DRAFT

Chapter 9
EU-Russia Security Relations:
Lessons from the South Caucasus
Licnia Simo1
Introduction
The nature of political-security issues is traditionally secretive, managed by political
and military elites. According to the realist paradigm, it is also one of the most difficult
areas in inter-state relations, because of suspicion and competition in international
relations, where hard power remains a fundamental currency for state survival in an
anarchical system. European integration has often deviated from this understanding,
promoting interdependence, transparency and consultation in a regional process of
gradual supranational integration in economic, financial and legislative issues. This
European choice remains a conundrum for realist analysis and for other international
actors who are still privileging traditional nationalist and sovereign approaches. This is
surely the case of Russia.
The argument has been made that Russia and the EU remain two fundamentally
different actors in international relations and that this distinct nature is an insuperable
obstacle to closer cooperation, namely in security issues (Simo, 2011; Freire, 2009, p.
73). Whereas the EU has been seen as a security community (Waever, 1998), privileging
consensus building and a cooperative approach to security and favouring international
institutions, within which inter-state relations can develop in a predictable way; Russian
elites continue to privilege high politics, rooted in a conception of state power which
drives to a large extent on militarist power projection capabilities by the state (Allison,
2006, p. 76). Its view of sovereignty is absolute and interference in domestic issues of
the state is unwarranted.
Considering this scenario, it is not surprising that cooperation on security issues
between Brussels and Moscow has been rather limited. What might be surprising is their
ability actually to engage on some level of cooperative action in this field. This chapter
seeks to explain patterns of cooperation and conflict between the EU and Russia on
security issues in their shared neighbourhood. The chapter deals with the security issues
challenging EU-Russia relations in the South Caucasus, and explains patterns of
cooperation and conflict on security issues using the assumptions guiding liberal
institutionalist and realist perspectives. On the one hand, the chapter argues that in order
for a cooperative security approach to develop, the EU and Russia would have to share a
meaningful set of views and interests, which so far has been lacking in their perceptions
of European security. On the other hand, non-cooperation and conflict can also be
explained by the EUs attempt to control the institutional and normative context of
security cooperation in Europe, thus increasing the costs of non-participation for Russia.
Although EU leaders often portray this process as Europes contribution to regional
stability, the view from Moscow is that EU leaders either do not consider Russian
interests or they seek to weaken Russias position as a security provider in the shared
neighbourhood.
1 The author would like to thank Sandra D. Fernandes for her comments on previous versions
of this chapter.
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As the chapter argues, Russias response has been to externalise the costs of nonparticipation to the neighbours of the CIS, who are heading closer to the EU. The war in
Georgia in 2008 and the gas wars with Ukraine can be seen from this perspective. For
those states embracing the legal and institutional order proposed by the EU one which
Russia contests this would have costs, mainly derived from Moscows inability to
shape that order. Building on this approach, the chapter starts with the conceptual
framework, followed by a section contextualising EU-Russia institutional relations. It
then addresses European and Russian policies towards Eurasian security and the final
section deals with conflict management in the South Caucasus and the main illustration
of EU-Russia security relations.
Conceptual framework: cooperation and conflict in international relations
The explanation of patterns of cooperation and conflict among actors in international
relations has been approached from divergent perspectives by the classical theories of
International Relations (IR). These approaches have either underlined the inherent
nature of the international system as anarchical and, thus, prone to conflict; emphasised
patterns of amity and enmity; or argued that conflict could be overcome by the growing
realisation of interdependence and absolute gains, which could be derived from
transparency and institutionalisation. Thus, cooperation and conflict need to be
perceived as two faces of the same coin, providing meaning and context for the other to
take place. As argued by Stein (1990, p. 172) [c]ompetitive and conflicting relations
can underline concerted, cooperative ones [and] international cooperation is embedded
within a structure of competition, rivalry and insecurity. Therefore, we need to
understand in an integrated way what drives conflict and cooperation simultaneously, to
explain the evolving relations of the EU and Russia on security issues in their shared
neighbourhood.
Cooperation emerged as a central concept for liberal institutionalists dealing
with issues of increased economic interdependence (Keohane 1984; Lake 1996; Weber
2000), but also transparency and predictability in world affairs, which could be
deepened in the framework of international institutions. Institutions would thus reduce
transaction costs for states (still regarded as the main actors in the international system)
and reduce the likelihood of violent conflict, by providing the institutional avenues to
cope with conflict. The process of European integration is perhaps the most widely
recognised political phenomenon illustrating these dynamics. Even if the argument has
been made by intergovernmentalists (Moravcsik, 1998) that steps towards integration
reflect a rational and self-interested choice by the most powerful actors in Europe, the
expectation that cooperation within institutions could avert further conflict in Europe
was widely shared. In his latest State of Union Address, the President of the European
Commission Jos Manuel Barroso argued that
[it]t was an illusion to think that we could have a common currency and a
single market with national approaches to economic and budgetary policy.
Lets avoid another illusion that we can have a common currency and a
single market with an intergovernmental approach. (Barroso, 2011)
This perspective reinforces the belief that institutional integration is the way to maintain
peace in Europe and to address the global challenges in its external relations.
This statement reminds us that the choices of political actors to cooperate or to
pursue strategies rooted in conflict, coercion and bargaining are not predetermined,
begging the question of what makes states pursue different strategies at different times.
Another illustration that states are not intrinsically cooperative or conflicting comes
2

from democratic peace theory. The theory acknowledges that, although democracies
tend not to wage war on each other, they are nevertheless capable and willing to use
force and violence on other non-democratic nations (Risse-Kappen, 1995). Therefore,
faced with a choice or dilemma actors must find suitable criteria to make a decision
about whether to pursue cooperative efforts or chose conflict, based on a rational
assessment of their interests. This is a view shared by both liberal and realist authors.
For realists, cooperation is rare and context-specific. This means that, in order to explain
cooperation among states, realists look at power rather than common interests. One line
of realist argument underlines limits to international cooperation due to the relative
gains for states as compared to relative gains for others (Grieco, 1988). This perspective
is particularly relevant in a context of increased multipolarity and fading hegemony,
both at the global and the regional level.
The second line of realist argument focuses on power and coercion as a driving
force for cooperation. Powerful actors see advantages in creating institutions and
cooperative frameworks as a way to create rewards for those within the club (Stein,
1982) and create pressure to those left outside to join. This is the logic behind
Ikenberrys argument of why the US post-World War II foreign policy privileged the
creation of multilateral institutions (Ikenberry, 2001). Institutions can reduce the costs
of maintaining order and provide powerful tools to restrain other actors choices, to the
benefit of those setting the rules. As Barnett and Finnemore (2005, p. 162) underline,
institutions may play a functionalist role, by proving services to the states which create
them; but they also exercise power by construct[ing] the social world within which
cooperation takes place. States can therefore regard cooperation within the institutions
they establish as a form of power exercise, which is regarded as legitimate and creating
benefits for the whole community. Ultimately, assuring compliance or exercising
leadership becomes less costly within these institutional and cooperative frameworks
and provides important leverage over other states and actors seeking to join the club.
IR theories explanations for cooperation and conflict in the international system
either underline mutual gains from the management of common challenges and
common interests in a cooperative way or, alternatively, underline cooperation as a
limited tool to assure order and stability and in a best case scenario just an expedient
way to exercise power. In both accounts, states perceptions of the gains they derive
from cooperation are fundamental to avoiding conflict. Whereas liberal views require
that interests be perceived as common in order for cooperation to be the rule, realists
assume that interests are mainly conflicting and cooperation will take place as a rational
assessment of relative gains. These assumptions are important guiding tools to EURussia security relations vis--vis the South Caucasus, as further elaborated below.
Whether both actors share any meaningful understanding of their interests in stability in
the South Caucasus becomes a fundamental aspect for cooperative security to develop.
On the contrary, cooperation within the framework of the Western-led security formats,
such as the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), becomes undermined by the perceived advantage
that the EU and the US have by dictating the rules of the game. In the absence of truly
cooperative approaches to security in the shared neighbourhood, and particularly in the
case of the South Caucasus, the prevalence of competitive approaches or at best a
division of labour in managing regional security issues is not surprising.
EU-Russia security dialogue
EU-Russia relations have developed within the framework of the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 and which entered into force in 1997. As
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Portela (2001) notes, the PCA transcended for the first time the economic dimension to
establish a regular political dialogue and focused on creating convergence of positions
on international issues of mutual concern and security. In 1999 the first important step
towards deepening and institutionalising the EU-Russia security dialogue was taken in
the European Council of Cologne, with the adoption of the EUs first Common Strategy
(a new tool envisioned under the Amsterdam Treaty) establishing a framework
document governing EU and member states actions towards Russia (Fernandes, 2009;
Haukkala, 2010). Despite difficulties in bilateral relations due to the EUs views on
Russias management of the Chechen wars, the Common Strategy was an important
achievement in bilateral security relations. As Lynch (2003, p. 57) underlines, the
Common Strategy on Russia established three main dimensions: development of
political dialogue to address security challenges in Europe, including operative
decisions on how Russia could join EU Petersberg Missions on conflict management;
help Russia enter the European political family, by transforming Russias domestic
system; and a third dimension underlining the shared values of this relationship.
Overall, the EU established the framework for Russias participation in the new
European security order, but failed to engage Moscow in defining that order.
The Europeanisation of Russia has been on the western agenda since the fall of
the Soviet Union as a way to resolve the idiosyncrasies of Russian identity and to
anchor it in the European political space. The EUs neo-functionalist approach to Russia
sought to derive political and security benefits from gradual economic integration, in a
classic spill over effect (De Speigeleire, 2002, p. 146). In a way, the EU sought to weave
Russia into its expanding governance network revolving around the institutions in
Brussels (Gaenzle, 2008). But, as Dmitri Trenin (2002, p. 140) argues, the integration of
Russia in Europe is only partly a foreign policy issue and depends first and foremost on
the changes taking place in Russian society. In that regard, for the changes effectively to
bring the two neighbours closer together, common interests and common values need to
be defined. As Bordachev and Moshes (2004) argue
The idea that Russias integration into Europe is possible in principle, and
that Russia could become a member of the community of nations sharing
similar values, has been circulating throughout Europe, although it has never
prevailed. Now it is becoming increasingly weaker. The edifice of common
interests has been built on the basis of common values, but if values differ,
then the community of interests weakens. [] There is a growing sentiment
that Russia is unintegrable in principle and that it remains a natural partner
(and rival at the same time) outside the European space.
Although economic and energy interdependence has been developing, security issues
have remained largely unaddressed in EU-Russia relations. The third common space on
external security is the least developed and often both Moscow and EU leaders prefer to
deal with security issues on a bilateral level (Bordachev, 2005, pp. 40-42). An example
of the importance of bilateral relations for security cooperation was the Meseberg
initiative, proposed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev, in June 2010. The two leaders reached agreement on the need to establish an
EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs (EU-Russia CSFA), which could
address common concerns in the shared neighbourhood, including the protracted
conflicts. As argued by Angela Merkel, [i]t would be very complicated and not very
realistic to expect all 27 EU members to reach agreement among themselves, and only
then present this or that initiative to Russia. I think that if one country is willing to take

a step forward this is something to be welcomed (Joint News Conference with German
Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel following Russian-German Talks, 2010).
Bilateral relations might actually prove an important vehicle for security
dialogue to take place and develop, making the best use of the EUs multilevel
governance, if properly anchored in CSDP decision-making processes. This could also
address concerns that the EUs neighbourhood policy is being developed at the expense
of Russias interests. With the adoption of the EUs Security Strategy (European
Council, 2003), embryonic strategic thinking about the EUs role in the world began to
develop, with a particular emphasis on its neighbourhood, as set in the wider Europe
communication (European Commission, 2003). EU enlargement posed real challenges
for Russia, namely the issue of Kaliningrad and EU engagement in the so-called shared
neighbourhood (DeBardeleben, 2008; Averre, 2005). Overall, the EU is gradually
creating a new regional order in which Russias position is not clearly defined. If
anything, Moscow is now being portrayed as a threat, considering Moscows use of
energy interdependence and its reaction to the pro-Western policies in Georgia and
Ukraine. On the other hand, NATO enlargements towards the CIS further reinforce
Moscows concerns, as the hopes of anchoring Russia in the European post-Cold war
security system failed (Arbatov, 1995, p. 140; Berryman, 2009, p. 167).
The latest changes in the EU, with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, and in
Russia, with the announcement that Medvedev will not run for a second term and Putin
will lead the lists of the United Russia Party to the 2012 presidential elections, seem to
place the security dialogue as a second order priority. Although the Lisbon Treaty aims
to reinforce coordination and coherence through the appointment of a High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with extensive
powers to define the guidelines of EU foreign and security policy, in coordination with
the member states, EU-Russia summits are still headed by the President of the European
Commission and the President of the European Council, underlining the importance of
economic issues and member states interests. Both President Medvedevs proposal for a
security treaty in Europe and the EU-Russia CSFA have lacked EU support illustrating
the reluctance of EU members to engage in Russian proposals. As far as Russia is
concerned, two important issues stand out in the next Presidents agenda, which might
take attention from security dialogue with Europe. On the one hand, the urgency to
address and reverse the negative effects of the global financial crisis on Russia and to
truly give substance to the modernisation agenda; on the other hand, Putin has hinted
that he will pursue deeper integration in the Eurasian space, reinforcing Russias
presence in the region through economic and institutional means (Putin, 2011).
EU and Russian revisionist policies towards Eurasian security
A major challenge to the development of cooperative approaches to security in the
shared EU-Russia neighbourhood is the perception that both actors sponsor revisionist
approaches to European security. The lack of clarity as to the foreign policy goals of
both actors in a post-Cold War context has largely contributed to this perception, as also
argued by Freire in this volume. On the one hand, the EU is perceived by Russia as
redesigning political and security relations in Europe to its advantage, through the
expansion of its rules and norms. Moscow also perceives the European partners as
largely supporting US interests in Eurasia, namely regarding NATO expansion and
democratisation of the shared neighbourhood. On the EU side, the accusations that
Russia is set on a revisionist path have been mainly voiced by former-Warsaw Pact EU
member states, who see Russias new found power and assertiveness as part of a wider
process of competition for influence with the EU and the US at the global and regional
5

level. Regardless of whether these perceptions are justified or not, policy implications
include lack of trust and a growing gap in security perceptions in Europe (AlexandrovaArbatova 2009, p. 287).
The South Caucasus is not immune to these dynamics. The EU and Russia are
now central actors in some of the most important issues affecting the region. Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, like most of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are still in the
process of devising a political and economic transition, looking for models of social,
economic and political development. This has been done over the last twenty years of
independence in a context of instability, reinforcing the heterogeneous yet
interdependent nature of the region. Each country is pursuing different approaches to
state building, but the security interdependence of the South Caucasus region makes it a
security complex (Buzan et al, 1998; Simo and Freire, 2008). However, due to its
location, the Caucasus anchors a set of different dynamics developing in neighbouring
areas, which affect these countries options and external actors behaviour. It is deeply
influenced by the Caspian energy development, through the increase in revenues in
production and transit countries, through the disputes of sovereign prerogatives over
natural resources, as in the case of the Caspian basin, and by the developments in the
Middle East, the worlds largest energy-producing region, which affect the strategic
importance of the Caspian energy for global and regional powers.
The Caucasus is also closely linked to developments in the Black Sea region.
Although this heterogeneous region has lived in relative stability since the end of the
Cold War (Antonenko, 2009, p. 264), it is clearly affected by the persistence of
protracted conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus. The region is also at the heart
of the EUs and NATOs expansion to the traditional areas of influence of the Russian
Federation and is increasingly disputed by other regional and global powers, like
Turkey, the US and China. Finally, the Caucasus is at the heart of Eurasian politics,
clearly marked by Russian foreign policy priorities and the EUs project of regional
stabilisation, the ENP, as well as a gradual integration of Eurasia into the global
international system. Considering these characteristics, can we consider EU and Russian
policies towards the South Caucasus as revisionist? Moreover, what does that mean for
relations between the two actors and the region?
Russias revisionist position vis--vis the South Caucasus is mainly due to the
perception in Moscow that keeping the status quo is no longer, either possible, or to
Russias advantage. Although Russia has been seen as conducting a policy of managed
instability through the protracted conflicts and the support of semi-authoritarian and
corrupt regimes, the changes ignited by the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003) and
Ukraine (2004) demanded a serious readjustment of Russian policies. Russia denounced
Western engagement as fomenting competition in Eurasia, but had to acknowledge that
these events were accumulating political capital for Western political and economic
interests.2 Russias response was a mix of goodwill gestures and coercive measures. It
2 Putins speech at the Munich security conference, in 2007, is illustrative:
According to the [OSCE] founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE
is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights
norms at their request. [] But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs
of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these
states should live and develop. It is obvious that such interference does not
promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes
them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable
(Putin, 2007).

supported the Saakashvili administrations efforts to deal with the peaceful ousting of
the leader of the Ajarian region, Aslan Abashidze, in the post-revolutionary period, but
later imposed trade embargos and energy price increases as a way to undermine the proWestern regimes in Georgia and Ukraine.
The protracted conflicts in Eurasia remain one of Russias most important assets
to project influence in the region. A major priority of the Saakashvili administration in
Georgia was to revise the existing formats for conflict resolution. This led to the process
of de-frosting of the so-called frozen conflicts, including through the
internationalisation of the mediation efforts and ultimately through the resort to violence
in 2008. Russia readjusted its priorities to the changing context and favoured a refreezing of the status quo, which would give Moscow greater ability to manage
instability in its southern borders. Russias military intervention in Georgia, in 2008, reconfigured Russias positioning in the South Caucasus, and readjusted the military and
political balance of the region. After the war Russia reinforced its military presence in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and by recognizing the independence of the two regions it
increased the number of its political allies. Russia also reinforced its presence in
Armenia, extending the leasing of its military base until 2044 (RFE/RL, 2010) and
continued its presence in the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan, strategically important
to control the Caspian and the Middle East. Overall, Russia embraced the changes in the
South Caucasus as inevitable and sought to re-shape the new status quo to its advantage.
Looking to improve its image among the CIS countries after the war in Georgia,
Russia became more engaged in conflict resolution efforts in the South Caucasus.
Russia has prioritised the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and President Medvedev
personally engaged in mediation efforts, meeting the Armenian and the Azerbaijani
Presidents at nine trilateral summits since 2008. Russia accepted also a reinforced
international presence in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, namely agreeing to
the EUs mediation of the cease-fire agreement after the war in 2008 and the
deployment of a team of observers in Georgia, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).3
As further developed below, Russian compliance with the agreement has been limited
and the pace of the peace process has been staling, indicating that Russia has somehow
been trying to limit and reverse the impact of this renovated international presence in
the Georgian protracted conflicts. Moscow also acquiesced to the process of
normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Although Russia remains
dissatisfied with the increasing external presence in Eurasia, it has adjusted to the new
realities. Russia has retained a veto power over the protracted conflicts and is now better
positioned to control the region, after having lost its military presence in Georgia in
2007 (Antidze, 2007). In the meantime, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement did not
reach fruition, stalling the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks and straining AzerbaijaniTurkish relations, granting Russia short-term advantages. Turkish influence has receded
in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russia managed to revitalise its image as a peacebroker.
The EU has also expressed a mix of revisionist and conservative trends in the
South Caucasus. The 2004 enlargement brought new advocates for EU policies towards
the Eastern neighbourhood. Poland and the Baltic States were particularly active in
bringing the South Caucasus to the EUs agenda. As the Wider Europe communication
underlines, the EU perceives itself as having a duty to act to ensure continuing social
cohesion and economic dynamism and to promote regional and subregional
cooperation and integration, perceived as preconditions for political stability,
3 Information on the mission available at www.eumm.eu.
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economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared
environment (European Commission, 2003, p. 3). The ENP rejected the consolidation
of new division lines in Europe, by creating opportunities for the FSU countries to
engage with EU governance structures: a sort of enlargement-lite (Popescu and
Wilson, 2009). The EU also actively supported the revolutionary movements in Georgia
and Ukraine and their pro-Western foreign policies, including their NATO membership
aspirations, through political and financial backing. This had a clear security purpose of
creating stability at the borders of the enlarged EU. In this regard, the EU was clearly a
revisionist power in Eurasia.
At the level of conflict resolution the EU was more conservative, reluctantly
taking on new security functions in Eurasia and rarely seeking them proactively. In
2005, the EU officially became part of the mediation efforts in the Transdnister conflict
(the 5+2 format) and established the EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission to the
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) to assist in the modernisation of border management
and to act as a confidence-building measure in the Transdnistrian conflict. 4 The previous
year the EU had deployed its first ESDP rule of law mission in Georgia, the EUJUST
Themis. Both in Moldova and the South Caucasus the EU has appointed Special
Representatives (EUSRs) actively contributing to conflict resolution.5 The EU did
respond to the demands from the ground with practical mechanisms, but failed to devise
a long-term strategy for its engagement with the region. Russia remained the most
divisive element among EU member states in this regard. A central concern of the EU
was not to antagonise Moscow by supporting a radical change in the status quo, but
rather to provide support for the existing mechanisms on conflict resolution, such as the
Joint Control Commission (JCC) on South Ossetia and the Minsk Group, for Karabakh,
as well as through a policy of limited engagement with Abkhazia. Despite the limited
nature of Russian cooperation, the most important turning point in EU engagement was
the war in Georgia in 2008, to which the EU responded by leading the negotiations of a
cease-fire between Georgia and Russia, followed by the unprecedented deployment of
the EUMM and the appointment of Pierre Morel as the EUSR for the crisis in Georgia, 6
responsible for leading the peace-process, known as the Geneva Talks (Council of the
European Union, 2008).
As regards the Karabakh conflict and the normalisation of relations between
Armenia and Turkey, the EU has had a more limited and cautious engagement. The EU
was largely unable to use its institutional links to Turkey and Armenia and its diplomatic
resources to prevent the failure of the process. This reduced the EUs contribution to the
resolution of the Karabakh conflict even further. Besides the commitments in Georgia,
the major driving force of EU engagement in the South Caucasus is EU interest in the
Caspian energy, positioning Azerbaijan as a strategic partner for the EU. This however
has decreased the EUs leverage on democratic reforms and conflict resolution, as Baku
has found new assertiveness in the regional and international stage, building on oil
revenues and its strategic regional position (RFE/RL, 2008).
4 Information on the mission available at www.eubam.org.
5 The mandates of the EUSRs are available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreignpolicy/eu-special-representatives.aspx?lang=en.
6 Mandate available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/eu-specialrepresentatives.aspx?lang=en.
8

The EU has now more security functions directly related to the protracted
conflicts in Georgia and is indirectly engaged in confidence-building measure in
Moldova. The reappointment of a new EUSR for the South Caucasus, announced in
September 2011 after months of uncertainty as to how the restructuring of the EUs
external relations after Lisbon would be managed in the South Caucasus, can be seen as
a sign that the EU will stay committed to regional stability. The EUSRs Philippe Lefont
will take on functions of conflict resolution both in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
in Georgia, which will demand a careful balancing of resources and time. These changes
at the security level were largely unwanted by the EU and in that sense the EU was not
openly a revisionist power. However, politically and economically the EU did push for
an agenda of mild European integration with the region and pro-actively sought to
advance policies such as the ENP and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), with the ability to
exert significant influence in Eurasia in the long-term.
Conflict management in the South Caucasus: schism or opportunity?
Conflict resolution issues in Eurasia have been largely absent from EU-Russia relations.
Although the PCA established the possibility of cooperation on foreign and security
policy and crisis management, it was not until 2005 with the celebration of the four
Common Spaces that concrete proposals began to be discussed regarding the conflict in
Moldova (Fernandes, 2009, p. 238). Georgia, which had been another potential
candidate for closer EU-Russia cooperation on conflict-related issues, became a sore
point of debate after the arrival of President Saakashvili to power in Tbilisi. By 2006
Georgian-Russian relations had deteriorated deeply and a diplomatic crisis developed
between the two countries (Vieira and Simo, 2008, p. 5, Knig, 2007, pp. 87-90).
Faced with the prospect of further escalation and pressured by Georgia to mediate
between Tbilisi and Moscow,7 the EU Council Conclusions of October 2006 called on
both parties to tone down the rhetoric and revise the measures adopted, and indicated
the EUs willingness to work with Georgia and the Russian Federation to facilitate
mutual confidence building and contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis
(Council of the European Union, 2006).
This marked another turning point in EU engagement in the conflicts in the
South Caucasus. The EU had already developed substantial efforts towards
rehabilitation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, having allocated 33 million in 19972005, the largest financial donor after Russia (Wilson and Popescu, 2009, p. 326). The
projects remained largely de-politicised, as a way to assuage Russia and more reluctant
EU member states, with the Commission deliberately presenting them as apolitical.
Starting from this low profile engagement promoted by EU institutions, the EU
gradually took on new functions. These included observer status for the European
Commission to the JCC meetings and, following a Commission and Council factfinding mission to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in January 2007, the report presented to
the Political and Security Council (PSC) suggested additional measures the EU could
take (Rettman, 2007). EU member states reaction to the proposal was to strip it of any
controversial issues in relations with Russia. This concern with Russias perceptions is
also illustrated by the fact the EUSR Peter Semneby travelled to Moscow and consulted
with the Russian ambassador in Brussels, before submitting the document to the PSC
(Popescu, 2011, p. 82). Conflict resolution, unlike other more structural approaches to
security, proved to be an area of peaceful coexistence, even if not of cooperation,
7 Interview with COEST delegate, Council of the EU, Brussels, 17 July, 2007.
9

between the EU and Russia, as long as the EU acknowledged Russias leading role in
defining the scope of engagement.
The most controversial issue to all the parties to the conflicts in Georgia was the
nature of the peacekeeping operations in the two separatist regions, where changing the
status quo would prove harder and more costly for all involved. Russia was actively
engaged in providing military, political and economic support to the separatist regions,
while simultaneously engaged in peacekeeping activities under the CIS mandate. Faced
with these prospects, the Georgian authorities began an intensive campaign to
internationalise the conflicts, aimed at changing the peacekeeping formats. The EUs
reluctance to even discuss this possibility can be seen as contributing to Georgias
decision to rely on NATO security guarantees through formal accession and close
relations with the US, including military support to rearm the Georgian states (Pardo,
2011, p. 1393). Both aspects were fundamental in Russias calculations and the
escalation of the conflict into open confrontation. In fact, the war was the only event
that led the EU to accept a conflict resolution role, as Georgia had actively requested.
Following the war, Russias position as a peace-broker was also clearly challenged. The
3+3 format of the Geneva Talks, with the EU, the OSCE and the UN acting as co-chairs,
on the one hand, and Russia, Georgia and the US on the other, seems rather artificial.
Russia is seen as a party to the conflict and offering patronage to the separatist entities,
whereas the US is seen as Georgias patron (Mikhelidze, 2010, p. 3).
Following the war, EU-Russia relations evolved positively and a new openness
to address the protracted conflicts has been visible. Although some EU member states
demanded sanctions to be applied to Russia, others advocated a policy of dialogue. The
former-High Representative for the CSFP, Javier Solana, made this point stating that
[after the war w]e opted for dialogue and negotiation [with Russia] rather
than sanctions as the best means of passing our messages and defending
our interests. This decision should not be misunderstood, however. [...]
Russia knows that what happens there [in Georgia] is important for our
relationship. (Solana, 2009)
Major breakthroughs in the Georgian conflicts have not been visible, and in fact there is
the real danger that the EUs presence might be inadvertently contributing to refreezing
the conflicts, without the means to make Russia comply with the cease-fire agreement.
President Medvedev has stated his understanding of the so-called Medvedev-Sarkozy
cease-fire agreement: Russias position on that is quite simple: the Medvedev-Sarkozy
plan was carried out and it was successful. I consider all other interpretations of the
events to be wrong (Medvedev, 2011). This position clashes with the view that the
agreement requires all parties to withdraw their military forces to pre-war positions and
that the monitors be granted access to the whole territory of Georgia, including the two
separatist regions.8
The realist argument of limited cooperation based on relative gains is useful in
this context to help us understand why Russia accepted the EUs presence in these
conflicts, but also why the EU chose to engage with Russia in the aftermath of the war.
Both stood to lose a great deal from breaking communication and dialogue in a context
of increased competition in Eurasia. Moreover, interdependence is a fundamental
explanation of these calculations of relative power gains, as is a time-flexible
perspective. Both actors seem to base their strategies on limited losses in the short term
8 The cease-fire agreement is available at
http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/Six_Point_Peace_Plan.pdf.
10

and potential gains in the long run. Moreover, the regional context of Eurasia has been
favouring competition and the establishment of a new multipolarity based on the control
of power leverages in the region: conflicts, energy and ideology. Relative gains from
cooperation thus become an important calculation for the actors involved. The EUs
reluctant engagement in Georgias conflicts confirms the perception among most EU
member states that the costs of confronting Russia would be too high and the
complexity of the conflicts highly reduced the chances for positive gains and success.
Russias acceptance of a short-term EU presence in the Georgian scenario derives from
the changes in the status quo and the need to revert the losses that the military
intervention in Georgia caused to Moscow.
It is in this context that a new division of labour emerged in conflict
management in the South Caucasus. Whereas the EU consolidated a central position as
a security provider for Georgia and became an interlocutor in the mediation efforts,
Russia has been more proactively engaged in the mediation efforts on NagornoKarabakh. The potential for cooperation in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
could be higher, since Russia is not a party to the conflict. Here the main obstacle to
closer EU-Russia cooperation comes from the EUs lack of direct mediation role and
poor involvement, both at the high political level of the official peace process and inside
Nagorno-Karabakh (Simo, 2010). The EU has agreed to a potential role as a
peacekeeper, once an agreement is reached, but has refrained from any attempt to take
on a role as a mediator. This position is in line with the views in Armenia and
Azerbaijan, which have expressed their satisfaction with the current mediation format.
Cooperation between the EU and Russia on conflict resolution seems to depend
more on a structure of opportunity and necessity, rather than on the existence of shared
interests to cooperate. Both the EU and Russia seem to share the view that the role of
external mediators in solving the Karabakh conflict is rather limited and it depends
primarily on Armenia and Azerbaijan to take the necessary steps to achieve a lasting
solution. Despite President Medvedevs efforts to mediate the conflict over the last year,
ultimately the persistence of the status quo is more favourable to Moscows short-term
interests than a deterioration of the situation on the ground. In the absence of realistic
possibilities to reach an agreement, small gestures towards confidence building are a
suitable strategy. Russia has been supportive of recent efforts to develop a strategy of
cultural diplomacy, which resulted in the visit of Armenian and Karabakh
representatives to Azerbaijan in 2007, and of Azerbaijani representatives to Armenia and
Karabakh in 2009, including the Armenian and Azerbaijani ambassadors to Moscow
(Broers, 2010). Russia has also taken a back seat in the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement, even if it stood to lose some strategic advantages in the short-term,
since it did not want to be seen as opposing this important process.
These shifts in regional balances and in perceptions, as well as the increased
militarisation of the Karabakh conflict (and of the Caucasus as a whole) should be a
central concern in bilateral EU-Russia relations. However, neither Russias increased
militarisation of the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nor its arms deals
with Armenia and Azerbaijan have been openly discussed with Brussels. Overall, both
Russia and the EU have clear energy concerns that drive them to short-term
considerations in their relations with the South Caucasus, as opposed to a concerted
long-term commitment to peace. Moreover, the EU seems to be driven by the principle
of causing no harm,9 in the absence of a clear strategy towards the South Caucasus. As
one EU member state ambassador in Moscow has put it: voluntarism is not necessarily
9 Interview with EEAS officials, Brussels, 21 October 2011.
11

the best option in this region.10 Cooperative action on confidence-building measures

has also been limited, since both actors are careful to capitalise on these initiatives for
their own regional image, more than effective results.
Conclusions
EU-Russia relations on political-security issues remain one of the least developed areas
of their interaction. Despite important steps in the institutional development of relations
and growing economic interdependence between the European region and Russia, the
lack of shared views on how to move the relationship forward has been hampering
cooperation in the field of high politics. The very different nature of both actors,
including the EUs gradual coming of age as a political and security actor, has added
confusion on how to develop a pragmatic approach that responds to the evident need to
address the security challenges in their shared neighbourhood. One important realisation
is the inability to fully harness the EU-Russia security dialogue on the protracted
conflicts within the framework of the strategic partnership (Kuzmicheva, 2011, p. 30).
To the extent that these issues have been addressed, they have remained outside of the
existing structures, as illustrated by the German-Russian Meseberg initiative.
The South Caucasus stands out as a particularly difficult challenge in this
security dialogue. Until 2008 the EU was largely reluctant to engage in security
functions and some member states were cautious not to let EU actions be perceived as
offsetting Russian interests. Because of this careful approach, there has not been open
conflict between the EU and Russia on these issues. However, if we consider the EUs
structural approach to security in its neighbourhood, and the proactive diligences of
some of the new member states towards the Eastern neighbours, the perception in
Moscow was that the EU was actively challenging the post-Cold War status quo in
Eurasia, by becoming a pole of attraction and a model of political development for the
CIS. Russia has been challenging this structural and normative approach and the
validity of the EUs model for Russia and the CIS. Instead, Russia has called for
dialogue and a partnership in its bilateral relations with the EU and has externalised the
costs of non-participation to the neighbours engaged in the ENP. The coercive strategies
adopted by the Kremlin, especially towards Ukraine and Georgia, are an illustration of
this.
The protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus helped to shed light on the limits
of EU-Russia security cooperation in their shared neighbourhood. Although the EU did
not seek to challenge Russias dominant position on conflict management, local actors
displayed an important ability to shape external actors agendas. Georgias strategy of
internationalisation of the conflicts achieved its goals against all odds. Lack of dialogue
between the EU and Moscow facilitated the escalation of the conflict, demanding that
important lessons be drawn from this experience. Although after the war both actors
seem to have taken a more constructive approach on security dialogue, the opportunity
has been missed to do so within the institutional context of the Four Common Spaces
and the strategic partnership they are developing. This weakens the liberal argument that
institutions can be learning sites, favouring transparency and interdependence and
pushes EU-Russia security dialogue back to the realm of bilateral diplomacy. This
makes any effort to link the EUs structural approach to security to more effective CFSP
and CSDP instruments harder to achieve, even after the Lisbon Treaty. Although this
might present Russia with short-term opportunities to undermine EU influence, it does
10 Email exchange with EU member state ambassador in Moscow, 6 June 2007.
12

little to stabilise a very important region standing between these two actors and to
further their strategic cooperation.
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