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G.R.No.

PHILIPPINEJURISPRUDENCEFULLTEXT
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
G.R.No.103119October21,1992
SULPICIOINTODvs.COURTOFAPPEALS,ETAL.
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.103119October21,1992
SULPICIOINTOD,petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSandPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

CAMPOS,JR.,J.:
Petitioner,SulpicioIntod,filedthispetitionforreviewofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals1affirmingintotothejudgment

oftheRegionalTrialCourt,BranchXIV,OroquietaCity,findinghimguiltyofthecrimeofattemptedmurder.
Fromtherecords,wegatheredthefollowingfacts.
InthemorningofFebruary4,1979,SulpicioIntod,JorgePangasian,SantosTubioandAvelinoDaligdigwenttoSalvador
Mandaya'shouseinKatugasan,LopezJaena,MisamisOccidentalandaskedhimtogowiththemtothehouseofBernardina
Palangpangan.Thereafter,MandayaandIntod,Pangasian,TubioandDaligdighadameetingwithAnicetoDumalagan.He
toldMandayathathewantedPalangpangantobekilledbecauseofalanddisputebetweenthemandthatMandayashould
accompanythefour(4)men,otherwise,hewouldalsobekilled.
Atabout10:00o'clockintheeveningofthesameday,Petitioner,Mandaya,Pangasian,TubioandDaligdig,allarmedwith
firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdigfiredatsaidroom.Itturnedout,however,thatPalangpanganwasinanotherCityandherhomewasthenoccupied
byhersoninlawandhisfamily.Noonewasintheroomwhentheaccusedfiredtheshots.Noonewashitbythegunfire.
Petitionerandhiscompanionswerepositivelyidentifiedbywitnesses.Onewitnesstestifiedthatbeforethefivemenleftthe
premises,theyshouted:"Wewillkillyou(thewitness)andespeciallyBernardinaPalangpanganandwewillcomebackif
(sic)youwerenotinjured".2
Aftertrial,theRegionalTrialCourtconvictedIntodofattemptedmurder.Thecourt(RTC),asaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,
holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by
holdinghimliableonlyforanimpossiblecrime,citingArticle4(2)oftheRevisedPenalCodewhichprovides:
Art.4(2).CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY.CriminalResponsibilityshallbeincurred:
xxxxxxxxx
2.Byanypersonperforminganactwhichwouldbeanoffenseagainstpersonsorproperty,wereitnotforthe
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.
Petitionercontendsthat,Palangpangan'sabsencefromherroomonthenightheandhiscompanionsriddleditwith
bulletsmadethecrimeinherentlyimpossible.
Ontheotherhand,RespondentPeopleofthePhilippinesarguesthatthecrimewasnotimpossible.Instead,thefactswere
sufficienttoconstituteanattemptandtoconvictIntodforattemptedmurder.Respondentallegedthattherewasintent.Further,
initsCommenttothePetition,respondentpointedoutthat:
...Thecrimeofmurderwasnotconsummated,notbecauseoftheinherentimpossibilityofitsaccomplishment
(Art.4(2),RevisedPenalCode),butduetoacauseoraccidentotherthanpetitioner'sandhisaccused'sown
spontaneousdesistance(Art.3.,Ibid.)Palangpangandidnotsleepatherhouseatthattime.Haditnotbeen
forthisfact,thecrimeispossible,notimpossible.3
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Article4,paragraph2isaninnovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal

Codewhere:
...itwasnecessarythattheexecutionoftheacthasbeencommenced,thatthepersonconceivingtheidea
shouldhavesetaboutdoingthedeed,employingappropriatemeansinorderthathisintentmightbecomea
reality,andfinally,thattheresultorendcontemplatedshallhavebeenphysicallypossible.Solongasthese
conditionswerenotpresent,thelawandthecourtsdidnotholdhimcriminallyliable.5
Thislegaldoctrineleftsocialinterestsentirelyunprotected.6TheRevisedPenalCode,inspiredbythePositivistSchool,

recognizesintheoffenderhisformidability, 7andnowpenalizesanactwhichwereitnotaimedatsomethingquite
impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against
property.8TherationaleofArticle4(2)istopunishsuchcriminaltendencies.9
Underthisarticle,theactperformedbytheoffendercannotproduceanoffenseagainstpersonorpropertybecause:(1)the
commissionoftheoffenseisinherentlyimpossibleofaccomplishment:or(2)themeansemployediseither(a)inadequateor
(b)ineffectual.10
Thattheoffensecannotbeproducedbecausethecommissionoftheoffenseisinherentlyimpossibleofaccomplishmentis
the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossibleofaccomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to

qualifytheactanimpossiblecrime.
Legalimpossibilityoccurswheretheintendedacts,evenifcompleted,wouldnotamounttoacrime.13Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law (2) there is intention to perform the physical act (3) there is a
performanceoftheintendedphysicalactand(4)theconsequenceresultingfromtheintendedactdoesnot
amounttoacrime.14
Theimpossibilityofkillingapersonalreadydead15fallsinthiscategory.
Ontheotherhand,factualimpossibilityoccurswhenextraneouscircumstancesunknowntotheactororbeyondhiscontrol
preventtheconsummationoftheintendedcrime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of

anotherwiththeintentiontostealthelatter'swalletandfindsthepocketempty.17
Thecaseatbarbelongstothiscategory.Petitionershootstheplacewherehethoughthisvictimwouldbe,althoughinreality,
thevictimwasnotpresentinsaidplaceandthus,thepetitionerfailedtoaccomplishhisend.
OneAmericancasehadfactsalmostexactlythesameasthisone.InPeoplevs.LeeKong, 18 the accused, with intent to

kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter
wasinadifferentplace.Theaccusedfailedtohithimandtoachievehisintent.TheCourtconvictedtheaccusedof
anattempttokill.Itheldthat:
Thefactthattheofficerwasnotatthespotwheretheattackingpartyimaginedwherehewas,andwherethe
bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this
countrythatwherethecriminalresultofanattemptisnotaccomplishedsimplybecauseofanobstructioninthe
wayofthethingtobeoperatedupon,andthesefactsareunknowntotheaggressoratthetime,thecriminal
attemptiscommitted.
InthecaseofStrokesvs.State,19wheretheaccusedfailedtoaccomplishhisintenttokillthevictimbecausethelatter

did not pass by the place where he was lyingin wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court
explainedthat:
ItwasnofaultofStrokesthatthecrimewasnotcommitted....Itonlybecameimpossiblebyreasonofthe
extraneouscircumstancethatLanedidnotgothatwayandfurther,thathewasarrestedandpreventedfrom
committingthemurder.Thisruleofthelawhasapplicationonlywhereitisinherentlyimpossibletocommitthe
crime.Ithasnoapplicationtoacasewhereitbecomesimpossibleforthecrimetobecommitted,eitherby
outsideinterferenceorbecauseofmiscalculationastoasupposedopportunitytocommitthecrimewhichfails
tomaterializeinshortithasnoapplicationtothecasewhentheimpossibilitygrowsoutofextraneousactsnot
withinthecontroloftheparty.
InthecaseofClarkvs.State,20thecourthelddefendantliableforattemptedrobberyeveniftherewasnothingtorob.
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Indisposingofthecase,thecourtquotedMr.JusticeBishop,towit:
Itbeinganacceptedtruththatdefendantdeservespunishmentbyreasonofhiscriminalintent,noonecan
seriouslydoubtthattheprotectionofthepublicrequiresthepunishmenttobeadministered,equallywhetherin
theunseendepthsofthepocket,etc.,whatwassupposedtoexistwasreallypresentornot.Thecommunity
suffersfromthemerealarmofcrime.Again:Wherethethingintended(attempted)asacrimeandwhatisdone
is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil intention will be carried out, the
incipientactwhichthelawofattempttakescognizanceofisinreasoncommitted.
InStatevs.Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was

inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of
attemptedmurder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the
judgmentofattemptedmurderagainstPetitioner.However,wecannotrelyuponthesedecisionstoresolvetheissueathand.
ThereisadifferencebetweenthePhilippineandtheAmericanlawsregardingtheconceptandappreciationofimpossible
crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the
punishable.Whereas,intheUnitedStates,theCodeofCrimesandCriminalProcedureissilentregardingthismatter.Whatit
providedforwereattemptsofthecrimesenumeratedinthesaidCode.Furthermore,insaidjurisdiction,theimpossibilityof
committingtheoffenseismerelyadefensetoanattemptcharge.Inthisregard,commentatorsandthecasesgenerallydivide
theimpossibilitydefenseintotwocategories:legalversusfactualimpossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held

that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committedhadthecircumstancesbeenasthedefendantbelievedthemtobe,itisnodefensethatinrealitythe
crimewasimpossibleofcommission.
Legalimpossibility,ontheotherhand,isadefensewhichcanbeinvokedtoavoidcriminalliabilityforanattempt.InU.S.vs.
Berrigan,24theaccusedwasindicatedforattemptingtosmugglelettersintoandoutofprison.Thelawgoverningthe

matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender
intendedtosendaletterwithoutthelatter'sknowledgeandconsentandtheactwasperformed.However,unknown
to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused
liableforattemptbuttheappellatecourtreversed.Itheldunacceptablethecontentionofthestatethat"eliminationof
impossibilityasadefensetoachargeofcriminalattempt,assuggestedbytheModelPenalCodeandtheproposed
federallegislation,isconsistentwiththeoverwhelmingmodernview".Indisposingofthiscontention,theCourtheld
thatthefederalstatutesdidnotcontainsuchprovision,andthus,followingtheprincipleoflegality,nopersoncould
becriminallyliableforanactwhichwasnotmadecriminalbylaw.Further,itsaid:
Congresshasnotyetenactedalawthatprovidesthatintentplusactplusconductconstitutestheoffenseof
attemptirrespectiveoflegalimpossibilityuntilsuchtimeassuchlegislativechangesinthelawtakeplace,this
courtwillnotfashionanewnonstatutorylawofcriminalattempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the
offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the
elementsofattemptaresatisfied.Itappears,therefore,thattheactispenalized,notasanimpossiblecrime,butasanattempt
tocommitacrime.Ontheotherhand,wheretheoffenseislegallyimpossibleofaccomplishment,theactorcannotbeheld
liableforanycrimeneitherforanattemptnotforanimpossiblecrime.TheonlyreasonforthisisthatinAmericanlaw,there
isnosuchthingasanimpossiblecrime.Instead,itonlyrecognizesimpossibilityasadefensetoacrimechargethatis,
attempt.
ThisisnottrueinthePhilippines.Inourjurisdiction,impossiblecrimesarerecognized.Theimpossibilityofaccomplishingthe
criminalintentisnotmerelyadefense,butanactpenalizedbyitself.Furthermore,thephrase"inherentimpossibility"thatis
found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility.Ubilexnondistinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossiblecrime.
ToupholdthecontentionofrespondentthattheoffensewasAttemptedMurderbecausetheabsenceofPalangpanganwasa
supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person
criminallyliableforanact"whichwouldbeanoffenseagainstpersonsorproperty,wereitnotfortheinherentimpossibilityof
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itsaccomplishment..."Inthatcaseallcircumstanceswhichpreventedtheconsummationoftheoffensewillbetreatedasan
accidentindependentoftheactor'swillwhichisanelementofattemptedandfrustratedfelonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
holdingPetitionerguiltyofAttemptedMurderisherebyMODIFIED.WeherebyholdPetitionerguiltyofanimpossiblecrimeas
definedandpenalizedinArticles4,paragraph2,and59oftheRevisedPenalCode,respectively.Havinginmindthesocial
danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arrestomayor,togetherwiththeaccessorypenaltiesprovidedbythelaw,andtopaythecosts.
SOORDERED.
Feliciano,RegaladoandNocon,JJ.,concur.
Narvasa,C.J.,isonleave.

Footnotes
1Peoplevs.Intod,C.AG.R.No.09205,August14,1991JusticeFidelP.Purisima,Ponente:JusticesEduardo
R.BengzonandSalomeA.Montoya,concurring.
2TSN,p.4,July24,1986.
3Records,p.65.
4Guevarra,CommentariesontheRevisedPenalCode15(4thed.,1946).
5Albert,Ibid.
6Albert,Ibid.
7Albert,Ibid.
8Albert,Ibid.
9GrogorioandFeria,CommentsontheRevisedPenalCode76(Vol.I,1sted.1958).
10Reyes,TherevisedPenalCode,90(Vol.I,11thed.,1977).
11Reyes,Ibid.
12Reyes,Ibid.
13U.S.vs.Berrigan,482F.2nd.171(1973).
14U.S.vs.Berrigan,Ibid.
15Aquino,TheRevisedPenalCode,(Vol.I,1987).
16U.S.vs.Berrigan,supra,p.13.
17U.S.vs.Berrigan,Ibid.
1821L.R.A.626(1898).
1921L.R.A.N.S.898(1908).
2017S.W.145(1888).
2171S.W.175(1902).
22U.S.vs.HENGAWKAKROMAN,39L.Ed.2d.874(1974).
23565F.Supp.1416(1983).
24Supra,n.13.
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