pany family and husbands or themselves settled there. Similar numbers of men and
women are settled elsewhere (34 men, 41 women) - but because of the far greater
numbers of men, the percentages are very different.
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CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 3
Figure 2.40 Male relatives: main reason for being overseas by region
Migration to and from Syria is clearly more long term, reflecting the proximity and
similarity of the two countries. The USA and Canada are the most important non-
Arab destinations, with both work and study prime motives.
96
CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 4 CONTENTS
Summary
Despite its lack of natural resources and the challenge of absorbing three major waves
of immigration, Jordan has done an impressive job of providing housing and basic
infrastructure. The overwhelming majority of Jordanians (over 98 percent) live in
permanent, substantial housing in the form of apartments, dars, or villas. Some of
the housing stock is in poor condition, but there is relatively little of the impro-
vised squatter-type housing found in the poorer areas of many developing coun-
tries. Home ownership is quite widespread in the population, and is found in roughly
equal proportions in high and low income groups. However, there is not much
variation in the size of available housing, probably as a result of high land and build-
ing costs. Most living quarters have between two and four rooms, and large num-
bers of families with children live with three or more persons per room and four
persons per sleeping room. At the same time, there are high proportions of vacant
units in both urban and rural areas.
Most urban and rural households have water piped into their living quar-
ters, 99 percent have electrical power services, and 81 percent have a paved road to
the house. Although basic housing and sanitation amenities are widely available for
the population as a whole, some areas and groups of people are much better served
than others. People are generally satisfied with their housing, but housing cost and
living space get relatively low approval ratings. Water supply is also a matter of some
concern, particularly for people in urban fringe and rural areas.
There are high levels of general concern about air and water quality. This
concern is greatest among people in urban areas, and is probably determined as much
by the household’s environmental awareness as it is by the family’s actual living
conditions.
Basic services are available to most people within easy walking distance, but
other services are not. A majority of all households in both urban and rural areas
live reasonably close to a mosque or church and a grocery store, Basic and second-
ary school, and health centre. However post offices, banks, police stations and
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CONTENTS
cultural centres are seldom available close to home. Refugee camps have better access
to local services than any other type of neighbourhood.
Respondents were generally satisfied with their neighbourhoods, but peo-
ple in urban areas are much more likely to be concerned about traffic and children’s
safety. Lower income groups and rural people were less satisfied with public trans-
port and shopping. All segments of the population expressed dissatisfaction about
the lack of cultural institutions and work and business opportunities in the neigh-
bourhood.
About 19 percent of the sample say they plan to move during the next two
years. For those planning to move within the area, housing conditions are by far
the most important reason. The reasons for moving to another area are more com-
plex, and include a desire for a better neighbourhood or services, work opportuni-
ties, or to be near relatives. Rural to urban migration will continue in the near future,
but at a very modest rate. Amman was by far the most common destination, but
most planned moves are urban to urban.
The Dwelling
98
CONTENTS
the family, to plan, save, and improve. The second is a commitment by the public
authorities, to provide for a healthy environment and to ensure that the ideal will
remain within reach for most of the population. In this chapter we will examine to
what extent – and for whom – the dream has come true.
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CONTENTS
portion of all types of neighbourhood – but only 42 percent of the sample house-
holds live in such houses. Across all types of neighbourhood, 55 percent of the house-
holds are apartment dwellers. Apartments account for two-thirds of all housing in
urban residential areas, and are common even in refugee camps and rural or semi-
urban residential areas.
Villa housing makes up about 1 percent of the residential neighbourhoods
in both urban and rural areas. Villas are sometimes concentrated in exclusive areas,
but more often they are found in areas dominated by apartments or dar housing.
Hut and barrack dwellings, which are generally of low quality and made of imper-
manent materials, make up less than 1 percent of the sample. They are primarily
found in farm areas, although they also appear in small numbers in other neigh-
bourhoods. Other types of dwelling – tents, or buildings primarily intended for
work, storage and other uses – accounted for about 1 percent of the sample, and
appear mostly in farm areas.
Rural and semi-urban residential areas: This category covers housing found
in small-town and village areas, as well as the sparsely-populated areas on the
outer fringes of cities where much spontaneous settlement has taken place.
Ninety-five per cent of this group are rural by Department of Statistics defini-
tion, and they comprise 19 percent of the sample.
Farm areas: As the name implies, most of the land in these local areas is used
for agriculture. Of the farm-area households 81 percent are in rural places by
Department of Statistics definition, and they make up about 3 percent of all
households in the sample.
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CONTENTS
Of course this broad classification of dwellings does not take into account differ-
ences in age, size, or structural condition. Many neighbourhoods are more varied
than they would appear to be from figure 3.1, and provide niches for a variety of
households, in terms of income, occupation, size, and stage in the family cycle.
The distribution of housing types varies somewhat by geographical area, as
shown in figure 3.2. The most obvious difference – the proportions of dar/villa and
apartment housing – largely reflects differences in urbanisation and land values.
Amman Zarqa and Irbid, for example, have significantly higher proportions of apart-
ments. However, figure 3.2 also shows that two regions (Balqa/ Madaba and the
South) had relatively high proportions of households living in impermanent hous-
ing such as tents, huts or barracks, or other dwellings. These other forms of hous-
ing made up about 5 percent of the sample in Madaba and Ma’an governorates and
10 percent or more in Balqa and Aqaba.
Vacant Housing
High vacancy rates have been a feature of Jordan’s housing market since the 1970’s,
and vacancies remain high. For all areas combined, the JLCS found a gross vacan-
cy rate1 of 11 percent, the same as was reported in the National Housing Survey
carried out in 1986 (DOS, 1987). Although urban areas have a lower percentage
of vacant units (9 percent, compared to 16 percent in rural areas), two-thirds of all
vacancies are urban and nearly 40 percent are located in Amman governorate.
1
As defined in the JLCS, the gross vacancy rate includes all residential dwellings vacant for
any reason, but does not include units planned or under construction.
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CONTENTS
The JLCS did not collect extensive information about vacant units, but Struyk’s
(1988) analysis of the National Housing Survey data suggests that there are three
distinct types of vacant housing. One type of consists of units which are being kept
off the market for family members living outside the country. A second component,
found mostly in rural areas, consists of older units which have been retired from
the active housing stock as households build new higher-quality living quarters for
themselves. A third element is housing that is built on a speculative basis, as opposed
to having purchasers or tenants committed before the unit is built. Jordan’s large
stock of empty housing is clearly a waste of scarce resources, considering the high
levels of overcrowding that exist (discussed below). Stuyk suggests two types of
reform to reduce vacancy rates. One is to reduce the amount of housing built for
future use by making alternative forms of investment — such as long-term savings
certificates — more attractive for middle-class households. The second is to pro-
mote changes in the tenancy laws, which currently make it extremely difficult to
remove sitting tenants. If owners are confident that they can regain possession when
needed, many units that are now held vacant would be released into the rental
market.
2
The proportion of renters given here is consistent with the 1994 Census, but is higher than
DoS statistics for dwelling units. In the1992 Income and Expenditure survey, for example, 70%
of the dwelling units were owned and 25% rented (Jordan Department of Statistics, 1992:
34). This is because the JLCS measured ownership as a percentage of all households, not as
proportions of the housing stock. Vacant units – which are usually owned – were not included.
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CONTENTS
Home ownership is fairly well distributed across different social and economic seg-
ments of the population. It is more common in rural areas (75 percent, versus 58
percent of all urban households), and among families with older household heads
(78 percent for heads aged 46 and above, versus 50 percent for others), but is found
in equal proportions of refugee and non-refugee families. In view of the experience
of other highly urbanised countries, it is particularly surprising that home owner-
ship is so similar among richer and poorer income groups. This is illustrated in fig-
ure 3.4, which shows the distribution of ownership for low, middle and high income
households.
Figure 3.4 Owning and renting: Percentage of households by income group (n= 5561)
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CONTENTS
The proportion of renters is nearly identical in all income groups, ranging from 27
percent to 29 percent . Although high income households are more likely to own
(67 percent, versus 61 percent in middle and 57 percent in low income groups),
lower-income households are more likely to occupy their living quarters without
paying cash rent. There definitely are differences in the quality and size of richer
and poorer people’s dwellings, but the current broad distribution of home owner-
ship is a positive sign. Housing is an important source of household wealth, and
provides incentives for savings and improvements.
However, maintaining equal access to home ownership has become more
difficult as Jordan shifts from a rural-agricultural to an urban-services oriented econ-
omy. The proportion of family owners has fallen by 3 to 4 per cent since the 1979
Census. Rising land prices, low-density zoning and high building standards have
made it extremely expensive to build new houses or extend existing dwellings. The
problem is complicated by a shortage of long-term mortgage financing and restric-
tions on the kinds of construction that are eligible for loans. The high proportion
of households who own without debt is a positive thing in many ways. But it also
reflects the common practice of saving to buy land, and then saving for more years
to afford to build. Informal financing from relatives and building materials suppliers
helps to bridge the affordability gap, but these options are less available to low
income households.
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CONTENTS
Table 3.1 Number of rooms in the living quarters, and rooms used for sleeping:
Distribution by households and persons
Total Percent of Number of Percent of
Percent of all Percent of all
Number of all Rooms for all
Persons Persons
Rooms Households Sleeping Households
1 8 4 1 33 23
2 19 17 2 43 46
3 33 33 3 20 26
4 26 29 4 3 4
5 or more 14 17 5 or more 1 1
The typical house or apartment is not large; according to 1994 Census estimates,
the median size of dwelling unit is about 100 square meters, including kitchen,
hallways, toilets and storage areas (DOS 1997, vol. I: 285). Overcrowding is most
severe among families with dependent children and extended families. For the pop-
ulation as a whole, there is an average of 2 persons per room and 3.3 persons per
room used for sleeping. Among families with any children under 14 years of age,
however, 32 percent have 3 or more persons per room and 42 percent have 4 or more
persons per sleeping room. Among extended families, 38 percent live with more than
3 persons per room and 4 per sleeping room. For refugees and displaced persons as
a whole, occupancy per room is the same as for the non-refugee population. How-
ever, refugees living in camps do suffer from serious overcrowding: 40 percent of
all camp refugees have 3 or more persons per room and 44 percent have 4 or more
persons per room used for sleeping.
In some cases overcrowding is a temporary thing, to be endured while the
children are growing up and the extended family is still together, or until larger liv-
ing quarters can be found. Crowding is greatest during the middle years of the family
cycle, when the household head is 35 to 54 years old. In other cases, the size of rooms
can compensate for having a small number of rooms. But the fact remains that there
is a serious mismatch between the narrow range of dwelling sizes that are available
or affordable, and the much broader variation in family size that exists in Jordan.
This is illustrated quite clearly in figure 3.5, which shows the average number of
persons per room for different sizes of household. The larger the household, the more
cramped are their living conditions.
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CONTENTS
Figure 3.5 Persons per room and per room used for sleeping by size of household (n= 5918)
The reasons for overcrowding are complex, but some observers see it as the prod-
uct of a segmented and inefficient housing market complicated by high vacancy
rates. Several approaches have been suggested to increase the supply of affordable
housing. They include changes in zoning and lending regulations to allow higher
densities, owner-builder support, relaxing some provisions of the building code
standards, exempting new units from rent control, and regularising tenure arrange-
ments (World Bank 1994: 43-44; Sims 1991; Bisharat and Tewfik 1985).
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CONTENTS
Figure 3.6 Percent of households with housing and sanitation amenities, by Urban/ rural lo-
cation (n= 5912)
In figure 3.6 we see that over 90 percent of all households have a separate kitchen
room in their living quarters, but a much smaller proportion (64 percent) have a
private bath or shower. Another 2 percent share with another household, but 34
percent have no access to bathing facilities in their living quarters. Toilets inside the
living quarters are much more common, and nearly all are connected to a municipal
sewage system (54 percent) or septic tank (39 percent). The high proportion of septic
tanks is perhaps a sign of the over-strained capacities of many local infrastructure
authorities. Where there are no resources to extend municipal connections, home
owners make do by installing their own waste systems. However only 7 percent of
the population must resort to using latrines or other arrangements.
About two-thirds of all households have their garbage collected, but another
22 percent - primarily people in urban apartments – dispose of solid waste in open
public containers. About 6 percent of households burn their garbage or dispose of
it in other ways.
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Considering the obstacles it has faced, Jordan has done an impressive job of
providing water for residential areas. In the 1961 Census only 49 percent of the pop-
ulation had access to piped water from any source, and in 1979 it was 87 percent.
Today the national average is about 95 percent: 88 percent of the urban and three-
quarters of the rural households have water piped into their living quarters, and
another 9 percent (not shown) have access to piped water in the building or yard.
Tanker trucks are the next most common supplier, serving as the main source for 2
percent to 3 percent of the population and the backup water source for 37 percent.
Most importantly, the incidence of unsafe water supplies is extremely low.
Roughly 98 percent of the sample households have access to water from municipal
systems or tanker trucks, and only 2 percent used wells, springs, boreholes, rivers
or canals as their main supply. However, 14 percent of all households use them as
an alternative source if the main supply fails. An additional 18 percent mentioned
miscellaneous secondary water sources, including borrowing from neighbours.
Although most wells and boreholes are safe, this high level of occasional use con-
firms that secondary water supplies must be carefully monitored to prevent health
problems.3
Fortunately, over 80 percent of households report that their main supply is
fairly stable, with problems occurring “Almost never” or “from time to time,” mostly
during the summer. Public (piped) water sources are among the least reliable, with
17 percent of the users reporting weekly or more frequent interruptions. Wells and
boreholes are the most reliable sources.
Electrical power services are very widespread, with 99 percent of the urban
and 88 percent of the rural households connected. Electricity is primarily used for
lighting and appliances, not heating or cooking. In general the electrical supply is
stable; 2 percent of the urban and 15 percent of rural respondents report daily or
weekly interruptions. Lastly, 97 percent of the homes have some form of room
heating in the winters. The types of fuel used for heating and cooking will be de-
scribed in a later section.
3
In the UN’s Human Development Report, safe water is defined as reasonable access to treated
surface water or untreated but uncontaminated water from springs, sanitary wells and pro-
tected boreholes (1997: 239). The JLCS could not apply this definition directly, due to relia-
bility problems in asking about water treatment and contamination. However, the UN esti-
mate for safe water access in Jordan is identical to the JLCS, at 98 percent.
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Figure 3.7 Number of amenities by type of dwelling, neighbourhood and family (n= 5867)
In the first part of figure 3.7 we see that there are large differences in amenities for
different types of housing. Dar, apartment and villa dwellers are all served at a fair-
ly high standard; if one or more amenities is lacking, it is generally garbage collec-
tion or a private bath or shower. Toilet, sewage, water and electricity are rarely absent.
The situation is quite different for the 2 percent of the sample living in huts, barracks,
4
Index reliability coefficients: Alpha= .63; standardized item alpha= .70. For more informa-
tion about index reliability measures, see Appendix 2.
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tents and other types of accommodation. Virtually all households in this group are
lacking most facilities, and in fact the average number of amenities is approximately
1.0. This does not mean that such households are exposed to life-threatening con-
ditions – for example, they may use sanitary covered latrines and drink safe water
from a tanker truck or public tap – but it does highlight the stark contrast between
their housing conditions and those of the majority.
The second group of bars in figure 3.7 shows amenities by type of neigh-
bourhood. Urban residential areas are well-served and refugee camp housing some-
what less so. (However, refugee and displaced households outside the camps have
the same standard of amenities as non-refugees.) Services decline in rural residen-
tial neighbourhoods, and drop off sharply in farm areas. Among the governorates
(not shown), Amman, Zarqa and Irbid have the highest levels of amenities on
average; Aqaba, Ma’an and Mafraq have the lowest. Balqa, Madaba, and Jerash have
slightly higher average scores, but 25 percent or more of their households lacked 3
or more amenities. Lastly, we can see that – with one exception — all types of fam-
ily enjoy roughly the same level of amenities on average. Single parents’ scores are
lower than others, but not significantly so. The major exception is single-person
households, which includes a higher proportion of workers living in non-standard
accommodation. Among low-income households, only 21 percent have all amen-
ities, and 27 percent lack 3 or more. The corresponding figures for high-income
households (earning more than 2900 JD per year) are 47 percent and 5 percent.
In highlighting groups which are less well-served, we should not lose sight
of the country’s strong overall record in providing the most essential infrastructure
for most segments of the population. At 83 litres per day, Jordan’s per capita home
water use is lower than most countries in the Middle East, but by UN standards it
has the highest rate of access to safe drinking water among the region’s non-indus-
trialised countries, and the third highest rate of access to sanitary amenities. Its per
capita electricity consumption is less than the regional average, but the proportion
of households with electricity connections is among the highest (Salameh 1995;
UNDP 1997: 164, 196).
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on most measures the small sample of tent dwellers reported the lowest discomfort
scores of any group, including villa owners. In terms of neighbourhood, people in
urban and rural or semi-rural residential neighbourhoods report comfort levels close
to the national average. Farm areas have fewer problems, while refugee camps have
by far the highest proportions of households suffering from indoor damp (75
percent), winter cold (65 percent) and summer heat (53 percent).
Figure 3.8 Nuisances and disturbances in the indoor environment. Percentage of all house-
holds (n= 5900)
The last three indicators in figure 3.8 deal with man-made nuisances and distur-
bances. Smoking is extremely widespread in Jordan, in both urban and rural areas
and among higher and lower income groups. Over 60 percent of all households
report that people smoke regularly inside the living quarters. Although most homes
are well-ventilated, this practice is likely to cause irritation and health problems,
especially when we consider the high levels of overcrowding among families with
children living at home (chapter 5).
Lastly, between 15 and 20 percent of the sample report disturbing levels of
noise coming from either inside or outside the building. ‘Disturbing noise’ is defined
here as noise so loud that it is difficult to have a conversation indoors, occurring
either daily or occasionally. Fortunately, cases of disturbing noise every day were
relatively rare, occurring in about 7 percent of the sample. As shown in figure 3.8,
most noise comes from outside sources such as traffic, markets and industry. Refu-
gee camp dwellers were the most affected, with over one-third complaining of seri-
ous noise daily or occasionally. However about 15 percent of all urban dwellers are
affected, especially those living in apartments.
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Household Fuels
For cooking, bottled propane gas is by far the most common energy source, used
in 96 percent of all households. Kerosene is the main cooking fuel for about 3 per-
cent of the population, and wood or charcoal is used by 1 percent. These propor-
tions have changed very little in the past 10 years. The small numbers of hut, bar-
rack and tent dwellers are more likely to use fuels other than gas as their main cooking
fuel, as are rural people generally, but in absolute terms the largest group of kero-
sene users is urban dar dwellers. About 8 percent of the sample use more than one
cooking fuel, usually a combination of gas and kerosene.
Figure 3.9 Energy sources used for room and water heating: All households
Gas is clean and convenient but somewhat expensive, and for that reason many
households turn to a variety of other energy sources for room and water heating.
This is illustrated in figure 3.9. Kerosene is the most common fuel for room heat-
ing, used by dar and apartment dwellers in both urban and rural areas. Dar,
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apartment and villa households also burn gas and diesel, and it appears that the use
of gas has increased a great deal in the past 10 years. A 1986 survey by the Ministry
of Energy and Mineral Resources (Aburas and Fromme 1991) found that liquid pro-
pane was used by less than 2 percent of all households; by 1996 that proportion
had grown to nearly 20 percent. The market share of kerosene has fallen by a sim-
ilar amount, from 82 percent to 66 percent. Wood or charcoal is primarily used in
farm areas. Three percent of the sample – primarily low-income dar, apartment and
hut or barrack households – have no room heating at all.
As in room heating, Jordanians use a wide variety of energy sources for heat-
ing water. Here too gas has replaced kerosene. Gas is now the most common fuel
in both urban and rural residential areas, growing from 37 percent to 67 percent of
all households as kerosene declined from 40 percent to 23 percent. The proportion
using electricity for water heating has doubled since 1986, and solar energy increased
by 3 percent, primarily in urban residential areas. The share of wood and charcoal
remained constant, at 4 percent; for the most part, these appear to be the same
households that use wood for room heating. Kerosene is much more common in
refugee camps than in other urban areas, for both room and water heating. About
one-third of all households use more than one type of fuel to heat rooms in winter,
and one-fifth use multiple fuels to heat water.
The Neighbourhood
For many families the character of the neighbourhood or hara is even more impor-
tant to the quality of life than the house they live in. The hara is the centre of
everyday social life, the setting for visits to relatives and friends, the mosque or
church, shopping, the children’s schools, and often the workplace. Many people
spend a large part of their day out of doors and in the neighbourhood, and the
environment makes a difference. In this section we look at the characteristics of
Jordanian neighbourhoods – their services and cultural features, infrastructure, and
environmental nuisances and hazards. The JLCS survey’s system for classifying
neighbourhoods is described in the section on Dwellings and Neighbourhoods at
the beginning of this chapter.
Neighbourhood Services
Since only one household out of four owns its own car or truck, it is important to
be within easy walking distance of essential services. In the Jordan Living Conditions
Survey respondents were given a list of services and were asked which of them could
be reached within five to ten minutes’ walking distance from the house. The answers
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suggest that many basic services are widely available locally, but services which are
used less often usually require a longer walk or a trip by car or public transport.
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As we can see from figure 3.10, people in most neighbourhoods can fulfil their daily
spiritual and physical needs quite close to home: almost 90 percent are near a mosque
or church and a grocery store. Basic schools are also widely available, even in rural
residential areas and to a lesser extent in farm areas. In part this is due to the Min-
istry of Education’s efforts to extend compulsory basic education to rural areas by
establishing schools wherever there are 10 or more students in the appropriate age
groups. Secondary schools show a similar pattern of equal coverage, although they
are more widely scattered due to the much larger investment needed per school.
Some kind of health centre – a government or private hospital, primary health centre
or UNRWA clinic – is in easy reach for almost to 60 percent of the population. (For
more information about the government’s school-building programs and health
facilities, see chapters 4 and 5.)
The other five services shown in figure 3.10 are not so widely available. Post
offices and banks are in walking distance of only 30 percent to 40 percent of all
households. Here we see quite clearly the difference between government and pri-
vate services: post offices are slightly more available for people in rural residential
areas (mostly because rural towns are smaller, and the cities have relatively few branch
post offices), while banks are quite rare in rural areas. About 20 percent of the pop-
ulation have a police station nearby, and only 10 percent have a local public library
or cultural centre.
Refugee camps have better access to local services than any other type of
neighbourhood. Access is especially good for some of the less-common services, such
as health centres, post offices, banks, police stations and cultural centres. Of course
this is due in large part to the activities of the Jordanian government and UNRWA,
but it also reflects the high densities of the camps. Although it makes for crowded
and uncomfortable living conditions, high densities do make it economically fea-
sible to provide a wide variety of services in a small area. Refugees and displaced
persons living outside the camps have roughly the same access to local services as
the non-refugee population.
Taken as a whole, figure 3.10 reflects a clear sense of national priorities.
Through a combination of public and private sector activities, basic day-by-day
needs for food, education, health and spiritual comfort can be met within the hara
for a majority of the population, regardless of income or family type. In other anal-
yses (not shown) we found that high and low income groups differed by 5 percent
or less in their access to all services except secondary education and banks. All fam-
ily types were equally well-covered except for one-person households, which had
significantly lower levels of service. For basic services the great barrier to equality is
distance, as shown in the large differences between farm areas and the rest of the
population. However, much remains to be done to provide access to cultural and
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intellectual resources. As we will see in a later section, this is the aspect of neigh-
bourhood life that most people are unhappy about.
Paved Roads
Across all types of dwelling and neighbourhood, 81 percent of the households have
a paved road to their houses; another 10 percent have a partly-paved road, and 9
percent have no paved road. As we might expect, the situation is quite different in
urban and rural areas: 86 percent of the households in urban residential areas and
refugee camps have fully-paved roads, but the proportion drops to 66 percent for
rural residential areas, and 49 percent for farm areas. Roughly one-quarter of all dar
households, three-quarters of the hut or barrack dwellers and virtually all tent dwell-
ers have unpaved or partially-paved roads to the house.
5
Estimated at 244 cubic meters per person in 1995; the ESCWA regional average was 2,227
cubic meters. Only the West Bank and Gaza have fewer water resources, at 80 cubic meters
per capita (ESCWA, 1996: 195).
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Figure 3.11 Percent of households exposed to outdoor pollution, by neighbourhood (n= 5918)
In total, between 15 and 25 percent of the respondents were bothered by the five
specific problems shown here. The exception was dust and smells from industry,
mentioned by 5 percent. Although Jordan’s polluting industries are often located
near heavily populated areas, they are few in number. Dust and exhaust fumes from
cars was a fairly common complaint in the cities, as were animal smells in rural areas
and some urban neighbourhoods. One out of six respondents said that the area was
not clean due to garbage and waste dumped in the streets and empty spaces, and
only 13 percent said that their area was ‘very clean’. Public tidiness appears to be an
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important concern: of all the environmental measures in the survey, this one had
by far the highest correlation with residents’ general satisfaction ratings concern-
ing outdoor pollution and cleanliness. In addition to the measures shown, 3 per-
cent of all households complained of smells from nearby sewage treatment plants
and about half – in all types of neighbourhood – were affected by general dust
pollution.
The survey also asked whether, in the respondent’s opinion, there was ‘sig-
nificant pollution of the air, water, or ground in this district of Jordan.’ As we can
see from figure 3.11, a clear majority of people in urban residential areas and refu-
gee camps believe there is serious air pollution in their district, and so do nearly
half of those in urban fringe or rural residential areas and one-third of the farm
population. About half the sample say there is significant water pollution, with a
very similar pattern of responses by neighbourhood, and about thirty percent think
there is ground pollution.
In interpreting these findings we should keep in mind that survey methods
capture only the subjective experience of the respondent. None of the pollution
measures was quantified in any way, and few people would have enough informa-
tion to answer accurately even if they were. (Twenty-five per cent of the respond-
ents simply answered ‘Don’t know’ to the question about ground pollution; non-
response rates were 7 percent for the question about air pollution, and 5 percent
on water pollution.) Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions about objective condi-
tions based on general opinion questions.6
Clearly there are high levels of general concern about air and water quality,
and this concern is greatest among people in urban areas. Complaints about air
pollution are correlated with exposure to general dust pollution (which is mentioned
by about half the population everywhere), traffic, and smells from garbage and
animals. Beyond that, it becomes harder to relate responses to facts ‘on the ground.’
For example, much larger proportions of villa dwellers report air and water pollu-
tion than do hut and barrack dwellers; people who use piped water report more water
pollution than those who take their water from natural sources such as wells or rivers.
Though it is possible that more privileged people are in fact exposed to higher
levels of pollution, the household’s environmental awareness also plays an impor-
tant part. In logistic regression analyses of the pollution questions (not shown), we
found that better-educated and higher-income households were more likely to voice
concerns about air, ground and water quality. This remained true even when the
effects of dwelling, neighbourhood, paved road, water source and governorate were
controlled for statistically. An implication for policy makers is that Jordan’s success
6
For more information about the hazards of survey research on environmental questions,
see Nishihara 1997: 36-45.
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Figure 3.12 Satisfaction with the Dwelling: All households (n= 5917)
Dissatisfaction about the cost of housing is lower in rural areas, but it seems to be
quite evenly distributed in the urban population, at about 22 percent. (Some of the
factors that may contribute to high housing costs are discussed in the section on
owning and renting, above.) Although there are exceptions – villa dwellers are
especially unhappy and hut/ barrack dwellers are quite satisfied! – there are virtual-
ly no differences in average cost ratings among broad income groups. Concerns
about affordability are not concentrated among the poor. This is interesting, because
lower income households do spend more of their money on housing.7 It is perhaps
due to the fact that most households try to live within their means and will sacri-
fice size or quality of the dwelling – temporarily at least – to reduce cost. It may
also be related to the ownership patterns illustrated in figure 3.4: similar propor-
tions of all income groups own without debt, or rent. Those who rent usually have
stable costs due to rent control, and a larger proportion of vulnerable low-income
people sublet from relatives or occupy without cash rent for other reasons. Dissat-
isfaction does increase somewhat among households in the peak child-raising years,
when crowding is most acute.
Water supply was also a matter of some concern, particularly for people in
rural and semi-urban areas. The 6 percent of the sample who took their main water
supply from public taps, tanker trucks or natural sources had levels of dissatisfac-
tion two to three times as high as users of piped water. That is probably due to the
inconvenience of those arrangements, because non-piped water sources are report-
ed to be more stable. Among users of piped water, the most dissatisfied were those
who experienced daily or weekly interruptions in supply.
7
In the 1992 Income and Expenditure survey, households with total expenditures of less than
1200 JD per year spent an average of 27% on housing and related expenses. Housing repre-
sented 20% of all expenses for the 1200 to 2999 JD group, and 15% for households with total
expenditures of 3000 JD or more (Department of Statistics, 1992: 237-239).
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Factors associated with noise, the indoor environment and housing privacy all
received somewhat higher satisfaction ratings. As we have seen (figure 3.8), disturb-
ing noise is not particularly common. Problems with cold, heat, humidity and
smoking are quite widespread, but they do not seem to be serious enough to make
people dissatisfied. The same is true for privacy: even among the most overcrowded
households, two-thirds or more say they are satisfied with that aspect of the dwell-
ing. Although it may seem remarkable to Westerners, this finding is quite consist-
ent with cultural traditions that emphasise privacy between households, as opposed
to the privacy of individuals within a household.
The JLCS also asked a question about overall satisfaction with housing con-
ditions, and the patterns of answers is quite consistent with the specific items dis-
cussed above. Overall, 82 percent of the respondents said they were very or rather
satisfied with their housing conditions, and 18 percent were dissatisfied. This is
shown in figure 3.13, along with ratings broken out by type of dwelling and other
variables. The differences in overall satisfaction ratings are quite small, even among
groups with quite different objective housing conditions. For example, people in
other dwellings – huts or barracks, tents, and buildings used as workplaces – have
much poorer standards by most measures, but they are equally satisfied. Low income
households (earning less than JD 1450 per year) are less satisfied than high income
people, but not by much. Other analyses by neighbourhood, family type, refugee
status, education and other variables found few differences.
Figure 3.13 General satisfaction with housing, by type of dwelling, income, refugee camp,
and overcrowding (n= 5919)
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In fact the only sizeable groups which were clearly less satisfied than the average were
refugee camp dwellers and households living at densities of 4 or more persons per
room. Camp dwellers have fewer amenities than other urban residents and face a
variety of other problems, including extremes of hot and cold, noise, and overcrowd-
ing. Data from the entire sample confirms that these last two factors – the amount
of space, and quality of the indoor environment – are the strongest predictors of a
person’s overall contentment with his or her housing situation. 8
Figure 3.14 Satisfaction with the neighbourhood: All households (n= 5908)
8
Pearson’s r = .548 for Satisfaction with housing space by General housing satisfaction;
r = .444 for Indoor environment by General housing satisfaction. n= 5917, two-tailed p <.001
for both variables. For more information about living conditions in refugee camps, see
Arneberg, 1997; World Bank, 1994; and Helwa and Birch, 1994. Helwa and Birch’s findings
are generally similar to those found in the JLCS, but their respondents reported higher lev-
els of dissatisfaction.
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CONTENTS
Jordanian respondents give high approval ratings on two aspects of the neighbour-
hood that are very important for family life, namely safety for children and distance
to relatives. Safety for children is highly correlated with the general security of the
neighbourhood (not shown) and satisfaction about traffic levels. As we might expect,
people in urban neighbourhoods are much more likely than rural residents to be
concerned about both traffic and children’s safety. However people in all areas tend
to live near their kinsmen, and satisfaction about the distance to relatives is nearly
universal.
Attitudes about pollution and the environment were discussed earlier, but
it is worth noting that this factor has by far the strongest correlation with respond-
ents’ overall assessment of the hara.9 It is related to feelings about traffic and noise,
but especially to the amount of trash and waste visible in the area.
Regarding local services, less than 15 percent of urban residents were dissat-
isfied with public transport, and a majority found it very satisfactory. The situa-
tion is quite different outside the cities, where distances are greater and less than
one household in five has a private car or truck. Nearly 30 percent of those in semi-
urban, rural residential and farm areas rated public transport as unsatisfactory. A
similar pattern holds for shopping and commerce: Jordan’s cities have an abundance
of local shops to meet everyday needs, and only 10 percent of urban residents ex-
pressed any dissatisfaction. The proportion of dissatisfied customers was three times
higher in rural neighbourhoods, although a majority of rural people still said they
were satisfied. Low income groups gave slightly lower ratings on shopping as well
as public transport. We will look at satisfaction with the availability of schools in
the next chapter, and health services are discussed in chapter 5.
As we can see from figure 3.14, respondents are much less happy about work
or business opportunities and cultural institutions than they are about other aspects
of the hara. Unlike shopping and services, work and business opportunities receive
similar ratings in urban and rural neighbourhoods. Lower-income and less educat-
ed households tend to be less satisfied, as are single parents and refugee or displaced
families. Across all groups about 40 percent of the population are uneasy, although
it is not clear whether they are dissatisfied with work opportunities in general or
would simply like to work closer to home.
Libraries and cultural centres are seldom available locally (figure 3.10), and
people clearly care about that. Dissatisfaction is slightly higher in rural areas and
lower in refugee camps (which are better served in this respect), but it is equally
strong among people of all educational backgrounds, incomes, and family types.
9
Pearson’s r = .432 for Satisfaction with outdoor pollution / cleanliness by General satisfac-
tion with the hara. n= 5891, two-tailed p <.001. See Appendix 3 for more information about
bivariate correlations.
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CONTENTS
In some ways this is a positive sign, as it shows that Jordanians of all kinds are eager
for new learning and cultural opportunities. It is clear that public or private efforts
in this direction would be met with great enthusiasm.
10
The term ‘other area’ was not defined precisely in the questionnaire, but most respond-
ents understood it as moving to another city, town, village or rural district, or moving to a
different area of a larger city, such as Amman or Irbid. We should also keep in mind that the
survey captures plans or expectations about moving, rather than actual behaviour. So these
responses probably overstate the amount of mobility that is taking place, but they remain
useful for understanding the motives and dynamics of moving.
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Figure 3.15 Going places: Groups with high proportions of households who plan to move
Figure 3.16 offers a more detailed look at the motivations for moving. As might be
expected, housing aspects are the main reason given by the vast majority of people
planning to move within their local area. About 10 percent cite neighbourhood
aspects, a measure which includes the outdoor environment and captures aspira-
tions for a cleaner, more suburban or more prestigious living area. Another 10 per-
cent seek better access to schools, health or other services, or a better social envi-
ronment – which in many cases means living closer to relatives. About 4 percent
were moving because they had bought land or property.
For those planning to move away from the local area the pattern of reasons
is quite different. Housing aspects are still important, but not overwhelmingly so.
Much larger proportions of respondents are seeking a better neighbourhood or serv-
ices, and believe that they must leave their present area to do so. Relocation for work
opportunities becomes a more important factor, as does the social environment and
proximity to friends and relatives.
In a separate analysis (not shown), we examined the reasons for not moving.
The question was asked of all respondents who said they were dissatisfied with their
housing conditions or hara but said they had no plans to move. Multiple answers
were allowed, so the percentages add up to more than 100. The most common rea-
sons for staying were that housing costs were reasonable (36 percent), or the family
owned the dwelling (38 percent). Twenty per cent cited schools, health or other
services, and 9 percent found the location convenient for work. Sixteen per cent
stayed to be close to relatives or friends.
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Figure 3.16 Reasons for moving within the area, or to another area (n= 1087)
Finally, figure 3.17 shows the most likely destinations of people who want to move
out of their local area. Clearly, most of Jordan’s internal migration is either within
or toward the major urban areas. Amman is the most common destination by far,
mentioned by nearly 60 percent of all movers; Irbid and Zarqa account for a fur-
ther 15 percent of all destinations. Slightly less than half of those who chose Amman
were already living in some part of the governorate, so these flows represent inter-
nal movement rather than net immigration. Another 33 percent of those who
selected Amman were living in nearby Zarqa.
Perhaps because of the improvements made to Jordan’s rural housing and
infrastructure, there are no signs of large migration flows from the countryside to
the cities in the near future. In the JLCS sample, rural people made up 21 percent
of the population but accounted for only 14 percent of the prospective movers. How-
ever, of the rural people who did plan to move outside the home area, about two-
thirds cited Amman, Irbid or Zarqa governorates as their destination.
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Figure 3.17 Destinations of urban and rural households planning to move out of their home
areas (n= 405)
127
CONTENTS CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 4
128
CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 5 CONTENTS
Chapter 4 Education
Summary
Jordan has undertaken a series of wide-ranging reforms of its education system, and
school opportunities have expanded rapidly in the past 15 years. Illiteracy rates have
fallen by half, to about 14 percent for the population as a whole, and an active school-
building program has put a Basic school within walking distance of nearly 80 per-
cent of all households. Ninety-five per cent of all children in the age groups eligi-
ble for Basic school are currently enrolled, and 70 percent of those in the secondary
school-aged population. The greatest gains have been for women, and girls actual-
ly have higher enrolment rates than boys at some stages of education. Among the
working-aged population, 42 percent now have a secondary or higher education.
Refugees have dropout rates and education levels similar to those of the non-refu-
gee population, and higher rates of literacy.
However, many forms of inequality remain. Functional literacy is still rela-
tively low for adult women in rural areas, even among women in their 20’s and 30’s.
Basic and secondary school dropout rates are significantly higher for rural and lower-
income children, and especially those from less-educated households. These fami-
lies also have lower expectations for their children who are still in school, and there
are large differences in the expectations of parents who support and do not support
higher education for women. There is a growing tendency for middle and upper-
income families to send their children to private schools.
As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placed
special emphasis on vocational education in recent years. Currently about 20 per-
cent of all secondary school students are enrolled in the Vocational stream. Low-
income children, boys, and refugees have relatively high rates of vocational
enrolment; rural children are under-represented. Vocational education remains an
unpopular choice among parents, although that may change now that it has become
possible to continue on to higher education after taking a vocational secondary
degree.
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For the most part the Jordanian public is satisfied with the nation’s school system,
and that is also true of parents who have children now attending Basic school.
Among the general public, urban people, men, richer and better-educated respond-
ents tended to be more critical. Among parents, those with children in private schools
gave the highest ratings and UNWRA schools received mixed evaluations. About
60 percent of all parents with children in the Basic cycle offered suggestions about
improvements needed in the schools. The problems mentioned most often con-
cerned teachers’ lack of qualifications or skills, overcrowding in the classroom, and
quality of textbooks and curricula.
At the time of the 1994 Census nearly one-third of the Jordanian population was
enrolled in some form of education. Illiteracy had fallen dramatically in the pre-
ceding 15 years, from 20 percent to 9 percent for men, and from 50 percent to 19
percent for women (Ministry of Education, 1996: 6). Today, Jordan’s government
and non-government expenditure on education is close to the average for develop-
ing countries, at 3.8 percent of GNP. However, its gross enrolment ratios1 for pri-
mary and secondary school are much higher than average (92 percent, versus 56
percent for all developing countries and 58 percent for all Arab states), and adult
literacy rates are also well above the average (UNDP 1997: 224–25, 180–81, 164–
65).
The Ministry of Education supervises all educational institutions at the pre-
school, Basic and secondary level. Most schools are administered directly by the Min-
istry of Education; others are run by UNRWA, the private sector, or other govern-
mental institutions. In total, there were over 1.4 million students registered for the
1996-97 academic year: 69,284 in the pre-school cycle, 1,099,215 in Basic educa-
tion, 151,708 in the Secondary cycle, and 134,945 in community colleges and
universities.
Jordan is a country with limited natural resources and a narrow base of
industrialisation. There is relatively little employment in agriculture, and most
employment is in the services sector. Women’s participation in the labour force is
low, at about 15 percent, and labour force participation rates for men appear to have
fallen in recent years. General unemployment stands at 17 percent, and
1
The gross enrolment ratio is the number of students enrolled in a level of education (whether
they belong in the relevant age group for that level or not), as a percentage of the entire
population in the age group for that level.
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CONTENTS
unemployment rates are much higher for women and younger people. All of these
trends have led to undesirable economic and social results.
Jordan began to review its education system comprehensively in the mid-
1980s, believing that the key to achieving comprehensive economic and social
development is to develop the nation’s human resources. The First National Con-
ference for Educational Development, held in 1987, created the foundation for the
Education Act of 1994. The Act defines the structure of the education system in
Jordan as consisting of a two-year cycle of pre-school education, 10 years of com-
pulsory Basic education, and two years of Secondary education (see Insert).
At the time of the survey, the first phase of the Educational Development
Plan (1989-1995) had been implemented and had partially achieved its objectives
in the fields of teacher training and certification, general examinations and school
tests, new curricula and textbooks, educational technologies, school buildings,
restructuring the education system, and vocational education and training. The
second phase of the Educational Development Plan (1996-2000) aims to achieve
the following:
• Consolidating educational reform through staff development, developing a
national system of examinations and curricula, school-based innovations,
technical vocational education and training, expanding pre-school educa-
tion, and enhancing non-formal education.
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CONTENTS
Basic school: All children at the age of at least 5 years and 8 months have to
attend the Basic cycle, which is for 10 years. As this cycle is compulsory, there is a
standard curriculum for all students, who are evaluated according to their aca-
demic achievement in the 8th, 9th and 10th grades. Taking into consideration
their attitudes and interests, students are then classified for joining the various
streams of comprehensive and applied secondary education.
Secondary education: At the end of the 10th grade, all children are classified
into two major streams: the Comprehensive Secondary education stream (academ-
ic and vocational) and the Applied Secondary education stream. The two-year
comprehensive secondary education program leads to examinations for the Gen-
eral Secondary education certificate in either the Academic or the Vocational sub-
streams. The Academic sub-stream includes scientific, literary and sharia special-
isations. The Vocational sub-streams covers industrial commercial, agricultural,
nursing, hotel and home-economics education. Students from either the Academic
or Vocational streams may continue on to higher education. In addition there is
a two-year Applied Secondary stream which provides vocational education for di-
rect placement in the labour market.
Literacy and adult learning: The educational system provides various non-for-
mal education programs, such as:
• Literacy programs through evening classes
• Evening classes for school leavers or dropouts
• Special education programs, which provide education for adults to
continue self-learning and to sit for Basic and secondary school
examinations
• Non-formal vocational training (short courses)
• Cultural centres programs
Other: Voluntary institutions provide financial support for the education of the
disabled and the gifted.
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CONTENTS
introduction to the state of education in Jordan. We expect that further work with
the survey data will produce papers of interest to the education specialist.
Availability of Schools
Historically Jordan has had to cope with a rapid expansion in the demand for edu-
cation due to natural population increase and large numbers of repatriated refugees.
In some areas it was necessary to impose a double-shift system for buildings, which
made it difficult to provide proper educational services. In response, the Ministry
of Education gave school-building a high priority in the first phase of the Com-
prehensive Educational Development Plan (1989-1995). Among the goals of the
plan were to do away with all rented school buildings, abolish the double-shift
system, improve educational facilities in existing schools and provide land for school-
buildings.
Accordingly, new school-buildings were established throughout the King-
dom and new classrooms, laboratories and libraries were added to existing schools.
As a result the percentage of schools with double shifts decreased from 20 percent
in 1992-93 to 14 percent in 1996-97, and proportion of rented classrooms declined
by a similar amount.
As shown in figure 4.1, the school building program has already begun to
pay off in the form of increased accessibility for people in most areas.2 Overall, 77
percent of respondents to the JLCS survey reported that there was a basic school
within 5 to 10 minutes walk from their house, and 54 percent had a secondary school
Figure 4.1 Percentage of households in walking distance of schools (n= 5866)
2
The survey’s system for classifying neighbourhoods is described in chapter 3.
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CONTENTS
located in easy walking distance. Refugee camps have the best access to basic schools,
at 86 percent, but other urban neighbourhoods are almost as well-served. Rural
residential areas have relatively good access to schools, but that is not the case for
farm areas. As part of its efforts to extend compulsory basic education, the Minis-
try of Education has adopted a policy of establishing basic schools in remote areas
wherever 10 students or more in the Grade 1 to 4 age-group are available.
The survey also asked about respondents’ satisfaction with the availability
of schools in the local area, and the findings show a similar pattern. As illustrated
in figure 4.2, an average of 78 percent said they were very- or rather satisfied. Sat-
isfaction is highest among refugee camp dwellers, and is much lower in rural areas.
The availability of schools was seldom mentioned as a reason for moving to anoth-
er place, although it is not clear whether that reflects a high level of service or a low
priority given to schools as a reason for moving.
Figure 4.2 Satisfaction with availability of schools in the neighbourhood (n= 5254)
Education has profound effects on income, employment, health, fertility, and many
other aspects of living conditions. We will explore the specific effects of education
in each of these areas in later chapters. In this section we look at education levels in
the population as a whole, with special attention to adults and people of working-
age.
Literacy
The expansion of basic education in the past 30 years has drastically reduced the
historically large differences between the education of men and women, city people
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CONTENTS
and rural people. One way to look at this change is to examine the proportion of
people in different age groups who ever attended school, as illustrated in figure 4.3.
Among the youngest age group, about half are enrolled in pre-school or are just
beginning basic school. Mandatory basic education starts at age 6, and in the age 7
to 25 groups virtually everyone (98 percent) has been enrolled. Beyond age 30 we
start to see a divergence between men and women, urban and rural areas, and for
people aged 50 and above the differences are quite large. For example, among peo-
ple aged 50 to 64, only 33 percent of the women had access to school versus 78
percent of all men. Across all age groups, 85 percent of the population have attended
school: 89 percent for men and 81 percent for women; 87 percent in urban areas,
and 79 percent in the countryside.
Figure 4.3 People ever enrolled in school, by age group, sex and urban-rural (n= 31,178)
Over the years Jordan’s Department of Statistics has collected information about
the proportion of adults who did not attend Basic school, and it has been used as
an indicator of illiteracy in the population. By this measure illiteracy has fallen from
68 percent in 1961 to 14 percent in 1994, as shown in table 4.1. Among the age
15 to 45 group it now stands at 7 percent: 5 percent for men and 9 percent for
women. Illiteracy has declined in all groups, but especially among women. The 1996
JLCS survey produced results very similar to the 1994 Census: when measured
according to the DoS definition, it found illiteracy rates of 9 percent for men, 20
percent for women, and 14 percent overall.
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CONTENTS
Table 4.1 Illiteracy (did not attend Basic school) by sex, 1961 to 1994: Percentage of adults
aged 15 and above
Year Men Women Total
1961 47 88 68
1979 20 50 34
1987 12 33 23
1991 11 28 20
1994 9 19 14
Source: Ministry of Education 1997: 54; Ministry of Education 1996: 6.
However, the JLCS was able to ask more detailed questions than the Census, and
that made it possible to construct a definition of literacy that takes into account
the person’s actual reading and writing abilities. A functional definition of literacy
is useful, because some people may complete basic school without learning how to
read and write properly, or they may lose those skills later in life. Others may pick
up literacy skills through adult education programs or with no formal schooling.
In the survey, people who had completed less than seven years of school were asked
if they could read everyday materials such as a newspaper or letter, and if they were
able to write simple messages, such as a letter to a friend.
Using this functional measure of illiteracy, we find the same general patterns
as the DoS results but with slightly higher rates. For the population aged 15 and
above, the overall rate is 17 percent - 11 percent for men and 24 percent for women.
For both sexes combined, 15 percent of the urban population is non-literate, as are
24 percent of those in rural areas.
Figure 4.4 Illiteracy by age group, sex and urban-rural: Persons aged 15+ (n= 20,170)
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CONTENTS
As we can see in figure 4.4, illiteracy is far higher in the older age groups, and the
disparities between urban and rural, men and women are far greater. Less than 10
percent of the population in the aged 15-30 groups is non-literate by our function-
al definition. The proportion rises to about 20 percent for the 35-49 age group, 46
percent for the 50 to 64 year olds, and 70 percent or more for those over 65. How-
ever, figure 4.4 also shows a quite disturbing trend for rural women, who make up
about 10 percent of the sample: their illiteracy rates are twice as high as those for
rural men or urban women, and this is true even for the youngest age groups. Clearly,
rural women are an important target population for literacy and adult education
programs.
Illiteracy rates are lower for refugees and displaced persons (14 percent) than
for non-refugees (19 percent). In part that is due to the urban location of most
refugees, and in part to UNRWA’s considerable investment in education over the
years. The disparity is small among the youngest age groups, but widens to about 8
percent for people over 30.
There are also large differences by governorate. Ma’an has the highest illit-
eracy rate by the JLCS definition, at 28 percent. It is followed by Mafraq (26 per-
cent), Balqa (25 percent), and Karak (24 percent). The urban governorates of
Amman, Zarqa and Irbid have below-average rates.
Jordan has realised the seriousness of the illiteracy problem and its negative
impact on all aspects of life. The 1987 Conference for Educational Development
confirmed the importance of non-formal education and set a goal of reducing the
overall illiteracy rate to 8 percent by the year 2000. Efforts to solve the problem focus
on the following methods:
• Prevention: The most effective way to combat illiteracy is to prevent it, by
providing free compulsory basic education for all students. Jordan has
required 6 years of basic education since 1952. The duration of compulso-
ry schooling was later extended to 9 years in accordance with the Education
Act of 1964, and to 10 years in 1987, and education is now compulsory and
available to all children aged 6 to 16. As mentioned above, the Ministry of
Education continues to open a class wherever 10 students become available,
and has set procedures in place to limit drop-out from basic education. We
will discuss the reasons for current drop-outs in a later section.
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CONTENTS
Literacy is only one aspect of the nation’s educational profile. As we can see from
figure 4.5, about half of the working-aged population has completed all or part of
the Basic cycle, and over 20 percent have completed or are enrolled in some form
of secondary school. One-fifth have an Intermediate Diploma or Community Col-
lege degree, or have completed or are enrolled in a university-level program (Bach-
elor’s, Master’s, Ph.D. or Higher Diploma).3 We would also note that Basic school
in Jordan covers grades 1 through 10, and thus is equivalent to lower secondary
education in many other countries.
Urban-rural and gender differences follow the same general pattern that we
have seen in earlier tables: rural people and women are less likely to attain higher
education, and less likely to go to school at all. Most of the disparity by sex is due
Figure 4.5 Highest level of education completed or currently enrolled in: Persons aged 15 to
64 (n= 19,567)
3
For respondents who were educated under earlier systems, Preparatory school is coded as
Basic school, and Intermediate Diploma is classified as higher education.
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CONTENTS
to people in older age groups; up to age 30, the proportions of men and women
with basic, secondary and higher education vary by only 1 to 3 percent. Beyond
age 35 the proportion of women with higher education drops sharply compared to
men, and the proportion with no education rises.
The situation is somewhat different with respect to urban-rural disparities.
There is a consistent gap of about 5 percent in the proportion of people with sec-
ondary education and a roughly 10 percent gap in higher education, and it is found
in every age group. Educational opportunities, migration, and traditional attitudes
towards women are the most likely reasons: even with an ambitious school-build-
ing program, it is difficult to have a secondary school within easy reach of every
rural household. Rural areas offer fewer work opportunities for those who do man-
age to get a secondary or higher education, and those people are more likely to
become urban residents over time.
There are no significant differences in the education levels of refugees and
non-refugees in the working-aged population. Slightly more non-refugees have never
attended school, but the proportions of people with basic, secondary, and higher
education are almost the same. However there are large differences in the type of
school attended for Basic education, largely due to the activities of UNRWA. Among
non-refugees, 86 percent went to government and 4 percent to private schools. About
10 percent took their basic education outside Jordan, or at some other type of school
such as sharia schools. The majority of refugees also attended government schools
(54 percent), but 28 percent received their basic education from UNRWA. Larger
numbers of refugees were educated in other schools or outside Jordan (15 percent),
and 3 percent attended private schools. Note that these figures are for people who
are no longer enrolled; we will look at the profile of today’s students in the next
section.
139
CONTENTS
that enrolment in the Basic and secondary cycles is quite well-balanced by sex.
Women are slightly under-represented in higher education (45 percent of the total),
especially in university B.A. and postgraduate courses. However, women make up
Figure 4.6 Distribution of currently enrolled students by level and sex (n= 11,800)
over half of the enrolment in the community colleges. This is probably due to the
wider availability of community colleges throughout the kingdom, which makes it
easier for women students to live at home. University education is also more
expensive, and parents give priority to sons.
As part of its efforts to create a more skilled labour force, Jordan has placed
special emphasis on vocational education in recent years. The two vocational sec-
ondary options4 have become available in more school districts, and the range of
course offerings has expanded and modernised. Who are the students who enter the
secondary vocational streams?
Figure 4.7 looks at the social profile of secondary enrolment in several
dimensions. In total, 80 percent of the sample’s secondary school students were in
the academic stream, and 20 percent in either the Comprehensive or Applied
4
Jordan offers two forms of vocational secondary training: Comprehensive vocational sec-
ondary, and Applied secondary. For more information, see “The Educational Ladder in
Jordan” at the beginning of this chapter.
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.7 Secondary school enrolment in the Academic and Vocational streams (n= 1435)
vocational track. But there are large variations by sex, location, refugee status and
income. For example, only 14 percent of the girls chose vocational education, ver-
sus 25 percent of the boys. The difference may perhaps be explained by a lack of
vocational courses appropriate for girls, along with social attitudes which put greater
pressure on boys to learn a marketable skill. More worrying is the low percentage
of rural students (13 percent) who enter the vocational secondary stream: this is
probably not a matter of choice. Vocational training facilities are quite expensive
to provide, and it has not been possible to offer the vocational option in many sparse-
ly-populated areas.
Two groups which have relatively high rates of vocational enrolment are ref-
ugees (24 percent, boys and girls combined) and children from families earning less
than 1450 JD per year (29 percent). Job-related training is clearly an attractive option
for many of these students, who may lack property or family connections, are
unlikely to get government jobs, and are expected to find work at an earlier age.
Education of the household head (not shown) also has an influence. Students are
more likely to enter the vocational stream from families where the head has basic
or vocational secondary education, as opposed to academic secondary or higher
education. In contrast, Academic secondary is chosen by 88 percent of students from
families with higher education, and 95 percent of those in the top income bracket.
This general profile of vocational students - male, low-income, less-educated
families - is not unusual. But it does have implications if Jordan wishes to expand
the vocational secondary stream. As we will see in the section on parents’ attitudes,
vocational education is not a popular choice and appears to have negative social
connotations, even among groups who might benefit from it.
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CONTENTS
Supervising Authority
Government agencies bear the main responsibility for education at all levels, as we
can see in figure 4.8. In the JLCS sample 78 percent of students in basic education
attended government schools, most of which are operated by the Ministry of Edu-
cation. About 9 percent were enrolled in private schools, and 13 percent in UNRWA
schools. Eighty per cent of the refugee children in camps attend UNRWA schools,
and 18 percent of those living outside the camps. Most private and UNRWA schools
are in urban areas. According to Ministry of Education statistics, the proportion of
students in private Basic and secondary schools increased by about 3 percent between
1992-93 and 1996-97 (Ministry of Education, 1997: 17).
Figure 4.8 Distribution of students by type of school and level (n= 11,800)
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.9 Type of basic school attended, by income group (n= 9049)
rises steadily from just 2 percent in the poorest families, to 58 percent among the
wealthiest.5
A similar pattern holds for secondary and higher education: of the academ-
ic secondary students from the two highest income groups, 30 percent or more
attend private schools, and 50 percent are in private higher education. The corre-
sponding figures for the lowest income group are 6 percent and 26 percent. Eco-
nomic factors also help to explain the lack of private vocational secondary schools.
Properly-equipped vocational schools are expensive to operate, and higher-income
families usually prefer academic education at the secondary level. The few people
in the sample who did attend private vocational schools were all from middle or
upper income households. It may be possible to get the private sector involved in
secondary vocational education by setting out policies similar to those for commu-
nity college education, which also includes a vocational component. However, given
the social and economic pressures to send children to higher education, it may not
be possible to attract enough middle and upper-income students at the secondary
level.
143
CONTENTS
and for some social groups. Table 4.2 presents Ministry of Education data on
enrolment by school cycle and sex for the 1992-93 and 1995-96 school years.
Enrolment is calculated here as a percentage of all children in the appropriate age
groups for each cycle, and includes both government and private schools. Gross en-
rolment increased to 26 percent in the Pre-school Cycle, 6 95 percent in the Basic
Cycle and 70 percent in the Secondary Cycle.
The JLCS sample produced results that were almost identical to the Minis-
try’s when the same definitions were applied. However, the survey data allow us to
take a much closer look at the composition of enrolment and the reasons for
dropping out. We will focus on the Basic- and secondary school aged populations,
children aged 6 to 18.
Figure 4.10a plots enrolment by age in completed years, for boys and girls.
Students who had already completed the cycle appropriate for their age (for exam-
ple, 18 year olds who had finished secondary school) were counted with those
enrolled. Percentages by sex are very similar, and in fact girls have slightly higher
enrolment rates in secondary education. This suggests that the Ministry of Educa-
tion’s outreach efforts have been successful, and it also indicates a positive develop-
ment in peoples’ attitudes about women’s education. However, continuation rates
at the secondary level do give cause for some concern. National enrolment at age
16 is just below 90 percent - an impressive achievement - but it drops off to about
75 percent at age 17 and 62 percent at age 18. Evidently many students or their
parents do not consider secondary education worthwhile, and drop out when school
is no longer compulsory. Of the 17 and 18 year olds who are not in school, about
half have a Basic education certificate and half dropped out before completing.
The last three parts of figure 4.10 illustrate some important factors related
to dropout and continuation rates. Rural children tend to start school later than
those in the cities; enrolment rates are similar from age 7 to 13, when more rural
children begin to leave school before completing Basic. Attrition rates are similar
in secondary school, but overall rural enrolment rates are about 6 percent lower.
The differences are much larger when we examine the effects of household
income and education. Children from upper-middle and higher income groups
(household incomes over 2900 JD per year) are more likely to start school by age 6
and to complete the Basic and secondary cycles. The pattern for the middle income
group is quite similar, but with more attrition going into secondary school. Clearly
the largest dropout problems are found in the low income households which make
up over 20 percent of the population. Enrolment rates are over 95 percent in the
first four grades, but they fall off steeply after age 11. Twenty percent have dropped
6
At present, almost all pre-schools and kindergartens are established, financed and admin-
istered by the private sector. The Ministry of Education’s main role is to supervise and regu-
late them.
144
CONTENTS
out by the end of Basic school, and by age 18 less than half are enrolled or have
completed secondary school.
The education level of the family makes an enormous difference. Better-
educated parents are more financially secure, and there is less pressure to abandon
school to work. They are able to help more with schoolwork, have stronger
Table 4.2 Gross enrolment by school cycle and sex, 1992-93 and 1995-96: Proportion of the
population in eligible age groups
Pre-school Basic Secondary
Academic Year Boys Girls All Boys Girls All Boys Girls All
1992-93 25 23 24 86 88 87 51 55 53
1995-96 27 24 25 94 95 95 67 73 70
Source: Ministry of Education 1997: 21.
Figure 4.10 Students who are enrolled or have completed Basic school (age 6-16) or Second-
ary school (age 17-18): Percentage by age and other measures (n= 12,389)
145
CONTENTS
expectations about the child going on to secondary and higher education, and
persevere in the face of bad school performance. The end result is a significant dif-
ference in dropout rates, as seen in figure 4.10d. In families where the household
head has a secondary or higher education (30 percent of the sample), virtually all
children are enrolled at the end of the Basic cycle and 85-90 percent are enrolled at
the secondary stage. In families where the head has not completed Basic, 78 per-
cent are enrolled at age 16 and 50-60 percent afterwards. It is also worth noting
that the turning point in preventing dropouts seems to occur when the household
head achieves a secondary education: on the one hand, the patterns are unfortu-
nately similar for the children of household heads who have completed the Basic
level or no level. On the other hand, there is almost no difference between families
headed by secondary and higher education graduates.
Figure 4.11 Reasons for not being enrolled in school: Children aged 6 to 18 (n= 845)
Parents gave a great variety of reasons, and they vary somewhat between boys and
girls and younger and older children. Family poverty and the need to work was the
main reason given in about 15 percent of the cases. General poverty was mentioned
more often for girls, and the need to work was cited most often for older boys.
Another 3 percent - and 6 percent of the girls - dropped out for marriage or to care
for other family members. Disability was a factor in about 10 percent of the cases.
146
CONTENTS
147
CONTENTS
For randomly selected respondents who had children in Basic school, the JLCS
survey asked a series of questions about the parent’s attitudes and expectations re-
garding the child’s future schooling. If there was more than one child of Basic age,
the questions referred to the eldest.
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.12 Do you expect your child to complete Basic school? (n= 1907)
When asked the reasons why the child would not finish school, respondents gave
answers that were broadly similar to parents whose children had already dropped
out (figure 4.11). Family poverty (16 percent), not interested in school (51 percent),
repeated failure (25 percent), and the need to help economically (13 percent for boys)
or marriage caring for family members (11 percent for girls) were the leading rea-
sons. It is also worth noting that family disintegration (7 percent) was one of the
more common reasons cited for boys.
149
CONTENTS
gap between expectations and experience; only 76 percent of all 17 year olds were
actually enrolled. As we can see from figure 4.13, about 8 percent want their boys
to begin work or an apprenticeship of some kind after completing Basic, and 2
percent mentioned the armed forces or some other activity. Ninety-one per cent
preferred some form of secondary school. For girls the expectations are even high-
er: 3 percent will get married or do some other activity, and 97 percent will go on
in school. No one mentioned work or vocational apprenticeships for girls, and young
women do in fact have higher secondary school enrolment. Urban and rural par-
ents have the same expectations about secondary school versus non-school activi-
ties. However, more parents from the lowest-income and least-educated groups
expect the children to work or take apprenticeship training (9 percent, both sexes
combined), or to get married or join the armed forces (4 percent).
Figure 4.13 is also interesting because it shows the relative proportions of
parents interested in the Academic versus the Vocational streams. Academic second-
ary is especially preferred for girls (75 percent, versus 66 percent for boys), but that
Figure 4.13 Expectations for the child after completing the Basic cycle: All children who are
expected to complete Basic (n= 1759)
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CONTENTS
is partly because more boys are expected to drop out and enter the labour force. Only
10 percent of the boys and 7 percent of the girls are expected to enter vocational
secondary school; about 15 percent of the parents have no preference. Actual
enrolment in secondary school is currently about 80 percent in the academic stream
and 20 percent vocational (figure 4.7), but parents’ expectations are obviously quite
different. The percentages change slightly if we ignore children who will go into
work or marriage, but there is still a serious mismatch between the school places
available and the education that parents expect. This is an important finding for
advocates of secondary education, because it suggests that vocational school is seen
as a “second best” alternative in many families, to be undertaken if the child wants
it or if there is no other option.
Figure 4.14 gives an overview of preferences for parents with different
incomes and educational backgrounds. Groups are sorted according to the
percentage of respondents who prefer the Academic stream, although the differences
are usually small. Low-income parents express the strongest definite preferences for
vocational secondary (13 percent for boys and girls combined) and also have a high
‘No preference’ rate. Not surprisingly, responses for less-educated parents show a
similar pattern. Vocational education appears to make sense for these families because
it opens up new job opportunities for the children; it also allows them to begin earn-
ing money at an earlier age and avoids the heavy financial burdens of higher edu-
cation. In addition, these parents may feel more confident that they can use family
Figure 4.14 Parents’ preferences for vocational vs. academic secondary school (n= 1673)
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CONTENTS
connections to help the child find a job afterward, which might not be true if the
child pursued an academic course.
Figure 4.15 Main reason for preferring Academic or Vocational secondary education: Parents
who expect their children to attend secondary school (n=1433)
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CONTENTS
At the other end of the scale we find the higher income- and education groups. Here
the respondents are less inclined toward the vocational stream and are also more
sure of their choice, as we can see from the smaller percentage of ‘No preference’
answers. It is interesting to note that parents who have had a vocational secondary
education themselves are slightly less in favour of a similar education for their
children, compared to their Academic peers. However the difference is not statisti-
cally reliable. Rural parents appear in the middle, as their preferences are almost
identical to the population as a whole.
The reasons underlying academic and vocational preferences are quite
different, as illustrated in figure 4.15. In interpreting the figure, we should keep in
mind that roughly eight times as many respondents are offering reasons for the
Academic stream as for the Vocational stream. For both boys and girls, preferences
for vocational secondary seem to be driven by the prospect of higher incomes or
better jobs, and by the child’s own preferences. The child’s abilities also play a part,
especially for boys. The people who believe that vocational secondary will lead to
good job prospects are mostly lower educated and low income men; mothers who
prefer the vocational stream are more likely to do so because the child wants it,
especially for their girls. Social status and the chance for higher education are rarely
mentioned.
For parents choosing Academic secondary, job and income opportunities are
a common reason; but even more important is the chance to obtain a higher edu-
cation. The two are closely linked, of course, and the numbers do not tells us whether
higher education is valued for its own sake or as a means to an economic end.
Respondents from all income and education levels cite these two factors in roughly
equal proportions, although mothers put more emphasis on access to higher edu-
cation. The child’s own preference is a less important factor in choosing the academic
stream, and is less important for boys than for girls. Social status was mentioned
by about 10 percent of the respondents, for both girls and boys and across all seg-
ments of the population.
In general, these results confirm that the public’s faith in vocational educa-
tion is still quite low.7 However, recent Ministry of Education data suggest that there
is growing interest in this type of school, particularly the nursing, hotel, press and
industrial specialisations, due to vocational graduates’ better work opportunities in
those fields. At the same time, enrolment is declining in the agricultural and com-
mercial specialisations. Graduates are not finding jobs, because the schools have not
7
In part, that may be due to people’s actual experience. As we will see in the chapter on
Labour Force and Employment, unemployment rates among academic and vocational second-
ary graduates are very similar, and far fewer vocational graduates end up in white collar
occupations.
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kept pace with changes in technology and students are not acquiring the practical
skills which are now required.
By the year 2000 the Ministry of Education would like to increase the per-
centage of students in the vocational stream to 50 percent of all secondary school
enrolment among boys and 35 percent among girls. It hopes to accomplish that by
expanding the existing specialisations and creating new ones for both sexes. The
Ministry has also removed an important barrier to expansion by opening up high-
er education to vocational graduates. In accordance with the new Education Plan,
academic students and those in the Comprehensive vocational secondary stream will
have similar chances to enrol in universities starting in the 1997-98 academic year.
This will help to reduce parents’ concerns about vocational education being a ‘dead
end’ which will limit the child’s future opportunities
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.16 Expectations about the highest level of school the child will reach (n= 1697)
especially for boys. Parents with a secondary or higher education are again more sure
about their plans, and between 74 percent and 84 percent want the child to have a
University degree. The distribution by income groups is not shown, but follows a
similar pattern.
As a whole the survey results point to two widespread attitudes among Jor-
danian parents. The first is that women should be educated, whether they are
expected to work outside the home or not; the second is that good jobs come only
with higher qualifications. This is a very positive set of ideals for any nation.
Unfortunately, it is also the sort of situation which leads to costly ‘credentials infla-
tion’ in countries where the government has expanded low-quality higher educa-
tion to keep pace with the demands of parents rather than labour market needs.8 In
part, the Ministry of Education’s effort to upgrade vocational education is meant
to cut the spiral of credentials inflation. But to satisfy parents this training must
prove itself in the job market.
8
Dore (1976) is a good introduction to the processes underlying credentials inflation.
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.17 Support for women’s education, and expectations about children’s highest
education level (If going on to secondary school: n= 1645)
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.18 Where higher education was completed, by sex (B.A., M.A., Ph.D., High
Diploma: n= 1242)
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CONTENTS
In this final section we examine public opinion about the overall performance of
the public schools, parents’ assessment of specific problems in their children’s
schools, and Ministry of Education plans for further upgrading of teachers and
facilities.
Figure 4.19 Satisfaction with the development of public schools: All randomly selected indi-
viduals (n= 5494)
The exceptions among urban dwellers were people living in refugee camps. Sixty-
two per cent of camp residents rated the schools as excellent, and only 10 percent
as poor. In this case it is clear that “the public schools” was understood by respond-
ents to mean the UNRWA schools. In general, higher-income and better-educated
respondents tended to be more critical of the school system, with ‘poor’ ratings
averaging about 10 percent higher. Lower income and less educated people were
more supportive. The breakout by reporting domain (not shown) follows a similar
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CONTENTS
pattern: the more urban regions of Amman, Zarqa/ Mafraq and Irbid received below-
average ratings, while people in Jarash/ Ajloun, Balqa/ Madaba and the South gave
the public schools higher evaluations.
One possible explanation is that urban, educated and richer people have
much higher expectations about the schools and are more likely to be frustrated if
the system does not develop in a direction that meets their specific needs. On the
other hand, poorer, rural and less educated people have seen enormous improve-
ments in their children’s educational opportunities in recent years.
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CONTENTS
In some respects evaluations of the child’s own school were similar to those for the
school system in general. Men were less supportive, and schools in Amman, Zarqa/
Mafraq and Irbid received slightly lower ratings. However there were no clear pat-
terns in the responses by household income or respondent’s education; the rich and
the better-educated are not less happy. The most likely reason for this is suggested
in the last three bars of figure 4.20: children at different socio-economic levels tend
to go to different kinds of schools.
Evaluations for UNRWA schools are more extreme than those given to gov-
ernment schools. They receive more ‘excellent’ and slightly more ‘very poor’ ratings,
but fewer in the middle. Parents’ evaluations of private schools are significantly
higher; about 90 percent rate the school as excellent or quite good, although that
may be related to the fact that they are paying for it. As we saw in figure 4.8,
UNRWA serves a primarily lower-income population and private schools are an
increasingly common alternative for the middle and upper-middle class. In the end,
it appears that this sorting of children by type of school has produced a rough equi-
librium in satisfaction for the time being. The larger question for policy makers is
whether Jordan’s three-way division of schools will lead to larger differences in
educational preparedness and, in the long run, to greater social inequality.
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CONTENTS
Figure 4.21 Parents’ opinions about improvements needed in their child’s Basic school
(n= 1907)
teaching methods were a greater concern for parents with children in private schools
and -again - among respondents with vocational secondary backgrounds. Concerns
about student behaviour and discipline were slightly more common in UNRWA
schools and urban areas generally. Almost no one had problems with the size of the
school, or with the school’s arrangements for communicating with parents.
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CONTENTS
critical thinking, dealing with individual differences, relating knowledge to real life,
and on higher intellectual skills. International organisations are helping to integrate
these concepts into new curricula and textbooks in such areas as environmental and
health-education, traffic education, democracy and human rights.
The second phase of the Educational Development Plan (1996-2000) will
concentrate on reviewing curricula and textbooks in order to consolidate these
changes and to bring in new concepts. It will also expand the teaching of computer
skills and French, and will strengthen the practical side in teaching the sciences and
listening and conversation skills in English. Textbooks will be put on computer, and
a new system of evaluating and revising textbooks will be developed to achieve sim-
plicity and efficiency in providing up to date information.
163
CONTENTS CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 5
164
CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 6 CONTENTS
Summary
Nearly four out of five adult respondents believe that their general health is very
good or good. Less than 5 percent describe their health as bad or very bad. More
men than women perceive their health to be very good. Furthermore, people living
in the most urbanised parts of Jordan as well as in the densely populated Palestin-
ian refugee camps report poorer health than people living elsewhere.
Seven percent of the population have some kind of a lasting health problem
and 3.5 percent have a severe problem. Not surprisingly, such chronic states of ill-
health are strongly correlated with subjective, self-perceived general health. Among
those above the age of forty, Jordanian women are somewhat more ambulatory and
sensory impaired than men, a result in line with lower female self-perceived health.
The indicators of functional impairment as well as the indicators of prolonged illness
and self-perceived general health points to the fact that individuals in the lower-
income social strata suffer from more health problems than people belonging to
higher-income groups.
The survey found that 24 percent of the surveyed population above the age
of fifteen are daily smokers, 44 percent of the men and 5 percent of the women.
However, 67 percent of all dwellings inhabited by under-fifteens are used for regu-
lar smoking. This might indicate that passive smoking is a big national health
problem.
Seven indicators of anxiety and depression indicate that psychological dis-
tress is somewhat more widespread among women than among men, as well as in
the poorer segments of the population.
Eleven percent of the sample above the age of five had been acutely ill or
suffered from an injury during the two weeks period preceding the interview. Four
percent had been affected so severely that they were prevented from carrying out
‘normal duties’. Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought help from the
health care system, about two-thirds from a general practitioner and one-third from
a specialist. Thirty-nine percent consulted the private health sector, while 55 per-
cent visited a public health centre or hospital. The rest went to an UNRWA clinic
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CONTENTS
or to a pharmacy. Consultation costs vary across the various institutions visited and
whether the individual is covered by health insurance or not. Yet, individuals tend
to pay the same for consultation and medication across income groups.
Physical access to health services seems to be good, as 67 percent of all
interviewed households have at least one physician, health centre or hospital with-
in five to ten minutes walking distance from their living quarters. The situation is
best in the densely populated governorates as well as in the compact Palestinian
refugee camps. Health insurance is another side to the accessibility of services. Fif-
ty-three percent of the surveyed population, 55 percent among Jordanian nation-
als and 20 percent among non-Jordanians, are covered by health insurance. The
coverage is poorest in the most heavily populated areas, such as Amman, and in the
lowest of three broad incomegroups.
Seven out of ten families assert that they are very satisfied or rather satisfied
with the local health services. Two out of three randomly selected adults hold the
opinion that the public health sector has developed excellently. Nearly nine in ten
consultations following sudden illness are viewed as very satisfactory or rather sat-
isfactory. The level of satisfaction is alike for the various types of health institutions.
Introduction
Health is one of the most crucial aspects of living conditions. Good health is both
of immediate value in itself and is directly and indirectly related to other aspects of
living conditions. For example, good health is an important resource for full
participation in society. A person’s health makes a difference in his or her opportu-
nities in, for instance, education, the labour market, or organisations. At the same
time, one’s health is itself affected by the environment in which one lives.
Health Status
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CONTENTS
‘Disease’ refers to pathological processes and is the health problem seen from
a medical diagnostic or the physician’s perspective.
‘Illness’ on the other hand refers to the human experience of symptoms,
distress and suffering. It concerns the layman’s perception of and response to
symptoms and disability. (Fylkesnes 1991, with reference to Chrisman and Klein-
man 1983).
reported when they are so common that they are perceived as part of the human
condition. Problems of interpretation are especially troublesome for cross-cultural
or cross-country comparison, and also for comparison between different sociocul-
tural groups within a population.
Nevertheless, survey data on self-reported illness have several advantages (UN
1984). First, such data allow the linking of health problems with a broad range of
social and economic factors and other indicators of living conditions. Often infor-
mation collected in surveys has better coverage than service statistics, because the
survey includes respondents who do not come into contact with the health care
system. Moreover, the survey puts emphasis on health conditions that are severe
enough to cause the respondent to reduce temporarily or permanently his or her
regular activities or to seek aid from the health care system. It could, of course, be
argued that it is the medically verified needs and not the perceived needs in a pop-
ulation that is of highest policy relevance. Nonetheless, it is people’s felt needs that
determine pressure on health services. Furthermore, survey data on assessed needs
are useful to the health planners, since they might be compared to health sector
performance data, for instance records of the help and treatment provided.
Before we move into details about the acute and chronic health situation of
the surveyed individuals, let us have a look at how the respondents understand their
own general or global health status.
The survey asked one randomly selected adult in each household (2,344 men and
3,159 women) to describe his or her own health according to a five-point scale rang-
ing from ‘very good’ through ‘fair’ to ‘very bad’. The question was posed because
research has shown that the answer to this question in fact reflects the overall health
167
CONTENTS
168
CONTENTS
residential areas as well as those residing in Zarqa and Mafraq have a lower likeli-
hood of reporting ‘very good health’ than respondents living elsewhere. Lastly, after
controlling for the other variables in the model, increased age was found to have a
negative impact on the likelihood of reporting a ‘very good health’. See appendix 2
for general information about logistic regression and chapter appendix 5.1 for the
detailed result of the logistic regression model here applied. The results on self-
assessed general health are reported in more detail below.
As can be seen from figure 5.1, the majority of those asked, nearly four in
five, consider their own health to be quite satisfactory. Forty-five percent of the
respondents claimed their health was very good. Another 34 percent stated that it
was good, while 16.5 percent of the respondents answered that their health was fair.
Four and a half percent felt that their general health situation was bad or very bad.
Figure 5.1 also discloses a difference between the sexes, in that slightly more
men than women assert their health to be very good (48 versus 42 percent). More
women than men state that their health is fair (20 versus 13 percent), in spite of
the fact that women have a higher life expectancy than men (see chapter 2). How-
ever, it is not unique to Jordan that women rate their global health as somewhat
lower than men. To illustrate, this phenomenon was reported in the living condi-
tions’ studies of Germany (Zapf et al. 1987), Estonia (Grøgaard (ed.) 1996) and
Latvia (Aasland (ed.) 1996). Several factors may be involved. First, women might
be more often but less seriously ill. Second, women may for some reason be better
at making realistic judgements about their own health (and possibly also the health
of others). Third, there might be a difference in response, in that men report less
illness. Yet, following Moum (1992a) above, there is reason to believe that the health
of Jordanian women, as that of women from several other countries, is slightly worse
than men’s health.
Health is closely related to age, and figure 5.2 demonstrates that with
increased age, people’s general health is reduced. The trend is similar for both sexes,
which is reflected by parallel curves in the figure. However, from the age of 25
women tend to feel less fit than men. The reports of very good health are to some
extent mirrored by the reports of bad or very bad health. More women than men
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CONTENTS
in the age groups 40-49 years and 50-59 years declare their health to be bad or very
bad. Among women above the age of 50, there are more respondents reporting bad
or very bad health than those claiming very good health. The situation is similar
for men above the age of 60.
Figure 5.3 highlights the relationship between various individual character-
istics other than age, and the respondents’ general health status. Not surprisingly,
there is a wide gap between the subjectively felt health status of individuals who have
some longstanding illness or disability and those who have not. While only 5.5
percent of the chronically ill state that their health is very good, 49 percent of those
who do not suffer from lasting health problems say the same.
There is a negative relationship between smoking and good health, as smok-
ing is a risk factor associated with a range of medical conditions governing diseases
(WHO 1995). A recent British study paints a gloomy picture of the negative health
effects of smoking. It found that only an estimated 42 percent of lifelong male
smokers alive at the age of 20 would be alive at 73, compared with 78 percent of
lifelong male non-smokers (Phillips et al 1996). Interestingly, there seems to be an
association between regular smoking and self-perceived general health in our data.
While 39 percent of those who smoke regularly declare their health to be very good,
47 percent of the non-smokers say the same. In fact, the real health gap between
smokers and non-smokers is wider, as the inclusion of women - of whom very few
smoke and who to a lesser extent than men report to have very good health - tend
to reduce it. If we compare men who usually smoke with those who never smoke,
Figure 5.2 Self-perceived good and bad health by sex and age
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CONTENTS
this becomes evident. Forty-one percent of the male smokers claim to have a very
good health, while 54 percent among the men who never smoke assert the same.
We will return to a more detailed analysis of smoking below.
We wanted to test if the global health of interview objects belonging to house-
holds with an adequate housing standard is better than the health among
interviewees who live in dwellings of a lower standard. We constructed a simple
additive index based on four indoor environmental factors: humidity/damp, cold/
difficult to heat, uncomfortably hot in summer, and poor ventilation. (More details
about these housing condition indicators are found in chapter 3.) Each negative
factor was given the score ‘1’. The number of 1s for all respondents were then
Figure 5.3 Individuals stating that their health is ‘very good’ by selected characteristics: chronic
health problems, smoking habits, indoor housing conditions, level of education, yearly house-
hold income, and type of residential area
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CONTENTS
counted and the respondents grouped according to the following categories: ‘Very
good indoor environment’ = 0 (21 percent of the sample); ‘Good indoor environ-
ment’ = 1 (25 percent); ‘Poor indoor environment’ = 2 (27 percent); and ‘Very poor
indoor environment’ = 3-4 negative features (also 27 percent of the sample).
Figure 5.3 indicates the effect of housing conditions on self-reported health.
The share of individuals reporting very good health increases with improved housing
standards, as measured by these four indicators. While 50 percent of the respond-
ents residing in houses with an excellent indoor milieu assess their health as very
good, 39 percent among those dwelling under the poorest indoor environmental
conditions claim the same.
Figure 5.3 also shows that subjective global health improves with increasing
level of education, a result in line with earlier studies (Ross and Wu 1995). The
particularly poor health among those without any formal education in our data is
due to the disproportionately high number of older person in this category. And,
as mentioned above, when controlled for the other variables in our regression model
only post-secondary or higher education has a significant effect. The figure further
indicates that the respondents report better health when they live in high-income
households than when they live in low-income ones. Contrasted with the lowest
income group, 16 percentage points more of adult individuals of the highest income
group report very good health.
Finally, figure 5.3 elucidates that there is variation in self-rated global health
according to type of residential area. People living in the most urbanised areas of
Jordan as well as in the densely populated Palestinian refugee camps report poorer
health than people residing in the less urbanised and farm areas. That the self-assessed
global health of adult individuals living in Palestinian refugee camps, on average,
is poorer than the health of grown-ups residing elsewhere in Jordan is due to sever-
al factors. For example, the indoor housing conditions of camp dwellings are below
average (see chapter 3); camp residents are often poorer than people living outside
the camps (see chapter 6); and they are more afflicted by chronic health failure than
other people (see figure 5.15 below). Yet, the regression implies that there are other
factors than those that are included in the model, and which can be attributed to
the camps as such or their residents, which also carry explanatory power.
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CONTENTS
Figure 5.4 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to geographic region, type
of residential area, Palestinian refugee status and yearly household income; all household
members (n = 35,126)
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CONTENTS
The JLCS data reveal no significant gender differences regarding chronic illness, but
show some variation between other subgroups of the population. The most densely
populated areas of Zarqa and Mafraq, and Amman have the highest proportion of
inhabitants with chronic health problems, while the predominantly rural districts
of Jerash and Ajloun as well as the four southern governorates have the lowest pro-
portions (figure 5.4). Similarly respondents living in urban residential areas more
often have permanent poor health than the residents of farm areas or areas that are
rural or semiurban in character. As was the case for subjective general health assess-
ment, residents of the Palestinian refugee camps are the worst off. Palestinian refu-
gees in general also tend to be more afflicted by chronic health problems than other
groups. Although not shown here, this relation is robust for comparisons between
the various governorates.
Finally, figure 5.4 tells us that persons belonging to the lowest income group
much more often report prolonged illness or injury than other persons. Whereas
nearly 11 percent in the low-income category have a lasting health problem and more
than 6 percent have a severe problem, the figures for the middle and high income
groups are about 6 and 3 percent. Hence the prevalence of chronic health problems
in the poorest two-thirds of the population is about double that of the wealthiest
one-third.
Figure 5.5 highlights the association between age and illness or injury of a
longstanding nature. Not surprisingly, we see that the prevalence of chronic health
Figure 5.5 Prevalence of prolonged illness and injury according to ten-year age groups; en-
tire surveyed population (n = 35,126)
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CONTENTS
problems mounts with increasing age. This is both because vulnerability increases
with age and because old people have been exposed to risk the longest.
Functional Impairment
Because health problems may differ considerable in magnitude and seriousness they
will influence the daily life of the affected individuals to a varying degree. Figure
5.6 demonstrates adult respondents’ ability to perform five everyday activities,
notably ascending and descending stairs, walking for a quick 5 minutes’ walk, car-
rying an item for no less than ten metres, reading a newspaper, and following a
normal conversation. Though only a limited number of activities are measured, we
believe they capture important aspects of people’s opportunity to operate freely, and
as such, are good indicators of physical wellbeing.
We have constructed an additive index to investigate how the five indica-
tors of ambulatory and sensory problems accumulate. Those who reported any prob-
lem related to a described activity were given the score ‘1’ on that particular activity.
Next we counted the number of 1’s for each respondent and grouped all respond-
ents accordingly.
The result for men versus women as well as for three income groups is given
in figure 5.7. We observe that women are systematically worse off than men. This
is due to the fact that women above the age of forty report more problems than men
on four out of five of the physical health indicators. The only exception is hearing,
where men and women are equally affected by problems. That women are more often
functionally impaired than men is in line with the section on subjective general
health assessment, where we found that women judged their own health to be a little
worse than did men. Hence, subjective evaluation of general health seems to be in
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CONTENTS
agreement with the self-reported, but still ‘objective’ indicators of physical health
in focus here.
Figure 5.7 further confirms the impression from the analysis above that level
of income is firmly associated with people’s health status. Sixteen percent of the
interviewed adults living in households with a yearly income of JD1450 or less have
a low score on four or all five indicators of physical health. This is about ten per-
centage points higher than for adult members of households with a yearly income
exceeding JD2900.
To what extent does functional impairment restrict people’s ability to gen-
erate income? To answer that question we have compared the scores of the respond-
ents between the ages of 25 and 65 who form part of the work force with those
outside the work force. We have taken out the individuals 15 to 24 years since a
majority of them are still in the educational system. As can be seen from figure 5.7,
labour force participants are less troubled by physical hindrances. Yet, as many as
13 percent of the Jordanians in the labour force can perform three or more of the
five activities only with some difficulty or not at all. The figures are 17 percent for
women and 12 percent for men. This suggests that despite physical impairments,
disabilities and handicaps that considerably reduce their radius of action, people
go very far in forcing themselves to work.
Figure 5.7 Difficulties in performing everyday life activities, according to sex and yearly house-
hold income (RSI 15 years or older), and labour force participation (RSI 25-65 years old). Index
based on five indicators: go up and down stairs; go for a brisk 5 minutes walk; carry 5 kg at
least ten metres; read normal newspaper print (with glasses if necessary); and hear a normal
conversation (with a hearing aid if necessary)
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CONTENTS
This phenomenon is of course related to the (male household head’s) need to support
family. Most likely, however, this need is not only associated with materialistic
demands from the family itself, but is also linked to normative values and forces in
society. The necessity of maintaining a dignified life is central to the Middle East-
ern culture. Dignity is closely linked to public judgement and ‘ard (honour), which
in its turn have several dimensions. While preserving ‘ard through generosity, bravery,
securing sexual modesty of female family members, and protecting the household
from public intrusion are important, the ability to provide for basic needs is the
relevant aspect to our discussion. As stated by Asef Bayat: “For a poor head of house-
hold, not only would the failure to provide for his family jeopardise their survival,
it would also inflict a blow to his honour.” (Bayat 1997: 61).
Smoking
Smoking is one of the prime causes of disease and death in the industrialist coun-
tries, and according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) “emerging as the
world’s largest single preventable cause of illness and death” (WHO 1995: 34).
Cancer, coronary heart disease and disease in the respiratory system are the three
most common causes of death related to smoking (Sanner and Dybing 1994a). To
what extent is smoking a health problem in Jordan? How many people smoke; how
much do they smoke; and when do they take up the habit?
As seen from figure 5.8, a minority of Jordan’s inhabitants smoke. While in
the total adult population 24 percent are regular smokers, between 3 and 4 percent
smoke from time to time. There is a huge difference between men and women. While
44 percent of men smoke daily, only 5 percent of women do the same. Three and
one-half percent of both women and men smoke occasionally. These JLCS results
are largely consistent with a study conducted by Jordan’s Ministry of Health (1996),
Figure 5.8 Smoking habits by sex: regularity of smoking; average number of cigarettes smoked
daily among regular smokers; and average age when started smoking; RSI 15 years or older
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CONTENTS
which concluded that 27 percent of the population aged 25 years or more were
current smokers. The JLCS rate for the same age group is close at 28 percent. The
rate for men is similar in the two studies, but the Ministry of Health reports a some-
what higher proportion of female smokers than do we.
While only 24 percent of the Jordanian adult population smoke daily, the
negative health impact of smoking reaches more people, as 61.5 percent of all liv-
ing quarters and 67 percent of all dwellings in which children below the age of fifteen
live are used for regular smoking. This indicates that passive smoking might be a
considerable problem in Jordan. Although the JLCS does not provide data on smok-
ing on the workplace, it should be well known that non-smokers are exposed to
cigarette smoke at many work sites, a fact that increases further the many negative
health-effects associated with passive smoking (Sanner and Dybing 1994b).
Figure 5.9 portrays the smoking habits in Jordan according to sex and age
groups. It is evident that the gender gap holds for people of all ages. Since we have
only data for one point in time, however, we can not conclude with any certainty
about the underlying causes of this picture. Several explanations might be involved.
First, women might become increasingly addicted to tobacco as they grow older,
while there are more quitters than beginners among men above the age of fifty. Next,
the figure might reflect that Jordanian smoking habits have changed. For instance,
fewer regular smokers among men in the three oldest age groups might indicate that
smoking was less common (among young and middle-aged men) before. Finally,
the result might indicate that smokers die earlier than non-smokers. None of the
Figure 5.9 Prevalence of regular smokers by sex and age groups; RSI 15 years or older
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CONTENTS
explanations necessarily exclude each other. Perhaps most likely, the three work in
combination.
Let us return to figure 5.8, which in addition to displaying daily and occa-
sional smoking presents figures on average number of cigarettes smoked and the
average age at taking up the habit. It shows that female daily smokers smoke less
than men, on average 12 cigarettes daily contrasted to 21. The loss of life expect-
ancy is greater the sooner smoking starts. On a global basis very few people start
after the age of 20 (WHO 1995). This seems to be the situation in Jordan as well,
at least among men. On average daily smokers reported that they took up the habit
at the age of 18. Compared to men, female daily smokers are slow starters, as they
commence smoking on the average nearly five years later.
There appears to be no significant variation in smoking with regard to such
factors as income and education, but people residing in urban areas more often
smoke than those living in rural areas. The survey found that 49 percent of men
and 9 percent of women dwelling in urban localities smoke daily or occasionally
against 41 percent of rural men and 7 percent of rural women.
We know that the health benefits of smoking cessation are big. One study
found that a person who quits smoking in the age 50-59 would reduce by 50 per-
cent the risk of dying within the next sixteen years compared to a person who keeps
up the habit (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1990, referred in
Sanner and Dybing 1994a). Almost 4 percent of Jordanian adults have once been
daily smokers, but have abandoned the habit at some point in the past. The number
of quitters as a proportion of the number of daily smokers is almost equal for men
(0.147) and women (0.125).
Psychological Distress
In addition to the physical sides of health, the more psychological, mental and
emotional aspects of health are naturally of great importance to people’s general well-
being and living conditions. ‘Psychological distress’ is a term often used in the
literature when the topic is ‘mental health’. The two are not synonymous, however.
Psychological distress is seen as a primary indicator of mental health, and symp-
toms of distress are important because they are stimuli to seek care (McDowell and
Newell 1996).
To measure psychological distress the JLCS used a short form of the so-called
HSCL-25, designed to tap anxiety and depression, and in turn an abbreviated ver-
sion of the ‘original’ Hopkins Symptoms Check-List (HSCL) developed by Deroga-
tis et al. (1974) (Moum 1992b). One randomly selected adult in each household
was asked whether seven symptoms or problems that people sometimes have,
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CONTENTS
bothered or distressed him or her very much, quite a bit, a little, or not at all dur-
ing the last week. The symptoms were (1) worrying too much about things, (2)
feeling depressed and sad (blue), (3) feeling hopeless about the future, (4) feeling
of worthlessness, (5) nervousness or shakiness inside, (6) feeling continuously fearful
and anxious, and (7) headaches. According to psychological and psychiatric litera-
ture the four first items are closely interrelated and measure depression, while items
5, 6 and 7 also are intimately linked and indicate anxiety (Moum 1992b, Tambs
and Moum 1993). The original HSCL-25 was constructed to measure symptoms
of anxiety and depression only, and not poor psychological health in general. None-
theless, it has been argued, the list “may serve as a good proxy to global general mental
health because most states of mental illness or distress are accompanied by anxiety
and/or depression.” (Tambs and Moum 1993: 364). Measures of anxiety and
depression overlap and interlink because both tap a broad and general mood
characterised by the experience of various negative affective states (Clark and Watson
1991).
Figure 5.10 elucidates the respondents’ score on each of the seven items. We
observe that between one in ten (‘feeling of worthlessness’) and nearly one-half
(‘nervousness’) of the interviewed reported to have been very much or quite a bit
plagued by these symptoms during the week preceding the interview.
The survey data also show that women systematically report more negative
symptoms than men; that the lowest income category is worse off on all items than
Figure 5.10 The adult population according to seven indicators of psychological distress; RSI
15 years or older
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CONTENTS
the middle and high income categories; that people dwelling in the refugee camps
systematically recount more psychological symptoms than those living in urban
residential areas, followed by inhabitants of semiurban/rural residential sites and the
coutryside; and that the Palestinian refugees suffer more from psychological distress
than the non-refugee part of the population.
Although the seven indicators capture distinct sides to psychological distress,
the aim is to focus on the overall level, not each of the indicators. The limited bat-
tery of questions used is no diagnostic instrument, but is constructed to get a broad
overview of the problem matter. We should use the items together to portray the
spread and seriousness of psychological problems in the population. This can be
done through the construction of a simple additive index, where we presume that
the more stressful symptoms reported, the poorer is the individual’s mental wellbe-
ing. For all seven items each respondent was given the score ‘1’ if he or she had
answered ‘very much’ or ‘quite a bit’. Otherwise he or she was given ‘0’. Next we
calculated the total scores for all respondents and assigned them a number on our
mental health index ranging from zero to seven1.
Figure 5.11 Men and women according to the reported number of symptoms of psycholog-
ical distress; RSI 15 years or older
Figure 5.12 Individuals of three income groups according to the reported number of symp-
toms of psychological distress; RSI 15 years or older
1
The index’ standardized item alpha = 0.8167.
181
CONTENTS
In figures 5.11 and 5.12 we display the results for men versus women as well as for
all respondents according to the yearly income of their households. While 37 per-
cent men did not report any signs of psychological distress, the figure for women
was ten percentage points lower. The prevalence of one to two symptoms is about
equal for the two sexes – we see that the two curves overlap almost perfectly. More
women than men, however, state that they suffer from three or more symptoms
(figure 5.11). Our finding that women are more vulnerable to psychological dis-
tress than men is consistent with the results of many other studies, from develop-
ing as well as developed countries (Jenkins et al. 1991).
Figure 5.12 demonstrates that the poorest segment of the population is more
ridden by symptoms of psychological disorder than those who belong to wealthier
families.
Figure 5.13 Prevalence of acute and severe acute illness or injury. ‘Severe’ is defined as pre-
venting the person from carrying out normal duties. Reference period: 2 weeks. All surveyed
population 5 years or older (n = 30,104). Interviews conducted during January, February and
March.
182
CONTENTS
to the respiratory organs is more wide spread during the winter-months. Therefore
one should take care not to extrapolate from these findings to yearly rates.
People obviously respond differently to sudden illness and injury, and the
JLCS did not set forth to get into great details about that. However, the survey asked
whether or not the acute health problem was followed by any consultation with the
health care system, and if so, what kind of health personnel was seen; what sort of
health facility was contacted; did the person have to travel far; and what did the
consultation cost? Below we present the answers to these questions.
Sixty-four percent of the afflicted persons sought professional help. Of those
who consulted someone, 63 percent saw a general practitioner, 33 percent visited a
specialist, while 3 percent went to a pharmacist. Fifty-five percent visited a govern-
ment-run health institution and 39 percent visited a private health provider. Three
percent used a centre run by UNRWA, while the 3 last percent visited a pharmacy.
Figure 5.14 gives us the place of consultation according to Palestinian refugee
status, level of yearly household income and health insurance coverage. Twenty-eight
percent of the camp refugees consulted the staff of an UNRWA clinic following the
incidence, 40 percent visited the private health sector and 30 percent saw someone
in the public health sector. Three percent of Palestinian refugees living outside the
camps consulted an UNRWA clinic.
Figure 5.14 Place of consultation following acute illness or injury by Palestinian refugee sta-
tus, yearly household income and health insurance coverage; all surveyed population 5 years
or older
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CONTENTS
Not surprisingly, we see that individuals belonging to the highest income group rely
more heavily on private health care than those in the medium and lower income
groups, 50 percent against 32 and 36 percent respectively. We also observe that
individuals that do not hold some sort of insurance card more often approach a
private health clinic than a public health centre for consultation. This tendency is
clear for all three income groups (not shown in figure). While in the low-income
group 39 percent without health insurance visited a private clinic, 26 percent who
had insurance did the same. For the middle-income and high-income groups the
figures are 46 and 16 percent, and 61 and 33 percent respectively.
Only 36 percent of the individuals who suffered from some kind of sudden
health problem during the two weeks preceding the interview did not seek medical
advice. The majority of them, four out of five, were either not ill enough to need
help, or they treated themselves or were treated by a household member. Neverthe-
less, as is revealed by figure 5.15, people belonging to different income groups put
rather different weight on the various causes for not seeking help from the health
sector. While the size of the self-treatment category is approximately the same for
the three groups, affordability plays a much bigger role in the explanation given for
individuals in the low-income group.
While 23 percent of the acutely ill persons received professional medical
assistance within the hara or neighbourhood where they live, 41 percent travelled
within the locality or town only, and 36 percent saw a medical doctor or the like in
another locality or town. People residing in rural parts of Jordan did not travel more
than people in urban areas. Fifty-five percent of all consultations were without
charge, while 42 percent of those who received medicines or other remedies did so
without charge.
The individuals’ consultation and medication costs vary a great deal across
the different types of health institutions and according to whether the person seek-
ing advice or treatment is insured or not. Acutely ill individuals from low-income
and higher-income households tend to pay roughly the same for medical diagno-
sis, advice or treatment. Figure 5.16 clearly shows that the insured pay much less
per consultation than do the non-insured. For instance, 74 against 30 percent receive
Figure 5.15 Reason for not seeking professional help during acute illness or injury by yearly
household income
184
CONTENTS
consultation without charge. The figure also demonstrates that the private health
sector charges a great deal more per consultation than does the public sector. The
public and private sectors offer somewhat different services, which might explain
part of the difference between the two. We notice that no one paid for consulta-
tion at the UNRWA clinics.
Figure 5.16 Cost per consultation by yearly household income, type of place consulted and
health insurance coverage
Figure 5.17 Cost for medication by yearly household income, type of place consulted and
health insurance coverage
185
CONTENTS
Figure 5.17, which exhibits the medication costs of the suddenly ill, to a large extent
mirrors figure 5.16. Again, we see that the poorer segments of the population pay
as much as the more well-to-do; that having health insurance makes a difference
on payments; and that the services of the private health sector are far more expen-
sive than the public sector services. About six in ten obtained medication from the
government sector without charge, while nearly nine out of ten visitors to the
UNRWA clinics were not charged for the medication. Thirteen percent and 42
percent of those who consulted the private clinics and private hospitals respective-
ly received medicines and other remedies without charge.
Health Services
Jordan’s health care system experienced substantial capacity expansion in the early
1990s, with an 18 percent increase in both hospital beds and the number of physi-
cians over five years. The growth of the private sector was higher than that of the
public sector. However, the bed to population and physician to population ratios
both declined somewhat. Still, Jordan’s bed capacity remained comparable with the
Middle East and North Africa region and other lower middle-income countries, and
its physician to population ratio was higher than most of these countries. The World
Bank has estimated that Jordan spends about eight percent of its GDP on health
care, which is more than most middle income and even some western industrial-
ised countries. (World Bank 1996).
Availability of Services
To have a variety of health care institutions available within the vicinity of ones
dwelling is obviously a positive feature of the environment in which people live.
We asked whether the households had different forms of health care providers within
five to ten minutes walk from their dwellings or not. The national average for each
of the health institutions was as follows: government hospital, 10 percent; private
hospital, 8 percent; primary health centre, 40 percent; medical doctor, 67 percent;
dentist, 32 percent; and pharmacy, 53 percent. Sixty-seven percent of all interviewed
households had at least one physician, health centre or hospital nearby.
As is revealed by figure 5.18, people living in urban Jordan have better access
to nearly all kinds of services than those living in rural Jordan. The exception is
primary health centres. However, although the primary health care centres may be
somewhat farther away in towns, they might still be easily available.
186
CONTENTS
Figure 5.19 shows how easy access to local health institutions varies along the urban-
rural dimension when type of neighbourhood is also taken into consideration. A
local health institution is here defined as a government or private hospital, a pri-
mary health care centre, an UNRWA clinic, or a medical doctor located within five
to ten minutes walk from the dwelling of the respondent. It is noticeable how well
inhabitants of the Palestinian refugee camps fare in comparison with the residents
of other areas. Eighty-seven percent of the camp refugees have at least one health
centre or medical doctor nearby compared to 71 percent living in urban residential
areas and 56 percent in rural/semiurban areas. A meagre 16 percent of the house-
holds in farm areas have such services within a short walking distance.
The high figure for the camps is probably due to several factors. Firstly, the
result may be understood in relation to the compactness of the camps, that is the
high population density. Secondly, the refugee camps’ good score is due to the pres-
ence of UNRWA clinics. Seventy-eight percent of the camp households have such
a clinic nearby. In addition, according to our measure camp residents have easier
access to physicians than people living elsewhere. Fifty-nine percent of the camp
Figure 5.18 Households with various health services within five to ten minutes walking
distance from dwelling by urban rural status (n = 5,919)
Figure 5.19 Households with at least one health centre, hospital or physician within five to
ten minutes walking distance from dwelling by type of residential area
187
CONTENTS
Figure 5.20 Households with certain health services within five to ten minutes walking distance
from dwelling by geographic region
188
CONTENTS
to health services for the rural 8 percent is most probably worse than for the urban
13 percent.2
Insurance
Another important determinant of health services accessibility is health insurance.
Insurance is here understood to include programs that give the individual free or
highly subsidised access to health services. Although the services provided might
vary considerably between the different programs, being covered by a program must
nevertheless be assumed to give the insured a benefit over the non-insured.
The Jordan Living Conditions Survey found that 53 percent of all individ-
uals in the surveyed households are entitled to at least one health insurance. This is
much lower than the estimated 80 percent given by the World Bank (1996), which
relied on information from the various health programs themselves. Among Jorda-
nian nationals 55 percent reported to form part of a health insurance scheme, while
only 20 percent among the non-Jordanians did the same.
2
A better public transport system in urban areas is reflected in the households’ opinion about
the local public transport. While 77 percent of the urban families express their satisfaction
(‘very satisfied’ or ‘rather satisfied’) with the transport services, 61 percent of the rural fam-
ilies utter the same.
189
CONTENTS
As highlighted by figure 5.21, military health insurance is the most common type
of insurance (25 percent), followed by government insurance (23 percent). UNRWA
and private insurance are the least widespread forms of health insurance (5 percent
each). Approximately 5 percent of the population is covered by two different health
insurances or more.
There is variation in the prevalence of health insurance according to place
of residence. Figure 5.22 shows that Jerash and Ajloun compete very well with the
other governorates. The main reason is that 51 percent of the inhabitants in these
two governorates report to have a military insurance, which is high above the
national average of 24 percent. At the same time the prevalence of government
insurance (19 percent) is just slightly below the national average (22 percent). It
appears that the heaviest populated areas have the poorest coverage. For Amman
the comparatively low level of military insurance at 13 percent is the most evident
cause for its residents faring badly in contrast to residents of most other governo-
rates. That few inhabitants of Zarqa and Mafraq have the right to government
insurance (14 percent against the national average of 22 percent), accounts for the
overall low score of those governorates.
Figure 5.21 Individuals covered by health insurance, by type of insurance (n = 35,593). Some
are covered by more than one health insurance
Figure 5.22 Health insurance coverage by type of insurance and geographic region
190
CONTENTS
Figure 5.23 gives us the status of insurance coverage according to three socio-
economic features. First, it shows that the coverage is better in rural than urban
districts. This is primarily caused by the fact that military insurance is much more
common among families living in the less populated areas.
Second, the figure discloses that the Palestinian refugees are covered by health
insurance to a significantly lesser degree than non-refugees. Again, the main reason
is the uneven distribution of military insurance. While 37 percent of non-refugees
have military insurance, only 5 percent of Palestinian refugees residing in camps
and 8 percent living outside the refugee camps have the same. Non-refugees’ access
to government insurance is also 3 to 4 percentage points higher. We note that
UNRWA-based insurance is quite widespread among the refugee population. This
type of insurance manages to close part of the gap in access to health insurance cre-
ated by the asymmetric distribution of government, and especially military, insur-
ance. Despite this ‘UNRWA-effect’, the insurance coverage nevertheless remains
about 20 percentage points higher in the non-refugee part of the population.
Third, figure 5.23 demonstrates how insurance coverage varies across income
groups. The poorest segment of the population more often lacks this welfare good
compared to persons belonging to higher income groups. Furthermore the figure
displays neatly how private insurance is a function of economic status. While 8
percent of individuals belonging to the highest income group have private insur-
ance, the percentage drops down to 4 and 1 percent for the middle and lowest
income groups respectively.
Figure 5.23 Individuals’ health insurance coverage by type of insurance, and according to
urban-rural status, Palestinian refugee status, and yearly household income
191
CONTENTS
192
CONTENTS
Figure 5.25 Respondents stating that the public health system has developed poorly, by highest
level of education completed; RSI 15 years or older
Figure 5.26 Respondents saying that the public health system has developed excellently, by
level of satisfaction with local health facilities; RSI 15 years or older
193
CONTENTS
Figure 5.27 Households’ opinion about treatment and service given by selected health insti-
tutions following acute illness or injury
194
CONTENTS
195
CONTENTS CHAPTER 4 CHAPTER 6
196
CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 7 CONTENTS
Summary
197
CONTENTS
of the refugees and foreign workers are employed in these sectors, they have been
somewhat more affected by economic difficulties than other Jordanians, who are
more likely to get their income from public employment.
Income mobility is low, and the trend seems to be toward increasing differ-
ences rather than evening out the distribution of income over time. Poor house-
holds more often report that their income has declined during the year prior to the
interview. The poor generally have low expectations for the future, and pessimism
increases with the duration of poverty. Poor households headed by highly educated
persons are more optimistic than those with low education, who rather tend to put
their fate into God’s hands.
All households interviewed in the JLCS were asked about the total annual house-
hold income from all sources during 1995. Respondents were not asked to report
the exact figure, but selected one of 10 categories. These income brackets were
constructed so that the two lower brackets roughly corresponded to the poverty lines
used in Jordan at the time.
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of household annual income and indicates
that the median income is approximately JD 2000. This is substantially lower that
198
CONTENTS
what was found in the 1992 income and expenditure survey conducted in Jordan
(around JD 3000). Given the methodological differences between the two surveys,
it is not surprising that JLCS underestimates income.
The JLCS indicates that 80 percent of all households in Jordan have income
from employment as the main source of income; 63 percent from wage labour and
17 percent have self-employment as main income source. Of the remaining house-
holds, 4 percent live mainly on income from property, while 16 percent have transfer
income as most important source of income. A detailed breakdown of different
income sources, and how the importance of different income sources varies with
the economic resources in the household, is shown in chapter appendix 6.1.
Figure 6.2 shows that there is a large difference in the income level between
those who have income from employment as main income source, and those who
have not. For example, almost 50 percent of the households with transfers as their
199
CONTENTS
main income source have annual incomes below JD 1450, while this applies to only
20 percent of households who mainly live from employment income. Whether the
employment income is generated through wage employment or self-employment
does not seem to have much impact on the level of income. However, this result
could be biased because almost 20 percent of self-employed households did not
report their income.
What does seem to matter, however, is the reliance on a single or multiple
income sources. As figure 6.3 shows, households which depend solely on wage earn-
ings are more likely to have low income than households which combine wages with
other income. (Although it is not reported in the figure, this result holds irrespec-
tive of the number of earners in the household, and hence it is not only a result of
the fact that households with multiple income sources also have more than one
income earner.) Moreover, as figure 6.4 shows, 90 percent of households who live
mainly from employment income have some form of secondary income, but half
of the households which have transfers as main income source have no secondary
source of income.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that the 16 percent of households in Jordan which
depend mainly on income from gifts and transfers are the most economically
vulnerable households. In order to find out more about these households, table 6.1
compares some vital household characteristics of households which have transfers
as main income source and those which have employment income (wages or self
employment) as main income source. The results show that households without
Figure 6.3 Percentage of households with annual income less than 1450 JD, by household
income sources.
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CONTENTS
Table 6.1 Characteristics of households whose main income source is transfer income, versus
households whose main income source is employment. Percent of households
Households where
Households where
Household employment income
transfer income is All Households
characteristics is main income
main income source
source
Household has no
economically active 51 21 10
members
Main provider is
22 3 6
unemployed2
Household head is at
40 12 17
least 60 years old
Household head is a
33 3 10
woman
Total 100 100 100
1
The reason why some households can have employment income but no economically ac-
tive members, is that household income refers to annual income, while labour force partic-
ipation was asked only for the week prior to the interview.
2
In most households, it is the head that is the main provider. However, in cases where the
head is out of the labour force or unemployed, another person in the household is considered
as main provider if he or she is employed. Among female-headed households, one third have
a male main provider, while only 4 percent of male-headed households have a female main
provider.
Figure 6.5 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by sex of household head
In general the group of Palestinian refugees who live in the refugee camps have lower
incomes than both non-refugees and refugee households outside the camps. About
46 percent of households which are living in refugee camps have income below JD
1450 per year, as shown in figure 6.6.
The geographical differences in income distribution are shown in table 6.2.
There are some differences in the income distribution across domains. The highest
occurrence of low-income households is in the domain of Balqa/Madaba, while the
lowest is in the domains of the South and Amman. This result is explainable in light
of the regional differences in labour market findings described in chapter 7. The
domains of the South and (to a lesser extent) Amman have higher rates of labour
force participation, higher proportions of full-time employed individuals, and lower
rates of unemployment, compared to other domains. In addition, the domain of
the South has a higher percentage of households which have multiple income
sources.
202
CONTENTS
Figure 6.6 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by refugee status and na-
tionality
More than 20 percent of households in these two domains have annual incomes
exceeding JD 3600, while this applies to only about 13 percent of households in
the domains of Balqa/Madaba, Jerash/Ajloun and Zarqa/Mafraq. Hence the results
indicate some geographical concentration especially of high-income households in
Jordan.
Table 6.2 further indicates that the richer households are most commonly
found in the urban areas, and a clustering of low income in rural areas. However,
in most domains the households with extreme low income are just as often located
in the urban as in rural areas, which indicates a substantial amount of urban poverty,
the higher cost of living in urban areas taken into account. Rural poverty is prima-
rily found in the domains of Balqa/Madaba and the South.
203
CONTENTS
To this point, the analysis has focused on describing some of the observed varia-
tions in household income, and how high and low income is clustered in certain
social groups and geographical areas. Table 6.3 provides a closer description of the
resources available to the households in the lower and upper extremes of the income
distribution. The first column in the table describes the 10 percent of households
with the lowest income (or the bottom decile): how many are characterised by low
education, lack of land, lack of employment etc. The second column describes the
10 percent of households with the highest income (the top decile), and the last
column gives the average figures for the whole population for comparison.
Table 6.2 Distribution of annual total household income, percent of households in the region
and by urban/rural locality
Number
Less More
JD 901 - JD 1451 JD 1801 JD 2901 of
than JD than Total
1450 - 1800 - 2900 - 3600 observ-
900 JD 3600
ation
Amman All 8 17 15 22 15 22 100 2335
Urban 8 15 15 23 16 23 100 2082
Rural 4 37 17 15 11 16 10 0 253
Zarqa /
All 11 17 22 26 13 12 10 0 1071
Mafraq
Urban 11 16 21 26 13 13 10 0 87 1
Rural 9 22 30 22 10 6 100 200
Balqa /
All 16 20 18 22 10 13 100 546
Madaba
Urban 14 17 18 23 11 17 10 0 354
Rural 21 26 18 20 8 7 100 19 2
Irbid All 11 14 22 24 12 17 100 1022
Urban 11 14 21 23 12 18 10 0 789
Rural 10 15 24 25 12 13 10 0 232
Jarash/
All 16 13 20 25 13 13 100 303
Ajloun
Urban 17 13 19 23 12 15 100 193
Rural 14 13 22 27 14 9 10 0 111
South All 10 14 18 21 14 23 10 0 592
Urban 7 10 17 22 17 28 100 32 2
Rural 13 19 19 21 11 17 100 270
All 10 16 18 23 13 18 10 0 5869
204
CONTENTS
As table 6.3 shows, many low-income households are headed by an old person or
by a woman. Single-person households are also more common among low-income
households, but this is not necessarily a poverty problem as small households need
less income to obtain a certain material welfare level than larger households do. More
alarming, however, are the refugee camp households, which make up 13 percent of
the low-income households, but only 5 percent of all the households in the country.
Camp households also tend to be quite large, which makes the income available to
each household member even smaller.
Table 6.3 shows a clear relationship between income and the resources avail-
able to the household in the form of education, land, health, and labour. The
following section discusses more thoroughly the relationship between household in-
come and the household’s access to these resources. Finally, the interrelation between
some demographic characteristics and economic resources are discussed. Chapter
appendix 6.2 gives a more detailed breakdown of access to resources in the form of
labour and human capital.
205
CONTENTS
206
CONTENTS
Figure 6.7 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by labour market status
of household main provider in household
207
CONTENTS
Table 6.4 Characteristics of the households by employment status of main provider in the
household
Percent of Percent of Percent of
households households households
without with with
Household characteristics
any labour unemploy- employed
force ed main main
members provider provider
Main provider has basic education or less 81 67 56
Main provider is at least 60 years old 49 2 5
Household head is illiterate 44 22 16
Main provider has chronic health problems 43 12 8
Main provider is a woman 43 11 7
Single person household 20 1 3
Household lives in refugee camp 6 8 5
Total 100 100 100
According to table 6.4, the lack of labour resources is common among households
whose main provider is old, has low education, bad health, or is a woman. Also,
single-person households are highly represented among households without any
labour resources.
Households where the main provider is unemployed are different from those
without labour resources in many respects: the main providers are younger and have
more education, fewer are women and very few live alone. Households living in
refugee camps are also over-represented among those with an unemployed main
provider.
The differences between male and female-headed households are large when
it comes to labour resources. Table 6.4 shows that 43 percent of the households
without labour resources are female-headed. To see it from another perspective, 40
percent of female-headed households have no labour resources, and thus are depend-
ent on income from capital, gifts and transfers, while only 6 percent of the male-
headed households lack this important resource. Also, in 8 percent of female-headed
and 7 percent of male-headed households, the main provider is unemployed, leav-
ing 48 percent of female-headed households without any employed member, as
opposed to 13 percent of the male-headed households.
Households headed by non-Jordanians (not including Palestinian refugees
without Jordanian citizenship) are more likely to have labour resources. This group
constitutes about 4 percent of all households, and is mainly composed of Egyptian
immigrants who have entered Jordan specifically for the purpose of obtaining
employment. There are no significant differences in household labour resources
208
CONTENTS
between the Palestinian refugee households and the rest of the Jordanian households,
nor between households in the different regions.
Households which do not have access to labour resources rely heavily on
transfers: 79 percent of these households report transfers to be their most impor-
tant income source. A majority of them have relatives abroad who send money, but
only 9 percent report that they have income from the Government's poor relief fund.
The group of households without labour resources is not entirely homogenous
however, as 14 percent live mainly from rent of land and buildings and other prop-
erty income.
Differences in industry and occupation can also contribute to explain the
variation in income between households, although to a much lesser degree than
unemployment and being outside the labour force. Table 6.3 showed that house-
holds that depend on income from agriculture are over-represented in the bottom
income decile. Figure 6.8 shows that households depending on income from
Figure 6.8 Cummulative distribution of annual household income by industry of main provider
in household
209
CONTENTS
construction also often have low incomes. Households with income from educa-
tion and health services and other private services have incomes above average, while
households with income from public administration employment have incomes
close to the average among households with employed members. The transport and
manufacturing industries are not shown in the figure, but have similar distributions
to trade and public administration.
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CONTENTS
As table 6.3 and figure 6.9 demonstrate, human capital is the main determinant of
household income. In fact, the majority of households in the bottom decile have a
household head who can not read and write, although only 18 percent of the house-
hold heads in Jordan are illiterate. In addition, 93 percent of the bottom decile of
household heads have no more than basic education. At the other end of the income
distribution, the majority of the households in the top decile are headed by a per-
son with higher education, while only 8 percent of the high-income household heads
have no education.
As can be seen from figure 6.9, the percentage of the households with annual
incomes of more than JD 2900 increases from 17 percent for households where the
head has no education to 54 percent for households where the head has higher
education. While households headed by a person with a Bachelor’s or higher degree
are almost completely absent from the lowest income brackets, close to one-half of
211
CONTENTS
the households where the head has never attended school have yearly incomes below
JD 1450. Surprisingly, a large share of the households headed by persons with
vocational secondary education have low incomes (33 percent), compared to only
13 percent for those with academic secondary. This can partly be explained by the
labour market analysis in chapter 7, indicating that vocational secondary graduates
more commonly have lower status jobs. However, it is surprising that households
headed by vocational secondary graduates have lower average incomes than house-
holds where the head has not even completed basic school. Finally, 35 percent of
the households with a household head who have a Master or Ph.D. have annual
incomes above JD 9600. Hence, except for vocational secondary, the results indi-
cate the existence of a strong positive correlation between household income and
the education level of the household head.
Households where the main provider is in bad health are also concentrated
at the lowest part of the income distribution. One in three households in the bot-
tom decile have a main provider with chronic health problems, as opposed to only
7 percent of the high-income households.
evident that low income is more rare when the head is a middle-aged man (19 per-
cent) than a middle-aged woman (36 percent).
Combining education and gender produces a similar effect. Education
contributes to higher household income, and the fact that female heads have less
education (regardless of age) compounds the difference. Although female heads
without any education have far less income than male heads without education, the
Table 6.5 The relationship between sex and age, health, education and household size
Percent of male- Percent of female-
headed households headed households
Age Less than 30 years 18 8
30 - 59 years 67 59
60 years and above 15 34
Education Not completed basic 14 51
Basic 50 34
Secondary 14 7
Higher 22 8
Chronic disease 16 34
Single person household 3 18
Total 100 100
Figure 6.10 Percent of households with annual income less than JD 1450, by sex, age and
education of household head
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CONTENTS
Determinants of Poverty
In the previous sections we have described the income distribution along several
dimensions, and also tried to find explanations for the observed variations in house-
hold income. However, we have tried to avoid touching upon the issue of measuring
poverty, which is more complex than simply to estimate the number of household
or persons below a certain income level.
There are many attempts to define poverty, ranging from simple, absolute
measures such as not being able to buy food to cover a minimum nutritional stand-
ard, to more complex and relative definitions such as not being able to function in
the society. While household income can be used for estimating poverty by most
definitions, it is evident that the total income of a household is not the only deter-
minant of poverty. Rather, poverty is determined by the imbalance between availa-
ble income and the expenditure that is necessary for obtaining a certain material
level of living. Even if we would be able to define such an acceptable level (or poverty
line), the required expenditures for obtaining a certain living standard will vary
between households, depending on differences in the cost of living in different parts
of the country and the size and composition of the household.
In the JLCS it has proven to be a useful tool to ask the households directly
for their own evaluation of their economic situation. Based on this, a subjective
poverty measure is developed. The classification as poor follows if the household
214
CONTENTS
rejects all the following statements: 1) “we feel we are among the well-off in Jordan”,
2) “we are not rich but manage to live well”, and 3) “we are neither rich nor poor”.
It is interesting to note that only 33 percent of the households with income
below JD 1450 per year consider themselves to be poor. In addition, 11 percent of
households with medium (JD 1450 to 2900) income and 3 percent of the high-
income households (above JD 2900) consider themselves as poor. Figure 6.11
illustrates that the main shortcoming of using total household income as a meas-
ure of poverty is that household size is not taken into account. While only 20 percent
of single-person households with annual income below JD 1450 think of themselves
as poor, 50 percent of the large low-income households do so. In the absence of a
per capita income measure, this is an argument for using the subjective poverty
assessment as a poverty indicator.
In all, 14 percent of the households consider themselves as poor (23 percent
of female-headed and 13 percent of male-headed households). This is almost the
same as the poverty rate estimated by the World Bank (15 percent) after assessing a
range of different poverty definitions on data from 1992 (World Bank 1994). More
recent figures from ESCWA indicate that as much as 23 percent of the Jordanian
population was poor in 1995 (ESCWA 1996). This poverty measure includes a wider
range of indicators than just income, such as health, nutritional status and school
enrolment. The JLCS indicates that poverty has at least not been reduced from 1992
to 1996, despite positive per capita growth.
The analysis above has shown that the factors associated with income are
interrelated. Hence, it is not clear whether the high incidence of poverty among
female-headed households is caused by the general low education level among female
215
CONTENTS
heads, (other) factors that affect their low labour force participation rate, or by simply
the fact that they are female-headed (i.e. they lack a male provider). To further
investigate the determinants of poverty in Jordan, a more sophisticated statistical
model is needed to isolate the effect of the single household characteristics on the
probability of living in poverty.
A logistic regression model is used for estimating the effects of selected house-
hold characteristics on the probability of being poor (subjectively felt). (For more
information about logistic regression, see appendix 2 at the end of the book). Two
models are estimated. The first regression is applied to all households, while the
second is restricted to households in which at least one member is employed. The
second regression thus enables us to measure the effects of employment status on
poverty. The results of the two models are shown in chapter appendix 6.3.
The models find significant relationships between poverty and most of the
explanatory variables, and the predicted probability of being poor shows systemat-
ically higher values for those who feel poor than for those who do not. Regretfully,
the differences in the predicted probabilities between the two groups are not very
large, and the cases are clustered around the range of 10-30 percent probability.
The two models show that the single most important determinant of pov-
erty is education. The risk of being poor is 8 times as high for households where
the head has no education than for households where the head has more than sec-
ondary education. This is irrespective of whether the main provider in the house-
hold is employed or not. When we only look at households that have at least one
employed member, and control for industry and occupation of the main provider,
the risk of being poor is still 5 times higher for households with uneducated heads
compared to households where the heads have higher education. The households
whose head has primary education have almost 3 times as high a risk of being poor,
while those with secondary education have 2.5 times the risk of households with
highly educated household heads.
It has been shown a high incidence of both low income and high subjectively
felt poverty among female-headed households. In analysing the regression results
for all households, female headedness per se has no significant impact on the prob-
ability of being poor. However, when looking at only households with at least one
employed member, having a female head is a significant determinant and in fact
doubles the risk of being poor. Thus, it appears that labour market attachment is
much more important than sex of the head of household, and that poverty is equally
common among households without any employed members, regardless of the sex
of the head of household. However, among those households which have labour
resources, female-headed households are worse off, regardless of education, number
of earners, industry and occupation. This may be caused by discrimination of women
in the labour market or - if it is not the head who is working but her sons - by lower
216
CONTENTS
217
CONTENTS
households to acquire land, or that having access to arable land yields higher income
due to income-generating activities. In any case, the prevalence of poverty among
those who have a garden plot or who farm their own land is significantly lower than
among other households.
Economic Mobility
The households interviewed in the JLCS were asked whether the household in 1995
had more, the same, or less income than in 1994. More than one-half of the house-
holds in Jordan experienced no change in their income during the period 1994 to
1995. However, while 24 percent said that their income had increased, 22 percent
said that it decreased during the same period.
Figure 6.12 shows that the economic mobility is very low and that the trend
is toward more polarisation: it is the poor who are getting poorer while the rich get
richer. These results suggest that the poverty situation is worsening over time. It
seems that the well off households are more likely to experience increases in income,
while the poor households are over-represented among households that have expe-
rienced income stagnation or decrease. This result is the same whether poverty is
measured through annual income or through self-assessment.
Female-headed households are not over-represented among those who have had their
income reduced, but fewer of them have experienced growth in income than house-
holds headed by men. Gulf returnees and Palestinian refugees are over-represented
among those who have experienced decreased income. This is probably because
218
CONTENTS
Figure 6.13 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995, by employment
industry of main provider
Figure 6.14 Reported change in household income from 1994 to 1995, by main household's
income source and domain
refugee households are more dependent on transfer income (camp refugees), remit-
tances from abroad (all refugees), and self-employment (refugees outside camp), and
they often work with construction and trade. These economic sources seem to have
been most severely affected by the economic changes that followed the Arab Gulf
crises of 1990-91, whereas public sector employees have experienced increased in-
come more often than others.
Moreover, income change is not the same for all domains. Households in
Amman more often report reduced income than other households, most likely
219
CONTENTS
Figure 6.15 Expectations for the future among the poor, by education of head of household
because of the importance of the trade sector in this region. Increased income is
most common in Irbid, Jerash/Ajloun and the South, reported by approximately
30 percent of the households.
As mentioned, poor households are over-represented among those who have
had their income reduced, and more than two thirds of the poor households report
that the hardship has lasted for more than five years. Moreover, the poor have little
hope for the future; around 80 percent of them believe that their economic situation
will not improve in the coming few years (of which 60 percent say that the future
is up to God). As expected, the pessimism is stronger among those who have been
poor for a long time. Optimism seems to increase with the education of the house-
hold head.
Household Wealth
Figure 6.16 reveals that more than 60 percent of households in Jordan own the house
they live in. More than 90 percent of the households own a TV set, and more than
80 percent own a refrigerator, radio and cassette player. Only one in three house-
holds own ordinary telephone sets. Luxury goods like video players are owned only
by about 22 percent of the population. Four percent have personal computers,
mainly high-income households. One quarter of the households own a car. As
expected, the ownership of capital is correlated with income. Figure 6.16 shows the
ownership of selected durable goods broken down by household income.
Only 12 percent of the female-headed households own a car, compared to
27 percent of the households headed by men. This is probably a result of both the
weaker purchasing power of female-headed households and the fact that few
Jordanian women drive cars. Other durable goods are just as common in female-
220
CONTENTS
221
CONTENTS
among the Gulf returnees than in any other group, but it is not known whether these
savings were brought from the Gulf, or if the households continued to accumulate
capital after returning to Jordan.
Figure 6.17 Ownership of capital and durable goods by age of household head
222
CONTENTS
Appendix 6.1
Wage in kind 18 1 25 17 20 18
Wages as main income source 63 3 56 51 73 64
Self
employment Regular self-employment income 24 3 40 25 21 29
income
Income from home production for
3 2 9 6 1 2
sale
Self employment as main income source 17 4 22 16 15 21
Transfer
Pension and social security 15 24 27 14 9 14
income
Coupons from Ministry of Supply 80 77 83 81 71 72
Monetary gifts 22 15 24 14 27 27
Zakhat 1 3 1 2 0
Scholarship 1 1 2 1 1 1
Transfer from charitable
0 1 0 1 0
organizations
UNRWA transfer 0 1 0 1 0 0
Other transfer 0 1 0 0 0 0
Transfer income as main income source 16 79 18 29 9 9
Property Income from rent of land or
9 14 19 8 9 15
income buildings
Interest profits 1 2 1 0 1 3
223
CONTENTS
Appendix 6.2
All 90 19 15 29 19 34 21 100
Female 60 17 14 28 54 15 17 100
Zarqa and
90 15 10 23 20 28 18 100
Mafraq
Balqa and
92 23 18 30 29 29 18 100
Madaba
Irbid 88 25 23 35 19 31 16 100
Jarash and
88 30 29 39 23 25 11 100
Ajloun
South 91 28 27 36 28 29 22 100
224
CONTENTS
All households
Number of selected cases: 5919
Number rejected because of missing data: 18
Number of cases included in the analysis: 5901
The Cut Value is .20
Predicted
Observed 0 1
0 4430 978 81.91%
1 428 446 51.04%
Overall 77.62%
225
CONTENTS CHAPTER 5 CHAPTER 7
226
CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 8 CONTENTS
Summary
The purpose of this chapter is primarily to analyse the structure of employment and
unemployment in Jordan, but also to explain why a majority of the adults in Jordan
are not economically active.
The labour force in Jordan is small compared to other countries. This is due
to a relatively large share of the population being under working age, and because
of the low labour force participation among women as most of them stop working
when they get married. Higher education is the most important factor in keeping
women in the labour force, but attitudes towards women and social restrictions also
influence female economic activity. For men, health problems are the most impor-
tant determinant of non-participation in the labour force.
Women more often have part-time jobs. Unemployment is also higher among
women than among men, especially among women with higher education. Spells
of unemployment lasts longer for women than for men, and the majority of unem-
ployed women have never worked. While unemployment is widespread among the
young, and in particular among Palestinian camp refugees, part-time work is com-
mon among the elderly.
The public sector is the largest employer in Jordan, and employs the major-
ity of persons with higher education, except for the Palestinian refugees. Although
low-skill occupations are predominantly a sign of low education, they also include
some 8 percent of men with higher education, implying excess supply of persons
with higher education. Among foreign workers in Jordan, men predominantly work
in the construction sector, while women are cleaners and housemaids. Palestinian
refugees work mainly in trade and other commercial services.
Workers in the construction sector are highly exposed to physical hazards at
work, and they seldom have access to protective equipment. Employees in the service
sector are least exposed. Less than 15 percent of the employed population in Jordan
receive updated, job relevant training paid by the employer. Most of those who
receive training work in the public sector. However, the high degree of job relevance
227
CONTENTS
among those who have ever received training indicates that there is a potential for
increasing skills by using this kind of training.
The JLCS uses a modified version of the framework for analysing economic activity
developed by the International Labour Office (Hussmanns et al. 1990). The frame-
work makes it possible to classify the working age population (all persons 15 years
and above) on the basis of each person’s activities during a particular week, the so-
called “reference period”. All persons are classified into three mutually exclusive
categories: the employed, the unemployed, and persons outside the labour force.
An employed person is defined as an individual who worked at least one hour
in the reference week or who was temporarily absent from work during that week.
Persons working 35 hours or more during the reference week are defined as full-
time workers, while those working less are part-time workers. An unemployed person
is an individual who did not work even one hour in the designated week, but who
was actively seeking work. The sum of employed and unemployed individuals makes
up the current economically active population or the labour force.
Hence, the labour force does not include persons who are not working or
did not actively look for a job during the reference week, as these persons are con-
sidered to be economically inactive. This does not mean that the inactive popula-
tion does not contribute to the economy of a nation, as many of them take care of
important reproduction activities such as child rearing and domestic work. Also,
many of them may want to work, but do not actively seek jobs because they have
lost hope of finding work. Others might refuse to work under the prevailing wage
or other working conditions that are offered them.
228
CONTENTS
for 1996 is 25 percent. However, this is still among the lowest in the Arab world,
and far below the average for developing countries. The most recent Human
Development Report (UNDP 1997) compares 1990 labour force figures for selected
countries. It shows that the Jordanian labour force was 27 percent of the total pop-
ulation in 1990, compared to 31 percent in Lebanon, 34 in Saudi Arabia and 28
in Syria. Industrial countries had an average of 49 percent, while the average for
developing countries was 47 percent.
Table 7.1 The labour force of Jordan. Number of weighted observations in the survey, and
percent of the total population
Below
Working age population = 21421 (57.5 %) working
age
Not in
Persons in the labour force = 9459 (25.4 %) labour
force
Unemploy-
Employed persons = 7843 (21.1 %)
ed
Part Hours Temporarily
Full Time
Time unknown Absent
(34
(35 hours or
hours or
more)
less)
As in other Arab countries, the difference between men and women concerning
economic activity is immense. As figure 7.1 shows, a large majority of the female
population 15 years and above are outside the labour force, whereas this holds for
only a small fraction of the male population.
The labour force participation rate is defined as the share of the working age
population who are economically active. It is computed as the number of labour
force members as a percentage of all persons 15 years and above. The overall labour
force participation in Jordan is 44 percent. This is mainly due to the very low female
participation, which is only 15 percent, in contrast to the 72 percent of economi-
cally active men. As a result, only 17 percent of the economically active persons in
Jordan are women. The female share of the labour force was reported to rise from
13 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 1990 (UNDP 1997), and thus seems to have
stagnated during this decade. This is extremely low compared to other countries.
In the Arab world we find lower rates in some of the oil-producing countries only.
229
CONTENTS
A study by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS) found that the labour force
participation rate was 47 percent in 1994: 77 percent for men and 15 percent for
women (Kharabshieh 1996). This shows that the rate of participation has not
changed for females during the period 1994-1996, although the JLCS gives a 5
percent lower rate for men. This can partly be explained by differences in the defi-
nitions of unemployment, where DoS uses a wider definition.
230
CONTENTS
As figure 7.2 shows, education mainly has three implications for labour force par-
ticipation. First, entry into the labour market naturally starts later for people with
more education. Secondly, people with higher education will retire later. Thirdly,
education has much more impact on economic activity for women than for men.
231
CONTENTS
The JLCS also reveals that while the choice of academic versus vocational secondary
does not affect men's labour force participation, women's participation is higher
among those who have vocational secondary education.
Figure 7.4 indicates that marriage has less impact on economic activity
among well-educated women than among women with low education. Marriage
reduces the labour force participation rate by about one-half for women with
Figure 7.3 Labour force participation by sex, age and marital status
Figure 7.4 Labour force participation rates among women by age, education and marital status
232
CONTENTS
secondary or higher education, but participation drops to near zero for low-educated
women when they marry.
Geographical variation in labour force participation is modest, although
larger for women than for men. As shown in table 7.2, the highest rate of econom-
ically active persons is found in the South, with 76 percent for men and 20 percent
for women. On the bottom is Irbid with 70 percent for men and 12 percent for
women.
Labour force participation does not vary significantly with Palestinian refugee
status, although camp refugees tend to have slightly lower rates and other refugees
and displaced slightly higher rates than non-refugees. As expected, figure 7.5 shows
that immigrants who are not Palestinian refugees have much higher rates than any
Table 7.2 Gender- and domain specific labour force participation rates (percent of population
15 years and above)
Domain Men Women All
Amman 71 15 44
Zarqa/Mafraq 74 14 45
Balqa/Madaba 73 20 47
Irbid 70 12 41
Jarash/Ajloun 70 14 42
South 76 20 48
Total 72 15 44
Figure 7.5 Labour force participation by nationality and refugee status. Percent of persons
15 years of age and above
233
CONTENTS
other group, as they are usually given residence permits in Jordan only on the con-
dition that their labour resources are needed.
Whether a person desires to be employed or not, and whether the person
succeeds in finding a job, is affected by many factors. Moreover, these factors are
often intertwined. To isolate the effect of each factor on economic activity, a more
thorough analysis of labour force participation is required.
Logistic regression analysis can be used to explain the probability of partic-
ipating in the labour force based on a set of variables relating to the individual. The
variables describe characteristics of the individual such as age, sex of household head,
marital status, and health problems (chronic disease), but they can also reflect other
social and economic characteristics such as geographical area, refugee status, house-
hold income, education, training, and urban-rural location.
The analysis, which is documented in appendix 7.1, is done separately for
ever-married women, never married women, and men, as these three groups are
assumed to have different determinants of labour force participation. Persons who
are currently enrolled in school or have an acute illness are not included in the
analysis.
Our analysis confirms that the determinants of male labour force participa-
tion are different from those of females. Although age and education are common
significant factors for participation in all groups, the relative importance of education
is much higher for women than for men. Highly educated women have more than
10 times the probability of being in the labour force than women with basic edu-
cation or less1. For men, the difference in probability between these two education
groups is only 50 percent. Also, while vocational training significantly increases the
probability of being economically active for women, it does not for men.
Having a chronic health problem is the single most important factor for male
economic inactivity, and having a chronic disease reduces the probability of partic-
ipating in the labour force to one-tenth the probability of a fit person. While chronic
health problems do not seem to affect the economic activity of ever-married wom-
en, they have a significant effect on never married women, although the effect is
lower than for men.
In every household, a randomly selected adult was asked whether he or she
was in favour of women working outside the home. The response indicates that the
attitude of the household is an important determinant of female participation. The
probability of labour force participation is twice as high for all women, married or
not, in households where the respondent claims to support the idea of women
working. Of course, the relationship could also go the other way, if opinions are
affected by whether the females in the household are working or not.
1
Relative probabilities are shown as risk ratios (termed Exp B) in the right-hand column in
Appendix 7.1. See Appendix 3, “Statistical methods” for more explanation of logistic regression.
234
CONTENTS
Figure 7.7 Reasons for not working. Percent of women 15 years of age and above who are
outside the labour force, by their main activity
235
CONTENTS
Employment
The employment rate is defined as the percentage of employed persons (including
those who are temporarily absent from their jobs) relative to the size of the labour
force. The remaining share of the labour force is defined as the unemployment rate.
Hence, the unemployment rate is the percentage of persons in the labour force who
are not employed, but who are actively looking for work.
236
CONTENTS
Figure 7.8 shows the activity status distribution for all economically active persons.
The general employment rate is 83 percent, but it is higher for men (85 percent)
than for women (73 percent). This gives a general unemployment rate of 17 percent.
15 percent for men and 27 percent for women. Also, women more often have part-
time jobs. As a result of both the low labour force participation rate and the high
unemployment rate among women, only 15 percent of all employed persons in
Jordan are women. In addition, only 40 percent of the employed women have full-
time jobs.
The World Bank (1994) estimated the unemployment rates in 1991 to be
35 percent for women and 13 percent for men. Although there most likely are dif-
ferences in methodology between the two surveys, this might imply that female
unemployment has declined, while male unemployment has risen slightly during
the period from 1991 to 1996. However, since the number of unemployed men is
much higher than that of women, the overall unemployment rate has risen during
the period. Table 7.3 shows changes in the unemployment rate over the period from
1991 to 1996, indicating that the situation improved gradually from 1992, but that
the trend was reversed for male unemployment in 1996.
As noted above, labour force participation is highly dependent on marital
status. As figure 7.9 shows, this is also the case for the employment pattern, as
unemployment is more widespread among the never married population, irrespec-
tive of gender. The highest rate of full-time employment is found among married
Figure 7.8 Gender-specific employment rates. Percent of persons in the labour force
Table 7.3 Gender specific unemployment rates in Jordan, 1991-1996. In percent of the labour
force
Year Male Female All
1991 15 35 17
1993 16 37 19
1994 13 30 16
1995 13 29 15
1996 15 27 17
Source: 1991-1995: Kharabshieh et al. (1996); 1996: JLCS
237
CONTENTS
Figure 7.9 Employment and unemployment by marital status. Percent of persons in the
labour force
men (65 percent), while the lowest is found among married women (39 percent).
Married women have more part-time employment than other women. Although
not reported in the figure, the incidence of part-time employment and temporarily
absence is much higher among married women with small children. Widows have
the highest employment rate of all women.
Under-Utilisation of Labour
Under-utilisation of labour resources is a loss for society as a whole since it means
that productive resources are not fully utilised. It is also a problem for the individ-
ual, since it in most cases is accompanied by a loss of earnings. It is widely argued
that unemployment rates do not accurately measure the extent to which labour
resources are under-utilised. Table 7.4 gives a schematic review of the different types
of labour under-utilisation. First, many employed persons in the labour force are
in reality under-employed, since they are not able to work as long hours as they wish,
or because they are not in a job where their skills are fully utilised, implying a loss
in productivity. The former might be labelled as ‘visible under-employed’, while the
latter is ‘invisible under-employed’. Second, many persons outside the labour force
can be considered 'discouraged workers', meaning that although they wish to work,
Table 7.4 Types of labour under-utilisation
Unemployment Underemployment
Visible Invisible Visible Invisible
Not employed, given
Employed but low
Not employed and up seeking Employed and seeking
productivity
actively seeking work (discouraged additional work
(difficult to measure)
workers)
Source: Øvensen, (1994:29)
238
CONTENTS
they have simply given up trying to find work, and will therefore not be visible in
the unemployment statistics.
Unfortunately, the JLCS does not provide us with information about
employed persons who are seeking additional work. However, other information
included in the survey can be used as indicators of hidden unemployment. In this
section, we will concentrate on part-time work and unemployment. Discouraged
workers were examined in the previous section, and some aspects of invisible
underemployment in the form of under-utilisation of skills are analysed.
Especially among men who are not enrolled in school, part time employ-
ment can be assumed to be involuntarily, and can thus be used as an indicator of
hidden unemployment. Figure 7.10 shows the proportion of the labour force who
is unemployed or working part time.
Although the unemployment rate does not show significant geographical
variation, the regional pattern indicates substantial hidden unemployment in Irbid
and Jerash/Ajloun, due to the high incidence of men working part time. Female un-
employment is much higher, reaching its peak in Zarqa/Mafraq at a rate of 38
percent, and Balqa/Madaba at 34 percent, while the lowest rates are found in the
South and Amman (22 and 23 percent respectively).
The under-utilisation of the labour force is more common among Palestin-
ian refugees, and especially refugees who live in the camps, where 29 percent of the
total labour force are unemployed. The highest rates of male unemployment are
found among camp refugees (27 percent), other refugees and displaced (16 percent)
and Gulf returnees (22 percent). In contrast, male unemployment for the non-ref-
ugee group was lower at 13 percent. This is, however, mainly an effect of the male
immigrants who rarely are unemployed. Unemployment among male non-refugees
who are Jordanian citizens is only insignificantly lower than for the refugees who
live outside the camps.
The age pattern shows that unemployment is more common among the
young. In fact, about 60 percent of all unemployed people are less than 25 years
old. However, part time work increases with age, and while part time work among
older men may be voluntarily, it might also indicate hidden unemployment.
Although persons who have never attended school have a much lower
unemployment rate than persons with some education, they have a higher rate of
part-time work, and 40 percent of them work in the agricultural sector. According
to the findings in chapter 6, persons without any schooling are also among the poor-
est. This may support the hypothesis that they simply cannot afford to be unem-
ployed, and hence take part time jobs in the absence of something better. However,
it is also likely that age plays a major role here, as it is predominantly the old who
have never been to school.
239
CONTENTS
Figure 7.10 Unemployment and part time employment by selected individual characteristics.
Percent of persons in the labour force
Unemployment among men with higher education is low. However, it is very high
among women with higher education, and hence the total unemployment rate for
highly educated persons is slightly above the total average.
240
CONTENTS
The unemployment rate for people with vocational secondary education is 2 per-
centage points higher than for those with academic secondary. Considering the high
cost of vocational training relative to academic secondary, other methods for
acquiring practical skills that are more efficient and less expensive could be explored.
For many occupations, a shift to flexible short-term training could be used to fill
the gap between the existing skills and the skills demanded.
On the other hand, the very high rates of unemployment among women with
higher education (31 percent) suggests that the national economy has not been able
to employ all the female graduates of the many public and private universities and
community colleges. In general, the results do not support the existence of strong
correlation between unemployment and educational level, as the relationship is
reversed for men: 12 percent of highly educated men are unemployed.
The high unemployment rate among well-educated women may thus be
caused by discrimination against women in the labour market for highly educated
labour. It might also be a result of the wages in the sectors available to women
Figure 7.11 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed men by education
Figure 7.12 Reasons for being unemployed. Percent of unemployed women by education
241
CONTENTS
(primarily education services), combined with the better economic resources in the
households of these women, that discourages them from being employed.
As shown in figures 7.11 and 7.12, the differences in the reasons for being
unemployed given by women and men with higher education implies that both of
the explanations may be correct. Women more often than men give the lack of jobs
as a reason for being unemployed, and they more commonly reply that they are
waiting for a job in the public sector.
The most common reason for unemployment given by the respondents is
simply the lack of jobs in the area (65 percent), but this reason seems to lose
importance with increasing education. Structural unemployment due to incompat-
ibility of skills is more common among men with higher education and women with-
out any education. While the problem for the former is probably that the jobs offered
will not let them utilise their skills, the problem for the latter is rather that they do
not have the skills required for the available jobs.
Frictional unemployment in the form of unemployed individuals who are
waiting for a new job to start, accounts for 12 percent of total unemployment. As
many of the unemployed women are waiting for a job in the public sector, this type
of unemployment is more common among women (21 percent of all unemployed)
than men (9 percent).
Voluntary Unemployment
Only 5 percent of the unemployed individuals refuse to take available jobs because
of low pay and/or bad working conditions, so-called voluntary unemployment. This
is more common among women with academic secondary education than in any
other group.
Duration of Unemployment
Most of the unemployment in Jordan (75 percent) lasts for two years or less. How-
ever, long-term unemployment seems to increase with age, and women are more
exposed than men. In fact, more than 50 percent of unemployed women above the
age of 25 have been unemployed for more than 2 years, and most of them have never
worked. In the group of unemployed men between 20 and 24 years old, 20 percent
have been unemployed for more than 2 years and 47 percent have never worked.
For women of the same age, only 16 percent have been unemployed for more than
2 years, but 77 percent have never worked.
Long-term unemployment and no working experience is also more common
among persons with higher education, irrespective of sex. While unemployment is
more widespread among Palestinian refugees, long-term unemployment is more
242
CONTENTS
often found among the unemployed non-refugees, who also have less work experi-
ence than refugees.
Employed persons are divided into four groups based on their main job: paid
employees, employers who employ non-family members, self-employed who do not
employ any non-family members, and unpaid workers in family business. While
chapter 6 showed that wage employment is the main income source for 63 percent
of the households, wage employment covers as much as 77 percent of all employed
persons. Self-employment is the main income source of 17 percent of the house-
holds, and covers 22 percent of the employed, if employers and unpaid family
workers are included.
Not surprisingly, women are under-represented among employers, and they
are over-represented in the group of unpaid workers in family enterprises. There are
no other major differences between men and women in any other employment
category. Figure 7.13 shows employment status by sex and education. It is evident
that self-employment is correlated with low education. Also, being an unpaid family
worker is quite common for women with little or no education.
Figure 7.13 Employment status. Percent of employed persons by education and sex
243
CONTENTS
Although the industry distribution is different for men and women, figures 7.14
to 7.17 indicate that education and nationality/refugee status is just as important
as gender. Agriculture is the major employer of both men and women without any
schooling. Education and health services are the dominant employers of persons
with higher education, although to a much larger extent among women than among
men. Public administration employment is more common among persons with
secondary education, in particular academic secondary. In general, education seems
to be a much more important determinant of employment sector for women than
for men.
244
CONTENTS
Palestinian refugee status and nationality also play important roles in explaining the
distribution of employment by industries. Among male, non-refugee Jordanians the
most important sector is public administration, and it accounts for around 35
percent of the employed. Male camp refugees are over-represented in education and
health services, which is due to employment by UNRWA. Non-jordanian male
employees more often work in agriculture or construction. For women, refugees and
non-refugees tend to have quite similar distributions by industry, although Pales-
tinian refugees more commonly work in manufacturing, and non-refugee Jordani-
ans more often work in agriculture. For female non-Jordanian workers, however,
the vast majority (80 percent) work in so-called other services, which include hotel
and restaurant services, and private household servants.
With regard to regional variation, the most important industries are as fol-
lows: trade and manufacturing for Amman, public administration and manufac-
turing for Zarqa/Mafraq, public administration as well as education and health for
both Irbid and Jerash/Ajloun, public administration and agriculture for the South.
The highest percentage of public employment is found in the Jerash/Ajloun (35
percent) and Irbid (29 percent), and the lowest is found in Amman (10 percent).
Employment in agriculture is more prevalent in Balqa/Madaba and the South.
Table 7.6 depicts the occupational distribution of employed persons. Almost
40 percent of the employed persons in Jordan are skilled workers and drivers, and
only 17 percent work in the elementary (unskilled) occupations. According to table
7.7, around 80 percent of the skilled workers are employed in agriculture, manu-
facturing and construction, while drivers of course primarily work in the transport
sector. However, as many as 16 percent of the drivers work in public administra-
tion, and 50 percent of all persons in elementary occupations work in public
Figure 7.14 Industry structure for men. Percent of employed men by education
245
CONTENTS
Figure 7.15 Industry structure for women. Percent of employed women by education
administration as porters, cleaners and the like. Twenty-two percent of all employed,
but 43 percent of employed women, work as professionals, predominantly in
education and health services. Another 10 percent work as clerks in public admin-
istration and other services.
As expected, figures 7.18 and 7.19 show that the majority of persons with
higher education work as professionals, while those with basic or no education work
as skilled workers or in elementary occupations. It is interesting to note that persons
without any formal education most frequently work as skilled workers, and hence
have acquired skills through work rather than through education. However, as much
as 8 percent of employed men with higher education work in elementary occupa-
tions (and 20 percent of other men). This under-utilisation of labour indicates that
246
CONTENTS
247
CONTENTS
too many persons acquire formal skills that are not in demand. In particular, it is
disappointing that almost 1 out of 5 employed men who have graduated from
vocational secondary do not utilise their education, but rather work as unskilled
workers. Vocational secondary is supposed to be more targeted than academic
secondary, and is also substantially more expensive. For women, however, the share
of employed, educated persons who work in elementary occupations is lower, indi-
cating that females acquire formal skills that are more in line with what is needed
from the employers point of view, or that they do not accept jobs incompatible with
their skills or social status.
Figure 7.18 Occupational structure for men. Percent of employed men by education
Figure 7.19 Occupational structure for women. Percent of employed women by education
248
CONTENTS
Figure 7.20 Occupational structure for men, by refugee status and nationality
Figure 7.21 Occupational structure for women, by refugee status and nationality
249
CONTENTS
Work Environment
The average actual working hours for all employed individuals in Jordan is 47 hours
per week, and the majority of the employed (63 percent) are doing regular day-shift
work. While employed women work on the average 39 hours per week, employed
men work 48 hours. Figure 7.22 shows the distribution of weekly working hours
for employed men and women. Almost 60 percent of the women work less than 40
hours per week, and 50 percent work between 20 and 40 hours. Among men, 65
percent work more than 40 hours, and almost 50 percent work between 40 and 60
hours per week.
Figure 7.22 Distribution of actual weekly working hours in all jobs. Percent of employed
persons
As table 7.8 shows, work hours vary significantly with industry and employment
status. Persons working in the trade and transport sectors have the longest working
hours, and work on average approximately 14 hours more per week than persons
working in public administration, and education and health services. Employers,
and to a certain extent the self-employed, work longer hours than others, while
employees have the shortest hours. Irregular working hours are also more common
among employers and the self-employed, especially in the transport industry.
Exposure to physical hazards is another important dimension of working
conditions. Heavy lifting and uncomfortable working positions increase the risk of
back injuries and prolonged illness. Heavy lifting is reported mainly in the construc-
tion sector. Of the employed men, 23 percent undertake activities that often involves
heavy lifting, and about 44 percent do heavy lifting sometimes. In contrast, only 4
percent of women engage in work that often requires heavy lifting.
In addition, 67 percent of working men often or sometimes work in
uncomfortable positions. The corresponding percentage is slightly lower for work-
ing women at 64 percent. Jobs requiring repetitive movements are common in all
industries but are not specific to any sex: about 73 percent of working individuals
250
CONTENTS
Table 7.8 Average weekly work hours by industry and employment status in main job
Unpaid
Paid worker in
Industry Employer Self-employed All
employee family
business
Agriculture 56 48 47 43 50
Manufacturing 52 52 40 44 51
Construction 46 54 43 36 46
Trade 55 57 53 53 54
Transport 53 46 52 46 52
Public administration 39 . . . 39
Education/health 37 50 48 . 38
Other services 49 53 48 63 49
Total 46 53 49 47 47
do monotonous work either often or sometimes. Thirty-eight percent men are often
exposed to dirt, grease, paint etc. in their work, compared to only 19 percent for
women. Dirty work environments are more common in construction and agriculture.
Regular exposure to air pollution is greater for men (47 percent) than women
(32 percent). Twenty-three percent of men have working areas characterised by too
much dampness or water, compared to only 13 percent of women. Forty percent
men report that they work in conditions of uncomfortable heat or cold, and the
figure for women is roughly 25 percent. Twenty-nine percent of men and 18 per-
cent of women complain about dry air at their workplaces. Forty-one percent of
the working men have a noisy work environment, and 33 percent of women.
An index has been constructed on the basis of some physical hazards found
in the work environment in order to measure the clustering of bad working condi-
tions in different industries. The index is presented in figure 7.24, and is based on
the presence of the following hazards: irregular work hours including shift work,
regular exposure to air pollution, noise, exposure to chemically hazardous materi-
als, explosives or dangerous machines without protection, working high above the
ground without protection, heavy lifting, uncomfortable work position, monoto-
nous movements and exposure to dirt.
The results clearly indicate that the construction sector has the worst phys-
ical working conditions. As much as 25 percent of the employed persons in this
sector are exposed to at least 6 of these hazards, and 50 percent are exposed to 4 or
more hazards. Transportation and mining/manufacturing industries are the second
worst, while persons employed in the service producing sectors complain the least
about their working conditions. In education and health services, only 7 percent
of the employed are exposed to 4 or more of the hazards mentioned above.
251
CONTENTS
Three out of four who report that they work high above the ground (mainly in
construction) have no access to protective means, while one-half of those who work
with dangerous machines or chemicals have access to protection.
Satisfaction with work environment, tasks and leadership is important for
the motivation and productivity of employees. Such satisfaction can be measured
through the degree of physical exhaustion, freedom of decision making and the
ability to gain new skills. Further, uncertainty about job security can be a major threat
to the living conditions of a household, particularly in an environment of high and
increasing unemployment.
With regard to the degree of physical exhaustion, 40 percent of all wage
employees in Jordan, irrespective of sex, respond that they are physically exhausted
at the end of the day. Fifty percent feel that they have no or very limited influence
on how to perform their job tasks, and only 21 percent of the employed said that
their job provides them with the opportunity to acquire new skills on a regular basis.
Another 33 percent said that their job provides them the opportunity of acquiring
new skills occasionally, and almost half the employed population say they have no
opportunity to acquire new skills at work.
Figure 7.23 Percent of employed persons with irregular working hours, by industry and em-
ployment status
252
CONTENTS
Figure 7.24 Clustering of bad working conditions. Cumulative percent of employed persons
by number of hazards and industry
Less than 60 percent of employees have a written contract with their employer, and
30 percent are afraid of losing their job. Working without contract is more com-
mon in agriculture and trade, where only one worker in four has a written contract.
Half of all agricultural workers are afraid of losing their jobs. Also, employees in
construction and manufacturing say they have highly insecure jobs, while employ-
ees in public administration and education/health services are not afraid of losing
their jobs.
253
CONTENTS
254
CONTENTS
Job Training
Only 35 percent of the employed have ever received any kind of training, including
on-the-job training. Of those receiving training, 83 percent use it in their current
or former job. Hence the training is in most cases job relevant. As shown in figure
7.25, on-the-job training is by far the most common type of training. Employees
in public administration and education and health services receive training more
often than other employees (almost 60 percent), and they are also more likely to
find the training relevant to their job (more than 90 percent). Other sources of train-
ing are much less common: 9 percent have received training through apprentice-
ship programs, 7 percent from short courses at commercial schools, 6 percent from
a university or high diploma institution, and 4 percent through informal training
by family members.
Almost 30 percent of those who received training, completed that training
more than 5 years ago. Taking into account that 65 percent of the employed never
have received any training, this leaves only 25 percent of the employed with any
recent training. As illustrated in figure 7.26, most training is paid for by the employer
(56 percent). Twenty-five percent had to pay for the training themselves.
Figure 7.26 Person or institution who paid for the training. Percent of those who
received job training
255
CONTENTS
Ever married women 15-60 years: not currently enrolled in school or acute ill
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
AGE .3077 .0449 46.9982 1 .0000 .1144 1.3603
AGE2 -.0042 .0006 49.4156 1 .0000 -.1174 .9958
FEMALE HEAD(1) -.7638 .1722 19.6732 1 .0000 -.0717 .4659
age at first marriage .0451 .0138 10.6152 1 .0011 .0500 1.0462
EDUCATION (vs higher) 290.7982 3 .0000 .2878
NONE(1) -1.4676 .2042 51.6457 1 .0000 -.1201 .2305
BASIC(2) -2.5215 .1553 263.6556 1 .0000 -.2758 .0803
SECONDARY(3) -1.6956 .1589 113.9333 1 .0000 -.1804 .1835
AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD (vs 14+) 30.2507 4 .0000 .0804
0 (1) -.5895 .1835 10.3218 1 .0013 -.0492 .5546
1-6 (2) -.8589 .1716 25.0688 1 .0000 -.0819 .4236
7-10 (3) -.2965 .2180 1.8498 1 .1738 .0000 .7434
11-14 (4) -.1028 .2321 .1961 1 .6579 .0000 .9023
INCOME (vs 5300+) 45.4445 7 .0000 .0956
<900 .2750 .2546 1.1671 1 .2800 .0000 1.3165
900-1450 -.4632 .2370 3.8195 1 .0507 -.0230 .6293
1450-1800 -.4036 .2216 3.3182 1 .0685 -.0196 .6679
1800-2900 -.3767 .1953 3.7220 1 .0537 -.0224 .6861
2900-3600 .1833 .2012 .8304 1 .3621 .0000 1.2012
3600-4300 .5137 .2271 5.1183 1 .0237 .0301 1.6714
4300-5300 .5387 .2445 4.8536 1 .0276 .0288 1.7138
VOC.TRAINING .9187 .1313 48.9462 1 .0000 .1168 2.5060
CHRONIC DISEASE -.4620 .2427 3.6241 1 .0569 -.0217 .6300
ATTITUDE TO WOMEN WORKING( vs against) 22.8382 2 .0000 .0740
SUPPORT .6645 .1394 22.7166 1 .0000 .0776 1.9435
INDIFFERENT .4612 .2509 3.3791 1 .0660 .0200 1.5860
DOMAIN (vs South) 32.0266 5 .0000 .0800
AMMAN -.8199 .1790 20.9732 1 .0000 -.0743 .4405
ZARQA/MAFRAQ -.5347 .1956 7.4727 1 .0063 -.0399 .5859
BALQA/MADABA -.1549 .2100 .5441 1 .4608 .0000 .8565
IRBID -.8232 .2004 16.8750 1 .0000 -.0658 .4390
JARASH/AJLOUN -.3882 .2571 2.2795 1 .1311 -.0090 .6783
URBAN vs rural .0027 .1408 .0004 1 .9845 .0000 1.0027
REFUGEE STATUS (vs Not refugees) 6.7737 2 .0338 .0284
GULF RETURNEE -.5421 .2360 5.2772 1 .0216 -.0309 .5815
REFUGEE -.2053 .1230 2.7850 1 .0952 -.0151 .8144
Constant -7.4759 .8313 80.8724 1 .0000
256
CONTENTS
Never married women 15-60 years: Not currently enrolled in school or acute ill
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
257
CONTENTS CHAPTER 6 CHAPTER 8
NOT MARRIED (vs married) -.8703 .1677 26.9460 1 .0000 -.0738 .4188
258
CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 9 CONTENTS
Summary
This chapter explores some aspects of the social networks of households and indi-
viduals in Jordanian society. It shows that family holds a strong position as the basic
social unit. Relatives tend to live close together in the same localities, and a high
number of spouses chose their partners among relatives and from the same social
group. There are some differences between urban and rural areas. Migration also
influences the shape and the size of the household networks.
Most of the population lives in households with other family members, and
very few live alone (7 percent of the households are single person households). It is
shown that three-quarters of Jordanian households live surrounded by relatives
within close distance. Only 26 percent do not have close relatives within the same
neighbourhood, and 2 percent have no family at all. Nine out of ten households
report that they are satisfied with the distance to relatives.
It is most common to have relatives on the husband’s father’s side living close
by, but other relatives are frequently neighbours also. It is more common to be sur-
rounded by relatives from the same descent line than by collateral kin like uncles,
aunts and cousins. Almost one-half of the population has both kinds of relatives
living nearby. In addition, almost 2 out of 5 households have many relatives living
in their neighbourhood. More than one-third of the population have this kind of
complex and extensive household network around them. In this manner, the local-
isation pattern found in present day Jordan corresponds to descriptions of the
‘traditional’ village. An overwhelming majority seem to be satisfied with this way
of living.
Closeness between the relatives is expressed by frequent visits: Only 15 per-
cent of the total population had not visited or had no visits from a relative during
the two weeks prior to the interview. The clan institutions rabita and diwan are
present, but do not play a very significant role in the ordinary life of the Jordanians.
Help and support given among relatives form an important part of the social
security system and safety net for the Jordanian population. One-half of the popu-
lation did not receive or give any help over the two weeks prior to the interview, or
259
CONTENTS
any transfers over the last year. One out of four persons only gave help to relatives,
while 9 percent both received and gave help from and to relatives. It is significantly
less common to engage in exchanges of help and transfers with non-relatives.
Help and transfers flow from the able, young, economically active, educat-
ed and relatively well-off person towards a person who is poorer, older, less educat-
ed, often female, and outside the labor force. Transfers from relatives are found
among the three most important income sources for the households as often as re-
tirement pensions and social security from Government. The transfers, however, flow
to different and often poorer households.
Introduction
260
CONTENTS
261
CONTENTS
because suggested solutions proved to be too time consuming in the field, too com-
plex to analyse, or too difficult to pursue conceptually.
One kind of data produced by the survey is the size and composition of the
group of relatives living nearby the household interviewed. This information is
broken down by kinds of relatives, permitting a distinction between the household
head’s and spouse’s relations, as well as identification of the generation and gender
of related individuals. This set of data can shed light on the importance of kinship
ties in creating spatially close social networks. We refer to the network covered by
this data as the “household network”.
The survey also measures the density of contact, or frequency of visits,
between a randomly selected adult in each household and the categories of relatives
living nearby. Third, questions were asked which measure the exchanges of servic-
es, help and transfers between the person and relatives. Fourth, the interviewees were
asked about support to and from non-relative neighbours and friends. As a fifth
topic, the survey explored the existence and use of institutions associated with kin-
ship like the diwan or rabita.
Finally, the survey contains more indirect information about social networks,
for example data on kinship ties between spouses. In connection with the mapping
of housing, environment and the availability of services, the respondents were asked
about their personal satisfaction with their social environment and the distance to
relatives and friends, and satisfaction with their neighbours.
262
CONTENTS
263
CONTENTS
Figure 8.1 Extended, nuclear and single person households by type of neighbourhood, do-
main, and sex and age of household head; in percent of households in the category;
unweighted valid N=5854
264
CONTENTS
Mafraq more often have family network nearby than those living in Amman or in
the South. There are no differences between refugees and non-refugees, but refu-
gees living in the camps have relatives living nearby somewhat more often (80
percent) than other areas (74 percent). There are no significant differences among
age groups or gender of the household head (females 72 and males 74 percent). This
is shown in figure 8.2.
Rural and semi-urban residential households more often have family and
relatives living nearby than households in farm and nomad areas, while in urban
residential areas the percentage of households with family nearby is close to the
average. A factor that influences the households’ family network nearby is migra-
tion. Not surprisingly, the households in which the head of household lived at the
same place five years prior to the interview more often (79 percent) had family living
Figure 8.2 Households having family and relatives nearby, by type of neighbourhood, domain,
sex and age of household head, if head of household lived same place or elsewhere 5 years
ago. Bars represent difference from average of 74 percent. Unweighted valid N=5842
265
CONTENTS
nearby than households where the household head had lived elsewhere. However,
even in the latter case 52 percent had family living nearby.
266
CONTENTS
Figure 8.3 Categories of relatives living nearby by sex of spouses, in percent of the house-
holds having the category of relatives living nearby
is common to have relatives both on the husband’s and on the wife’s side, although
relatives living nearby on the husband’s side are more common.
Almost one-half of households are located in neighbourhoods together with
brothers of the male head of household (46 percent). It is also common to have his
sisters living nearby (34 percent). The grandparents from either side live nearby few
households (3 and 2 percent), while one out of three households have the parents
of the husband living nearby. Nineteen percent of the households have children of
either sex living nearby, 14 percent have sons and 12 percent have daughters.
The high percentages of lineal relations, i.e. relatives belonging to the same
direct line of descent up or down (parents, grandparents, children etc), are in gen-
eral not matched by collateral relations, i.e. where kinship links include a sibling
link. These are relatives like cousins, uncles and aunts. Of such collateral relations,
the most common is to have cousins on the father’s side of the husband living nearby
(27 percent), as well as uncles and aunts on the father’s side of the husband (22
percent). All in all, it is less common to have relatives of the wife living nearby. Many
couples probably settle in the area where the husbands’ relatives live rather than
among the relatives of the wife.
267
CONTENTS
Figure 8.4 Lineal and collateral relatives of both spouses living nearby, percentage of the
households, n=6300
In figure 8.4 these categories of relatives are grouped. The figure shows that the most
common type of household network in the neighbourhood is that with both lineal
and collateral relatives living nearby (44 percent). In addition, 26 percent have only
lineal relatives living nearby. Only 4 percent of the households have only collateral
relatives living nearby.
The most comprehensive household networks, those comprised of both lineal
and collateral relatives, are most frequent in rural and semi-urban areas (60 percent),
and in the governorates of Jarash and Ajloun (62 percent) and Irbid (59 percent).
Households in which the head of household is younger than 35 years also more often
have more comprehensive household networks than those with older household
heads (54 percent as against 41 and 33). Female headed households less often have
such comprehensive household networks (33 percent). This is shown in figure 8.5.
The lowest percentages of households with both lineal and collateral relatives
living nearby are found in farm areas (31 percent), among refugees and displaced
persons (36 percent), and in Amman (35 percent). The household network is also
influenced by migration. Fewer of those having moved since 1990 (28 percent), have
both lineal and collateral relatives living nearby, than those living in the same place
(52 percent).
268
CONTENTS
Figure 8.5 Type of network: Lineal and collateral relatives, in percent of the households in
the category. Bars represent difference from average of 44 percent. Unweighted N = 2817
“no relatives nearby” and “some relatives living nearby” to “many relatives living
nearby”4. Figure 8.6 shows the distribution of this network size indicator.
Thirty-eight percent of the households can be considered to have extensive
or dense networks, that is, households which have more than 10 relatives of the
household head and the head’s spouse nearby. The distribution of such networks
across types of neighbourhood, governorates, sex and age of the head of household
and migration status, is very similar to the distribution of complex networks, i.e.
the networks consisting of both lineal and collateral relatives (see figure 8.5).
If the traditional pattern of living in localities characterised by dense net-
works made up of close kin with a preference for the father’s relatives still persists,
4
The actual size limits for the two latter categories cannot be firmly established. But all
households with definitely ten relatives or more living within walking distance were placed
in the category “many relatives living nearby”.
269
CONTENTS
Table 8.2 Types and size of household networks, percent of all households
Size of network
Type of network None Some Many
No relatives 26
Collateral only 3 1
Lineal only 22 3
Lineal and collateral 10 34
270
CONTENTS
Figure 8.7 The village household network: Many relatives and both lineal and collateral
relatives. Bars represent difference from average of 35 percent. Percent of households in cat-
egory. Unweighted N=2203
271
CONTENTS
The level of satisfaction with the distance to relatives does not vary much between
the governorates, or according to type of neighbourhood. There is practically no
difference in the levels across age of the household head. The only exception is that
more respondents reported being unsatisfied in farm areas, 31 percent compared
to the average of 18 percent. The most influential factors are the type and size of
the household network, which again are influenced by migration during the last five
years, and whether children are living nearby. This is shown in figure 8.9.
While 90 percent are satisfied and only 10 percent are unsatisfied with the
distance to relatives among households with many relatives living within close dis-
tance, 31 percent of those living without relatives nearby are unsatisfied. Of those
having both lineal and collateral relatives in the neighbourhood, 89 percent are
satisfied. Having only collateral relatives nearby is less satisfying, and 21 percent of
these households are unsatisfied with the distance to relatives. Those who have
moved residence and lived elsewhere five years ago also are more often unsatisfied.
Among households surrounded by both lineal and collateral relatives with many
relatives in the neighborhood, only 3 percent reported that they are unsatisfied with
the distance to relatives.
In-Marriage
Arab marriage rules allow for consanguineous marriages among first cousins, and
it has been claimed that there traditionally exists a preference for marrying the father’s
brother’s daughter (bin ‘amm) for men and hence the father’s brother’s son for women
(ibn ‘amm). In the JLCS all women were asked about the relation to their most recent
husbands. Close to one-half of the marriages were contracted with a person that was
related through kinship to the woman before marriage. The results are shown in
table 8.3.
Figure 8.8 Satisfaction with distance to relatives and friends. Percent of all households, n=6300
272
CONTENTS
Figure 8.9 Unsatisfied with the distance to relatives. Percent of the households in the cate-
gory: Bars represent difference from average of 18 percent. Unweighted N=5919
273
CONTENTS
The level of in-marriage is high, although not exceptionally so in the context of the
Middle East where rates of consanguineous marriage are generally high (Bittles
1995). It agrees well with the pattern of residence among relatives in Jordan. If rel-
atives live close together, the chances for marrying a relative increase. Through
generations, the practice of endogamy creates a dense web of kinship ties such that
people are related to each other in many ways and the family network grows.
The observed levels of in-marriage agree only to some extent with answers
given to questions regarding the preferred marriage type. In this instance, 11 per-
cent of respondents stated that the father’s brother’s son was the preferred spouse
for a daughter, a figure very close to the observed level of 13 percent. Other forms
of cousin marriages received scant support, and only an additional 1 percent
preferred cousin marriage of other types as their first choice in contrast to the 13
percent actually having this form of marriage. Forty-nine percent stated that they
did not have any preference, and 35 percent wanted their daughter to marry out-
side of the hamulah. It is not clear if the difference between observed and preferred
marriages is due to a recent shift in opinion, or if the complex choices involved in
finding a spouse make the outcomes different than the preferences. There is a clear
association between marriage preference and education, in that those having not
attended school have a much higher preference for cousin marriage than those with
education (table 8.4). This may, however, to some extent also reflect an age effect,
in that those with little education are generally older than those with some more
education. However, in actual marriage practice, there is no clear-cut relation
between the age of a woman and the relation to her spouse.
Since many marriages are between relatives, it would be expected that other
dimensions of closeness influence the choice of a future spouse. Overall, the JLCS
shows that in 36 percent of the cases the spouses are from, or born in the same area
in Jordan, while in 20 percent they come from different places. In 21 percent of
the cases, the spouses come from different countries and in 24 percent they both
come from a country other than Jordan. But as Jordan is a country hosting a large
274
CONTENTS
refugee population (44 percent of the population), these results mask an even higher
propensity for endogamy. This is shown in table 8.5.
One-half of spouses in the non-refugee population in Jordan are from the
same locality in Jordan, while 26 percent come from different places in Jordan. A
locality as defined in JLCS is most often a town or rural district (see appendix 1).
Fifteen percent come from different countries, and 8 percent come from a same
country outside Jordan. There are very few marriages between persons of refugee
background and non-refugees, only approximately 10 percent of the marriages are
between these two groups.
The refugees and the displaced tend to marry persons who are not only
refugees, but who have the same refugee background as themselves. Seventy-three
percent of 1948-refugees are married to persons that are themselves refugees from
1948, and 17 percent are married to persons from other categories of refugees. Two-
thirds of the 1967 displaced have married 1967 displaced, and another 20 percent
of them have chosen a spouse who is either 1948 refugee or 1948 refugee and
displaced. Seventy-seven percent of refugees and displaced have married within the
same category.
This pattern of selection of spouses implies that not only are the family net-
works strengthened and continued through generations, but also broad social groups
are perpetuated over time. The same pattern based on a preference for social closeness
in marriage has been observed for other refugee populations in the region (Tuastad
1997, Pedersen 1997).
275
CONTENTS
The frequency of visits among relatives in Jordan is extremely high. Only 15 per-
cent of the total population had not visited or had no visits from a relative during
the two weeks prior to the interview. Twenty-five percent visited or were visited daily.
It is worth noting that approximately one-third of the fieldwork was done during
Ramadan5, and that the frequency of visits is expected to be particularly high dur-
ing this month. During the month of Ramadan, 28 percent had visits, as against
24 percent during the remaining part of the fieldwork. During the latter period a
higher percentage falling into the group with less frequent visits made up for the
somewhat lower number visiting daily. The overall impression of very high levels
of visiting remained unchanged. All in all, the results clearly demonstrate the close
contact among relatives.
Visits are more frequent between the respondents and relatives on their
father’s side than between the respondents and other kinds of relatives. The level of
visits is high all over Jordan, and seems to be nearly constant across age and sex
differences. Factors influencing the visiting pattern most are the size and type of
5
The fieldwork was carried out from 25 January to 18 April 1996. Revisits to cover house-
holds where no contact was established during the main fieldwork continued until the end
of April. Ramadan started on 20 January and lasted till 20 February.
276
CONTENTS
household network surrounding the family. The population in Amman has slightly
less frequent visits with family and relatives than the population in other
governorates.
The JLCS gives a detailed account of which kinds of relatives are visited by
or paid a visit to the respondent during the last two weeks. The answers show that
the most frequent visits occur with relatives on the father’s side. Sixteen percent of
the interviewees visited such relatives daily, and 71 percent had visited or had visits
from relatives on the father’s side at least once during the last two weeks. Visits with
relatives on the mother’s side are less frequent, as 43 percent had such visits during
the two weeks preceding the interview, and visits with the relatives of the spouse
are the least frequent. This is shown in figure 8.10.
There is only a very slight tendency for women to report more visits than
men. While 23 percent of men report that they had or paid visits daily, 28 percent
of the women did so. Seventeen percent of the male respondents and 13 percent of
the female told that they had no visits over the last two weeks. The visiting pattern
is equal over the age groups, except for older persons, i.e. those over 60 years, who
report 4 percentage points less visits than persons in other age groups.
Head of households and children are rather less involved in visiting than the
spouses of the household heads, but the differences are small. While 15 percent of
the heads of households and 16 percent of the children did not pay or have any visit
during the two last weeks, only 10 percent of the spouses of the household heads
had no visits. Twenty-nine percent of the household heads, and 31 percent of their
spouses, have daily visits, while 20 percent of the children have the same frequency
of visits. Other household members and non-relatives living in the household have
fewer visits (67 percent). This is shown in figure 8.11.
Figure 8.11 discloses that the factors influencing visiting patterns the most,
are the type and size of the family network living nearby. Respondents from house-
holds with both lineal and collateral relatives living in the neighbourhood and those
Figure 8.10 Visits with relatives during last two weeks, in percent of respondents (n=6300)
277
CONTENTS
Figure 8.11 Respondents with visits last two weeks, in percent, by sex, age group, position in
the household, types of relatives living nearby, size of household network nearby and report-
ing domain. Bars show the difference from the overall level of 84 percent
with many relatives living nearby visit relatives more than others. There are also some
differences across governorates, and the frequency of visits is higher in Irbid than
for the other governorates.
When we consider the percentage of the population with daily visits over the
two-weeks’ period, we see that frequent visitors are more numerous among heads
of households and their spouses as opposed to the children and other members of
the household. There are no differences across age groups. Amman has less frequent
visitors than the other reporting domains and the type and size of the household
network in the neighbourhood seems to be an important factor influencing the visits.
The more complex and bigger the group of relatives living nearby, the higher the
percentage of the population engaging in daily visiting. This is shown in figure 8.12.
The visiting pattern is relatively stable over types of neighbourhoods. Visits
occur with somewhat higher frequency in refugee camps and in rural/semi-urban
residential areas than in other kinds of neighbourhoods, but the differences are small.
278
CONTENTS
In farm areas, the percentage of persons having paid or received visits is lower than
for other neighbourhoods. This is shown in figure 8.13.
Figure 8.12 Respondents with daily visits last two weeks, in percent, by sex, age group, posi-
tion in the household, types of relatives living nearby, size of household network nearby and
reporting domain. Bars show the difference from the average level of 25 percent
Figure 8.13 Visits among relatives by type of neighbourhood, in percent of the population
living in each type of neighbourhood
279
CONTENTS
The diwan and the rabita are two types of clan or village institutions that have sim-
ilar functions in Jordan. The diwan is a kind of a social club or a gathering place
for the clan or the hamulah or the ashira, where the members of the family group
gather on occasions. The diwan is primarily used for social gatherings, for wedding
and engagement parties, and for gathering to express condolences. It can also be
used for gatherings concerning family politics, for example solving disputes among
families or raising social assistance for needy families. They are also used for religious
events and to discuss political matters. The rabita has traditionally a clearer politi-
cal role than the diwan, and was used by the clan leaders to exert their influence
and authority over the families and their members. In the JLCS no distinction was
made between these two clan or village institutions.
As we find that the Jordanian population tends to continue or recreate village
living patterns when it comes to organising the social space surrounding households,
we would also expect that they utilise traditional institutions for organising major
social events. The survey results show that 34 percent of the respondents were mem-
bers of hamulahs, ashiras or villages that had a rabita, a diwan or similar institutions.
But only 13 percent of all respondents had attended gatherings in their rabita or
diwan during the last 12 months, or slightly more than a third of those who have a
rabita or diwan.
Who are the users of the diwans and rabitas? The results indicate that men
and head of households more often than women and the spouses of household heads
attend to gatherings in the clan institutions. Nineteen percent of the male respond-
ents and 18 percent of the heads of household had attended any kind of gathering
in own rabita or diwan. Women also use the institutions, but less frequently, as 7
percent of them had attended any kind of gathering during the last year. There are
no differences across age groups, nor is there any noticeable difference related to
size and type of household network.
The attendance to meetings in own family's diwan and rabita is slightly
higher in Zarqa and Mafraq (16 percent) and in Irbid (16 percent) than in other
governorates (11-13 percent), and it is lowest in Jarash and Ajloun (7 percent). We
also find lower attendance in farm (4 percent) as well as in rural and semi-urban
residential areas (7 percent) and in refugee camps (10 percent). We find the highest
frequency of attendance in urban residential areas (14 percent).
If we look at the various types of gatherings and how the population is us-
ing their diwans and rabitas as opposed to gatherings outside their own clan or village
institutions, we see that the clan institutions do not hold a very strong position as
a convention place. For most of the types of occasions included in the survey, the
percentage of the population that attended gatherings held outside their own rabitas
280
CONTENTS
or diwans by far exceeded the ones that attended meetings in their own rabita or
diwan. This applies to ordinary gatherings, to marriages and engagements, to con-
dolences and to religious events. By way of an example, 80 percent had participated
in at least one wedding or engagement during the last 12 months. But only two
percent had attended the wedding or engagement in their own diwan or rabita. The
majority, 72 percent, attended such gatherings outside their own clan institutions.
Six percent had been in marriages and engagements both within and outside of their
clan institution.
Only when it comes to more rare occasions and more politicised matters
involving clan politics, like settlements of family disputes, political discussions and
mobilisation of social assistance, do clan institutions hold a stronger position. This
is shown in figure 8.14.
In spite of the noticeable presence of the clan institutions, they do not seem
to hold a very strong position in organising the most common social gatherings for
the Jordanian population. This picture may underestimate, however, the real influ-
ence of these institutions, as is indicated by the fact that they tend to be attended
by heads of household on occasions less of a social and more of a political nature.
In addition, gatherings taking place outside own rabita or diwan, may take place in
another family's institution.
Figure 8.14 Attendance to gatherings in and outside of the diwan and rabita, by type of gath-
ering. In percent of total population
281
CONTENTS
We would expect that the high frequency of living amidst many close relatives finds
its corollary in a high level of sharing of resources and of exchanges of services and
support within the group of relatives, as well as among other neighbours and friends.
Comparing with the findings of very high levels of visiting among relatives, the
frequency of exchange of help and support is lower, although significant. Of all the
respondents, 38 percent had given help of any kind to relatives, or to neighbours,
friends or colleagues, while 26 percent had received help. The term “help” refers to
the provision of work or services during the two weeks prior to the interview, as
well as financial help and transfers in cash and in kind during the last year.
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CONTENTS
If we group the givers and takers, 29 percent of the population consist of givers of
help to relatives only, while 4 percent direct their help to both relatives and friends,
and 5 to friends only. Among the receivers, 17 percent obtain help only from rela-
tives, while 3 percent are helped by relatives and friends, and 6 percent are helped
by friends only. In table 8.7 is shown how the respondents are both givers and takers
and with whom they are interacting both “ways”. The table clearly shows the dom-
inance of family and relatives in the pattern of exchange of support and help. Only
4 percent interact exclusively with friends, neighbours or colleagues, and not with
family and relatives. Thirty-nine percent interact exclusively with family and rela-
tives, while 5 percent interact with both relatives and non-relatives.
Table 8.7 shows that those who interact with friends, neighbours and col-
leagues – only, or in combination with family and relatives – are all both givers and
takers of help, or, what we could call “exchangers”. Those who are exclusively “giv-
ers” of help, provide their support to family and relatives (21 percent of the total
population). Nine percent are exclusively “receivers” of support, and they receive
help from their family and relatives. If we add the 9 percent who are “exchangers”
Table 8.6 Help and transfers to relatives and friends, by givers and receivers. In percent of
the total population. N=6300
Given Received
No help 62 74
Help, relatives only 16 6
Transfers, relatives only 8 8
Help and transfers, relatives 5 3
Help friends, neighbors, colleagues 5 6
Help relatives and friends 2 1
Transfers - relatives, help - friends 1 1
Help, transfers - relatives, help - friends 1 0
Total 100 100
Table 8.7 Givers and receivers of help, by categories of others. In percent of total popula-
tion, N=6300
Receivers of help from
Only Friends and
Givers of help to No help Only friends Total
relatives relatives
No help 53 9 62
Only relatives 21 9 29
Relatives and friends 2 2 4
Only friends 1 4 5
Total 74 17 3 6 100
283
CONTENTS
of help between relatives, a total of 17 percent are both givers and receivers of help
and transfers.
The pattern described here seems to indicate that there are other principles
or norms guiding the helping patterns among non-relatives than those prevailing
among family members and relatives. Exchanges in non-family relations tend to be
more balanced than for the family relations, in the sense that if a person has pro-
vided help over the last two weeks he or she has also received support, and vice versa.
A more generalised patterns of reciprocity seems to prevail among family and
relatives. By this we mean that with the family, one may be expected to give even if
help is not reciprocated immediately, and family and relatives may extend support
even if the recipient is not in a position to give back at the moment. Let us now
turn to the question of which kinds of help and transfers are most frequently in-
volved in social network exchanges.
6
It was also asked about the kinship relation to the receivers or providers of support. As the
answers were few for each kind of support and the variations in kinship relations to providers
and receivers were great, the results are not easy to interpret and they will not be analysed
here.
284
CONTENTS
Table 8.8 Types of support given and received during the last two weeks, by categories of
others. In percent of all respondents
Friends, neighbours
Support given to or received from: Family and relatives
and colleagues
Types of support :1 Given Received Given Received
Help in one or more household activities 13.6 7.2 9. 1 5.0
Do shopping 3. 9 1.6 2.9 1.0
Child care 3. 6 1.6 1.0 0.4
Prepare food 5. 0 3.0 2.0 1.0
Other housework 5. 7 3.6 2.0 1.0
School work/ studies * * 3.0 2.4
Help in one or more productive activities 2.6 0.9 2.2 0.5
Transportation 1.3 0.8 1.5 0.4
Help in family enterprise 0. 7 0.1 0. 3 0.2
Work in fields or hakura 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2
Help in one or more occasional activities 4.5 1.2 3.1 0.5
Assist in post-natal care 1.0 0.5 0. 5 0.2
Assist in arranging wedding 1. 3 0.1 1.0 0.1
Assist in arranging funeral 1.3 0.1 1.1 0.1
Assist in house building or repair 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.1
2
Financial help 14.6 12.5 3.2 0.8
Other help 5.6 2.5 5.5 2.5
3
Total 23.9 20.3 19.3 8.6
Total excluding financial help 23.8 11.1
Unweighted Valid N 5503 5503 5503 5503
* This answer category was not included for family and relatives.
1
Multiple answers were allowed, the subtotals give the percentage mentioning at least
one of the answers in the group.
2
Financial help was raised in a separate question for family and relatives, and the recall
period was the last year, while it was raised only as one answer category under help over
the last two weeks for friends, neighbors and colleagues.
3
Including financial support to and from family and relatives.
that of the givers of help. Similar results were found concerning support among
friends, neighbours and colleagues. The results are shown in table 8.8.
The respondents also were asked about the purpose of financial transfers
given to or received from family and relatives over the last year, and about what the
financial help was intended to cover. The defined answer categories covered specif-
ic purposes like wedding arrangements and purchase of land, capital goods or farm
equipment, as well as procurement of housing and payment of debts and for health
treatment, education and pilgrimage. The defined alternatives gathered only few
answers each, as the most frequent answers fell in the “other” category. This may
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CONTENTS
Table 8.9 Reasons for financial help or transfers in cash or in kind given to or received from
relatives during the last twelve months. In percent of all respondents
Reason for financial help: Given Received
Pay for wedding arrangement 2.0 0.6
Build dwelling 0.6 0.2
Buy dwelling 0.1 0.0
Pay a debt 0.6 0.7
Pay hospital bill 0.7 0.6
Pay for pilgrimage 0.1 0.1
Pay for education 0.6 0.9
Buy land 0.1 0.2
Buy capital goods or farm equipment 0.1 0.2
Other help 10.6 9.5
Total 14.6 12.5
Unweighted Valid N 5503 5503
286
CONTENTS
receiver of help than a younger person, and one-half the chance of being a provider
of help. This is shown in figure 8.17.
Education and income also influence whether a person is a giver or receiver
of help. Education seems to positively influence the propensity to give help and
support. The higher the level of achieved education, the more frequent is it to either
be an exchanger or a giver of help. With the exception of those who have not
attended school, who are more often receivers of help than others, the percentage
of receivers is stable over income groups. This is shown in figure 8.18.
Figure 8.19 shows the manner in which total household income influences
giving and receiving help. While the percentage of givers increases with increasing
income, the percentage of receivers decreases. Respondents living in female headed
households nearly twice as often are receivers compared to respondents living in
households headed by men (15 and 8 percent respectively). Participation in the
labour force has a similar effect, as there are twice as high a percentage of receivers
among the respondents outside the workforce as among those in the workforce (11
and 6 percent). Twenty-six percent of those in the labour force are givers.
When we look into the different kinds of help and support, we find that
exchanges of non-financial help among family and relatives are not much influenced
by household income, nor are they much influenced by where the respondent lives
in Jordan. Men less often claim that they are receivers of non-financial assistance
than women, and they give help somewhat less often than women.
Figure 8.16 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by sex. In percent, n=6299
Figure 8.17 Givers, exchangers and receivers of help, by age group. In percent, n=6300
287
CONTENTS
Figure 8.18 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by level of completed education. In
percent, n=6300
Figure 8.19 Receivers, exchangers and givers of help, by income group. In percent, n=6300
288
CONTENTS
Figure 8.20 Financial help and transfers given and received during the last year, by income
groups. In percent, n=6300
Men are more frequently providers of financial help and transfers than women.
Economic help is more often received by respondents living in poor households and
more often given by respondents living in households with higher total income. On
the one hand, only 5 percent of the respondents from households with a total year-
ly income of less than 900 dinars and 11 percent of those having between 900 and
1450 dinars supported relatives economically. On the other hand, more than 20
percent of the respondents residing in households with a total yearly income of 3600
dinars or more did so. In the lowest income groups, those with less than 900 dinars
and those with 900-1450 dinars, 20 and 17 percent of the interviewees received
economic support from relatives. Among those with more than 3600 dinars in yearly
household income, only 8 percent received economic support. There are no signif-
icant differences across governorates.
In sum, we see that the provision of help between family and relatives, which
for the most part consists of help in household activities, is less dependent on the
economic situation of both giver and receiver, than is the case for financial help and
transfers. The overall direction of help, however, is from the able, young, econom-
ic active, educated and relatively well off, towards the poorer, older, less educated,
often women, and those outside the labour force. Exchange patterns seem to con-
tribute to a safety net and serve as social security for those in need of it.
How important are these transfers, and to what extent are interfamily flows
functioning as a social security net? The Jordan Living Conditions Survey does not
give very good answers to these questions, as information about the size of economic
289
CONTENTS
Figure 8.21 Households receiving remittances from relatives and households receiving retire-
ment pensions and/or social security from the Government, by importance as income source.
In percent of all households, n=6300
flows is lacking. However, an indication can be obtained from the information about
the households’ sources of income and their importance. Fourteen percent of all
households had remittances from relatives as one of the three most important sources
of income. In comparison, the same percentage of households received retirement
pensions or social security from the Government as one of the three most impor-
tant sources of income. This is shown in figure 8.21.
It is interesting to note that very few households receiving retirement pen-
sions or social security from the Government also have remittances from relatives
as one of the three most important sources of income. Table 8.10 shows that less
than 1 percent of all households have both kinds of income among their three most
important sources of income. This finding indicates that the remittances are directed
towards those households in need who lack public support for their subsistence, and
that family networks function as an additional source of support for a substantive
part of the population. This picture is somewhat altered if we look at the number
of individuals benefiting from the two kinds of support. The percentage of the
population supported through the public system is higher than the percentage having
Table 8.10 Households receiving remittances from relatives as one of the three most impor-
tant sources of income by households receiving retirement pension or social security as one
of the three most important sources of income. In percent of all households
Source of income: Retirement
pension or social security
Source of income: Most Second most Third
None Total
Remittences from relatives important important important
None 72.9 5.9 6. 2 1.4 86.4
Most important source 6.1 6.2
Second most important 4.6 0.8 5.0
Third most important 2.1 2.3
Total 85.6 6.6 6.4 1.4 100.0
N 6298
290
CONTENTS
291
CONTENTS CHAPTER 7 CHAPTER 9
292
CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 10 CONTENTS
Summary
Dealing mainly with participation in public life and attitudes towards such partic-
ipation, this chapter finds that there are substantial differences between Jordanian
women and men. Approximately six in ten Jordanians above the age of twenty have
ever voted in a municipal or national election, with only minor variation between
the sexes. However, when considering a second indicator of electoral politics, cam-
paigning, we notice that men have been more active. While 15 percent of men have
been involved in electoral campaigning, only 9 percent of women have. Six times
as many men as women (12 percent versus 2 percent) are members of at least one
voluntary organisation. Not surprisingly, Jordanian men are also more frequent users
of what we have called ‘guesthouses’ (rabitas, diwans and similar institutions) for
political purposes.
Turning from actual participation to attitudes towards such participation,
we see that the gender difference persists. About double the number of men are
opposed to female involvement in political and associational life compared to wom-
en. Yet, our main conclusion is that there is a general ‘psychological’ barrier against
female public and political participation in Jordanian society. For example, one-third
of the interviewed individuals above the age of fifteen are against having women in
the elected local councils, the National Assembly, or in the government.
This chapter also looks at the consumption of news through modern media.
Three in four Jordanians were found to have obtained news from a newspaper, radio
or TV station the day preceding the interview. TV is clearly the most popular source
of information, followed by radio and newspapers. More men than women follow
the news. The widest gender gap can be seen in newspaper consumption, due to
higher illiteracy rates among women. Nearly three in ten Jordanians supplement the
mentioned three Jordanian information sources with non-Jordanian TV news at least
once a week. Twenty percent of the adult respondents watched non-Jordanian Arab
channels during the week before the interview; 15 percent watched Israeli news;
while 2 percent followed news put on the air by Western TV stations.
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CONTENTS
Introduction
This chapter deals with several aspects of public life. First, it sheds light on people’s
interest in societal and political issues by describing their level of news consump-
tion through modern mass media such as newspapers, radio, and television. It then
turns from interest in public issues to public participation. Four indicators of par-
ticipation in public life are included: voting, campaigning, organisational member-
ship and the political use of ‘guesthouses’. Two indicators, voting and, belong to
the core of electoral politics. We asked about participation in both national and local
elections. The third indicator of public engagement is voluntary membership in
various sorts of organisations, associations, and clubs. Clearly, all associations are
not involved in politics to the same extent. This becomes evident if we compare a
neighbourhood-based group of women committed to social work with a national
NGO supporting female candidates for parliamentary elections or an association
for the protection of consumer rights.
Yet, whatever the degree of politicisation, it has been argued that associational
membership is of considerable relevance to the discussion of political participation.
Involvement in organisational life may enhance political awareness and skills, which
in turn lead to participation in formal politics (Almond and Verba 1989, Bibic 1994,
Diamond 1994).
The fourth indicator of public participation is the use of what we have called
a traditional guesthouse (rabita, diwan, and similar institutions) belonging to a clan,
tribe or village. These institutions play a central role in Jordanian society, includ-
ing in the field of politics.
The third focus of the chapter is on women’s situation. More specifically we
discuss women’s opportunities to take part in public activities, Jordanians’ attitudes
toward female participation in public and political arenas, and women’s freedom
of movement. Finally, this chapter takes up people’s opinion about the spread of
technology, literature, and system of governance from the industrialised countries
into Jordan.
For some topics in this chapter, such as voting and campaigning, it would
make little sense to include other nationalities than the Jordanian. Hence, for the
sake of clarity and simplicity only Jordanian nationals are included in our analysis.
We study persons fifteen years of age or older. However, for analyses of elections,
Jordanians below the age of twenty are excluded. In this manner only those who
had had the opportunity to take part in at least one election at the time of the
interview are covered by the analysis. Respondents are 4,991 randomly selected
individuals (RSIs), 2,001 men and 2,990 women.
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CONTENTS
News Consumption
People obtain information about what is going on around them in society from a
variety of sources. For the majority perhaps the most valuable information deals with
local events and comes from informal channels in the private and local milieu. Of
equal importance to many, however, are news about broader issues, questions of a
more general and principal character, and political decisions that affect people’s daily
lives. Such information is first and foremost available through the modern mass
media. The Jordan Living Conditions Survey asked three questions to capture data
on this topic. First, it asked whether the respondent had read a newspaper the day
preceding the interview and if so, how many newspapers the respondent had read.
Next, it asked if the person had received news through Jordanian as well as non-
Jordanian radio or television the day before the interview. Finally, the survey que-
ried if the respondent had watched the news on any Jordanian or non-Jordanian
TV the week prior to the interview.
Results show that 77 percent received news from at least one of the three
above-mentioned types of mass media. We did a logistic regression analysis to find
out which factors determine who actually use the media. The following variables
were included in our model: sex, age, level of education, level of income, labour
force participation, governorate of residence, Palestinian refugee status and urban-
rural status. Only the first four variables mentioned turned out to be statistically
significant. These are included in figure 9.1. (See Chapter Appendix 9.1 for the
detailed results of the regression analysis.)
While 82 percent of men consumed news channelled through one of these
forms of media, only 72 percent of women did. Similarly, it is evident from figure
9.1 that the highly educated are more interested in news from these sources than
are the less educated, and that there is a positive correlation between level of income
and obtaining news from listening to radio, watching TV, or reading newspapers.
Finally, people aged 30 to 44 years digest more news than both the younger and
older generations.
Of the three different kinds of mass media included in the survey, TV is clear-
ly the most popular source. While only 25 percent had read a newspaper the day
before the interview (or, if yesterday was a Friday or holiday, the day prior to that)
and 33 percent had listened to news on the radio, 68 percent had followed the news
on television. In general the patterns in figure 9.1 have their parallels when the same
four background characteristics are applied to the three types of mass media one
by one. Nevertheless, three points have been identified where the situation is slightly
different and therefore warrant comment.
First, as could be expected, young people listen to the news on radio less than
older people. While only 28 percent among those 15-29 years of age received news
295
CONTENTS
Figure 9.1 Persons 15 years and above who received news from any newspaper, radio, or TV
the day preceding the interview by various characteristics: sex, highest level of education
completed, yearly household income, and broad age groups
from the radio the day preceding the interview, the percentage increases to 37 and
41 respectively for the age groups 30-44 years and 45 years and more.
Second, the gender gap is much broader for newspaper consumption than
it is for watching TV. Only 15 percent of Jordanian women read at least one
newspaper daily against 38 percent of Jordanian men. However, 71 percent men
and 65 percent women watch news on the TV. For radio listening the gender gap is
12 percent in favour of men (38 against 26 percent). The difference between men
and women in newspaper reading is, to a considerable extent, explained by illiteracy.
While according to the JLCS about one-tenth of men are functionally illiterate, i.e.
unable to read everyday materials, the figure for women is one out of four (see chap-
ter 3).
Third, newspaper reading is highly affected by level of education, and more
so than listening to radio and watching TV. As can be seen from figure 9.2, not only
does a person’s level of education increase the reading of newspapers, it significant-
ly affects the number of newspapers consumed per reader as well. The figure also
indicates that newspaper consumption increases with level of income.
The section on news consumption concludes with a deeper look at the use
of radio and TV as information sources. The overwhelming majority of Jordanians
rely on Jordanian radio and TV. Nearly one-third (32 percent) listened to news from
the radio the day preceding the interview, while two-thirds (67 percent) watched
296
CONTENTS
news on TV. But a substantial number of people also follow the news on non-
Jordanian TV stations. Nonetheless, for the most part these sources serve as sup-
plements. Just one percent of the respondents used non-Jordanian TV or radio alone.
A considerable number of Jordanians, 28 percent, follow news from other Arab,
Israeli or Western TV at least once a week.
Figure 9.3 displays that about 20 percent of the adult respondents watched
Arab channels other than the Jordanian during the week before the interview; that
Figure 9.2 Newspaper consumption. Number of newspapers read the day prior to the inter-
view, by sex, highest level of education and yearly household income
Figure 9.3 Consumption of non-Jordanian radio and television news the day prior to the in-
terview, by nationality of source. Note that some individuals use more than one source of
information. RSI 15 years or older
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CONTENTS
15 percent watched Israeli news; while two percent followed news put on the air by
Western TV stations.
Public Participation
This section focuses on four different indicators of public involvement: (1) voting,
(2) campaigning, (3) organisational membership, and (4) the use of a rabita or diwan
or similar institutions. The first two, voting and campaigning, relate to the elector-
al system. Let us therefore begin with briefly delineating that system. Jordan has a
bicameral legislature. The Parliament or National Assembly consists of a Senate of
40 senators appointed by the King and a popularly elected House of Representa-
tives of 80. Both chambers have a tenure of four years. Following the 1967 war, no
elections were held until 1989. The electorate consists of Jordanian citizens above
the age of 19 years, suspending however the right of the Armed Forces, Public
Security and Civil Defence personnel to vote as long as they are in service. Candi-
dates for election are required to meet several conditions, among which are to be a
Jordanian citizen for at least ten years and to be at least 30 years of age. The elec-
tion law also stipulates that a person may not combine membership in the House
of Representatives with holding a public post. 1993 saw the first multiparty election
in nearly forty years. Yet, the majority of the candidates did not run under a party
banner. Tribal support is a decisive factor in Jordanian elections. In addition to
national elections, there have been polls at the local level. The last municipal elec-
tions prior to the survey were held in 1995.
Voting
Does the Jordan Living Conditions Survey identify any population groups that vote
more than others? Are there any socioeconomic characteristics that appear to ‘explain’
variance in voting? We start with some factors which do not play an important role
in accounting for people’s voting. No effects are traced for level of education and
income. Likewise, whether a person lives in an urban or rural area does not have
any impact on the act of voting.
Gender does not seem to have much effect either, as 62 percent of Jordani-
an women and 60 percent of Jordanian men above the age of twenty have voted in
municipal or national elections at least once during their life. Yet, it is known that
the female turnout in each individual Jordanian election is less than that of men,
despite the fact that women constitute a higher percentage of the total electorate.
To illustrate, official figures show that the female share of voters was 48.6 percent
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during both the 1995 municipal elections (Jordan Times, 15 July 1995) and the
1997 parliamentary elections (Jordan Times, 13 September 1997). The female
dominance of the electorate is partly due to the age/sex structure of the population,
and partly to the Election Law, which suspends the right to vote of the Armed Force,
Public Security and Civil Defence, institutions that are mainly filled with men.
Figure 9.4 discloses some attributes that do affect balloting. First, more older
than younger Jordanians have ever voted. Another conclusion would have been very
surprising, as one would expect some positive effect from the increased number of
opportunities to vote. Second, there is a considerable gap in voting between
Palestinian refugees and the non-refugee part of the population. Whereas only 54
percent of the refugees have been to the polls, 68 percent of the non-refugees have
ever voted. An interesting point is that female voting behaviour explains most of
the variation. Fifty-nine percent of the male refugees and 62 percent of the male
non-refugees have voted, while the figures for women are 50 percent and 72 percent
respectively.
Figure 9.4 Persons 20 years or more who have ever voted in local or national elections by age
groups, Palestinian refugee status, governorate, organisational membership and news con-
sumption
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Third, a striking feature of figure 9.4 is the geographical variation found. Amman,
Zarqa and Mafraq have voting participation rates about 20 percentage points below
that of the other governorates. This regional variation is at least partly explained by
the lower participation rates among Palestinian refugees, since the majority of them
reside in these cities. Fourth, we have identified a difference in voting between those
who are and those who are not members of one or more organisations. The figures
are 73 percent and 61 percent respectively. Finally, people who actively seek news
through mass media are somewhat more politically active, at least judged by this
particular indicator, than those who do not follow the news as much, and therefore
perhaps are less preoccupied with politics. While 63 percent of the Jordanians who
follow news through the media have ever voted, 57 percent of those who do not
use media as an information source have ever voted.
Campaigning
Conventional wisdom would have it that it takes much more political awareness
and dedication to engage in electoral campaigning than to vote. Therefore the
number of people involved in such activities should be considerably less than the
number of voters. The Jordan Living Conditions Survey data reveals that 12 per-
cent of Jordanians (15 percent of men versus 9 percent of women) have ever actively
promoted or campaigned for a candidate during elections.
Two comments on this result seem in order. First, nearly one in eight Jorda-
nians above the age of twenty has ever been involved in electoral campaigns. In
interpreting this result we should keep in mind that the survey did not define elec-
toral campaigning as it is understood in Western democracies. Contrary to what is
usually the case in the West, men and women who actively promote a candidate
under informal circumstances would also define themselves as campaigners. This
means that although campaigning is a reliable indicator of political involvement,
it is not, at least as it was used in this particular study, necessarily a very good indi-
cator of participation in formal forums.
Second, the gap between the two sexes is not very wide. In fact, we would
have expected a far bigger difference between men and women’s participation since
Jordanian politics is traditionally understood as the prerogative of men. The result
is even more remarkable when we take into consideration women’s short experience
with electoral politics. Women were enfranchised in 1974 but were not able to
execute this right until the by-elections held ten years later. The national election
of 1989 was their first real opportunity to engage in parliamentary life. Moreover,
there have been very few female candidates to encourage women campaigners. Only
twelve women ran for the parliamentary elections in 1989. Four years later the
number of candidates was down to three.
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As is the case for voting, figure 9.5 shows that the proportion of people who have
ever campaigned increases slightly with age. Contrary to what was the situation for
voting, there is a correlation between educational level and campaigning. While 16
percent of Jordanians with higher education have actively campaigned for a
candidate during elections, only 8 percent among those without any education have
done so.
In parallel to the result on voting, figure 9.5 reveals that the non-refugee
population has been much more actively involved in electoral campaigning than
the Palestinian refugees. The likelihood of Palestinian refugees having ever cam-
paigned is nearly one-half that of non-refugees. One important reason for the
variation between the two population groups is the relatively low number of Pales-
tinian candidates in comparison to the number of candidates of East Bank or Trans-
Jordanian origin. For instance, only an estimated 8 percent of the candidates were
identified as Palestinians during the 1989 parliamentary elections (Robins 1990).
This situation is partly explained by the Election Law that allocates a
Figure 9.5 Persons 20 years or more who have ever campaigned for a candidate in local or
national elections by sex, age groups, education, Palestinian refugee status, news consump-
tion, organisational membership and voting
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Membership in Organisations
A 1996 national poll by Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, indicat-
ed that 10 percent of the population participate in some kind of social organisa-
tion (Jordan Times, 11 May 1996). The JLCS asked if the respondent was a mem-
ber of any women, youth, social, sports, or cultural organisation or club. Data reveal
that 7 percent of Jordanian citizens above the age of fifteen are members of such
voluntary associations. Figure 9.6 shows various determinants for participation in
associational life. It indicates that 12 percent of men against only 2 percent of women
claim to be member of at least one organisation, society or club. The figure further
discloses regional differences. While 8 percent of the population in the southern
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governorates of Karak, Tafileh, Ma’an and Aqaba are affiliated with some formal
organisation, only 4 and 5 percent of the inhabitants of Jerash and Ajloun, and Zarqa
and Mafraq are. Those who live in urban centres are more often members of asso-
ciations and clubs than are people living in more sparsely populated areas. As for
voting and electoral campaigning, Palestinian refugee status plays a central role in
accounting for variation. The likelihood of being a member of a voluntary organ-
isation is higher among non-refugees than among the Palestinian refugee population.
Contrary to what the survey shows for voting and campaigning, there is no
relationship between age and the tendency to become involved in organisational
activities. But education has a positive effect. As can be seen in figure 9.6, the
membership level increases steadily with more education. While 2 percent are
Figure 9.6 Persons 15 years or more who are members of at least one organisation; by sex,
urban rural status, governorate, Palestinian refugee status, highest level of education com-
pleted, and yearly household income
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CONTENTS
304
CONTENTS
attended against only 5 percent women. A study by the Centre for Strategic Stud-
ies at Jordan University found that 45 percent of 600 surveyed Jordanian men had
ever participated in a jaha (Jordan Times, 11 May 1996).
Rabitas, diwans and similar institutions are important aspects of any discus-
sion on political participation in Jordan. For instance, one Jordanian scholar writes
that the guesthouses (what he calls reception-houses) are the locus of electoral pol-
itics (Haddad 1992). For comparison, diwans made up central arenas for the 1996
election campaigns in the neighbouring West Bank and Gaza Strip also (Gilen 1996,
Hovdenak 1996, Tuastad 1997). The JLCS shows that 10 percent of the interviewed
individuals above the age of fifteen attended at least one political meeting the twelve
months before the interview either in his or her own guesthouse (2.4 percent) or,
more commonly, in somebody else’s guesthouse or outside a guesthouse (7.6 per-
cent). Roughly one in four who attended a political meeting did so in own diwan
or rabita or similar institution. We must assume that some of the respondents vis-
ited political meetings in other guesthouses as well. Hence, our results correspond
well to the political importance assigned to such institutions as diwans and rabitas.
Who attends political meetings? Our data produce no surprises. In general,
analysis supports earlier results showing that men are more politically active than
women, that older people are more active than younger people, that increasing
educational levels increase political participation, and that the non-refugee part of
the population is more politically active than the Palestinian refugee population
Figure 9.7 Respondent’s hamulah or ashira or village has a guesthouse; by urban-rural sta-
tus, governorate and Palestinian refugee status
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CONTENTS
(figure 9.8). In addition, those Jordanians who consume news through the media
and are most active in organisational life and electoral politics also make most
political use of this arena. Twenty-eight percent who have ever campaigned have used
a guesthouse for political purposes as compared to 8 percent who have never cam-
paigned. Among voters, 16 percent have participated in a political meeting at a diwan
or rabita. Five percent of the Jordanians who have never been to the polls have visited
Figure 9.8 Persons 15 years or older who attended at least one political meeting during the
12 months preceding the interview; by sex, age groups, highest level of education completed,
Palestinian refugee status, news consumption, organisational membership, ever voted, and
ever campaigned
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CONTENTS
a guesthouse to discuss political matters. In the same vein, among persons who form
part of associational life, 23 percent have been to a political guesthouse gathering
compared to 10 percent among individuals who are not members of any voluntary
organisation.
A brief comment to the gender differences in the political use of a diwan or
rabita seems appropriate. But first, let us make it clear that men and women usual-
ly participate in separate meetings. Approximately seven times as many men as
women, whose extended family or village have a guesthouse, attended at least one
political gathering at the community guesthouse during the 12 months prior to the
interview, 14 percent against 2 percent. This gender gap is significant and in line
with the situation in other Arab countries. To illustrate, among Palestinians living
in the neighbouring West Bank and Gaza Strip the guesthouse still appears to be
an institution primarily for men. Observers of the Palestinian 1996 Elections found
that Palestinian women were excluded from campaign meetings held in such family
associations (Gilen 1996, Hovdenak 1996). Likewise, a similar Kuwaiti institution,
the semi-public diwaniyya, remains part of male political culture, controlled by rigid
patterns of gender segregation (Al-Mughni 1997).
The gender gap in the field of family politics is even wider than for general
politics, at least if one looks at participation in guesthouse meetings where the top-
ic is resolution of inter-family or inter-tribal conflict. While 11 percent of Jordanian
men belonging to a community with a guesthouse had engaged in such a meeting,
only 1 percent of women had done the same.
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CONTENTS
are gradually obtaining more prominent public positions, although changes are com-
ing at a slow pace.
The JLCS basically confirms the claim that there is a ‘psychological’ barrier
against female public and political participation in Jordan. Hence, it is in agreement
with a 1993 national poll by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of
Jordan that found that nearly four in five of the 2,250 respondents believed that
men were more capable of political work than women. When asked the hypothet-
ical question of who they would prefer if a man and a woman with the same qual-
ities and capabilities competed for elections in their district, 68.5 percent of the
women said they would cast their vote for the man. The majority saw women’s main
role at home. (Jordan Times, 28 September 1993).
According to the JLCS, about one-third of those interviewed are against
women serving in municipal councils (34 percent), the national assembly or in the
government (35 percent). Figure 9.9 shows that nearly double the number of men
(46 and 47 percent) compared to women (24 and 25 percent) are against women
Figure 9.9 Individuals 15 years or older who are opposed to women doing the following
activities: participate in voluntary social work, vote, be a member of a local council, be a
minister or parliamentarian
Figure 9.10 Views on women’s public participation by age groups and sex. Individuals 15 years
and above who state that they are against women being a minister or a parliamentarian,
women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work
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CONTENTS
holding such positions. Furthermore, as many as 20 percent of the men do not want
women to vote. Only 9 percent of the women share this view. Many Jordanian men
would prefer not to see women active in organisational life. When asked if women
should be allowed to take part in voluntary social activities, which is presumably
among the least political of all organised activities, as many as 34 percent of men
answer that women should not be allowed to engage in these activities. Even 10
percent of Jordanian women share this opinion.
People’s age seems to have a positive effect on political participation. What
impact does age have on people’s attitudes? Figure 9.10 reveals that age has the
opposite effect on women and men. While older men are more positive to women’s
entry into public roles than younger men, women above the age of 50 are more
conservative than younger women. The most noticeable result is without doubt the
Table 9.1 Views on women’s public participation according to the respondent’s religion and
Palestinian refugee status, highest level of education, level of yearly household income,
news consumption, whether the respondent has ever voted or campaigned, and wheth-
er he or she is member of at least one association. Percent of respondents 15 years and
above who state that they are against women being a minister or a parliamentarian,
women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work. Percent
Voluntary social Be a minister or
Vote in elections
activities parliamentarian
Christian 8 4 10
Muslim 21 14 36
Non-refugees 19 12 32
Palestinian refugees 23 17 38
Low income: JD1450 or less 23 17 34
Middle income: JD 1451-2900 22 14 36
High income: JD 2901 or more 17 12 33
No education 24 19 35
Basic school 23 14 37
Secondary school 14 11 32
Higher education 18 9 32
Not member 21 15 35
Member of organisation 20 8 33
Never campaigned 21 15 36
Ever campaigned 16 8 26
Never voted 22 19 39
Ever voted 20 9 31
No news through media 24 19 35
News through media 20 13 35
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CONTENTS
Freedom of Movement
It is here hypothesised that the more women are free to move around at will and
the wider the range of activities they may do alone, the more liberalised and pro-
gressive are the mindsets and internal values of their families. Philippe Fargues has
convincingly argued that
“both girls’ enrollment at school and women’s work in cities are indicators
that females have a recognized place outside the world of kin. They also
suggest an openness of men to non-patriarchal values: openness of the father
in the former case, openness of the husband in the latter.” (Fargues 1995:
184)
The idea being that such values are conducive to a more active public life, and to
democratic and participatory action. Before looking at the effect of women’s free-
dom on public life, this section describes how unrestricted Jordanian women may
move around according to the JLCS, and presents a few factors that appear to explain
the presence of this freedom or the lack of it.
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CONTENTS
Figure 9.11 Women who can go alone, with company, or can not go to certain places: study
abroad, visit relatives abroad, visit relatives outside of town, visit relatives in town, go to a
doctor, go to the local market, and visit neighbours
The survey shows that the majority of Jordanian women above the age of 15 (83
percent) can visit their neighbours without being accompanied. However, as the
distance from family and dwelling to the destination increases, the ability to move
around decreases for many women. Around six in ten adult women can travel alone
within the borders of the town or village where they live, but less than one-half of
that say that they can visit relatives alone outside their place of residence. Approx-
imately 5 percent are not allowed to visit relatives outside of town and 30 percent
state that they can not visit relatives abroad, even when they travel with
someone(figure 9.11).
Based on the items in figure 9.11, we have developed a ‘freedom of move-
ment index’. By counting the number of ‘can go alone’ responses, the female Jor-
danian population has been divided into five groups: Very free = 7 ‘can go alone’
answers; Quite free = 5 such answers; Free = 3-4; Not so free = 1-2; and Can never
go alone = 0 ‘can go alone’ answers. At one end of the scale, 27 percent are able to
move around very freely or quite freely, while at the other end, over 12 percent can
never go alone (figure 9.12).
Figure 9.12 confirms that women’s freedom of movement is closely related
to public and political participation. For instance, women who are free to move
around alone are more likely to vote than women who are hindered by social
restrictions. Among those who can never go alone only one-half as many women
have ever voted as among those who can move around very freely or quite freely.
Our analysis, moreover, demonstrates that there is a relationship between
women’s freedom of movement and their opinions about women’s participation in
the realms of voluntary organisation and politics. Those who are most free are clearly
less opposed to women’s involvement. For example, negative attitudes are
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CONTENTS
approximately three times more common among women who ‘can never go alone’
than among women who are ‘very free’. This implies that women’s attitudes to a
considerable degree mirror their own social positions and their families’ values (figure
9.13).
Figure 9.12 Freedom of movement and public participation. Women 15 years or more who
have participated in certain activities by their freedom of movement: ever voted, ever campaigned,
member of organisation, attended political meeting in a guesthouse last twelve months
Figure 9.13 Freedom of movement and women’s views on women’s public participation.
Women 15 years and above who state that they are against women being a minister or a
parliamentarian, women as voters, and women participating in voluntary social work
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CONTENTS
Many Jordanian citizens have for historical reasons spent a considerable part of their
lives abroad, and a substantial number of households have close relatives living in
some non-Jordanian country (see chapter 2). Therefore, we can assume that the
Jordanian population has been exposed to substantial cultural, economic and
political influence from outside. Moreover, modern mass media has made non-Jor-
danian and foreign ideas accessible to most people. For example, as mentioned earlier,
nearly 30 percent of the Jordanian public watch news on a non-Jordanian TV channel
at least once a week. Yet, for the most part, people are exposed to influence from
within the Arab world.
What do Jordanians above the age of 15 years think about influence from
the developed countries, by most respondents probably interpreted to mean the
Western states, into Jordan? The JLCS finds 11 percent of the respondents to believe
that more technology from the industrialised coiuntries should not be transferred
to their home country, while 89 percent give strong or moderate support to its wider
use. It also reveals that about one in five are against translating non-Arabic (West-
ern) books into Arabic and selling them in Jordan, and that one-half of the Jorda-
nian population does not want the political systems of Arab countries to become
more like the systems of the West (the developed countries) (figure 9.14.). This is
however not to be interpreted as if Jordanians do not want to continue the path of
political liberalisation started in 1989. According to a series of national surveys from
the most recent years, Jordanians rate their democracy at the middle of the road and
want to keep up with reform politics. (Centre for Strategic Studies at the University
of Jordan, referred in Jordan Times, 11 May 1996, 5-6 June 1997).
Figure 9.14 Opinions about influence from the developed countries. Individuals above the
age of fifteen who supports, give conditional support or are against more widely use of tech-
nology from the industrialised countries in Jordan, the sale of non-Arabic books translated
to Arabic in Jordan, and that Arab countries should become more like the developed countries
in their political systems
313
CONTENTS CHAPTER 8 CHAPTER 10
314
CHAPTER 9 CHAPTER 11 CONTENTS
Summary
Our findings show that the health conditions of Jordanian children, from the new-
born to teenager, are generally good. Refugees do not appear to have worse child
health conditions than non-refugees, and for a number of indicators, showed a
tendency towards better child health.
On the other hand, several categories of individuals were associated, to a
greater or lesser degree depending on the indicator and age of the child, to poorer
health outcomes. Low annual household income was consistently associated with
poor health indicators in infants and children, and lower educational achievement
in youth. We found that the children of women with no education were associated
with significantly poorer results on health indicators, particularly so for young chil-
dren. One important exception to this relates to the duration of breast-feeding.
Women with no education or only basic education had a significantly lower risk of
stopping breast-feeding than highly educated women. We found the mother’s edu-
cation to be most influential in comparisons between children born to uneducated
mothers and children born to mothers with high levels of education, with differ-
entials according to other levels of education inconsistent.
Considering living conditions indicators for children under 5 years of age,
levels of prenatal care, assisted deliveries, infant and child mortality, and vaccina-
tion coverage were better than those in most MENA and middle-income countries.
We also found some problem areas impacting the health of young children which
include postnatal care (only 5 percent of Jordanian women received a postnatal
health care check), malnutrition and short birth intervals.
Although still below rates reported for other MENA countries, some 14
percent of Jordanian children under 5 years showed malnutrition in the form of
stunting.
Median birth intervals in Jordan have increased over the last 2 decades, but
not considerably - only 4 percent since 1990. Average birth intervals (30 months)
are slightly over the minimum considered healthy by international health agencies.
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CONTENTS
Considering youth aged 5 to 15 years, the mother’s education shows little effect on
the health of children. Income and household conditions including crowding,
smoking in the home and sanitation facilities as they related to youth health, showed
no association with the degree of illness in youth of this age group. Household in-
come, however, was associated with how youth spend their leisure time - with youth
from higher income families participating more in social, educational and sport-
ing activities than lower income groups. Youth from low-income families were are
also more likely to drop out of school. The probability of dropping out of basic
school is almost two times higher among this group than among children from other
income groups.
Introduction
This chapter will focus on the situation of children and youth, including mother’s
health care before birth up to youth at 15 years of age. It is organised in chapters
centering on issues concerning age groups from pregnancy and birth through child-
hood to youth.
We start the chapter by discussing findings related to the position of new-
born children, infants and small children less than five years of age. As the care
received by the mother both prior to birth, during birth and after birth can often
determine the health and survival of the newborn child, we will begin with a
description of delivery assistance and postnatal care for Jordanian mothers. Second,
infant and childhood mortality levels will be presented. Factors affecting infant and
child health and survival will then be discussed, including birth spacing, birth
weights, breast-feeding practices and the nutritional status of children under 5 years.
Finally, the type of care received by children under 5 and their play activities will
be described.
We then proceed to children and youth above 5 years of age. Here, we first
give a presentation of their home situation and their health, before we turn to
studying their educational and leisure activities. While more detailed analysis of
education is found in chapter 4, we will give attention primarily to dropouts and
reasons for not attending school.
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CONTENTS
Prenatal Care
In Jordan most women receive prenatal care, meaning some type of health care
during pregnancy. Eighty-five percent of women ever pregnant visited a health center
during their pregnancy. During the latest pregnancy, 79 percent of women received
prenatal care by a doctor, 2 percent by a nurse and 4 percent by a midwife.
There are only small differences in the amount and type of prenatal care
obtained by women in urban compared to rural areas. Figure 10.1 presents a fairly
equal distribution of prenatal care among women living in urban and rural areas.
In total, 88 percent of urban women and 76 percent of rural women received prenatal
care during pregnancy. In both urban and rural areas the majority of women visit-
ed a doctor for care (81 and 72 percent respectively), while the remaining visited a
nurse, midwife or other type of care-giver.
The use of prenatal care is dependent on the socioeconomic status of the
mother. Based on health care data covering the last pregnancy, 68 percent of wom-
en from households with a total income of less than 1450 JD visited a doctor for
prenatal care, while 86 percent of women from households with an income higher
than 2900 JD did so. In the lowest income group, 22 percent of the women did
not receive care, while 10 percent of women from households earning more than
2900 JD per year had no prenatal health care.
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CONTENTS
Figure 10.2 Prenatal health care during last pregnancy by urban or rural status
When controlling for level of education, we find that prenatal health care utilization
rises with increasing education of the woman. Among women never having attended
school 38 percent received no care, while only 4 percent of women with higher
education received no prenatal care. Among the latter, 91 percent visited a doctor
and 5 percent visited other types of practitioners.
Women who received prenatal health care, on average had nearly seven vis-
its, and the majority of them (around 65 percent) had between four and ten. This
percentage is the same for urban and rural areas. Use of prenatal care services also
varies little according to the educational level of the woman. However, while 12
percent of women with low levels of education had more than ten visits, 17 percent
of women with higher education had this many visits. Women with low education
levels more often have few visits than those with higher education. This is shown
in figure 10.3.
Jordanian women start prenatal health care early, and higher educated women
seem to have a higher level of concern regarding prenatal health than women with
no or basic education, in the sense that they consult prenatal health care services
earlier on in their pregnancies. During the first month of pregnancy more than 30
percent of women had their first visit, and after three months nearly 70 percent had
initiated their prenatal care program. The number of women starting their prena-
tal health program early increases with household income, but there is no difference
between women living in urban and rural areas. The level of the woman's educa-
tion influences how early the prenatal care program is started. While 17 percent of
women who have not attended school began prenatal visits during the first month
of pregnancy, 45 percent of the women with higher education did the same.
318
CONTENTS
Figure 10.3 Number of health visits during last pregnancy by mother’s education
The JLCS data indicate that Jordan has good vaccination coverage against tetanus
for pregnant women. Among ever pregnant women, 36 percent reported that they
were vaccinated during pregnancy to avoid tetanus infection in the mother and child
in conjunction with delivery. This percentage is the same for urban and rural areas.
As tetanus vaccination is effective for about 10 years it is not necessary that women
be immunized during every pregnancy.
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CONTENTS
Figure 10.6 describes the place of delivery for the most recent and second most recent
births. Data on birth assistance was extracted for births during the five years pre-
ceding the survey only, in order to better compare JLCS data with earlier studies
and depict the current situation.
Ninety-five percent of births in Jordan were assisted by a trained medical at-
tendant. Most Jordanian women gave birth in either a public or private hospital
where the delivery was assisted by a doctor, nurse or midwife. In three out of four
deliveries, public hospitals were chosen over private facilities for the most recent
birth. As the figure indicates, 13 percent of the respondents reported that their most
recent child was born at home. Considering data complete for both delivery loca-
tion and birth, slightly over one-half of home births were assisted by a medically
Figure 10.6 Delivery location for 2 most recent births (1991-96). n=8001
320
CONTENTS
321
CONTENTS
Figure 10.7 Location of delivery and delivery assistance for 2 latest births by background var-
iables (1991-96)
were most pleased with their care (over 80 percent had no recommendations for
changes) while women who had completed higher education were the least pleased
with their care (44 percent recommended one or more changes). This is likely to
be a reflection of demands for higher standards by educated women, not that
uneducated women were best treated.
322
CONTENTS
with increasing levels of education through basic and secondary levels as well. Post-
natal care was given to mothers slightly more often after early birth-order children
than after later pregnancies. For example, 30 percent of first birth-order children’s
mothers received postnatal care compared to 27 percent of the seventh- to ninth-
order children’s mothers.
Birth Intervals
Allowing for a minimum of two years between births is important for the health of
infants and children. Adequate birth spacing lowers infant mortality rates and
generally improves infant and child health, in part by allowing for better breast-feed-
ing practices. Promotion of the concept of birth spacing and encouraging a mini-
mum two-year gap between births are among the activities of the Jordan Birth Spac-
ing Project, begun in 1995, which works in conjunction with the Ministry of Health
in Jordan (Jordan Times, Dec. 19, 1996).
The JLCS found that Jordanian women had a mean birth interval of 30
months – slightly over the minimum of two years for births during the five years
preceding the survey. While over 50 percent of all births during this period occurred
at least 2 years after the previous birth, one-quarter of the children were born less
than 18 months after the previous birth. Figure 10.8 shows the cumulative percent-
ages of birth intervals for two time periods: the ten years preceding the survey (1986-
96) and the five years preceding the survey (1991-96) compared to that of all cases.
JLCS data showed that birth intervals have lengthened somewhat over both the past
10 and past 5 years, but not considerably.
Considering only the five years preceding the survey, the median number
of months between births was 4 percent higher in comparison with results from the
1990 JPFH survey. According to JLCS results, longer birth intervals can be seen
across a variety of background characteristics. Birth intervals were higher for the
fourth to sixth order children, those born to mothers age 30 and above and to
mothers with higher education. While the JPFH survey showed that women with
higher education had shorter birth intervals than all those less educated, this trend
has shifted such that women with higher education show longer birth intervals than
women with only secondary education. This may indicate a change in the use of
contraception in which women have increased contraception use as a method for
controlling the interval between births rather than using contraception only when
the women wishes to stop having children completely.
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CONTENTS
Figure 10.8 Cumulative percent of birth intervals for 10 and 5 years preceding survey compared
to all years. (1986-96) n=8726, (1991-96) n=4552, (all years) n=19351
Figure 10.9 Median birth intervals by background characteristics (1985-90 compared to 1991-
96)
Source for 1985-90 data: Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (1990)
324
CONTENTS
325
CONTENTS
children, and 34 percent for the seventh to ninth-order children. The high percentage
of short birth intervals among certain groups of women suggests that the postpartum
amenorrhea affect is limited for these women, and due to the fact that Jordanian
women tend to begin feeding their infants supplemental liquids fairly early after
birth. Thus, less frequent and non-exclusive breast-feeding leads to a shorter post-
partum infecundable period than could be expected given the duration of breast-
feeding reported.
The large drop in infant and under-5 mortality rates over the last several decades
in Jordan mirror general improvements in health outcomes that have been excep-
tional in comparison to both other developing countries and the Middle East region.
The JLCS data showed the rapid progress in lowering infant and under-5 mortali-
ty through the 1970s continued into the early 1980s. However, indications of a slow-
ing of this decline (and reversal for select subgroups for certain measures) are evident
by the early 1990s according to most infant and child mortality measures.
Infant and child mortality was measured by 5-year groups from 1980, and according
to a number of measures, these included:
• Neonatal mortality (the probability of death during the 1st month)
• Post-neonatal mortality (the probability of death after the 1st month and before
the 1st birthday).
• Infant mortality (the probability of death before the 1st birthday).
• Child mortality (the probability of death between the 1st and 5th birthdays).
• Under-5 mortality (the probability of death before the 5th birthday).
For the most recent period (1990-94), under-5 mortality was 32 deaths per 1,000
births, child mortality was 4 deaths and infant mortality was 28 deaths per 1,000
births. The infant mortality rate in Jordan is lower than average for other middle-
income economies, which was measured as 39 deaths per 1,000 in 1995 (World
Bank 1997). The under-5 mortality rate in Jordan is also lower than that for the
MENA region, which was measured at 70 deaths per 1,000 in 1993, and signifi-
cantly lower than that for all developing countries, which was 102 deaths per 1,000
births in 1993 (UNICEF 1995).
326
CONTENTS
327
CONTENTS
Figure 10.12 Component measures of total under-5 mortality by 5-year groups. n=5428
328
CONTENTS
data from the JLCS study shows that post-neonatal levels have slowed their decline
compared to results from 1971 - 1990 presented in the JPFHS study, where the pace
of decline was between 21 - 35 percent over the three 5-year periods preceding the
study.
The relative increase in the share of post-neonatal mortality compared to
neonatal mortality, found in both the JLCS survey data and in comparing this data
with the JPFHS study, is unusual in circumstances of declining infant mortality rates.
The usual pattern is for neonatal deaths to make up an increasing share of infant
mortality for the reason that, in general, death within the first month of life is less
impacted by socio-economic and health improvements. This finding indicates that
there may be a data quality issue in which either post-neonatal mortality was under-
reported during the earliest periods or that neonatal mortality was under-reported
in the more recent periods.
Higher Mortality Rates for Infants Born to Mothers Over Age 40,
Particularly Post-Neonatal Mortality Levels
Differentials in the infant and child mortality levels by certain demographic varia-
bles are shown in table 10.1 on the following page for the 1990-94 period. Infant
mortality rates (both neonatal and post-neonatal) were slightly higher for female
children than males. Women over the age of 39 at birth had twice the frequency of
their children under 5 years dying. The highest components of under-5 mortality
for older mothers were child mortality and post-neonatal mortality rates. Child
mortality rates were more than four times higher for children born to women over
40 than those born to women between 15 and 19 years of age, and post-neonatal
rates were nearly three times higher. For example, following a large drop in post-
neonatal rates between 1980 - 85, post-neonatal mortality levels had nearly dou-
bled for women giving birth after the age of 39 during the 1990-94 period.
Young mothers, under the age of 20, can also be associated with higher infant
and child mortality levels since the 1985-89 period, subsequent to large decreases
between the 1980 and 1985 periods.
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CONTENTS
Table 10.1 Infant and child mortality by demographic characteristics (1990-94). n=5428
Post Infant Under-5
Neonatal Child
neonatal Mortality Mortality
Mortality Mortality
Mortality (1Q0) (5Q0)
Sex of child
Male 17.7 11.5 29.2 3.9 33.1
Female 16.8 10.2 27.0 3.8 30.8
Mother's Age at Birth
15-19 18.4 9.8 28.1 1.6 29.7
20-29 16.7 10.6 27.3 3.8 31.1
30-39 17 9.6 26.6 4 30.6
40+ 25.1 27.8 53 8.9 61.9
Number of Months Since Previous Birth
7-17 12.3 12.6 24.9 3.8 28.7
18-23 19.8 19.6 39.4 8.2 47.6
24-35 12.1 5.7 17.8 3.3 21.1
36-47 18.7 5.4 24.1 1.3 25.4
48+ 9.3 9.3 18.6 3.7 22.3
Birth Order of Child
1 20.4 4.7 25.1 2.5 27.6
2-3 14 10.3 24.3 3.3 27.6
4-6 13.6 11.1 24.7 3.6 28.3
7+ 25.2 17.6 42.8 6.1 48.9
that gains in reducing mortality levels have been considerable for infants born at
short intervals (less than 18 months after the previous birth). However, for the most
part under-5 mortality and infant mortality rates have either remained unchanged
or been increasing since 1985 for higher birth intervals (greater than 3 years). One
exception to this is a continued decline in neonatal mortality for birth intervals of
two years or greater which has been coupled with a continued increase in post-
neonatal mortality for the same group — showing an overall slight increase in the
infant mortality rate compared to the 1985-89 period.
First birth-order children showed higher neonatal mortality levels than all
other birth orders with the exception of the seventh or greater-order children, but
lower post-neonatal and child mortality rates. High birth-order children were
associated with higher mortality according to all measures of infant and child
mortality, but most evidently among post-neonatal deaths. Over time, however, high
birth-order infants and under-5 mortality rates dropped considerably between the
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CONTENTS
1980 and 1985 periods, and remained stable or slightly increased during the 1990
period.
Figure 10.13 on the following page describes the components of under-5
mortality rates (neonatal, post-neonatal and child mortality) by select socio-econom-
ic characteristics for the most recent period. Higher income households experienced
lower under-5 mortality as a total, and this difference was most marked for child
mortality levels. While child mortality for low-income households was 6.3 deaths
per 1000 births, middle income households had 1.1 deaths and high-income house-
holds showed no child deaths per 1000 births. Post-neonatal rates also were lower
in the middle and high-income groups than the lowest income group. Interestingly,
neonatal mortality rates were higher with increases in income.
Surprisingly, urban areas had higher under-5 mortality rates than rural are-
as, which mostly consisted of the difference between urban and rural neonatal mor-
tality rates. Across the different domains, the South showed considerably higher
under-5 mortality rates than the other domains, and the difference was mostly due
to higher neonatal mortality. Finally, the mother’s education showed a relationship
to under-5 mortality, particularly when comparing women not educated to all other
education groups.
Birth Weights
The JLCS collected birth weight data for the most recent and second most recent
births. In 11 percent of the latest two births children had low birth weights (less
than 2,500 grams). This measure is close to the average percent of low birth weight
infants for the Middle East and North Africa region, which was 10 percent in 1993,
and considerably lower than that for all developing countries (19 percent) (UNICEF
1995).
It should be noted that an unusually high number of infants were recorded
as weighing exactly 2500 grams. In order to adjust for the likelihood that many of
these birth weights were either slightly lower or higher than 2500, 50 percent were
grouped into the under 2500 grams category and 50 percent into the over 2500
grams category.
The incidence of low-birth-weight infants was examined according to a
number of demographic and socio-economic variables. As shown in figure 10.14,
the percentage of low-birth-weight infants was highest among young mothers (15-
19 years), first order births and short birth intervals. The number of low-birth-weight
infants decreased with the mother’s age at birth, higher birth orders and intervals
(with the exception of mothers over 40 years of age and birth orders higher than 10.)
331
CONTENTS
Figure 10.13 Infant and child mortality by socio-economic characteristics (1990-94) n=5428
The mother’s education showed that women with basic education had the highest
incidence of low-birth-weight infants followed by women with no education, higher
education and finally, secondary education. Household annual income appeared to
have a more direct relationship to birth weights. While 12 percent of the two latest
infants had low birth weights among low-income families, 7 percent of the infants
were low-birth-weight from high income households. Rural/urban status showed
the strongest relationship to birth weights among the socio-economic variables.
Rural infants were twice as likely to have low birth weights (16 percent of the latest
2 births) than urban infants (8 percent of the latest two births). This contrasts to
findings discussed above concerning infant mortality. One would expect that the
incidence of low-birth-weight infants would follow infant mortality rates. Urban
areas had higher infant mortality rates than rural areas, but considerably fewer low-
birth-weight infants.
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CONTENTS
No relationship was found between the mother’s receiving, or not receiving, prena-
tal care and low birth weights in their infants — nearly the same percentage of infants
had low birth weights.
Figure 10.14 Percent of births with low birth weights by background variables, latest 2 births
333
CONTENTS
Breast-Feeding Practices
334
CONTENTS
The education level of the mother again showed an inverse relationship to infants
being breast-fed. More infants born to uneducated mothers were breast-fed at least
four months, and the duration was longer than all other education groups. Infants
born to highly educated women were the least likely to be breast-fed the minimum
recommended duration, and those who were breast-fed for at least 4 months or
greater were done so for a shorter duration than infants born to women with lower
education. For example, while 12 percent of infants born to uneducated women
were breast-fed less than four months, 23 percent of infants born to women with
higher education were not breast-fed the minimum recommended duration. First
birth-order children were slightly less often breast-fed for at least four months and
breast-feeding stopped sooner than with other later order children. This could be
due to the mother’s lack of success at breast-feeding due to inexperience or knowl-
edge deficit with the first child.
The association between the location of birth and duration of breast-feed-
ing was examined to ascertain if infants born in hospitals were breast-fed more often
or longer than those born at home. As mentioned above, hospitals can play an
important role in encouraging good breast-feeding practices. However, it was found
that the relationship between these variables was opposite as what might be expected.
Infants born at home were most often breast-fed at least 4 months --10 percent more
than infants born in government hospitals and 12 percent more than those born in
private hospitals. Since low-income, uneducated women would be most likely to
give birth at home, this finding, however, could also be expected, as these charac-
teristics were associated with better breast-feeding practices above.
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CONTENTS
In order to examine more closely the relationship between these factors and the
duration of breast-feeding, we employed a Cox regression analysis, or the Cox
proportional hazard model. Here, the model assumes that the proportional hazard
for ceasing breast-feeding is proportional to the co-variates (explanatory variables)
for the individuals. The results of this analysis show the level of risk for women stop-
ping breast-feeding associated with each of the independent variables.
The variables used included location of delivery, mother’s education, urban/
rural status, sex of the child and the mother’s participation in the labour force.
Significant results were found in a number of categories. Women’s education at the
lower levels showed the lowest risk of stopping breast-feeding related to the higher
educated women. Women with basic education or less showed a 33 percent lower
risk of stopping breast-feeding than highly educated women. A lower risk was
associated with women who had secondary education also, but this result was not
statistically significant. Part of the affect of educational achievement, however, may
be including the affect of household income, which was not included in the analysis.
Women with increasing levels of education also tend to have increasing household
incomes, and higher household income was associated with shorter duration of
breast-feeding.
Urban women had a 9 percent higher risk of ceasing breast-feeding compared
to rural women, and women not participating in the labour force had a 13 percent
lower risk of stopping breast-feeding than working women. In comparing the rela-
tionship between breast-feeding duration and the sex of the child, we found that
336
CONTENTS
mothers of male infants had a 12 percent lower risk of ending breast-feeding than
mothers of female infants.
Finally, the relationship between location of delivery and duration of breast-
feeding described above was substantiated with significant results. With women
delivering in a hospital as the reference group, women delivering at home with
trained assistance showed a 17 percent lower risk of stopping breast-feeding. Women
delivering at home without trained assistance also had a lower risk (12 percent), but
this was not statistically significant.
337
CONTENTS
to have been influenced by the reluctance parents showed to undress their children
before weighing, leading to child weights being higher than reality.
Regarding all indices, the prevalence of malnutrition in Jordan is well below
that for the MENA region as a whole, for which it has been reported that 13 per-
cent of the children were underweight, 6 percent suffered wasting and 25 percent
were stunted (UNICEF 1995).
Few cases showed malnutrition in the form of underweight and wasting, and
these measures may by biased due to inaccurate recording of weights. Therefore,
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Child Immunisation
Vaccination information was collected for children under 5 years of age, with
detailed immunisation records obtained from vaccination/health cards or the
mother’s recall of the number of vaccinations for children for which no health card
was presented. Over one-half of the respondents presented a vaccination card for
their child, 35 percent responded that the child had a card but it was not shown,
and 9 percent of the mothers responded that the child had no card. Of those who
did not show a vaccination card, but relied on mother’s recall of vaccinations, 82
percent of the respondents said the child had been vaccinated, 10 percent respond-
ed that the child had not been vaccinated and 5 percent did not know their child’s
immunisation status.
Data concerning the type and timing of vaccinations for children under 5
was collected only for children for whom an immunisation card was presented. This
information will be examined according to immunisation schedules described by
the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region (1995). As the countries within the region
follow slightly different schedules, we compared the schedules described by WHO
to JLCS data. Although, in practice, Jordan’s schedule may vary slightly from this
on the number of doses and timing. The WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region
schedule is described in table 10.3 on the following page with the number of doses
and timing described as being practised in Jordan.
While a number of countries’ immunisation schedules include additional
DPT and Polio vaccinations, the primary series of DPT, Polio and Hepatitis is 3
339
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340
CONTENTS
doses and the primary series for measles is one or two doses. Using this as a mini-
mum, 1, 1.5, 2 and 3-year old children’s immunisation records were examined to
ascertain how many had completed their immunisation schedules.
As figure 10.18 describes, over 80 percent of one-year-olds had completed
their minimum DPT, Polio and Measles vaccinations: 84 percent, 86 percent and
85 percent respectively. However, only 14 percent of one-year olds had completed
Hepatitis vaccinations. Over 90 percent of children at 18 months had completed
their immunisations, with the exception, again, of hepatitis. Only 8 percent of 1.5-
year-olds had received 3 doses of hepatitis, and the majority (84 percent) had not
received a single hepatitis dose. By three years of age, nearly all children had been
fully vaccinated for DPT, Polio and Measles, but less than 15 percent had ever
received a single dose of hepatitis.
Note: “completed” vaccination includes 3 DPT, 3 Polio, 1-2 Measles & 3 Hepatitis
Immunisation rates for Jordanian children at 1 year of age are similar to other MENA
countries, which as a group had 83 percent DPT coverage, 83 percent Polio, and
80 percent Measles coverage in 1993 (UNICEF, 1995).
Excluding Hepatitis immunisation, what incidence of incomplete vaccina-
tion that exists in 1-year-olds appears to be due to the tendency for increasingly less
coverage with each dosage. For example, considering the schedule of doses for DPT,
the majority of 2-month old infants had received their first DPT dose (74 percent)
while this coverage decreased to slightly over one-half of the 3 month-old infants
receiving their second dose of DPT as scheduled, and another 34 percent receiving
only the first dose. Forty percent of 4 month-old infants had received their third
341
CONTENTS
dose of DPT as scheduled, 39 percent had received their second dose and 13 percent
had only received one dose. Thus, there was a tendency for vaccinations to be given
slightly later than the schedule describes for children during the first year, and for
the children to “catch-up” with vaccinations over the next two years.
Results from the JLCS also showed that there appears to be a few number
of cases of over-vaccinated children less than 5 years of age for DPT and Polio. While
the vaccination program for Jordan described by WHO includes 4 DPT and 5 Polio,
there were 49 cases out of 1565 (3 percent) in which children 2-4 years had received
more than 4 DPT doses. Although some countries do include a fifth DPT dose,
this is not usually given until the child is at least 6 years of age. In addition, 18
children out of 1595 (1.1 percent) at 2-4 years old were given more than 5 Polio
doses. The sixth Polio dose also should not be given before the child reaches 6 years.
The JLCS survey asked mothers if their children had been ill during the last two
weeks, and collected data regarding what type of illnesses the children had including:
fever, cough or cold, diarrhoea, other illness and if the child had an accident of some
kind. Figure 10.19 shows the distribution amongst these categories of illness for
those children under 5 years who had some kind of illness during the last two weeks.
Including all responses, slightly over one-half of the children had some type
of illness during the last two weeks. Coughs and colds were the most common illness,
Figure 10.19 Type of illness in children who had illness during the last two weeks (children
under 5 years)
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CONTENTS
and inflicted some 25 percent of all children. Less than 5 percent had fevers and
approximately 2 - 8 percent had been inflicted with diarrhoea.
Illness in young children was analysed according to a number of background
factors to determine if such variables as access to healthcare, household conditions,
and socio-economic situation influenced the frequency of illness in children, or the
tendency towards certain types of illness. Access to healthcare, measured by whether
or not the household had a health facility within walking distance, was predicted
to influence illness in children in that children with regular, preventative care are
less often ill, ill for shorter durations and with less severe illnesses. Household con-
ditions could influence the incidence of illness in children through easier transmis-
sion of virus and disease in conditions of poor sanitation and/or crowding.
No difference was found in the number of children ill during the last week
in households which had a health centre nearby compared to those that did not,
nor was there a difference in the type of illnesses contracted.
We considered that poor household conditions might contribute to increased
risk of infection in small children. However, crowded conditions, the number of
household members and the existence of proper sanitation facilities showed little
influence on the level of children ill versus not ill. In fact, fewer children were ill in
households with 3 or more persons per room than in household with less crowd-
ing. The same held true with the number of household members.
Socio-economic level measured by the education of the household head and
household income also did not appear to coincide with the level of illness in children.
However, considering only those children who reported as had been ill, more chil-
dren amongst lower income households reported diarrhoea than in higher income
households. While 10 percent of those ill in low-income households had diarrhoea,
8 percent had the same in medium income households, and 6 percent in high-
income households. Fevers were also slightly higher in low-income households.
Finally, no difference in illness was shown for refugees, who had exactly the
same incidence of illness (40 percent) as non-refugees, nor were gulf returnee house-
holds distinguishable as a group.
The results given above are all somewhat surprising, and one should not
totally discount the possibility of measurement errors here.
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CONTENTS
was yoghurt, given in 24 percent of the cases. Herbal tea was given to 16 percent
and regular tea given to 14 percent of the children with diarrhoea.
The analysis shows that the pattern of child care for children under 5 years of age
in Jordan is that few children are taken care of by an individual or day-care centre
outside the immediate family as a usual solution. The wide majority were properly
supervised during play, and television watching among these young children was
limited to a few hours per day on a regular basis. Few cases were found in which
Jordanian children were left not cared for during the day, unsupervised outside or
allowed to watch extensive amounts of television.
Almost all children under five years are taken care of by their mother dur-
ing the day (96 percent). The next most common caretaker of under-5 children is
the grandmother (1.5 percent). Less than 1 percent of the children are reported as
having no daytime caretaker.
Most of the children under five play inside or in the near vicinity of the
household. Forty-four percent of the children usually play in the house and 29
percent play in the courtyard. Few young children play in the street or on the roof.
Children at this age in Jordan spend little of their playtime outside. Close
to one-half do so for less than one hour. Twenty-two percent of the children are
outside up to two hours and 15 percent are outside for play between two and four
hours. Interestingly, 9 percent of children less than five years are reported to play
outside most of the day. Most are supervised during play outside, with 86 percent
being always supervised and 11 percent sometimes supervised. Three percent of the
children were reported to have no supervision during play outside.
Ninenteen percent of the children were too young to watch TV. Most chil-
dren watched television on a daily basis (45 percent), but they tended to watch for
limited durations. Forty-seven percent watched TV less than one hour the previ-
ous evening and another 30 percent watched for one to two hours. Fifteen percent
of children never watched TV, and 6 percent watched TV for more than 4 hours
the previous evening.
In Jordan the children typically grow up in large households headed by men, and
together with many siblings. Ninety-four percent of children of an age between 0
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and 15 years live in male headed households and 6 percent in female headed ones.
Table 10.4 shows that only 9 percent of these children and youth live in households
with 2-4 persons, while 62 percent live in households with 5-9 persons and 29
percent in households with 10 or more people.
Table 10.4 Household size among the children 0-15 years of age
Household size Not female head Female head All
2-4 persons (%) 9 19 9
5-9 persons (%) 55 61 62
10 persons or more (%) 30 20 29
Total (n) 15 756 975 16 732
The household size tends to be larger in rural than in urban areas. In urban areas
25 percent of the children and youth live in households that have 10 members or
more. Thirty-nine percent of the rural children and youth live in such large house-
holds. Sixty-four percent in urban and 54 percent in rural areas live in households
with 5-9 persons, while only 11 percent in urban and 7 percent in rural areas live
in small households. Figure 10.20 shows the distribution of household size among
the children 0-15 years of age by household head and urban or rural status.
A comparison of the JLCS data to results from the 1990 JPFHS study shows
that the large household size has been relatively stable. In studying household size
we include only ‘usual’ members, which means that only persons who are members
of the household are included. Considering household size based on all households
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CONTENTS
from the JLCS showed that 5 percent of the Jordanians live in single-person house-
holds, 31 percent live in households with 2-4 persons, 50 percent with 5-9 person
households and 14 percent in households of 10 persons or more. This is roughly
the same distribution as the JPFHS from 1990, although the mean size of usual
members in households is lower in the JLCS results. The average of household
members from the JPFHS was 6.9 while the mean size of usual members in the JLCS
was 6.0. By studying the household size categories mentioned above, most house-
holds are in the range of 5-9 persons, which covers the mean size of usual members.
Another important factor related to Jordanian children is that they grow up
in stable family environments in which parents mostly live together, and, in addi-
tion, among other family members and relatives.
Figure 10.21 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by age groups
346
CONTENTS
Figure 10.22 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by location
Figure 10.23 The general crowding index (GCI) among children 0-15 years of age by house-
hold yearly income
347
CONTENTS
the buildings. These results do not indicate higher risk of acute illness among chil-
dren exposed to smoking.
Further, smoke and acute illness have been controlled by GCI to see if GCI
influenced the distribution of smoking inside and illness. The distribution of smoke
and illness controlled by GCI was fairly equal in the four combinations of smoking
inside, no smoking inside, acute illness and no acute illness. These results do not
allow for a claim that children living in households exposed to passive smoking have
more acute illness than children not exposed to smoking inside. There could be a
number of explanations for this. One possibility is that children generally reside in
different rooms than smokers. Another explanation is that they tend to spend most
of their daytime hours outside the house.
Figure 10.24 The distribution of GCI by smoke inside houses and illness among children
0-15 years of age
Figure 10.25 The GCI by noise inside the building among children 0-15 years of age
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CONTENTS
We have, however, analyzed the relationship between the crowding and exposure
to noise. Twenty-six percent of the children live in households in which the
individual who reported told they were exposed to noise inside the building. Figure
10.25 shows that there tends to be more noise in the crowded households, and we
can expect that this indicates an environment that adversely influences the children’s
and the youngsters’ ability to do for instance schoolwork at home.
A similar analysis was conducted with the SCI for the same variables as
discussed above. The SCI rate increases with the number of persons per sleeping
room. The SCI decreases with higher total household yearly income. In 88 percent
of the households earning less than 1450 JD a year, three persons or more sleep in
the same room. In 68 percent of the households earning more than 2900 JD a year,
the sleeping rooms are similarly crowded. By looking at SCI and chronic illness to
see whether smoke influenced the frequency of ill children, there were no essential
findings. Further SCI has been controlled by noise to see if there were more responses
of “Noise from inside the building” when the SCI rate increases. The distributions
of persons per sleeping room were equal in both cases of noise or no noise from inside
the building.
The JLCS provides three variables concerning illness among children, i.e. observa-
tions of chronic illness, incidence of acute illness, and information about whether
the illness was serious enough to prevent the person from performing his or her
normal duties.
Approximately 3 percent of the children aged 5-15 years of age were reported
to have a chronic illness or disability, and roughly 10 percent of the children had
an acute illness during the two weeks preceding the interview. Few of these incidences
Figure 10.26 The GCI and acute illness of children 5-15 years of age
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CONTENTS
of acute illness were serious enough to prevent the concerned person from perform-
ing normal duties.
A more detailed study of the cases of acute illness revealed no relationship
between acute illness and educational level of the mother. Nor did we find any
significant impact on acute illness of household the crowding as measured by the
GCI.
Of other possible indicators that could influence children’s health, the following were
examined:
• Stability of main source of drinking water
• Exposure to car pollution
Leisure Activities
How children spend their leisure time does not vary much according to where the
children live in Jordan. The activities are more determined by the income of the
household. In the following, we distinguish between the younger children (5 to 9
years old) and the older ones (10 to 15 years old) in order to depict differences in
activities across these two age groups.
There is no difference between the two groups regarding playing outside
without supervision. Approximately 20 percent of the children normally play out-
side without supervision, 10 percent do this occasionally and 20 percent normally
do not play outside without supervision. These percentages are the same for urban
and rural areas.
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CONTENTS
group read books as well as newspapers while, three in ten of the highest income
group read books or newspapers. Participation in activities does not seem to be
dependent on the mothers’ education.
In general, very few children are members of any organization. Only 3 percent
of the respondents said they are members of an organization.
More than 90 percent of Jordanian children between 5 and 15 years of age
watch TV daily. Sixty percent of the children are watching TV for 2 hours or more
a day, while 28 percent watch TV for 4 hours or more. 29 percent watch TV between
1 and 2 hours. These percentages are the same for both age groups. Neither the
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Figure 10.28 Time spent in front of TV the day before interview. Children aged 5 years to 15
education level of the mothers nor the income of the household significantly
influences the time spent in front of the TV each day.
In Jordan children start schooling at the age of 6. In the age group 5-9 years, 85
percent have ever attended school. Among children of 10 to 15 years of age, 99
percent have ever attended. At the age of 15 virtually everyone has attended school.
Although the rate of school attendance is high, some children drop out of school,
and in the following we will focus on these.
In the JLCS all children of 6 to 18 years of age and not attending basic school,
were asked about the reasons for not going to school. These reasons are given in
the table 10.5 below. The table gives 610 observations of dropouts out (of 12 437
children), telling that 5 percent of the child population in schooling age has dropped
out of basic school. Of the dropouts, 15 percent give economical reasons for not
attending school, while 50 percent claim that they are not interested in school. 14
percent point to repeated failures, and 10 percent are not allowed to go to school.
The reasons varied among boys and girls. The boys’ most common reason
was that they were not interested in school (59 percent of the boys). Thirteen per-
cent gave repeated failures as the main reason, and 16 percent of the boys had no
school available nearby. Among the girls, 40 percent answered that they are not
interested in school, 19 percent were not allowed to go to school, and 15 percent
gave repeated failures as the reason.
When we check for the background of the children that are not attending
school, we find that children from low-income households are over-represented
among the dropouts. Table 10.5 shows that 33 percent of dropout children come
from households with income lower than JD 1450, while 20 percent of all children
352
CONTENTS
6-18 years old live in households with income lower than JD 1450. The probability
to drop out of basic school is almost two times higher among the children coming
from households with the lowest income group compared to the children coming
from the other income groups.
The data also show a clear relationship between the educational level of the
household head and the probability for not attending school (table 10.6). Almost
Table 10.6 Reason for dropping out by household head education level. (Percent)
Education of household head
Not Basic or
Secondary Higher All
attended less
Below legal age 0 0 0 0 0
Disability 1 2 8 32 2
Economical reasons 15 15 8 23 15
Family disintegration 1 3 1 0 2
Not interested in school 56 47 70 22 50
Repeated failure 14 15 1 0 14
Bad treatment at school 1 2 2 0 2
School not available nearby 4 5 2 0 4
Not allowed /Married /Caretaker 8 10 8 33 10
Safety problems during travel 0 0 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
353
CONTENTS CHAPTER 9 CHAPTER 11
all of the individuals that do not attend school have a household head that did not
attend school himself, or has only basic education or less. Thirty-one percent of the
dropouts have a household head who did not attended school and, in 65 percent
of the cases, the household head has basic education or less. Together, these two
groups cover 96 percent of the observations. The end result is that nearly all drop-
outs are children coming from households where the head of household either did
not attend school at all or finfished only basic school.
354
CHAPTER 10 APPENDIX 1 CONTENTS
Jon Pedersen
In the preceding chapters of this book we have dwelled on the various aspects of
living conditions in Jordan. Living conditions have been seen from inside of vari-
ous fields of study, such as health, population or economics. In this chapter the
purpose is rather a bird’s eye view of the wide field of living conditions: we want to
draw the map of living conditions in Jordan.
Some basic results from the previous chapters bear repetition, although the reader
can turn to the chapter summaries and the Introduction for more extended over-
views. A tabular overview of some basic social indicators is presented in table 11.1.
In chapter 2 on the demography of Jordan we showed that a fertility decline
is currently underway in Jordan, and that mortality is quite low compared to other
societies with similar fertility rates. Thus population growth has been very high, and
even though fertility is declining it will remain high for some time. However, a high
birth rate and low death rate are not the only reasons for rapid population change;
migration and refugee flows have also been of central importance. This has both
increased the total size of the population within the borders of Jordan, and has led
to a redistribution of the population within the country.
Because of the rapid population growth Jordan has experienced it is perhaps
surprising that the discussion on housing and infrastructure (chapter 3) found that
housing conditions generally are quite satisfactory, with good access to infrastruc-
ture such as electricity, water, roads and other public services. Crowding is never-
theless a problem, in particular in the refugee camps and in some urban areas.
The chapter on education (chapter 4) documents the revolution in school-
ing that Jordan has been through in recent years. Female education in particular
has increased tremendously, and there is now little difference in enrolment between
boys and girls up to secondary school. For the most part Jordanians are satisfied
with the performance of the schools.
355
CONTENTS
Table 11.1 Basic social indicators for Jordan as revealed by the JLCS
Number afflicted
Indicator Value Trend
in thousands*
Total Fertility Rate (1994) 4.3 Down -
Infant mortality rate 28 per 1000 Down/Stable -
Dependency ratio 77.3 Down -
Birth weight <2500g 11% ? 15+ (births)
Births with spacing < 24 months from previous 50% Stable 70+ (births)
Births not assisted by trained personnel 5% Down 7+ (births)
Children not breast fed or for less than 4 months 17% up? 23+ (children)
Postnatal care not given, % of most recent two
72% ? 94+ (births)
births
Children 6-59 months stunted 14% Down 80 (children)
Persons aged 15+ who report their health as poor 5% ? 112 (persons)
Crowding (>= 3 persons per room) 20 147 (households)
Households not having access to safe water 2% Down 15 (households)
Households with weekly or daily problems with
20% 146 (households)
stability of drinking water
Households with no health facility or doctor nearby 33% Dow n 239 (households)
Persons not enrolled in school at age 16 10% Down 11 (persons)
Persons illiterate age 15 and above 17% Down 422 (persons)
Women aged 15+ not in labour force 85% Down 1032 (persons)
Unemployed 17% ? 187 (persons)
Employed without formal work contract 54% ? 492 (persons)
Household heads outside LF 25% ? 177 (persons)
Household head has basic or less than basic
66% Down 476 (persons)
education
% female headed household 11% ? 77 (households)
% of households without electricity 3% Down 23 (households)
% households with income less than 1450 JD 27% ? 182 (households)
% households reporting reduction in income from
22% 162 (households)
1994 to 1995
% of Jordanian population aged 18+ never having
39% ? 843 (persons)
voted
% of Jordanian population aged 18+ not being
93% ? 2010 (persons)
members of a voluntary organisation
% of households without family nearby 26% ? 190 (households)
*
Assumes a base population of 4.314 million at end of February 1998. (DoS statistics estimate
for end of 1995 with population growth linearly extrapolated).
+
Numbers refer to yearly number of children born, which is roughly 137 thousand assuming
1995 fertility rates
356
CONTENTS
As was the case for education, health services has seen a rapid expansion and around
80 percent of the adults characterise their health as good or very good. Smoking
appears as a substantial problem, particularly among men. Physical access to health
care appears good. The public health care system is used in slightly more than half
of the consultations.
Several of the chapters show the importance of household income for vari-
ous living conditions outcomes in Jordan. In the chapter on the household economy
we point out that wage income is the dominant form of income, but the most suc-
cessful way of making a living is to combine income sources. Transfers of various
kinds affect most households. Increased education is a key to improved household
income.
The chapter on labour force participation and employment (7) documents
the crucial importance of the public sector for employment in Jordan, but also finds
that overall the labour force participation in Jordan is very low. This is related to
very young age distribution of the country, but is also because few women are la-
bour force members. Among the women who are members of the labour force, there
is more unemployment than for men; this is especially true for young educated
women. For men, health is an important determinant of labour force participation.
An unusual feature of the Jordanian economy is that it is both a labour exporter
(to the Gulf ) and importer (from Egypt and Syria). Women are mainly employed
in education and health services, and among men, Palestinian refugees and displaced
from 1967 are engaged in trade and private services while others are much more
frequently engaged in public services.
In chapter 8 on social networks the emphasis was to point out the impor-
tance that social networks based on family and kinship have in Jordan. In particu-
lar it is shown that people tend to live in neighbourhoods with close relatives, and
that the social network is an important part of people’s coping strategies.
Women and men differ when it comes to participation in public life (chap-
ter 9) with men being the more active. Men are often negative towards female
involvement in politics, and also female autonomy in general. Neither men nor
women are often members of voluntary organisations, but men (12 percent) more
so than women (2 percent). Participation in kinship and locality based organisa-
tions is at higher levels.
Chapter 10 on children and youth found that in general Jordanian children
and youth enjoy better living standards than do comparable countries in the region.
However, several characteristics, such as poor household income and low education
of the mother were associated with poorer health outcomes, in particular for the
youngest children. Moreover postnatal care shows very low rates of use, although
vaccination coverage is better than in comparable countries. Malnutrition, especially
357
CONTENTS
stunting, is a problem, but the JLCS did not find much extreme malnutrition in
Jordan.
In sum, the chapters paint a varied, but perhaps fairly rosy picture of Jordan,
rosier perhaps than many would expect. To a large extent the colour of a picture
depends on the colour of the pictures with which it is compared. With its 1995 GNP
per capita of 1510 USD (World Bank 1997) Jordan is a lower middle income coun-
try in World Bank terms, with many of the characteristics of such countries: extensive
coverage of basic needs for the majority, but with large room for improvement. It
still fares well compared to many such countries, especially when one considers its
poor natural resource base. For example, during the 1970s and early 1980s Jordan’s
improvement in the fields of health was much better than in other Arab countries.
A characteristic of Jordan is also that it has been, and to some extent still is,
a redistributive social formation. The government uses a large amount of its income
in subsidies, in the maintenance of a large public sector, and in education and health.
It has, traditionally, used more of its income on health than similar countries. At
7.9 percent of GDP spent on health (4.2 percent public expenditure) in 1995 (World
Bank 1997), Jordan places itself in the extreme high end among Middle Income
Countries in its share of the GDP spent on health (see World Bank 1993 for com-
parative data).
As a recent comparative paper makes clear (Deininger and Squire 1996),
Jordan does not distinguish itself in any particular way as regards income inequal-
ities. On one common measure of inequality, the income distribution, Jordan is
quite similar to other Arab countries for which data exist, is slightly more inegali-
tarian than Western European countries, and more egalitarian than African and Latin
American. To some extent that reflects the sorry state of the world more than Jor-
danian realities. In Jordan, according to the World Bank (1997), the 20 percent of
households with the lowest expenditure account for 5.9 percent of total expendi-
ture, while the 20 percent with the highest expenditure account for 50.1 percent.
Nevertheless, although the structural adjustment and the social productivity pro-
gram have reduced government involvement and are likely to reduce it further, this
less than extreme inequality is still a feature of Jordanian society.
Many contemporary reports on the social conditions in Jordan paint a dif-
ferent picture. This is partly because they focus only on those on the bottom, being
based on case studies that illuminate the conditions of the poor (e.g. Miles Doan
and Bisharat 1990; Shami 1997; DeJong 1995, Jaber 1997). Such studies are very
valuable, as they examine a significant part of the population, but they do leave
another significant part of Jordanian society out of the picture.
358
CONTENTS
A key characteristic of Jordan is that while physical and social infrastructure are
distributed quite widely to the population, many Jordanians also experience an
income deficit. As described in chapter eight on household economy 27 percent of
the households have incomes that fall below 1450 JD per year and in some rural
areas the percentage is around 40 (see table 11.3 below). One should note as dis-
cussed more in depth in chapter 6 that it is likely that the income is underestimat-
ed. As many as 11 percent of the households state that they cannot obtain 100JD
to cover a sudden urgent need, and an additional 2 percent would need help from
friends or relatives. A similar number considers themselves poor, in the sense that
they did not agree to any statement that would place them as better off. Although
it is difficult to say precisely because of very different ways of collecting data, it
appears that the distribution of income now shows a larger clustering at the lower
end of the scale than it did in the household budget survey of 1992 (Jordan
Department of Statistics 1992). However, using the program POVCAL (Chen et
al. n.d.) to smooth the observed grouped income reports into a continuous distri-
bution reveals that the gini-coefficient (a measure of lack of equality in a distribu-
tion) has not changed appreciably. Nevertheless, seventeen percent of the labour force
members are unemployed. Moreover, 19 percent of the households with children
below age 5 have one or more children afflicted with malnutrition in one form or
another.1
Thus the JLCS found comparatively good access to basic services, housing
and infrastructure existing alongside income shortfall and unemployment. There
are at least three ways to interpret that juxtaposition. The first two possibilities centre
on what many have termed the rentier character of the Jordanian economy (Brynen
1992).
The first possibility is that the population enjoys its standard of living due
to the emphasis that the government has put on its own role in the Jordanian
economy. The public sector is big, and the World Bank ventures that it broadly
defined may account for as much as two-thirds of the employees in Jordan (World
Bank 1994:105). Government investments in infrastructure and public utilities have
been very important, both directly in the provision of services and indirectly through
employment. Finally subsidies have traditionally been quite substantial. The
subsidies on wheat, powdered milk, rice and sugar corresponded to 4.2 percent of
government spending in 1992 or 1.6 percent of the GDP (World Bank 1994:34).
While that high level has since been reduced substantially, it was still important when
the JLCS data were collected. Thus, people may have been able to invest in housing,
1
Malnutrition was measured as a deficit of height for age, weight for age, weight for height
or mid upper arm circumference.
359
CONTENTS
for example, due to comparatively small expenses on food. An indication that this
may be the case is that a large proportion (11 percent) of houses in Jordan are vacant
(see chapter 3).
A second way of interpreting the findings is to point to the importance of
remittances in the Jordanian economy. Throughout the seventies the remittances
from workers abroad rose steadily, from 5 Million JD in 1971 (or 2.3 percent of
GNP) to 475 million in 1984 – a staggering 24 percent of GNP (Samha 1990:227).
The late 1980s saw a reduction in remittances and a low point was reached in 1991
when remittances made up 12 percent of the GNP. After 1991 remittances increased
again, and accounted for about 19 percent of GNP in 1994 and increased further
to 21 percent in 1996. In 1996 the remittances were JD 1,095 Million or roughly
JD 5502 Million in 1984 prices (Central Bank of Jordan 1998:5). Thus remittanc-
es play a much larger role in the economy than subsidies do. The remittances allow
many Jordanian households to enjoy living standards that they would not other-
wise have had, and 14 percent of the households consider remittances from rela-
tives as one of their three most important sources of income.
A third possibility, which is not entirely contradictory to the preceding two,
is that the level of infrastructure reflects the past economic history of Jordan while
the shortfall in income is due to the more recent downturn. Jordan experienced very
good years during the 1970s, with a GDP real growth of 11.1 percent on average
during the period 1973-79 (World Bank 1994:4). The growth slowed down during
the 1980ies, and by 1985-89 the average growth was negative at –1.2 percent (World
Bank 1994:4). Unemployment rose from a level of 3.5 percent in 1980 to the present
17 percent. The 1991 Gulf War led to a massive influx of returned workers to Jor-
dan. That undoubtedly created heavy strains, both because of the scale of the re-
turn and the concomitant need for creation of new jobs, and because of the reduc-
tion in remittances it led to. Furthermore, it also led to an upsurge in housing and
construction as the returned migrants brought with them much of their assets. Some
observers (e.g. Van Hear 1996) therefore consider that the return is partly respon-
sible for the improvements in the economy of Jordan during the early 1990s.
However, the improved fortunes of Jordan have not been distributed equally.
The boom in the eighties appears to have been followed by a diminishing of income
inequality (Ali Shab’ban 1990). But, the recovery in the early nineties may appear
to have had different results, and it is likely that the effects have had different impacts
on different categories of people. The JLCS found that one-quarter of the house-
holds considered that their incomes had declined from 1994 to 1995, while another
one-half reported that it had been stagnant. Similarly, among those that considered
themselves as poor, 39 percent stated that the situation had developed during the 5
2
1984 equivalence calculated using the relation between the 1984 current prices GNP and
constant prices GNP as calculated in Central Bank of Jordan 1998.
360
CONTENTS
years preceding the survey. As was discussed in the household economy chapter, it
is those with the least income who report that their income has diminished.
There are also other signs of strains. For example the returned migrants are
overall somewhat better off in material welfare than others, but they are more of-
ten unemployed with a rate of 23 percent. This implies that at least some are basi-
cally living off their savings, if they have not already used all of it
Another factor in this context is that although the government continued
to put emphasis on the development of public services after 1988, its degree of
success has varied. As discussed in chapter 10 on children and youth the propor-
tion of women that gave birth with a trained assistant (an important indicator of
women’s health) rose from 1990 to 1996. In contrast there has been little improve-
ment in infant and child mortality recently. The survey findings resonate well with
longitudinal studies of disadvantaged groups in Amman (Bisharat and Tefik 1985,
De Jong 1995) that also point to early improvements but worsening or stability of
the situation after 1988.
Kuznets (1955) pointed out long ago that the relation between economic
development and income inequality tends to show an inverted U-curve. At the
beginning of industrial development, income inequality is fairly small, it tends to
increase during development, and then diminishes in later stages. However, some
analysts (e.g. Nielsen 1994), point out that this simplistic model must be supple-
mented by variables such as the spread of education, political democracy and labor
force shifts, particularly from agriculture to industrial work. If we translate this into
the Jordanian context, it would seem that Jordan to some extent has been able to
avoid increased social differentiation, precisely because of some of the factors that
Nielsen points to. Education has perhaps been of particular importance, with the
rapid spread of education and the quite high economic returns to education. Some
data suggests that urban differentiation is less than rural (Deininger and Squire
1996). However, recent developments in the Jordanian economy indicate that
differentiation may be on the increase.
The discussion above suggests that the distribution of living conditions in
Jordan be of some significance. But to analyse this, we need to return to the frame-
work for the study of living conditions.
The JLCS was designed with several theoretical assumptions in mind. One was that
it is fruitful to study the statistical patterns of living conditions as outcomes that
have been produced by actors in particular social situations, with particular resources
361
CONTENTS
and constraints and with their own particular values. The outcomes that each actor
experiences feeds back on the resources, constraints and values each actor bring to
bear on subsequent situations. For instance, using resources for investments in
education creates a new situation for an actor, in which he or she can command
higher pay than what would otherwise be possible.
The focus on actors, situations, resources, constraints and values provided
much of the guidelines for the design of the survey. It is also the guiding principle
for the analysis. It leads us to ask whether it is possible to discover particular categories
of actors that tend to be in similar situations, and if they face the same constraints.
The previous chapters have tentatively shown that several categories of actors
may be distinguished within the Jordanian population with respect to living con-
ditions. Some of these were categories that were expected to be meaningful at the
very outset, such as female headed households. Some were identified from empir-
ical analysis of the survey data. Some categories that we had thought would be
meaningful across the board, such as refugee status, turned out not to be so in terms
of socio-economic differentials.
It is important, however, to point out that the actors in the analysis may be
both individuals or households. Living conditions can also be seen from the
perspective of several levels of aggregation, such as the household, community or
region or, indeed, the nation as a whole. So when we speak about “living condi-
tions in Jordan”, it is necessary to be precise about who or what we are talking about.
As noted in the introduction to this book, a basic premise for the study of
living conditions is that they are multi-faceted. Many factors combine to create the
situation of a household or an individual. Thus, there will be no single measure that
can summarise all aspects of living conditions, although attempts are sometimes
made, such as the well-known UNDP “human development index” (UNDP 1997)
or the World Bank’s practical emphasis on income as a single measure. The lack of
a single measure creates the analytical difficulty that a given household or individ-
ual may score high on some measures, and low on others. This is precisely the
situation we pointed to above, in that comparatively good access to public services,
housing and infrastructure may well be combined with low income, even though
low income households more often than high income have poor housing conditions.
When living conditions factors combine in such a way, it becomes necessary to weigh
the different aspects against each other if one wants to find an overall measure. That
weighing is necessarily quite arbitrary: is crowding a worse problem than humidity
within the house? However, what we can do, is to see how various aspects of living
conditions go together.
In general, we can identify three different ways living conditions may be
ordered. First, they may be sorted in heaps. In such a case good or bad things go
together. For instance, if the education of a person is high, the person is also
362
CONTENTS
employed, has a high salary, lives in a good neighbourhood and sends the children
to a good school, it is a typical instance of positive heaping. In contrast, the results
shown in chapter 5, that 8 percent of the households in the rural areas and 13 percent
in urban has neither a health care facility nearby, nor a car, nor telephone are typi-
cal examples of negative heaping. Here are three aspects that are not necessarily large
problems by themselves, but by their conjunction limit accessibility to health
services.
Second, living conditions factors may be compensatory. In such a case a
person who is badly off on one indicator may make up for it by the score on an-
other. For example a person with a physical handicap may be compensated by good
access to health services. Another example is that of the Gulf returnees in Jordan,
who have lower levels of employment than others, but still enjoy a comparatively
high standard of living due to the fact that they draw on resources they acquired
abroad.
Third, the factors that constitute living conditions may be simply lack order.
In such cases, one cannot predict from knowledge of one factor what the levels for
others will be. This is usually more a theoretical possibility than a reality when it
comes to large living condition differentials, but is common when one considers
small differences.
Two other aspects are important to the mapping of living conditions, namely
the strength of the differentials and the way in which people enter into particular
configurations of living conditions. If the differences between groups are large, then
heaping, compensation and independence become much more important consid-
erations than if the differentials are small. For example, we have seen in the educa-
tion chapter that enrolment differentials between girls and boys exist in Jordan, but
they are small and probably not a case for concern except in higher education. On
the other hand, unemployment rates for educated young women are extremely high,
and the differentials to young educated men are large.
Another important consideration is how different parts of the population
are recruited into particular positions with respect to living conditions. In some cases
specific, easily identifiable categories of people find themselves in disadvantaged or
vulnerable positions. The typical example in Jordan is that of women with depend-
ants, heading their own household. In other cases the vulnerable household or
individual can only be identified through the fact that they score low on several
criteria, but do not have any particular characteristic that easily can be put as a
“heading” for their situation a priori. In this latter instance the analytical task
becomes to find if there are common factors that characterise or may be seen as
determining the position of these households or individuals.
In the rest of the chapter we will focus on some different ways of approach-
ing the overall living conditions in Jordan. First, ordering of living conditions will
363
CONTENTS
be regarded from a geographical point of view, and we will explore how living con-
ditions are structured in terms of the main reporting domains of the survey. Second
we will try to establish how the different aspects of living conditions sort themselves
by different categories of individuals and households.
A Map of Jordan
Figure 11.1 shows a map of Jordan illustrating some of the key living conditions
characteristics for individuals. Figure 11.2 shows a similar map for households.
Turning first to the map of individual characteristics, we have plotted the
variation in some key variables (total fertility rate, birth weight, infant mortality,
malnutrition as measured by stunting, percentage aged 16-23 not in school, per-
centage of women not in labour force and unemployment). Concerning regional
disparities, the first conclusion to be drawn from the map is that Amman is better
364
CONTENTS
off than the other regions. The South stands out in that it fares poorly on the health
related measures, but has relatively high female labour force participation and little
unemployment. This is probably related to the service sector and tourist industry
in the area. However, the form of presentation overstates the differences to some
extent, since what is shown is the percentage of the range of each variable. Thus when
Amman has a bar that is on 0 (on the baseline) for fertility, and Jerash and Ajloun
has one that is higher than the others, it means that Amman has the lowest fertility
rates, and Jerash and Ajloun the highest. Seen in another way, one of the striking
findings is that the geographic differentials are quite small. Moreover, the variables
presented have been picked because they actually show some differences although
they are also variables that are central to the well-being of the population.
Nevertheless, a break down along the urban-rural dimension shows substan-
tial variation hidden within each region (table 11.2). Rural health is worse than
urban, and in some cases, as revealed by the high figures for stunting in rural Balqa
and Madaba the contrast is quite large. The urban-rural pattern of Jordan resem-
bles other currently developing countries, but contrasts to the historical development
365
CONTENTS
of the Western societies where rural health was better than in the cities during the
first phases of development.
The second map is presented in figure 11.2. It shows regional disparities on
the household level. Here, the focus is on access to infrastructure, economic resources
and characteristics of the household head. Again Amman comes out as better off,
although the households of Amman more often than those in other areas report that
they had less income in 1995 than in 1994, and the governorate also scores poorly
on water reliability and housing standards. The South also stands out as generally
fairly well off. The other regions present a more varied picture, and it is not clear
how one should assess their ranking. As was the case for individual characteristics,
but to a lesser degree, the rural areas within each domain are somewhat worse off
than the urban. This is shown in table 11.3.
Table 11.2 Individual living condition components by Urban-Rural status
Zarqa and Balqa and Jarash and
Amman Irbid South
Mafraq Madaba Ajloun
U R U R U R U R U R U R
Total Fertility Rate 4 4 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 6 4 5
Low Birth weight 7 13 9 14 9 21 8 16 11 18 15 20
Percent stunted 11 17 14 27 14 22 10 13 15 20 15 24
Percent aged 17-23 not
63 58 72 78 61 69 63 63 66 71 67 67
enrolled in school
Percent females aged 15+ not
85 88 85 90 80 80 88 89 84 90 78 82
in labour force
Percent unemployed 16 17 21 14 21 19 16 15 20 16 14 15
U Urban R Rural
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CONTENTS
The analysis of the survey data indicates that overall geographic differences are not
particularly important in Jordan, except to some extent the urban-rural dimension.
To obtain a more varied understanding of who the disadvantaged or well off are in
Jordan, and what characterises them, other methods may be employed.
Correspondence analysis (Benzécri et al. 1973) is another approach to the
mapping of living conditions in Jordan. The basic idea behind this qualitative
multivariate descriptive statistical tool is that a complex table of categorical varia-
bles may be reduced to a few dimensions, embodying the most important variabil-
ity in the data. As such it is related to principal components analysis, but works for
categorical data. Parts of the output of a correspondence analysis may convenient-
ly be shown in various cartesian plots. Interpretation of the plots focuses on the
relative location of the data points in the space defined by the dimensions obtained
from the analysis. In one type of plot, the points represent the average dimensional
score for each category of each variable. In that case, nearby locations of two cate-
gories in the plot indicate that the two tend to occur together. The interpretation is
relative to the centre of the plot. Values that occur in the centre do not contribute
to the differentiation. This is because the dimensional scores basically are measures
of deviation from the expected frequencies of each variable.
Correspondence analysis is well suited to the problem at hand, because it
can be used to show if living condition disadvantages are heaped or independent
of each other. Independence is shown by values that cluster in the centre, while
heaping is shown by off-centre clustering.
Figure 11.3 is a correspondence plot in which we have attempted to illus-
trate the basic socio-economic adaptations of the households in Jordan. 3 The four
quadrants of the plot suggest four basic adaptations.4 In the upper right quadrant
we find the well off. High cost possessions (car) are found together with high in-
come, income from property, high education, and ownership of land. In contrast
diagonally opposite are the poor, characterised by residence in refugee camps or
agricultural areas, with low income, unemployed household head and inability to
meet a sudden outlay of JD 100. Households in the upper left quadrant are some-
what better off: those are the households that subsist on remittances or transfer
income. Let us call them the dependants. The head has little education, and is not
member of the labour force. In contrast the group diagonally down to the right are
3
Thanks are due to David Drury for some of the preliminary analysis.
4
For those unfamiliar with correspondence analysis we should add that there is a correspond-
ence between the quadrants and the analytical interpretation is coincidental. The points do
not need to distribute themselves over the four quadrants.
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CONTENTS
Figure 11.3 Category score correspondence plot of household socio economic adaptations in
Jordan. Variables either refer to the household as a whole or to characteristics of the house-
hold head
the independent workers. They secure their livelihood, but not at a high level. They
are employed, they have some education and they do not receive transfers.
The plot provides an illustration of the concepts of heaping, compensation
and independence referred to above. The poor category in the lower left quadrant
is a category for which poor conditions tend to aggregate. In contrast, their oppo-
site on the diagonal is a typical example of positive heaping, while the dependent
households at the upper left compensates for their poor education and low income
generation capability by the transfers and remittances they receive. And finally, the
independent workers in the lower right corner consist basically of a heaping of
middle characteristics. One should also note that there is considerable independ-
ence or lack of association in the plot. This is partly indicated by the cluster of val-
ues in the centre of the plot, but more importantly by the variables we have left out
because they contribute little to the differentiation.
Not surprisingly, given the presentation of the maps above, the governorates
were not useful as variables. Most of the variation is captured by the ‘Type of area’
characteristics in the plot, such as farm area, refugee camp, urban residential, and
rural/ semi-urban residential. The rural – urban distinction that emerges from the
geographical analysis is also subsumed by the type of area. Another measure not
368
CONTENTS
shown in this plot is the dependency ratio (unproductive members divided by total
members in the household), Dependency ratios tend to be lower for the most well-
off households than for others. This probably reflects the lower fertility of that cat-
egory. In general, however, the dependency ratio does not distinguish much, and
we also did not find any large effect of household type. Female headed households
are located together with the dependants. Refugee status did not differentiate (see
also Arneberg 1997 for a more thorough discussion of this point). Access to infra-
structure and public services also did not contribute to the plot when it was tried.
Correspondence analysis can also be presented in another way, by plotting
how the individual households are distributed according to the dimensions identi-
fied. This is shown in figure 11.4, which is a so-called hexagonal binning (Math-
Soft 1997). The different hexagons are shaded according to how many households
that fall in their area, from light grey (few) to black (many). The space defined by
the axes is the same as that of the previous plot, even though each axis has a greater
Figure 11.4 Object score correspondence plot of household socio economic adaptations in
Jordan. Darker means higher densities of households
369
CONTENTS
range.5 This is because individual households may have more extreme values than
the average for a variable. The centre of density is around the area of those we have
termed the independent workers, and towards the origin of the plot. The other
quadrants are less heavily represented, but there is a clustering in the poor quad-
rant towards the origin. All in all it shows the importance of the lower two quad-
rants, as opposed to the upper two, although there is also a substantial number of
cases in the well-off quadrant.
The results have bearing on the above discussion on the simultaneous
occurrence of income disparities and homogeneity in service access. The correspond-
ence analysis supports the picture given in the introduction to this chapter, namely
that Jordan may be considered a society in which basic needs are generally fulfilled,
but where some households face a considerable income shortage. The analysis also
supports the factors that we have considered as explanations, i.e. the importance of
remittances and transfers as well as education. Moreover, the population is divided
into categories, where the different explanatory factors have different weight.
Remittances and government transfers are most important for the depend-
ants category in figure 11.3. Since this category of households is marked by such
characteristics as low education and being out of the labour force the transfers seems
well targeted. Being out of the labour force may, however, also be an effect of the
transfers, in the sense that transfers allow people to refrain from trying to get a job.
In contrast, there is the category of the poor for which transfer and remittances do
not play a role, in the sense that their lack of income due to unemployment is not
compensated. As noted, this category is partly made up of the refugee camp dwell-
ers, those in poor agricultural areas, and probably also the squatters of the large
towns. Howver, it is difficult toidentify the latter in the survey, even if they as noted
have been the target of both research and policy interventions in Jordan.
The discussion above raises the question of how one becomes poor or how poverty
is reproduced in Jordan. But it also gives some indication of the answers. One such
indication is how the transitions between the different quadrants of our correspond-
ence plots can be achieved. The perhaps most obvious transition is between the two
left quadrants, i.e. between the poor and the dependants. Reduced or increased trans-
fers and remittances will move people from one group to the other. Similarly, changes
5
The relation between dimensional score for the objects (here households) and the charac-
teristics is subject to some debate. See Bacher 1995 for a discussion.
370
CONTENTS
in employment will move people between the lower quadrants. Increased education
increases the chances of getting a job (as shown in chapter 7), but not so much for
women who are often unemployed when well educated.
Figure 11.5 explores the question further by using “Ability to raise JD100
should an unexpected need arise” as the dependent variable. The figure shows the
breakdown that emerges by using the exploratory data analysis technique CHAID
(Magidson 1993). The analysis creates a so-called classification tree. It is based on
letting a number of predictors form cross tabulations with the dependent variable,
and at each stage finding the combination of cross-tabulations that best divide the
population into groups that are as different as possible on the dependent variable.
In the figure, the percentages are given for those that can muster JD100
themselves. Thus, in the figure, education of the household head is the variable that
best separates the respondent households in groups of different responses on the
JD100-variable. It ranges from having JD100 among 74 percent of those with no
education to 96 percent of those with higher. This is a finding that is entirely con-
sistent with what we have stated so far, in the discussions about the effects of
education, and therefore not particularly surprising.
For those with higher education, the next branch is defined by the age of
the household head in that older household heads are more often able to come up
with JD100. This is reflecting that as the household gets more established it accu-
mulates resources. Among the established households, with heads aged 25 years and
above, those living in Amman are best off, as all can meet a sudden demand for
JD100.
Among those with secondary education, it is having a property income that
increases the ability to pay.
In contrast, for those with only basic education, it is the employment situ-
ation that counts. The reason why the employment situation does not count for those
with secondary and higher education is that in those groups nearly all household
heads are employed, and the employment variable cannot therefore distinguish
within those groups. The unemployed are worst off among those with basic educa-
tion, while those out of the labour force or temporarily absent are marginally worse
off than the full time employed. Those out of the labour force live better when they
have property income, and within that group the dependency ratio of the house-
hold is important. This result is fairly obvious – people who do not work live bet-
ter when they have some income, and also if they do not have many to care for.
Like the above result, several of the results from the classification tree are quite
obvious. However, the point shown by the classification tree, is how different com-
binations of variables result in different outcomes, and also the numerical
importance of the various combinations.
371
CONTENTS
As one can observe, another important benefit of analysis using classification trees
is that it makes possible the use of different variables for different parts of the tree.
This allows for the important ability to detect that there are different ways to afflu-
ence or poverty, or that particular combinations of values have particular good or
bad results. For example, it is among those with no education who live from trans-
fer income (i.e. pensions, social security), do not own land and receive no remit-
tances that the ability to pay JD100 is at its lowest. However, this is a fairly small
group at 98 households or 1.4 percent of the sample.
Figure 11.5 CHAID classification tree of “Ability to raise JD100”. Variables refer to household
characteristics or characteristics of household head
Labels for values where space does not permit complete text:
* Main source of income:
WP- Work or property income,
T: Transfer and other types of income
* Employment;
Full: Full time employed,
Part/NLF: Parttime employed or not member of labour force,
TA-Un: Temporarily absent or unemployed
* Governorate:
A: Amman,
I: Irbid,
Z: Zarqa and Mafraq,
B: Balqa and Madaba,
S: South.
372
CONTENTS
It is striking, however, that the categories that distinguish themselves in the corre-
spondence or classification analysis are not necessarily social groups in the
sociological sense of making out corporate units. The squatters and refugee camp
dwellers may be so, in the sense that they sometimes act as groups, and are located
geographically close. But in this case one should not be blind to the fact that even
among those groups there is considerable social differentiation.6 One should also
bear in mind that there might be quite strong selection effects at work. Poor people
will tend to move towards areas where the poor can afford to live, and many of those
who succeed in becoming more affluent will move out. Therefore these areas are
not necessarily reproduced as pockets of poverty only by the people that live there,
but also by the people that move to and from. Movements into refugee camps do
occur, for example, albeit less frequent than to other types of neighbourhoods. Eight
percent of the inhabitants of the refugee camps lived in another place in 1991. In
contrast, the average for all types of localities in Jordan is 14 percent. As seen in
figure 11.6, migration appears more widespread among those with low incomes and
those with high incomes, than among those with middle incomes.
All in all there appears to be a significant element of individual or house-
hold based social differentiation as opposed to social differentiation based on sta-
ble social strata. This is not the least because of the importance of education in
individual success in Jordan. This is not to say that other, more group based social
differentiation is unimportant. Even when considering education there is a strong
Figure 11.6 Frequency of different residence five years ago by household income groups.
Individual moves
6
Social differentiation within spatially compact groups cannot be tested by JLCS, but see for
instance Bisharat and Tewfik 1985.
373
CONTENTS
tendency that highly educated parents much more often than parents with low
education have children who have higher education.
Since Jordan has experienced a tremendous economic development during the last
decades, one might expect that there will also have been substantial changes in social
and cultural relations. That is true to some extent. To illustrate one may point to
the fact that female labour force participation is increasing, suggesting new roles
for women in the economy and in the family. Or one may bring to bear the obser-
vation that Jordan is currently undergoing a demographic transition resembling that
experienced by European societies on their eve of modernity. Furthermore, as we
have seen Jordan has instituted a modern education system, in which almost all
receive basic education and many obtain advanced education. Jordan also is intensely
subject to influences from abroad through the large share of the inhabitants that
move out and in of the country in search of work. Modern mass media is widely
distributed, and 82 percent of men and 72 percent of women had read a newspaper
or received news on television or radio the day preceding their JLCS interview.
Twenty-eight percent received news from wireless sources abroad (Arab, Israeli or
Western) as discussed in chapter 9.
Nevertheless, the JLCS data do not suggest that Jordan is developing into a
copy of modernised Western societies. Although Jordan is becoming increasingly
globalised, it is also taking its own specific path through modernity, as Clifford
(1988:5) puts it in a discussion on tradition and modernisation. Clifford’s point is
that there is no necessary link between a modernised society and specific social
formations, in contrast to what is often posited by modernisation theorists and im-
plicitly accepted by many of us. Moreover, as Wallerstein (1995) asserts, the cul-
ture of developing countries should not be seen as a unitary something to be over-
come in the process of modenisation, but rather as a mixture of different visions of
what a good life should be.
We show in chapter 9 that the political organisation of Jordan is influenced
by what many would call “traditional” groups based on kinship and locality. That
may be interpreted as a survival from a former organisation of political life that is
in the process of being destroyed. It may also be interpreted precisely as a specific
path that is currently being trod in Clifford’s terms. In chapter 8 we document the
role of social networks in Jordanian society, pointing out that while many of those
networks are not now based in locality, they are virtual localities in Appadurai’s
(1993) terms in the sense that they organise people as if they were sharing a village.
374
CONTENTS
Thus, dense networks are reproduced despite the distances often involved in urban-
isation or migratory wage labour. A telling example of this is how Jordanian house-
holds are able to mobilise remittances from their relatives abroad.
In the correspondence plot in figure 11.7 we present some aspects of the
configuration of views and activities that might be seen as related to modernisation.
In this case the correspondence solution is three-dimensional7 which makes it
considerably more difficult to read, but the interpretation follows the lines outlined
above.
The data are for the randomly selected individual. Several variables were
introduced in the analysis: consumption of news, attitudes to aspects of Western
culture, smoking, labour force status, consumption of news, place of residence,
history of labour migration, gender, voting behaviour and refugee status. Some
variables were left out of the final plot, as they did not contribute to the spread.
This was the case for religion.
In figure 11.7, the range of attitudes on aspects of Western culture delineate
themselves clearly from lower left (accepts Western political system as a model) to
upper right (does not want translation of non-Arab books and will not accept
7
The number of dimensions in a correspondence analysis is partly a matter of choice, partly
a matter of how much of the variation that is represented by each dimension. In this case
the three first dimensions represent similar amounts of variation (“inertia”).
375
CONTENTS
Western technology) on the other extreme. While this line in the correspondence
space may be interpreted as one of “modernisation” we are reluctant to do so. One
reason is, as mentioned above, that some variables that we would have expected to
go together with this line, such as position on women’s autonomy, did not appear
to have any association.
To some extent most of the other results are negative with respect to the fac-
tor of Westernness, in that they show a lack of association with this factor. Thus,
the age dimension appears quite unrelated to being oriented towards the West, and
also residence. Similarly, while Gulf returnees and refugees are clustered in the lower
right corner, they do not appear to have any particular characteristic as regards views
on the influence of the West.
The reason for including smoking habits in the analysis is that marketing
for tobacco in developing countries often has explicit references to modernity – the
modern man is presented as a smoker. Smokers in Jordan are definitely male. That
was shown in the health chapter, and also is visible clearly in figure 11.7. But
smoking appears not to be associated with views on the West, rather it is associated
with the employed male with a history of labour migration.
Interestingly, consumption of the more widely used mass media does not
influence views on westernisation much. There is a tendency that those who watch
television news from other Arab countries are more positive to western influences.
However, the bivariate associations between watching Israeli TV and Western TV
and the various measures of Western influence were quite strong. This was espe-
cially the case for watching Western TV, where much higher percentages among the
watchers than among the non-watchers wanted to accept Western influence. How-
ever, the number of watchers is very small and therefore the variables were not in-
cluded in the correspondence analysis.8
The other measures of influence from abroad, that of having been on labour
migration or being a Gulf returnee were not associated with the westernisation
variables in the correspondence plot.
As noted, the main result of the above analysis is largely negative, but it may
be seen as a useful negative. The analysis finds no support for a contention that there
is a simple relation between position of women, Islam, and modernisation in a
Western direction as often posited – at least in the Western Press.
8
The effect of inclusion would have been to make the bivariate association between West-
ern news consumption and the other factors dominate in the plot and all other associations
would be hidden.
376
CONTENTS
The Future
Jordanian society is likely to change in the near future. One of the key factors in
that change is the development of the population, both in terms of numbers and
in terms of human resources. As described in chapter 2, Jordan is currently going
through a demographic transition, in which fertility rates are dropping fast. A quite
substantial mortality drop has preceded the fertility decline, leading to the rapid
population increase that Jordan has experienced.
The fertility decline is likely to continue for some time into the future, and
this will lead to changes in the structure of the population. While the Jordanian
population is now quite young, it will rapidly become older. Since many aspects of
living conditions are tied to the individual’s life cycle from infant to elder – as amply
described in several of the chapters – it is of some interest to see how the popula-
tion and its age distribution are likely to develop if current trends continue.
Figure 11.8 shows the age and sex structure of the Jordanian population in
1995 and projections for 2000, 2005 and 2010. We made the projections using the
component-cohort method using the program FIVFIV (Shorter et al. 1995). We
377
CONTENTS
assumed that fertility will be reduced to replacement levels by year 2025 and that
mortality will slowly be reduced from the present level. No migration was stipulated.
That is obviously an unrealistic assumption, but there is no factual basis for pre-
dicting migration flows between Jordan and surrounding countries given the twists
of history after 1948. Such a projection entails an increase in population from about
4.2 million in 1995, to 4.9 in year 2000, 5.6 in year 2005 and 6.2 in year 2010.
However, the population projection is mainly illustrative. As noted in chapter 2 the
past performance of population projections in Jordan has been less than perfect and
there is no reason why this attempt should fare very much better. It is more the
characteristics of the changes than their absolute sizes that are the focus here. That
being said, several changes currently underway are noteworthy.
First, the population is ageing. By the year 2010 the effects of the fertility
decline will be very noticeable, in that the youngest age groups will be smaller than
the preceding ones and that the proportion of elderly will be somewhat larger. This
is a classic example of what demographers call “ageing at the base” (i.e. of the pyr-
amid) where the overall population distribution gets shifted up in age because of
fewer births than before. In contrast, increases in life expectancy, i.e. that people
live longer, generally are relatively unimportant in the ageing of the population. The
proportion of children below 15 years old will decline, and with it the child depend-
ency ratio.
Second, the working-aged population will increase both in absolute and
relative terms (table 11.4). Thus Jordan’s characteristic of being a labour surplus
economy is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Given that unemployment
is already high, Jordan faces acute challenges in providing enough jobs for its la-
bour force. This is particularly so because the proportion of labour force partici-
pants in the population is currently extremely low (see chapter 7). As the country
continues to modernise, labour force participation is expected to rise, mostly due
to higher rates among women. Female labour force participation correlates posi-
tively with education of women, as shown in chapter 7. Increased female labour force
participation has been the trend so far, and is also the experience of most other Arab
countries.
Third, one of the most striking developments will be the growth of the pop-
ulation’s stock of education. In the age groups now entering adulthood close to 100
percent have primary education. Illiteracy rates will thus decline steadily, as younger
Table 11.4 Percentage of population in different age groups, 1995-2010
1995 2000 2005 2010
0-14 41.4 40.1 38.3 35.6
15-64 56.4 57.3 58.5 60.7
65+ 2.2 2.7 3.2 3. 7
378
CONTENTS
literates replace the old generations. Figure 11.8 also suggests how the educated
youngsters in the future will fill the population pyramid from the bottom. One effect
of this is that education, as a differential in the population, will change its signifi-
cance. Today those without primary education are consistently worse off, and make
out a sizeable group. In the near future they will probably be even worse off because
of the demands that modern societies put on human resources. But they will also
make out a much smaller group. Similarly, in the population chapter it was point-
ed out that while educated women were a tiny minority 20 years ago, with strik-
ingly lower fertility than that of other women, the educated women of today are
not so different from their sisters with less education regarding fertility.
One consequence of the shift in population size and structure together with
the increase of qualifications will be that the structure of the labour market will have
to change in the direction of being able to use more educated labour. At the same
time the education system will have to change to supply the specific needs of a more
knowledge based economy. As noted in the chapter on education, this is already
recognised as a problem. Part of the current high economic returns on education
in Jordan stems from the fact that the public sector has employed a large number
of the educated at comparatively advantageous terms, especially as regards job
security, working hours and pensions.
Not all factors change because of population processes. As we have seen
(chapter 2), there is little that distinguishes refugees from non-refugees in terms of
demographic behaviour. Thus, the proportion of refugees in Jordan is likely to
remain fairly constant, assuming, of course, that refugee flows to or from Jordan
do not again become an issue.
Conclusion
The question that has been posed most often to us during our work with the Jordan
Living Conditions Survey is perhaps: How good or bad are the living conditions
in Jordan? This of course, is the question we have attempted to tackle, but it is also
a question that has no simple answer. The UNDP’s Human Development Report
answer of a human development index of 0.730, is perhaps not too illuminating,
although it does have the benefit of ranking Jordan 84 among the 175 nations of
the Earth (UNDP 1997:146-48).
Another answer is that we have attempted in this summary. Jordan is a soci-
ety that has done surprisingly well considering its poor natural resource base and
troubled history. As we have seen, the basic needs of Jordanians have been satisfiedto
a large extent. The country has handled the huge population fluxes surprisingly well.
379
CONTENTS CHAPTER 10 APPENDIX 1
But a large share of this needs satisfaction has been achieved either by government
transfers that exceed the long term capability of the government given the current
economic climate, or through remittances from relatives abroad. In a situation where
both those sources are strained, a great many Jordanians suffer from income short-
falls.
380
CHAPTER 11 APPENDIX 2 CONTENTS
Jon Pedersen
Summary
As is common for large scale surveys, the JLCS used a two stage stratified proba-
bility proportionate to size cluster design in which households were selected with
approximately equal probability within each stratum. On the national scale the sam-
ple was not self weighting, because of the need to report from governorates of widely
varying size. A randomly selected individual was chosen within each household in
order to answer questions where proxy respondents could not be expected to give
accurate answers. The sample frame was derived from the 1994 Census and is con-
sidered very accurate.
Non-response, both on the household, individual person and on the ques-
tion level was generally very low. Some randomly selected individuals were not in-
terviewed because it was impossible to find them at home. This mainly involved
working males, and may constitute a slight bias. Also, some children that should
have been measured for anthropometry were not measured. In the figures present-
ed in this report, non-response has been corrected for to some extent by adjusting
the weights.
A cluster sample such as that of the JLCS is in most cases less efficient than
a simple random sample from the same population. It is also very much cheaper,
and is the only practical way of carrying out such a survey on a national scale. The
efficiency costs of the design of JLCS are fairly typical for such surveys.
In general the JLCS data do not show any detectable biases or shortcomings.
The sample of the JLCS was designed with several aims in mind. It should be of a
sufficient size to allow comparison of living conditions for several sub-groups (such
as women, children, female headed households, vulnerable groups). The sample also
381
CONTENTS
Figure A1.1 JLCS sample number of households compared to total number of households.
The bars for the population represent the households in each domain as a proportion of the
total population of households, while the bars for the sample represent the household sam-
pled in each domain as proportion of the total number of households sampled.
382
CONTENTS
unit in the sample is the same. While desirable, this was not possible within the
budget. Also, a self-weighting sample would have resulted in about one third of the
sample in Amman, or about 2000 households, which is more than is needed for
independent reporting of Amman. Because of this, it was decided to group gover-
norates into six reporting domains, and to allocate the sample so that adequate re-
porting domains were obtained. The benefit of this is that it became possible to
report by geographic divisions, the cost is that the precision of the sample on the
national level suffered somewhat. Of course, since the final estimates from the sample
are weighted, this does not affect the representativeness of the sample in any way.
Six geographic reporting domains were identified based on the governorates:
Irbid; Jerash and Ajloun; Amman; Balqa and Madaba, Zarqa and Mafraq; and South.
Their relative importance in the population and in the sample is shown in figure
A1.1. Planned net sample size was 6000 households. All the domains had an ini-
tial allocation of 900 households, except for Amman, which had 1500.
The JLCS defines households, household members and a single randomly
selected individual (RSI) in each household as respondents, or ultimate sampling
units. For some questions the respondent was the person whom the question per-
tained to. For other questions a different household member answered, either on
behalf of another household member, or for the household as a whole. The overall
arrangement of topics and respondents can be seen in table A1.1.
383
CONTENTS
384
CONTENTS
a self-weighting (epsem) design, but within each stratum the sample is approximately
self-weighting.
In selecting clusters the measure of size used was the number of households within
each cluster as provided by the preliminary 1994 Census data.
385
CONTENTS
intervals from the list. The first household was selected randomly. Thus, given that
10 households were to be selected within each cluster, the sampling interval was
determined to be the number of households in the cluster divided by 10. A random
start between 1 and the interval was selected, and dwelling units were selected system-
atically at regular steps defined by the calculated interval. The list used was a list of
dwelling units rather than households, even though the interval had been calculated
on the basis of the number of households. Since the number of dwelling units gen-
erally was higher than the number of households, this resulted in an automatic
oversampling of dwelling units which provided, on average, the desired number of
households within each cluster, and also kept the sample approximately self-
weighting within each stratum.
Once a dwelling unit within a structure (usually a house) had been selected,
the structure was relisted in order to determine the number of households current-
ly living there. The intention had been to relist all of the selected clusters, but this
was not carried out.
Selection Probabilities
The computation of selection probabilities follows more or less the textbook case
of a two stage sample. Nevertheless, we would note one important modification.
When clusters were selected with PPS a size estimate of households was used, while
386
CONTENTS
the second stage selection used a size estimate of dwelling units. Also, as noted above,
the selected clusters were partially relisted. Thus, there was one population estimate
used for drawing the cluster, and another for drawing the households within the
cluster. The formulas for selection probabilities are as follows, and the notation used
is given in table A1.2.
Equation 1
1V F
SV F = ⋅ PV
1V
Equation 2
QV
PV =
Within each cluster a number of households are selected. The selection probability
for a household (or dwelling unit) within a cluster is then the following:
387
CONTENTS
Equation 3
QVG F
SF K = G O
1V F
Note that at this stage the listed number of dwelling units should be used, rather
than the first estimate from the census count. The overall inclusion probability for
a dwelling unit in a stratum then becomes
Equation 4
1 V F ⋅ PV ⋅ QVG F
SV K =
F
1V ⋅ 1 VGFO
(since SV F K = SV F ⋅ SF K )
Because of the mode of selection used (drawing from the list of dwelling units) the
nds,c (cluster take counted as dwelling units) is set to the overall sampling fraction
for the stratum, so that the selected number of dwelling units equals:
Equation 5
QV ⋅ 1 VGFO
QVG F =
1 V F ⋅ PV
In practice this means that except for rounding errors the sample of households will
be approximately self weighting within the stratum.
The selection probabilities for individuals in the case where all individuals
of a specific category are selected in the household (e.g. all household members, all
women) is equal to the selection probability for the household. Thus:
Equation 6
SV F K G = SV F K
However, the selection probabilities for the randomly selected individuals of the
household are different. In these cases a person who is a member of a household
with few persons aged 18 years or more has a greater chance of being selected than
a person who lives in a household with many such adults. Since the person is se-
lected from the household by simple random sampling, the selection probability is
simply (for the randomly selected adult):
388
CONTENTS
Equation 7
1 V F ⋅ PV ⋅ QVG F
SV K UD =
F
1 V F K UD 1 ⋅ 1 VG FO
V
Sampling Weights
The sampling weights used for estimation are of two types. The expansion weights
create estimates equivalent to real numbers in the population, while the relative
weights retain the sample size and only adjust the relative contribution of each unit
of analysis (household or individual). The expansion weights are calculated as the
inverse of the sampling probability, while the relative weights are calculated as the
expansion weight divided by the mean of all the expansion weights.
Equation 8
: =
L
SL
where i is an index of each individual analysis unit. The relative sampling weight is
then:
Equation 9
SL
:U =
L
∑: L
H
The sampling weights were not used in the estimation of survey results, because all
weights were adjusted for non-response as discussed below.
Response Rates
The response rate that is achieved during the field work of a survey is crucial for
the quality of the survey results. When response rates are low, one may justifiably
suspect biases in the results. Surveys in developing countries have often very low
response rates, often as low as 60 or 50 percent of the population sampled. In contrast
389
CONTENTS
surveys in developing countries have often very high response rates, often surpass-
ing 90 percent.
In general one may distinguish between two types of non-response: unit non-
response and item non-response. Unit non-response pertains to the non-response
of a whole unit, such as a household. In that case almost nothing is known about
that household. Item non-response pertains to the lack of information on a specific
item for a unit, for example that a person does not answer one question. We shall
deal with the two in turn.
390
CONTENTS
The framework is built around the fact that an interview can be missing for two
main reasons. First, it may be that the selected household did not belong to the
sampling frame. This is the case when a dwelling unit does not exist in reality, is
vacant, or the household is not eligible (foreign diplomats, for example). Second, a
selected household, which actually exists and is eligible, may refuse or not be found
at home.
As can be seen from Table A1.4 the non-response due to refusals is insignif-
icant. The non-response problems experienced by the survey are more due to sam-
pling frame characteristics and field work operations than to the respondents’ will-
ingness to answer. As noted, an aspect of the DoS sampling practice is that
non-existing dwelling units are not removed from the sampling frame. Thus, the
non-existence rate is 1.4 percent, which is higher than one would normally expect
for a survey that was carried out soon after a census. Also, for sampling of house-
holds the vacant dwelling units are not removed from the list before sampling, and
over-sampling is used instead to ensure a sufficient number of households from a
PSU. This leads to a Temporary Out of Scope rate that is very high. It is mainly a
result of the very high number of vacant dwelling units.
The vacant dwelling units and the fact that non existing dwelling units are
kept in the frame do not lead to any biases in the sampling, although the variability
Table A1.4 Non-response rates in JLCS
Item Indicator Calculated as
All households/dwelling units drawn
Total 751 3
in the sample
Total minus the units with
Resolved 7323 indeterminate status (code 4 in
Table 3)
Resolved minus the not existing, not
In scope 6472
eligible or vacant units
Resolved rate 97.5 Resolved/Total
In scope rate 88.4 In scope/Resolved
Non-existence rate 1. 4 Non-existent units/resolved units
Temporary out of scope rate 10.2 (Vacant + Not eligible) / resolved
Refusals converted/(Refusals +
Refusal conversion rate .00
converted)
Response rate 91.5 Completed interviews/In scope
Refusal rate .4 Refusals/In scope
(Not determined + No contact)/ (Not
No contact rate 7. 4
determined + In scope)
(Not determined + Refusals + No
Non-response rate 7. 8 contact)/(Not Determined + In
scope)
Residual non-response rate .1 No usable information / In Scope
391
CONTENTS
of the weights is increased slightly. More problematic is the fairly large count of
dwelling units with Not Determined status. That is mainly due to some clusters with
a predominantly nomadic population being included in the sample frame. As the
survey and the population census took place at different times of the year, the
nomads had moved, and there was no one that could be asked about the selected
dwelling units. It is clear that the survey does not represent the nomadic part of the
population adequately. The intention was not to survey nomads, and the inclusion
of some nomadic PSUs in the frame is mainly due to misclassification of those
clusters.
The most problematic feature of the non-response is the comparatively high
no contact rate. It is also the aspect of the response characteristics of the survey that
was most improved during field work. Early field work monitoring showed that the
no contact rate was unacceptably high. Supervision and revisit practices were then
improved, and some clusters were revisited after interviewing had been completed.
392
CONTENTS
Item Non-Response
In general item non-response in JLCS is insignificant. There are seldom more than
10 respondents to a question for which there is no answer recorded. There are a few
exceptions. Among the more important is the date of birth for some small children,
anthropometric measurements of children, and also date of birth of some children
that are now dead.
Non-Response Adjustment
Despite generally high response rates, some non-response was present. In order to
reduce possible biases resulting from this, non-response adjustments have been car-
ried out, and all results presented in this report from have been calculated using the
non-response adjustments.
The method of correction for non-response is the so called “adjustment cell
method”(see for example Lehtonen and Pahkinen 1995; Little and Rubin 1987).
In this approach, households that are considered to be fairly similar are identified
and a non-response rate is calculated for each group of households, called adjust-
ment cells. These non-response rates are based on the number of households that
could have responded, but for some reason did not. Vacant units, for example, are
excluded.
The inverse of the non-response rate is then used to adjust the weights (both
expansion and relative) for each household. This results in a weighted sample size
that is as it would have been if all households had responded. The effect is also to
increase the relative contribution to the estimates of units that are similar to those
missing.
In the JLCS the adjustment cells used for households were localities, which
usually consisted of several of clusters. When a locality was too small, consisting of
less than 30 households, it was merged with a nearby one. This is because the sam-
pling error on the non-response rate becomes excessive with adjustment cells that
are too small.
Using the notation in table A1.6, the correction factor for non-response to
the weights is given in Equation 10.
Table A1.6 Notation for non-response adjustment
Symbol Explanation
a
Index of locality (Adjustment cell)
hr Responding households
f
h Non-responding households
393
CONTENTS
Equation 10
&D =
KDU
KDU + KDI
The number of possible interviews (i.e. the denominator in the non-response rate)
is thus the sum of categories 1,2,5,10 and 11 in table A1.3. The number of non-
respondent units is the sum of the categories 5, 10 and 11. The Status Not Deter-
mined category may be distributed over the other categories, but this has not been
done for JLCS. Instead the category was ignored in the calculations, as most of the
households in this category probably do not belong to the sample .
The weights for the randomly selected individuals were also adjusted for non-re-
sponse. Here the adjustment cells were formed by labour force participation status,
sex and governorate. The logic and mathematics of the adjustment are otherwise
the same as that described for the adjustment on the household level. The main
reason for applying the adjustment in this case was that there was a discernible ten-
dency for men — and especially working men — to not be contacted for RSI in-
terview.
All surveys produce estimates that contain some degree of error. So-called sampling
error results from the fact that the survey is based on a sample and not a census of
the entire population. Non-sampling error is a general term that is used to describe
any deviation or failure of measurement. Thus, when the interviewer records that a
household has refrigerator when it really does not have one, it is a non-sampling
error. The reason for the error may be that respondent did not understand the ques-
tion, that the respondent lied, the interviewer recorded the answer wrongly or that
the answer was incorrectly keyed in during data entry.
Non-Sampling Errors
It is relatively easy to understand non-sampling errors when the reasons pertain to
the various errors of recording. It is conceptually more difficult when the problem
is with the dialogue between the respondent and interviewer, or when the concept
394
CONTENTS
covered by the question is complex and open to many interpretations. The concept
of an error presupposes a real or true value for the answer. In general the true answer
is not known (as it would then be rather meaningless to carry out the survey to find
out). Moreover, in many cases the true answer is not easy to define, as the only
realized instance of the answer is that generated by the survey. For example, the ques-
tion of whether or not the respondent wants to allow translation of non Arabic books
into Arabic was posed in the survey. It is probably the first time anyone in Jordan
has been confronted with that exact phrasing, although the discussion about trans-
lation of western philosophy and thought has been current in Arab intellectual debate
for a long time. Thus, the survey generates a set of answers, for which the true value
is not easily defined.
Because of the many complications in the measurement and conceptualiza-
tion of non-sampling errors, they are very difficult to quantify. Their discussion
belongs to the substantive analysis of the survey results. Sampling errors are more
tractable, as their characteristics may be studied with the aid of statistical sampling
theory.
Sampling Errors
Sampling errors reflect the fact that the sample is a sub-set of the population stud-
ied rather than the whole. They stem from the intrinsic variability of the character-
istic being studied and the sampling design used in the study. It is important to
realize that surveys with a complex sampling design such as the JLCS have sampling
errors that are different from those that would be obtained from a simple random
sample of the same size. In general, the use of stratification tends to decrease sam-
pling errors, although the use of non-proportionate stratification such as in the JLCS
increases sampling errors for estimates relating to the whole of Jordan. Clustering
increases sampling errors in most cases, and the use of weights also normally in-
creases the degree of sampling error.
The combined effects on the sampling error of the various elements of the
sampling design are conventionally measured by the so-called design effect. That is
the ratio of the variance actually obtained, and the variance that would have been
obtained in a simple random sample of the same size. If the design effect is 1.0 the
sample is as efficient as a simple random sample, if it is less than 1.0 it is more
efficient, and if it is more than 1.0, it is less efficient. The design effect is not a sin-
gle number that applies to the whole of the survey. Rather, each estimate has its own
design effect, as the variance of an estimator depends on the particular sampling
characteristics of that estimator. Because of that we have included in tables 7,8 and
9 a number of estimates and their associated variances for the household, for indi-
viduals and for the randomly selected individual.
395
CONTENTS
For each estimate we have included the estimate itself (i.e. the percentage that have
a given characteristic), the standard error of the estimate, the design effect and the
un-weighted and weighted number of observations (households or individuals as
the case may be).
The standard error of the estimate is the square root of the variance and may
easily be interpreted, in that 1.96 times the standard error gives a 95 percent confi-
dence interval for the estimate. For example, in table A1.8, the percentage of refu-
gees (including displaced) is shown as 43.7 percent. One can be 95 percent sure that
the true percentage of refugees in the population is 43.7 percent±(1.43 percent *
1.96): that is between 40.8 and 46.6.
The design effect can be calculated in various ways. The one presented here
is the ratio of the actual variance, and the variance that would be obtained under
simple random sampling. It takes into account stratification, clustering, unequal
weighting and over-sampling, which are the main design characteristics of the JLCS
sample. The sampling errors were calculated using SUDAAN (Shah, Barnwell and
Bieler 1997).
As can be seen from the tables, the design effects are fairly normal for sur-
veys of this type. Some variables stand out, though. These are mainly the variables
where clustering of characteristics is especially strong, such as refugee status, type
of neighborhood or distance to services.
396
CONTENTS
397
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Household head Refugee, then displaced
Total 6.0 0.43 1.96 328 377
Amman 7.5 0.81 2.28 109 193
Zarqa and Mafraq 8.1 1.11 1.80 73 93
Balqa and Madaba 6.8 1.47 1.86 62 39
Irbid 2.0 0.59 1.80 16 21
Jarash and Ajloun 5.7 1.49 1.21 53 18
South 2.0 0.57 0.98 15 12
Household head Gaza refugee
Total 1.1 0.17 1.60 68 66
Amman 1.1 0.27 1.74 15 27
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.6 0.41 1.19 14 18
Balqa and Madaba 0.6 0.25 0.59 5 3
Irbid 0.2 0.16 1.10 2 2
Jarash and Ajloun 2.2 0.85 1.00 20 7
South 1.4 0.84 2.92 12 9
Household head not refugee or displaced
Total 58.0 1.32 4.22 3862 3651
Amman 44.7 2.24 4.90 648 1148
Zarqa and Mafraq 46.6 2.82 3.46 415 537
Balqa and Madaba 65.4 3.62 3.15 589 378
Irbid 72.1 3.87 7.50 647 771
Jarash and Ajloun 85.0 3.21 2.41 758 269
South 88.7 2.11 2.59 805 548
Basic school
Total 77.1 1.22 5.00 4528 4857
Amman 74.6 2.42 7.47 1067 1914
Zarqa and Mafraq 87.0 2.08 4.13 782 1002
Balqa and Madaba 73.6 3.66 3.76 672 426
Irbid 74.2 2.41 3.05 653 793
Jarash and Ajloun 69.3 2.74 1.04 619 219
South 81.4 2.81 3.04 735 503
Secondary school
Total 54.2 1.60 6.10 3028 3414
Amman 60.5 2.93 8.64 861 1552
Zarqa and Mafraq 56.9 3.58 5.66 511 655
Balqa and Madaba 48.1 4.21 3.87 441 278
Irbid 47.2 3.56 5.11 415 505
Jarash and Ajloun 41.7 3.28 1.31 376 132
South 47.2 3.97 3.68 424 292
Primary health center nearby
Total 46.8 1.71 6.93 2655 2951
Amman 45.4 3.26 10.33 648 1166
Zarqa and Mafraq 51.6 3.78 6.18 462 595
Balqa and Madaba 40.2 4.06 3.72 369 233
Irbid 52.7 3.54 5.04 459 564
Jarash and Ajloun 32.5 3.21 1.39 287 103
South 47.2 3.95 3.63 430 291
398
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
UNRWA clinic nearby
Total 8.2 1.05 8.63 466 518
Amman 10.3 2.02 10.68 149 264
Zarqa and Mafraq 7.3 2.51 10.06 65 84
Balqa and Madaba 8.2 2.51 4.56 75 47
Irbid 7.5 2.09 6.33 66 81
Jarash and Ajloun 10.8 3.04 2.84 100 34
South 1.2 0.86 3.52 11 8
Living quarters owned, no debt
Total 48.7 0.92 2.02 2987 3065
Amman 43.9 1.53 2.30 634 1128
Zarqa and Mafraq 52.6 2.19 2.07 470 605
Balqa and Madaba 53.4 2.32 1.18 482 309
Irbid 49.6 2.24 2.02 438 531
Jarash and Ajloun 55.8 2.27 0.62 500 176
South 51.3 3.20 2.37 463 316
Living quarters owned, pay on loans
Total 13.2 0.65 2.16 839 834
Amman 11.6 1.25 3.68 164 297
Zarqa and Mafraq 8.4 1.02 1.46 76 97
Balqa and Madaba 14.8 1.38 0.82 131 85
Irbid 21.5 1.77 1.86 194 230
Jarash and Ajloun 21.1 1.50 0.40 188 67
South 9.3 1.36 1.27 86 58
Living quarters rented, unfurnished
Total 27.2 0.98 2.87 1429 1712
Amman 33.9 1.89 3.85 487 870
Zarqa and Mafraq 29.3 2.06 2.21 263 337
Balqa and Madaba 16.7 1.80 1.27 153 96
Irbid 17.3 1.94 2.65 149 185
Jarash and Ajloun 13.3 1.62 0.67 119 42
South 29.4 2.87 2.29 258 181
Living quarters rented, furnished
Total 0.9 0.17 1.89 53 59
Amman 1.2 0.29 1.73 17 30
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.7 0.30 1.51 6 8
Balqa and Madaba 0.7 0.27 0.58 6 4
Irbid 0.7 0.30 1.37 7 7
Jarash and Ajloun 0.3 0.19 0.33 3 1
South 1.5 1.01 3.87 14 9
Living quarters owned by relative (free)
Total 6.5 0.37 1.35 383 407
Amman 6.1 0.65 1.78 89 157
Zarqa and Mafraq 6.9 0.88 1.29 63 80
Balqa and Madaba 5.6 0.85 0.73 49 33
Irbid 8.1 0.97 1.28 71 86
Jarash and Ajloun 8.0 1.02 0.42 72 25
South 4.2 0.75 0.81 39 26
399
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Living quarters owned by employer (no direct payment)
Total 2.8 0.41 3.66 182 174
Amman 2.7 0.79 5.77 43 69
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.8 0.56 1.94 16 21
Balqa and Madaba 7.8 1.95 2.90 71 45
Irbid 1.0 0.43 1.92 9 10
Jarash and Ajloun 1.0 0.46 0.63 9 3
South 4.1 1.12 1.87 34 25
Living quarters occupied, no payment
Total 0.7 0.12 1.28 37 42
Amman 0.5 0.21 2.03 8 14
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.3 0.19 1.18 3 4
Balqa and Madaba 0.9 0.31 0.58 8 5
Irbid 1.8 0.41 0.98 16 19
Jarash and Ajloun 0.2 0.16 0.34 2 1
South 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Living quarters Other tenancy arrangement
Total 0.1 0.04 1.11 6 5
Amman 0.1 0.07 1.80 1 2
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Balqa and Madaba 0.2 0.12 0.47 2 1
Irbid 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Jarash and Ajloun 0.2 0.16 0.33 2 1
South 0.2 0.18 1.01 1 1
Toilet to sewage network
Total 54.5 1.59 5.98 2676 3407
Amman 76.3 2.90 11.09 1087 1941
Zarqa and Mafraq 58.7 3.27 4.74 526 672
Balqa and Madaba 46.6 4.41 4.24 428 269
Irbid 26.8 4.00 8.16 229 286
Jarash and Ajloun 17.1 2.84 1.68 152 54
South 30.6 3.90 4.09 254 185
Toilet to septic tank
Total 38.8 1.50 5.59 2656 2427
Amman 21.6 2.78 10.88 314 550
Zarqa and Mafraq 35.6 3.09 4.49 316 407
Balqa and Madaba 37.1 3.82 3.39 327 214
Irbid 67.0 3.83 6.63 596 714
Jarash and Ajloun 69.0 2.78 1.06 614 216
South 53.5 3.60 2.97 489 324
Covered dry latrine
Total 4.8 0.42 2.27 394 303
Amman 1.7 0.51 3.88 24 42
Zarqa and Mafraq 4.7 0.87 1.81 41 54
Balqa and Madaba 8.0 1.42 1.48 72 46
Irbid 4.9 1.35 3.88 46 53
Jarash and Ajloun 12.4 1.64 0.73 110 39
South 11.3 1.81 1.87 101 68
400
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Toilet Other
Total 1.8 0.35 4.00 146 113
Amman 0.4 0.20 2.53 5 9
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.9 0.38 1.67 8 11
Balqa and Madaba 8.2 2.57 4.75 74 47
Irbid 1.3 0.43 1.50 11 13
Jarash and Ajloun 1.4 0.45 0.43 13 5
South 4.6 2.20 6.25 35 28
Smoking insideregularly
Total 61.5 0.78 1.53 3610 3875
Amman 62.6 1.42 2.08 906 1606
Zarqa and Mafraq 62.7 1.63 1.23 562 722
Balqa and Madaba 63.4 1.59 0.59 571 367
Irbid 58.3 2.02 1.69 515 623
Jarash and Ajloun 56.7 1.73 0.36 506 179
South 61.2 2.05 1.03 550 378
Owns land in Jordan
Total 14.9 0.61 1.74 1082 941
Amman 8.9 0.98 2.86 129 228
Zarqa and Mafraq 9.3 1.07 1.46 82 107
Balqa and Madaba 18.2 1.80 1.19 163 105
Irbid 22.6 1.96 2.21 205 242
Jarash and Ajloun 29.2 1.86 0.50 260 92
South 27.1 1.56 0.71 243 167
Owns land in other country
Total 4.5 0.32 1.42 222 281
Amman 5.9 0.62 1.67 84 150
Zarqa and Mafraq 5.6 0.80 1.31 50 65
Balqa and Madaba 4.8 0.75 0.66 44 28
Irbid 2.5 0.62 1.60 20 26
Jarash and Ajloun 1.2 0.36 0.31 11 4
South 1.4 0.41 0.73 13 8
Owns land both in Jordan and other country
Total 0.2 0.07 1.61 7 12
Amman 0.4 0.16 1.71 5 9
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.2 0.16 1.22 2 3
Balqa and Madaba 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Irbid 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Jarash and Ajloun 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
South 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Does not own land
Total 80.4 0.68 1.75 4608 5066
Amman 84.9 1.18 2.64 1225 2179
Zarqa and Mafraq 84.9 1.32 1.46 763 977
Balqa and Madaba 77.0 1.74 0.93 696 446
Irbid 75.0 1.95 2.04 660 802
Jarash and Ajloun 69.6 1.95 0.53 624 220
South 71.6 1.65 0.78 640 442
401
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Iodized salt found (tested)
Total 77.2 0.82 2.24 4464 4857
Amman 76.8 1.56 3.27 1102 1969
Zarqa and Mafraq 76.8 1.92 2.23 690 884
Balqa and Madaba 66.8 1.96 0.94 600 387
Irbid 88.8 1.21 1.49 785 949
Jarash and Ajloun 74.3 1.93 0.58 665 235
South 70.4 2.42 1.62 622 434
Not iodized salt found (tested)
Total 20.2 0.79 2.26 1298 1272
Amman 20.4 1.49 3.30 299 524
Zarqa and Mafraq 19.7 1.89 2.44 176 227
Balqa and Madaba 30.4 1.91 0.94 278 176
Irbid 9.6 1.12 1.45 85 103
Jarash and Ajloun 23.3 1.88 0.59 208 73
South 27.4 2.33 1.58 252 169
No salt in home
Total 1.4 0.17 1.22 84 85
Amman 1.3 0.30 1.71 18 32
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.9 0.49 1.37 17 22
Balqa and Madaba 2.0 0.46 0.56 18 12
Irbid 0.5 0.23 1.02 5 5
Jarash and Ajloun 1.4 0.36 0.27 13 4
South 1.4 0.37 0.57 13 9
Salt not tested for iodine
Total 1.3 0.20 1.84 69 81
Amman 1.5 0.37 2.14 23 40
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.6 0.60 2.54 14 18
alqa and Madaba 0.8 0.32 0.72 7 5
rbid 1.0 0.32 1.05 9 11
Jarash and Ajloun 1.0 0.35 0.38 9 3
South 0.8 0.29 0.63 7 5
Owns TV
Total 89.3 0.53 1.76 5209 5624
Amman 92.6 0.80 2.28 1334 2377
Zarqa and Mafraq 87.5 1.28 1.61 786 1007
Balqa and Madaba 79.5 2.56 2.18 717 460
Irbid 89.3 1.09 1.24 792 955
Jarash and Ajloun 87.5 1.11 0.33 783 276
South 88.8 1.75 1.79 797 548
Owns telephone
Total 32.8 1.03 2.86 1728 2064
Amman 44.9 2.03 4.03 645 1153
Zarqa and Mafraq 21.5 1.93 2.38 193 248
Balqa and Madaba 25.1 2.49 1.79 224 145
Irbid 22.8 1.99 2.27 201 244
Jarash and Ajloun 17.4 1.85 0.70 156 55
South 35.5 3.09 2.41 309 219
402
CONTENTS
403
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Gulf returnee
Total 5.9 0.44 12.30 1648 2196
Amman 8.3 0.87 13.81 688 1214
Zarqa and Mafraq 7.3 1.18 13.19 391 495
Balqa and Madaba 3.9 0.70 4.29 212 137
Irbid 4.5 0.92 12.24 221 291
Jarash and Ajloun 1.6 0.55 3.59 97 33
South 0.7 0.29 4.33 39 26
1948 refugee
Total 22.3 1.11 25.22 6468 8320
Amman 30.0 2.08 28.90 2475 4402
Zarqa and Mafraq 23.4 2.25 18.17 1245 1575
Balqa and Madaba 22.6 2.99 17.14 1230 788
Irbid 19.2 2.93 34.32 1019 1254
Jarash and Ajloun 3.1 1.07 7.38 180 62
South 6.3 1.33 10.85 319 240
1967 Displaced
Total 13.5 0.74 16.53 3671 5013
Amman 19.4 1.50 20.23 1587 2850
Zarqa and Mafraq 21.1 1.81 12.71 1110 1420
Balqa and Madaba 8.3 1.23 6.65 453 288
Irbid 5.1 1.21 18.61 263 335
Jarash and Ajloun 3.2 0.77 3.73 184 64
South 1.5 0.39 3.91 74 55
Refugee, then displaced
Total 6.7 0.53 15.75 2113 2491
Amman 8.9 1.00 17.16 737 1310
Zarqa and Mafraq 8.6 1.30 13.92 454 579
Balqa and Madaba 8.1 1.81 14.60 450 284
Irbid 2.4 0.95 23.48 98 158
Jarash and Ajloun 5.1 1.48 8.81 298 102
South 1.5 0.49 5.86 76 57
Gaza refugee
Total 1.2 0.19 11.02 477 438
Amman 1.2 0.31 11.26 99 177
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.6 0.41 6.86 85 109
Balqa and Madaba 0.6 0.31 5.19 33 21
Irbid 0.1 0.05 1.58 5 6
Jarash and Ajloun 2.9 1.20 9.86 169 58
South 1.7 0.99 20.91 86 66
404
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Refugee, displaced or Gaza refugee
Total 43.7 1.43 29.43 12729 16262
Amman 59.5 2.43 34.31 4898 8739
Zarqa and Mafraq 54.7 2.92 22.18 2894 3683
Balqa and Madaba 39.5 4.11 23.56 2166 1381
Irbid 26.9 3.93 48.90 1385 1753
Jarash and Ajloun 14.2 3.21 16.27 831 287
South 11.0 2.17 17.51 555 419
Ever attended school
Total 85.2 0.35 3.00 26215 27806
Amman 87.6 0.59 3.94 6405 11412
Zarqa and Mafraq 84.1 0.78 2.49 3791 4850
Balqa and Madaba 80.2 1.30 3.12 3849 2471
Irbid 86.1 0.68 2.08 4067 4904
Jarash and Ajloun 84.0 0.64 0.52 4195 1481
South 81.1 1.26 3.28 3908 2687
Chronic illness, disability
Total 7.0 0.20 2.10 2318 2596
Amman 7.7 0.36 2.58 630 1126
Zarqa and Mafraq 7.6 0.50 2.30 395 509
Balqa and Madaba 6.3 0.42 1.00 344 220
Irbid 6.6 0.46 2.17 344 427
Jarash and Ajloun 5.3 0.32 0.40 302 106
South 5.5 0.38 1.00 303 208
Had acute illness last two weeks before survey
Total 11.0 0.38 4.44 3068 3475
Amman 11.3 0.72 6.21 806 1428
Zarqa and Mafraq 13.3 0.89 3.62 574 738
Balqa and Madaba 8.9 0.69 1.69 412 266
Irbid 11.6 0.86 3.78 522 638
Jarash and Ajloun 6.9 0.65 1.08 331 117
South 9.0 0.93 3.25 423 288
Full time employed
Total 25.7 0.45 2.17 5112 5505
Amman 27.2 0.81 2.82 1354 2403
Zarqa and Mafraq 25.5 1.00 1.84 736 940
Balqa and Madaba 27.1 1.23 1.52 874 558
Irbid 20.6 1.05 2.37 620 761
Jarash and Ajloun 20.9 0.86 0.46 639 226
South 29.8 1.28 1.54 889 617
Part time employed
Total 6.8 0.26 2.27 1418 1455
Amman 5.6 0.43 2.98 281 496
Zarqa and Mafraq 6.8 0.61 2.05 195 250
Balqa and Madaba 5.9 0.53 1.01 189 121
Irbid 10.1 0.87 2.93 315 374
Jarash and Ajloun 8.5 0.66 0.59 260 92
South 5.9 0.50 0.91 178 121
405
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Employed time not det .
Total 2.5 0.16 2.18 563 542
Amman 2.3 0.30 3.39 114 203
Zarqa and Mafraq 2.4 0.35 1.81 69 90
Balqa and Madaba 3.1 0.41 1.14 97 63
Irbid 2.0 0.33 2.02 62 73
Jarash and Ajloun 3.5 0.45 0.63 107 38
South 3.7 0.45 1.15 114 76
Temporarily absent from work
Total 1.6 0.12 1.95 313 341
Amman 1.6 0.24 3.07 80 140
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.5 0.26 1.64 42 55
Balqa and Madaba 1.6 0.23 0.65 50 32
Irbid 1.8 0.26 1.31 59 68
Jarash and Ajloun 1.3 0.24 0.46 40 14
South 1.5 0.27 0.94 42 31
Unemployed
Total 7.5 0.24 1.66 1572 161
Amman 7.0 0.40 2.07 349 621
Zarqa and Mafraq 8.9 0.64 1.77 256 327
Balqa and Madaba 9.6 0.62 0.88 309 197
Irbid 6.5 0.58 1.95 200 241
Jarash and Ajloun 7.7 0.55 0.44 239 84
South 7.1 0.54 0.87 219 146
Seeking,miss availabable
Total 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Amman 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Zarqa and Mafraq 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Balqa and Madaba 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Irbid 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Jarash and Ajloun 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
South 0.0 0.00 . 0 0
Not in labor force
Total 55.9 0.38 1.21 11212 11978
Amman 56.3 0.67 1.53 2796 4982
Zarqa and Mafraq 54.9 0.88 1.10 1578 2022
Balqa and Madaba 52.8 1.06 0.89 1692 1085
Irbid 59.0 0.80 0.93 1802 2185
Jarash and Ajloun 58.0 0.91 0.35 1772 626
South 52.1 1.25 1.25 1572 1078
406
CONTENTS
Table A1.9 Sampling errors for selected variables pertaing to the randomly selected individual
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Works day shift
Total 63.1 1.68 2.20 1265 1318
Amman 58.0 3.10 3.05 278 513
Zarqa and Mafraq 61.7 4.28 2.32 169 212
Balqa and Madaba 67.1 3.13 0.91 247 157
Irbid 72.8 3.54 1.58 163 208
Jarash and Ajloun 68.8 4.37 0.62 165 55
South 66.1 3.15 1.02 243 173
Works Irregular hours
Total 15.3 1.19 2.00 242 320
Amman 19.7 2.25 2.48 86 175
Zarqa and Mafraq 16.1 2.71 1.63 42 55
Balqa and Madaba 14.4 2.44 0.99 47 34
Irbid 10.2 2.95 2.37 15 29
Jarash and Ajloun 10.5 2.61 0.51 24 8
South 7.2 1.49 0.76 28 19
Rotating shift
Total 9.9 1.03 2.17 173 206
Amman 8.7 1.88 3.45 35 77
Zarqa and Mafraq 10.5 2.33 1.73 28 36
Balqa and Madaba 8.2 1.97 1.06 23 19
Irbid 12.8 2.81 1.76 29 37
Jarash and Ajloun 11.6 3.42 0.80 20 9
South 10.7 1.97 0.92 38 28
Other
Total 11.7 1.11 2.18 198 245
Amman 13.5 2.06 2.80 63 119
Zarqa and Mafraq 11.7 3.05 2.70 26 40
Balqa and Madaba 10.2 1.92 0.82 34 24
Irbid 4.2 1.57 1.55 9 12
Jarash and Ajloun 9.1 2.52 0.54 16 7
South 16.0 2.57 1.12 50 42
Very good general health status
Total 44.9 0.92 1.89 2371 2828
Amman 46.7 1.62 2.41 591 1219
Zarqa and Mafraq 36.5 2.35 2.32 283 407
Balqa and Madaba 48.5 2.05 0.93 429 307
Irbid 43.4 2.16 1.69 319 442
Jarash and Ajloun 47.8 2.27 0.55 368 147
South 49.4 2.41 1.26 381 306
Good general health status
Total 33.8 0.91 2.04 1881 2129
Amman 32.9 1.57 2.53 459 858
Zarqa and Mafraq 38.8 2.45 2.47 352 432
Balqa and Madaba 28.9 1.99 1.06 241 183
Irbid 36.4 2.11 1.71 291 370
Jarash and Ajloun 31.9 2.16 0.58 269 98
South 30.2 2.35 1.42 269 187
407
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Fair general health status
Total 16.6 0.63 1.56 968 1047
Amman 17.0 1.10 1.97 23 3 442
Zarqa and Mafraq 18.1 1.63 1.73 165 202
Balqa and Madaba 16.7 1.43 0.81 152 106
Irbid 15.0 1.46 1.48 134 153
Jarash and Ajloun 14.2 1.33 0.39 132 44
South 16.3 1.42 0.80 152 101
Bad general health status
Total 4.1 0.37 1.88 242 258
Amman 3.0 0.56 2.38 46 79
Zarqa and Mafraq 5.4 0.95 1.73 48 60
Balqa and Madaba 4.5 1.22 1.93 35 28
Irbid 5.1 1.08 2.13 39 52
Jarash and Ajloun 5.5 1.11 0.64 40 17
South 3.5 0.65 0.68 34 21
Very bad general health status
Total 0.6 0.13 1.59 40 38
Amman 0.3 0.15 1.51 6 9
Zarqa and Mafraq 1.2 0.57 2.75 5 13
Balqa and Madaba 1.3 0.41 0.73 12 8
Irbid 0.2 0.11 0.70 2 2
Jarash and Ajloun 0.6 0.28 0.37 7 2
South 0.6 0.24 0.51 8 4
Smokes daily
Total 23.7 0.76 1.73 1291 1496
Amman 25.1 1.34 2.18 348 653
Zarqa and Mafraq 23.8 1.86 1.86 193 266
Balqa and Madaba 28.7 1.93 1.01 242 182
Irbid 16.3 1.51 1.48 132 166
Jarash and Ajloun 19.3 1.59 0.44 158 59
South 27.3 2.14 1.25 218 169
Smokes occasionally
Total 3.5 0.37 2.18 192 222
Amman 3.0 0.50 1.94 46 79
Zarqa and Mafraq 3.4 0.66 1.29 32 38
Balqa and Madaba 3.3 0.66 0.75 34 21
Irbid 6.5 1.61 3.79 42 66
Jarash and Ajloun 2.5 0.54 0.31 24 8
South 1.6 0.47 0.75 14 10
Smokes never
Total 72.7 0.81 1.84 4019 458
Amman 71.9 1.42 2.26 941 1875
Zarqa and Mafraq 72.8 1.93 1.82 628 811
Balqa and Madaba 68.0 2.00 1.02 593 430
Irbid 77.1 2.10 2.23 611 785
Jarash and Ajloun 78.2 1.60 0.40 634 240
South 71.1 2.08 1.13 612 440
408
CONTENTS
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Regular user of psychopharmaca
Total 7.1 0.45 1.67 404 447
Amman 4.6 0.67 2.28 69 121
Zarqa and Mafraq 12.2 1.28 1.49 103 136
Balqa and Madaba 6.2 1.01 0.96 55 39
Irbid 9.4 1.31 1.80 71 95
Jarash and Ajloun 7.0 1.20 0.59 56 22
South 5.5 0.90 0.83 50 34
Time to time user of psychopharmaca
Total 14.2 0.69 2.13 837 892
Amman 10.7 1.22 3.53 146 280
Zarqa and Mafraq 16.0 1.55 1.75 141 178
Balqa and Madaba 14.0 1.29 0.76 123 88
Irbid 21.8 2.01 2.10 193 222
Jarash and Ajloun 16.3 1.77 0.61 134 50
South 12.0 1.40 1.01 100 74
No use of psychopharmaca
Total 78.7 0.80 2.10 4261 4961
Amman 84.6 1.45 3.69 1120 2207
Zarqa and Mafraq 71.8 1.81 1.58 609 800
Balqa and Madaba 79.8 1.37 0.64 691 505
Irbid 68.9 2.12 1.87 521 701
Jarash and Ajloun 76.7 2.03 0.62 626 236
South 82.5 1.58 0.94 694 511
Male respondent had child last 12 months
Total 24.2 1.43 1.39 378 345
Amman 19.9 2.45 1.99 71 121
Zarqa and Mafraq 26.9 3.38 1.35 65 71
Balqa and Madaba 26.7 3.46 0.83 73 41
Irbid 31.2 4.46 1.44 51 56
Jarash and Ajloun 26.0 4.03 0.46 56 16
South 24.9 3.35 0.84 62 40
Current user of contraception (males)
Total 42.7 2.13 1.78 456 470
Amman 46.7 3.94 2.58 128 220
Zarqa and Mafraq 35.5 4.28 1.40 67 71
Balqa and Madaba 34.1 4.24 0.79 64 39
Irbid 46.5 5.49 1.53 55 67
Jarash and Ajloun 49.3 5.44 0.47 63 23
South 40.0 4.86 1.08 79 50
Has voted
Total 46.2 0.90 1.78 2847 2906
Amman 38.8 1.56 2.35 533 1011
Zarqa and Mafraq 42.3 2.12 1.79 377 471
Balqa and Madaba 54.9 2.21 1.09 492 347
Irbid 55.6 2.38 2.05 458 565
Jarash and Ajloun 52.7 2.61 0.73 478 162
South 56.6 2.10 0.97 509 350
409
CONTENTS CHAPTER 11 APPENDIX 2
Weighted
Indicator Per cent Standard Error Design Effect Observations
observations
Accepts translation of non Arabic books
Total 57.7 0.89 1.57 2649 3210
Amman 62.0 1.44 1.80 724 1459
Zarqa and Mafraq 57.7 2.27 1.79 415 560
Balqa and Madaba 59.1 2.34 1.09 443 327
Irbid 46.2 2.38 1.76 290 408
Jarash and Ajloun 52.6 2.37 0.53 362 142
South 59.3 2.38 1.09 415 316
Conditionally accepts translation of non Arabic books
Total 22.5 0.77 1.65 1083 1250
Amman 19.7 1.24 1.99 230 464
Zarqa and Mafraq 18.0 1.73 1.72 134 175
Balqa and Madaba 18.9 1.71 0.92 133 105
Irbid 37.5 2.37 1.84 248 331
Jarash and Ajloun 27.3 2.30 0.63 191 74
South 19.2 2.03 1.23 147 102
Does not accepts translation of non Arabic books translation
Total 19.8 0.76 1.77 1039 1100
Amman 18.3 1.32 2.38 240 431
Zarqa and Mafraq 24.4 1.82 1.53 193 236
Balqa and Madaba 21.9 1.80 0.91 169 121
Irbid 16.2 1.76 1.75 125 143
Jarash and Ajloun 20.1 1.90 0.53 153 54
South 21.5 2.13 1.25 159 114
Supports that women can work outside the home
Total 64.6 0.89 1.89 3657 4056
Amman 62.7 1.51 2.23 863 1631
Zarqa and Mafraq 59.9 2.15 1.87 523 667
Balqa and Madaba 63.7 2.52 1.51 558 402
Irbid 69.1 2.20 2.01 543 703
Jarash and Ajloun 72.8 1.91 0.49 596 223
South 69.9 1.98 1.00 574 430
Indifferent to women and work
Total 6.4 0.49 2.17 329 400
Amman 7.3 0.95 3.04 99 190
Zarqa and Mafraq 7.4 1.14 1.86 66 82
Balqa and Madaba 5.5 1.01 1.07 44 35
Irbid 5.3 0.96 1.62 42 54
Jarash and Ajloun 3.1 0.62 0.34 31 10
South 4.9 0.73 0.62 47 30
Against that women work outside the home
Total 29.1 0.85 1.94 1492 1827
Amman 30.0 1.46 2.29 369 780
Zarqa and Mafraq 32.7 2.17 2.09 261 364
Balqa and Madaba 30.8 2.34 1.41 264 194
Irbid 25.6 2.10 2.05 198 260
Jarash and Ajloun 24.1 1.80 0.47 183 74
South 25.2 1.83 0.96 217 155
410
APPENDIX 1 REFERNCES CONTENTS
Most of the results shown in this book are based on simple cross-tabulations of one
variable with another. Most non-technical readers should be able to follow the pres-
entation without any particular problems. However, in some cases we have used more
complex statistical techniques, and readers may want to consult the descriptions
below to refresh their memories if needed.
411
CONTENTS
100 times, 95 of those samples will yield estimates of 72% to 74.5% for the pro-
portion of households with relatives living nearby, and 5 of the samples will give
results outside of the limits.
A p-value (or probability value) is used in a slightly different situation, where
we are examining the difference between two estimates, or between an estimate and
a fixed value, such as 0 or 1. The p-value tells us the probability that our finding is
a chance result of sampling rather than reflecting a real difference in the popula-
tion. A low p-value means that there probably is a real difference.
For example, 72.3 per cent of urban households and 78.9 percent of rural
households have relatives living nearby according to the survey. Is this really a dif-
ference? One way to find out is to apply a statistical test, in this case the Chi-square.
Like most statistical tests, the Chi-square assumes that “nothing is happening” —
in this case, that urban and rural areas have the same proportions of households with
relatives nearby. It calculates the amount of difference that might be expected purely
due to randomness in the sampling, and compares that to the amount of difference
that we actually observe. The test generates a p-value that tells us the probability of
getting the observed result purely by chance if there actually were no difference
between urban and rural areas.
It turns out that the probability for the two estimates to be “really” the same
is 0.007, or 7 times out of 1000. Most people would consider this value so small
(so unlikely) that they would reject the idea that the difference is due to chance.
However, “most people” is a fairly imprecise invocation of authority. How improb-
able does the result have to be? In order to avoid making decisions on a case-by-
case basis, we have adopted the rule that only probabilities of less than 0.05 (or 5
times in 100) will be considered as indicating deviation from a chance result. That
is also what the chapter authors mean when they refer to statistically significant find-
ings. This is of course rather arbitrary, but in line with common practice.
In appendix 1 we present confidence intervals for the more widely-used sur-
vey variables, as part of a discussion of some statistical issues that arise from the type
of sampling used in the JLCS. That is mainly to give an impression of the levels of
uncertainty associated with the results.
In general, however, we do not provide confidence intervals or p-values for
the estimates that we discuss in this book. In the main text we have adopted the
practice of not commenting on results that may easily be due to chance. That prac-
tice also helps to focus attention on differences that are substantively relevant, which
is important for a survey with a large sample size like the JLCS. Neither from a
general social science nor from a policy perspective are we interested in differences
that are too small to have an effect on practical affairs.
412
CONTENTS
Correlation Coefficients
If the values on two variables are related in a systematic way, we say that the two
measures are correlated. If it is a positive correlation, high values on one variable are
associated with high values on another variable, and low values on one with low on
the other. A common example is height and weight. Correlations can also be in-
verse or negative, when low values on one variable are associated with high values
on the other.
A correlation coefficient describes the extent to which two variables vary sys-
tematically with another. The correlation coefficient most commonly used in this
report is the so-called Pearson’s r. It takes on the value 0 when there is no correla-
tion between two variables, +1 when there is perfect correlation and –1 when there
is a perfect inverse correlation. In the social sciences correlations in the range of 0.3
to 0.6 (or similar negative values) are usually considered strong enough to comment
on. Higher values are also worth noting but they do not occur very often, partly
because of measurement problems. The correlation coefficient may be reported with
a p-value (see above) which describes how often it could occur by chance. That p-
value is then an example of a case where the estimate, i.e. the correlation coefficient,
is compared to a fixed value, namely 0.
413
CONTENTS
Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a statistical technique that explores how a set of explanatory
variables affect the probability of something occurring. It is commonly used when
the variable that we want to explain has only two values — basically ‘occurring’ and
‘not occurring’. Some examples from this report are: whether or not a person is a
member of the labour force, whether the person is unemployed, or whether he or
she has been sick in the 14 days preceding the interview. In logistic regression the
‘yes’ value is usually termed an event (for example the event of falling sick or being
unemployed). The main aim of the analysis is to determine what factors influence
the probability of the event occurring.
The main benefit of the technique is that it allows us to isolate the effects of
several variables simultaneously. When a large number of variables is involved, the
presentation becomes much clearer than it would be if we used a complex series of
cross-tabulations.
The main result from a logistic regression analysis is a set of odds-ratios, which
appear in the column labelled Exp (B). The odds-ratios describe how the odds of
an event change with the values of different explanatory variables. The concept of
odds is a slight rephrasing of the concept of probability. Mathematically an odds is
the ratio of the probability of an event occurring to the probability of it not occur-
ring. Another way of saying it is that, for example, there are 5 chances that some-
thing will happen, against 1 chance that it will not. A connoisseur of horse racing
may believe that for one horse there is a 5 to 1 chance that the horse will win a race;
for another horse he may believe there is a 4 to 1 chance that it will win. In logistic
regression what is compared is the ratio of odds. Thus, to continue the horse racing
example, the odds ratio for the two horses is 5/4, or 1.2: the first horse is 1.2 times
more likely to win than the other.
Thus, odds ratios compare odds to some other odds. In a typical example
from the JLCS, we report that the odds ratio of women voting is 0.8 relative to that
of men. This tells us that women are 0.8 times as likely to vote as men are, all other
variables held constant.
414
CONTENTS
The education variable has four categories: no education, primary, secondary, and
more than secondary. The odds ratios for voting are 0.5 for no education, 0.8 for
primary and 0.9 for secondary education. The reference category is usually not
shown, so in this case the odds ratios are relative to the group with more than sec-
ondary education. The 0.5 ratio means that people with no education are half as
likely to vote as those with more than secondary education.
If the results are presented relative to the group with no education, different
categories will be displayed and the odds ratios will be different, but the meaning
is essentially the same: the 2.0 ratio means that people with more than secondary
education are twice as likely to vote as those with no education.
EDUCATION Exp (B)
BASIC(2) 1.6
SECONDARY(3) 1.8
MORE THAN SECONDARY(4) 2.0
However, odds ratios are not always calculated relative to one category, as they are
in the above examples. They may be presented relative to the mean effect of the
variable, or in other ways. The author will usually provide some helpful interpreta-
tion of the results in the chapter text.
A logistic regression analysis also provides a number of other statistics. The
partial correlation coefficient (R) measures how strongly each explanatory variable
correlates with the dependent when the correlation of other variables with the de-
pendent is subtracted. It is thus a measure of the specific contribution that each
variable makes to the model. The probability value (Sig.) shows the probability that
the odds ratio is actually 1 or the regression coefficient is 0. If the value is high (more
than 0.05) it is likely that this explanatory variable has no influence on the event.
The results also include regression coefficients and their standard errors, but these
are on a scale that are not easy to interpret.
415
CONTENTS APPENDIX 1 REFERNCES
416
APPENDIX 2 CONTENTS
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