PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

JENOSA VS. DELARIARTE

GR NO. 172138 SEPTEMBER 8, 2010

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: some students of University of San Agustin, among them

the petitioners, were caught engaging in hazing outside the school
premises. In a meeting conducted among the school authorities,
apprehended students and their parents, they have agreed that
instead of being charged and found guilty of Hazing, the students
who participated in the hazing as initiators, including the petitioner
will just transfer to another school. While those who participated
as neophyte, will be suspended for 1 month.
The petitioners together with their parents signed the
minutes of the meeting signifying their conformity. In view of this
agreement, the university will no longer convene the committee on
students discipline to investigate the hazing. However, the parents
of the petitoners sent a letter to the university urging them not to
implement the AGREEMENT. According to them the principal
without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate
transfer of the students.
Petitoner filed a complaint for injunction and damages to
RTC of Iloilo city. Petitioners assailed t the principals decision of
immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their
right to due process because COSD was not convened. Trial court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed the University
to admit the petitioner students during the pendency of the case

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and ask for the

dissolution of the writ but was denied
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the TC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the petitioners are guilty of
forum shopping but was denied

Petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying

the release of the petitioner students report cards and other
credentials. TC issued the writ of injunction and directing the
respondent to release the report cards and other credentials of the
petitioners Respondent University alleged that they cannot comply
with the writ pending the investigation of COSD
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari on the ground the TC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the civil case 03-27646
( proceeding approving the mandatory injunction to release the
report cards of the petitioners and other credential) and civil case
03-27460 ( proceeding enjoining the immediate transfer of the
petitioner students to another school)

ISSUE:
1. Was the Court of Appeals correct in holding that Branch 29 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City in Civil Case Nos. 03-27460
and 03-27646 did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of this case for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies?
2. Was the recommendation/report/order of the Committee on
Student Discipline dated 7 July 2003 valid, and did it justify the
order of exclusion of petitioner students retroactive to 28
November 2002?
HELD:

The Principal had the authority to order the immediate

transfer of petitioner students because of the 28 November 2002
agreement. Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the
minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting and signified their
conformity to transfer their children to another school. In turn, the
University did not anymore convene the COSD. The University
agreed that it would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings and
instead issue the transfer credentials of petitioner students. Then
petitioners reneged on their agreement without any justifiable
reason. Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction,
and injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to
court with clean hands
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must
apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so
because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity
must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not
have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to
the controversy in issue.
Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement
without any justifiable reason, come to court with unclean hands.
This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.

attachment. Subsequently an amended writ of attachment was

annotated TCT of the subject property.
A similar complaint for collection of money, damages
and prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment in
RTC of Makati (Makati city case) by spouses Vicente against
spouses Baladjay, polished arrow and other corporation. Sps
vicente established that spouses baladjay solicited millions of
investment from them using conduit companies that were
controlled by Rosario baladjay. A writ of preliminary attachment
also against the subject property was issued and annotated in
TCT of the property.
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
LIGON VS. RTC OF MAKATI BRANCH 66
GR NO. 190028 FEBRUARY 26, 2014

FACTS

Petitioner ligon filed a complaint for collection of sum of

money and damages and recission of contract and nullification
of title with a prayer for preliminary attachment in the RTC of
quezon city (Quezon city case) against sps Baladjay. Polished
arrows and its incorporator. Ligon alleged that Rosario Baladjay
enticed her to extend a short term loan in the amount of 3
million. As further enticement for the loan extension, the
spouses baladjay claimed that they are in the process of selling
their property in ayala alabang with clean title, the proceeds
thereof could easily pay off the loan. However the check used as
payment was dishonored by allied bank. Despite the assurance
of sps baladjan to replace it with cash, Rosario Baladjay failed
to pay. Ligon also discovered that the property was already sold
to polished arrow which was alleged as a dummy corporation of
sps Baladjay.
Asserting that the transfer of property to polished arrow
was made in fraud of creditors, Ligon also prayed the
nullification of the transfer and the issuance of preliminary

Before the Quezon City case was concluded, the Makati

city case rendered a decision rescinding the transfer of the said
property to Polished arrow upon finding that the transfer was
made in fraud of the creditor and order to restore to its previous
condition in the name of Rosario baladjay
Citing the decision of the Makati RTC and the polished
arrow being dropped off as party defendants, RTC of Quezon
City rendered a decision directing sps Baladjay to pay Ligon the
amount of 3 Million after Polished Arrow and other defendants
were dropped as party defendants. When Ligon sought the
execution of the decision of the RTC of Quezon city, LIgon
discovered that the Attachment annotated in TCT of the subject
property was deleted when the subject property was sold by
public auction to the respondent TING during the execution
proceeding in Makati city case. Ligon likewise discovered that
RTC of Makti had issued its first assailed order directing atty
Garing to register the final Deed of sale on the ROD and cancel
the TCT in the name of the sps Baladjay. RTc issued its second
assailed order directing atty Garing to comply with the first
order under the pain of contemp.
Atty Garing issued the new TCT in the name of Ting free
from any lien and encumbrances. Later on Ting had sold the
same to Benito Techico.
In view of this Ligon filed a petition for certiorari against
respondent presiding judge, that the Makati RTC committed

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed decisions.

Praying that the assailed decisions be declared void for having
been issued in violation of her prior attachment lien over the
property.

The Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed
Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia,
Ligons prior attachment lien over the subject property

CA dismissed Ligons petition finding that Makati City did not

gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed decisions.

Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No.

9273 due to the Makati City RTCs December 9, 2004 Decision
rescinding the transfer of the subject property from Sps.
Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was
made in fraud of creditors, Ligons attachment lien over the
subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she
had earlier secured binds the property itself, and, hence,
continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as
adjudged in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment
discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.

Aggrieved, Ligon Filed this present petition

ISSUE: whether or not the ca erred in ruling that the Makati city
RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed
orders
HELD:
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which
the property of an adverse party is taken into legal custody,
either at the commencement of an action or at any time
thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the
attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy
except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached
is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the
owners debt.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had
under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment
is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some
manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an
attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an
attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser
thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property
subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529,
said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all
persons.

RTC Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and declaring

the plaintiff (FCP credit corporation, also the private respondent)
not entitled to the writ of replevin and ordering the latter to return
to the defendant the subject vehicle And now requiring the latter to
pay defendant orosa damages under the replevin bond. Trial court
ruled that private respondent FCP had no reason to file the present
action since the petitioner had already paid the installments which
are the sole bases of the complaint. In a supplemental decision,
TC ordered stronghold Insurance Corporation to jointly and
severally with FCP Corporation return the subject vehicle or its
equivalent in kind and cash.

REPLEVIN
OROSA VS. CA
GR NO. 111080 APRIL 5, 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Surety company filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to

annul the order of the trial court denying its motion for
reconsideration. On the other hand, private respondent appealed
the decision of the RTC of manila to the CA
The CA first division affirmed the decision of the RTC but
deleted the order for the issuance of writ of execution pending
appeal. Meanwhile, in private respondents appeal, CA eighth
division affirmed the ruling of RTC with modifications:
1) Deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages

FACTS: private respondent FCP credit corporation filed a

complaint for replevin and damages in the RTC of manila against
petitioner Jose Orosa and one john doe to recover the possession
of a ford laser sedan. It was alleged that the petitioner purchased
the subject vehicle to ford fiesta motor Sales Corporation on
installment basis. Orosa likewise executed a promissory note to
ford fiesta in the sum of 133,824 payable in monthly installment.
Ford fiesta assigned the promissory note private respondent FCP
credit corporation
The complaint alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of
the instalment which fell due on july, august, September and
November of 1984. Consequently, private respondent demand
from the petitioner the balance of the obligation amounting to 10,
154 and to surrender the vehicle which the petitioner was allegedly
detaining
A. On the issue of Jurisdiction:

2) Deleting the order to return to defendant appellee Jose

orosa the subject vehicle its equivalent, in kind or value.
3) Ordering the FCP credit corporation to pay OROSA the
amount equivalent to the value of 14 installments made by the
latter to the former on the subject vehicle.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled

for the issuance of a writ of replevin?

HELD: NO. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial
court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the
subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet
fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial courts
decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals
was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return,
not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen
installments actually paid with interest

Petitioner alleges that the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to review the present case since the First Division of the Court
of Appeals already passed upon the law and the facts of the same.
Petitioner alleges that the present appeal involves the same causes of
action, same parties, same facts and same relief involved in the decision
rendered by the First Division and affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
84979.
Petitioner's argument is untenable. Jurisdiction is simply the power or
authority to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to review decisions and orders of lower courts is conferred by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. More importantly, petitioner cannot now assail the
Court of Appeals' jurisdiction after having actively participated in the
B. Issues were raised first time on appeal:
Petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it considered causes of actions which were raised for the
first time on appeal. True, private respondent submitted issues to the
Court of Appeals which were not raised in the original complaint. Private
respondent belatedly pointed out that:
1.1. It is pertinent to note that Defendant-Appellee has waived prior notice
and demand in order to be rendered in default, as in fact the Promissory
Note expressly stipulates that the monthly installments shall be paid on
the date they fall due, without need of prior notice or demand.
1.2. Said Promissory Note likewise expressly stipulates that a late
payment charge of 2% per month shall be added on each unpaid
installment from maturity thereof until fully paid.

appeal and after praying for affirmative relief. Neither can petitioner argue
that res judicata bars the determination of the present case. The two cases
involve different subject matters, parties and seek different reliefs.
The petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was for certiorari with
injunction, brought by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. alleging that
there was grave abuse of discretion when the trial court adjudged it liable
for damages without due process, in violation of Rule 60, Section 10 in
relation to Rule 57, Section 20, of the Rules of Court. The surety also
questioned the propriety of the writ of execution issued by the trial court
pending appeal.

obligee, and hence, violated the terms of the chattel mortgage.

Meritorious as these arguments are, they come too late in the day. Basic is
the rule that matters not raised in the complaint cannot be raised for the
first time on appe
C. On the issue of moral damages:
Petitioner laments that he assigned the car to his daughter so that she
could "approximate without equaling the status of her in-laws." This being
the case, petitioner experienced anguish and unquantifiable humiliation
when he had to face his daughter's wealthy in-laws to explain the "why
and the whats of the subject case." Petitioner further insists that an award
of moral damages is especially justified since he is no ordinary man, but a
businessman of high social standing, a graduate of De La Salle University
and belongs to a well known family of bankers.

1.3. Of equal significance is the Acceleration Clause in the Promissory Note

which states that if default be made in the payment of any of the
installments or late payment charges thereon when the same became due
and payable, the total principle sum then remaining unpaid, together with
the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at oncebecome due and
payable.

We must deny the claim. The law clearly states that one may only
recover moral damages if they are the proximate result of the,
other party's wrongful act or omission.
Two elements are
required. First, the act or omission must be the proximate result of
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. Second, the act must be wrongful.

Private respondent argued that based on the provisions of the Promissory

Note itself, petitioner incurred in default since, even though there was
actual payment of the installments which fell due on July 28, 1984, as well
as the three installments on August 28 to October 28, 1984, the payments
were all late and irregular. Private respondent also argued that petitioner
assigned the subject car to his daughter without the written consent of the

Petitioner maintains that embarrassment resulted when he had to explain

the suit to his daughter's in-laws. However, that could have been avoided
had he not assigned the car to his daughter and had he been faithful and
prompt in paying the installments required. Petitioner brought the situation
upon himself and cannot now complain that private respondent is liable for
the mental anguish and humiliation he suffered.

but CA denied the motion Hence, the matter was brought before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: whether or not the petitioners are concurrently liable

with Edward to provide support to respondents

HELD:

LIM VS. LIM

CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
respondent Cheryl Lim married Edward Lim, son of the
petitioners.
Cheryl lim bore Edward 3 children, herein
respondents. Cheryl, Edward and their three children resided at
the house of the petitioners in forbes park Makati. Edwards income
of 6000 pesos from their family business shouldered the family
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. After a violent
confrontation ( she caught Edward with their in house midwife of
chua Giak, grandmother of Edward Lim) in a very compromising
situation) with Edward, Cheryl abandoned the forbes park bringing
with him their 3 children.
Cheryl for herself and their children sued the petitioners,
Edward lim, and Chua Giak and Mariano (edwards grandfather) in
the RTC of Makati city for support
Trial court ordered Edward and petitioners jointly provide
40,000 monthly support to respondents with Edward shouldering
6000 and the petitioners the balance of 34000
An appeal was made by the petitioners before the Court of
Appeals assailing their liability to support Cheryl and her children.
However, it affirmed the decision of the trial court, arguing that
although parents and their legitimate children are obliged to
support each other, this obligation extends down to the legitimate
grandchildren and great grandchildren as mentioned in Article 195
of the Family Code. Petitioners sought reconsideration from the CA

YES. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the CA

with modification limitng the the petitioners liability to the
amount of monthly support needed by respondents ( Cheryl and
Edwards children) only
Petitioners relied on the provisions of the civil code on
parental authority. Petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination or suspension during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support,
Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latters offspring ends with them.
The governing provision of the civil code is title VIII on
support. The court agreed on the view of professor Pineda
which states grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest
degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because
we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to
discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to
her children, then all schoolbound. It is also undisputed that the
amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents,
P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic
needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide
for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article
199.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation

extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category.
Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family

extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital

bond.20 Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of
monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined
from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case
to the trial court for this limited purpose