WEEK ONE: RULE 128

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224

May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing
appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him
to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages
in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in
the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the
amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to
P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under
the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30,
1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of
a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with
use of a bladed weapon stab the latter
inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the
death of the victim, and on the occasion or by
reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, and by means of force and
violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn
D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a
and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the
house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to
her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through
Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband,
together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 1

and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she

intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she
would not be able to leave, she would just stay home
and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt,
Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house. 4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old
Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They
saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside
the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a
drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing
there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring
to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from
Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run
towards the back of the house. 6 She later noticed
appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and
black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his
wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called
her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black
shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her
that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked,
and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants
eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her
where her husband was as he had something important
to tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant
immediately left and went towards the back of the house
of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived
home and found that the lights in her house were off.
She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The
door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the
water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that
day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs.
She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she
went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark,
she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She
found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and
her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors
had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel,
Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a
report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawangs
house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went
to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba
with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers
that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere,

denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver
at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white
shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the
house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant
denied any knowledge of Kathylynss death, 11 however,
he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he
could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten
meters away from the police station. They suddenly
heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!"
(Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel
exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70
meters away from the station when Police Officer
Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape
with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998,
appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape
with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was
accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS
CRIME
CHARGED
DUE
TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Wellentrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court
on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal
unless
cogent
reasons
are
presented
necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of
the same; the reason being that the former is in a better
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. 14
Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood,
or
misapplied
some
facts
or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of
the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 2

deserves the appellate courts highest respect. 15 Where

there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be
appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the
crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven
(11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found
on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of
her small intestines to spill out of her body. 18 Rigor
mortis of the vicitms body was complete when Dr.
Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998.
According to him, the time of death may be
approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12)
hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other
words, the estimated time of death was sometime
between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This
was within the timeframe within which the lone presence
of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was
testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem
Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations,
contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim, 20 Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal
canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo
stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal
canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with
the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of
the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling
in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellants assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to
be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information
in all living organisms. 23 A persons DNA is the same in
each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the
DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft
of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal
and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been
advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect,
where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It
can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating
the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a

suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents
involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence
such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which
can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene.
Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victims body
during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in
proving that there was physical contact between an
assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the
victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared
with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of
the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI),
which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method
by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR
testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be
copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether
the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria
was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30
Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined
that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. 31
The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01
7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. 32
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in
the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant
in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these
advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we
traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately,
we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has
proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test
to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 3

PCR testing
appreciated
since it is
principles of

and utilizing STR analysis, and which was

by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
reasonably based on scientifically valid
human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellants

semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living
in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the
house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant
received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998;
(4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly
Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen
of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and
wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a
saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of
Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and
again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6)
Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pasa was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw
appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder
of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with
her intestines protruding from her body on the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained
pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm
in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The
stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was
found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit
"J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the
appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt. 35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a
conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to
a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To
determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial
evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the
appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation
of his right to remain silent as well as his right against
self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is
simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accusedappellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the National Bureau of

Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples

may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under
People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the
accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that
there was no violation of the right against selfincrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit
to a physical examination to determine his involvement
in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case
submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the
presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted
by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on
the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the
application of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is
involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an
ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law,
DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be
sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence
at Isabel Dawangs house during the time when the
crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June
30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with
clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in
two places at the same time, especially in this case
where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter
radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere
five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This
fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts
that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he
should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon
duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of
evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary
relevance must contain a "plus value." 41 This may be
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied
by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated
by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without
"plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 4

to balance the probative value of such evidence against

the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only
when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain
a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty
that convinces and directs the understanding and
satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyond reasonable doubt. 42 This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a
satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one
else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the
totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose
of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is
doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first
cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim
alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of
Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running
down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the
back of the same house. 46 She also testified that a few
days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter
revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her
after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn
about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape
her five days before her naked and violated body was
found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25,
1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her
auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally
present during an argument between her aunt and the
appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his
wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill
all your family and your relatives x x x." 50 These
statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the
victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is
established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after
the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for
committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually
assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed,
permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her
repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with
homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved
by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by

means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed

the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin,
such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed. 53 Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.54 The fact that the victims hymen is intact
does not negate a finding that rape was committed as
mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the
hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength
and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so
elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of
tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the
victims aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated,
appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law,
together with the victim and his wife. After the
separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
approximately one hundred (100) meters from his
mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity within
the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the
victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although
three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position
that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and
that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of
P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting
to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059
should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded
as part of the civil liability since the crime was not
committed
with
one
or
more
aggravating
circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of
the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar
alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of
Rape
with
Homicide
is
AFFIRMED
with
the
MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family
of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in
the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual
damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award
of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with
Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec.
25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines
for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 5

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.*, Puno*, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC
with the crime of murder under the following
Information:3
That on or about the 1st day of June, 2000, at about 6:30
in the evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a .357 caliber Magnum revolver
S&W (Homemade), with treachery and evident
premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill,
did then and there attack, assault and shot one Jacinto T.
Bayron, hitting him on his [sic] vital parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, as a
consequence of which said Jacinto T. Bayron died
instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon
arraignment.4 The prosecution presented the following
witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Jose
Secula (Jose); Gaudioso Quilaton (Gaudioso); Sergio
Bayron (Sergio); and Dr. Rene Enriquez Cam (Dr. Cam).
The appellant, Carlito Moalong (Carlito), and Police
Senior Inspector Mutchit Salinas (P/Sr. Insp. Salinas) took
the witness stand for the defense.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 176527

October 9, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMSON VILLASAN y BANATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the May 25, 2006 decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00250. 1
The appellate court affirmed the May 29, 2001 decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Cebu City, 2
that in turn found appellant Samson Villasan (appellant)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 6

Jose, a security guard of PROBE Security Agency,

testified that he was outside his employers branch office
at the Ayala Business Center, Siquijor Road, Cebu City at
around 6:15 p.m. of June 1, 2000, when he heard three
successive gunshots.5 He mounted his motorcycle to go
and investigate but before he could start it, he saw the
appellant "walking fast" and carrying a gun. He ordered
the appellant to stop and to drop his weapon. The latter
obeyed and dropped his gun. He then approached the
appellant, conducted a body search on him,6 and turned
him over to his (Joses) supervisor who, in turn,
contacted the police. The police forthwith brought the
suspect to the police station. Jose recalled that he
executed an affidavit on the shooting incident before the
police.7
On cross examination, Jose clarified that he did not see
the actual shooting; he only saw the victims lifeless
body after the appellant had been arrested. 8 On redirect, Jose stated that before the appellant was brought
to the police station, the latter told him that he had shot
a fellow driver.9
Gaudioso, a store assistant at Healthy Options, narrated
that he boarded a jeep at the waiting shed at the Ayala
Business Center at around 6:30 p.m. of June 1, 2000. 10
He occupied the jeeps front seat, beside the driver
Jacinto Bayron (Bayron). While so seated, he heard the
appellant briefly converse with Bayron, requesting the
latter to be allowed to ride the jeep because his own
jeep conked out.11 Soon after the appellant got into
Bayrons jeep, Gaudioso heard a gunshot. He looked
back and saw the appellant shoot Bayron twice in the
head.12 Gaudioso immediately jumped off but later
returned to assist in bringing Bayron to the hospital. 13 It
was then that he learned of Bayrons name. Thereafter,
the police invited him to the police station for his
statement regarding the shooting.14

On cross examination, Gaudioso recalled that there were

three other passengers at that time inside the jeep. He
immediately turned his head towards the passengers
side when he heard the first shot; two more shots
followed. He got scared and jumped off the jeep together
with the other passengers. He later returned and found
that the driver was already dead.15
On re-direct, he reiterated that he was the only
passenger at the jeeps front seat, and that the appellant
was seated at the jeeps rear seats. He maintained that
the appellant shot Bayron.16
Sergio, the victims brother, testified that Bayron was a
jeep driver earning more or less P500.00 daily. He further
stated that the funeral and burial expenses for his
brother amounted to P100,000.00. He also added that
Bayron had a common-law wife and had a 1 year-old
son with her.17
Dr. Cam, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), Cebu City, testified that he
conducted a post-mortem examination on the victims
body on June 2, 2000,18 and made the following findings:
NECROPSY REPORT
xxxx
GUNSHOT WOUNDS:
1) ENTRANCE: 1.0 x 1.3 cms., ovaloid edges,
with an area of tattooing around the wound,
8.0 x 10.0 cms., contusion collar widest superolaterally, located at the right side of the face,
below the right eye, 3.5 cms. x x x
2) ENTRANCE: 0.9 x 1.0 cm., ovaloid, edges
inverted, contusion collar widest inferoposteriorly, located at the right side of the
head, just in front of the right ear x x x
3) ENTRANCE: 0.6 x 0.8 cm. ovaloid, edges
inverted, contusion collar widest, superomedially, located at the right side of the head,
occipital area, 4.0 cms., above 13.0 cms.,
behind the right external auditory meatus, x x
x
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Hematoma,
parietal.

scalp,

frontal

area

and

right

Hemorrhage,
intracranial,
intracerebral,
subdural, subarachnoidal, massive, generalized
Internal Organs, congested
Stomach, empty
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS OF THE HEAD

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 7

Remarks: Two (2) bullets were recovered and

submitted to Firearm Investigation Section for
Ballistic Examination.19
On cross-examination, Dr. Cam stated that the distance
between the muzzle of the gun and the entrance wounds
was two feet, more or less.20
The defense presented a different version of events.
Carlito testified that he was with the appellant at the
parking lot of the Ayala Business Park at past 5:00 p.m.
of June 1, 2000, when Bayron and another person
approached the appellant. Bayron pointed to the
appellant and said: "Pre, pagtarong sa imong pagkatawo,
basig magkaaway ta" (Behave like a good man,
otherwise we will become enemies). The appellant
replied, "pre tell me who was the person who told you
about that"?21 Bayrons companion then accused the
appellant of being a traitor.22
The jeepney dispatcher soon after called Bayron as it
was his jeeps turn to load passengers. 23 Bayron and his
companion boarded the jeep; Bayron sat at the drivers
seat while his companion proceeded to the passengers
seats at the rear. The appellant followed them into the
jeep and sat behind Bayron. There were 5-7 passengers
on board the jeep, one of them at the front seat beside
Bayron. Bayron then drove away, leaving the parking
area.24 According to Carlito, he learned of Bayrons death
at 6:30 p.m. of that day.25
On cross examination, Carlito testified that he went to
Ayala on June 1, 2000 to meet the appellant to ask for
help on his application as a driver. 26 He saw the
appellant and Bayron talking to each other when he
arrived, and overheard Bayron warning the appellant to
be careful. Bayron thereafter got into his jeep, followed
by the appellant who sat behind him (Bayron). While
inside the jeep, Bayron pointed his finger at the
appellant and continued to argue with the appellant as
he drove away.27 He heard gunshots 15 minutes after the
jeep left the parking area. Carlito later saw the appellant
being apprehended by security guards.28
The appellant stated that he was a driver plying the
Ayala-Colon route. At around 5:00-6:00 p.m. of June 1,
2000, he talked to "Lito" at the parking area of the Ayala
Business Center. Lito was a friend of his son who had
been asking for his assistance in applying as a driver. 29
He read a newspaper after talking to Lito. Not long after,
Bayron and a certain Roel came and pointed their fingers
at him. Roel uttered, "Even if you are double your body
[sic], I am not afraid." 30 The appellant suspected that
Roel was mad at him for an incident in 1999 when he
reprimanded Roel for indiscriminately firing a gun. 31
The appellant further narrated that Bayron went to the
jeeps drivers seat after the dispatcher called him. Roel
followed Bayron but sat on the rear passenger seat. The
appellant also got into the jeep and sat across Roel
because he was bothered by what was happening
between Bayron and Roel. 32 He asked Roel to get off the
jeep so they could settle their differences, but Roel
instead drew a gun from his waist. 33 The appellant and
Roel wrestled for the gun which discharged while they
were grappling for its possession. Thereafter, Roel

immediately alighted from the jeep. The appellant

followed but was unable to catch up with Roel. 34

We deny the
indemnities.

On cross examination, the appellant recalled that he

read a newspaper at the parking lot after conversing
with Lito. At that point, Bayron and Roel came; Roel
pointed a finger at him and blamed him for his (Roels)
arrest for illegal possession of firearms. 35 Bayron went to
board his jeep when the dispatcher called him; Roel
followed him inside the jeep. The appellant then also
boarded the jeep, sitting across Roel to "clear the
matter" with him.36 When the jeep was already on its
way, Roel suddenly drew a gun from his waist. The
appellant held Roels hand, but the gun went off while
they were grappling for its possession. He did not notice
if anyone had been hit. The passengers, including Roel,
ran out of the jeep.37 The appellant saw the gun on the
ground and picked it up. The appellant tried to follow
Roel, but the latter was able to board another jeep.
Thereafter, the security guards arrested appellant and
then turned him over to the police.38

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

P/Sr. Insp. Salinas testified that he conducted a paraffin

test on the appellant at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory on June 2, 2000 to determine the presence of
gunpowder nitrates. The appellant tested negative for
the presence of gunpowder nitrates.39
On cross examination, P/Sr. Insp. Salinas explained that
the absence of gunpowder nitrates was not conclusive
proof that person did not fire a gun. According to him, a
person could remove traces gunpowder nitrates by
washing his hands.40

appeal

but

modify

the

awarded

An established rule in appellate review is that the trial

courts factual findings, including its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from
the factual findings, are accorded respect, if not
conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions
assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA.
Despite the RTC and the CAs unanimity in the findings of
fact, we nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records of
this case, as the penalty of reclusion perpetua demands
no less than this kind of scrutiny. 45
Gaudioso, in his July 25, 2000 testimony, positively
identified the appellant as the person who shot Bayron
inside the latters own jeepney on June 1, 2000; he never
wavered in pointing to the appellant as the assailant. To
directly quote from the records:
FISCAL VICTOR LABORTE:
Q: At about 6:30 in the evening of June 1,
2000, can you recall where you were?
GAUDIOSO QUILATON:
A: Yes, I can remember.

The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder

in its decision of May 29, 2001, as follows:

Q: Please tell the Court where you were at that

particular date and time.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and

circumstances, accused Samsom B. Villasan is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jacinto Bayron in the
sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

A: When I went out of my work place, I boarded

a jeep.

The accused is, however, credited in full during the

whole period of his detention provided that he will signify
in writing that he will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.

Q: In what place did you board the jeep?

A: At the waiting shed at the Ayala, where the
jeepney stop is located.
Q: Where is this Ayala situated, in what city?
A: Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.41
The appellant directly appealed to this Court in view of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua that the RTC imposed.
We referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.42
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto in its May 25,
2006 Decision.43

Q: Were you the only one who boarded that

jeepney?
A: We were four (4), sir.
Q: I see. In what particular seat of the jeepney
were you seated?
A: Front seat, sir.

44

In his brief, the appellant argued that the prosecution

failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
THE COURTS RULING

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 8

Q: While you were on board that jeepney, what

happened?
A: First, the driver had conversation.

Q: With whom
conversation?

did

that

driver

have

A: The one who shot. [sic]

Q: So, what happened afterwards, while that
man and the jeepney driver were talking with
each other?
A: First, I heard there was a request that he
would be boarding a jeepney because his jeep
conked up. [sic]
Q: Who made that request?
A: That one person who shot. [sic]

A: Two (2) "dangaw" only, which may be loosely

translated as thumb and forefinger extended,
is less than, from the thumb to the forefinger,
because he was sitting at my back. [sic]
Q: Was the driver hit?
A: Yes, he was hit.
Q: In what portion of his body was the driver
hit?
A: On his head.
Q: Now, if that person, whom you said you saw
shot the driver, is in the courtroom now, can
you point to him?

Q: And what happened afterwards, after that

request was made by the person to the driver?

A: Yes, I can.

A: He was able to board.

Q: Please point to that person.

Q: And then what happened next?

A: That man, third (3rd) from the left.

A: Then I heard one (1) gunshot.

(Witness pointed to the person who stood up

and identified himself as Samson Villasan)

Q: And what did you do when you heard that

gunshot?
A: I turned towards my back.
Q: And what did you see, if any, when you
turned your head?
A: When I turned back, there were two (2)
gunshots I heard, two (2) gunshots. [sic]

xxxx
Q: Now you told the Court Mr. Witness that you
were the only one seated at the front of the
jeepney, Right?
A: Yes.
Q: And three other passengers were at the
back of the jeepney?

Q: You only heard two (2) gunshots?

A: Yes.
A: Three (3), sir: the first one, and then
followed by two (2) gunshots.
Q: Who caused that gunshot?

Q: And one of the three passengers at the back

shot the driver?
A: Thats right, sir.

A: That person who shot the driver.

Q: Did you actually see that person shot the
driver?

Q: Is that person whom you saw shot the driver

inside the courtroom now?
A: He is around.

A: Yes.

Q: Can you point to him again?

Q: How far were you to that person who shot

the driver?

A: Yes.

A: Very near.

Q: Please do.

Q: How near?

A: That person.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 9

(Witness pointing to the person who stood up

and identified himself as Samson Villasan).
x x x x46 [Emphasis supplied]
Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of
the trial court as this tribunal had the actual opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude. The trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is binding on
this Court, except when that tribunal overlooked facts
and circumstances of weight and influence that can alter
the result.47
We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and
found no reason to disbelieve Gaudiosos straightforward
narration of the events surrounding Bayrons death. Nor
did we see anything on record indicating any improper
motive that could have led Gaudioso to falsely testify
against the appellant. In fact, the appellant never
imputed any ill motive on Gaudioso. To reiterate,
Gaudioso and the appellant were in the same jeep
during the shooting incident; there was light inside the
jeep. More importantly, Gaudioso saw the actual
shooting because he was "very near" the appellant when
the latter shot Bayron. To Gaudioso, what he witnessed
must have been a shocking and startling event he would
not forget in a long, long time. Under these
circumstances, we entertain no doubt on the positive
identification of the appellant as the assailant.
The Appellants Defenses
The appellant sought to exculpate himself by claiming
that the shooting of Bayron was accidental; and that he
(appellant) was not sure who pulled the trigger because
the gun went off when he and Roel were grappling for its
possession.
We do not find the appellants claim of accidental
shooting believable as it contradicts the available
physical evidence provided by Dr. Cam that the victim
suffered three gunshot wounds on the face and head. Dr.
Cams Necropsy Report corroborated by the Autopsy
Report of the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes showing that
the victim suffered a total of three gunshot wounds,
supported the testimony of Gaudioso that the appellant
shot the victim thrice. Jose notably also testified that he
heard three successive gunshots. These pieces of
evidence are clearly inconsistent with the appellants
claim that the victims shooting was accidental and that
only one shot was fired.
The nature, number and location of the victims gunshot
wounds also belie the appellants claim of accidental
shooting. The three wounds, all sustained in the head
and the face from shots coming from the rear, are clearly
indicative of a determined effort to end the victims life.
The appellant nonetheless claims that his identity as the
assailant was not proven with certainty as no trace of
gunpowder nitrates was found in his hand.
We do not find the appellants claim persuasive.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 10

While the appellant tested negative for gunpowder

nitrates, Forensic Chemist Salinas testified that a
paraffin test is not conclusive proof that one has not
fired a gun. This view is fully in accord with past findings
and observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in
general, are inconclusive; the negative findings in
paraffin tests do not conclusively show that a person did
not discharge a firearm.48 Our ruling in People v.
Teehankee, Jr.49 on this point is particularly instructive:
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has " proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or
absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the
nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The
person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such
as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco
may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco." In numerous rulings, we have
also recognized several factors which may bring about
the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a
gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting,
or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman
at the time of firing. x x x x [Emphasis ours]
In sum, the positive, clear and categorical testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses deserve full merit in both
probative weight and credibility over the negative results
of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant.
The Crime Committed
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime
of murder as follows:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, x x x
In convicting the appellant of murder, the courts a quo
appreciated treachery. This circumstance exists when
the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, method or forms which tend directly
and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender, arising from the defense that the offended
party might make. This definition sets out what must be
shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed,
namely: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense
or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious
adoption of this means of execution. 50 The essence of
this qualifying circumstance is in the elements of
suddenness and surprise, and the lack of expectation
that the attack would take place, thus depriving the
victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while
ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
offender.51

The evidence in this case showed that the appellant

briefly talked with Bayron as the latter sat on the jeeps
drivers seat preparatory to driving off. Thereafter, the
appellant entered the jeep through its rear entrance, and
sat behind Bayron. Not long after Bayron started his
jeep, the appellant shot him three times, hitting him in
the head and at the side of the face. This manner and
mode of attack by the appellant, to our mind, indicate
treachery. The appellants attack came without warning,
and was swift and sudden. The appellant attacked
Bayron from behind; the unsuspecting victim had no
expectation of the coming attack and was totally
defenseless against it. From these facts, the appellant
clearly and purposely DENIED the victim of any real
chance to defend himself and secured the commission of
the crime without risk to himself.52

Civil Liability
The grant of civil indemnity as a consequence of the
crime of murder requires no proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the crime and proof of the
appellants responsibility therefor. While the RTC and the
CA commonly awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity
to the murder victims heirs, prevailing jurisprudence
dictates an award of P75,000.00.56 Hence, we modify the
award of civil indemnity to this extent, to be paid by the
appellant to the victims heirs.
Moral damages are likewise mandatory in cases of
murder and homicide. We award P50,000.00 as moral
damages to the victims heirs in accordance with
prevailing rules.57

In People v. Vallespin,53 we explained:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim. It can exist even if the attack is
frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim
no opportunity to defend himself against such attack. In
essence, it means that the offended party was not given
an opportunity to make a defense.
No Evident Premeditation
The Information alleged that the crime was committed
with evident premeditation. We do not find any
evidentiary support for this allegation.
Evident
premeditation,
like
other
qualifying
circumstances, must be established by clear and positive
evidence showing that planning and preparation took
place prior to the killing. For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the prosecution must show the following:
(1) the time the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to this determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of
time between the resolve to kill and its execution that
would have allowed the killer to reflect on the
consequences of his act. 54 Significantly, the prosecution
did not even attempt to prove the presence of these
elements. In People v. Sison,55 we held that evident
premeditation should not be appreciated where there is
neither evidence of planning or preparation to kill nor of
the time when the plot was conceived.

The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary

damages since the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was firmly established. When a crime is committed with
an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or
generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil
Code.581avvphi1
The lower courts were correct in not awarding actual
damages to the victims heirs because they failed to
present any supporting evidence for their claim. To be
entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable certainty, based
on competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by
the injured party. In the absence of proof, jurisprudence
dictates an award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages
for the victims heirs on the reasonable assumption that
when death occurs, the family of the victim incurred
expenses for the wake and the funeral.59
We cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity
to the victims heirs because no documentary evidence
was presented to substantiate this claim. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for this type of damages. While
there are exceptions to the rule, these exceptions do not
apply; although self-employed, Bayron did not earn less
than the current minimum wage under current labor
laws.60
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby
AFFIRM the May 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00250 with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

The Proper Penalty

(1) the awarded civil indemnity is INCREASED

to P75,000.00;

The crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized

under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659) with reclusion
perpetua to death.

(2) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs

of the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages;

While evident premeditation was alleged in the

Information, this circumstance was not adequately
proven. Hence, in the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
felony, the courts a quo correctly sentenced the
appellant to reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.1avvphi1

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 11

(3) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs

of the victim P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
(4) the appellant is ORDERED to PAY the heirs
of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Case Digest: People vs. Adoviso 309 SCRA 1

Pablo Adoviso, and four John Does, were tried for the
MURDER of Rufino Agunos and Emeterio Vazquez. Pablo
Adoviso was positively identified by Bonifacio Agunos,
the son of one of the victims, because the former did not
wear a mask in the perpetration of the crime.
Aside from denial and alibi, the defense also offered in
evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph
Examiner II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on Adoviso.
In Polygraph Report No. 900175, Lucena opined that
Adovisos polygrams revealed that there were no
specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent
questions relevant to the investigation of the crimes.
The trial court found Adoviso guilty.
On the premise that the trial court rendered the
judgment of conviction on the basis of mere conjectures
and speculations, appellant argues that the negative
result of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt
the scales of justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument
that simultaneously measures and records certain
physiological changes in the human body that are
believed to be involuntarily caused by an
examinees conscious attempt to deceive the
questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie
detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will
have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in
breathing, which will be recorded on the graph.
However, American courts almost uniformly reject
the results of polygraph tests when offered in
evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt
or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the
accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 12

reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific

acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different
in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that
much faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie
detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this
case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should
not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two
counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killings to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In other words, there is treachery
when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not
given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected
and without warning. The victims in this case were
totally unaware of an impending assault Rufino was
sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when
they were shot.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116196 June 23, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur 2 declaring him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.
Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was originally
charged with four unidentified persons who have,
however, remained at large. The information 3 charging
appellant with the Murder of Rufino Agunos under
Criminal Case No. P-2079 alleges:
That on or about the 18th day of
February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock
[sic] in the evening at Sitio Tan-agan,
Barangay Casugad, Municipality of
Bula, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with
assorted long firearms, conspiring,

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 13

confederating and mutually helping

one another, with intent to kill and
with
treachery
and
evident
premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one Rufino Agunos several
times with said firearms hitting the
latter on the different parts of his
body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Rufino Agunos.
That the crime complained of against
the accused is not service connected.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for the name of the victim, the information in
Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect to the killing of
Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations. 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint
trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080, the
prosecution presented their version of the events that
transpired on the evening of February 18, 1990, as
follows:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two
adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad,
Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a
camalig where they stored harvested rice. The spouses
preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living
area of the camalig had walls of bamboo called salsag.
This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led
down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats.
These slats were placed horizontally approximately four
to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as
a kitchen but another portion had a papag where the
Vasquez' grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter
Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the irrigation
pump. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other
house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own
son Elmer.
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990,
Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife was
about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had
already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had just
finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard
three or four gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he
had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed,
"Why should you not be hit when infact there are guns in
front of you." Anastacia saw the "protruding edge of the
gun" on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went
down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank
coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to
recognize the persons who fired their guns at her
husband.
The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house
when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening,
Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of
the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when he
noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back
against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in
the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute
had passed after he had gone up when Bonifacio heard

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 14

the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer

immediately went down the front yard to investigate.
Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard,
behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8)
meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the
camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside.
Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall.
Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large
built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because
of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of
Rufino's assailants, only appellant was not wearing a
mask. Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped
inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed
where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting
Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father
Emeterio shout "Pino," (referring to his grandson Rufino)
and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas
lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the
stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with
his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming their
firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of
these persons had a cover over their faces. Three (3) of
them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while
two (2) others were near its door. Elmer saw these five
(5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down
on the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able
to crawl under the papag. Elmer's grandfather was also
hit on the stomach but he managed to up the camalig.
When appellant and his companion by the camalig door
saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others
at the ditch, escaped to the banana plantation Elmer, on
the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father
carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found Rufino
at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his
side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he had
been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound,
Rufino took Elmer's hand and put it on his back. Elmer
then moved Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to the
camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his
stomach with diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal
building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio
Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned
to the scene of the crime with him. The police brought
Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and
then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and
Rufino died early the next morning.
The certification 5 dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr.
Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the Bicol
Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old
Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds: at the
inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh and the
abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh
bore contusion collars. The same physician certified that
Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven (7)
gunshot wounds at the paraumbilical area, lumbar area,
hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm,
anteromedial aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial
aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm.
Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars
at the paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right
forearm and the left arm. 6

Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his

defense.
Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU
whose headquarters was located in Barangay Palsong,
Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of
February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Durabod, Palsong,
about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters.
He, together with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr.
and PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of
Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m.
Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated
appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that
from 7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18,
1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at the
Tragante store. He distinctly remembered that date
because it was the fiesta of Balatan.
To support his denial appellant presented Lt. Antonio
Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2 Claro
Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a
police certification 7 prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe
to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated
"by unidentified armed men." Lopez said that he (Lopez)
was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital
who were then still conscious. The victims told him that
they did not know who shot them or why they were shot.
SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the followup investigation he conducted several days after the
incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he
(Bonifacio) "vividly saw the incident and recognized"
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime and
that the killings had some something to do with land
dispute between Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia
family.
The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of
Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a
polygraph test on appellant. In Polygraph Report No.
900175, 8 Lucena opined that appellants ''polygrams
revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative
of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the
investigation of the crimes.
In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he
reported the incident to the police, he did not identify
appellant as one of the culprits because he was afraid of
appellant who was a member of the CAFGU.
Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that he
recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime although he told them that he did not recognize
appellant's four (4) companions. He did not mention to
Lopez and Canabe appellant's identity because he was
"confused" about what had happened in their house.
On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint
Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two (2) counts of murder and disposing of
Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, joint judgment is hereby
rendered:

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 15

In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding

the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER and imposing upon him
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to pay the legal heirs of Rufino
Agunos, consisting of the widow,
Evelyn T. Agunos and their four (4)
children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS
(P50,000.00)
Philippine
Currency;
In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise
finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and imposing upon
him another penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs
of the late EMETERIO VASQUEZ,
consisting of Anastacia Vasquez and
Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
Philippine Currency with all the
accessory
penalties
provided
therefore in both cases and to pay
the costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED. 9
Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he
was properly identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses as
one of the killers of the victims. He contends that
eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an
"incredible" story because it is "highly improbable" that
they could have "distinctly and positively recognized
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crimes." 10 According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in
the dark portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut
tree, could not have identified appellant by the light
emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where
Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the
time of the incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who
declared that he saw his grandfather shot by appellant,
could have identified appellant because of the poor
lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his
grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried
by Elmer's grandfather was "a small can about two (2)
inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette" and
the lamp inside the camalig "was placed inside a bigger
can so that the direction of the light emanating
therefrom was upwards and not sidewise." 11
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of
whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when
conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses
do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the
identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted.
12
Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight
is sufficient to allow identification of persons. 13
Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may,
in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination,
making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely
on that ground unmeritorious. 14
In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps
illuminated the place the one placed inside the
camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from
the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellant's
contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could

not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a

can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not describing either
of the gas lamps during the incident. The defense
counsel
at
the
trial
and
appellant's
counsel
misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his
grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer testified:
ATTY. CORTES:
Q Is it not that the
lamp
you
said
placed along the
door,
which
is
already marked as
lamp, is that not
this
lamp
was
placed inside a
kerosene can as
testified to by your
grandmother
so
that the cat could
not cause it to fall?
A It was placed
just on the floor
not inside the can.
15
(Emphasis
supplied.)
For her part, Anastacia testified as follows.
ATTY. CORTES:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Because you
were
already
about to retire, the
doors
and
windows
were
already closed, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q That you also
shut
down
or
closed the light, is
that correct?
A No, sir, we even
placed
the
kerosene
lamp
inside a can.
Q You said, you
placed the lamp
inside a can so
that the light is
going up, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 16

Q So, the light was

not
illuminating
sidewise because
it was inside a
can?
A When we left, I
got the kerosene
lamp and brought
it with me.
ATTY. CORTES:
I think, the witness
did not get the
question
right,
Your Honor.
COURT:
Repeat
question.

the

ATTY. CORTES:
Q
My
question
Madam Witness is,
when you were
about to retire?
A The lamp was
placed on the floor
where
my
husband
was
drinking coffee.
COURT :
Q Who are the
persons you are
referring
to
as
having left when
you placed the
light inside the
can?
A
My
son,
Bonifacio, and the
policemen,
Your
Honor,
when
the(y)
brought
Emeterio
and
Rufino
to
the
16
hospital.
(emphasis
supplied).
Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on
the floor and a can was placed over it only after the
incident when Anastacia left with her son and the police
to bring the victims to the hospital.
The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have
effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of
appellant, considering that the slats were built four (4)

meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of

relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and
appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their
identities, and the manner in which the crime is
committed. 17 A relative will naturally be interested in
identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to
obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). 18 It must
remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger
to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten
(10) years 19 while Elmer had been acquainted with him
for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that appellant used to
join the rabuz at the barracks. 20 Familiarity with
appellant's face and appearance minimized if not erased
the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to
his identity.
Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to
have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike the
other participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not
contrary to human experience for a person to commit a
crime before the very eyes of people who are familiar to
them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their
identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.
Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's
failure to immediately identify him as the perpetrator of
the crime to the police. 21 The delay in reporting his
participation to the police was however sufficiently
explained by Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant
since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as
such, was provided with a gun. He was also hesitant in
identifying appellant immediately lest he got wind of his
impending arrest and posthaste escaped the clutches of
the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the
identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as
a witness. 22 The general or common rule is that
witnesses react to a crime in different ways. 23 There is
no standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no
standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react.
24

There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio

had a motive in implicating him. According to appellant,
Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia
family to kill Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a
land dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk
of motive on the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as to
credible witnesses had positively identified appellant as
one of the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez
and Rufino Agunos.
Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive
identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. 25
For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof
that the defendant was not only somewhere else when
the crime was committed but that he could not be
physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 26
Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his
being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote from
Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident
happened. Both places are within the Municipality of
Bula. Appellant admitted that the distance between the
two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even
without any means of transportation. 27 On the other
hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero
Esteron, testified that the distance could be traveled in

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 17

thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle.

28

Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently

weak, he was not even sure where he was and who were
his companions at the time the crimes were committed.
We quote the observation of the trial court on this point:
On the premise that the trial court rendered the
judgment of conviction on the basis of "mere conjectures
and speculations," 29 appellant argues that the negative
result of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt
the scales of justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that
simultaneously
measures
and
records
certain
physiological changes in the human body that are
believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. 30 The
theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a
person who lie deliberately will have rising blood
pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which
will be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs
tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of
establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a
crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its
introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as
yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and
ascertaining truth or deception. 32 The rule is no different
in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating
that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a
lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this
case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should
not apply to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two
counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killing to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which offended party
might make. 34 In other words, there is treachery when
the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the
slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without
warning. 35 The victims in this case were totally unaware
of an impending assault Rufino was sleeping and
Emetario was going down the stairs when they were
shot.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year

old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo
and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old
child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her
vocabulary was limited and most of the time she
expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of
Misamis Occidental. Four security men were assigned to
him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto
and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109144

August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and
co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with
the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old
Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991,
signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which
reads:
That during the period between the
last week of March 1989 and the first
week of April 1989, in Barangay
Lower
Lamac,
Oroquieta
City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have (sic)
carnal
knowledge
with
Sandra
Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a
woman who is a mongoloid and so
weak of mind and in intellect as to be
capable of giving rational and legal
consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged and due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 18

The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife

Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and daughter
Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside
Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was
occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the
lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was
occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of
constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought her to a doctor
in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to
Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra
became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno
Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen and told her
mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's
condition, brought her to Regina Hospital. Sandra was
able to relieve herself the following day but still
remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a
bath in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not
want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a
second checkup. Dr. Conol, the examining physician,
ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist,
conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that
Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not
believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she
brought Sandra to Madonna and Child Hospital in
Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist,
examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultrasound examination. The results were positive. The fetus'
gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another
ultra-sound examination at the United Doctors Medical
Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989
confirmed that she was indeed pregnant. 5
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy
who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the
complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about
thirty (30) pictures of different persons were laid on the
table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of
her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought
out of the investigation room to a police line-up of ten
people, including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She
was again asked to point to her assailants. Without
hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto. 8

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two

daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask
Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually
molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra
who sexually molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her.
Sandra demonstrated how she was raped. First, her
thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her
panty was taken off. A push and pull movement
followed. 10 Celsa testified that she was present when
the victim demonstrated how she was sexually abused
by the two accused, including the way her nipples were
touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to
emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of
removing her panty, uttering at the same time "hubad
panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who raped her
and said she wished them dead, as they did something
bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how she was
sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two
hands next to her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then
placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she
were sucking. She also touched her private organ and
made a push and pull movement. 12
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test,
both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood
Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child
Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that
Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type
"B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant
type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial
contending that it was impossible for them to have
committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno
Tumimpad of the crime charged but acquitted the other
accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that
he "has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob
Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child
Jacob
Salcedo
is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Court finds the accused, PO1
Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape, as charged in the information,
and pursuant to the provisions of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as
amended,
there
being
no
aggravating
nor
mitigating
circumstance
attendant
in
the
commission of the crime, said
accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify
the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in
the amount of P20,000.00; and to

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 19

suffer the other accessory penalties

provided for by laws; and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel
Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED
from the charge.
SO ORDERED.

13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the

lower court:
1. The lower court erred in not
appreciating the impossibility of
committing the offense charged
without detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting
the accused-appellant base on major
blood grouping test known as ABO
and RHS test, not a paternal test
known as chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him
to have committed the crime of rape because most of
the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together
with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours while the victim
was always in the company of her mother. He further
contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if
she had really been molested, not to have shouted out of
pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury,
accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother,
Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could
have raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo
during inspection tours but sometimes they were left
behind and would play pingpong or card games with
Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra
was always with her mother, there were times when she
was left alone in the house with the accused. 14
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q How many security men
remain if you can recall when
your husband reported for
work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security
men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto.

Q How about the 2 other

security men Tanggan and
Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them
for an errand and sometime
they used to go with my
husband to the office.
Q Every time when your
husband is out what they do
while they were (sic) at the
headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and
sometime they were playing at
the porch with my daughter
Sandra playing pingpong and
sometime they were listening
music.
Q Where did they play usually
take place?
A Living room.

15

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the say, (sic) Mrs.
Salcedo, you said a while
ago when you were at the
headquarters you were able
to do your choirs, (sic) doing
laundry jobs in the second
storey of your house. Do
you know where is your
daughter Sandra at that
time?
A Yes, she spent her time at
the second floor.
Q What part of the ground
floor she used (sic) to stay?
A Because she is found (sic)
of music she stay in the
living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any
playmates?

the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his

co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of
different persons shown to her. Second, at the police
lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS,
Sandra once again unerringly pointed accused-appellant
and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. Third, in
open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to
accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim's own testimony:
PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate
before this Honorable Court
what Moreno and Ruel did to
you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood
up held both her thighs (sic)
with her two hand (sic)
down to her sexual organ
saying a word "panty" and
she placed her hand on her
breast and did something as
if sucking and held her
private part (sic) and did a
push and pull movement
and she cried.
Q When you said that there
was a push and pull
movement of the body and
when this was being done
did you feel pain?
A Yes pain.
Q What part of your body is
painful?
RECORD:
The witness touching her
private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on
your sexual organ?
A Yes.

A Moreno and Prieto.

Q Have you seen actually
the 2 accused playing with
your daughter?
A Yes, playing pingpong and
playing cards. 16
The victim more than once positively identified accusedappellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators
of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 20

Q Where did you see these

blood?
RECORD:
The witness touching her
private parts.

Q When this push and pull

movement was being made,
did you see a man's organ?

Q What part of the ground

floor, was it outside or
inside the room?

A Yes sir.

A In the room.

Q Where did you see this

male organ?

Q When (sic) Moreno and

Ruel
are
inside
the
courtroom now, can you
point to them?

A Witness touching
private part.

her

A Yes.
Q Who did this to you, who
removed your panty?
A Moreno and Ruel.

Q Will you please point to

them?
PROS. RAMOS:

Q Did you see Moreno

taking off his pants?

May we request the accused

to stand up your honor?

A Yes.
RECORD:
Q Did
organ?

you

see

his

sex

A The witness touching her

private parts.

Both accused stood up from

where they were sitting
inside the courtroom.
PROS. RAMOS:

Q How about this Ruel, did

you see if he taken (sic) off
his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did
organ?

you

see

his

sex

Who
is
that
person
(prosecutor Ramos point to
accused
Moreno
Tumimpad)?
A Moreno.
RECORD:

A
Yes,
witness
again
touching her private part.
Q Both of them?
A Yes.
Q Where did Moreno and
Ruel removed (sic) your
panty?

The witness pointing to a

certain
person
who
is
standing and when asked
what is his name, he readily
answered that he is Moreno
Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing
besides Moreno?

A Moreno.
A Joel.
Q In your house?
PROS. RAMOS:
A Yes.
Q What part of your house
did Moreno and Ruel remove
your panty?
A Downstairs Moreno and
Ruel remove panty.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 21

If your honor please, she

could not pronounced (sic)
well the word Ruel but the
way she called this name is
Joel which refers to the
same person who is one of
the accused in this case. 17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified

that Sandra demonstrated to her how she was ravished
by the two accused, thus:
Q Now, will you please tell us
what did Sandra Salcedo told
(sic) you as to how she was
abused?
A By what she had stated there
were also actions that she made.
Q Will you please demonstrate to
this Honorable Court how did
Sandra Salcedo was abused as
narrated or demonstrated to you
by Sandra Salcedo?
A According to her she was held
in her thigh and then she was
hugged and then the panty was
taken off and making a push and
pull
movement
(witness
demonstration by holding her
thigh)?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told
you and demonstrated to you
how she was abused. What else
did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she
had told you any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo
refused to talk or say anything
else. What happened next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked
her.
Q Where were you when Celsa
asked Sandra Salcedo?

Q And what if any did Sandra

Salcedo tell you as to what was
done to her?
A By way of talking and action.
Q And what was the answer of
Sandra Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action
and talking.
Q And what was the answer of
Sandra Salcedo as related by her
to Celsa through words and
action?
RECORD:
The
witness
demonstrated by holding his
(sic) nipple going down to her
thigh.
Q What else had
transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever
Sandra Salcedo mentioned the
names
of
accused
Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have
you observed whose names was
usually
mentioned
first
by
Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned
first the name of Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q
And
happened after that?

what

A I was just beside her.

Q You said that after Sandra
Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did
the questioning, did you hear the
question being asked by Celsa to
Sandra Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question
being asked by Celsa to Sandra
Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as
to what other things that these
two had done to her?

A I informed my
mother-in-law of what Sandra
Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you
tell your mother-in- law about
what Sandra Salcedo told you
and Celsa?
A
evening sir.

That

very

18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously

argues that his conviction was based on the medical
finding that he and the victim have the same blood type
"O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly
by testimonial evidence given by the victim herself and

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 22

her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence

only to show that the alleged father or any one of many
others of the same blood type may have been the father
of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs.
Court of Appeals 19:
Paternity

Science
has
demonstrated that by the analysis of
blood samples of the mother, the
child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man
is not the father of a particular child.
But group blood testing cannot show
only a possibility that he is. Statutes
in many states, and courts in others,
have recognized the value and the
limitations of such tests. Some of the
decisions
have
recognized
the
conclusive presumption of nonpaternity where the results of the
test, made in the prescribed manner,
show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases
in which the judgment of the Court
may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn
on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of
such blood tests are not admissible to
prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possibility that the
alleged father or any one of many
others with the same blood type may
have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of
rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

WEEK ONE: RULE 129

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 23

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994

STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and
eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place a
premium on how he has complied with his continuing
duty to know the law. A quality thus considered essential
to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who
spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight
acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and
the learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the
learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning."
1

Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he

owes to the public and to the legal profession, to know
the very law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the
administration of justice if judges cannot justly be
accused of apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal
principles. For, service in the judiciary means a
continuous study and research on the law from
beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992,
respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State
Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno
V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct
and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992,
respondent judge issued an Order
dismissing
eleven
(11)
cases
(docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed
by the undersigned complainant
prosecutors (members of the DOJ
Panel of Prosecutors) against the
accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960,
in relation to the penal provisions of
Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his
Order solely on the basis of
newspaper reports (August 11, 1992
issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and the Daily Globe) concerning the
announcement on August 10, 1992
by the President of the Philippines of
the lifting by the government of all
foreign exchange restrictions and the
arrival at such decision by the

Monetary Board as per statement of

Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported
announcement of the Executive
Department on the lifting of foreign
exchange
restrictions
by
two
newspapers which are reputable and
of national circulation had the effect
of repealing Central Bank Circular No.
960, as allegedly supported by
Supreme Court decisions . . ., the
Court contended that it was deprived
of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven
cases aforementioned "for not to do
so opens this Court to charges of
trying cases over which it has no
more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases
on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a
Central Bank Circular or Monetary
Board Resolution which as of date
hereof, has not even been officially
issued, and basing his Order/decision
on a mere newspaper account of the
advance announcement made by the
President of the said fact of lifting or
liberalizing foreign exchange controls,
respondent judge acted prematurely
and in indecent haste, as he had no
way of determining the full intent of
the new CB Circular or Monetary
Board resolution, and whether the
same provided for exception, as in
the case of persons who had pending
criminal cases before the courts for
violations of Central Bank Circulars
and/or regulations previously issued
on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant
and cavalier posture in taking judicial
notice purportedly as a matter of
public knowledge a mere newspaper
account that the President had
announced the lifting of foreign
exchange restrictions as basis for his
assailed order of dismissal is highly
irregular, erroneous and misplaced.
For the respondent judge to take
judicial notice thereof even before it
is officially released by the Central
Bank and its full text published as
required by law to be effective shows
his precipitate
action in utter
disregard of the fundamental precept
of due process which the People is
also entitled to and exposes his gross
ignorance of the law, thereby
tarnishing public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary. How can the
Honorable Judge take judicial notice
of something which has not yet come
into force and the contents, shape
and tenor of which have not yet been
published and ascertained to be the
basis
of
judicial
action?
The
Honorable Judge had miserably failed
to "endeavor diligently to ascertain

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 24

the facts" in the case at bar contrary

to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
constituting
Grave
Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not
even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring
first the comment of the prosecution
on the effect of aforesaid Central
Bank
Circular/Monetary
Board
resolution on the pending cases
before dismissing the same, thereby
denying the Government of its right
to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with
which respondent Judge acted to
dismiss the cases may be gleaned
from the fact that such precipitate
action
was
undertaken
despite
already scheduled continuation of
trial dates set in the order of the
court (the prosecution having started
presenting its evidence . . .) dated
August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31,
September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and
October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in
the morning, in brazen disregard of
all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right
to be heard, and clearly exposing his
bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of
respondent Judge in dismissing the
case without even waiting for a
motion to quash filed by the counsel
for accused has even placed his
dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8,
1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4 contending,
inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of
the Central Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law
on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that
the public announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign
exchange controls was total, absolute, without
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having
acted only on the basis of such announcement, he
cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous
statement of the President that the new foreign
exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases
filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only
on August 17, 1992 but published in the newspapers on
August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had
issued his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that
the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead
of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by
assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the
consequence of their failures to respondent judge who
merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the
President which had become of public knowledge; that
the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353
specifically refers only to pending actions or
investigations involving violations of CB Circular No.
1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved
charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the
accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law

different from that under which she was charged; that

assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the
order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been
an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative
complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake committed by
a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance
of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a
doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or
judges whose decisions were reversed or modified"
because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court
are later reversed, so how much more for the lower
courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since
the prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he
theorized, "What explanation could have been given?
That the President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a
colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should
wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB
circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic)
does not affect my dismissal order because the said
circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB
Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed
cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to
take judicial notice of the facts which are of public
knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the
contention of complainants that he acted prematurely
and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on
a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of
the newspaper report wherein the President announced
the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an
intention to be effected in the future, because of the use
of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted,"
not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants
who are officers of the Department of Justice, violated
Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides
that "proceedings against judges of first instance shall
be private and confidential" when they caused to be
published in the newspapers the filing of the present
administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the
fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and
pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of
the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants
aver that although the saving clause under Section 16 of
CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB
Circular No. 1318, it will be noted that Section 111 of
Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause
substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn
refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether
under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending
cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are
excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged
that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases,
without according the prosecution the opportunity to file
a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause
why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should
not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's
partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted
as if he were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution
referring the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator
for
evaluation,
report
and
recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 25

involved.
The
corresponding
report
and
recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was
submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani
Cruz-Pao.
The questioned order
follows:

of respondent judge reads as

These eleven (11) cases are for

Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange
Restrictions
as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in
relation to the penal provision of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
pleaded not guilty to all these cases;
apparently the other accused in some
of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto,
was not arrested and therefore the
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
his person; trial was commenced as
against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, announced on August 10,
1992 that the government has lifted
all foreign exchange restrictions and
it is also reported that Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia said that the
Monetary Board arrived at such
decision (issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of
the Daily Globe of the same date).
The Court has to give full confidence
and
credit
to
the
reported
announcement of the Executive
Department, specially
from
the
highest official of that department;
the Courts are charged with judicial
notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, without introduction of
proof, the announcement published in
at least the two newspapers cited
above which are reputable and of
national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the
Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras,
56 Phil. 520, People vs. Francisco, 56
Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil.
1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61
Phil. 225), among others, it was held
that the repeal of a penal law without
re-enactment extinguishes the right
to prosecute or punish the offense
committed under the old law and if
the law repealing the prior penal law
fails to penalize the acts which
constituted the offense defined and
penalized in the repealed law, the
repealed law carries with it the
deprivation
of
the
courts
of
jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence persons charged with
violations of the old law prior to its
repeal. Under the aforecited decisions
this doctrine applies to special laws
and not only to the crimes punishable

in the Revised Penal Code, such as

the Import Control Law. The Central
Bank Circular No. 960 under which
the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is
considered as a penal law because
violation thereof is penalized with
specific reference to the provision of
Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which
penalizes violations of Central Bank
Circular No. 960, produces the effect
cited in the Supreme Court decisions
and since according to the decisions
that repeal deprives the Court of
jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio
dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as
a forestated in the caption, for not to
do so opens this Court to charges of
trying cases over which it has no
more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of
Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment,
private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise,
after the appellate court gave due course to the petition,
private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite
notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show
cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue.
Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August
13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959
to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio,
i.e., without any motion to dismiss
filed by counsel for the accused,
without giving an opportunity for the
prosecution to be heard, and solely
on the basis of newspaper reports
announcing that the President has
lifted
all
foreign
exchange
restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the
publication required by law in order
that the enactment can become
effective and binding. Laws take
effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation unless it is
otherwise
provided
(Section
1,
Executive Order No. 200). The full
text of CB Circular 1353, series of
1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing
Foreign Exchange Regulation" was
published in the August 27, 1992
issue of the Manila Chronicle, the
Philippine Star and the Manila
Bulletin. Per certification of the CB
Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular
No. 1353 took effect on September
2....

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 26

Considering that respondent judge

admittedly had not seen the official
text of CB Circular No. 1353, he was
in no position to rule judiciously on
whether CB Circular No. 960, under
which the accused Mrs. Marcos is
charged, was already repealed by CB
Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision
would have readily shown that the
repeal of the regulations on non-trade
foreign exchange transactions is not
absolute, as there is a provision that
with respect to violations of former
regulations that are the subject of
pending actions or investigations,
they shall be governed by the
regulations existing at the time the
cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion
that
he
has
lost
jurisdiction over the criminal cases is
precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited
the filing of a motion to dismiss by
the accused, and given opportunity
for
the
prosecution
to
comment/oppose the same, his
resolution would have been the result
of deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact
can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters
which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge
of men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable
of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts

which are universally known, and which may be found in

encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are
judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal
notoriety and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion
and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of
foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and
cannot be considered of common knowledge or of
general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence
dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute
before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A
law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a
fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it
was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was
not yet in force at the time the improvident order of
dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on
September 1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign
exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of
residents arising from non-trade and trade transactions.
Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB
Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions
in Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318
insofar as they are not inconsistent
with, or contrary to the provisions of
this Circular, shall remain in full force
and effect: Provided, however, that
any regulation on non-trade foreign
exchange transactions which has
been repealed, amended or modified
by this Circular, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or
investigations,
shall
not
be
considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are
concerned, it being understood that
as to such pending actions or
investigations,
the
regulations
existing at the time the cause of
action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers
only to the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the
eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of
CB Circular No. 960. Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is
deemed repealed by the new circular and since the
former is not covered by the saving clause in the latter,
there is no more basis for the charges involved in the
criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the
same. The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular
No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 27

trade foreign transactions which has been repealed,

amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
not be considered repealed insofar as such pending
actions or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of the
circular are clear and unambiguous and leave no room
for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the
eleven cases had already been arraigned, had pleaded
not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960,
and said cases had already been set for trial when
Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial
court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing
of the cases in spite of the existence of Circular No.
1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a
little more carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he
would have readily perceived and known that Circular
No. 1318 also contains a substantially similar saving
clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section
111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All
existing provisions of Circulars 365,
960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the
second paragraph of Section 68 of
Circular 1028, as well as all other
existing Central Bank rules and
regulations or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with or contrary to
the provisions of this Circular, are
hereby
repealed
or
modified
accordingly: Provided, however, that
regulations, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall be considered
repealed insofar as such pending
actions
or
investigations
are
concerned, it being understood that
as to such pending actions or
investigations,
the
regulations
existing at the time the cause of
action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted
that although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No.
960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all
cases covered by the old regulations which were then
pending at the time of the passage of the new
regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No.
1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such
a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge. 20 This means that a judge should
not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but
should do so in such a manner as to be free from any
suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law
in order that he can competently construe and enforce
the law, it is more important that he should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before him
should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not
enough that he decides cases without bias and
favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself

of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover

inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not
only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in
disposing of controverted cases, judges should show
their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion
of arbitrary conclusion, promote confidence in their
intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to
the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that
his duty is the application of general law to particular
instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of
men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he
may personally consider substantial justice in a
particular case and disregards the general law as he
knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have
detrimental consequences beyond the immediate
controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23
These are immutable principles that go into the very
essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no
reason why they should not be duly considered in the
present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no
need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the
reason that the public announcement made by the
President in several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute,
without qualification, and immediately effective, is
beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, respondent is supposed to be wellversed in the elementary legal mandates on the
publication of laws before they take effect. It is
inconceivable that respondent should insist on an
altogether different and illogical interpretation of an
established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his
own personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his
indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even
to give the appearance of catering to the at-times
human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He
having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises,
this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in
good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or
erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte
the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to
quash having been filed by the accused, and without at
least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on
oral argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary
due process to the Government but is palpably indicative
of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily
dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license for
abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such
professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of
the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its
right
to
due
process
of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of
complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to
dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 28

without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably

opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality
for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may
have evaluated changes in the factual situation and
legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no
chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong
evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right
to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the
fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and
implications of the President's announcement, as by his
own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should
dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately
refrained from requiring the prosecution to comment
thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent
judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could
have been given? That the President was talking
'through his hat' and should not be believed? That I
should wait for the publication of a still then nonexistent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this
ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal
scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he
should have the patience and circumspection to give the
opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if
he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A
display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of
the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very
least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with
unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven
cases, and thereby rendered his actuation highly
dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of
respondent judge could have seriously and substantially
affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, considering that
the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without
the consent of said accused. This could have spawned
legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal
proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of
Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved
the day for the People since in the absence of
jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this
point, and as a caveat to trial courts against falling into
the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have
heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial
court's judgment of dismissal or
acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in
criminal
cases
is
denied
due
process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of
a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process
is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are

ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the

violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue . . . which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due
notice, never submitted either her comment on or an
answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the
Court of Appeals, nor was double jeopardy invoked in her
defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that
the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and
erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is
a prominent public figure with a record of influence and
power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and
suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to
the consequent although undeserved discredit of the
entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly
unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has
acted without malice, he failed to observe in the
performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and
care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of
any public service. Negligence and ignorance are
inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which
cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and
even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the
law applied, it nevertheless results logically and
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner,
in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment
filed by respondent judge reveals that no substantial
argument has been advanced in plausible justification of
his act. He utterly failed to show any legal, factual, or
even equitable justification for the dismissal of the
eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious
submissions therein do not speak well of respondent and
cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On
this point, it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts
from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law
imputed to me, it is said that I issued
the Order dismissing the eleven (11)
cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
on the basis of newspaper reports
referred to in paragraph 2 of the
letter complaint without awaiting the
official publication of the Central Bank
Circular. Ordinarily a Central Bank
Circular/Resolution must be published
in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, but
the lifting of "all foreign exchange
controls" was announced by the
President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the
Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the
government has lifted ALL foreign
exchange controls," and in the words
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 29

of the same date "The government

yesterday LIFTED the LAST remaining
restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both
quotations supplied) not only the
President made the announcement
but also the Central Bank Governor
Jose
Cuisia
joined
in
the
announcement by saying that "the
Monetary Board arrived at the
decision after noting how the "partial
liberalization" initiated early this year
worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE
lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, there was no
need to await the publication of the
repealing circular of the Central Bank.
The purpose of requiring publication
of laws and administrative rules
affecting the public is to inform the
latter as to how they will conduct
their affairs and how they will
conform to the laws or the rules. In
this particular case, with the total
lifting of the controls, there is no need
to await publication. It would have
been different if the circular that in
effect repealed Central Bank Circular
No. 960, under which the accused
was charged in the cases dismissed
by me, had provided for penalties
and/or modified the provisions of said
Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the
lifting of controls was not yet in force
when I dismissed the cases but it
should be noted that in the report of
the two (2) newspapers aforequoted,
the President's announcement of the
lifting of controls was stated in the
present perfect tense (Globe) or past
tense (Inquirer). In other words, it has
already
been
lifted;
the
announcement did not say that the
government INTENDS to lift all foreign
exchange restrictions but instead
says that the government "has
LIFTED all foreign exchange controls,"
and in the other newspaper cited
above,
that
"The
government
yesterday lifted the last remaining
restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions". The lifting of the last
remaining
exchange
regulations
effectively cancelled or repealed
Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief
Executive, publicly announced the
lifting of all foreign exchange
regulations. The President has within
his control directly or indirectly the
Central Bank of the Philippines, the
Secretary of Finance being the
Chairman of the Monetary Board
which decides the policies of the
Central Bank.

No official bothered to correct or

qualify the President's announcement
of August 10, published the following
day, nor made an announcement that
the lifting of the controls do not apply
to cases already pending, not until
August 17 (the fourth day after my
Order, and the third day after report
of said order was published) and after
the President said on August 17,
reported in the INQUIRER's issue of
August 18, 1992, that the "new
foreign exchange rules have nullified
government cases against Imelda R.
Marcos, telling reporters that the
charges against the widow of former
President Marcos "have become moot
and academic" because of new
ruling(s) which allow free flow of
currency in and out of the country"
(Note, parenthetically, the reference
to "new rules" not to "rules still to be
drafted").
The
INQUIRER
report
continues: "A few hours later,
presidential spokeswoman Annabelle
Abaya
said,
RAMOS
(sic)
had
"corrected himself'." "He had been
belatedly advised by the Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice
Secretary Franklin Drilon that the
Monetary Board Regulation excluded
from its coverage all criminal cases
pending in court and such a position
shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs.
Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in
making the August 10 announcement
(published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17
announcement, SUPRA, and thus I
should have relied on the Presidential
announcements, and there is basis to
conclude that the President was at
the very least ILL-SERVED by his
financial and legal advisers, because
no one bothered to advise the
President
to
correct
his
announcements, not until August 17,
1992, a few hours after the President
had made another announcement as
to the charges against Imelda Marcos
having been rendered moot and
academic. The President has a lot of
work to do, and is not, to my
knowledge, a financier, economist,
banker or lawyer. It therefore
behooved his subalterns to give him
timely (not "belated") advice, and
brief him on matters of immediate
and far-reaching concerns (such as
the lifting of foreign exchange
controls, designed, among others to
encourage the entry of foreign
investments). Instead of rescuing the
Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors
in the latter's announcement, these
advisers have chosen to toss the

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 30

blame for the consequence of their

failing to me, who only acted on the
basis of announcements of their
Chief, which had become of public
knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume
and expect that respondent judge is possessed with
more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to
merit his appointment as a presiding judge in the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the
nature of the arguments and the kind of logic that
respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof.
This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this Court
reacted thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged
for acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular
No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was
apprehended with US$355,349.00 while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State
must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and
benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the
return of US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on
the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts
such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein
was ordered dismissed from the government service for
gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge,
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance
of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or
judgment when he granted bail to an accused charged
with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and
thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case
allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court
as one "who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain
for due process and the rule of law, applies the law
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays
bias and impartiality," was dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was
also dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the
law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name
of the complainant, without affording due process to the
latter and other interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in
the service was dismissed after he acquitted all the
accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of
firearms, on the ground that there was no proof of
malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to

violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross

ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost
deliberate and tantamount to knowingly rendering an
incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and
considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel
T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, such dismissal to carry with
it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement
benefits,
and
disqualification
from
reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST
immediately from rendering any judgment or order, or
continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever,
effective upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges
are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous.
Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has
been held to be protected official activity. Although a
decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition,
absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The
rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the
protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might
become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be
subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to
be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this
Court has repeatedly held that . . . it is a fundamental rule of long
standing that a judicial officer when
required to exercise his judgment or
discretion is not criminally liable for
any error he commits provided he
acts in good faith, that in the absence
of malice or any wrongful conduct . . .
the
judge
cannot
be
held
administratively responsible . . . for
no one, called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible
in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively
accountable
for
every erroneous ruling or decision he

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 31

renders . . . would be nothing short of

harassment or would make his
position unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal,
or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot
be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by
him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
5
It is a general principle of the highest importance to
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. This concept of
judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public
policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." 6 This being settled
doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant
case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of
Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of
the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated
valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed
sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged
with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven
(11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of
Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for
Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions
after President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was
published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign
exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues,
particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the
circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent
judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which
reversal has now become final for failure of the accused
to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused
except that complainants had to avail of a judicial
remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make
respondent judge liable administratively, much more
civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the
judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this
regard may exist only when the error appears to be
deliberate or in bad faith. 9

Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge,

first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the
public announcement made by the President in several
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign
exchange
controls
is
total,
absolute,
without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second,
for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases
without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty,
not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith
and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for
I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that
there really is no need to await the publication of
Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that
he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not
is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the
eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous
though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad
faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a
necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It
is an elementary principle in procedural law and
statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law
deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of
the person charged under the old law cannot be had and
the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith
should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith
means that the motive that actuated the conduct in
question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is,
that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive.
16
Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the
criminal charges against accused have been eliminated
and thus strikes down the information and consequently
dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be
criminally, civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting
a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and
promulgation of an unjust decision from being held
accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise
that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized
the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the
remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as
has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the
defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the
office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 32

of lower court judges - which does not necessarily make

them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was
indeed in bad faith, he should have given the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a fullblown trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of
double jeopardy would have been proper and the
accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v.
Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the conclusions of
the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that
"[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction against
a judge simply because he has committed an error in
deciding the case against such person, when such error
can be elevated to a higher court for review and
correction, the action of such person can only be
suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on
the petition before the appellate court, and consequently
invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy
of the assailed order, 19 may be indulging in needless
speculation. And to imply that the influence of the
accused who is a prominent public figure brought about
the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the
records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can
hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his
dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as
it turned out when the reversal of his decision by the
appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as
even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal
advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed
by his administration against the accused, was quoted
as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental"
beneficiary of the foreign exchange deregulation policy
of his administration. 20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos
further said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to
everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government
against Mrs. Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have
become moot and academic because of the new
regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board,
but that is to her advantage." 21 Where the conclusions
of the judge in his decision are not without logic or
reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or
grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not
only be pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the
cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes
suspicion especially from the successful appellant who
feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his
duty is the application of general law to a particular
instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of
men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may
personally consider substantial justice in a particular
case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a
judge under the sanction of law." 24 As it has been said,
he must interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with
existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own
personality, character, convictions, values, experiences

and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and

unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes,
he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is
bound to apply, all having profound influence on his
eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the
Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of
judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we
please. None the less, we can never see them with any
eyes except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower
court judges, if not reversed by the Court of Appeals and
this Court, have continued to set new trails in
jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has
been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely
unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this
Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective
dispensers of everyday justice.

Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is

being administratively charged.

In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond

reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the
assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and
deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.

In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he

was charged with a litany of administrative cases, six (6)
in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of
the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all the
charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was
found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite
familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
(with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication
of controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even
disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the
law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and
displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed,
"[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in
office and to continue to discharge the functions and
duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of
the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service."
There is nothing in the records of the instant case which
shows
that
respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern
for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which
breed manifest and irreversible injustice.

Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re

Horilleno, 26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings
before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be
in their nature highly penal in character and to be
governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal
cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice
of this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge
Ugbinar 27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic
concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in
. . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this character
being in their nature highly penal, the charge must,
therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To
paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of
the alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of the
law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less
beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard
has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent
decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and
the burden is on the one challenging the same to prove
want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard"
required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case
failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of
the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those
cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, 29
respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free,
leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief
against the accused, the former likewise ordered the
release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, respondent
judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the
law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and
serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency,
and was consequently dismissed from the service. And,
failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative
case, respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this
time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4)
different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally
the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly
demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4)
times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent or
grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit
to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former Judge

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 33

In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found

respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust
order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who
was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and
immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the
criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for
granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the
basis of an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by
the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the
actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are
far worse than the complained indiscretions of herein
respondent Judge.

And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent

aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to
abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of
this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open
defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not
only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also
of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the
interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely
imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge who
entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects
prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted
allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of
the congressman who "sponsored" the appointment of
respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this Court
imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after
he improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case
for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And,
still
in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed
against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be
condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to
produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that
he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that
the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro

was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a

disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal
is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from
the records that the respondent's assailed decision was
inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose,
and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order,
dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not
proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the
challenged order may curtail the independence of judges
and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to
exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for
expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants
may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly
and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions,
but these are necessary evils which must be endured to
some extent lest judicial independence and the growth
of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the
luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his
decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and
independence. And, while this Court may slightly bend
backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and
cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step
forward and take the lead to defend him against
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and
disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire
judicial system as well. As champion at other times
tormentor of trial and appellate judges, this Court
must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in
dismissing administrative complaints which serve no
other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges
from the service, the Court must be circumspect and
deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their
independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and
professional credentials which, experience shows, are no
longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all,
he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It
is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic
evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of
ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after
all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges
are not accountable by way of either civil suit or
discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous.
Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has
been held to be protected official activity. Although a
decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition,
absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The
rule is consistent with the concept of judicial
independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the
protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might
become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 34

subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to

be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this
Court has repeatedly held that . . . it is a fundamental rule of long
standing that a judicial officer when
required to exercise his judgment or
discretion is not criminally liable for
any error he commits provided he
acts in good faith, that in the absence
of malice or any wrongful conduct . . .
the
judge
cannot
be
held
administratively responsible . . . for
no one, called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible
in his judgment, and to hold a judge
administratively
accountable
for
every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders . . . would be nothing short of
harassment or would make his
position unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal,
or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot
be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by
him in good faith. 4 As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
5
It is a general principle of the highest importance to
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself. This concept of
judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public
policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary." 6 This being settled
doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant
case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of
Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of
the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated
valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed
sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged
with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and
violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct 7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven
(11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of
Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for
Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions
after President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was
published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign
exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and
disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.

With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues,

particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority
on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the
circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent
judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which
reversal has now become final for failure of the accused
to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused
except that complainants had to avail of a judicial
remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make
respondent judge liable administratively, much more
civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the
judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious,
deliberate or done in bad faith. 8 Plainly said, fault in this
regard may exist only when the error appears to be
deliberate or in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge,
first, for insisting that "there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the
public announcement made by the President in several
newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign
exchange
controls
is
total,
absolute,
without
qualification, and immediately effective," 10 and, second,
for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases
without even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty,
not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some
interested or sinister motive. 12 It implies breach of faith
and willful failure to respond to plain and well
understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
means breach of a known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for
I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that
there really is no need to await the publication of
Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that
he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to
await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not
is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the
eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous
though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad
faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a
necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It
is an elementary principle in procedural law and
statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law
deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of
the person charged under the old law cannot be had and
the action should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith
should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith
means that the motive that actuated the conduct in
question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is,
that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive.
16
Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the
criminal charges against accused have been eliminated
and thus strikes down the information and consequently

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 35

dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be

criminally, civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting
a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and
promulgation of an unjust decision from being held
accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise
that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the administration of justice can be infallible.
State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19
September 1994)

the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and

discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice
is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in
the negative
Facts:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel
of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the
prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in
violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The
respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the
basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of national
circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all
foreign exchange restrictions. The respondents decision
was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive Department in the
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby
divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the
pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He
further contends that the announcement of the President
as published in the newspaper has made such fact a
public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take
judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge
erred in taking judicial notice on matters he purported to
be a public knowledge based merely on the account of
the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the
foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of
inexcusable ignorant of the law not to accord due
process to the prosecutors who were already at the
stage of presenting evidence thereby depriving the
government the right to be heard. The judge also
exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial
notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the
newspaper which is a matter that has not yet been
officially in force and effect of the law.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in taking
judicial notice on the statement of the president
lifting the foreign exchange restriction published
in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for
gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his
assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication

of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the

Presidents announcement in the newspaper, believing
that the public announcement is absolute and without
qualification and is immediately effective and such
matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a
judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory
requirement that a new law should be published for 15
days in a newspaper of general circulation before its
effectivity. When the Presidents statement was
published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of
not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus
it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this
matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge
and is not based on the public knowledge that the law
requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court to take judicial notice, three material
requisites should be present:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that should be assumed as judicially known
must be on such notoriety that such fact cannot be
disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where
the personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to
the judicial notice of the court. The common knowledge
contemplated by the law where the court can take
judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men
generally in the course of ordinary experiences that are
accepted as true and one that involves unquestioned
demonstration. The court ruled that the information he
obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay
evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law
that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the
case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard
and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal
of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case
motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to
take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and
groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all
times.

Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T.

Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose
L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila
G.R. No. 156052
March 7, 2007
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang
Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on
November 28, 2001. and it became effective on
December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called
Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron
and Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of
understanding with the oil companies in which they
agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the
most viable and practicable option. Under the
memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and
the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to
continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down program.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum
of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of
understanding was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30,
2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30,
2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13,
s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory
legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not
the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 36

the resolutions ratifying

Ordinance No. 8027.

it

can

amend

or

repeal

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon

respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.
On the other hand assuming that the terms of the
memorandum of understanding were contradictory with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR

ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as
Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social
Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. 2 Respondent mayor
approved the ordinance on November 28, 2001. 3 It
became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police
power delegated to local government units, a principle
described as the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 37

society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof

which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general
welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well
as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of
land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south,
Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan
in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero
de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The
area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River,
Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street,
are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a
period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of
this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the
operation of businesses which are hereby in
consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under
Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity
of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the
area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down
of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies
agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated
above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this
MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals which shall include, among others, the
immediate
removal/decommissioning
process
of
TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres
and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan
Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program
mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish
joint operations and management, including the
operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities,
consistent with international and domestic technical,
safety, environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to
the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational
terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be
entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 38

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the

safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which
shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES
and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the
sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand,
committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City
Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view
of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall,
consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable
the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited
area resulting from the joint operations and the scale
down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor
the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of
this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national
government shall protect the safety buffer and green
zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal
settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the
Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for
a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. 8
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian
adopted Resolution No. 13 9 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing
Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a
reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for
mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor
Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the
resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory
legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code (RA 7160), 13 to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals
of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to
stay.

Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has

been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. 14
However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance
and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that
the latter has not amended the former. He insists that
the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect
and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from
enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the
MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 3 16 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the performance of the act and it must be
the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the
act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel
compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over
which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function
of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite,
not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the
office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but
to implement that which is already established. Unless
the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus
will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear
legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered
with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in
Manila. It claims to have many members who are
residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and
Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously

hinder the transaction of public business if these officers
were to be permitted in all cases to question the
constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government
from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the
respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to
the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether
the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003
of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms
of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027,
the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on
the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect
only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is
nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the
Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed
the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The
objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of
Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan
Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective
measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City
of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in

previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest. 19
Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the citys ordinances.
Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to
institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes
upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed

by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21

He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 39

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31408

April 22, 1991

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and BORROMEO BROS.
ESTATE, INC., respondents.

Feliberto Leonardo and Benjamin S. Rallon for private

respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
Whether the land in dispute was formed by the action of
the sea or by deposits of soil and sedimentary matter
carried by river currents is the main issue in this case,
which was elevated to the Court by petition for review of
a decision of the Court of Appeals.1
In October 1956 the corporation R. Borromeo Bros.
Estate, Inc. instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Leyte original proceedings2 for confirmation and
registration of title in its favor of a parcel of land fronting
the sea in the coastal town of San Isidro, Leyte with an
area of 130,537 square meters. The application3 alleged
that the land was bounded on the North, East and South
by property of the applicant and on the West by San
Isidro Bay; that it had been formed by accretion of
sediments carried from the highlands by the natural
action of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Rivers when these
overflowed their banks during the rainy season;4 that it
had been publicly, openly, continuously and adversely
possessed by the applicant for 20 years prior to the filing
of the application; and that to the applicant's knowledge
there existed no mortgage, lien or other adverse claim
on the land.5
Two oppositions to the application were filed. One, filed
by the Director of Lands, asserted that the land applied
for was part of the public domain, and that the applicant
or its predecessors-in-interest had no sufficient title to
the land, by way of either composition of possessory
information, or by virtue of open, public, adverse and
continuous possession under claim of ownership since
July 26, 1894.6
The other opposition, filed by the Municipality of San
Isidro, echoed the contention of the Director of Lands
that the land formed part of the public domain, alleging
that it was classified as Timber Block-J, Leyte Project No.
40; denied the applicant's claim of open, adverse,
continuous and exclusive possession and averred that
the land was occupied by other parties who had waived
their claims in favor of said oppositor; and alleged,
further, that it (oppositor) needed the land for municipal
expansion, having in fact adopted resolutions requesting
the Government to reserve the land for that purpose,
and that the applicant had applied for, but had been
denied, a lease of the land after it had been released for
private occupation by the Bureau of Forestry.7
The case was then heard. It would appear that after the
applicant had presented its evidence, it sought and was
allowed to amend its application, which originally alleged
that the land applied for had been formed of alluvium
deposited by the action of the sea,8 in order to allege, as
said appellant's evidence had tended to establish, that
said land had been formed instead from accretions of
soil and sediment carried from higher places by the
currents of the Si-ong and Sinubdan Creeks.
Thereafter, evidence for the oppositors also having been
presented, the Trial Court rendered judgment denying
the application and declaring the land applied for public

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 40

land formed by the action of the sea and not of any

river.9 The applicant then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Trial Court,
sustained the applicant's contention as to the origin of
the land, on that basis declared the land to be private
land of said applicant and decreed its registration in the
applicant's name.10
The Appellate Court's judgment was in turn appealed to
this Court by the Director of Lands who, in the main,
argues that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that
the evidence showed the land to have been formed by
the action of rivers and in not holding the applicant
bound by the averment in its original application that the
land was formed by the natural action of the sea.11
The first assignment of error may be disposed of by the
simple expedient of pointing out that the assailed
"conclusion" of the Court of Appeals is one of fact, not of
law, and is, therefore, beyond the province of this Court
to
review,12
save
in
certain
exceptional
circumstances.13
To dispel any doubts, however, and not to rely solely on
what might appear to some to be a fine distinction,
particularly considering that the finding of the Court of
Appeals on the crucial factual question of how the land
in dispute came into existence conflicts with that of the
Trial Court, this Court has reviewed the available
record14 and finds no sound basis for ascribing any error
to the Appellate Court in its appreciation of the
evidence.
The petitioner's case is anchored on evidence tending to
establish that the Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers whose
currents, according to the private respondent, formed
the land in question from the sediments they carried
were not natural streams, but mere canals dug as part of
an irrigation system; that they had no intrinsic water
sources and in fact dried up during the summer season;
that a survey commissioned by the petitioner itself in
1949 did not indicate their existence on the plan; and
that part of the land is swampy with mangrove trees
growing thereon.15
More persuasive, however, is the countervailing
evidence of the private respondent which consists,
principally, of the testimony of Felix Sablado, a bridge
foreman of the Bureau of Public Highways, and Teofilo
Pacana, overseer of the petitioner's lands. According to
the petitioner's uncontradicted summary of Sablado's
testimony, said witness had undertaken studies of the
Sinubdan and Si-ong Rivers, measuring their depth and
width, the volume of water that they carried, and the
size of the bridges spanning them. He had declared the
Si-ong was more than seven meters deep, while the
Sinubdan had a depth of more than three meters, that
the Filemon Bridge crossing the Si-ong was seven meters
long and four meters wide and the Sinubdan Bridge had
the same dimensions. And under cross-examination, he
had maintained that there is a source of water under the
Filemon Bridge.16 Pacana, for his part, testified that
there is a continuous flow of water in both rivers
throughout the year, and not merely during the rainy
season, as claimed by one of the oppositors' witnesses,
and that while a few mangrove trees grow in the salvage
zone which is far from the land, none are found within
the boundaries of the land itself.17 This is at least partly
confirmed by photographs received in evidence18
showing rice, coconut trees and bamboo groves growing

on the land, and which apparently persuaded the Trial

Court that at least a part of the land had been . . .
transformed (through cultivation by the private
respondent) into a veritable first class rice land.19
The petitioner's argument that accretion, by definition
imperceptible, could hardly account for such an area of
land (more than thirteen hectares) being built up within
a period of six years, hinges upon an unwarrantedly
literal advertence to the testimony of one of the private
respondent's witnesses who declared that the process
took place from 1930 to 1936.20 Assuming that the
witness attested to what he sincerely believed to be the
truth, the possibility of his being mistaken cannot be
discounted because, the age of the rivers in question
never having been established, the process of accretion
through the action of their currents could have started
much earlier than 1930. It is also entirely possible and
reasonably presumable, lacking any proof to the
contrary even granting that accretion started only in
1930, for the land to have grown to thirteen hectares in
the twenty years that followed until 1956 when the
application for registration was filed.
The Court therefore finds no error in the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that the land was formed by accretion
through the action of river currents and belonged to the
private respondent as riparian owner pursuant to Art.
457 of the Civil Code.1wphi1
The Court of Appeals also correctly overruled the
petitioner's contention that the averment in the original
application for registration attributing the origin of the
land to the action of the sea, which averment, with leave
of court, was later superseded by an amendment to the
effect that the land was formed by the action of rivers,
was binding on the private respondent as a judicial
admission. Pleadings that have been amended disappear
from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease
to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be
utilized against the pleader as extra-judicial admissions,
they must, in order to have such effect, be formally
offered in evidence.21 It does not appear that the
original application for registration containing the
averment in question, or that particular averment itself,
was offered or received in evidence for the petitioner in
the Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayo, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 41

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181829

September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the November 5, 2007 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02210
which affirmed with modification the November 28, 2003
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tayug,
Pangasinan, Branch 51. The CA found appellant
Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay his
victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count.
Factual Antecedents:
On November 6, 2002, three Informations were filed
against appellant for the crime of rape. The accusatory
portions of the Informations read:
Crim. Case No. T-3157:
That on or about the 9th day of June, 2002, at dawn, x x
x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused who is the father of complainant, armed with a
bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," 3 a
minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent, to
the damage and prejudice of said "AAA."

Crim. Case No. T-3159:

That on or about the 28th day of September, 1999, at
dawn, at x x x, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused who is the father of complainant, armed
with a bladed weapon, by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one "AAA," a
minor 9 years of age, against her will and consent, to the
damage and prejudice of said "AAA."
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 8353.6
When arraigned on November 14, 2002, appellant
pleaded not guilty to all charges.7
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the appellant
is the father of "AAA." It was likewise agreed that "AAA"
was below 12 years of age when the rape incidents
happened.8 "AAAs" birth and medical certificates were
likewise marked as Exhibits "A" and "C," respectively. 9
Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly. 10
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented "AAA" as its witness. "AAA"
narrated that when she was about 4 years old, her
mother left her in the care of her father, herein
appellant. Since then, she had been living with her
father.
"AAA" claimed that appellant sexually abused her on
September 27 and 28, 1999 and on June 9, 2002. During
her testimony, "AAA" narrated that:
PROS. ULANDAY:
Q Will you please state your name, age and
other personal circumstances?
WITNESS:

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Republic Act 8353.4

A I am "AAA," 13 years old, out-of-school youth,

presently residing at x x x11

Crim. Case No. T-3158:

xxxx

That on or about the 27th day of September, 1999, in

the evening, at x x x, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused who is the father of
complainant, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of
force, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one "AAA," a minor 9 years of age,
against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudicie of said "AAA."

PROS. ULANDAY:

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended by Republic Act 8353.5

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 42

Q Madam Witness, do you still remember

September 27, 1999?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you remember that particular date?
A That was the birthday of my father and the
date when he touched me, sir.

xxxx
Q Who rape[d] you?
A My papa, sir. Witness pointed to the accused.

Q Madam Witness, during the last hearing you

uttered the word "incua na." What do you
mean by that?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

xxxx

Q How long a time did your father [insert] his

penis into your vagina?

PROS. ULANDAY:

A About two minutes, sir.

Q You claimed that your father touched and

used you. How did he begin in touching you?

Q At early dawn of September 28, 1999, what

happened if any, between you and your father?

A He tied me, sir.

A The same, sir.

xxxx

Q What do you mean by the same?

Q What part of your body was x x x tied by

your father?

A That he inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.

A My mouth, sir.

Q Before your father inserted his penis into

your vagina, what did he do, if there was any?

Q What other parts of your body, if there [are]

any?

A He first undressed me, sir.

A My hands and my feet, sir.

Q While he was undressing you what were you

doing, if any?

PROS. ULANDAY:

A I failed to do any, sir.

My witness is crying, your Honor.12

Q Why did you fail to do any?

xxxx

A Because I was afraid, sir.

Q Now, after your father tied you on September

27, 1999, what did he do, if theres any?

Q Why were you afraid at the time?

A He raped me, sir.

COURT:
Q What do you mean by x x x saying he raped
you?
xxxx

A Because he threatened me, sir.

Q How did he [threaten] you?
A That if I would report the matter to anyone
he would kill the person to whom I will report,
sir.
Q Do you remember June 9, 2002 at 3:00
oclock dawn?

A He undressed me, sir.

A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q Why do you remember that particular date?
COURT:
A Because he again raped me, sir.
And we make of record that [witness is now] in
tears.13

Q Who raped you?

xxxx

A My father, sir.

PROS. ULANDAY:

Q In what particular place [were] you raped?

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 43

A In our house, sir.

xxxx
Q You claimed that you were raped by your
father, how did he rape you?

year old boyfriend and that "AAA" only separated from

her boyfriend when she was brought under the care of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development. 20
When asked how old "AAA" was when she allegedly
eloped with her boyfriend, Marcelino answered that
"AAA" was only 13 years old.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A He undressed me, sir.

Q What else did he do aside from undressing
you?
A He poked a knife at me, sir.
Q And after poking a knife at you, what
happened next, if any?
A Then he touched (kinuti) me, sir.
Q What part of your body was touched by your
father?
A My vagina, sir.
Q How did he touch your vagina?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q What happened when he inserted his penis
into your vagina?

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE,
finding
the
accused
SATURNINO
VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of rape, defined and penalized by Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, perpetrated against [his]
daughter on September 27, 1999, September 28, 1999
and June 9, 2002, x x x and as mandated by Article 266B, same Code, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of DEATH for each offense, to indemnify the
complainant "AAA" for damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 per [count], and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.24

A I cried, sir.14
After the presentation of
prosecution rested its case.

The trial court lent credence to the testimony of "AAA."

However, it noted that although it was agreed upon
during the pre-trial that "AAA" was a minor below 12
years of age, the fact remains that "AAA" was 12 years,
six months and 19 days when she was ravished by the
appellant on June 9, 2002. 22 The court below also
observed that "AAA has always been a pathetic child of
oppression, abuse and neglect" and that "[h]er
innocence, tender age, dependence [on appellant] for
survival, and her virtual orphanhood sufficed to qualify
every sexual molestation perpetrated by her father as
rape x x x."23

"AAAs"

testimony,

the

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its first witness. In
his testimony, appellant admitted that "AAA" is his
daughter.15 He also admitted that on September 27 and
28, 1999 and June 9, 2002, he was living in the same
house as "AAA." 16 However, when asked regarding the
rape charges filed against him by his daughter, appellant
denied the same. Thus:
Q And this daughter of your[s] now charge you
[with]
rape
in
Crim.
Case
Nos.
T3157/3158/3159 for allegedly having sexual
intercourse with her against her will and
consent. What can you say against these
charges by your daughter?
A [Those are] not true, sir.17
The defense next presented Marcelino Villanueva
(Marcelino) who testified that he is the father of the
appellant.18 He claimed that "AAA" filed the rape cases
against appellant because the latter forbade her to
entertain suitors.19 Marcelino also alleged that after
appellant was incarcerated, "AAA" eloped with her 20-

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 44

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the appellate court, appellant
claimed that the prosecution failed to present evidence
that would overcome the presumption of his innocence.
Appellant also alleged that the trial court erred in
lending credence to the unrealistic and unnatural
testimony of "AAA." 25 He claimed that it was unusual for
"AAA" not to offer any resistance to the advances
allegedly made by him considering that he was
unarmed. According to the appellant, "AAA" should have
struggled or at least offered some resistance because
she was not completely helpless. 26 Appellant also
suggested that "AAA" must have been coached because
initially, she did not know the acts which constitute rape.
However, during the succeeding hearings, "AAA"
allegedly testified in detail the bestial acts committed
against her.27
Moreover, appellant argued that the prosecution failed to
formally offer in evidence the medical certificate and to
present the doctor who conducted the medical
examination to testify on his findings. 28 Likewise, "AAAs"
birth certificate was not formally offered. Neither did the
Municipal Civil Registrar who allegedly prepared the
same take the witness stand. Thus appellant claimed
that assuming he was indeed guilty of the crimes
charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape
and not qualified rape because the minority of the victim
was not duly established.29 Further, with the passage of

Republic Act No. 9346,

sentenced to death.30

appellant

should

not

be

On the other hand, appellee maintained that "AAAs"

credibility was beyond doubt31 and that it was
unnecessary to offer proof of resistance where the
assailant exercised moral ascendancy against his victim,
as in this case.32 Appellee insisted that the crimes
committed were three counts of qualified, and not
simple, rape considering that "AAA" was a minor and the
offender was her father,33 and that the parties had
already stipulated during pre-trial as regards the age of
the victim.34
On November 5, 2007, the appellate court rendered its
Decision disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
28 November 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan, Branch 51 in Crim. Case Nos. T-3157, T-3158
and
T-3159
finding
accused-appellant
Saturnino
Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of qualified rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death imposed on
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count
of qualified rape, without eligibility for parole under Act
No. 4103, as amended. Further, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the private complainant/victim ["AAA"],
for each count of qualified rape, the amounts of Php
75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 75,000.00 as moral
damages and Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.35
The appellate court found no reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of "AAA." 36
Although there were occasions when "AAA" would not
immediately answer the questions propounded to her,
the CA opined that it was because she was either
distressed in recounting her horrible experiences or in
tears.37 The appellate court likewise considered the fact
that "AAA" was only 13 years old when she testified on
her harrowing experiences.38
The appellate court likewise brushed aside appellants
contention that "AAA" did not offer any resistance.
According to the CA, appellants moral ascendancy over
"AAA" substitutes for violence or intimidation. 39
The CA also concluded that even without the medical
certificate, appellant could still be held liable for three
counts of rape. His conviction could rest exclusively on
the credible testimony of "AAA" and the medical
certificate would only be corroborative evidence. 40 Anent
the birth certificate, the CA recalled that during pre-trial,
the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
appellant had already been stipulated upon. Hence, the
said elements have been sufficiently alleged in the
Informations and proven during trial.41
Finally, the CA held that appellants denial is intrinsically
weak and self-serving especially considering "AAAs"
credible and straightforward testimony. 42
Our Ruling

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 45

Both the appellant and the appellee opted not to file

their supplemental briefs.43
The appeal is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we must state that we entertain no doubt
that appellant thrice raped his daughter, "AAA." We
examined the records and we find "AAAs" testimony
convincing and straightforward. We therefore have no
reason to reverse or modify the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of the victims testimony, more so in
this case where the said findings were affirmed by the
CA.
We also agree with the ruling of the appellate court that
appellant could be convicted of rape even without the
medical certificate. "In rape cases, the accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided
the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things."44 As stated above, "AAAs" testimony was
credible and convincing. As such, appellants conviction
could rest solely on it. The medical certificate would only
serve as corroborative evidence.
We, however, agree with the appellant that both the
medical certificate and "AAAs" birth certificate, although
marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have
been considered by the trial court and the CA because
they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: "The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified."
In this case, we note that after the marking of the
exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not formally
offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in
evidence. In fact, the prosecution rested its case after
presenting the testimony of "AAA" without formally
offering any documentary exhibit at all.
Our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha 45 is
instructive, thus:
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial
matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any evidence
that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
xxxx
The Rules of Court [provide] that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. A formal offer is necessary because judges are
mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by
the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial
judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other
hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously scrutinized
by the trial court.

xxxx
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the
testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have
been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or
trial but which were not formally offered in evidence
cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither
can such unrecognized proof be assigned any
evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that
there is a significant distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is
done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests
its case. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that
it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It
must be emphasized that any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court must
formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is
excluded and rejected.46ten.lihpwal
We reiterated the above ruling in Dizon v. Court of Tax
Appeals47 where one of the issues presented was
whether the Court of Tax Appeals and the CA gravely
abused their discretion "in allowing the admission of the
pieces of evidence which were not formally offered" by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue.48 In finding the case
impressed with merit, the Court held that:
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically
described as a court of record. As cases filed before it
are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every
minute aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary
value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by
the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require
that these documents must be formally offered before
the CTA. x x x
xxxx
x x x [T]he presentation of the BIRs evidence is not a
mere procedural technicality which may be disregarded
considering that it is the only means by which the CTA
may ascertain and verify the truth of BIRs claims
against the Estate. The BIRs failure to formally offer
these pieces of evidence, despite CTAs directives, is
fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact
that not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR
to justify such fatal omission. This, we take against the
BIR.49
We are not unaware that there is an exception to the
above-stated rule. In People v. Mate, 50 Silvestre Mate
(Mate) was charged with the crime of "Kidnapping for
Ransom with Murder and Frustrated Murder." 51 During
arraignment, he entered a plea of "guilty." The court
then propounded clarificatory questions to determine
whether the accused understood the consequences of
his plea. Immediately thereafter, the trial court
promulgated its decision finding the accused guilty as
charged and sentenced him to death. 52 It was only after
the rendition of the judgment that the trial court
conducted hearings for the reception of the
prosecutions evidence.53

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 46

From the prosecutions evidence, it would appear that

during the investigation, Mate voluntarily made extrajudicial statements as contained in Exhibits "A," "B," and
"J." Also, after his conviction, he appeared as witness for
the prosecution against his co-accused where he
affirmed his extra-judicial statements in Exhibits "A," "B,"
and "J." However, the state prosecutor failed to formally
offer said exhibits.
In debunking the defenses contentions that the trial
court erred in rendering a judgment of conviction on
Mate even before the prosecution could present its
evidence, and in considering the exhibits which were not
formally offered, the Court held thus:
The defense contends that the trial court committed a
serious error in rendering judgment of conviction
immediately after Mate had pleaded guilty to the crime
charged on the basis of his plea of guilty and before
receiving any evidence. While the trial court committed
an error in rendering judgment immediately after the
accused had pleaded guilty, and, thereafter, conducted
hearings for the reception of the evidence for the
prosecution, such an irregularity, is insufficient to justify
the setting aside of the judgment of conviction,
considering that it is supported by the judicial and extrajudicial confessions of the accused and by other
evidence. x x x
xxxx
The defense questions also the failure of the state
prosecutor Cornelio Melendres to make a formal offer of
his exhibits, although they have been marked and
identified. Such an oversight appears trivial because the
entire evidence for the prosecution is recorded. Even
without the exhibits which have been incorporated into
the records of the case, the prosecution can still
establish the case because the witnesses properly
identified those exhibits and their testimonies are
recorded.
Exhibits "A", "B", and "J" are all admissible against Mate
because it appears with clarity that he voluntarily and
spontaneously gave those narrations without compulsion
from anybody. In fact, . . . when he testified against Ben
Bohol he affirmed those narrations again.54
In Mato v. Court of Appeals,55 we concretized the above
ruling by holding that evidence, although not formally
offered in evidence, may be "admitted and considered
by the trial court provided the following requirements
are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly
identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of the
case."56 In Ramos v. Dizon,57 we deemed the exhibits to
have been incorporated into the records because they
had been "presented and marked during the pre-trial of
the case."58 Likewise, the first requisite was deemed
satisfied because one of the parties therein explained
the contents of the exhibits when interrogated by the
respondents counsel.59
In the instant case, we find the rulings espoused in
People v. Mate,60 Mato v. Court of Appeals,61 and Ramos
v. Dizon62 not applicable. Thus, we find that both the trial
court and the CA erred in allowing the admission of
"AAAs" medical certificate and birth certificate. The

records would show that the lone witness for the

prosecution did not identify the said exhibits or explain
their contents. When "AAA" was placed on the witness
stand, she merely stated that she was 13 years old. No
reference was ever made to her birth certificate. The
same is true with the medical certificate. After the
marking during the pre-trial, the prosecution did not
refer to it in any stage of the proceedings. Neither did it
present the doctor who prepared the same.
Moreover, appellants admission during the pre-trial that
"AAA" was a minor below 12 years of age 63 would not
help the prosecutions case. First, the trial court found
this admission inaccurate as in fact, "AAA" was already
above 12 years of age when the rape incident transpired
on June 9, 2002. Second and more important, appellants
admission during pre-trial is not admissible as it violates
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which explicitly
provides that: "All agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced
in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel,
otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. x x
x." In People v. Chua Uy,64 we held that:
Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON
admitted during the pre-trial that Exhibits "D" to "D-4",
inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence
against him because the Joint Order was not signed by
RAMON and his counsel. Section 4 of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court expressly provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No
agreement or admission made or entered during the pretrial conference shall be used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed by his
counsel.
Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial
order must be signed not only by him but his counsel as
well. The purpose of this requirement is to further
safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident
or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his
counsel may have entered into without his knowledge,
as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial
conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the
accused of the facts agreed upon.
In this case, records would show that the Pre-trial Order
was not signed by both appellant and his counsel.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did
not present any satisfactory evidence to prove "AAAs"
minority. "In the prosecution of criminal cases, x x x,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused
is
charged
must
be
established.
Qualifying
circumstances or special qualifying circumstances must
be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance
of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the victims
minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant
must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt."65
In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of
three counts of simple rape66 the penalty for which is

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 47

reclusion perpetua for each count. Accordingly, the

awards of civil indemnity must be reduced to P50,000.00
and moral damages to P50,000.00. Finally, the award of
exemplary damages is proper. "Exemplary damages may
be awarded in criminal cases as part of civil liability if
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.
Relationship
as
an
alternative
circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
is considered aggravating in the crime of rape." 67 In this
case, the aggravating circumstance of relationship was
duly established. Appellant himself admitted when he
testified in open court that he is "AAAs" father.
However, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence. 68
WHEREFORE, we find appellant Saturnino Villanueva
GUILTY of three counts of simple rape and accordingly
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify his victim "AAA" the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
each count.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

RULING
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be
proved as fact in order to employ them. The plaintiff was
not able to prove the applicability of the laws of
Singapore that he cited to his case. Under the principle
of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved
as facts it will be presumed as the same as ours. Hence,
Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioners
action for damages due to illegal dismissal has already
prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more
than four (4) years after the effective date has
prescribed.

FACTS
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore
Airlines Limited on 1979. However because of the
recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982,
Defendant Company initiated cost-cutting measures
such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the
plaintiff. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal
dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited
Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in the
Singapore Airlines Ltd.
ISSUES
1.
2.

Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be

applied in this case.
Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on
the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 48

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV
34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28,
1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent
appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B.
Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila,
applied for employment with defendant
company [herein private respondent] through
its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual
personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
offering a contract of employment as an
expatriate B-707 captain for an original period
of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and
commenced working on January 20, 1979. After
passing the six-month probation period,
plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective
July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an
extension of his two-year contract to five (5)
years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20,
1984 subject to the terms and conditions set
forth in the contract of employment, which the
latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on
August 24, 1980, while in command of a flight,
committed a noise violation offense at the
Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff apologized.
(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail
scraping incident wherein the tail of the aircraft
scraped or touched the runway during landing.
He was suspended for a few days until he was
investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy.
He was reprimanded.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776

February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 49

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to

take a course of A-300 conversion training at
Aeroformacion,
Toulouse,
France
at
dependant's expense. Having successfully
completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and
subsequently appointed as captain of the A300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in
flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E"
and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a
recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the
Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p.
11). Consequently, defendant informed its
expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance
leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)

Realizing that the recession would not be for a

short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It
did not, however, immediately terminate it's A300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for
possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among
the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff
was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed
plaintiff of his termination effective November
1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3)
months salary in lieu of three months notice
(Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could
not uproot his family on such short notice,
plaintiff requested a three-month notice to
afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues
for reconsideration and retention. Defendant
gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted
a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor
Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on
jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract
of services before the court a quo (Complaint,
pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a
motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction over the instant
case. Defendant contends that the complaint is
for illegal dismissal together with a money
claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and
that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore,
all other aspects of his employment contract
and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus,
defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff
claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in
a complaint are the natural consequences
flowing from a breach of an obligation and not
labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil
dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is
beyond the field of specialization of labor
arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded
not on the employee's dismissal per se but on
the manner of said dismissal and the
consequence thereof, the case falls under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied
defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid).
The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. (p. 95 ibid.)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its

answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in
its motion to dismiss and further arguing that
plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and
estoppel from instituting the complaint and
that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its
decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and
against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited,
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts
of
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine
currency at the current rate of exchange at the
time of payment, as and for unearned
compensation with legal interest from the filing
of the complaint until fully paid;
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine
currency at the current rate of exchange at the
time of payment; and the further amounts of
P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint
until fully paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages;
P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the
respondent court and raised the issues of jurisdiction,
validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the
decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages
due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiffappellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than
four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's
action
has
already
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is
hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions
for reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following
queries:

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 50

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT

WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES
ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF
EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN
EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED
PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING
LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our
concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court
rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the
termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant's
failure to show which specific laws of Singapore
Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of
the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws
to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when
defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5 On this
matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue
of jurisdiction.6
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is
one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil
Code. According to him, his termination of employment
effective November 1, 1982, was based on an
employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his
action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in
said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate
court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only
four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded
that the action for illegal dismissal originally filed before
the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional
Trial Court, had already prescribed.
In our view, neither Article 11447 nor Article 11468 of the
Civil Code is here pertinent. What is applicable is Article
291 of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 291. Money claims. All money claims
arising from employee-employer relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code
shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.
xxx

xxx

xxx

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 51

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this

one has long been decided by this Court. In illegal
dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive
period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be
invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of
general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a
SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from
employee-employer relations.9
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10
where the money claim was based on a written contract,
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code
does not limit its application only to "money
claims specifically recoverable under said
Code" but covers all money claims arising from
an
employee-employer
relations"
(Citing
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721,
764 [1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
It should be noted further that Article 291 of
the Labor Code is a special law applicable to
money claims arising from employer-employee
relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one
designed therefore should prevail." (Citing
Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157
SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non
derogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the
appellate court's conclusion that petitioner's action for
damages due to illegal termination filed again on
January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has
already prescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due
to illegal termination was filed by plaintiffappelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than
four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly,
plaintiff-appellee's
action
has
already
prescribed.
We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil
Code but on which sets the prescription period at three
(3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled when he filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor
Relations Commission. However, this claim deserves
scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In
Olympia International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we
held that "although the commencement of a civil action
stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by
the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as
though no action had been commenced at all." 12

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the

company due to retrenchment was valid, the appellate
court found that the employment contract of petitioner
allowed for pre-termination of employment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals when it said,
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force
of law between the parties. From the moment
the same is perfected, the parties are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly
stipulated
but
also
to
all
consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the
offer of employment, he was bound by the
terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination
by giving three months written notice or by
payment of three months salary. Such provision
is clear and readily understandable, hence,
there is no room for interpretation.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he

is not bound by the provisions of the
Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto,
deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed,
he applied for membership with the Singapore
Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the
signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As
such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from
questioning the legality of the said agreement
or any proviso contained therein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show
that respondent court's decision is amply supported by
evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the
reason for the retrenchment:
When defendant-appellant was faced with the
world-wide recession of the airline industry
resulting in a slow down in the company's
growth particularly in the regional operation
(Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It
had no choice but to adopt cost cutting
measures, such as cutting down services,
number of frequencies of flights, and reduction
of the number of flying points for the A-300
fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a
result, defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300
pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it
found to be in excess of what is reasonably
needed.14
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal
basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from
employment was for an authorized cause, for which he
was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by
respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of
discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent
appellate court.1wphi1.nt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is
AFFIRMED.

EVIDENCE
AGUSTIN, E.P. | 52

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.