Yemen OPR Final Report 12616

FINAL REPORT
OPERATIONAL
PEER
REVIEW
Operational Peer Review
RESPONSE
TO THE YEMEN
CRISIS
RELEASE DATE: 26 JANUARY, 2016
MISSION DATES:28 NOVEMBER 8 DECEMBER 2015
Summary .......................................... 1
SUMMARY
Key Course Correctors ..................... 3

Context ............................................. 5
1.
The Saudi-led coalition, consisting of ten countries , began targeted air

strikes on Houthi positions in Sanaa, Yemen on 26 March 2015. The
coalition airstrikes escalated an already unstable situation into a fullyblown conflict. Humanitarian operations are being conducted in an
active war zone where bombs are being dropped daily. The levels of
insecurity under which the operation is being implemented cannot be
overstated. The coalition also imposed an aerial and naval blockade as
part of the military intervention, Operation Decisive Storm, which has
radically limited the import of goods which are essential to the daily lives
of all people in Yemen, and has exacerbated the suffering of affected
people.
2.
As a result of the coalitions escalation of hostilities, the UN started

evacuating staff from Yemen on the 28 March. The majority of
international NGOs also left the country, leaving Mdecins Sans
Frontires (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) as the only international humanitarian presence in the country.
3.
UN agencies started to return to Yemen shortly after with a limited

number of staff due to the security ceiling that was put in place. The
initial ceiling allowed 17 UN staff into Yemen. This was increased
incrementally to more than 105 slots (37 reserved for security staff) as of
14 October 2015, but fluctuates. During the OPR mission, the security
ceiling was reduced to 80 slots due to insufficient security guard capacity
in the Diplomatic Transit Facility, the residence of all UN staff in Sanaa.
Rationale for the Operational Peer

Review .............................................. 5
Findings and Recommendations ..... 6
Leadership and Coordination ........... 6
Delivering Assistance ........................ 8
Accountability to Affected
Populations..12
Protection ....................................... 12
Global
Issues15
Next Steps ...................................... 18
Annex I. Action Plan....................... 19
Annex II. Glossary of Terms ............ 27
Annex III OPR Schedule. ................. 29
Annex IV. List of Meetings and People
Consulted ....................................... 30
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4. Several international NGOs have returned to Yemen, but not all of them, and not at their full capacity. The international
NGOs articulated a set of preconditions to permit their return and give them the confidence that minimum safety and
security requirements would be provided for by common services (evacuation procedures, for example). Not all of these
have been met in the eyes of the international NGOs, nevertheless progress is being made and international NGOs have
returned.
5. Operationally, the response is hindered by (1) disjointed leadership arrangements that were slow to be established, (2)
the limited capacity of UN agencies due to security ceilings and inadequate numbers of staff in-country, (3) the slow
return of international NGO staff to Yemen, as a result of visa restrictions and concerns about security and evacuation
capabilities and responsibilities, (4) restricted access across Yemen due to insecurity and bureaucratic impediments, (5)
a limited ability to expand operations and establish UN humanitarian hubs outside Sanaa; and (6) limited credible
information and analysis on local security threats and risks, and the actual needs of people.
6. The level-three crisis was declared on 1 July 2015. The operation was led by a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) based in
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Sanaa, Yemen, who was also the UNHCR Representative . In addition to the HC function in Yemen, two other leadership
positions were established at the Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) level, (1) a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator
(RHC) and (2) a Senior Advisor to the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Both of these positions are based in Riyadh,
although the RHC has operated from various locations in the region due to difficulties in obtaining a visa for Saudi
Arabia. Furthermore, the HC was working alongside a Resident Coordinator who was also the Designated Official
(RC/DO). The separation of the DO function from the HC function reduced the HCs authority in security related
decisions, even when relating to the humanitarian response.
7. The split functions of the RC, HC, and DO have undermined the leadership role of the HC. The appointment of the two
ASG positions in the region undermined the HCs leadership further. Moreover, the functions of the ASGs have either
been unclear, not well-communicated, or not implemented in a manner consistent with the Terms of Reference, adding
further confusion to an already confusing leadership structure.
8. The appointment and deployment of the triple-hatted RC/HC/DO to Yemen on the 6 December 2015, more than five
months after the L3 was declared, is expected to bring structure and clarity to the leadership arrangement.
9. Humanitarian agencies have used national staff and partners to deliver assistance where it is needed the most, and it is
thanks to the dedication of humanitarian workers on the front-line that assistance is being delivered. But the scale and
speed of the response is inadequate to cover the needs. The humanitarian community needs to expand its humanitarian
footprint beyond Sanaa, and complement and support the staff of national NGOs that are putting their lives at risk to
deliver assistance to the people that need it most.
10. The UN needs to operationalise the six hubs (in addition to Sanaa) that have been pre-identified to bring its response
closer to affected people. The humanitarian community needs to expand its network of national partners and find ways
of working in close proximity with them, to increase humanitarian coverage. The RC/HC/DO needs to ensure the
security management system, and support provided by UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), enables hub
lead agencies and humanitarian actors to expand operations and bring the response closer to people in need of
protection and assistance.
11. The perception of the UN humanitarian agencies as active, neutral, and impartial actors is increasingly questioned in
Yemen. The UN and international NGOs need to expand their humanitarian operations across the country and
demonstrate their ability to deliver assistance in a neutral and impartial manner.
NOTE: this leadership arrangement was already in place before the declaration of the L3.
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KEY COURSE CORRECTORS

BETTER HUMANITARIAN
ACCESS
(a) EXPAND FIELD
PRESENCE. BRING THE
RESPONSE CLOSER TO
THE PEOPLE
Strengthen delivery of assistance to the people in need.

Limited field presence and proximity to people affected by the crisis is impeding a
clear understanding of humanitarian needs and consequently hampering the
delivery of assistance in terms of scale, speed and appropriateness of response.
International humanitarian agencies and organisations need to expand their field
presence to ensure proximity to affected people in priority areas. This will result in
better information analysis, stronger evidence based assessments and direct
monitoring to accurately understand risks and needs and ensure adequate direct
support to those most in need.
(b) STRENGTHEN SECURITY

MANAGEMENT TO
BETTER ENABLE FIELD
PRESENCE AND
DELIVERY
A more effective security management system at the country level is required to

achieve better field presence (currently only one out of six field hubs is fully
operational). Security decisions need to be made by the Senior Management Team
(SMT) in Sanaa, including the review of the evacuation status for locations
outside the capital, to support the long overdue request by operational agencies to
roll out their presence. In addition:
The Chief Security Advisor (CSA) needs to lead the effort to roll out operations
to the field through support and advice to the DO and SMT and by participating
in missions outside Sanaa.
Security Risk Assessments need to be carried out in support of operations.
UNDSS needs to adopt more of a robust, pro-active approach to support the roll
out of operations. The DO should make the most of Agency Field Security
Advisors (FSA) capacity to enable field presence.
(c) STRONGER
ENGAGEMENT WITH ALL
ACTORS THAT ENABLE
BETTER ACCESS
Engage emphatically with actors that influence the humanitarian response to

create the space to deliver assistance.
Humanitarian partners need to engage more emphatically with all actors that
influence humanitarian operations in an effort to overcome impediments to
delivering assistance and engaging with affected people. Humanitarian partners
need to initiate a closer dialogue and raise awareness on humanitarian operations
as a trust building exercise with local authorities, community leaders, and other
parties to the conflict. This needs to be done strategically and with a common
approach between all actors to ensure consistency. The Humanitarian Country
Team (HCT) need to identify the most appropriate system based on the skills and
capacities in-country, to engage with these actors. A possible approach could be the
establishment of an access team that can include: OCHA (Civil-Military), the
Protection Cluster, and security actors (UNDSS and agency FSA). A similar model
functioned well in South Sudan.
Substantial and consistent engagement with interlocutors can trigger a positive
spiral of confidence building that will ensure substantial understanding of
humanitarian principals (neutral, impartial, independent) and the benefits it brings
to civilians caught in the middle of the conflict. Building trust with all interlocutors
will reduce risks and improve the security environment for humanitarian actors, it
will allow wider access to deliver assistance with minimal delays and open up the
space for direct monitoring of assistance and engagement with affected people.
Sustained engagement will also provide a basis from which to engage authorities on
the issue of bureaucratic impediments to reduce these.
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MAINTAIN STRONG
LEADERSHIP ON
PROTECTION TO DELIVER
ON THE CENTRALITY OF
PROTECTION, INCLUDING
IN TERMS OF ACTIVE
ENGAGEMENT WITH
RIGHTS UP FRONT
Establish and drive a clear HCT vision for the centrality of protection, including
active engagement with the Rights Up Front (RUF) initiative, and its
operationalisation, particularly in terms of senior level advocacy and support to
operations.
The Protection Cluster has completed a Protection Strategy. This needs to be
complemented by a HCT owned Strategy on the Centrality of Protection to identify
the most serious protection issues that need to be addressed. These issues need to
be high on the agenda of the HCT, not only the Protection Cluster. A clear HC/HCT
strategy and articulation of protection priorities will open the way for structured
engagement with RUF initiative leaders to advocate on human rights and protection
issues from the highest levels of the UN system, bringing together the weight of the
humanitarian, political, human rights, and development interests. A draft strategy is
under development. It needs to be finalised and adopted by the HCT.
Accurate and substantive data is essential to underpin advocacy on protection and
the goals of a centrality of protection strategy. Agencies are currently using a variety
of systems to collect protection data, which hinders a common understanding of
protection concerns and limits the ability to develop a strong evidence base for
protection programming and advocacy. The Protection Cluster needs to strengthen
the direct collection, analysis, and harmonisation of protection data and to provide
analysis to the HC/HCT so that it can provide leadership on protection issues and
identify protection priorities.
CLEARLY COMMUNICATE
THE YEMEN
HUMANITARIAN STORY
Effectively communicate the gravity of the humanitarian situation to the outside

world.
There is a sense that the international media narrative on Yemen is dominated by
the political/military agenda without much information on the dramatic human
impact of the conflict on the people of Yemen. Yemen is off limits to most
journalists due to security constraints and also to agency communication staff as a
result of the limited number of security slots available for humanitarian staff. This
makes it hard to get the story out. Communicating the gravity of suffering in Yemen
requires a stronger effort to tell the humanitarian story and highlight the dramatic
situation of civilians caught up in the conflict.
OCHA and other agencies need to form a dedicated team to drive a focused
communication strategy that clearly illustrates the situation in Yemen and the
neutral role that agencies and NGOs have in the humanitarian response. The team
needs to engage international and regional news media to report on humanitarian
issues in a balanced manner and help raise the profile of the crisis. A seasoned and
Arabic-speaking Communications Officer needs to be identified and deployed to
drive the effort and build a team. All agencies and NGOs should support the effort
with resources and a commitment to engage with this communications team.
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CONTEXT
12. Armed conflict has spread rapidly across much of Yemen since mid-March 2015, with devastating consequences for
civilians. The conflict continues to force women, men and children to flee their homes and impede or cut off
humanitarian access in parts of the country. Some 2.5 million Yemenis are now internally displaced (67 per cent are
women and children) and some 21.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (82 per cent of the
population). The main drivers for displacement are conflict related: ongoing air strikes, ground attacks and an
increasingly volatile security environment while the need for humanitarian assistance also stems from the pre-existing
crisis in Yemen as poverty, under-development and weak state authority and rule of law. The conflict is also reversing
gains made in recent years that had seen estimates of people in need in several sectors largely stabilise or decrease.
13. The districts most heavily impacted by the conflict are Saada, Hajjah, Abyan, Al Dahlee, Lahj, Taizz, Aden and Sanaa.
Currently, nearly half of all displaced people originate from the governorates of Saada, Taizz and Sanaa (Amanat Al
Asimah). In some regions, mainly in the south, people have chosen to return to their homes. However, in most parts of
the country the security environment remains extremely volatile, and return cannot be considered a feasible option.
The people that have returned home, however, remain extremely vulnerable and the needs for assistance for conflict
affected people to rebuild homes and restart lives are immense.
14. Yemen depends significantly on commercial food and fuel imports to meet its basic needs. The country was highly
dependent on the import of basic commodities before the current phase of the conflict, illustrated by around 90 per
cent of its food needs coming from outside the country. In 2015, import restrictions due to the conflict exacerbated
the humanitarian situation and brought the economy to near collapse. The import constraints have led to widespread
shortages and steep increases in the price of food, fuel, water and other basic supplies for the civilian population. The
import challenges have also had a severe impact on the in-country delivery and distribution of humanitarian
commodities.
15. Humanitarian space in Yemen is constrained by widespread insecurity. In Sanaa, the threat against international staff,
including kidnapping and assassination, remains high as does the risk of complex terrorist attacks as Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seek retaliation for military operations in the south. Outside Sanaa, field staff and partners
are constrained due to active conflict and the threats this brings to humanitarian workers, restrictions imposed by de
facto authorities and/or, insufficient security risk analysis that can facilitate critical aid delivery.
16. With little to no state authority in many areas, the most vulnerable in Yemen migrants, minorities, refugees, IDPs,
women and children, especially girls face serious protection risks. Violations include human trafficking, gender-based
violence and child recruitment into armed forces and groups. More generally, traditional sensitivities around certain
protection issues notably gender complicate efforts to address them.
17. The cluster system was activated in Yemen in 2009, and currently 11 clusters and two sub-clusters are active. At the
end of 2015, the total number of operational humanitarian partners in Yemen was 106 (9 UN agencies, 31
international NGOs and 66 national NGOs). Despite the encouraging number of partners in particular, the increase
of national partners up from 42 to 66 in 2015 - the actual implementation capacity (humanitarian expertise and
experience) was less than before the conflict started. The commitment and dedication of the humanitarian community
to stay and deliver, despite the dangers and operational challenges, is fully recognised and appreciated.
RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW

18. The OPR is a requirement of the IASCs Transformative Agenda for humanitarian crises of the highest magnitude, for
which a system-wide level-three (L3) response has been activated. The OPR is an internal inter-agency management
tool which serves to identify areas for immediate corrective action to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian
response. It is not a real-time evaluation. The OPR is a mandatory element of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle
(HPC) and ideally should be conducted within 90 days of the level-three declaration. The OPR for the Yemen response
was initiated by the Emergency Directors Group (EDG) and the humanitarian leadership of the Yemen response.
19. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) activated a system-wide Level 3 response to the Yemen crisis on 1 July 2015.
The OPR was conducted between the 28 November and 8 December 2015, five months after the L3 declaration. The
delay was due to the unpredictable security environment and to coincide with the arrival of the newly appointed
leader for the Yemen response: the triple-hatted Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator / Designated Official
(RC/HC/DO).
FINAL REPORT
20. The primary aim of an OPR is to review four areas of the response: (1) leadership and coordination, (2) delivery, (3)
protection (4) accountability to affected people (AAP), and to recommend adjustments to the response as appropriate
(course correctors). The Terms of Reference for the OPR, additionally, requested that the team consider the specific
situation of women and girls, and how the response accounts for this. The OPR also looked into best practices for
system-wide learning and issues requiring support and policy adjustment from the global level.
21. Prior to the mission, the OPR team held bilateral interviews with Emergency Director level representatives (or
identified alternates) of UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs, and arranged two group discussions in Geneva with
prominent donors and the international NGO community.
22. The OPR team initiated the mission with a day in Amman, Jordan, to meet with humanitarian partners and support
functions that are not present in Yemen, due to security restrictions. This included OCHAs support office,
international NGOs, the Information Management Working Group (IMWG), donors, and some cluster coordinators.
The team then proceeded to Sanaa to meet with humanitarian agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, cluster
coordinators and cluster partners in a series of group meetings (self-assessments), bilateral meetings, and focus group
discussions. The team was restricted in its ability to travel outside Sanaa due to security restrictions, but engaged with
humanitarian partners in the Area Humanitarian Country Team (A/HCT) in the Hudaydah hub via skype. The team also
met with a limited number of representatives from affected communities at an IDP centre in the outskirts of Sanaa.
23. The team reviewed secondary data, collected qualitative feedback and perceptions through four self-assessment
exercises, and organized a retreat with the HCT in Sanaa to jointly review the findings and pinpoint potential areas for
improvement. The retreat formed the basis of the HCT action plan that will be implemented in the next three months.
24. The OPR team would like to thank all individuals that have contributed to the mission and report, and particularly
OCHA staff that provided exceptional organisational support for the team during the mission, despite the substantial
demands of the humanitarian operation. The OPR team would also like to praise the commitment, energy, and good
nature of almost everyone that supported, helped with, and participated in the mission.
25. The OPR team consisted of four core members representing UN agencies and NGOs. The team was made up of Panos
Moumtzis (OPR Team Leader), Kate Halff (Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response, SCHR), Zlatan Milii
(World Food Programme, WFP), Roberto Mignone (UN High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR). Stuart Kefford (Senior
Transformative Agenda Implementation Team, STAIT) participated in the mission, providing organisational support.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

26. The following narrative section of the report is organised in four sections that relate to the Transformative Agenda and
the specifics of the Yemen crisis: (1) leadership and coordination; (2) delivery of assistance; (3) protection; and (4)
accountability to affected people (AAP).
LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

27. The split between the HC and DO functions created a disconnect between security analysis and the humanitarian
operation which disempowered the HCs decision-making capacity, particularly related to security and programme
issues. This has significantly impeded the expansion of humanitarian operations to field locations and the delivery of
assistance to people that need it the most. The appointment and deployment of the tripled hatted RC/HC/DO
(December 2015) brings these functions under one leader and should address the disconnect. It is disappointing,
though, that the appointment and arrival of the RC/HC/DO (ASG) has come more than five months after the
declaration of the L3 (and nearly nine months after the start of the conflict).
28. The new RC/HC/DO will be expected to orient security decisions to be better balanced between the need for
humanitarians to work safely, and the need to deliver assistance. Security decisions, to date, have been perceived as
risk averse by most agencies, even though such concerns have not systematically been brought up in SMT meetings,
which is a reflection of the SMTs functionality. SMT members need to be more engaged and vocal at the SMT and
ensure that its function addresses the relationship between humanitarian delivery and security, rather than security
and safety as a stand-alone issue.
29. The multiplication of leadership functions for the international humanitarian response in Yemen has provided some
benefits to the response. However, the need for two ASG-level functions in the region (outside Yemen) and none
inside the country (until the appointment of the RC/HC/DO) to support a humanitarian operation is questionable and
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FINAL REPORT
has created more confusion than clarity in terms of achieving a coherent response under an established and
empowered leader in the affected-country. The lack of an identifiable unified structure has clouded accountability
lines and created confusion within the response, and for interlocutors that engage with the response.
30. Furthermore, the creation of multiple leadership functions in the region has created inconsistent communications and
messages from (and between) Sanaa, Riyadh and New York. There has also been ad hoc engagement by different
parts of the leadership with donors, authorities and parties to the conflict on issues related to humanitarian access,
operational priorities, the protection of civilians, and resource mobilisation. As a result, parties to the conflict have
started to see the UN-led humanitarian response as disorganised, at best, and at worst subsumed by a political
agenda. It was not conclusive, and was not commented upon during the mission, as to whether the NGO community
was viewed in the same way. The different messages and confusion over leadership functions has not helped to build
trust with the various interlocutors that the humanitarian community have to engage with.
31. The leadership of the humanitarian response needs to be centred in Yemen and that needs to be clear for all
stakeholders, both in Yemen, and in the region. The appointment of the triple-hatted RC/HC/DO should go a long way
to providing the clarity and direction that is needed. However, a review of the roles of the Regional HC and the Special
Advisor is needed.
32. The potential to abolish the RHC and Special Advisor positions, as they currently stand, should be considered. The
opportunity to appoint a Senior Advisor or Liaison Officer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia authorities, in place of the
ASG-level Special Advisor, should be considered. This position should report to the RC/HC/DO in Yemen.
33. The HC/RC/DO and the HCT should also consider a stand-alone Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) based in
Sanaa, to support the HC function of the RC/HC/DO. The proposed DHC would have a particular focus on expanding
and supporting field operations. This would retain the crucial support functions that are needed to strengthen the
delivery of assistance, and create the space for the RC/HC/DO to be empowered as a leader for his roles, both inside
Yemen and in the region.
34. De-confliction procedures with the coalition in Riyadh are perceived as overtly cumbersome and unnecessarily
bureaucratic. The excessive information required to be de-conflicted only adds an administrative burden onto
humanitarian actors with little or no security benefit. The necessity for humanitarians to provide photographs of the
front and back of each truck in a convoy, and a photograph of the driver of each truck was questioned when the
coalitions military engagement is in the form of air strikes. These requirements are at the request of the KSA
authorities, and not the OCHA de-confliction team working in this area, and streamlining the process is not in the
hands of the OCHA or the Special Advisor. However, the possibility to streamline and simplify the process needs to be
considered and taken up with the KSA authorities. The importance of de-confliction for the safe delivery of assistance
and the safety of those delivering assistance should not be understated. But the mechanism needs to be simplified
and be less of an administrative burden.
35. There is a clear need for a consistent whole-of-system access strategy. There are several obstacles that are impeding
humanitarian access. The security situation is the main one, nevertheless, a lot more could be done to tackle other
issues such as the administrative and bureaucratic impediments and internal restrictions on movement of staff. The
RC/HC/DO and the HCT needs to develop a coherent access strategy to create and maximise opportunities to deliver
assistance in this challenging environment. Such a strategy would need to identify approaches and strategies to
engage with actors that can provide or influence access (parties to the conflict, local authorities, community, religious
and business leaders, etc.), finalise a plan to operationalise the hubs, and clarify criteria and processes for programme
prioritisation. It should also articulate roles and responsibilities of different actors, including the UNDSS) and agency
security advisors. Furthermore, this strategy will need to articulate how advocacy efforts can be harnessed from the
leadership of the IASC and other branches of the UN, including the office of the Secretary-General to encourage those
that control access, to open it up. This could include substantial advocacy efforts from the leadership of the IASC, the
UN Secretary-General and authoritative figures at the highest level. The strategy should be grounded in a regularly
reviewed analysis of risks, and its implementation should ensure that in-country leadership remains in the driving seat
and has final clearance on reviewing messages before they are issued.
36. There is also a need to improve dialogue between UN humanitarian and political actors to understand the activities of
each other, but more importantly to ensure a clear distinction between the political and humanitarian roles of the UN.
The humanitarian response needs to illustrate that it is grounded in the principles of impartiality and neutrality.
37. The strategic and operational levels of the humanitarian response are too de-linked, and neither fulfils its function to
the other. The HCT does not provide sufficient strategic direction to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism
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(ICCM), and the ICCM does not engage sufficiently with the HCT to provide analysis on operational issues to support
strategic decision-making. The Head of OCHA in Yemen has committed to take on the leadership of the ICCM to ensure
there is: (a) a clear vision and that priorities exist within the group, (b) the strategic guidance from the HCT is
transferred into operations through the clusters, and (c) that the inter-cluster mechanism provides sufficient input to
the HCT to support its strategic decision-making function.
38. Furthermore, the ICCM needs to be more focused on operationalizing the strategic guidance provided by the HCT. At
the moment, the clusters are utilized as a mechanism for primarily responding to information requests from a variety
of sources. This is distracting them from their primary function of operationalising the response. The reporting
structures and processes for the clusters need to be clarified and better organised to reduce the amount of time
cluster coordinators spend chasing information from frequent requests from senior leadership in different locations.
If this is managed, cluster coordinators will be able to spend more time coordinating their members and
understanding operational challenges which will help HCT strategising (through the ICCM).
39. The Yemen crisis is under-reported in relation to other humanitarian situations around the world. It is incredibly
difficult for journalists to gain access to Yemen, and consequently the conflict, and its human impact, receives limited
coverage in international and regional media. The security ceiling also means that humanitarian agencies are
compromised in who they can bring into the country, and programme officers are prioritised over communications
officers (understandably so in the context and respecting the need to deliver). The absence of journalists and the small
number of communications officers working with the agencies and NGOs means the humanitarian story of Yemen is
under-represented to the outside world. This is negatively impacting on fundraising efforts, and is exacerbating the
perception by parties to the conflict that UN-led humanitarian action is subsumed by a political agenda. The story
needs to be clearly and accurately communicated.
40. OCHA and other agencies should appoint a Senior Arabic-speaking Communications Officers with experience of
working in the region, to drive and lead a coordinated inter-agency communication strategy and implementation plan.
The plan should be grounded in the complementarities offered by different agencies and organisations, and should
capitalise on communications capacity at regional and headquarters level to compensate for the limited presence of
these people inside Yemen. The work should be aimed at raising awareness and raising the profile of the operation
both internationally and regionally, and highlighting the plight of Yemeni citizens. This could catalyse and support
advocacy efforts on the humanitarian operation, human rights issues, protection, and contribute to fundraising
efforts. The potential for communications products and messages to support advocacy should be exploited as well,
including the need to ensure communications work does not undermine advocacy. Again, the RC/HC/DO and the HCT
need to be in the driving seat on communications and advocacy.
41. The humanitarian community has not effectively prioritised its programming in Yemen. This is particularly apparent in
the draft Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2016 which identifies 82 per cent of the population is in need of some
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form of humanitarian assistance requiring a USD 2 billion dollar appeal . It was clear throughout the OPR mission that
the emphasis of the statement is on some form of humanitarian assistance. There needs to be a more focused
approach on prioritisation in the response. The RC/HC/DO and the HCT need to understand the humanitarian needs
(assessment, information, listening to the affected people) and establish a prioritisation exercise that reflects the
capacities of agencies and NGOs to respond (including national NGOs) in relation to the needs of the people. The
clusters will need to provide strong justifications for plans and priority activities which address the strategic objectives
of the HRP. The Strategic Objectives of the HRP may also need to be adjusted to ensure they clearly reflect what is
needed and achievable in the response, rather than bland statements which are highly principled, but excessively
aspirational.
DELIVERING ASSISTANCE
42. The conflict has had a brutal impact on the people of Yemen. Insecurity has dramatically hampered the ability of
humanitarian workers to access and deliver aid to people in need. It is a testament to the dedication and perseverance
of the humanitarian community that assistance is being delivered in all affected governorates (though not at the scale
required), despite strict security restrictions placed on UN agencies and NGOs that limits the number of international
NOTE: the original draft of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP, 2016) requested USD 2 billion, of which USD 1 billion was for food assistance
alone. The newly arrived HC/RC/DO has indicated his concerns regarding this figure and would like to apply a higher level of prioritization to the original
plan to reflect implementation capacity and a more realistic financial ask.
FINAL REPORT
staff working in the country, and significantly impedes their ability to travel outside Sanaa. At this point all UN
international staff are based in Sanaa with the exception of one sub-regional hub in Hudaydah. There are national
staff based in the other hub locations, but there was general agreement from interviews and assessments that
international staff are needed to take some of the risk burden away from national staff and national partners and help
strengthen assessments, delivery and monitoring.
43. The humanitarian response is compromised by the limited number of international staff working with UN agencies and
the 32 international NGOs operating in country, all of whom are working with reduced levels of staffing because of the
security situation, and international NGO concerns about evacuation procedures and capacity and restrictions on
visas, amongst other issues. Furthermore, agencies and NGOs have lost national staff members who have been
forcibly displaced themselves as a result of the conflict which has further compromised their ability to deliver.
However, these capacities are being rebuilt and there is an increasing ability for programmes to be implemented as a
result. It should be noted that few agencies and international NGOs stopped implementation during any part of the
crisis. National staff remained in the country and continued to operate in the absence (or reduced levels) of
international staff. The role of national staff should be recognized. Equally so, the role of national NGOs.
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44. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) have the largest presence
in Yemen of the international actors (outside the combined UN presence), and operate in multiple field locations. Both
organisations felt their ability to remain in the country and deliver assistance with relative safety, while other UN
agencies and NGOs evacuated, was a result of consistent advocacy to their partners (authorities, community leader
etc.) on their principled approach to humanitarian work, their visibility when delivering assistance in an impartial and
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neutral manner, a higher appetite for risk , and their independence in terms of logistics and evacuation capacity. The
impression that they are there for the people is clear, and this creates the space for the ICRC and MSF to remain in
Yemen and continue their work.
45. The limited presence of international staff from UN agencies and international NGOs in locations outside Sanaa and
Hudaydah severely impedes the ability to deliver assistance. International NGOs need to continue to get international
staff back in country to expand their operations. This has happened substantially already, but the need for them to
return with full capacity was expressed several times, in a testament to their ability to deliver where needed. Many
international NGOs are facing restrictions over entry visas for their security officers and are concerned that evacuation
procedures are still not in place to ensure they can evacuate their international staff. Both of these issues restrict
their commitment to return fully and scale up their presence in Yemen. The HCT and SMT need to revisit and clarify
evacuation procedures to encourage international NGOs to return and provide a level of confidence that the UN
system, with the support of UNHAS, will evacuate international NGO staff if needed. If these procedures are already in
place, as was communicated to the OPR team, then they need to be adequately communicated to all NGOs. This
should include providing details on eligibility requirements for evacuation, and confirming evacuation options,
including the availability of stand-by aircraft, or designated aircraft that can be provided from UN missions in the
region. This would go a long way in giving international NGOs the confidence to scale up their operations in Yemen.
The HC/RC/DO also needs to ensure that they are supported in advocating for visas for security officers.
46. The need to utilize the full capacity of national NGOs is also essential. UN agencies and international NGOs work
primarily with only six national NGOs from a total of forty-nine that are referenced in the HRP. Both the UN and
international NGOs need to review and expand partnerships with well reputed and experienced national NGOs in a
spirit of equal partnership and mutual learning. They also need to support national NGOs to satisfy the demands of
donors and their own requirements for partnership. The HCT should develop a curriculum or approach (training,
mentoring, and partnerships) to build national NGOs capacities to operate effectively and based on humanitarian
principles. Such capacity building exercises have been initiated prior to the conflict and need to be built on. National
NGOs are of paramount importance to the humanitarian response, particularly in view of the access constrains that
exist in Yemen. They need to be supported, respected, and engaged as equal partners in the response.
47. The humanitarian response to Yemen is hampered by the limited footprint of humanitarian agencies and international
NGOs. The L3 benchmarks identified five humanitarian hubs (six including Sanaa) that needed to be operationalized
MSF is represented by four societies, MSF-Netherlands, MSF-France, MSF-Spain and MSF-Switzerland.

It should be noted that ICRC lost two staff members in September in an attack on one of their vehicles, and a further two were abducted in December.
One was subsequently released. MSF health facilities have been bombed and destroyed by coalition forces in September, December, 2015 and January,
2016.
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to allow the response to expand to areas outside of Sanaa: Aden, Mukalla, Hudaydah, Sa`ada and Taizz. However,
only the hubs in Sanaa and Hudaydah had been established with international staff presence at the time of the OPR
mission. It is acknowledged that efforts to re-establish the hubs in Aden, Hudaydah (now operational), Sa`ada and
Taizz have been made, and that some agencies have some national staff based in these locations. But the hubs have
not been set up and the capacity to deliver at scale is inadequate. The SMT needs to review the processes and
arrangements which have not permitted these hubs to be adequately operationalized. It needs to reconsider its
strategy to expand the response to areas outside of Sanaa. The need for a safe and secure environment needs to be
balanced with the need to deliver humanitarian assistance.
48. OCHA has provided plans for expanded field presence in the hubs which require approval from the SMT. However, the
current approach to Security Risk Management has not prioritized or enabled the expansion of humanitarian field
presence. It has inadequately supported the concept of Stay and Deliver. Many humanitarian actors referenced an
absence of a pro-active and hands-on approach to security risk assessments by UNDSS staff, and that there is a clear
need for DSS staff, including the Chief Security Advisor (CSA) to undertake missions to the field in order to better
advise the operation. Several actors felt compelled to report that the CSA had primarily focused his attention on
Sanaa and had never gone to Aden or other field locations (except one visit to Hudaydah). There is a need for UNDSS
to have a more client-oriented approach that supports humanitarian actors carry out their functions. The disconnect,
or misunderstanding, of the need for security advice to support humanitarian operations and not only ensure safety of
staff and assets is concerning.
49. The separation of the DO and HC functions has contributed to the disconnect between security advice to keep people
and assets safe, and security advice to support humanitarian delivery. Security decisions have regularly been deferred
to New York as opposed to making the decision at the field-level based on analysis from the ground. As already
mentioned, the combined RC/HC/DO function should overcome many of these issues. The SMT, as a body, also needs
to ensure security advice is provided in support of the humanitarian imperative. The responsibility does not rest with
one person alone.
50. The bottom line is that operationalizing the field hubs has been highly ineffective for several months and this is not
only due to insecurity. There has been insufficient detailed analysis to differentiate the security situation in different
parts of the country. The SMT has assessed the security level of the country as a whole, rather than assessing the
different level of risk in different areas of the country. This could at least have opened up access for a partial
expansion of operations. In addition, this has also impeded the lifting of the evacuation status and relocation status
in less unstable areas. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to security analysis to support the delivery of humanitarian
assistance rather than putting staff safety and security above the needs of the people directly affected by the crisis.
The approach should not be reckless, but more balanced than it currently is.
51. UNDSS needs to immediately expedite Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) in priority locations to support SMT decisions
on the expansion of field presence (particularly operationalising the hubs), and to permit more extensive field travel.
UNDSS and UN agencies have to work together on establishing more streamlined processes for expediting field
mission requests, and ensure decisions for such missions are made at the field-level based on substantial security
analysis and programme criticality. There is significant potential for UNDSS to capitalize on the security capacities that
exist in UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and IOM (ten senior Field Security Advisors). This will significantly help bring a stronger
humanitarian mind-set to security discussions and provide the balance between a safe and secure environment, and
an environment that facilitates humanitarian delivery. Finally, an approach to engage international NGOs in security
discussions needs to be developed, and security information needs to be shared with the international NGO
community. The SMT is comprised of UN agency heads only, and exceptionally an invitation was extended to one
NGO representative in Yemen. But this was not sufficient to ensure all NGOs were privy to security information and
decisions discussed at the SMT. It is unclear why security information that is relevant to all international humanitarian
actors is not systematically shared with them.
52. Sub-national coordination structures need to be revived with the operationalization of the hubs. The coordination
structures for the hubs need to be re-established and need to be delegated authority by the HC/HCT to be focused on
delivery, despite the unstable security situation. The HC needs to designate an Area Coordinator with clear reporting
lines and a delegation of authority that allows the decentralization of certain decisions to the field level. The expansion
of field presence needs to proceed as a matter of priority.
53. Limited access is not only a consequence of insecurity alone. The potential to expand the humanitarian communitys
presence to areas where it needs to work is also undermined by bureaucratic impediments to access: the denial of
clearances to work in certain locations by authorities and/or armed groups, the denial of visas for staff waiting to
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enter the country, holding armoured vehicles at the port which are badly needed by humanitarian agencies. These
issues, and the internal constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have severely curtailed the presence of the
UN in the field, and their visibility. Furthermore, international NGOs are increasingly facing bureaucratic delays and
blockages imposed by local authorities over project agreements and travel authorisations. The humanitarian response,
as a whole, has not been present where it matters and has not been sufficiently engaged with interlocutors and
parties to the conflict to articulate the impartial and neutral role of the humanitarian response, and its importance.
Consequently, the UNs reputation has been damaged and its humanitarian purpose questioned. It is not always
considered impartial, and according to information from interviews and groups session, its help is not always
welcome.
54. The HC/HCT needs to develop a strategy on how to overcome such impediments and to win back the trust that is
being lost as a result of field absence. This should include reaching out to all interlocutors to sensitize them to the
principles of humanitarian action and illustrate clearly that the humanitarian response is neutral and impartial in
delivering assistance based on needs. This will not only raise awareness of humanitarian principles amongst
interlocutors but it will also build trust and confidence between individuals or groups that control access, and
humanitarian actors. The need to engage in dialogue with all actors cannot be overstated. We need to be engaging
with all actors that influence humanitarian access.
55. The Protection Cluster, with a grounding in international humanitarian law and human rights law, is well-positioned to
support activities as part of this trust building and access strategy (see also para. 73 - 75), and could be a critical player
in developing the strategy. There are also critical roles for OCHA (Civil-Military and Access), and UNDSS with agency
security staff for security analysis. A similar structure for engaging with interlocutors and establishing access and has
been rolled out in South Sudan previously with some success, when resourced.
56. But the HC/HCT should not be left alone to overcome access challenges. The potential for senior level support and a
strong lobby from the highest levels of the UN needs to be harnessed to help unlock bureaucratic (and security)
impediments to access. Consistent senior level support to the HC in Syria (and the HCs individual efforts) has resulted
in an increase in visas approvals in recent months, and a ceasefire agreement to allow assistance to be delivered in
three enclaves that were previously beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. This indicates the potential for
senior level advocacy to work in other contexts. Similar support needs to be provided to the leadership in Yemen.
However, it needs to be consistent, substantial and regular to help the HC/HCT overcome the bureaucratic and
security impediments to access that they face.
57. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and cluster plans do not clearly illustrate a correlation between needs and
planned activities. Firstly, there is insufficient data to support a strong evidence base to build the response plan and
prioritise activities. In response to this, clusters and cluster partners need to clarify their assessment work. The clusters
have produced 79 assessments since the start of the conflict i.e. no lack of assessments, but it feels like there is a lack
of information and understanding of needs collectively. The links between needs, capacities, targets, and results are
not clear, and consequently difficult to assess and measure. There is a clear need to systematize assessments, better
coordinate processes for reporting, and improve information management as part of this process. The clusters and the
inter-cluster mechanism are central to this. It needs strong leadership at the cluster level, and experienced
information management staff to support the cluster coordinators. This leadership and information management
capacity has not been fully supported by all cluster lead agencies since the declaration of the L3, and is only starting to
take shape now. Agency headquarters need to support their country offices and their inter-agency obligations to the
clusters with the necessary and appropriate staff at the right time and with sustainability. This has largely not
happened in Yemen and the coordinated and collective response has suffered as a result.
58. There is also a significant gap in understanding activities funded outside the official HRP process which is undermining
the efficiency of the response. There is a need for the HCT to build a planning and reporting process into the HRP that
takes into account funding that is disbursed, and activities that are planned and implemented, outside the HRP and
the clusters. In the context of Yemen, the issue is particularly relevant for the Gulf States and charities that that have
contributed approximately USD 500 million to the response in 2015. There is a limited understanding of how this
money is spent and what activities it supports. The outputs of this funding are most likely contributing to humanitarian
goals and objectives, but this is not captured or measured effectively in relation to the HRP. The potential for OCHAs
Financial Tracking System (FTS) to track such funding should be explored, and these donors and operational partners
should be encouraged to engage with the clusters. The clusters should also look at ways of adapting their modus
operandi to accommodate partners from other parts of the world that have not traditionally engaged with the
conventional humanitarian structures. At the moment, a significant part of the response is not coordinated.
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59. Development agencies also have a role to play in Yemen, but they are currently struggling to reflect how best they can
contribute to humanitarian operations. These agencies have a considerable understanding of context and strong
networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response. Humanitarian operations cannot (or
should not) work independently from the recovery and development agenda and the two are clearly interlinked.
There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort and this needs to be planned.
This is not a new issue, and this is the essence of early recovery which has been an enduring discussion for many years
but still remains a debate. However, there is an increasing understanding that early recovery is a process which UNDP
(but not only) can provide leadership on, strategically in-country with direct support to the HC and to humanitarian
and strategic planning. The process needs to be seen less as a series of early recovery activities sitting under a cluster,
and more as an approach that sees the humanitarian response open the way for, and potentially contribute to, a
recovery agenda as and when the time is appropriate. This approach needs to be operationalized and recovery and
development actors need to clearly articulate their role and function in the Yemen context, and illustrate this function
to the HCT. The newly arrived RC/HC/DO has indicated a desire to resume meetings of the UNCT, which last met in
May 2015. This is an indication that the RC/HC/DO feels the space exists for recovery and development actors to carve
out a role that is complementary to the humanitarian response. Development actors need to illustrate their function
clearly in this situation and show how they can contribute to the collective response.
ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE (AAP)

60. The potential for humanitarian actors to reach out to communities and understand their needs is compromised by the
limited presence of humanitarians on the ground, and access to people affected by the crisis. However, the high
number of assessments (approximately 79 according to OCHAs statistics, but probably more) indicates that it is
possible to engage with communities to seek their feedback, understand more clearly their needs, and communicate
clearly what can be expected in terms of assistance i.e. give account, take account, and be held to account.
61. However, the information collected from assessments is not considered of a sufficient quality for decision-making and
planning, and there is a general feeling that feedback from affected people is not adequately influencing cluster plans
and programmes, and is not supporting the operationalisation role of the ICCM and the strategic direction and
decision-making of the HCT.
62. As in other humanitarian crises, UN agencies and NGOs are engaging with the people that they are assisting, and
numerous systems have been established to collect feedback on programmes, assistance, and needs. This includes the
use of telephone call centres to register complaints from beneficiaries (UNHCR and WFP); the use of WhatsApp to
register issues of concern and raise issues that need to be addressed (Education Cluster); and focus group discussions
facilitated by national NGOs in areas beyond the reach of international actors. However, there is no common
mechanism that brings these various modalities together to provide an overall picture of the situation to support the
HCT, ICCM and clusters to provide strategic guidance and operational direction broadly, that reflects feedback from
the people that we, as humanitarians, are accountable to.
63. A strategy on Accountability to Affected People has been developed which identifies approaches to bring information
from numerous sources together in a way that would assist the HCT understand, from the perspective of affected
people, how the response can be adapted to ensure humanitarian programmes are appropriate to the context and the
needs. There is great excitement about this strategy amongst the majority of agencies, and rightly so. It is well-defined
and has been developed with significant contributions from the humanitarian community i.e. it has the buy-in that is
necessary for it to become operational. However, there are also concerns about the implementation and roll out of
the strategy following the departure of the OCHA SURGE staff that developed it.
64. OCHA needs to ensure that dedicated capacity is recruited, or is committed by another agency, to ensure the strategy
is implemented and rolled out. It is an excellent start to an issue which is often neglected in crisis situations. There is a
need to make sure that the initiative has enough fuel to keep it going to its destination.
PROTECTION
65. The Yemen crisis is characterized by indiscriminate killings; disappearances and torture; arbitrary detentions; sexual
and gender-based violence (SGBV); recruitment of children into armed groups; landmine incidents; aerial bombings
and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure by all parties to the conflict. There has been massive internal
displacement and refugee outflows; there are severe restrictions on freedoms; and there is little access to basic
services. The benchmarks for Yemen specifically reference the importance of operationalizing the centrality of
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protection as a fundamental theme in the humanitarian response to ensure that it is given the attention it deserves
(benchmark 7.1).
66. Despite the importance of protection and its high profile on the humanitarian agenda, there is still an insufficient
common understanding of it in regard to the different dimensions that it entails, given the broad and expanding scope
of protection: mainstreaming protection; a protection cluster strategy and protection programming; the centrality of
protection and links to the Human Rights Up Front (RUF) initiative. Consequently, protection, in all its facets has not
been operationalised sufficiently, although progress has been made. The Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters (child
protection, SGBV) have been established, have capable coordinators, and work well together. An experienced Cluster
Coordinator (Protection) was key in facilitating progress on protection in several aspects of the work, but this initial
work needed to be continued with the deployment of a dedicated and full-time cluster coordinator. For example, a
Protection Strategy has been produced, as has a draft Rights Up Front Framework and Action Plan. The Protection
Cluster and Child Protection and SGBV sub-clusters have started to work with other clusters to ensure protection is
mainstreamed in all clusters across the response, and a Committee on Arbitrary Detentions has been promoted by a
member of the Protection Cluster. Also, a PROCAP Advisor is being deployed imminently (at the time of writing). But
more needs to be done to strengthen the collective understanding of protection, and there needs to be a stronger and
clearer link to the HCT to bring the centrality of protection to the senior level. This would also create the space for a
clearer articulation of issues to be taken up with the RUF initiative.
67. Despite progress on protection, there is still a need to identify why and how protection needs to, and can be,
operationalized in the response. There needs to be a clearer and stronger articulation of (1) the life-saving dimension
of protection, and (2) how a protection approach can support and improve the whole response. The protection
narrative has become a little lost amongst the various strategies on the different strands of protection that are
expected from the Protection Cluster, other clusters, and the HCT.
68. A report by Action on Armed Violence and OCHA registered that 2,355 civilians had been killed in the six months up to
mid-September. The death toll from bombings and other forms of violence continues to rise. 93 per cent of the total
killed was civilians. 32,200 casualties (injured) have been accepted into health facilities since the conflict started in
March, 2015 (as reported in October 2015). OHCHR has verified 8,875 reports of human rights violations since the
start of the crisis, an average of 43 violations every day (as reported in November 2015). Due to limited direct access
and difficulties in collecting data, it is likely that these figures do not reflect the reality, and the actual impact on the
population is probably higher. It is clear that there has been a substantial impact on human life but the protection
narrative focuses on strategies, advocacy and protection as a cross-cutting issue.
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69. Despite the best efforts of the HC in the past months, protection has not gained sufficient traction with the HCT to
highlight and operationalize an approach on key protection concerns. The protection cluster, or the in-coming PROCAP
Advisor, needs to engage more substantially with the HC/HCT (or a smaller team of senior members) on drafting the
HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy and operationalising it, as well as assisting the HCT to capitalize on potential
support from, and links to, the RUF initiative. This will require the development of a strong advocacy approach based
on clear evidence.
70. Protection needs to be more focused on the human security dimension of the crisis and clearly identify ways to
protect people from the direct impact of the conflict. This includes raising the profile of the crisis, highlighting the
impact of the conflict in terms of people killed and injured, collecting data, compiling an analysis on violations of
human rights and of international humanitarian law, and advocating for action to be taken to mitigate the impact of
the conflict on peoples lives: stressing the life-saving dimension of protection. This is being done to a certain degree.
OHCHR continues to collect data, and UNDP has recently received funds to do a similar activity (and will coordinate
with the work of OHCHR) but it is not clear how this data will be utilized and what action is planned or being taken to
strengthen the protection of civilians. All of these issues and approaches will underpin the centrality of protection
strategy and its implementation, and establish the most pressing protection concerns on the agenda of the HCT.
71. In order to support advocacy, a key element of the centrality of protection strategy (and links to the RUF initiative),
protection actors need to strengthen data collection and analysis and agree to use a common system for harmonizing
data from different actors. Information exists, but it is not sufficiently consolidated. Protection actors have carried out
58 rapid assessments, alone, but bringing this information together to paint a holistic picture is mitigated by the
absence of direct access, common indicators, joint analysis, and a common system for protection information
management. Several of these efforts were rapid assessments at the big picture level and do not have the level of
granularity for a comprehensive analysis of needs and gaps to inform plans, programmes, and underpin a credible
advocacy approach. UNICEFs Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in
conflict situations is a leading example of information collection for advocacy purposes, and is working well in Yemen.
As mentioned, OHCHR is active in collecting information on human rights violations and is supported by other actors.
UNDP has been funded to implement a similar activity, and UNFPA have a GBV information management system that
collects evidence on rights violations against women, men, boys and adolescent girls. The combined efforts of these
systems, and others, would provide a strong evidence base for advocacy on protection and provide a platform for the
HCT and the highest levels of the UN system, through the RUF initiative, to hold parties to the conflict accountable for
violations carried out on their watch. The ActivityInfo information management system has been set up in Yemen and
could have the potential to operate as a collective platform for information management, and many agencies and
NGOs are inputting to this and using it. But it needs to extend its reach and encourage more operational actors to
participate and utilise it.
72. It is important that information is not derived from quantitative data only. It is equally important to collect qualitative
data to provide the context of protection and underpin the numbers with analysis and explanations of the situation
that needs to be addressed. For instance, in the case of IDPs, numbers alone do not paint the whole picture. Trends,
profiles, needs and reasons for displacement need to be explained and understood in order to convey the gravity of
the situation and to plan appropriate responses. A holistic and collective approach to information management is
required and the protection cluster needs to discuss how this can be done, together with the ICCM and the HCT. The
potential to reach out to the Information Management Working Group could be utilized to take this forward.
However, this group is currently based in Amman, and the evidence from interviews and discussions during the OPR
indicated that it is insufficiently engaged with the clusters to be of much value, and there is limited confidence that
this group is sufficiently active or has the capacity to establish a common information system (with the exception of
one or two strong individuals).
73. The Protection Cluster could have a significant role to play in terms of access. The Protection Cluster is well-positioned
to reach out to interlocutors to raise awareness of humanitarian obligations and principles. This would help develop a
better understanding of humanitarian principles and humanitarian action (especially neutrality and impartiality), and
help to build trust with interlocutors that influence access to areas most affected by the conflict. The Protection
Cluster and its members should support the HCT to start a programme to engage more substantially with all
interlocutors to raise awareness on humanitarian principles and build trust with actors that influence access. This is a
strategy that is successfully implemented by the likes of ICRC and MSF (and other NGOs) to maintain access in areas
off-limits to other international actors. These organizations clearly demonstrate their value to communities affected
by the conflict, maintain a close working relationship with interlocutors that have the authority to allow humanitarian
operations to deliver assistance, and retain the ability to deliver assistance. This idea of building trust to support
access is highlighted in the course correctors, and is also covered in the Delivery section of this report (see para. 55
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also). It is replicated here to reference the key role of the Protection Cluster, and other actors (such as OCHAs CivilMilitary section, and security actors from DSS and the agencies) have in the development of strategies and activities to
support its implementation.
74. The Protection Cluster should take a step-by-step approach to this activity (trust building), and start engaging with
relevant actors in Sanaa and Hudaydah, where humanitarian actors have some level of consistent and predictable
presence, and then progress to other areas of the country. The Protection Cluster should engage a variety of actors
(local authorities, tribal leaders, parties to the conflict, if possible) in a dialogue and mutual learning exercise. This
could be done through a systematic and progressive roll out of workshops on the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, and on humanitarian principles (independence, neutrality, impartiality) to counter the concern that the
UN is not viewed as neutral and impartial.
75. This approach, if done successfully in the initial stages, will catalyse a positive spiral as it will raise awareness of
humanitarian principles and build confidence between the humanitarian community and key stakeholders that have
influence on granting access. This increased level of trust will reduce some misperceptions of the international
communitys (mainly UN agencies) humanitarian work, and reduce the risk of operating in insecure areas, though it
will never nullify the risk. This will permit wider access for the humanitarian community to deliver assistance and
provide better protection for people affected by the crisis.
76. The Protection Cluster should also expand workshops to include national partners on humanitarian and protection
principles. This is particularly critical, given that many national NGOs are still the main deliverers of assistance and
services and need to be doing it in accordance with the principles of humanitarian work. This relates to a formal
capacity building approach for national NGOs referenced in para. 46, which should be driven by the HCT.
77. The Protection Cluster has initiated specialized trainings on protection mainstreaming to all its members, its subclusters (child protection, SGBV), and to national NGOs. But the cluster needs to accelerate the planned roll out of
trainings to other clusters. The Protection Cluster also needs to ensure that protection is embedded in the functions of
the ICCM to support the mainstreaming approach in the operational response as a whole, and also to make the vital
link between the clusters and the HCT to ensure protection is high on the agenda at the decision-making and strategic
level of the humanitarian response. Currently, protection is rarely discussed at the ICCM and even less at the HCT
level. The commitment, during the OPR mission, of the OCHA Head of Office to chair the ICCM is expected to improve
the linkages between the HCT and the ICCM.
78. The Protection Cluster also needs to identify organisations in the response that are dealing in specialized areas to
ensure all people that are affected by the conflict are taken care of the extent possible. This should include
organisations covering the protection needs of the elderly, the disabled, and other marginalized groups. This is not
only important to support these marginalized groups, it would also illustrate the humanitarian communitys presence
in communities and indicate the humanitarian value of the work being undertaken as part of the response. This would
build trust and support the spiral of trust already mentioned (para. 73-75).
79. There was an almost complete absence of discussions during the OPR mission on the humanitarian communitys
obligations to the Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) agenda. The fact that it was rarely
mentioned, is mentionable in itself. It was agreed, when it was brought up in discussion groups, that a stronger
commitment on PSEA from agencies, NGOs and the HCT, collectively, needs to be taken. The absence of allegations
against humanitarian workers abusing their position vis-a-vis affected people (or other people, for that matter) is
positive. However, this should not detract from agencies and NGOs taking a proactive approach to PSEA to make sure
that the absence of reports against humanitarian staff in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, continues. Further
action needs to be taken to ensure the positive record is maintained. The first step to this has already been taken by
the out-going HC who appointed a focal point for PSEA in each cluster, and requested a workshop on the issue to be
organised in early 2016.
GLOBAL ISSUES
80. The OPR identified several issues that have impacted the response in Yemen which are more relevant for the global
level to take action on, rather than resting with the HCT or other actors in Yemen. Some of these issues have been
mentioned already and are included in the main narrative of this report and in the course correctors, but they are
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reiterated in this section for clarity. Several of these issues are relevant to all level-three (and non-level-three) crises,
not only the Yemen context.
81. Leadership arrangements should be reviewed immediately when a level-three is declared and action taken promptly
by the IASC Principals, and ultimately by the ERC. The Yemen crisis started in March 2015, and the L3 was declared on
1 July 2015. The triple-hatted RC/HC/DO was only identified and deployed to Yemen on 6 December. It is advisable
that more prompt action for such an important position be taken.
82. All humanitarian agencies need to review the capacities that exist in-country when a level-three is declared,
particularly their leadership arrangements. The L3 declaration did not trigger a change in leadership for any
operational UN agency or international NGO (members of the HCT) in Yemen despite commitments to deploy senior
and experienced leaders to a level-three crisis. The importance of strong leadership and experience of level-three
situations is not only relevant to the operational impact of the agencies, but also to the collective approach. The SMT
would have had the ability to exert more influence on security and programme decisions if seasoned humanitarian
professionals with previous level-three (or similar) experience participated in these meetings. The obligation to
strengthen leadership and commit the highest capacity human resources to level-three emergencies needs to be
taken into account by agencies and NGOs operating in level-three crises.
83. All humanitarian agencies need to review their SURGE processes. A key element of the Transformative Agenda is the
deployment of senior staff as part of the SURGE, during the early stages of the level-three activation. SURGE was also
referenced as a key benchmark for the Yemen response. Significant concerns were raised, however, that SURGE staff
sent in support of leadership and coordination functions were often too junior and inexperienced in complex
emergencies, and were deployed for an insufficient period of time to be of any real value (two or three weeks only, on
occasions). The turnover of SURGE staff has been excessive in the Yemen crisis and the utility of short-term
deployments undermined the consistency, continuity and predictability of the response. The short-termism of such
deployments is damaging to the reputation of the collective humanitarian response, and more importantly,
undermines the capacity to respond effectively to the crisis and serve people that are suffering. Agencies, at
headquarters level, should review their approach to SURGE and support coordination and programme functions with
SURGE deployments of no less than two months initially, with replacements recruited on fixed term contracts or other
contractual modalities for a duration of no less than six months. Senior staff should be recruited at the P4/P5 level for
these important positions. This is relevant to all crisis situations, not only Yemen.
84. Cluster coordinators are insufficiently supported by the global clusters. The global clusters have developed many
products that can be beneficial to cluster coordinators in-country, which are under-utilized. As an example, cluster
coordinators in Yemen struggled to develop common indicators for their partners to work with, and few coordinators
were aware of the indicator registry that has been developed by all global clusters and is available on
humanitarianresponse.info. This is just one example of how the global clusters can help support their in-country
coordinators. There is also a tendency for headquarters functions to overload cluster coordinators with excessive
demands which strains the relationship with cluster partners. There appears to be a limited awareness that every
request that is put to a cluster coordinator means the coordinator needs to request information from its partners.
These partners have programmes to run and other tasks to fulfil for their own agency or organisation, and this needs
to be respected. Cluster Lead Agencies (CLAs) and senior leadership need to better understand that the effectiveness
of clusters relies on strong partnerships with the members, and requests for information need to be planned, clear
and concise to retain these partnerships and not abuse the good will of cluster members. Demands for information
need to be given with realistic deadlines and the type of information required needs to be agreed and predictable so
coordinators can plan for anticipated requests. CLAs, OCHA headquarters, and senior humanitarian leaders (HCT,
ICCM, and global actors) need to give cluster coordinators the space to coordinate rather than be used as information
gatherers only. The information requests may be communicated through the HC, the Head of OCHA, agency heads or
someone else. But each request usually gets loaded onto the cluster coordinator.
85. There is a need for a fundamental reform of safety and security processes and capacities in humanitarian operations.
The current culture reflects a risk averse approach which undermines the ability to deliver assistance. The IASC
Principals need to be more involved in supporting UNDSS recruit and deploy security staff with a profile more relevant
for humanitarian operations. UN agency security staff consistently demonstrate a better understanding of the balance
between safety and security with the need to deliver assistance. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to reflect the
need to assist agencies and NGOs to stay and deliver, and support humanitarian operations in a safe and secure
environment, rather than stress safety and security to the detriment of the operation. UNDSS need to consider the
importance of training its security officers in international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, and the concept
of stay and deliver. The potential for developing stronger relationships between UNDSS and UN agency security
16
FINAL REPORT
officers will help to orient security processes towards a more appropriate balance between safety and security and the
need to deliver assistance.
86. Protection is consistently identified as an issue which needs strengthening in all humanitarian crises. It is often
inadequately articulated and consequently misunderstood by many actors. The Global Protection Cluster should adopt
a position where it deploys, without question, a senior expert immediately after the declaration of the level-three to
ensure that the HCT and inter-cluster mechanism are clear on their role in regard to protection (centrality of
protection, Rights up Front, protection mainstreaming, protection programming, advocacy and data and information
collection). The deployment of the PROCAP Advisor (pending at the time of the OPR mission) had not happened nine
months after the start of the conflict, and almost six months after the L3 declaration i.e. slower than the selection and
deployment of the RC/HC/DO.
87. The linkages between the ICCM and the HCT are inadequate in Yemen. The same situation has been evident from
other OPR (and STAIT) missions. The inter-cluster mechanism needs to have a better capacity to operationalize the
response and link its work to the strategic level that is provided by the HCT. HCs and inter-cluster coordinators (Heads
of OCHA) need to be fully aware of the importance of the functions and how they inter-relate. There is an argument to
create a roster of dedicated inter-cluster coordinators that are highly experienced and have previously operated in
senior positions in level-three or level-three-like operations. There is a need, as has been mentioned in para. 37 and
38, to manage the demands that are increasingly being placed on cluster coordinators (and by extension, the ICCM)
which is detracting them from the coordination function. The operationalization of the humanitarian response, and
the linkages between the HCT and the ICCM will remain weak if cluster coordinators are not given the space to
coordinate their clusters and contribute clear operational challenges to the ICCM for consideration by the HCT. There
is a tendency at the moment to utilize cluster coordinators as an extension of an information management function.
88. The self-assessment methodology of the OPR mission clearly reflected areas for the HCT (and broader humanitarian
community) to improve the response. The HCT members felt that the suggestions would have been useful even earlier
in the mission in steering the response in the right direction from day one (after the L3 declaration). This led to an ad
hoc recommendation from the HCT that a light inter-agency team should be deployed at the onset of an level-three
emergency to provide immediate support to the HC and the Head of OCHA to help identify specific issues that are
predictable in a mega-crisis and need to be addressed, and to set up appropriate systems and processes to set the
direction for the first months of the response. The Yemen HCT voiced appreciation for the OPR mission and suggested
the direction provided during the OPR would have also been relevant at the start of the L3.
5
89. There is an understanding that approximately 50 per cent of the humanitarian response to Yemen (financial
contributions and programmes) is not programmed through traditional humanitarian tools such as the HRP and
OCHAs Financial Tracking Service (FTS). This means a substantial contribution to the response is not tracked and
therefore not well coordinated, thereby affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. There is a need to
better understand the financial and programmatic contributions of donors and organisations operating outside the
HRP. The IASC Principals, led by the ERC, need to engage with traditional and non-traditional donors and operational
partners to encourage them to participate in existing systems, or alternatively revisit the existing systems (FTS, OPS) to
understand how they can be adjusted to accommodate contributions and programmes that currently fall outside the
HRP. A similar recommendation was suggested in the OPR for the Whole of Syria Response, to disaggregate donor
contributions between the three main hubs in that response.
90. Development agencies have a significant role to play in an emergency context but have difficulty articulating what this
role can be i.e. how best they can contribute to the humanitarian response. These agencies have a considerable
understanding of context and strong networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response.
There is also a recognition that humanitarian operations cannot work independently from a recovery and
development agenda. There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort. This is
not a new concept, and is the essence of early recovery. UNDP and its Global Cluster on Early Recovery need to clearly
articulate how recovery and development actors can contribute to a better humanitarian response that links to
recovery and development and illustrate how this can be achieved. This could include holding discussions with donors
on the need for more flexible arrangements for humanitarian and development funding, in addition to deploying early
NOTE: other estimates suggested 30 per cent. However, it is clear that accurate information is not available. The point is that a significant part of the
humanitarian funding and response happens outside the official humanitarian system.
17
FINAL REPORT
recovery advisors to work for the HC in all humanitarian emergencies. The average length of a humanitarian
emergency is now seventeen years. This is no longer only a humanitarian emergency, and our systems have not
adapted to this reality.
NEXT STEPS
91. The findings of this review will be communicated to the senior leadership of the Yemen response and leadership at the
IASC level: the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator/Designated Official (RC/HC/DO), the Humanitarian Country Team;
the Emergency Directors Group (EDG), the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the IASC Principals. Interested donors
and other stakeholders will be briefed on the outcomes of the mission.
92. As per the guidance document governing the OPR, the senior leadership in Yemen, represented by the Humanitarian
Coordinator, is requested to provide the Emergency Directors with a status report against the Action Plan (see Annex
I) three months after the submission of this report (by 1 May 2016). In order not to distract the leadership from their
primary responsibilities to deliver humanitarian assistance, the STAIT team can provide some support for compiling
the report, although the ownership rests clearly with the HC and HCT.
93. Support will be offered by the OPR and STAIT team to the HCT, where useful, to guide the implementation of the
Action Plan and facilitate global support for the response where this is of interest to the HC/HCT.
94. The global learning will be shared with the relevant owner of the particular issue, through IASC bodies or otherwise,
and the OPR team and STAIT will follow up as appropriate.
95. The Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT) will remain in contact with HC, HCT, Cluster
Coordinators and OCHA office to capture further learning which is of global value. The STAIT will actively disseminate
good practices to strengthen humanitarian response in other contexts.
18
FINAL REPORT
ANNEX I
ACTION PLANS
Issue/Problem
Action
Desired Outcome
Who
When
FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

Senior leadership roles and
responsibilities unclear:
The roles and
responsibilities of the
Regional HC and Senior
Advisor to the ERC in Riyadh
are not clear internally as
well as externally.
Narrative of the
humanitarian crisis and
response in Yemen is not
communicated sufficiently
and strongly enough.
Inconsistent messaging
between Sanaa, Riyadh and
New York.
There is ad hoc engagement
with authorities and parties
19
RHC and the Senior Advisor

to the ERC positions to be
reviewed by the
RC/HC/DO, and if required,
the positions to be
abolished or re-oriented as
articulated by the
RC/HC/DO.
Appoint a Senior
Communication and
Advocacy Advisor/Officer
to drive the development
and implementation of a
HCT communication and
advocacy strategy
(including engagement
with international news
agencies). S/he will be a
member of the HCT and
lead an inter-agency
communication and
advocacy working group.
HQ messaging related to
the humanitarian situation,
including access,
humanitarian space and
Protection of Civilians is
Streamlined and clear

leadership structure with
no ambiguities on decisionmaking and lines of
accountability.
ERC; EDG; RC/HC/DO
31/01/2016
a) HCT members (and

other international NGOs)
adhere to a common
communication and
advocacy framework,
based on a regularly
reviewed risk analysis.
OCHA
HCT members and INGOs
01/03/2016
b) The Yemen
humanitarian story is
profiled in international
media and through social
networks.
In-county leadership
reviews messaging before
it is issued.
RC/HC/DO
15/02/2016 and on-going
Status Update
FINAL REPORT
to the conflict on issues

related to humanitarian
access and protection of
civilians (including political
dimension).
developed based on
consultations with agency
and organisations incountry leadership.
DPA appoints a senior focal
point in Sanaa who sits as
an observer on the HCT.
Strategic guidance (HCT)

and operationalisation
(ICCM) are delinked.
The ICCM to be chaired by

the Head of OCHA or the
Dep. HC; ICCM
recommendations and
issues are addressed by
the HCT.
- The HCT provides
strategic guidance to
the ICCM on issues
raised by the ICCM
and other relevant
issues.
- Revisit / review the
TOR of the ICCM and
HCT.
There is consistent
exchange between the UN
Special Envoy and the
HC/RC/DO.
The HCT is informed by
ICCM recommendations
and provides relevant
strategic guidance to ICCM.
- The ICCM provides
technical and
operational advisory to
the HCT.
- The HCT focuses on
strategic issues related
to delivery.
DPA
15/02/2016 (dependent on
security ceiling, visa etc.)
Implemented
Head of OCHA; HC
Implemented
HC and HCT
15/12/2015
Implemented
Cluster leads, ICCM lead, HC,
01/03/2016
FOCUS AREA: ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE

Community feedback does
not influence the
humanitarian response:
Perceptions, needs and
complaints, and other
feedback mechanisms does
not influence cluster, ICCM
and HCT decision-making
20
HCT reviews proposal for a

common service for a
feedback mechanism and
articulates how it will be
operationalised, who will
be responsible and
accountable for its roll out
and implementation.
A common service bringing

together the data sets and
analysis from the different
feedback mechanisms is
available and accessible to
HCT members and other
interested stakeholders.
- Feedback from affected
FINAL REPORT
populations in terms of
needs, perceptions and
complaints is taken into
account by clusters, the
ICCM and the HCT.
Humanitarian response
activities are adjusted
appropriately.
There is limited common

understanding on most
appropriate communication
channels for two-ways
communication with
affected populations.
and UNICEF/ Search for

Common Ground.
FOCUS AREA: DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Insufficient field presence
of humanitarian actors in
different parts of the
country.
Security risk management

not effectively enabling
field presence and delivery
(Stay and Deliver).
Risks are passed onto

national staff and partners,
21
Revisit the approach to risk

management so as to
enable field presence and
delivery (Stay and Deliver)
and take appropriate
action with focus on
delivery (with support of
relevant enabling
organization, particularly
DSS).
Less Risk Averse

Approaches that facilitate
expanded field presence
and delivery of assistance.
SMT
31/12/2015
Utilise differentiated
movement regimes for
national and international
UN staff.
Streamline Programme
Criticality criteria, process
and consensus.
National staff movement

less restricted,
where/when appropriate.
SMT
15/02/2016
Programme Criticality
endorsed, ideally by UNCT
consensus.
HC/HCT
22/02/2016
Complete Security Risk

Assessments (SRAs) in
priority locations.
Identify main capacity gaps
of national partners and
SRAs done in priority

locations to permit
operational activities.
Capacity Strengthening
Assessments done and
DSS
31/03/2016
ICCM/Clusters
31/03/2016
Being implemented
FINAL REPORT
while not adequately

building their capacity.
staff and develop plans to

address them.
Inadequate speed and

scale of humanitarian
assistance delivery.
Improve linkages between

the strategic (HCT) and
operational levels (ICCM)
of the
response architecture
- ICCM to be chaired by
Head of OCHA
- Revisit / review the
TOR of the ICCM and
HCT
Limited monitoring
activities.
Unclear links between

needs (evidence),
capacities, targets
(priorities), and
achievements / results
22
plans developed, and roll

out of initial capacity
building programmes.
Improved strategic HCT
decision-making and
delivery.
HCT; ICCM
24/03/2016
Implemented
Ongoing
Better and tighter

prioritisation by clusters
and facilitated by the
ICCM, with guidance from
the HCT
Critical activities prioritised

in line with needs and
available funding.
HCT; ICCM; Clusters
31/01/2016
Strengthen monitoring
systems and increase
monitoring activities.
rd
- Assess existing 3
party and mobile /
remote monitoring
practices for possible
expansion and use
across clusters.
Systemise and better
coordinate needs
assessment processes and
content at the inter-cluster
level.
More regular and robust

monitoring of assistance to
affected people, activities,
results. Clearer
understanding of the
humanitarian situation.
OCHA; Clusters, all

humanitarian actors
24/04/2016
Comprehensive and
comparable presentation
of humanitarian needs
overall, across clusters.
ICCM, OCHA
01/03/2016
FINAL REPORT
(indicators).
Insufficient spirit of
togetherness and
collaboration to overcome
common obstacles.
Critical impediments to
delivery caused by third
parties (authorities and
parties to the conflict)are
inadequately addressed.
23
ICCM to analyse and feed

more and better
information to the HCT for
improved decision-making
and delivery.
Partners utilizing common
services (Logistics, UNHAS,
Emergency
Telecommunications) to
provide information on
their needs, plans,
requirements,
expectations in a timely
manner (in advance) to be
serviced adequately.
Regular inter-cluster
analysis of needs and
responses; Better strategic
thinking and decisions.
ICCM, OCHA
01/03/2016
Better planned and more

effective and responsive
from Common Services.
Common Service Users
Being implemented
Expand partnerships with

credible national NGOs to
support expanded delivery
opportunities, and to use
their knowledge and
presence across the
country to better
understand needs, collect
information and engage
with communities affected
by the crisis.
Develop a more
comprehensive Access
Strategy and mechanisms
for the HCT as a whole.
Improved reach and

outreach in areas where
international actors have
limited presence/capacity;
empowered local actors;
more robust national
response systems.
All Hum Actors, HCT, OCHA
01/03/2016
Ongoing
Better informed and

coordinated approach to
access; faster handling of
issues.
HCT, OCHA
15/03/2016
Closer engagement with
More access to
HC, ERC
31/01/2016
Being implemented
FINAL REPORT
24
authorities on the ground

to address access denials,
diversions, and
interference with
programmatic plans (see
also Protection Section in
this Action Plan on
engaging with
interlocutors: authorities
and parties to the conflict).
populations in need; less

diversion of assistance;
improved reputation and
perception (reality) of
impartiality in the eyes of
interlocutors.
Address de-confliction
challenges, especially for
road movements and
distributions sites (with
Coalition).
More effective deconfliction mechanism

permits more movement,
field missions and
increased humanitarian
outreach (NOTE: not only
dependent on deconfliction).
HC, Liaison to the KS

Centre, KSA), ERC
31/01/2016
Ongoing
Closer engagement with

authorities (on both sides)
to approve visas, travel
permits and clearances,
allow the import of
humanitarian goods and
other items to support
humanitarian work such as
security and
telecommunications
equipment, armoured
vehicles etc.
Organise workshops/
training on humanitarian
Humanitarian presence,
movements and
operations enabled.
Equipment delivered into
the country, more
clearances granted. More
understanding and
responsiveness of
authorities to
humanitarian actors and
operations.
HC, ERC
15/01/2016
Ongoing
Better understanding and

more enabling
Protection Cluster, OCHA
FINAL REPORT
issues, Human Rights and

Humanitarian Principles for
interlocutors, including
parties to the conflict.
environment for
humanitarian action by
governments and
authorities.
FOCUS AREA: PROTECTION

Limited common
understanding of Protection
and of its life-saving nature:
- Protection should be at
the core of the
humanitarian response
(Centrality of
Protection).
Protection is not
mainstreamed in all
clusters.
PROCAP to work with the

Protection Cluster and HCT
to elaborate a strategy to
bring most significant
protection issues on to the
agenda of the HCT
(Strategy on the Centrality
of Protection).
Protection Cluster trains
other Clusters, with the
support of the GPC, on
mainstreaming protection,
including sharing best
practices and concrete
models that can be
utilized.
Centrality of Protection
firmly on the agenda of the
HCT: HCT prioritizes and
takes action on two-three
high priority protection
concerns in Yemen.
PROCAP
Protection Cluster
HC (to lead the process)
01/03/2016
Protection is
mainstreamed across the
humanitarian response:
Clusters incorporate
protection concerns as a
central element of their
planning, responding and
reporting.
PROCAP
Protection Cluster
Other Clusters
Global Protection Cluster
01/05/2016
Direct access to
communities is severely
limited due to security
constraints and security
management procedures
that limit the potential of
humanitarian actors to be
present in areas of highest
need.
Confidence building
measures with
interlocutors: Systematic
and progressive roll out of
workshops on the Guiding
Principles on Internal
Displacement and on
humanitarian principles
(neutrality and
impartiality) to counter the
perception that UN
agencies are not delivering
Perception (amongst all

interlocutors) that UN
agencies and partners are
neutral and impartial in
their humanitarian role.
Protection Cluster
Coordinator as lead.
Protection Cluster
members as support.
OCHA (Civil-Military)
UNDSS
UN agencies (security
officers)
15/03/2016, and on-going
25
Significant confidence and

trust built between the UN
(and its partners) and
interlocutors that are in a
position to grant access
and permit the delivery of
FINAL REPORT
Information collected by
different systems is not
harmonized.
RUF strategy is unclear and

not operationalized.
Advocacy efforts are
unclear, particularly in terms
of roles and responsibilities
(especially Yemen vis-a-vis
the region and NY,
especially for high level
public advocacy).
26
based on needs. Strong

engagement with
authorities, tribal and
community leaders and
parties to the conflict, on
all sides of the conflict
(where and when
possible).
Clarify a common system
(possibly ActivityInfo) to
harmonise protection data
and information collected
by different actors and
cluster mainstreaming
protection into their
activities: Protection
indicators included in
common assessments e.g.
MIRA.
Assign roles and
responsibilities and
timeframe to develop and
finalize the RUF Action
Plan.
assistance.
Discuss and agree among

Yemen, regional level and
NY on who is going to
speak out, when, how and
on what.
RUF Action plan finalized

and showing signs of
implementation.
Harmonized system of
reporting that facilitates
analysis and packaging of
protection issues and
activities is in place.
Protection Cluster All

Clusters
Information Management
Working Group
Clarity of roles and

responsibilities for
operationalising the RUF
Action Plan are defined.
HC
HCT
PROCAP
Protection Cluster
01/03/2016, and on-going
FINAL REPORT
ANNEX II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AAP:
Accountability to Affected People
A/HCT:
Area Humanitarian Country Team
ASG:
Assistant Secretary-General
CLA:
Cluster Lead Agency
CSA:
Chief Security Advisor
DHC:
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
DPA:
Department of Political Affairs
DTF:
Diplomatic Transit Facility
EDG:
Emergency Directors Group
ERC:
Emergency Relief Coordinator
FSA:
Field Security Advisor
FTS:
Financial Tracking Service
GPC:
Global Protection Cluster
HNO:
Humanitarian Needs Overview
HPC:
Humanitarian Programme Cycle
HQ:
Headquarters
HRP:
Humanitarian Response Plan
ICCM:
Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism
ICRC:
International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP:
Internally Displaced Persons
IMWG:
Information-Management Working Group
INGO:
International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM:
International Organisation for Migration
KSA:
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
L3:
Level 3 crisis
MIRA:
Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
MSF:
Mdecins Sans Frontires
NGO:
Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO:
National Non-Governmental Organisation
OHCHR:
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPR:
OPS:
Online Project System
PROCAP:
Protection Standby Capacity Project
RC/HC/DO:
Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian Coordinator / Designated Official
RHC:
Regional Humanitarian Coordinator
RUF:
Rights Up Front
27
FINAL REPORT
SCHR:
Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response
SGBV:
Sexual and Gender-based Violence
SMT:
Security Management Team
SRA:
Security Risk Assessments
STAIT:
Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team
TA:
Transformative Agenda
UNCT:
United Nations Country Team
UNDP:
United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS:
United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNFPA:
United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS:
United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR:
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA:
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNVIM:
United Nations Verification and Inspection Mission
WFP:
World Food Programme
28
FINAL REPORT
ANNEX III SCHEDULE OF THE OPR TEAM

Day 1
Sunday 29 November / Amman
Bilateral Meeting, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA

Bilateral Meeting, Humanitarian Financing Unit, OCHA
Group Meeting, Information Management Group: OCHA, FAO, World Relief, UNDP, IOM
Group Meeting, Humanitarian Donors: ECHO, DFID, USAID
Group Meeting with NGOs(presence in Amman): Mercy Corps, World Relief, IMC, Save the Children
Bilateral Meeting, UNDP Yemen, Country Director
Group Meeting, Cluster Coordinators (not in Yemen): WASH Cluster, Refugees and Migrants Cluster
Day 2
Monday 30 November / Djibouti
Bilateral Meeting, UNHCR

Day 3
Tuesday 1 December / Sanaa
Bilateral Meeting with authorities

Day 4
Wednesday 2 December / Sanaa
Self-Assessment, Humanitarian Country Team

Self-Assessment, International NGO
Group Meeting, National NGOs
Day 5
Thursday 3 December / Sanaa
Group Meeting, Area HCT, Hudaydah, Skype Meeting

Small Group Meeting, Education Cluster
Small Group Meeting, Food Security Cluster
Small Group Meeting, Logistics Cluster
Bilateral Meeting, Intersos
Bilateral Meeting, Danish Refugee Council
Bilateral Meeting, CSW (national NGO)
Bilateral Meeting, The Humanitarian Forum (national NGO)
Small Group, UN Agency Security Staff Meeting
Day 6
Friday 4 December / Sanaa

Bilateral Meeting, IOM
Bilateral Meeting, OHCHR
Bilateral Meeting, GENCAP Advisor
Bilateral Meeting, IOM
Bilateral Meeting, UNFPA
Bilateral Meeting, WFP
Bilateral Meeting, Oxfam
Bilateral Meeting, UNDSS
29
FINAL REPORT
Day 7
Saturday 5 December / Sanaa
Self-Assessment, Inter Cluster Coordination Mechanism

Small Group Meeting, Health Cluster
Bilateral Meeting, Early Recovery Cluster
Small Group Meeting, Nutrition Cluster
Small Group Meeting, Shelter and NFI Cluster
Small Group Meeting, WASH Cluster
Small Group Meeting, Protection Cluster (and sub-clusters)
Bilateral Meeting, ICRC
Bilateral Meeting, UNHAS and ETC
Day 8
Sunday 6 December / Sanaa
Bilateral Meeting, MSF

Day 9
Monday 7 December / Sanaa
Humanitarian Country Team Retreat
ANNEX IV PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONS

CONSULTED
PRE-MISSION INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS:
OCHA-Yemen
Telephone, Monday 9 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Trond
Jensen
OCHA
Head of Office, OCHA-Yemen
Humanitarian Coordinator, Yemen

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Johannes
Van der Klaauw
UNHCR / IASC
Humanitarian Coordinator, Yemen
NGO focus group

Geneva, Tuesday 10 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Michael
Gallagher
Jesuite Refugee Service, JRC
Geneva Office
Reshma
Adatia
ACT Alliance
Geneva Office
Emma
Williams
Norwegian Refugee Council,

NRC
Geneva Office
Charlotte
Stemmer
Oxfam
Geneva Office
Gareth
Price-Jones
CARE
Geneva Office
30
FINAL REPORT
Donor Group
Geneva, Wednesday 11 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Tristen
Slade
Australia
Permanent Mission, Humanitarian Office
Joshua
Tabah
Canada
Intern
Intern
Netherlands
Anh-Thu
Duong
Switzerland
Nance
Kyloh
USA
Intern
Intern
Germany
Kim
Nason
European Union
NGO Forum, Yemen

Telephone, Wednesday 11 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Lisa
Piper
Danish Refugee Council
Country Representative and Chair, Steering

Group, NGO Forum
OCHA/Emergency Directors' Group

Telephone, Wednesday 11th November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
John
Ging
OCHA
Chair, Emergency Director Group
OCHA CRD
Telephone, Thursday 12 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Paola
Emerson
OCHA
Chief, Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD
Melissa
Fernandez
OCHA
Middle East and North Africa Section, CRD
Farhad
Movahed
OCHA
James
Weatherill
OCHA
Jiyoung
Lee
OCHA
Nathalie
Fustier
OCHA
Moira
Little
OCHA
Riyadh Liaison Office (Deconfliction)

Telephone, Thursday 12 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Max
Gaylard
OCHA
Head, Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia
Abdul
Haq
OCHA
Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia
David
Woods
OCHA
Deconfliction Liaison, Saudi Arabia
31
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World Health Organisation, WHO

Geneva, Friday 13 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Ina
Bluemel
WHO
Assistant Desk Officer, Yemen
Karen
Hobday
WHO
Desk Officer, Yemen
US Department of State
Washington DC, Monday 16 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Virginia
Terhar
State Dept. Bureau of

Population, Refugees and
Migration
Programme Analyst
OHCHR
Geneva, Monday 18 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Frej
Fenniche
OHCHR
Director (a.i.), Asia, Pacific, Middle East and

North Africa Branch
Samah
OHCHR
Emergency Section
Mohammad
OHCHR
Desk Officer, Yemen
Rights Up Front Initiative (RUF)

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Andrew
Painter
Rights Up Front, Exec. Office of

the SG
Senior Officer, RUF Initiative
UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, FAO

Telephone, Friday 20 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Daniele
Donarti
UN FAO
Position
International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC

Geneva, Friday 20 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Yehia
Khalil
ICRC
Desk Officer
United Nations Development Programme, UNDP

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Bruno
Lemarquis
UNDP
Deputy Director, Crisis Response Unit
UNDP
Desk Officer
Cecile
32
FINAL REPORT
UK Department for international Development, DFID

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Stuart
Little
DFID
Mike
Irwin
DFID
MSF
Telephone, Tuesday 27 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Antoine
Bieler
MSF
Director, Regional Advocacy and Policy
Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, RHC

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Amer
Daoudi
IASC
Regional Humanitarian Coordinator
UNICEF
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Yasmin
Haq
UNICEF
Emergency Director
In-coming Humanitarian Coordinator

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Jamie
McGoldrick
IASC
Humanitarian Coordinator (Nepal), in-coming for

Yemen
OPR MISSION MEETINGS, AMMAN AND DJIBOUTI

Bilateral Meeting, Deputy Head of Office, OCHA
Amman, Sunday 29 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Paul
Thomas
OCHA
Dep. Head of Office (in Amman), OCHA
Bilateral Meeting, Humanitarian Financing Unit

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Laurianne
Leca
OCHA
Head of Unit, Humanitarian Financing
Liisamarie
Keates
OCHA
Humanitarian Affairs Officer
33
FINAL REPORT
Group Meeting, Information Management Group

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Joseph
Kandeh
OCHA
Information Management Officer
Daria
Lisi
Food Security Cluster, FAO
Frederic
Dagorne
World Relief, Germany
Gabriel
Oduori
Early Recovery Cluster, UNDP
Duncan
Sullivan
Refugees & Migrants Cluster
Group Meeting, Humanitarian Donors

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Christophe
Reltien
ECHO
Philip
Royan
DFID
Briana
White-Gaynor
USAID
Group meeting with NGOs (presence in Amman)

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Jonathon
Bartolozzi
Mercy Corps
Country Director
Nate
Harper
World Relief, Germany
Orlena
Scorville
IMC
Programme Officer
Grant
Pritchard
Save the Children
Country Director
Bilateral Meeting, UNDP Yemen, Country Director

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Mikiko
Tanako
UNDP
Country Director
Group meeting, Cluster Coordinators (not in Yemen)

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Derek
Hyun Kim
WASH Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
TBC
TBC
Refugees and Migrants Cluster
Cluster Coordinator

Djibouti, Monday 30 November
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Claire
Bourgeouise
UNHCR
Regional Refugee Coordinator
34
FINAL REPORT
OPR MISSION MEETINGS, YEMEN

Bilateral Meeting with authorities
Sana'a, Tuesday 1 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Ali
Al-Kuhlani
MOPIC
Abdulwahab
Alweshlay
Executive Unit for IDPs
Humanitarian Country Team Self-Assessment

Sana'a, Wednesday 2 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Lisa
Piper
DRC
Country Director
Edward
Santiago
Save the Children
Programme Officer
Nicoletta
Giordano
IOM
Country Director
Ahmed
Shadoul
WHO
Country Representative
Sajid Mohammad
Sajjad
Oxfam
Country Director
Christina
Thevenot
ACF
Head of Mission
Johannes
Van der Klauuw
IASC
Humanitarian Coordinator
Salah
El Hajj Hassan
FAO
Jordan
Hoffman
INGO Forum
INGO Forum Coordinator
Trond
Jensen
OCHA
Head of Office
Marie
Spaak
OCHA
Deputy Head of Office
George
Abu Alzulot
OHCHR
Purnima
Kashyap
WFP
Nasir
Fernandes
UNHCR
Representative (acting)
Syrma
Jamil
NRC
Deborah
Clifton
GenCap
GenCap Advisor
Ezizgeloi
Hellenon
UNFPA
Julien
Harnies
UNICEF
Filipo
Tarakinikini
UNDSS
Chief Security Officer
International NGO Self-Assessment

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Syrma
Jamil
NRC
Jordan
Hoffman
INGO Forum
Christina
Thevenot
ACF
Head of Mission
Sajid Mohammad
Sajjad
Oxfam
Country Director
Lisa
Piper
DRC
Country Director
Edward
Santiago
Save the Children
Programme Officer
Evelyn
Vernont
Intersos
Country Director
35
FINAL REPORT
Group Meeting, National NGOs

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Amal
Al Saqqaf
Image
Musaeed
Musaeed
RRDF
Awfa
Annaami
UFDHR
Waleed
Al-Khayat
RRDF
Noha
Yehya Aleryami
HFY
Mohammed
Ali Al-Kanani
CHR-Taiz
Mohammed
Tahir
Al-Jaseem
SHS
Mohammed
Amani
ADO
Mohamed
Al Gieez
YFCA
Ishraq
Motohaz Zabarah
YWU
Motohar
Al-Haidani
CSSW
Fahmi
Satari
YDN
Group Meeting, Area HCT, Hudaydah, Skype Meeting

Sana'a, Thursday 3 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Abdulkarim
Hussein Ali
OCHA
Head of Sub-Office
Other participants: UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, CCSW, IOM, FAO, WFP, WHO, OHCHR, Oxfam, Save the Children, ACTED, NRC,
Islamic Relief, STC (national NGO).
Education Cluster, Small Group Meeting
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Ahmed
Giahad
Education Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
Nabila-Alkumain
Abdulmoula
Life Markets Meeting

Place
Mohey
al-Dein
GIZ
Abdullah
Modhesh
UNICEF
Programme Officer
Food Security Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Gordon
Duchi
Food Security Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
Awfa
Annaami
NFDHR
Etienne
Peter-Schmitt
FAO
Alamnew
Endalhachew
WFP
36
FINAL REPORT
Logistics Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Christophe
Morard
Logistics Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
Yasser
al-Azazi
UNICEF
Intersos, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Evelyn
Lernout
Intersos
Country Director
Danish Refugee Council, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Lisa
Piper
DRC
Country Director
CSW (national NGO), Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Abdulwas'a
Al Wasai
CSW
Director
The Humanitarian Forum (national NGO), Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Noha
Yeyha al-Eryani
Humanitarian Forum
Director
UN Agency Security Staff Meeting, Small Group

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Petra
Finianos
UNHCR
Ahmad
Alousaily
WFP
Stuart
Wright
UNICEF
Hind
Ghorayeb
UNICEF
Alen
Hodzic
IOM
UNHCR, Bilateral Meeting

Sana'a, Friday 4 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Johannes
Van Der Kraauw
UNHCR
Representative
Nasir
Fernandes
UNHCR
Deputy Country Director
37
FINAL REPORT
IOM, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Nicoletta
Giordano
IOM
Country Director
OHCHR, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
George
Abu Alzulot
OHCHR
GENCAP Advisor, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Deborah
Clifton
GENCAP
GENCAP Advisor
IOM, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Nicoletta
Giordano
IOM
Country Director
UNFPA, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Himyar
Abdulmoghni
UNFPA
Assistant Representative
WFP, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Purnima
Kanhyap
WFP
Country Director
Oxfam, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Sajid
Mohammad
Sajjad
Oxfam
Country Director
Department for Safety and Security, UNDSS, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Filipo
Tarakinikini
UNDSS
38
FINAL REPORT
Inter Cluster Coordination Mechanism, Self-Assessment

Sana'a, Saturday 5 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Mia
Jeong
Child Protection SubCluster
Coordinator
Jamal
Seid
Nutrition Cluster
Coordinator
Marije
Broekhuijsen
WASH Cluster
Coordinator / Programmes
Sam
Brett
Slefu
Maia
Giawad
Ahamed
Education Cluster
Coordinator
Daria
Lisi
Information Manager
Gordon
Duchi
Coordinator
Alfred
Dube
Health Cluster
Coordinator
Kamal
Olleri
Health Cluster
Coordinator
Ghamdan
Mofarreh
SGBV Sub-Cluster
Coordinator & Reproductive Health Programme
Federica
Dispenza
Early Recovery Cluster
Coordinator
Randhir
Wanigasokara
Protection Cluster
Coordinator
Safa
Algahomm
Protection Cluster
Coordinator
Mohammed
Nassir
Shelter, NFIs and CCCM
Coordinator
Monir
Alsobori
Coordinator
Fouad
Diab
Coordinator
Multi Sector Cluster,

IOM
Multi Sector Cluster,
UNHCR
Co-Coordinator
Co-Coordinator
Health Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Alfred
Dube
Health Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
Shafiq
Fouzia
UNICEF
Chief, Health Programmes
Ghamdon
Mofarreh
UNFPA
UNFPA Humanitarian Coordinator
Bushra
Al-Makaleh
IMC
Programme Manager
Kamal
Olleri
WHO
Public Health Officer
Early Recovery Cluster, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Federica
Dispenza
Early Recovery Cluster
Cluster Coordinator
Stephen
Bryant
UNDP
Programme Officer
Zafaran
Saeed
Women Empowerment
Foundation
Director
Nutrition Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Jamal
Seid
Nutrition Cluster
Coordinator
39
FINAL REPORT
Shelter and NFI Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Nasir
Abel Fernandes
Shelter/CCCM/NFI
Cluster
Senior Emergency Coordinator/ Cluster Coordinator
Mohammed
Nassir
UNHCR
Field Officer
Monir
AlSobari
Shelter/CCCM/NFI
Cluster
Senior Cluster Associate
Fouad
Diab
IOM
Shelter Coordinator
Mona
Alhajri
CSSW
Project officer
Mohamed
Tahir Al-Jaseem
SHS
Field Coordinator
Abeer
Mezher
DRC
Emergency and Early Recovery Coordinator
WASH Cluster, Small Group Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Marije
Broekhuijsen
WASH Cluster
Coordinator / Programmes
Protection Cluster (and sub-clusters)

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Randhir
Wanigasokara
Protection Cluster
Coordinator
Mia
Jeong
Child Protection SubCluster
Coordinator
Ghamdan
Mofarreh
SGBV Sub-Cluster
Coordinator and Reproductive

Health Programme
ICRC Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Simon
Schorno
ICRC
Deputy Head of Delegation
UNHAS and ETC, Bilateral Meeting

First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
George
Harb
WFP UNHAS
Chief Air Transport Officer
Christophe
Morard
Logistics Cluster
Logistics Cluster, Coordinator
Purnima
Kanhyap
WFP
Country Director
40
FINAL REPORT
MSF, Bilateral Meeting

Sana'a, Sunday 6 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Jerome
Alin
MSF
Country Director
Humanitarian Country Team Retreat

Sana'a, Monday 7 December
First Name
Surname
Organisation
Position
Lisa
Piper
DRC
Country Director
Edward
Santiago
Save the Children

International
Programme Officer
Nicoletta
Giordano
IOM
Country Director
Ahmed
Shadoul
WHO
Sajid Mohammad
Sajjad
Oxfam
Country Director
Christina
Thevenot
ACF
Head of Mission
Johannes
Van der Klauuw
IASC
Humanitarian Coordinator
Salah
El Hajj Hassan
FAO
Jordan
Hoffman
INGO Forum
Trond
Jensen
OCHA
Head of Office
Marie
Spaak
OCHA
Deputy Head of Office
George
Abu Alzulot
OHCHR
Purnima
Kashyap
WFP
Nasir
Fernandes
UNHCR
Syrma
Jamil
NRC
Deborah
Clifton
GenCap
GenCap Advisor
Ezizgeloi
Hellenon
UNFPA
Julien
Harnies
UNICEF
Filipo
Tarakinikini
UNDSS
41

Yemen OPR Final Report 12616

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FINAL REPORT

Operational Peer Review

RELEASE DATE: 26 JANUARY, 2016

MISSION DATES:28 NOVEMBER 8 DECEMBER 2015

Key Course Correctors ..................... 3

The Saudi-led coalition, consisting of ten countries , began targeted air

As a result of the coalitions escalation of hostilities, the UN started

UN agencies started to return to Yemen shortly after with a limited

Rationale for the Operational Peer

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

KEY COURSE CORRECTORS

Strengthen delivery of assistance to the people in need.

(b) STRENGTHEN SECURITY

A more effective security management system at the country level is required to

Engage emphatically with actors that influence the humanitarian response to

Operational Peer Review

Effectively communicate the gravity of the humanitarian situation to the outside

Operational Peer Review

RATIONALE FOR THE REVIEW

Operational Peer Review

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

MSF is represented by four societies, MSF-Netherlands, MSF-France, MSF-Spain and MSF-Switzerland.

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE (AAP)

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

Operational Peer Review

FOCUS AREA: LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

RHC and the Senior Advisor

Streamlined and clear

ERC; EDG; RC/HC/DO

a) HCT members (and

15/02/2016 and on-going

to the conflict on issues

Operational Peer Review

Strategic guidance (HCT)

The ICCM to be chaired by

15/12/2015 and on-going

Cluster leads, ICCM lead, HC,

FOCUS AREA: ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE

HCT reviews proposal for a

A common service bringing

Operational Peer Review

There is limited common

and UNICEF/ Search for

FOCUS AREA: DELIVERING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Security risk management

Risks are passed onto

Revisit the approach to risk

Less Risk Averse

National staff movement

Complete Security Risk

SRAs done in priority