Pavel

Sevostyano\>

Before

A-Nazi
Invasion
in

Soviet Diplomacy
September 1939-June 1941

BUS
PROGRESS publishers

MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian by

David Skvirsky
Designed by Vladimir Solovyov

CONTENTS

naBeji CeBOCTbHHOB

HEPh^ PHTTIEPOBCKHM HAIUECTBMEM

'CoBeTCKasi annaoMaTiui
b ceuTsiGpe 1939 r.-iiioHe
I9-H

Ha

qhujiu&ckom mi,tice

Foreword
Chapter 1

1-

Could the Second World War Have Been

Prevented?
t-Js Face the Truth Squarely
Main Directions and Specifics of Soviet
Po'licv
m the Initial Period of the Second World Foreign
War
1

3.

REQUEST TO READERS
Progress

Publishers

your opinion of
design

and

any

tills

would

book,

be

its

suggestions

to

all

2.

IN

have

and

may have

2.

3.

'

Lie

THE WEST AND NORTHWEST

Anxious Month of September

1939
lhe USSR and Finland
Developments in the Baltic

its

for

Chapter

future publications.

Please send

Ingredients of a

glad

translation

you

4.

Chapter

3.

...

1.

Boulevard, Moscow, USSR.

10
93
31
--

68

....

'

f.n

gg
q7

THE USSRS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

KRAN
AND TIIE USA
/

CE,

your comments to 17 Zubovsky

,

HISTORICAL REALITY AND ITS FALSIFICATT-

The USSR and

'

]Q7

the Anglo-French Coalition After

the

Outbreak of the Second World

War
A ntl ' Sovietism to Planning an Attack on the
USSR
the North
Payment for Anti-Soviet Blindness
".

107

m
.

3.

jj 7
.

r
*
Chapter
.

4.

Soviet- British Relations After

the Defeat of France .
S viet Union and thc United States
of America

IN

3.

ri0JIHTH3aaT, 1981

English

translation

Printed in the Union

Progress Publishers 1984

PI
Chapter

5.
1-

of Soviet Socialist Republics

2.

0802000000415
014(01

84

3.

2984

Chapter 6

THE SOUTHWEST AND THE BALKANS

troublesome
2.

Relations with

The USSR and Bulgaria

The USSR and Hungary
T,le * SSR and
Yugoslavia
IN THE SOUTH
The USSR and Turkey
The USSR and Iran
The USSR and Afghanistan
IN THE EAST

Romania

....

125
135
143
155
156
179
io 7

'

104

.'

....

2 05
'

'

Military and Political Situation

in the Far East

019

...

220

2.

The

USSR and Japan: Negotiations, 1939-1940

Soviet- Japanese Neutrality Pact
4. Soviet Assistance

to the
6

Chapter

Chinese People

w
War

in Europe

2-1

'>

Germany: Trade and Economic

The Nazi Threat Grows

Soviet-German Political

9g7

Confrontation

5.

The

6-

Ij3st

J48
248

Bilateral Relations with

AsPects

USSR

in

November'

'

and Italy
Months Without War: Opportunities for
Diplo-

macy Narrow Down

Conclusion

'

FOREWORD

'

2.

3.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY

** C nflict With Germany During the Phoney'

7.

4.

227
237

ooq

299

The Second World War began on September i, 1939, with

The outbreak of war was
preceded by a nazi provocation code-named Himmler and
orchestrated along lines typical of fascist methods of misleading
nazi Germanys invasion of Poland.

public opinion. In the early hours of September t SS-men, dressed

in Polish military uniforms, seized the
radio station in the
small town of Gliwicc, situated near the German-Polish fronof the time, and exchanged fire with the German police.
Several corpses in Polish uniforms were left near the radio station as evidence. These were the corpses of
German convicts
shot by the nazis. The casus belli was thus engineered.
tier

At

04.45 hours on September

dromes,
strative

nazi aircraft attacked aero-

communication junctions, and

centres

Poland. The

in

economic and

battleship

admini-

Schleswig-Holstein,

that had arrived earlier at the Polish coast,

shelled installations
on the Wcsterplatte peninsula. German land
forces crossed into
Poland.

The Second World War thus provoked bore

out Lenins words
war is the continuation, by violent means,

that

of the policies

pursued by the ruling classes

of the belligerent powers long beore tie outbreak of
war and that the policies which they were
1

'

0 "1

Thc Pcace Programme, Collected Works,

Vol.
Moscow, 1974, p.

p'

_ __

r
/i- I*
gress
Publishers,

Urtl er

Colllrtr,!*IV/ Tl
less
lcss

otherwise

'

S'

tIie

r sress

quotations of Lenin arc taken from V.

Publishers,

Moscow

22,

T.

Pro-

Lenin,

(English-language edition), un-

indicated.

3
grasped* in

never had a war

brought Inch

"-

many people were Si led

years. Fighting took

place

ty-one nations

were involTd.
spared

on the

^
h

^lavement atThe"

thVT^T

'

j-

everlasting

example

generations entering

Wat

from

bu,

f our wdr'dvicw,
an
scllle^h
S leiolsm and
dedication for the

Jf

life

'

of the Soviet

^- *-

* f his
outbreak of( the Great
Patn

9
?

complex periods experienced

bv

the"

USSItTft

tf,

ma,

combining firmness

0 '

in the

L
'J:

Pravda,

responsibility,

Wat

November

xz,

B = "bon",

1978.

still

the victory over the fascist aggressors

influences the entire course of postwar devel-

whose attainment the decisive role

was played by the USSR, consolidated the world status of the
Soviet Union, enhancing

its

international influence

and

prestige.

The defeat

of imperialisms most reactionary forces provided the

impetus for a further acceleration of the world revolutionary
Process. Peoples democratic and socialist revolutions took place
in some countries in Europe and Asia. A world socialist system
emerged. Moreover, the defeat of nazi Germany and its satellites, as well as of militarist Japan, powerfully
stimulated the
national liberation struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries. In a situation witnessing a significant weakening of the capitalist system and a rapid
development of the
USSR and other socialist countries, this movement, which had
the active support of the international

is an attempt to give
a comprehensive picture of
international situation and of
the general conception and
concrete principles, character,
forms, and methods of the struggle
wage
y Soviet diplomacy to win security and improve the
13
< 0aditions
f r building socialism and upgrading
the
rciQR s defence
capability in the period from September
1
?9
UnC 22 I941 Witb tbis ur ose in
view
it analyses
P
P
J
th1C n oc
s
rela tions with those
countries whose policy most
intimately affected its
international interests: with imperialist

and

'

24 ,

W4

Britain, France (until

its

surrender), the

USA,

'

Gr , yko

Policv'\
y SelCCtcd
6

how much

powers-Germany,
Collected Work,, Vol.

ideals

This book

rmtatsrxwSV:

p.

the

opment. This victory, in

pages telling of the conrage

and staunchnL of
SovLt
d l"*
'
diplomats, those envoys of thf> c~
6 ' pe0p e vil
Pursued
the
Partys line skilfully,
skilfully with a high
h- I"
sense of

___3

to

fuller idea of

favour of socialism, in favour of

the forces fighting for peace,
freedom, and independence.

s=r-*=s sis is -r
If
to principle,

understand

to

and

communist movement,
smashed imperialisms colonial system.
The growth of the might of the USSR and of the
socialist
community as a whole, the further development of
the world
revolutionary process, and the deepening
of capitalisms general
crisis fundamentally
changed the world balance of power in

r*

Tb

magnitude of

mitment

&

th Se years wil1
never

^s^r%
riotic

first

leader-

rSoirL what S

become cold hiZ Th
,T* ^

ft

an

better

influenced and

l0SSCS a d

enormous outlay of resources'

by
^ Vlct ^ nion in the
place. It was a
vac
difficultL VC
^ CU\ t t * me c he Soviet

ship pointed out

for

of communism. 1
what was accomplished
by the Soviet people, it is worthwhile reviewing the immediate
prehistory of the Great Patriotic War. More, this will help us

To have a

'

unfaltering devotion

displayed

but

territory of lo
40 count nes. Sixon
881682(6 P PuIation ot
*-7 million

with

and

'

z: sr?E- *ra ne

1.

over twice as

Stud ed
f Ion * cr Wars

n the Na,ne f the Triumph of the Leninist

Foreign

S Pl>*s and Articles,

Moscow, ,978,

p.

584

(in

Russian).

a d

dcfe at)

a y: Wlth

"^^-Finland,

Poland (prior

to

it,
the magnitude and nature of the innumerable
impediments that Soviet diplomacy had to surmount on the in-

able to

ternational

scene of that period, vigorously countering anti-So-

viet actions of the

tnem, and the orientations

and content of its nrartir^l
Pv.ty arc spelled out
clearly in documents of
the CPSU and the
Sovtet government
and in the statements
made by Soviet

two

imperialist groups

The

topicality of this

work

cumstance that the problems

amenta

Un<

^yearsT
kst

9 39- 1 94 1 are the subject of the

struggle. Bourgeois historiography

Soviet

hm

b-

stir
- stras
-
-

TzS"

ir

In

'*i

" p -< s~-j woru

sr

* *

r:-

-I

e
1C
b
S f th S bu
k C nsists chiefl f
p
documents
y
from' the
from
thc Soviet
So
boretgn Policy Archives
of the USSR Min
is try for Foreign
Affairs and documentary
sources p^bfiLd
,n
Rus tan and other languages.
Wide use has been made of
doci
ments and other materials
relating to diplomatic
contacts of So
Sta
en
high-ranking officials of the
People s Com
ssariat for Foreign
Affairs of the
USSR and the People's
'

If

still

policy

cir-

in

ongoing acute ideological

and the political ideology of

present-day imperialism have elaborated and actively use not
merely a series of false theses about Soviet foreign policy
in

Wtnfhad

*";**

due, in particular, to the

is

facing Soviet foreign

publications ^brai^iT^ut^^rKent

and also other coun-

tries.

1939-T941 but a whole system of falsifications that has

entered
most of the products of bourgeois historians and political
writers. These arc by no means abstract
academic falsifications. Imperialism sees them as a major weapon of
its ideological arsenal. In

terms of the viciousness and dimension of the

pseudohave been piled up in the West about
the Soviet Unions foreign policy actions
in 1939-1941, this period of Soviet foreign policy has, perhaps,
no equal
scientific falsehoods that

in

the attempts of bourgeois ideology

to
Soviet Union.

fueling

smear the history of the

To x Pf c a, i these falsehoods by means of the

Marxist-Len^
mist historical method is a pressing
practical task in the ideological struggle today.
.

Research into Soviet foreign

policy of the initial period of
World War is important in both the scientific
and
political contexts,
especially today when the Soviet
Union, the
e Second

world

socialist

community as a whole, and all other peace-lovand socio-political forces arc doing
everything to make
ctente a dominant
trend in relations between countries.

ing nations

The author has

foreign policy

tried to

and

its

The

show how much was done

by Soviet

diplomatic setvice to enable

the

to ,o,n ,ssuc with the

fascist aggressors

USSR

under conditions favour

imperialisms

aggressive

circles

at-

to talk again

m tflc colcl war language and their efforts to

UatC t1c dangerous contest
in developing ever more dcstrucivc means of
warfare brought

cn't'
.

Ifvttto

in

two

1981;

W".

Moscow,

z
voW, X

.4

si

>

p &y-

'

n
^
Vol ^ D'n/
His, Z 7,1 SecoTZZo^'w

History of Diplomacy
, 97!;

***
i c7t;V *?<Smi F"*-*
d
edltI

Moscow

>

*980-

about a considerable deteriorathe mter national climate

at the close of the 1970s and
the beginning of
the 1980s.
!

n o

The

lessons of 1939-1941 help us

to
the consequences
of this policy, and
erstanding of the

mo

insistent
8

get

a clearer insight

make

for a better un-

epochal significance of the Soviet Unions

course towards peace,

detente,

and disarmament.

Chapter

HISTORICAL REALITY
and its falsification

of Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and the 1930s. Repeatedly

new military conflicts of regional and

noting the possibility of

dimensions the

global

world's

socialist

first

founder of the foreign policy of the

Vladimir Lenin, stressed that the

state,

outwardly strong alliances and coalitions of the leading

capitalist

states could turn out to be short-lived

of settling inter-imperialist

and that peaceful ways

contradictions would be superseded

by military means.

Mindful of
futuic

COULD THE SECOND WORLD

WAR HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?
1

cataclysms

threat to socialism

war

Lenins,

would

be

the

a most

CPSU

held

that

serious external

achievements in the USSR because were a

would inevitably involve the Soviet Union
existing alignment and correlation of class forces

break out

to

prevision of

this

military

by virtue of the

it

the world. As Lenin pointed out, in the

present world
situation following the imperialist war, reciprocal
relations be-

in

yoc. before they

!
the revival of German
,tary

realities.

Topping

is

turn

POWCf and

*e

is not purposeless.
If we tsfe .
that not only Washington
but also London
1
d an ncredlbIe rc uctance
to

St

are

Second

wifeTo? we thal?

growtng mthtary threat,

j

was lean

their

militarism, the strengthening

of Japan as

WoHd
time span in measuring
official Washingtons
lack d
more than questionable, but the
raising of thi

War*
War. Th
TW s
foresight

became

in

see

and Paris demon

understand the reality of the

between the two worid

the period

meZ^TZcZ
LENINS PREVISION

The outbreak

that

We

we

must remember

arc always a hairs breadth

away from invasion. 2
After Hitler came to power, practically
all Soviet assessments
of the international situation
boiled down to the premise that
nazi Germany was the
source of the war danger in Europe.
1 his was stated unequivocally
in early 1934 at the 17th Congress (i the CPSU(B.).
It was then that the extremely
important t coretica
and practical conclusion was drawn:
inter-impenahst contradictions had
reached a point paving the way for
1 ary C n
1Cts and
P lacin g war on the agenda as a means for
a new redivision of
the world and spheres of influence
in favour of the stronger
nations.

mam
1

OF MILITARY CATACLYSMS
surprise to the

tween peoples and the world political system as

a whole are determined by the struggle waged by a small
group of imperialist nations against the Soviet
movement and the Soviet states
headed by Soviet Russia. He foresaw that
at times this struggle could grow so acute that it would
erupt into an armed assault by capitalism, and therefore
warned:

of the Second World

War did not come
CPSL* and the Soviet
government The

This conclusion-an
indicator of the soundness of the scientific

as a

LX

standing that the mternational

relations of the period
between
Wei VOlatil and th3t
war collid be kindled by
'L
?
the forces o f aggression
underlay the planning and
practical steps

hLoXcsTa

-- ?r

Collected
l

Vol
;

'

'
**
C mmunist ^national,
Works,' Vof'

Lcntn
N,nth All-Russia Congress of Soviets,
Collected Works,

V,
JX

*970.

p.

148.

Party

1952

of

ParC>' f
^

0Viet

Tuurtiier
?!

on

Lni0a
is

tilC

Sov,et

(DoIl>llcviki )

LTn, oa

was

ca!letl

lrom December 1925

mentioned as the

to

tlie

Communist

October

CPSU.)- 2>.

in
11

'

prevision

of Marxist-Leninist
thought-was adopted and further
developed by the international
co mmu i st a d working-ch

movement. German fascism is

the main instigator of a
new
war and comes forward as the
shock troop of international counter-solution^
.stated the resolution of
the VII
(SUmmei ,935) The na2is the
imperialist

rcZutionideclared,
resolut.cn

^^
0f

who

ra

'

strive for the

thC qUCSti

hegemony

ist powers were agreements between one group directed against

another, while a regional pact spelled collective efforts to ensure peace in a specific region and presented no threat to any1
body. This was a pact of peace, not of war.

Soviet diplomacy sought

The very first major foreign policy

action of the nazis gave
a clear indication of their
intentions. On October i
4> I9
the
German delegation walked out of the
disarmament conferee

nd hvc days
tcr German
y Withdrew from the League of
fj
D
f
Nations. Promptly,
on December 12, 1953, the CPSU
Central
Committee passed a dectsion to
launch a campaign for collective security. On December
20 the Political Bureau of thc
CPSU
Central Committee endorsed
a document of thc USSR
Peoples
,

USSR

1937, thc

M.M.

exist.

7/

CnnZ TCSS

p.

f the

Communist

International,

588.

Soviet Foreign Policy

Russian;.

Moscow,

roio, F
n

1937 the

Vol.

16,

Moscow, 1970, p

8-6

Union were not

affected at

when

all,

we

participate with bilateral measures. In 1935signed treaties on joint defensive actions against

to

USSR

aggression with France and Czechoslovakia, and

a non-aggression pact with China. At the same time, enormous
political work
was being done to expose the forces of
aggression, all acts of
aggression were denounced, and support was
extended to victims
of aggression to help them uphold their
freedom and independence.

PROBLEM OF AGGRESSION:
INCOMPATIBILITY OF TWO STRATEGIES
In the
tion o

po

ic>

mg

1 9 30s, in contrast to
the Soviet idea of forming a coalinations to prevent war, the
Western nations pursued a

which

in

their

immediate security was overshadowed by

aims. These aims were to
avoid war between thc
imperialist states, divert from themselves
the claims of

c ass

SlP<>1S

Documents

Affairs

efforts to organise a collective rebuff to aggression, seen

a willingness

*8 er

t
,
Tbicl.,

Foreign

by the USSR as the most effective way of averting war, were

supplemented in those few cases when other countries displayed

ea

for

suitable occasions, even

The

FinTand

Commissar
all

Eu-

On November

have emphasised our readiness to participate, on an equal footing with other big and also small powers, in a collective rebuff
to an aggressor. But the collective for a rebuff does not yet

the

"fr."

On

the interests of thc Soviet

'

framework of the League of Nations,

a regional agreement on
a 8 ressIon by Germany. In
addition to
the USSR the signatories of this
agreement were to be Belgium
C2echoslovak!a Lithua a> Latvia,
Estonia, and
3

Peoples

Litvinov declared:

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

on the practical steps to be
t0
m
S
m
Europe This docu " ent
sLred The
stated.
The USSR
usSR has
h
no ejection to concluding, within

bring the idea of collective secur-

ropean and the Asian seats of the war danger.

towards

.to

materialisation in various forms-adapted both to the

ity to

27,

the very outset begun a

struggle
against the growing military
threat in Europe and Asia,
when
Ac seats of this threat were only emerging,
and it was the only
world power that conducted this
struggle consistently and hon
y
S
Iy as Februa
> 933
T
at the disarmament conffat the time,
ference held
the Soviet Union proposed
the draft of
deC,aratl 0n defin,n
S aggression. This draft won wide recognition
t ic world,
but Britain took a negative
stand

policy of regional pacts differed fundamentally

from the
policy of alliances, because thc military alliances of the imperial-

German

of

Changin 8 thc b
r pc at thc ex ense of
th eir neighbours by means
P
of
f

The Soviet Union had from

The

(i a

(in
K

Ruh n

'|

Pravcla,

S0V et ForeiRn PoUcy- '9)3-1955, Moscow,

1980,

November

p.

151

29, 1957.

12
13

tl r

in^^Z

inK

ToZ

and
Of

3nd f
Sam5t the

Pe

8'

run
Ch

tmutual|

Is

milItarist J a a "
P

USSR and

T fT

Asia, direct the

thercb >' 5ettle the gtow-

tHc CXpCBSC of thc

USSR

and smal > European nations,

and by means
CePtab,
mPr0m S<: " colonial Possessions.
'

ns r;
lldate

the imperialist system

and return
S tUatl n that
existcd P rior to the Great
,
Oc-

the world to th

,
o
tober Socialist
Revolution.

In the final analysis this

explains Britains, France's,
and the
unprecedented indulgence as
regards aggressi
their
ta n
t0 S ee thc growth and
extension of the threat of
war
thdr t
void using real sanctions
let al
alone
onemTn
, litary
force agamst the aggressive
powers, and theit
readiness to appease
these powers.

USAs

Z*

aim
Met trends
SoviTttfndT

in

S<!U

d With the

Japan, the Western powers

P
efforts

iZn
the

tod

felt

had

anti-

by Germanv Tt-nG on A
they could allow the continual
C0Untries and connivc a * their

entire 'structure of international

relations

T e
ot
oflhe
die USA,
USA Britain,
R
and
rCV<VC G " man

tlfat

and

the policies pursued

|

Wat Td
War
and Y
d.tect tt agamst
me t0 P WC With th

WolU

War Thc im P eri uh

France, said Leonid Brezhnev
'

militarism aft

thc

Soviet Union.

the First

World

And when

channel for the nazis to build up their military strength, namely,

a navy, lhe Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 permit-

Hit-

hC P f the Germa monopolies

and
openly
Ipenlv proclaimed
o
t
a course towards war,
the Western powers
ngaged in appeasing the aggressor.
They threw more and more
'

Germany

ted

to increase

be prepared for war

to

number

Thc Munich

collusion,

which gave Czechoslovakia to nazi

Germany, was the
most disgraceful manifestation
of this perfidious design
imperialists.

W3S

iS

March

d n time t0 Prepare f C total "

^r. On
ren0unced thc miii tar>' provisions
of
T
Treaty, T
wh.ch forbade it to have an

,T

kVm.l
Versatile.,
the

Three days

air

later

Germany introduced

'

Ru,L"

universal

force

military

ser-

IeaCting res lutely Britai

"

controlling Gciman
Wrol
Ge

(in

of the

e'r

armaments

FOUOW>"e

used thc pretext of

voluntarily open a new

to

Cm,SC V L

'

its

Germany

that period.

increased the

other words, it increased more than 35-fold. In

1934 Germany
produced 840 aircraft, whereas in 1936 it manufactured 4,733d
On the whole, between 1933 and 1939, military production registered a ten -fold increase.

Germany could
not received

not have maintained this growth rate had it

British loans for the buildup of its mil-

US and

potential. Germany purchased abroad

military equipment
and weapons, including what for those years were
first-class' aircraft engines. Thc Heinkel and Fockc-Wulf
factories and thc
Thyssen, Krupp, and IG Farbcnindustric
military-industrial
complexes received thc most up-to-date military
itary

technology.

a result of the alliance between thc

As

German monopolies and

prewar years Germany was able to

foreign capital during thc

uild a large military-industrial
base

armed

forces.

dollars

and

create powerful

Investments amounting to

were transferred

nearly

1,000

modern
million

Germany from the USA and Britain

war. The Soviet historian N.N.
Yakovlev

shortly before the

to

By 1939 the feverish arms race had

strained
man economy to thc limit, and foreign trade
had

the Gerbeen put into a

precarious position on account

of the rapid stockpiling of stratan<J 0t hCr materiaIs * Any
ste
t0

redu ce their import

P
the na 21 Reich with catastrophe.
The West had
e necessary leverage
in its hands. On the
eve of the war
gCtting ab Ut 50 PCr CCnt
0f the raw and ther

t0 ts war econom
y from Britain, France, the
TjcA
nH
and the te mtories
controlled by them. 2
Hitler opened his
record of using military force
for foreign

cmn/T
d threaten

Tl

'

P'avd*>
. o

in

divisions

substantially.

from 31 in 1935 to 102 in the autumn

of 1939seven prewar years,
the Wehrmachts numerical
strength grew from 105,000 to 3,755,000 officers and men, in
of

writes:

the East, agamst thc

socialist country.

navy

1936 Hitler announced that he would have a

battleworthy army within four years. The German economy was

to

its

In September

August

31,

I979
^

istorii,

No.

1959

^ View

40 Years Later, Vnprosy

14
15

policy purposes in

March 1936 with

militarised

the occupation of the de-

Rhine region. In the League of

Nations the USSR
at once proposed collective
sanctions against the aggressor.
Britam and France opposed this
move, demonstrating Western
tractability in territorial matters,
greatly impressing nazi Berlin
and stimulating its self-assurance.
The expansionist nature of
nazi Germany s policies and its
striving to become the
rallying
centre of the most reactionary
militarist forces were seen clearly
the Anti-Comintern Pact
signed in 1936 and the formation
the German-Italian-Japanese
military and political axis. After
the fascist coalition had been
formed hotbeds of war ready to
develop into a w'orld conflagration
began to appear in Europe

and Asia.

As

the Second

World War drew nearer

it

was becoming

in-

creasingly obvious that, with the

exception of the Soviet Union
and the Mongolian Peoples Republic,
no country was making
consistent efforts to prevent a military
cataclysm. But there was

another obvious development-thc

Western poliev of appeasement was, more than anything else,
perhaps, encouraging the
aggressive nations to unleash that war.
Dcspite extremel 7 unfavourable
geographical conditions the
Soviet Union was the only country
that gave tangible assistance
to Republican Spain, where a fascist
mutiny staged with German
and Italian backing broke out in
July 1936. Francisco Franco
soon had 150,000 Italians, 50,000
Germans, and the best that
could be provided by the nazi air force
fighting on his side. In
Spain Soviet volunteers clashed with the
nazis on the battlefield
for the first time.The policy of
non-interference and neutrality proclaimed by Britain, France, and
the USA in fact meant
support for the Franco forces.
.

In Asia, the

USSR

took a vigorous stand against the

predaThere it acted jointly with
Mongolia. Britain and the USA refused to
accept the Soviet
tory plans of the Japanese militarists.

made in 1933, to sign a Pacific Pact as a collective

barrier
Japanese expansionism. No Western power
joined the USSR
to help China, which became the
target of Japanese aggression
m the summer of 1937. The USSR gave China large credits
and
armaments. A significant part in helping China
was played by
ofFer,

to

Soviet volunteer military experts.

Conference convened

in

Meanwhile,

November 1937

at

the

the situation in East Asia, the

and Britain secured the
rejection of the Soviet proposals
for collective sanctions by
the
League of Nations against japan.

USA

After Neville Chamberlain became

Britains Prime Minister
May 1937, a new element appeared in the
Western policy of
appeasing aggressors. This was the
quest for all-embracing mutual understanding with Germany
and the intention to give it
a free hand in Central and Eastern
Europe; it was evident that
German expansion was being channeled in
the
in

USSR. Herbert von Dirkscn, who was

German ambassador

to Britain,

wrote that the British government

had come nearer
understanding the most essential points

to

of the major demands

advanced by Germany, with respect to
excluding the Soviet
Union from the decision of the destinies
of Europe, the League
of Nations likewise, and the
advisability of bilateral negotiations and treaties.
1

At

talks with Hitler in November

1937, Lord Halifax clearvoiced Britains ncadincss to agree
to a rocarving of Europes
political map in favour of Germany,
in particular to satisfy its
claims to Austria, Danzig (Gdansk),
and Czechoslovakia provided these claims were realised
gradually. It was implied that Hitler would guarantee the
intactness of the British colonial
ly

The

pire

results of the Halifax-Hitlcr

talks

the

emwere endorsed by

French government. Hitler evaded giving

a specific reply
saw the main thing, namely, that German
expansion in Central and Eastern Europe
would encounter no reIn Berlin they

sistance

from

the

most powerful Western

countries.

On March 12, 1938, the nazis marched into

Austria. Once
again the LSSR was the only power to
denounce resolutely this
aggression.

Moscow took

llus was the

first

a very serious view of the anschluss.

time since the end of the First

that a country,

World War

whose independence was guaranteed by Britain

and France under the Saint-Germain
Treaty of 1919, had disappeared from the political map of
Europe. The seizure of Austria,
the Soviet Peoples Commissar
for Foreign Affairs wrote
in a letter to the CPSU Central
Committee on March 14, 1938,

Brussels

?TT

V
Z
Mouse, Moscow,
IV/

specifically to consider

direction of the

the

a>Ul

Materials Relalin
Z

,rkSCn

Papen

Eve of the Second World

Foreign. Languages Publishing

the

1948, p. 34.

16
226
17

1
is the most significant event
after the world war and
with the gravest danger, not least to
our Union. 1

On March

and the

USA

FSA

Even

in this

USSR did not relax its efforts to

immediately after the nazis entered
Austria, the Soviet Union officially
declared it was prepared
to honour its commitments
under the 1935 Soviet-Czechoslovak
Treaty of Mutual Assistance. In April
1938, the CPSU Central
Committee passed a decision to help Czechoslovakia
avert war.

Britain

ment

join it in collective actions to halt

the further spread of aggression and
eliminate the mounting threat
of another world conflagration.
Tomorrow it may be too late,
the Soviet government pointed out,
but today there is still time
if all countries, especially
the great powers, adopt a firm, unequivocal stand on the question of
collectively saving peace. 2
But, as before, the British and
French reaction was negative. The
left the Soviet proposal
unanswered.

situation the

On March

17,

and

in-

formed the Czechoslovak President Edward Benes

of this decision.
The USSR was prepared to go to Czechoslovakias
assistance
single-handed, without France, provided
Czechoslovakia requested such assistance and, of course, defended
itself.
This was
backed up by the corresponding military measures:
30 infantry

were massed along the Soviet Unions western

frontier,
military exercises were organised, and
tanks and
aircraft were kept in combat readiness.
More than 500 Soviet
bombers and fighter-planes were concentrated in only
the Byelorussian and Kiev special military districts.
With the exception of the USSR, not a single
government in
the West, including the Benes government
itself, had any intention of resisting aggression against
Czechoslovakia.
1938, Benes had assured the British envoy in Prague

In

of the Czech problem,

this question merely as a step towards the conclusion

an all-embracing agreement under which Germany would

recognise the inviolability of the British empire and commit itto take Britains great power positions into account. This

self

was the essence of Plan Z, which envisaged reinforcing the barall levels, including visits to Britain by Hermann Goring and even Hitler. 2 The French government gave the
British its full support in the efforts to make a deal with Hitler
gain with visits at

at Czechoslovakias expense.

In Munich, on September 29, 195S, Britain

an agreement with

many was

to take

choslovak question.

had begun

in

London

Germany was informed:

History of Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1980,

Vol.

we

from Czechoslovakia roughly 20 per cent of

has no equal in anything that has occurred since the

perialist

first

im-

war. 3

he very

the

Western

first

post-Munich months showed how little grounds

had for hoping they could appease

political leaders

fascism. Hitler not only sliced off more

territory than was
agreed upon at Munich but demanded the annexation
of other
legions populated by nearly a million
Czechs. On March 15,
939 , the Wehrmacht completed its occupation of the whole of
'

Czechoslovakia.

LAST ATTEMPT
TO AVERT' WAR

TIIE USSRS

The Soviet Unions next attempt

was its proposal

to avert a second world war

of April 17, 1939, for forming an Anti-Hitler

two, Great

1917-1947, Mos-

19S0, p.
(in
Russian).
335
Soviet Foreign Policy Documents, Vol. 21,
1977, p. 129.
*
Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1 919-19
39, Third Series, Vol.
London, 1949, p. 314.

documents and Materials Relating

Vo IT Dirksen Papers

cow,

J.

Flarm

"

18

and France signed

under which Ger-

had one-fourth of that nations population and

nearly half of its heavy industry. The USA gave its unqualified
approval to the outcome of the Munich talks. In the Soviet
Union this deal was assessed as an act, which for its brazenness

HV
1,

Italy,

territory that

its

that Cze-

to settle the Cze-

If

Germany and

May

always follow and be bound to Western

Europe and never to Eastern Europe. 3 In the
meantime, secret
talks

shall

regarded
of

choslovakia would

Anglo-German

to

we

divisions

large-scale

and Germany, come

agreement regarding the settlesimply brush aside the resistance that France or Czechoslovakia herself may offer to the
decision . Czechoslovakia was not the point at issue-London

fraught

1938, the Soviet government suggested that

17,

Britain, France,

is

( in

to the Eve of the Second World

(19)8-1939), p. 45.
<->vs
y an >r J he Secret that Ignited the War (How the Imperialists
Unleashed the Second World War), Moscow,
1975, pp. 204-14
-

'

1,

Fravda, October

4, 1938.

2*

19

Coalition
assistance

on the basis of a
between the USSR,

military-political

Britain,

Pnnuplc of ec ual n S hts an d

TIhe main articles of the
draft,
l

pact

duties for all

as

of

proposed

Union, stated:

its

mutual
lion

and France,

resting on
signatories.

by the Soviet

i. Britain, France,

and the USSR conclude this Agreement

term of five to ten years, on a
mutual commitment to extend to each other every possible
assistance,
ot a

including military
assistance, without delay in the
event of aggression in Europe
against any one of the Contracting
Parties.
"2. Britain, France,
and the USSR undertake to extend
every
including military, assistance
to the East European states
situated between the Baltic and the
Black seas and

mon border with

having a com-

the

USSR

in

these states.
3.

Britain, France,

est possible time,

and the

to consider

the event of aggression against

USSR
and

undertake, within the shortestablish

the

volume and

forms of military assistance to be

rendered by each of them
compliance with Paragraphs 1 and z. n

in

Moreover, it was assumed that Britain,

France, and the USSR
would pledge that if hostilities broke
out they would
not enter

any negotiations or conclude a

separate peace with the aggressors without agreement among
all the
into

three signatory

ers.

The Soviet proposals envisaged

the signing of a

pow-

military

convention simultaneously with the

political agreement. The substance of the Soviet proposals
was communicated

by the Peoples
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on
July 19 to the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris.
The Soviet Union made what proved to be
its last attempt to
prevent a second world war, and the
Western powers
likewise

made their last attempt, in July-August

1939, to divert war from
themselves to the USSR. Documents from
German secret archives
confirm that Chamberlain was prepared
to conclude an alliance with Germany and grant it a
long-term loan of 3,500 mil'

w (September
War

in

, 9i 8 -August

for Peace on the

t 959 ).

Eve of the Second World

Documents and Materials, Moscow 19 .,

336-37 (m Russian).
In those years Soviet ambassadors
had the title of Plenipotentiary Representatives. To avoid confusion the
title of ambassador is used
throughout

this

According to the German ambassador

sterling.

in

German sphere of interest. Further, Great Britain would bring

influence to bear on France to get her to give up her alliance
with the Soviet Union and her commitments in Southeast Europe.
She would also drop her treaty negotiations with the Soviet
As von Dirksen put it, the underlying purpose of

Union.

this treaty was to make it possible for the British

gradually to
disembarrass themselves of their commitments toward Poland.
Then Poland
would be left to face Germany alone. 2
.

All this

was

reflected in the stand taken

by the Western powon a military convention with the Soviet

Union that were begun as a result of the Soviet proposal of
ers at the negotiations

July 23. In particular, the instructions to the British (and

to the
French) military missions were a clear indication that Britain
had no intention whatever of signing an obligating military
con-

vention with the

USSR on

mutual assistance to repulse nazi

aggression.

At

these negotiations the Soviet side presented a

military
providing for joint actions by
the Soviet, British, and
French armed forces in all possible cases of

plan

aggression.

B.M.

Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, showed

how
the Soviet Armed Forces would
be deployed along the Soviet
Unions western frontiers. In the event of
aggression in Europe

Red Army was prepared

the

and

16

cavalry

divisions,

to put into the field

5,000

pieces

of

120 infantry
heavy artillebetween
5,000

ry,
between 9,000 and 10,000 tanks, and
and 5,500 aircraft. The fortified
districts along the entire Soviet
western frontier would be ready for
action within four to six

hours. 3

Developments over the next two years definitively showed

the
enormity of the crime that the
Munichmen of London and Paris
committed against their own countries
and the whole of human-

D c*unents

'

PP-

pounds

London Herbert von Dirkscn, the essence of the Anglo-German

agreement planned by Chamberlain was that England would
renounce the guarantees she had given to certain States in the

ity,
i

TI '

lb 'd.,

book.-//-.
the

!l
'

and Materials Relating

Dirksen Papers

to

(mS-i 9i9 ),

the

Eve

p.

186.

of

Second World

the

pp. 183, 187.

y f the SeCOnd

Moscow

1974,

pp-

World War
I44-4 6 (m

7 9 19-1945Vol.
Russian).

The Eve

of

20
21

kind when they turned down the

Soviet offer of cooperation,
ihe anti-fascist coalition became
a reality only in the latter
halt of 1941, but in the
period after September 1,
1939, France

was defeated, many European countries

were occupied, and Brifound itself in a critical situation.
Today, when one rereads the draft for the Anglo-French-Soviet
treaty, one may well
ask how blind and petty our diplomacy
must have been in its
tain

approach to this matter, losing the

opportunity for concluding a
treaty of such crucial significance? 1
General Andre Beaufrc,

was a member of the French negotiating

team, wrote

who

bitterly in

later years.

Ihe West German historian Axel

Kuhn

realistically notes that

the Soviet

Union was well aware of Hitlers aggressive

ambiand took every possible step to prevent
the formation of
an anti-Soviet coalition of imperialist
powers and make itself
secure/ Nazi Germanys clash with the
other powers was
tions

pracwrites Alan Bullock, a British

expert on the
history of fascism. Tf the Western
Powers had recognised the
threat earlier and shown greater resolution
in resisting Hitlers
(and Mussolinis) demands, it is possible
that the clash might
not have led to war, or at any rate not
to a war on the scale

This recognition came, instead, from the British Foreign Sec-

Anthony Eden, in February 1945. In presenting the deciCrimea Conference of the leaders of three Allied
powers-the USSR, the USA, and Britain- he said in the British
parliament: Can anyone doubt that, if we had had, in 1939,
the unity between Russia, this country and the United States
that we cemented at Yalta, there would not have been the pres1
ent war?" History has severely punished the appeasers, who
retary

sions of the

rejected the Soviet governments proposal for collective resistance to the fascist aggressors, Leonid Brezhnev noted. Despite
the forecasts and hopes that were running high at the time in
London, Paris, and Washington, nazi Germany began the Second World War with an attack not on the USSR but on the
3
capitalist countries of Europe.

tically inevitable,

on which

it had finally to be fought . 3

H. Liddell Hart, one of the most eminent
Western historians, is likewise of the opinion
that the Second World War
might have been prevented. Nazi aggression
had to be countered by a united front of Britain,
France, and the Soviet Uni-

B.

.LET

US

FACE,

THE TRUTH SQUARELY

is always the best and the only correct attiLenin wrote, enlarging on his words, which we have used
in the above heading. When it is a matter of the class struggle
embracing all international relations, he said, we must base

In politics that

tude,

our tactics

first

situation. 1

What was

fronting the

and foremost on an appraisal of the objective

USSR

the objective international situation con-

on September

1,

1939?

on.

Peace could be saved, he wrote, by securing

the support
of Russia for Poland, and the situation
demanded prompt action.
But the British governments steps were dilatory
and

THE REALITY

half-hearted. Liddell Hart comes very close

to the truth but
evades the main thing, namely, the recognition
that had there
been a united anti-Hitler front, the Second
World War might
have been averted altogether.

With the exception of fraternal Mongolia it had no friends

n the international scene. The socialist community of nations,
which is today the leading factor of international politics and

Parliamentary
e '^' ral

'

p
Manfred

Droste

AncIrL Beau f re,

Verlag,

The

'

Funke

(Ilerausgeber),

Diisseldorf,

ri&ns

Le drame de

f the

Hiller,

1940, Plon,

Paris,

Deutschland und

die

p.

n9

Mdchtc

2 .
P,

Putmans

Debates.

House

of

Commons

Official

Report, Vol.

Published bv His Majestvs Stationery Office, London,

408,

T945,

p.

S14.

1976, pp
644-45.
Second World War, edited bv E. M. Robertson

Macmillan and Co. Ltd., New York,

1971, p. 221.
1
B. H. Liddell Hart, History
of the Second World War, G.
Sons, New York,
1971, p. 704.

22

1965,

Printed and
I-

I.

Brezhnev, Following Lenins Course, Vol.

V.

I.

Lenin,

1964, p

More About

the

Political

Crisis,

p.

122

(in

Russian).

Collected Works, Vol,

275.

Y. I. Lenin, Extraordinary Fourth

Collected Works,
Vol. 27, 1965, pp. 172-73.

All-Russia

Congress

of

Soviets,

23

TTv
aid
imn

Lt n Ame
A
'
r

TV

Ca

T
-

e cTmmll
muni stI and

f rCe

he wotld >

aCW

States

was "-existent
of Afrka Asm,

T'

workers

against the imperialist system.

USSRs standing and

World War.

>

I
ilCh
t0day oppose imperialism, there

was

inttrnational Proletariat and

parties were the USSRs only
ally

The USSRs border with capitalist

countries extended over
many thousands of kilometres.
Of decisive importance was not
ge

Tel

of collusion with the aggressor pursued by Britain

and France
support brought thc world on the brink of military
catastrophe. Thc refusal by Britain, France, and Poland
to act
jointly with the USSR to repulse nazi aggression
made it obwith

31 faCt f this Capita,ist

all

of thc

cirdement as
USSRs neighbours

unsympathetic, to sav thc least,

to the

Ant
lty

WaS

and

n0t a singIe imperialist power

nor
(Finland, Poland

when

had any desire to base its

Union on the permanent basis
of the
inmciples of peaceful coexistence
and goodneighbourlv relations
the

contrary,

they systematically flouted

USSR was

the

their

treaty and
powers used all
f ecodc thc external
and internal

USSR. The

THE USSR THREATENED BY ATTACK FROM

THE WEST AND THE EAST

imperialist

S
1C r
SP Sal
!
condition
lditions f^
for socialist construction
in the USSR: direct subversion, political struggle
in all directions, anti-Soviet
alliances and
coalitions, total discrimination
in trade and in the
eZirnic
sphere, and unceasing
ideological warfare. But more
important
than anything else was that
large-scale material preparations
were
underway for a military collision
with thc USSR: conflict sit-

alone and encircled by capitalist countries,

class had been split by the Right-

and thc international working

wing Socialists. 1

relations with the Soviet

o her obligations to the

US

vious that towards the close of August 1939 the last possibility
for averting a world war had evaporated. The USSR
could not
do it single-handedly. It was an unattainable aim to avert war

an^of
of ^
the countries bordering
on thc USSR

Romans, Turkey, Iran, and others)

'

on the eve of the Second

Specifically, during thc last prewar months thc situation

was
characterised, on the one hand, by a sharp increase of the threat
to Soviet security in Europe and Asia and, on the other, by the
USSRs growing isolation on the international scene. The policy

Thc

the
he circumstance
t'
that in practically
the ruling Circles were

potentialities

f T^
0

abetted
abetted.
perialist

The prospect
camp and the

aided and

of a head-on collision
between thc imSoviet Union, up to a war
of annihila-

tion, was becoming ever

more imminent. Given the
entire
complexity of the causes that led
to the Second World
War
and
the diversity of the motivations
of the

warchf socialism!^

imperialist

* h
*

^
powers

'*"

mm

**

'

'977

PP

become the

dominant power

6J

in

the ever-closer unity of the powers

of the fascist Axis, which
gone beyond the political framework of the
Anti-Comintern
net and evolved
into military cooperation. On May 22,
1939,
ermany and Italy signed the Stahlpakt
(Steel Pact). Japans

>

Sr-

pre-

Central Europe and

bent on aggression,
Germany was planning to continue its expansion eastward.
On
April 11, 1939, the nazi leadership endorsed
a plan, code-named
Case Weiss, for the invasion of
Poland at any time from
cptember 1, 1939. On April 28 Hitler announced
Germanys
enunciation of its
1934 pact with Poland. Uneasiness enhanced

in-

Such was the overall international

situation characterising thc

(to

Meanwhile, Europe was hit by a prewar political crisis that

began with the occupation of the whole of
Czechoslovakia by
Germany. Thc political atmosphere was white-hot with
tension
running high in inter-state relations. Having

involvement

in this pact was on thc agenda.

As could be seen from the Anglo-German
and Franco-Germ-

H slor
d
U

448

;
(m

>'
t the
Russian).

Communist Party of the Soviet Union Moscow,

980

24
25

an declarations, signed on the heels

of the Munich deal at the
September and in December 1938 respectively,
Britain
and France had, in effect, undertook
not to attack Germany.
The assumption of this obligation
by France signified, among

Union at the present time internally weakened and externally in a position of singular isolation. 1
Indeed, since May 1939, following Japans attack on the ^Vlongolian Peoples Republic, large-scale hostilities involving more
siders the Soviet

close of

other things, the invalidation of the

1935 Franco-Soviet Treaty
of Mutual Assistance. Thus, with
Germany poised for aggression
eastward, the USSR found itself without
military allies. The
results of the talks with Britain
and France in the spring and

summer

of

1939

made

it plain that the Western

powers were
Soviet efforts to prevent war. The
facts
indicated that by refusing to give
the USSR military guarantees

reluctant to

join

the

the event of direct aggression

against
posed it to invasion.
in

it

What the military-strategic scenario of

Germany would attack Poland, the system

these powers had ex-

would be 5

trap

to declar-

ing war on Germany. Without military

allies the USSR was a
very attractive target for aggression.
Key military advantages
were given to Germany in advance: having no
possibility

of cros-

Poland and coming into combat contact

with the enemy, the Soviet

their choice of
tirely

An
USSR

Armed

Forces would be fettered

strategic initiative,

in

which would depend en-

on the Wehrmacht Command.

extremely difficult situation

had taken shape for the

where the Western powers had long
been pushing Japan against it. The leaders
and diplomatic circles of the imperialist powers were expecting
war to break between Japan and the Soviet Union. In one of his dispatches
the
US ambassador in lokyo Joseph C. Grew explained
in

the Far East,

why

a Russo-Japanese

felt

conflict

is

more threatening

he

in

1939 than
m past years. He wrote: In the present state of Chinese military affairs, Japan might well expect, if
involved in hostilities
against the Soviet Union, that, although execution
of plans of
economic exploitation on the continent would he
seriously de-

layed, Japan

would face no acute military problem from China.

he Munich conference has had a marked effect
upon
Japanese thinking with regard to foreign relations, and the
con.

ference
against

is

taken here to mean that no obstacles

German

nevertheless being fought.

Only a few weeks before the Second World War broke out
two events occurred which still further complicated the international situation for the

the

of political commitments desired by. the Western powers would

come into operation, and the Soviet Union
would have no alternative

sing the frontier into

and more troops on both sides had unfolded on the Khalkhin

Gol River. Under the protocol on mutual assistance signed on
March 12, 1936, by the USSR and Mongolia, the Soviet government had sent Red Army units to help its ally. No war had been
declared either by Japan, the USSR or Mongolia, but it was

Japan con-

Bri-

Japans seizures in China and pledged to raise

no obstacles to the attainment of Japans military aims in China

was signed in Tokyo on July 24, 1939. In other words, the Japanese troops operating on occupied Chinese territory, from where

were being conducted against the USSR and Mongolia

on the Khalkhin Gol River, were guaranteed against attack from
hostilities

the rear. This

was

precisely the

Western powers wanted

Far Eastern Munich that the

order to encourage the aggressive

anti-Soviet ambitions of the Japanese militarists. On August 10
in

the

government of Kiichiro Hiranuma announced that it was

prepared to sign a military treaty with Germany and Italy with
all the ensuing dangerous consequences to the security
of the

USSR.
Within literally a few days before the outbreak of the world
war the Soviet Union found itself faced by the prospect of having to fight a war concurrently against two
powerful countries
,n Europe and in Asia
at a time when it was in military and
political isolation.

France, and the

This was actually the situation that Britain,

had planned to create by long years of

USA

appeasing aggressive powers. Stating the desired objective of

he Munich strategy to Harold L. Ickes,
a member of the US
government, in December 1938, the US ambassador in Paris
f

William Bullitt bluntly declared that in due course Germany

Wl H try to take the Ukraine.
In the process
.

be interposed

will,

pressure upon the Soviet Union.

USSR. An agreement under which

tain recognised

j,

F reS n Relations
of the United

US Go ' ernmcnt
r

Germany

States.

will

Diplomatic Papers 1959, Vol.

Printing Office, Washington, 1955,

P-

2.

27

UCh a desrcc that shc cannot

stand the rain.
j
She will break under
it
the end. Similarly,
Japan will conquer
or attempt to conquer Siberia,
and she in time will break under
rain. But by leaving Russia to
her fate, England and France

"8
f Ge
any from theit
^

SWlfk"!

lands.

The decision was taken only after no doubt was left that the
governments of Britain, France, and Poland were reluctant to
sign an agreement with the USSR on joint resistance to nazi
aggression and

all other possibilities for safeguarding the USSRs

had been exhausted. On August 26 the Peoples Commissar for Defence of the USSR K. Y. Voroshilov, who headed

security

the Soviet military delegation

THE ONLY POSSIBLE DECISION

the la: wcck of A ugmt
1939, when it had become
a world war could not be
averted, the Soviet Union
was confronted with the need
unilaterally to safeguard its ter3ttaCk by German >' if onl
n short period. The
USSR had no reasonable alternative i'
to prolonging, even if only
emporarrly, a state o non-aggression
with Germany. To intervene

ciT
lear that

bT

r^

Wat W0Uld

0liSh

Si8Dify

e P ardis iS socialisms

i'

USSR on its own initiative.

The Soviet leadership had to
change the situation at all costs
11
aCk b
h impCrialistS foc as
1^8 as possible!
and
rnd^snr
spike then designs. V,
The preservation
gainb
ai
in
n the
i

^"

C-

fysocialism
national
n

of the first and, at the

s cialist

state

and

heir actions, the

was required by the

interests of inter-

of the

CPSU

working people of all countries,

Central Committee and the
Soviet

government were guided by the instructions

of the Partys 18th
Congress to proceed with caution
and give the warmongers no
pretext for dragging the Soviet
Union into conflicts. This was

the point of departure of the

CPSU and the government when
thc> made the crucial decision
to sign, on August
23, 1939, with
Germany a treaty of non-aggression,

which had

earlier

been

offered by Berlin. This forced

step was consonant with
political
realism and an accurate assessment
of the objective situation,
enm had, in his time, said: Is it the
correct policy for us to
use the discord between the imperialist

bandits to

difficult for

them

to unite against us.

Of

course,

rect policy. 2

make
it

is

it

more

the cor-

the

USSR

of,

among

1959 ,

The

Secret Diary of

Harold L. lakes, Vol.

Simon and Schuster. New York,
1954

WorZ'

Yott:

EiS,

470

ri

"**

II.

The
5 ,

Inside

Struve.

rg
935 6 -

C *

<***

the negotiations with Britain

signed the non-aggression pact with Germany because

other things, the circumstance that the military talks

with France and Britain had reached an impasse by virtue of

insuperable disagreements. 1 In this same statement by the So-

Defence Commissar nazi Germany was again called an

viet

aggressor.

Even after August 23, T939, the Soviet Union did not abandon its hope for collective security. Thus, on the very next day,
August 24, London informed the British Embassy in the USA
of V. M. Molotovs statement that after a bit,
say a week, negotiations with France and this country might be continued. 2
Ihe supreme significance of the non-aggression pact was that
evented the formation of a united front of imperialist powthe Soviet Union. Harold L. Ickes, certainly no friend
of the USSR, noted: I
am not surprised at Russias action.
Russia suspected England of playing double with her
while making terms with Germany. I believe that this
it

pi

ers against

was true:
England could have terms with Russia long ago. She kept
hoping against hope that she could embroil
Russia and Germany w ith each other and
thus escape scot-free herself. Shc got
ca ught in her own
toils and in so doing has lost the respect
and tllc sympathy of the world generally. 3
Bernard Shaw said
that

at the time
that he failed to see

why so much tension was gennews of a Russo-German pact. Hitler, he declared,

powerful hands of Stalin whose desire for peace

erated by the

Was

111

Prevailed over
1

at

and France, publicly announced: The military talks with Britain and France were suspended not because the USSR had concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany; on the contrary,

Izvestia,

eign
l
he

all else.

August

27, 1939.

Rations

Sccrct

D iary

of the United Stales.

of

Harold L.

1 939 ,

Vol.

T,

1956. p.

311.

lakes, Vol. II. p. 705.

28
29

The cffect o{ thesc resolute

anions by the USSR on the world
scene was ofr inestimable
significance for the subsequent
stru*g e agamst the fascist Axis. The USSR
put paid to the unity
tl a
was being forged in the imperialist
camp. The conclusion
oi the non-aggression pact
infuriated Tokyo, which was counting on the possibility of
striking at the

USSR

ic

fascist

camp

The

official protest

made

to

Germany

were damaged and

sitions

it

fell.

nazis

the pact as a

to

expand

blow

mainly

the direction of the

was

it

tral

its

attention

nation

leadit

own

hands.

The

party stressed

German

people to abide
thc Soviet Union. The German

1945.

The Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union was aware of Germanys aggressive intentions, but did not know when the attack be
launched and sought to stave it off. 1

to their
3. MAIN DIRECTIONS AND SPECIFICS
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE INITIAL PERIOD
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

to

was

consolidation of the aggressor

set

back by approximately a year.

It

was only

July

1940 that Japan and Germany resumed

the talks that
had been broken off in August
1939 following the
of the

Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

Italy formalised their tripartite
alliance on

conclusion

Germany, Japan, and

September 27, 1940.

In The Truth About Hitler,

a book written jointly with Wilfned Reckert, member of the Presidium
of the Board of the
German Communist Party, Kurt Bachmann relates
how the ptet
was received by the German Communists:
In

Germany

time

it

was forbidden

to listen

to foreign

of long

at the

broadcasts on pain

imprisonment, incarceration in a
concentration camp, or
even death. In this situation the
only orientation that could be

their

ciated only after liberation from nazism in

eastward,

result, the

coalition

into

by the treaty, not to attack

quail-

Second World War broke out not

as a coordinated action of the Axis powers
but as an act of aggression
by Germany alone. .Lhe military

w
War

CPG

Moscow. As

As a

in

1939, by Radio

in the vital interests of the

USSR, so that nazi Berlin would not

Romes Balkan sphere of imperialist
inciests. Italy refused to
enter the war at the same
time as
ermany, hranco Spain, too, announced
that it would be neuurn

25,

Communists saw thc justice and necessity of the non-aggression

pact, and upheld it, even though its significance was fully appre-

in

Japan was now compelled

on the Khalkhin Gol River.

saw

wanted the

lc >

German

the

that

ed the pact as running counter

to the secret treaty appended
to the Anti-Comintern
Pact. 2 The Hirahuma governments
poto settle the acute conflict
situation
1 he. Italian fascists likewise

statement by the underground

August

had always done before, thc CPG warned of the danger presented by Hitler. Addressing our people it declared that peace
would be secured only if the German people took the future of

in collaboration

and

in a

ership broadcast on

with Germany On August

24, 1939, the Soviet embassy in
Japan repotted that the news
made a stunning impression, obviously sowing confusion
especially among the
military

was provided

got

USS !i

rZ n /
(September
A

th

rugRle ,or Peace

\ -August
193!

History of tbe Second

9i9 )

p,

(>n

g. 7

thc

Eve f

tbe Seco d

World War. 1939-1945, Vol.

2,

p.

2fiX .

World

The very

possibility of winning time in order to strengthen

bulwark of thc world revolutionary process, a possibility
created by Soviet foreign policy on the eve of the Second World
War, was a tangible contribution to thc struggle against fascism
on a global scale. No one can doubt that the coming war, even

the

war between two big imperialist powers or as

power against a small country, will inevitably tend
to develop into and will inevitably become
a war against the
Soviet Union. Every year and every month of respite is a guarantee for us that the Soviet Union will be in position to
better
if

begins as a

it

war

of a big

repulse the attack of the imperialists, 2 said Palmiro Togliatti,

outstanding personality of thc international communist and workmg-class movement, as early as

1935 at thc VII Congress of the

Communist
l

j.

939

>

to

Throughout the period from September

June 22, 1941, Soviet foreign policy was guided by

International.

D/c Wahrheit uber

Hitler.

Kurt Bachmann im Gesprach mit Wilfried

lL

A' 1

r c Port

'

Weltkreis Verlag, Dortmund, 1978, pp. 12 1,

Congress of tbe Communist International.
of Proceedings,

Lawrence and Wishart

Ltd.,

123.

Abridged Stenographic
London, p. 417.
31

the need to

rr
flu.

make

use of this priceless

respite to reinforce the

ussr

in

iJth
r the

was possible.
d d0Vfa by the r8th Con ress of the

u
USSR on the
international scene, and
formulated

CPSU
in the

policy consistently

rf

policy st'e'

WetC 8 Pt gramme f r SOViet

f rei n

Ihe utmost shall be done

to

strengthen the combat ef-

Red Array and Red Navy;

4 International ties of friendship with

the working people
of all countries interested
in peace and friendship
among nations shall be promoted. 1
-

Following the outbreak of the

Second World War, the USSR
defined its attitude to the
belligerent groups as a neutral in
the

context of international law,

stating this in notes handed
on September 17, 1939, to the
ambassadors of all the countries with
winch the Soviet Union had
diplomatic relations. 2 The Soviet
P lcy of ncutraht -y differed fundamentally from
the policy of
neutrality pursued by the USA
in that period.
The Soviet governments report to
the sixth session of the Supieme Soviet of the USSR in the
spring of 19,40 stated: In
brief, our foreign policy
objectives are to ensure peace
among
nations and the security of our
country. The conclusion from
this
is the posture of
neutrality and non-participation
in the war between the leading European powers.
This posture is based on
the treaties signed by us, and
is fully in keeping
with the interests of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, this posture exercises an
influence restraining the spread
of war in Europe, and it there-

by conforms to the interests

of

already

suffering

enormous

all

peoples desiring peace or

caused by war.

privation

TSt 'J

CZress

MarCJ 1021 !9i9

<vxJ)
-

Soviet

Foreign

'

Communist Party of the Soviet

Verbatim Re P rt< Moscow,
1939,

Policy.

1946, pp. 448-49 (hi Russian).

Collection

0f

Documents,

We

Union (Bolsbep.

Vol.

15

4,

(in

R us

Moscow

told the seventh session of the

USSR: In

of the

play heightened

this

Supreme Soviet
Union should disexternal security and

situation the Soviet

vigilance

relative

to

its

and external positions. We have

effected a switch from a seven-hour to an eight-hour working
day and taken other steps in line with our duty to secure a further and more massive growth of our countrys defence and
economic potential, a serious tightening of discipline among all
the working people, and to work hard to promote labour proreinforcing

to

all

its

internal

ductivity in our country. 2

In

its

tional

efforts

positions,

to

reinforce the

USSRs

Soviet foreign policy

security

made

and interna-

active

use of in-

ter-imperialist contradictions in accordance with Lenins

on the need for a strategy of

all clearly

this kind.

We, Lenin

emphasis

said, can

sec the clash of the imperialist states interests.

De-

pronouncements by their ministers about the peaceful

settlement
of questions in dispute, the imperialist powers
cannot in reality take a single serious step in political matters
without disagreeing." The paramount and immediate aim of
spite all

Soviet
fact

foreign

that as

policy in 19 39-1 941, especially in view of the

a result of the ongoing world war all the anti-

Soviet forces on the international scene had

was
and
the

become more

active,

to

use these disagreements

to

ensure peaceful conditions for socialist construction in

to

counter the military threat

USSR.

Sixth Session oj the

940

'

Supreme Soviet of the USSR. March

29- April 4,

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940, p. 42 (in Russian).

Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. August i-August
; 940,
Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940, p. 42 (in Russian).
V- I. Lenin, Speech Delivered ac a Joint Session of the
.

7,

All-Russia

ential f-xecutivc
Committee of the Moscow Soviet of Workers, Peasants
and Red Army Deputies,
Trade Unions, and Factory Committees, May
1920, Collected. Works,
Vol. 31, p. 131.
5

32

USSR

sars of the

a " tio * haU be orcised and

the instigators of war, who
?' S
1
are used to others
pulling the chestnuts out of
the fire, shall be
given no opportunity to drag
our country into conflicts;

and steadfastly. 1

Presenting an analysis of the international situation up to

August 1940, the Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commis-

wi^c^
ficiency of our

we

have scored no little success during this time. This is precisely

what infuriates our enemies. For our part, with faith in our
cause and in our strength, we shall continue to pursue our foreign

extent that this

neS

matter of ensuring our countrys security

the

that in

feel

an

320

33

In

an address headed
Twenty-Second Anniversary of the
October Socialist Revolution the
Comintern Executive
Comnuttee noted that the ruling
quarters

foreign policy

reat

started

in the imperialist states

war not

the

fascism-the

for

freedom of peoples or for saving

democracy from fascism, but for the
entrenchment of reaction
and further imperialist seizures.
This,

rivalry in the capitalist

As

the Second

their

in

anti-fascist

war

this

ZSr

Ut

tHe Capitalist

was an unjust

s ? stem -

USSRs armed engagement with fascism, nazi Germanys inthe upper hand over the USSR, and the Soviet

Armed

Forces

victories

from

In this situation the Soviet

Union intensified its foreign policy actions to counter the
fascist threat and check
the fascist
bloc s further expansion in
Northern Europe and the
Balkans
and the strengthening of Germanys
positions in countries neighbouring on the USSR-Bulgaria,
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Concuncntly and this, too, was a
major contribution

NAZI

34

tslorta,

of the occupied

GERMANYTHE MAIN THREAT

I

In

the context of the Soviet Unions security, relations

with

the aggressor powers-the nazi imperialist

group and military
Japan- were the central problem of Soviet foreign policy in t 399

1941. With Germany poised on the Soviet western frontiers

in
September 1939, these states had a border with thc
USSR extending for thousands of kilometres
and huge springboards for
aggression against the Soviet Union.
Throughout the initial period of the Second World War the
l

SU

Central Committee and the Soviet government proceeded

from the assumption that there
would inevitably be a collision
with nazi

Germany, which was thc most reactionary force ever

spawned by imperialism. In Moscow there were no
illusions whatever about the
nature of fascism and its insatiable appetite for

aggression.

One

evidence of this is provided in a report of a

between thc British ambassador Stafford Cripps
J se Ph Stalin (September 2r, 1940) sent to Washington by
e US
ambassador Laurence Steinhardt, who wrote: Stalin

conversation

eXtremc,y

Komm,wtsl >cbesky International,

No.

veisbaya

the peoples

order.

by Soviet

Zh

inspired

hope that their resistance to fascism would

be successful and were the main factor in turning this resistance
into a mass armed struggle of peoples against thc fascist
new
countries with the

coalition.

the states of the aggressive

fascist bloc, which started the
war
with the objective of enslaving
the entire world and establishing
a predatory new order. For
that reason, for the peoples of
Poland and other states that fell
victim to fascist aggression the
war was from the very beginning
a just struggle for freedom
and national independence. 2

the

At

However, it would be inadequate

to
he Second World War of even
this period as imperialist
on both sides because the
resistance of the masses in the
counties subjected to fascist
aggression focussed in liberation
from
the outset. One should
bear in mind thc special danger

short

ability to gain

assess

'

cut

was decisive to mobilising all the peoples for the struggle against
for freedom, independence, and social progress.
The

imperialist war not only on

CSSivC ascist bloc but a ^o
on the part of the

ag

Anglo-French

allies, this

inWafT
ntial stage,

its

thC PeOP ' es thc

* war
was increasingly becoming an
Academician Y. M. Zhukov writes
that "thc
'

to

The Second World War acquired a definitively just and libwhen the Soviet Union became involved. This

many

to take a hard-

er stand against the

aggressive powers. The liberation
struggle
o peopics began to
unfold under the leadership of
communist

Par eS
'!
with
r
h (Jermany
and tts

could

fascism,

scope the peoples in

governments

it

by Britain, France, and the USA

weaken the positions of the bulwark of

erative character

many-years imperialist

World War grew

a successful struggle against

everything

socialism.

camp. 1

oun tries increasingly pressed

facilitating

thrusts

attempts to

their

in

ain, Trance,

acy

did

Munich anti-Soviet

the

The governing classes of Britand Germany are waging war for

world supremwar is a continuation of the

towards

USSR

OV

tNo.

T, C

1,

risins

1980, p.

8-9, 1959,

PP 5 - 4
of thc Second World War
.

Novaya
*

^ ran k

Stalin had made it quite

was designed to avoid thc involveent of the
Soviet Union in the war and, in particular, to avoid
con ict with the
German Army. Stalin had admitted that Ger-

cleCar

no-

j.

realistic.

tbat h s present policy

3*

35

many

constituted the only real threat

to the Soviet Union and
German victory would place the Soviet Union in
a difficult
not dangerous position, but he
felt that it was impossible
at the present time to invite
the certainty of a German invasion
of the Soviet Union by any
alteration of Soviet Policy. 1
that a

The USSR laced Germany under

conditions that were extremely unfavourable. Germany had
access to enormous economic
resources that, as it subjugated
Western Europe, considerably
surpassed the economic potentialities
of the Soviet Union. Germany enjoyed an undisputed reputation
of being the strongest
military power of
the capitalist world. It
foreign policy
tion of

commanded huge

resourccs-its central role in

European and Asian

the

powerful

coali-

imperialist states, the growing coor-

dination of their strategic plans

and practical actions in many
(which gave Berlin increasing leverage
regions of the world far from
Germany) and, lastly, the na2i
political diktat in Europe and
the ramified system of alliances
areas of world politics

and

with many European countries. Class

hatred for the
throughout the capitalist world and the
anti-Soviet and
anti-communist leaning of the ruling
quarters in the countries
forming the capitalist encirclement
of the Soviet Union played
into the hands of Germany
as the shock force of another crusade against the worlds first
socialist country.
Ol course serious difficulties wore
links

LSSR

created for the

Unions policy towards

Germany by
rivaIs

LSSR and

t0

the

hasten

intensified

the nazis. These efforts

and the need

were a drag on the Soviet Unions

possibilities

Soviet

efforts

of

between the
them
for manoeuvre.

to counter

In the initial period of the war

the main concern of Soviet
foreign policy relative to Germany
was to keep Berlin bound
as long as possible to the
commitment of non-aggression, even
if this was unreliable and
unstable, bring into play all political
potentialities for containing the nazi
leaderships aggressive ambitions, and use every possibility
for strengthening the USSRs

defence capacity. At the same time, the

Soviet Union did not,
course, retreat from

o.
ci

its

etc situation of 1939-1941

fundamental principles. In the

the only realistic line

Foreign Relations of the United States.

1940, Vol.

i,

was one that

959

6 ,,.

objective,

line that

could ensure the attainment of the cento safeguard and strengthen, in ful-

which was

filment of Lenins behests, the bulwark of the world revolutionary process-thc Soviet Union. The maintenance of relations with
Berlin on the level of the non-aggression treaty predicated the
special and not always visible character of the diplomatic battles

between the Soviet Union and Germany, when the Soviet

Union s striving to avoid unnecessary strains was always combined with

its

firm stand against nazi intrigues. Soviet foreign

policy countered

Germany

Germany sought

to

curity,

inflict

damage
USSRs se-

strictly to the extent of the

on the

interests

of the

without allowing matters to reach a point of sharp con-

frontation.

must be specially emphasised that the Soviet efforts, in

Second World War, to secure better conditions for the inescapable clash with nazism were made by
no means solely through Soviet-German relations as such. To
It

the early period of the

reduce Soviet foreign policy preparations to repulse nazi aggression to these relations would be a gross mistake. Yet this
is
exactly what is being done by most bourgeois historians, who
studiously separate Soviet-German relations of 1939-1941 from
the overall context of Soviet international efforts in that
period.
They ignore a key aspect of the problem, namely, the tense
struggle between the USSR and Germany in regions adjoining

USSR. There were anti-Soviet manoeuvres by Germany in

Finland, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Japan, Hungary, Turkey, Roma-

the

nia, Iran, Sweden, Yugoslavia,

and other countries. The forms
and methods of the Soviet counteraction to these
manoeuvres
were in each case selected to fit the situation.

Soviet policy towards Germany was, needless to

say, by no
means passive, as was asserted at the time by the political
forces
hostile to the USSR and as is still being
asserted by present-day

bourgeois historians. It was not a matter

of the Soviet Union
having been used by Germany,
as most bourgeois historians
maintain, but a case of Soviet diplomacy skilfully
using imperiallst

con-'

ruled out both foreign policy

adventurism and capitulation. This
1

was the only

tral

contradictions on a large historical scale.

Deep-seated motivations gave birth to the myth of a deal
e tween the
USSR and Germany. Its political basis

was the
desire of the ruling
circles of the two imperialist coalitions to
ave P c plc think along
precisely these lines. In London, Paris,

36
37

and Washington the allegation that

the USSR and Germany
U C a barga n . was made with
the purpose of discredit!
ing the TUSSR and inflicting
the maximum political damage
on
it
It was also expected that
in refuting this blatant lie the
Soviet
Lmon would lose its temper, fall for the
provocation, and

thereby cause a further exacerbation

of

many.

its

relations with Ger-

In the case of Berlins rulers, they

were even

more

their efforts to sustain this

th

LjSS ff s
f

^ u hly from the

active in

myth, chiefly to engineer a deteriorarcl tions with Britain,

France, and the USA.

latter half of 1940 to almost

the moment
invaded, the nazis peddled this
myth through
the mass media and through
diplomatic and intelligence channels as a means of camouflaging
their preparations for aggression
against the Soviet Union.
t

ic

USSR was

Throughout the initial period of the

Second World War
Soviet diplomacy exposed the
provocative assertions about the
character of the relations between
the USSR and Germany. For
instance, on February 22,
1940, the Peoples Commissar
for
oreign Affairs of

in

London

I.

the

USSR

Maisky

instructed the Soviet

ambassador

inform the British Foreign Office

of the following fundamental line of
the Soviet Unions relations
with Germany: First. We consider
to

as ridiculous

and

insulting

not only the assertion but even any

assumption that the USSR
ms allegedly entered into a military alliance
with Germany. Even
simpletons in politics do not enter so
lightmindcdly into a military alliance with a belligerent
power for they cannot but realise
how complex and hazardous such an alliance
would be.
Second. The economic treaty with
Germany is no more than trade
.

agreement under which exports from the

will reach the

sum

of only 500

USSR

to

Germany

million

marks; besides, this agreement is economically beneficial to the USSR,

which receives from
Germany a large number of machine tools and
other equipment,
as well as quite a large amount of
armaments, the sale of which
has been consistently denied to us in
both Britain and France.
third. The USSR remains neutral,
as before, if of course, Britain and France do not attack it
and compel it to take up arms
The rumours, assiduously spread, that the USSR
and Germany
have entered into a military alliance are sustained
ceitain elements in

Germany

itself in

not only by
order to intimidate Brit-

and France but also by some agents of Britain and France

want
to use the imagined switch of the
USSR to the German camp for their special purposes in interain

themselves, which

nal politics.'

The bourgeois inventions about a deal between the USSR

and Germany arc compellingly refuted by historical evidence
such as, for example, the content and orientation of Soviet military-strategic planning. What accord could there have
been
when as early as April 1940 the General Staff of the Red Army,
acting on instructions from the CPSU Central Committee, was
completing

man

its

operational plan for repulsing the expected Ger-

attack?

M. Vasilevsky, who was

Deputy Chief of

A.

pointed First

at

approximately that time ap-

the General Staffs

Operational

Department, was actively involved in drawing up that plan. In

his memoirs he writes: We worked in concord and very
inten-

The operational plan took up all our time and thoughts.

Germany was indicated in the plan as the most likely
and main adversary (my italics.-?. S.). It was assumed that Italy might act on the German side,
but, the plan specified, it
sively.

Hitler

would

in all probability confine itself to the Balkans,

indirectly
threatening our frontiers. Germany could possibly be supported by Finland (after the defeat of France and British
evacua-

tion

from Dunkirk the Finnish leaders drew closer to Berlin),

(a source of raw materials for Germany since
1939,

Romania

rejecting neutrality altogether to join the fascist bloc

in the
mer of the next year) and Hungary (at the time already

her of the Anti-Comintern Pact).

tilities

might be confined

In this connection,

it

to the

Shaposhnikov

felt

that

western borders of the

sum-

memhos-

USSR.

was there that the plan proposed the con-

forces. A Japanese attack on our Far

East was not precluded, however, and so the
plan provided for
such a force to be deployed there as
would guarantee us a stable

centration

of our main

situation.
Such were the basic military-strategic points of
the Soviet operational plan
for repulsing aggression.
As regards the question of determining the exact time of a

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

t

A.

M.

1981, p. 74.

Vasilevsky,

Lifelong

Cause,

Progress

Publishers,

Moscow,

38
39

decisive clash

between the

r it ,-s

USSR and

^ ~Mc

lZ7j,r:,
*

subscribe.

and mobilisation stocks. In the period between

January ,<,, and
January 1941 the increases in state reserves
and mobilisation

My

stocks were: pig iron-five-fold

- ^rr.

rolled stock-two-fold;
copper-

more than two-fold xinc-r.r-fold; and

lead-i.6-fold. Stocks of
food and fodder were created to last
the Armed Forces from
four to six months ,n the event
of war. The
;

material resources

value of the nations

was

nearly

doubled in the course of 18

months before nazi Germany
invaded the USSR. The Soviet
defence industry developed at
roughly three times
the rate of

the other industries. 1

all

The CPS U Central Committee

and

fron,

Japanese

milita^ peL^m

SLrrt:

a"

hC5e e,feK

^rr sx

,h

f-rhae

in

the Soviet defence

'

programme'

Soviet government

the

non-i.ggress.on

pact signed with Germany

in
Soviet Union could be attacked

9)9 , a t a time
on two fronts- -by

^ ^ZTo'^'

the

were well aware that Berlins

attitude to the observance
of the
non-aggression pact neither was
nor could be sincere. Soviet
diplomacy had no illusions on this
score. As to evaluating
,

when the
Germany and by Japan-thcre arc no
grounds for asserting
Stalin relied on it. The
CPSU Central Committee and the

that

Soviet

government proceeded from

the assumption that while

this pact
did not deliver the USSR
from the threat of nasd
aggression it
gave us an opportunity to win
time for strengthening our defences
and prevent the formation
*
of a united anti-Soviet
front

^ ^'b^dt

writes

Marshal G. K. Zhukov, who in February

1941 was apP
Red Army General Staff.

pointed Chief of the

Unions military a/d

tC

ANTI-SOVIETISM
IST ADVERSARIES
'^ERIAI
nr THE
'rur AXIS
OF
POWERS
'

On

the

question of the policy of

non-interference and
of aggressor the CC report
to the ,8th CPSU
LCarCS
d)c policy of non-interference
there is

ppeasement
CSS

T ^

the

V l
Nv s ,i P^;

40

:t;

Srru- - -

V-,, p. 4I9

Mo ^ fT'

deSke

t0 hinder the a

S*sors
s?nT WOrk
t0 prCvent s y
f
getting
m
embro
ld
L
r' led i n wat WIth
Chlna and still better, with the
!
Soviet
in

'0 *

ar* rs*

their

the

'wfZZ 1-

ttrZ,

,a

WM W"-

"

A SS'ession

> Beginning el
Against ,be USSR, Moscow.
74 pp

(in

RusSoU

Moscow,

,9

41

Union, not to prevent,

European
II

aflams,

Him

say,

Germany from

from getting embroiled

t0

'

getting stuck

the

ing the world at its expense.

of the period between the

<* *

dee

P
wa to tacit|
war,
tacitly encourage them
to do so, to let them
wear down
and exhaust each other and
then, when they are
sufficiently
weakened, to enter the stage with
fresh forces, to enter
of
course, in the interests of
peace and to dictate terms
to the
uca-cncc >e lgercnts. This political
assessment of the Munich
hc> accurately defined
i
the political aspirations of
nazi Germany s imperialist adversaries
throughout 1939-1941 and to
some extent, in the subsequent
period.
The strengthening of the Soviet
Union's security in the face
2'
Ce tral bM by no
l bjccfive of
ofSo
f
Soviet, foreign policy during
these

aim of destroying the worlds first socialist state and redividThe anti-Soviet military schemes
autumn of 1939 and the spring
of 1940 were the last and most adventurist gamble in the criminal strategy of the Munichmcn: they undertook the initiative
to launch aggression. Their calculations were that in these circumstances nazi Germany would take its natural step and

in

war with the Soviet

in

likewise attack the

<

T*-**
th

he

An 7 F

POl C

years.

f thc

Gcrma "

anti-Soviet

bloc

imperialist rivals,

WC1 e extremcl
dangerous to thc
3
phoney war, i.c until mid-May
1940 the

U n
f
USSR.
During the

'

international climate for thc

^mounting danger

of an

USSR was

armed

showing instead a readiness

at times

intervention

Motivated by their anti-Sovietism

governments actually brought the war
still

The

to

fraught with

with
use

against the

and French

Germany

to a stand-

armed
was

their

forces

USSR. In terms of the harm that

i
Hicted on Soviet security
interests and of the intensity
of their
anti-Soviet activities during
the period of the "phoney
war in
Europe the Anglo-French coalition
was objectively not second
to nazi Germany In
planning and, in fact, preparing for
hostilities against the USSR
during the first few months of
1940 (in a
northwestern and a southern directions),
London and Paris were
even ahead of nazi Germany,
where the drawing of operational
p ans of war against the USSR was started only
in the latter half
or 1 940*

UU

and

thc Soviet historian O.

A. Rzheshevsky
f
plans for a new joint anti-Soviet

crusade
pursued by
cstern powers, which
prepared a second world war
with

were the
\X

that the design

ie

XLly 7

p ointed

logical continuation of
thc

prewar

mJZZtzZZ?2m:ZP7 *
oF

leads to the conclusion that these policies were, in essence, followed in all geographical directions and affected all major matters relative to the security of the USSR-/;; the Soviet northwest,
where Finland was being pushed into war against thc Soviet
Union, with Britain and France displaying their readiness to
intervene militarily on the side of the Finnish militarists; in the

Soviet west,

policies

where anti-Soviet campaigns were aimed

ing the measures being taken by the

by Britain and

British

An analysis of the entire range of the anti-Soviet policies

pursued by the Anglo-French coalition and the USA inevitably

rity

(Western Ukraine, Western

region);

the

USSR.

in the southwest,

anti-Soviet

nudged

aspirations

into a

where
of

USSR

Byelorussia,
efforts

at disrupt-

to reinforce

and

were made

bourgeois-landowner

its

secu-

the

Baltic

to

kindle

Romania

USSR, and where antiwere being woven in Sofia, Budapest, and Belgrade; in the south, where military aggression against the USSR
was also planned, attempts were being made to draw Turkey
into anti-Soviet activity, and hostility for the USSR was
being
fanned in Iran and Afghanistan; in the Far East, where the
Anglo-French coalition and the USA spared no effort to aggravate Sovict-Japanese relations and channel Tokyos expansionconfrontation with the

Soviet intrigues

ism to the north, to the frontiers of the

USSR.

In other words, in the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet

Union there was practically no country where British and French

diplomacy was not playing an anti-Soviet game to one extent or

Thc reason for this active anti-Soviet preoccupation on

another.

the part

of Britain and France, as well as of the USA, was

rooted chiefly in the logic of thc Munich political conception,

which was

Sovlet Uai "

*

to

divert

Germany from

its

expansionist ambitions

O. A. Rzheshevsky, War and History (US Bourgeois Historiography

of
e Second World War),
Moscow, 1976, p. 100 (in Russian).

42
43

USSR

the

t ht

gS tt:S5Ion a a hist the

8

tion,
ion

USSR, compel

mtereStS of the Anglo-French

coali-

and secure a qualitative

weakening and, perhaps, the deruction

of the worlds

socialist state A key

objective of
block the Soviet Union's
striving to avoid
thE lmperialist
by chilling its relations with
first

policy

was

V " ent

G'
trermany,

to

and draw it as quickly

most unfavourable situation.

as possible into the

war

in the

During the period of the phoney war and, to a large extent,

up to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, British, French,
and US diplomacy engaged in a complex game relative to the
USSR, seeking to combine incompatible objectives. On the one
hand, the British and French tried to secure a deterioration of
the external conditions for the USSR by bringing every possible
pressure to bear on the USSR, deteriorating Soviet-German

and by fanning anti-Soviet feeling among the Soviet

relations

dd

'

thinkin
ing in

VLondon
f

ar
ayS
u

the hiSt0ry 0f the Second

are thc 'sic of the fore

and Pans during

n P^y

this

period.

overrunning o

months

World

Poland," he writes, "was

lullchristened the Phoney
War.
.

The rapid

followed
.

by a
For the leaders

fix

as

the Westetn countries

spent the time in
framing f*
f
P
attackins Gcrma >'' s flanks -and
talked
abZt fh
n too openly.
about
them all
In reality, there was no
prospect
o
ranee and Britain ever being
able, alone, to develop
the
strength required to overcome
Germany. Their best hope, now
that Germany and Russia
faced each other on a common
border
u as that friction would ...
draw Hitlers explosive force castward instead of westward. That
happened a year later, and
,

not been impatient

happened earlier if the Western

Allies bad
1
(my italics. -P.S.).

Articulating the views of

many Western political leaders of
time, Liddell Hart regrets
that the efforts of

the

thc

Anglothis clash were inadequate.

But
the decisive factor was not
inadequacy of the efforts made
by
Britain and Francc-these
were more than adequatc-but in
the
effectiveness of Soviet foreign
policy.
f cussing on worsening
thc

French coalition to provoke

external

I men
USSR,

and French diplomacy sought

military mact'on of their countries
so as
ing to fight

conditions

British

am
/
s

others,

the

British

a conversation

with

However

F rench
B.

the

in
1939-1941 the anti-Sovietism of thc
Anglocoa lition was not head-on,
undisguised in aii situations.

li.

Liddell Hart, History of the Second

of

World War,

p.

?0 6.

On

thc other hand, the reality of the state

war with Germany kept reminding London and

Paris that

by going too far they could lose, for their anti-Soviet policy could
lead to a military confrontation with the USSR and thereby

make an enemy
tempts

Hence

of yet another great power.

by the leaders

of the Anglo-French

many

the

coalition,

at-

notably

the British, to start a conversation about a desire to seek a

general improvement of relations, to set a

relations with the

USSR,

new tone

in the

etc.

Ihesc approaches were made chiefl)' for tactical reasons-to

ensure that their anti-Soviet policy did not alienate the USSR.
In no instance did London and Paris raise in practical terms
the question of expedient steps in the sphere of political, let
alone military cooperation with the USSR. On
the contrary,
they demanded one concession after another from thc Soviet

Union, seeking gradually to draw the USSR into the war, to

it from its neutrality posture, pushing it not into a realistic and equitable alliance with the Anglo-French coalition,
as

move

was offered by the USSR at the negotiations in the summer of

1939 and realised only with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic
War, but into a premature confrontation with Germany, while
themselves remaining aloof.

to

newspaper magnate Lord

the Soviet ambassador
most cherished dream was to
see a German-Soviet

R
Beavcrbrook
London

for

camouflage the
altogether to avoid hava real war with Germany.
This was admitted can-

Unions neighbours.

The

USA

likewise used various pretexts to inflame tension

in its relations

with the Soviet Union. Cordell Hull acknowledges

memoirs that on thc eve of the Hitlers invasion of the
USSR, US policy towards the Soviet Union embraced the following points: Make no approaches to Russia. Treat any approaches toward us (the USA -P.S.) with reserve until the Russians satisfied us they were not maneuvering
merely to obtain
in

his

u nilateral
1 be

co ncessions for themselves. 1

Memoirs of

C. Hull, Veil.

II,

The

USA

The Macmillan

Co.,

thereby in ad-

New

York, 1948,

PP- 972-7J.

44

45

XL"

barriers t0 the Sovie '

Union

'

cff

- -

hostile

made by Lenin

Througtout the initial period

of the Second World War
the
Anglo-French coalmen neither
offered nor tried to offer
the
any alter ati
t0 na2 ^Stesrion,
i
an alternative
7
that
thaTcouwT
could be more acceptable
f to
the

USSR

ts

security than a policy of

neutrality

ealC On th
the
r? SS
he USA
L Apursued

rary

.T

indis P utablc

,udg,ns by thcic

Britain

'

F mce

(until

its

in

S0Viet

and not by
and

f rd8n

to

P licy in the initial P edod of

ensure the security of all Soviet

state

ronticrs

notably in Europe, maintaining

corresponding relations with neighbouring
countries.
Soviet
diplomacy tackled
hesc tasks as part of the entire
spectrum of problems in the
USSR s relations with the two imperialist
groups.

Growing

anti-Soviet feeling and aspirations

ing quarters in

some neighbouring

arising

the rul-

states

out of the fact that the

against us.

many and

USSR was

encircled by

and Frances imperialist adversaries, Geracted in the same anti-Soviet key. To one ex-

Britains

Italy,

tent or another, practically all

of the Soviet Unions neighbours

northwest, west, southwest, and south were dependent on
the leading imperialist powers. Whenever any of them tried
to
in the

pursue a more balanced policy towards the USSR they promptly

came under strong pressure from the imperialist coalitions, pushing

them

into worsening their relations or even into a confronwith the USSR.

Thus, expressing the opinion of Finnish reactionaries, Pchr

tation

Evind Svinhufvud, who was President of Finland

down

laid

the

in 193 T-1937,

following guideline:

...any enemy of Russia

must always be a friend of Finland. 2 In Helsinki they rejected
as fundamentally unacceptable the only reasonable alternative,
namely, the promotion of friendly relations with their great

eastern neighbour on the basis

Soviet elements

in

Finland

of

peaceful

actively

drew

coexistence.
closer

to

Anti-

countries

which at that stage were hostile towards the USSR. An analogous posture was adopted by the ruling quarters in bourgeoislandowner Poland, which suffered a crushing military defeat,
and by the leaders of bourgeois-landowner Romania. Statements
to the effect that

Romania was an unsheathed sword ready

defend the old continent

,:0

palace

> al

in

Bucharest.

The question
9 I9

followed

one another out of

to

the

of military bridgeheads against the

V.
,

among

were a distinctive feature of the early period of the

Second World War. In 1939-194!
there was a dramatic rise in
the impact of all the negative
factors

about freedom, independence and democracy is sheer hypocrisy,

and the Entente may compel them once again to raise their hand

in

defeat),

for security along

THE USSRS FRONTIERS
SeLri World
|/w
Second
War was

now one, now another of the small states that

are our neighbours. Such attempts will occur because the small
states arc wholly dependent on the Entente, because all this talk

f historical

1919,

doubt that further

est

The situation bore out the forecast

when he said: I have not the slightattempts will be made by the Entente

countries.
in

to set against us

terms of ensuring

in

and non-involvement

a harder policy towards the

USSR during the
period of the phoney war
and, in many respects, almost
until
the very outbreak of the
Great Patriotic War, than in
peacetime
Germany s imperialist adversaries
had no desire whatever
or setious political rapprochement
with the USSR, They wanted
not a neutral Soviet Union,
but a Soviet Union that would
bear
most of the burden of the
war against Germany and divert the
Third Reich from its war against
the West. In London Paris
(unt, the defeat of France)
and Washington they realised that
a political rapprochement with
the USSR prior to the start
of
Germany s crusade' against the East
could inhibit the realisation of the naz. s aggressive
plans, if not frustrate them
altogether, and they therefore
ruled out such rapprochement
so as to
8
the USSR In thc broad
this
b the
n
Strategy by
Western imperialist circles was very
much consonant with the Munich political line.

capitalist

it

I. Lenin, Seventh All-Russia

Collected Works, Vol. 50, 1965,

Congress
p.

of

Soviets.

USSR was

December

5-9,

217.

Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D (1957-1945),

V, Washington, 1953, p. 536.
N. I. Lebedev, The iron Guard, Carol I] and Hitler (From the History
* omanian Fascism, the Monarchy, and Its Foreign Policy of " Playing on
J.
?<"> Tables),
Moscow, t 96s N. I. Lebedev, The Downfall of Fascism in
a mam a, Moscow,
1976 (both in Russian).

46
47

paramount
i

azi

the anti-Soviet plans of the

imperialist powers,

Germany acquired such

a bridgehead in the west as early

September 1939, after crushing

bourgeoisdandowner Poland,
and then assiduously sought to
expand it by drawing the Soviet
Union s neighbours in the northwest
and southwest (Finland, Romania, and Bulgaria) into its
military-political orbit. For its part,
the Anglo-French coalition,
which had no common
as

the

frontier with

USSR, concentrated on creating sores

for the USSR wherever possible, shifting the focus

of their anti-Soviet activities to
die countries bordering on the
USSR.
In

the period of the

phoney war Soviet foreign policy

tions to the

ac-

west and northwest of its European

frontiers were
motivated chiefly by the need to reinforce
the countrys
security

in

the face of nazi

frontiers

Germanys presence on the Soviet western

a result of the overrunning

of bourgeois Poland,
it was also crucial to
prevent Germany from
seizing the territory of the Western
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, which had been tom
away from Soviet Russia in 1920.
It was vital to reduce the
possibility of the nazi threat spreading
le BaltIC The treaties
of mutual assistance that the
fUSSR signed
with the Baltic states were directed largely
towards
one of the aims that the Soviet government
had sought to achieve
as

in this situation

at the

Anglo-French-Soviet talks in the

summer

of 1939,

name-

greater security in the Baltic region.

Since both the British
and the French refused to join in
organised resistance to the aggressor in this part of Europe,
Soviet diplomacy steadfastly
worked to attain this objective by means
of
ly,

bilateral relations

with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The resultant treaties upset
tlie calculations of the
Western powers that Estonia, Lithuania,
and Latvia would let Hitler use their territory
as a passageway
01 an invasion of the USSR
and even take part in that invasion.

Problems linked

to Sovict-Finnish relations, especially

in

view

of the attempts of both

imperialist groups

to use the militarist

of the then Finnish leadership
to create a war threat on
the Soviet Unions northwestern
frontier in the period of the
phoney war in Europe, were also in the
focus of Soviet foreign
po icy. It was the USSRs belief that
problems

mood

could and should

be settled by, above

possibility

all,

peaceful, political means,

opened up by diplomacy had

and that every

to be used to this end.

Had

it

not been for the hostile influence of the imperialist

pow-

which egged Finland

s ruling quarters into a

confrontation
not to be ruled out that the USSR and Finland would have reached a mutual understanding by peaceful

ers,

USSR,

with the

it is

means.
In London and Paris, as well as in Washington, it
was expected that a military conflict between Finland and
the USSR
could open up the long-sought opportunity for organising

an

USSR

attack on the

by the entire imperialist camp. Since, on account of the Soviet Unions resolute actions, nothing came of
their
calculations on a military clash between the USSR
and Ger-

many

in the

west

in

September 1939, their search

for

ways of

USSR into a big war and for new bridgeheads

USSR shifted to the northwest. With pressure from

dragging the
against the
the

imperialist powers intensifying, the Finnish

government
showed no willingness for a mutually-acceptable peaceful settlement and tried to get unilateral concessions from the USSR.
Military-political

developments which showed that Finland

would be inescapably defeated brought the Finnish side
round
to seeing the need for a peaceful settlement.

The notorious

stories

about the

division

Poland,

of

the

Sovietisation

of the

Baltic region,

and aggression against

Finland are refuted by the sober assessments of leading

bourgeois

political

personalities,

publicists,

and

historians.

For

in-

stance, recalling the years

1939-1941 juho Kusti Paasikivi, who

was President of Finland, noted: For a period of more than
ten recent years the Soviet leaders stressed
to us that peace had
to be preserved in this region.
In their proposals and
requests

they pointed out that

was necessary to ensure the security of

the country and remove the possibility
of aggression through
Finland.
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, who succeeded Paasikivi as
it

President of Finland, said in 1964: If today, two

decades later,
we try to put ourselves in the position of the Soviet Union,
we
shall be able, in the light of Iditlers
attack on the Soviet Union
1,1

1941, to understand the concern that the

feel relative to
1

its

USSR

could not but

security at the close of the 1930s. 2

Tbe

Paasikivi Line. Ankles and Speeches by Juho Kusti Paasikivi.

1944Moscow, 1958, p. 139 (Russian translation).
Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, Friendship and Goodneighbourly
Relations.
Peaches and Statements, 1963-1967,
Moscow, 1968, p. 56 (Russian translation).

/ 95>,

48
4-26

49

complex area

for

Soviet foreign policy

for security in the southwest

plomacy sought

on the attempts of the then Chinese leadership to provoke

was the struggle

and the Balkans, where Soviet di-

to counter the anti-Sovietism in the

policies of

the ruling circles of

Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, combining this with efforts to establish with these
countries not only
constructive relations but also relations of
friendship based on

nazi

Although the southern approaches to the USSR were geographremote from the European theatre, where the

main

events of the world

danger emanated to

war unfolded and from where the greatest

the vital interests of the USSR, the CPSU

Central Committee and the Soviet government

attached considthe development of the Soviet Unions
relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Soviet diplomacy
followed, with unrelaxed attention, the intensive anti-Soviet

Germany.

USSRs approach to militarist Japan, to the

problem of containing and preventing Japanese aggression against
die Soviet Union, was the effort to blunt the threat from
Japanese militarism by political means and, as far as possible,
Central to the

mutual security, equality, and the settlement of

outstanding problems. Of course, the USSR took a differentiated
approach to
each of these countries.
ically

war

between the USSR and Japan; fourth, as far as possible to

weaken, again using the inter-imperialist contradictions, the anti-Soviet aspects of the expanding cooperation between Japan and

more constructive

secure

with Japan

relations

in

with a firm rebuff to Tokyos anti-Sovietism in

combination

its manicounterposing this line to the policies of Japans

rulers, Soviet diplomacy effectively countered the creation of a
Far Eastern front against the USSR.

festations.

all

By

erable significance to

AN IMPERIALIST PLOT
WAS NOT RULED OUT:
SECRET DIPLOMACY

game

played in these countries by the two imperialist coalitions,

took
every possible counter-measure to prevent these
southern neighbours of the USSR from being used to the detriment
of its security,

and consistently pursued a

line

aimed

at restraining

and

limiting anti-Soviet manifestations in the policies

of the ruling
countries. The southern direction of Soviet
diplomacy was by no means of a purely restraining, defensive
character. On the contrary, the USSR worked towards

quarters in these

its aims
with resolution, suggesting to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan
a comprehensive programme for strengthening goodneighbourly
rela-

on the basis of mutual security'.

One of the most important areas of Soviet diplomatic activity
the initial period of the Second World War
were the efforts

The international situation of the early period of the Second

World War was such that up to and even after the disastrous
defeat of the Anglo-French coalition in the summer of 1940 the
Soviet government could not entirely ignore the possibility of an
anti-Soviet deal between the belligerent imperialist coalitions. In
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikovs reminiscences we

find what
Do
J. V. Stalin told him in the autumn of 1940:
not imagine, he (Stalin. -P.S.)

tions

the

in

gressor are rushing back

Western

in this difficult

They are prepared

keeping the USSR uninvolvcd in war with Germany in Europe and with Japan in the Far East. In practical terms,
what

alter

in

Soviet diplomacy

had

to

do was:

first, prevent Japanese aggressecond, use inter-imperialist contradictions to prevent the consolidation of both
imperialist groups on
an anti-Soviet basis; third, continue the line of extending sup-

sion against the

USSR;

after Frances

defeat

to

and

forth

make new

between Berlin and London.

concessions at any time, pro-

vided the aggressor turns his arms against the Soviet Union. M1
The very attitude adopted by Britain and France to the war

September 1, 1939, eloquently pointed to the fact that

the hopes for
a real war breaking out against the Soviet Union
'verc still very much alive. The nazis were invited, as it were, to
continue

developing aggression in the direction of the Soviet

Union. The French journalist Ronald Dorgclcs was astounded

port to China in the Sino-Japanese war, keeping a vigilant

eye
50

that

from the scene. Even now,

time for the British people, appeasers of the ag-

ensure the USSRs security in the Far East. There

Soviet
diplomacy was faced with the task of using the results
of its
actions on the eve of the Second World War, when it
succeeded
to

said,

conciliators will depart

V.

I.

Chuikov, Mission

in

China,

Novy mr. No.

11, 1979, p. 202.

4*

51

by what was taking place on the

Western front: Artillerymen
deployed along the Rhine were calmly
watching German ammurmion trains running on the opposite bank,
and our airmen were
dying over the smoking chimneys
of the Saar factories without
c ropping bombs,
ihe High Commands main preoccupation
was
obviously to avoid provoking the enemy.
In the work entitled
drome de i 94 o, the French researcher and
general A. Bcaufre
wrote mat in the Allied armies the
war had begun to seem to
e a
colossal scenario of tacir conciliation,
under which nothmg especial could happen if we properly played
our part. In
1

U
.

tench and British military quarters

it was expected that the
itical leadership would
ultimately reach a compromise with

po

Germany. 2
Ihe French

Queen Wilhelmina

of the
Netherlands urged Britain, France,
and Germany to conclude peace.
The machinery of secret diplomacy was working at full capac-

the basis of

new

Meanwhile, the Anglo-French leadership

was engaged in
backstage manoeuvres in many capitals
of the world. For example, with Italian mediation France
was sounding

objectives being:

first, to restore all prewar channels of commuwith Britain; second, to sound how serious Britains
going over was to the camp of Germanys undisguised adversa-

nications

For

ries.

this

purpose they mobilised

war with Germany

On

16, the

as early as

French ambassador

in

September 1939.

Rome Andre

Fran-

all

their forces, including

Sweden, Franz von Papen in Turkey,

the Belgian king, who was under German surveillance, and some
other emissaries. For example, Dahlerus was received by Hitler
and Goring and given a programme for separate talks
with
Britain. Here we shall make only one observation: in the series
in

of secret contacts of

June-August 1939 the initiative was taken

mainly by the British side, whose proposals were rejected by
Hitler, but the situation was now reversed, with the initiative
coming from the Reich Chancellery.

USA looked for wide-ranging muunderstanding with nazi Germany. In early October 1939
R. Davis, an American oil magnate, who told the White

Influential quarters in the

the possibility

of ending the

archival materials the Soviet research-

Bezymensky writes: It has now been established

er L. A.
immediately
following the attack on Poland Hitler, Goring,
that
Canaris
began
a broad offensive on the secret front, their
and

Johan Birger Dahlerus

historian Beau de Lomcnie acknowledges

that although France was in a state of war
with Germany, the operations of the French troops against the
Wchrmacht were a
wretched travesty of an offensive, a
vacillating, timid game.
In essence, the French government
and military leadership were
continuing the former Munich line under
conditions of war. 3

September

On

ity.

tual

W.

Sois-Poncct told Galcaxzo Ciano, then the

Italian Foreign Minister, that if upon the completion
of the Polish campaign Hitler
were to offer reasonable proposals for peace he
could recommend that his government should consider the possibility
of an
agreement with Hitler. In September
1939, the German envoy

House he was willing to act as a mediator between the belligerents, had meetings with Goring. The same subject was
discussed at several meetings between Goring and
James D. Mooney,
head of the General Motors Overseas Corporation. At these
talks Goring put the idea to the
Americans of organising a meet-

in Luxembourg Otto von Radowitz

was informed that the
French Foreign Ministry wanted an honourable
peace with
Germany. Pope Pius XII joined in the peace soundings
in December 1939. The governments of the Netherlands,
Spain, Belgium, Norway, and Finland offered themselves
to both sides as

ing between representatives

of Britain, France, and Germany.
Minister Without Portfolio Hjalmar Schacht, for his part, asked

mediators. In

November 1939 King Leopold

III of

tie
lin

US ambassador in Berlin Hugh Wilson to pass on to FrankD. Roosevelt a request for mediation between the belligerents,

hesc explorative contacts with the nazis

industrialist

Belgium and

and

friend

were joined

of Gorings

also by
Johan Birger

Dahlerus, to
Ronald Dorgcles, La drole de guerre.

icj}q-i<j 4 o,

Editions Alhin Michel,

Paris, 1957, p. 9.
2

Andre Bcaufre,
R.

Vol. V,

Beau

Le

de

op.

cit.,

I.omenie,

whom Hitler expressed his willingness to establish

'icndly relations with Britain and guarantee its
security. They

p. 198.

Les responsibility dcs dynasties

Hitler a Petain, Editions Denoel, Paris,
1973.

L.

bourgeoises,

A.

Bezymensky, Secret Diplomacy' of Prince Hohenlohe (From the

Backstage Talks Between Nazi Germany and the Western PowNov aya i noveisbaya isloriya No. 1, 1980, p. 133.

Jry of die
T',

c -v
tr

52
53

were

also joined by the former Supreme

Commissar of the League
Nations in 'Danzig, the Swiss diplomat
and scholar Carl
Jacob Burckhardt and representatives of
of

some neutral

Prince
est

countries

Max

political

Hoheniohe, who had the confidence of the

highquarters in the Third Reich and
had for several

years been a Berlin emissary in the most

important secret diplomatic missions, started seriously to sound
out the possibility for
a deal between Britain and Germany
at the close of 1959 and
in early 1940. The British
had expected this overture. The Brit-

envoy

ish

London

in

Switzerland David V. Kelly recalls: Before

left

had been given orally and very secretly by Sir

Robert
(later Lord) Vansittart, who
was adviser to the Secretary of
State but no longer Permanent
Undcr-Secrctary, the names of two
Germans to whom I might listen if they ever
approached me.
I

Some time in June, the former Swiss Minister

in London,
M. Paravicini, after ascertaining that I had no
objection, invited me to visit him after nightfall to
meet Prince Hoheniohe,
who ... was one of the Germans I had been
authorized

meet

if

he wished.

was

This
see me,

all

to

the first of three or four visits to

Switzerland to
within the period of five or six weeks before
the

Battle of Britain.

Put

the message he professed to bring from

Hitler
was always the same, though with an increasing note
of urgency.
Hitler did not wish to touch
Britain or the British Empire
(though a deal over one of the old German
colonies would be
helpful); nor to ask for any reparations;
his sole condition was
briefly,

we should make peace and

that

hand

in

leave him

a completely free

Europe. 2

The American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles

toured
Europe in February-March 1940 and in a meeting
with him
the French Premier Edouard Daladier said
he would not refuse
to deal with

Germany

if

France were guaranteed against being

This tour was undertaken

again involved in war with Germany.

b\

Sumner Welles

peasing

the

as part of a search for possibilities of

ap-

aggressor powers.

German diplomats

reported to

USA was suggesting a four-year truce to the

and in the meantime entering into economic negotiations in which Japan (but not Russia) and Italy would
be
included. The American efforts to settle the contradictions
in Europe were approved in London and Paris. It was intimated to Welles that Britain and France were not ruling out a
compromise with the Axis powers.
Virtually in a few days following Frances surrender, the German envoy in Bern arrived in the small Swiss town of Gstaad
to see Prince Hoheniohe. He brought the Prince a letter from
Walter Hewel, who was a key figure in the Third Reichs
Berlin

that the

belligerents

foreign-policy

Foreign
latters

machine.

As

the

full

confidence.

The

the German
Hewel enjoyed the

representative of

headquarters

Ministry at Hitlers

threads of Germanys secret con-

with the Western powers, including the channels opened

tacts

Hewel to Hitler and other

Hoheniohe later recalled receiving this letter: The
ambassador was in a hurry and I opened the envelope only after
he left. It contained a letter. I exactly remember the opening
words: Main Headquarters of the Fiihrer. Ambassador Hewel.
by Prince Hoheniohe, went through
nazi leaders.

And

further: After long consideration the Fiihrer has decided

to enter into

an alliance with Britain. Expounding Hitlers idea,

Hewel wrote

that for Britain the

its

last

war had been

lost

and

chance to obtain Germanys guarantees for

its

this

was

empire.

was surprised by the calm tone of the letter and the absence
demands couched in terms of an ultimatum. So far as I can
remember, it gave September as the deadline. This proposal had
to be accepted before then, otherwise the bombing of Britain
would begin. I felt, and I still feel, that this proposal was made
in earnest. Let me add that the letter was signed by Hewel and
by Gauss, juridical counsellor of the German Foreign Office. 2
Kellys contacts with Hoheniohe were by no means momentary, especially as others were involved. Carl Jacob Burckhardt
went to Berlin in June 1940 where he had political talks, following which ho called on Kelly in Bern to inform him
that
Hitler wanted an armistice with Britain on the following terms:
I

of

A History

of Diplomacy, Vol. 4, Moscow,

1975, pp. 15-14 (j n Russian).
2
David Kelly, 1 be Ruling Few or the Unman Background
to Diplomacy,
Hollis & Carter, London, 1953, pp. 272-73.

Foreign Relations of the United Stales. 1940, Vol.

I
54

1,

p. 64.

954

Documents on German Foreign

.

p.

Policy.

1913-1945, Series D, Vol. VJI 1

771.

Quoted from

L. A.

Bezymensky, op.

cit.,

pp. 134-35.

55

a
Germanys recognition

as a world power; the return

of the colonies; guarantees of the
British Empires inviolability. Kelly
reported this to London, where it
was

interpreted

an

as

official

misc with

No

was made,

USSR.

none had been made in previous political contacts of this kind between the two imperialist coalitions-thc rivals
did not agree about price. The nazis
demanded much more than was acceptable to the other side.

by Lord Halifax

proposal.

Burckhardt and then Kelly were notified

of his reaction. In
reporting Kellys reply Hohcnlohe
informed Ilewel that the British envoy considcrd
Hitler to be a great man but
that Britain did not trust German
promises. Hohcnlohe immediately
got
tOUC1 w,th the Vatican requesting
>
Pope Pius XII to contact
p
Roosevelt
and get him to mediate peace.
major operation to conclude a deal
between Britain and
Germany was undertaken six weeks
before the Great Patriotic

One way

01

another, there

as

was an undisputed common denom-

inator in all these contacts: neither Britain, nor France,

nor the
USA, nor the different mediators ever attempted to prevent the
nazi leadership from carrying out its anti-Soviet plans
in the
East.

War

imperialist adversary before attacking the

its

political deal

4.

On May jo, 1941, Rudolph Hess, the second

the na * party hierarchy after
Hitler, [lew from Augsburg
to
Britain
an Me-iro fighter plane allegedly
on purely personal
initiative
few days before taking off Hess was
instructed by
ttitlet to make no
oppressive demands of England.
Hess set
out the terms for an
Anglo-German peace at a meeting with
the Chancellor of die
Exchequer John Simon and a Foreign
Office representative Iven
Kirkpatrick, who received the nazi
broke out.

INGREDIENTS OF A LIE

Any analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s and the

1940s should give scrupulous attention to a
retrospective consideration of developments. The productiveness
of this policy
can best be judged by comparing the -scale
and character of international tasks in a specific historical situation
with the actual
possibilities obtaining at the time for
accomplishing them.

in their

official

capacities.

In exchange for

ending

the

state

war and guaranteeing the inviolability

of the British colonial
empire Berlin wanted London to
recognise German hegemony
in Europe and to return all
the former German colonies
In
of

the. ev ent the British refused,

Hess threatened,
an intensification of the war in
the air and

it

at sea.

man

would

face

These Gervolume, it is

terms were in fact not new. As

regards their
not likely that Berlin felt they
were too unrealistic. After all,
the many years of his relations
with Britain Hitler had grown
med t0 CXpeCt ng nothin hut concessions
S
to his growing

'

ch?ms
A few days
announced and

Hess appearance in Britain was

publicly
was taken by the nazi leadership to
mean
that h,s mission had failed.
The Third Reichs propaganda
machine went into action at once. Hess
was disavowed and declared a lunatic. But the fact
is- that Hess mission
was evidence
that Berlin had not abandoned
its hopes of reaching
a compro-

Tribunatvol

&

later,

this

The

zeal of bourgeois political thought in

distorting the true

picture of international

development

in the early period

of the

Second World War, particularly Soviet foreign

policy, is a derivative of the broad political aim
to which it is subordinated,
namely, to whitewash imperialism, to absolve
it from the responsibility for unleashing and spreading
the war, and impute
his responsibility to

On

the one hand,

the

USSR.

Western historians and

politicians arc espe-

cially

anxious to justify the gross setback suffered by the policy

of the

Anglo-French coalition

in 1939-1941. They cannot forgive

consistency in championing security with a view
to safeguarding
and reinforcing its positions. Put briefly, the
c aigc
against the USSR is that it refused to serve the

USSR

its

interests

tlie

imperialist camp, that

ria ist

Ivut

it

make

it

made

skilful

use of intcr-impe-

contradictions to advance the cause of socialism and peace,

refused to fall for provocations and adventurism and
itself

vulnerable to a strike by aggressive powers. But

has always been, the strong side of socialisms foru gn policy that enables it to get the better
of its class adversaries,
s

ls

as

thC ther
to

tU c

hand thc heightened attention given in the West

ear iy period of the Second World
War is motivated by

56
57

the desire to find

some arguments

in history to prove that

always aggressive and immoral, to
as an imperialist power and thereby
sub-

Soviet foreign policy

portray the

USSR

is

modern imperialisms principal propaganda lie about

a Soviet threat and prejudice the Soviet
Unions prestige in
stantiate

the world.

Since

these

purely class aims

and supported by

facts, all

cannot be achieved honestly,

the greater

is the lie to which the

compelled to have recourse. The political palette of
their falsifications is extremely broad,
including charges like
conspiring with the nazis, reluctance to cooperate
with

falsifiers are

Germanys imperialist adversaries, connivance at German

agmenacing neighbouring states, economic aid to
Germany, and even an interest in a preventive war
against
Germany and its allies.

gression,

economic analysis with an abstract pattern of struggle

or change the balance of power.

policy during the first phase of the war, for it offers

theoretical" justification for the attempts to bracket the
USSR
not only with Britain and France but also with nazi Germany,
foreign

since all wcie, in the long run, equally

the entire range

of Soviet foreign policy activity-fits aims, principles, overall conception, individual directions of diplomatic activity, and so
on-

misrepresented. But the sought-for goal

is

War

is

aggression

in

1973 under the

World War

struggle for
in the

FRG

History of Germany Since the First

gives the following interpretation of the motives
title

that

allegedly guided the foreign policy actions of

the USSR,
Britain, France, and Germany in the initial period
of the Second World War: The war in Europe, at any rate from the
mo-

ment

was entered by

two Western powers, was not only

over territories, frontiers, and state existence of Poland
but over
the principle that would underlie the order in
Europe: hegemoit

ny or equilibrium.
in

the

culate

groups of

This interpretation suits bourgeois historians

place because it enables them to entirely emas-

first

the

the

substance of
imperialist

the

states

contradictions between the two

and replace a concrete historico-

dem

I
1

Ersien Weltbieg, Vol.

II,

Deutsche Ve'-

among

Fabry.

He

discounted.

whether

countries,

socialist or capital-

on the international

others,

the

German

West

historian

in

1939-

Philipp

aim of Soviet diplomacy

expanding nazi aggression but to
create a counter-weight to Britain by
broadening cooperation
with and strengthening Germany. Fabry writes: For the Kremlin the issue was not even Germany but the
maintenance of the
power balance in Western and Central Europe. As long as it
existed the Soviet Union would be the decisive factor in any
conflict of the relevant magnitude. Enlarging upon this thesis
asserts that the principal

was by no means

to counter

another book, lie maintains that Hitlers conquest of some

West European countries, particularly the aggression in the Balkans, was all but welcomed by the Soviet leadership. 2 Everyin

thing

is

simple,

weakened
positions

if

Fabrys logic

is

accepted: the nazi aggression

Britains positions and, consequently, strengthened the

of the USSR, and for that reason the Soviet Union

had allegedly steadfastly pursued the purpose of expanding the

efforts to prevent the spread of the

war - The Soviet Unions

Philipp

W.

Darmstadt, 7962,
'

Detttscbe Gcscbkhte seit

Iags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1975, p. 9.

are
all

used for an analysis of Soviet foreign policy

is

by,

1941

the actions

by strength and the

power. For example, a voluminous study published

that

invariably seek to expand their influence

W.

of any nation are determined

re-

and spread of the Second World

shared out equally and all the steps taken by the USSR

counter

scene,

More frequently than not the conceptual-methodological

foundation of bourgeois falsifications is the theory of
political realism with the central thesis that in world politics
all

achieved -the

is

sponsibility for the outbreak

ist,

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

motivated by one and

same drive for power. And, of course,

the

The contention

OF SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR

preserve

This method of bourgeois historiography proves to be even

more productive when it is applied to an analysis of Soviet

to

THE MYTH

to

Fabry,
p.

Der

Hitler-Sialin-Pakt.

1959-1941,

Fundus Verlag,

164.

Philipp

ineiuierte

W. Fabry, Die Sowjctunion and das Drittc Reich. Einc dukuGcscbkhte der deutsch-sozejetkcben Bezieb ungen von 1955 bis 1941,

Seewald Verlag,

Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 145, 29c.

58
59

I
war and its long and consistent opposition
to nazi aggression are
thus given out for something quite
different.
Reality is falsified also by the
historian Sven Allard of West
Germany. He does not feel it necessary
to conceal his political
purpose, which is, in his words, to
debunk the idealisation of
tiie Soviet Union and,
most particularly, its foreign policy. 1 Allard studiously tries to reduce
Soviet foreign policy and its unimpeachable principles and aims to the
level of imperialist policy. In order to exonerate
the Munich strategy of the Western

powers, he makes the charge that the

Soviet Union disrupted the
talks on collective measures to
curb the aggressive plans of nazi
Germany. He asserts that it was the Soviet
Unions purpose to
drag out the negotiations with the
British and French governments to the extent of making it clear
to Hitler that

with

Moscow was

believed could

tries

revolutionary

strat-

The magnitude

of the calamity experienced by the world in

compels Western historiography to give as little attention as possible to the study of the lost opportunity-a timely alliance with the USSR against the aggressors-and use the

blanket camouflage that the policy of peace as a whole had

suffered fiasco. Thus, repeating an idea widespread in the West,
the US historian A.F.K. Organski writes: Indeed, it took a
madman to start World War II.
England and France were
.

extremely concerned to preserve world peace

fore

World War

the clear

II,

meaning of

the years

in

much so that they refused

many of Germanys actions.
so

with the Soviet Union

looking on from the sidelines/
This argument is much favoured by
present-day bourgeois his-

ts purpose is
to create the impression that
the
not interested in cutting short nazi
aggression. This
is typified by the writings
of the American historian Louis
Fi1
scher. While he is silent about
the US role in promoting the Munich course towards collusion
with nazi Germany and encouraging the nazis to attack the USSR,
Fischer will have people
believe that it was the Soviet Union
and not the imperialist pow-

USSR was

who conduced to the outbreak of the Second

World War.
Uric D. Butler, a well-known British
historian, argues alon- the
same lines, alleging that the USSR
deliberately precipitated war,
and when war broke out it had no intention
whatever of opposing nazi aggression, which the
Communists confidently
ers

-wen Allard, Stalin und Hitler.

Die sowjetrussisebe Aussenpolitik

TIIE

to

be-

understand

Ibid.

MYTH

John Lewis Gaddis, a distinguished American historian, has

comment: The Munish agreement of September 1938
represented the triumph of a widely shared view that communism was at least as dangerous as fascism, if not more so. It
was
a view which was to persist until Hitlers violation of that agreement six months later made his ultimate intentions clear. But
by that time the Soviet Union had decided that, in the absence
this

of cooperation

from the West, the best chance of preventing war

collaboration with Hitler, not resistance to him. 3 This
last assertion is a falsehood revealing the
tendentiousness of his
lay in

which is yet another stereotype of bourgeois, especially

American, historiography.
thesis,

Categorically refusing to see that the Soviet-German treaty

of non-aggression was signed at a time when collective
resistance
to fascist aggression
ers,

serts

had been blocked

by

the

Western

pow-

West German historian Johann Wolfgang Briigcl asthat the Soviet Union had turned the non-aggression pact

the

Eric D. Butler, The

J)}0-

107.

COLLUSION WITH

NAZI GERMANY

to

prove that on the eve and during the

initial period of the war
Soviet diplomacy was preoccupied
with provoking conflicts between Germany and the Western powers

their

agreement

pp 10 6,

expand

1939-1945

the indispensable condition for the

realisation
of his aggressive plans
With this argument Allard

i<M[, Francke Verlag, Bern,

1974,
2

be used to

egy-'

Red

Pattern of

London, 1968, p. 34.

A. F. K. Organski, World

Politics,

World Conquest,

New

Times

Alfred A. Knopf,

New

York, 1958,

Ltd.,

PP- 61-62.
1

Louis Fischer, Russias

nous. iyi 7 -i 94 i r Harper and

60

Road from Peace

Row

Publishers,

to

New

War. Soviet Poreim

York, 1969.

tiela-

John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States:
Wiley and (Sons, Inc., New York, 1978, p. 138.

An

nterpretive History, John

61

signed with the Third Reich into a

friendship treaty. 1 And further: Actually, Moscows neutrality
provided Hitler with a safe
rear

and enabled him

to

fact that lor the Soviet

start the

Union

Second World War. 2 The

was necessary to win time to

it

be better prepared for resistance to

aggression is cynically discounted by Briigel as not deserving credence. 3
He goes so far
as to declare that for the
pect of war with Germany.

The ideological

USSR

there had never been the pros-

slant of this

widespread Western argument is

obvious. It is trumpeted that had it
not been for the Soviet
posture, Germany would not have
risked starting the war and,
consequently, the responsibility for the
war rests with the Soviet Union. There is thus the omission
of the immutable historical reality that the

Second World War broke out after the Anglo-French coalition had refused to combine
its forces with those
of the Soviet Union to give a concerted
rebuff to fascist aggression. 1 here is thus a silence about
the subsequent activities of
the Western ruling quarters to turn
the spearhead
of the nazi

aggression against the USSR, to drag it into

war and themselves
take a ringside seat as an applauding
spectator.

The endless talk in the West about an alliance

between
USSR and Germany based on an agreement to divide
spheres of influence in Europe 1 is directly
connected with the
charge that the Soviet Unionwas responsible
for die outbreak
of the Second World War. This is the
yardstick used by bourthe

geois

historiography-both

traditional

the steps that were taken by the

frontiers, to

as well as

nish conflict,

steps in connection

entation. It

was

posite side of the

the

less

USA

its

ensure

Johann Wolfgang

its

with the Soviet-Fin-

security, but

were put

Briigel, Stalin

und

European continent, or

US

insular Britain, or

its

state frontier

was moved away from key administrative and

European part of the USSR and this

industrial centres of the

placed the

USSR

in a better position strategically. 1

One of the pillars of the Soviet-German collusion lie is the

misrepresentation of Soviet-German economic relations in 19391941. These relations arc described as collaboration, the alleged direct outcome of which

was a dramatic growth of Germand the creation of conditions

for the active pursuit of its aggression in the West. For instance,
Klaus Hildebrand maintains: The military supplies from Russia to the Third Reich helped to end Germanys dependence on
foreign raw materials and food. 2
anys military-industrial potential

ihe content of theories of this kind makes one wonder

proponents are all that informed of what they write.

if

their

PREVENTIVE WAR
AND RED EXPANSIONISM
To

justify the

ography

into

Hitler.

go so far as to
with advance

effect

sneak attack on the USSR, bourgeois historilegend about a preventive

has long had recourse to the

it is alleged that the war against the USSR was started

by the nazis to forestall Soviet aggression against Germany
a >id other West European countries. This is the message of the
:

specially

US

State

and
Department

selected

tailored
in

documents brought out by the

1948 in a volume entitled Nazi-Soviet

Pakt gegen Europe, Europa-

verlag, Vienna, 1973, p. 7.

Ibid., pp. 16-17.
4

much
armed forces 250-350
September 1939. The Soviet Unions

USSR moved

that the

western

and West German historians

nazi aggression
in Western Europe with
to

an anti-nazi orion the op-

to seize

rialists

The

clearly of

and determined stand upset the plans of the impeadvantageous bridgeheads for a war against it.

consistent

vvar

USSRs measures

fundamentally at odds

clearly not against France, situated

kilometres to the west in

else.

assert that these measures

1

to strengthen

British, French,

not only bracket the

is

and modern-in assessing

USSR

Western Ukraine and Western Byeloof mutual assistance with the three
Bal-

its

and much

Many American,
the

Germanys expansion and were

of

liberate the

russia, to sign treaties

tic states,

agreement with Germany. This argument

with logic if only in terms of elementary political geography. All

0 f the Soviet Unions measures were implemented in the zone

Ibid., p. 10.

Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin : the German

Defeat in the East,
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1968, p. 24.

The Soviet Armed

Forces.

History,

Moscow, 1978,

p.

225

(in

Russian);

-lso^sec

Chapter 2 of this book.

Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Aussenpolilik. 2933-1945, Verlag

hairitner,

W.

Kohl-

Stuttgart, 1971, p. 95.

62
63

Relations.

was

1959-1941. The political purpose of this publication

to justify the nazi regimes invasion of the USSR.
Analo-

gous motivations guided the compilers of the volume Geschichte

des Zweiten Weltkrieges in Dokumenten (Bd.
1-3, Munchen,
I 953"i95b)
published in the FRG, and of some other volumes
of documents printed

in

the West.

base gave birth to a large

number

The

existence of this broad

of bourgeois studies dissem-

inating the thesis that the Soviet

Union pursued an aggressive

Europe and that Hitler and his associates built up
and trained armed forces to invade the Soviet Union allegedly
in response to the Soviet threat. The purely defensive
meapolicy

Ill

III! Illll

in

sures taken by the USSR in the face of the growing nazi

threat
were described as offensive and even aggressive, while the
diplomatic struggle and efforts to avoid war were interpreted as

cold calculation.

Precisely these arguments

plain the

German

invasion in

close their

line.

were used by Ribbentrop to exa memorandum that was handed

to the Soviet

ambassador in Berlin on June

man troops had already crossed into Soviet

22, 1941,
territory.

when GerThe mem-

orandum claimed that die Soviet government sought to undermine Germany from within, that it was preparing to seize and
Bolshcvise West European states, invade the Balkans, capture
the Bosphorus

and the Dardanelles, and so on and so forth.

This astonishing slander ended with the assertion that the Soviet government could be expected to perpetrate
aggression
against Germany at any time. This dangerous situation, the
Ribbentrop

memorandum

government

to forestall a Soviet invasion of

lied,

was what compelled

the

nazi

Germany and

thus

begin a preventive war.

For nazi propaganda

for the invasion of the

top aides, admitted at

on the Soviet Union

it

this story

became the

official justification

USSR. Hans Fritzsche, one of Goebbels

the Nuremberg trial:
.after the attack
was the main task of German propaganda

to justify the necessity of this attack.

Therefore

attack ... the next task for propaganda was to

1
Germany but Russia was guilty of this war.

Throughout the war nazi propaganda kept repeating this exIt is noteworthy that the pre-

planation of what led to the war.

ventive
nazi

war theory was used

General

Staff

Nuremberg trial.
jor war criminal, claimed at the trial that all the preparations
made in Germany until the spring of j 94 were defensive-against
a possible attack by the Red Army. Thus, he declared, the
entire war in the East could be called preventive to a certain
extent. Analogous explanations were offered by Goring and
Other chief German war criminals at Nuremberg.
1

we had

to

em-

Walter
Leiden, 1954.

Der deutsebe Generalslab, Vcrlag der Frankfurter

Main, 1953; Germany and the Soviet Union. 1939- 1941

Gorlitz,
011

German

aggres-

sion against the USSR could go by was that the Soviet Union
was giving Germany no cause for so-called preventive mea-

sures.

Franz Haider, Chief of the German General Staff, made

on July 22, 1940: . .there are

the following entry in his diary

2
no indications of Russian activity against us.

This was also

the gist of reports to Berlin from the German ambassador in Moscow Count Friedrich Werner von Schulcnburg, the German
and his
military attache Lieutenant-General Ernst Kbstring,

deputy Colonel von Krebs.

the USSR had
19 39-1 941
used by the American historian Tre-

Nevertheless, the charge that in

expansionist intentions
vor Nevitt

Dupuy

in the

is

book The Military Life

(1969) in order to depict the

USSR

as

of

Adolf Hitler

a potential aggressor.

Kurt Assmann, Helmut Krausnick, and other West German historians disseminate this fable with the charge of Red imperialism. Assmann, for instance, asserts that from the standpoint
f future
tion.

B.

developments Hitler had correctly assessed the

In Strategy.

The

Indirect

Approach

the British

situa-

historian

H. Liddell Hart says that by continuing the war with Britain,

1

The Trial

of

German Major War

'fonal Military Tribunal Sitting at

Heftc, Frankfurt

as the basis for the plea for the

by the defence lawyers and defendants at the

General-Fieldmarshal Wilhelm Keitel, a ma-

Actually, the only premise the architects of

These arguments arc eloquent evidence of how

advocates arc to the nazi political

and again that we had merely prevented a Soviet

show that not

phasise again

Stationery Office,

London, 194S,

Criminals: Proceedings of the InternaPc. 17, His Majestys

Nuremberg, Germany,

p. 295.

Gcneraloberst Jlalder, Kricgstagebucb, Vol.

" l England
bis

zum

IT,

tieginn des Ostfcldzuges (1.7.

V on

der geplanlen Landung

1940-11. 6.1941),

W.

Kolil-

liamincr Verlag, Stuttgart,

1963, p. 32.

64

S-2G

63

Germany would be exposed to a fatal attack in the back from

Russia. The American professor Louis Fischers book Russias
Road from Peace to War (1969) portrays Soviet foreign policy
in

1917-1941 as one of expansion in

all

directions.

The preventive war legend is willingly disseminated by neonazi publicists. An example is Helmut Siindcrmann, who in 1966
published a book under the

of Deutsche Notizen 1945/1965.

Great Patriotic War, the world
public is able to draw upon a colossal archive of documents that
show beyond the shadow of a doubt that nazi Germanys inva-

Today, decades after

sion of the

USSR was

would be absurd

title

the

deliberate and meticulously planned.

to ignore irrefutable facts. In a

book

ideology,

political

notably the

Soviet

military

threat

myth.

Western
ideologists to conceal their own imperialist aims. Attempts of
this kind were started from the moment the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed. Whenever the imperialists need
to cover up their aggressive schemes, the 24th Congress of the
CPSU pointed out, they try to revive the Soviet menace

These legends are part of the unrelenting

myth.

efforts of the

It

entitled

Der zweitc Weltkrieg in Chronik und Doknmentcn

West German historian Hans-Adolf Jacobsen writes: All

1959-1945.
the

the preventive war legends

Germanys invasion

still

current

of the Soviet

Union

must be
in

dispersed:

1941 ... was not

a preventive war. Hitlers decision to start the invasion was not

motivated by concern about any imminent formidable strike by
the Soviet Union; it was the ultimate expression of his aggressive policies, which were increasingly stripped of all camouflage
from 1938 onward. 2 Another West German historian, Andreas
Ilillgruber, writes in his book Hitlers Strategic. Politik und

Kriegfuhrung. 1940-1941 that the invasion of the

a response to any serious threat from the Red
contrary,

Hitler

and

the entire

line of his general

not
the

German General

reason to see an adversary in the

opinion that Hitlers obsession to

main

USSR was
Army; on

Red Army.
destroy

It

the

policy ever since he

Staff

is

had no

the authors

USSR was

came

to

power

the
in

1933, while Case Barbarossa was the implementation of his

programme, the consummation of all the preceding steps along
the road to this objective.'

The legends about Germanys preventive war against the

USSR, Red imperialism, and Soviet expansionism have a
close class affinity to the present basic
1

Quoted from

P.

theses

of

bourgeois

A. Zhilin, Problems of Military History, Moscow, 1975,

pp. 199-202, 206-12 (in Russian).

Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 1959-1945. Der gweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und

Documenlen, Wehr und Wissen Vcrlagsgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1961, p. 680.
Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategic. Politik und Kriegfiihrung. 1940-1941.
Bernard und Gracfe Verlag liir Wchrwessen, l rankfurt am Main, 1965.
;

66

24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,

^P Tl
r

97 i,

9,

1971, Documents, Novosti Press

p. 36.

March 50
Agency Publishing House, Moscow,

THE WEST AND

NORTHWEST

Chapter 2

IN

Polands

long.

strategic

to Soviet security.

importance was of special significance

as a rule, during the period between

However,

the two world wars Soviet-Polish relations were not friendly.

The Soviet Union sought to establish and maintain mutually beneficial relations with Poland. But the proposals for building up
goodneighbourly relations were invariably rejected by Polands

bourgeois-landowner rulers.
Jozef Pilsudski, Poland s actual head of state for many years,
was rabidly anti-Soviet. In foreign affairs, writes the British

Antony Polonsky, Pilsudski continued to see Russia

enemy and failed to appreciate the danger

researcher

Polands main

as

created by the rise of Hitler. 1

In

the

period of the phoney war, since September

1939,
great changes that affected the
Soviet Unions vital interests
to
pIacc alon S its western, northwestern,

and southwestern
frontiers. On its western frontier
the situation changed radically
in the very first weeks of September
.

1939.

On

the one hand, the Polish

bourgeois-landowner state was
Germany and, as a result, the strongest military power of the imperialist
world appeared on the Soviet
Unions western frontiers. The nazis thus
came into possession
of a huge springboard, extending for
more than 1,000 kilometres
from north to south, for aggression against
the USSR. On the
other hand, by the summer of
1940, fundamental

rapidly crushed by

changes had
taken place in the situation in the Baltic
region, where, as a
result of revolutionary actions
by the working people,
socialist

revolutions triumphed and Soviet power

was restored in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Baltic
republics dropped out of
the capitalist system and were admitted into
the USSR. Lastly,
in the northwest of the USSR the
relations with Finland deteriorated to the point where they erupted into
a major armed conflict. With the situation in a
state of flux in all these regions
Soviet diplomacy had to work extremely hard.
1

ANXIOUS MONTH OF SEPTEMBER

German diplomacy spared no effort to reinforce the antiSoviet feelings of the Polish leaders. In Berlin they knew that
anti-Sovietism was blindfolding Warsaws outlook and dulling
sense of danger emanating from nazi

its

Germany. To

sustain

atmosphere Hitler invited the Polish Foreign Minister Jozef

Beck to Berchtcsgaden on January 5, 1939. Beck was received
with pomp and ceremony. He left flattered, frightened, and deceived. The French ambassador in Warsaw Leon Noel
wrote
this

that Hitler

had put

German and

of

ity

special

emphasis on the complete commun-

Polish interests relative to Russia.

He

ar-

gued that because of the threat from Russia a strong Poland

was vital to Germany, adding that every Polish division brought
into action against Russia saves a German division. 2
This is
exactly
lated

what Polands

his

political

wanted

rulers

credo back

in

to hear.

Beck had formu-

1934 as hatred for Russia, a

hatred for which he could not find adequate epithets. 2

Polands rulers refused even to consider the idea of an equitable defensive alliance with the USSR that could
guarantee Polands
that

freedom and independence. And

their

military-strategic

plans

this

in

spite of the fact

of war with
Germany were based on the belief that it was unrealistic to fight
such a war singlehanded. In bourgeois Warsaw
they set their

the

for

event

1939
Antony Polonsky, The Little Dictators. The History of Eastern Europe
Routledge and Kogan Paul, London, 1975, p. 40.

DISASTROUS COURSE
OF ANTI-SOVIETISM

stnce igiS,
'
t

In

those years the

USSRs

frontier with

neighbour, bourgeois-landowner

Poland,

its

was

biggest Western

1,400 kilometres

Leon Noel, Degression allemande contre

la

Pologne, Flammarion, Paris,

946, p. 285.
1.

Androsov, At the Crossroads of Three

hn Russian).

Strategies,

Moscow,

1979, p. 80

68
69

hopes mainly on assistance from the Western

Allies. They banked
on Britain and France striking at Germany
from the west,
while the Polish

army conducted an

offensive in the direction

of Berlin.

The Polish Communists were

who correctly, in keeping with

the only people in the country

Polands national interests, understood the importance of cooperation with
the USSR to Poland s security, showed that Soviet
policy was a genuine policy
of peace, and pointed to the
menace that fascism was bringing
to

all

Advanced by

nations.

the

Communist Party

of Poland,

idea of defending Polands independence

in alliance with
the USSR and other countries threatened
by fascism won support among progressive groups, especially
in the Polish Socialist
Party and the Peasant Party, and among
patriotic intellectuals. 1
Anti-Soviet blindness, an astonishing incomprehension

no case could admission of Soviet troops into Poland be agreed

A day earlier, the Foreign Minister Jozcf Beck had said arto.
1

We have no military accord with the USSR, nor do

to
have one. 2
wish
we
Even after the non-aggression treaty with Germany had been
rogantly:

reality of the

overhanging threat, and the

total discrepancy be-

tween the

policies of the ruling quarters and the

interests of the
Polish people conspicuously manifested
themselves in these
poli-

cies in the

summer

were being held

when the Anglo-Sovict-Frcnch talks

Moscow. As part of its efforts to create a

of 1939,

in

united front against fascist aggression in

Europe the Soviet govto safeguard Poland and Romania
against nazi
aggression. 1 he question of Poland and
Romania cooperating
until the Soviet Union and permitting
Soviet troops to move

mission,
27,

felt

the aggressor, could help France, Britain,

troops

were permitted

way

other

ly,

Although the international situation had changed

dramaticalthe Polish government reacted negatively to
the Soviet call

lor a joint front against fascist aggression,

for putting Germany
before the accomplished fact of unity between
the armed forces
of Poland, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain.
The Polish
government clung stubbornly to the dogmas of its policy,
refusing to consider Soviet participation in joint
actions to preserve

peace and thereby strengthen Polands

to the British

Chief of

Staff

military attache on

General

Militant Cooperation

Waclaw

own

August

security.

20,

The

joint

action

Soviet military

Soviet troops can

of the aggressor.

and Poland only

to cross Polish territory, for there

come

if
is

its

no

into contact with the troops

11

Soviet assistance offered to Poland in the event of fascist aggression

was

rejected.

Thus, on account of the anti-Sovietism of Polands rulers, the

undeniable coincidence of Polish and Soviet interests in the face
of fascist aggression did not materialise into mutual commitments.

The

ruling quarters in bourgeois-landowner Poland

were

unable to guarantee the existence of the Polish nation.

THE GERMAN-POLISH WAR

On September 1, 1939, without a declaration of war, German
troops invaded Poland from the north, south, and west. Right
from the beginning

this

was

annihilation not only against

civilian population.

for

Germany

armed

a total war, a war of

forces but also against the

The Luftwaffe bombed towns,

villages,

and

roads filled with refugees.

Polands military situation deteriorated rapidly.

ment appealed

The govern-

France and Britain to honour their promises

f military assistance. But this was in vain. In London and Pans they had long ago written Poland off as a victim of the
nazis and took consolation from the hope that the invasion of
to

Speaking

1939, the Polish

Stachicwicz declared

out

said K. Y. Voroshilov. in a public statement on August

that the USSR, which has no common frontier with

ernment offered

across their territories in the event of a nazi

attack was openly
taised in August 1939 at the talks between
the military missions of the USSR, Britain, and France.

rule

against aggression in the western direction.

the

of the

Soviet government did not

the

signed

that

in

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1 939, Third Series, Vol. VII,
London, 1953, p. 83.
Paul Reynaud, An
coe/tr de la melee (1939-1945), Flammarion, Paris,
*951, p. 307.

Between

cow, 1973, pp. 62-63 On Russian).

the Soviet

and the Polish Peoples, Moslions,

Documents and Other Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish RelaVol, 7, 1939-1943, Moscow, 1973, p, 176 (in Russian).

70
71

Poland would bring die Wehrmacht to Soviet frontiers,

and that
each kilometre of the Polish armys retreat
was bringing nearer

moment Germany would

the

clash with the Soviet Union.

sent

Germany

Edward

Raczynski. With their illusions shattered, the Pol-

saw with bitterness

The Polish

end have to fight alone.

In the evening of September

fice

sador

ish representatives

i, 1939, the British Foreign Ofa note demanding the termination of hostil-

against Poland and warning that Britain intended

to fulfil
commitments. Typically, the British ambassador in Berlin
Nevile Henderson made the reservation that the note
ities

Up

reported:

Germans

was not

to

the

be seen as an ultimatum. The French government

acted in
same vein. But within 24 hours it became clear to the leaders

Western powers that further evasion from the commitments given to Poland would discredit Britain and France
inof the

ternationally.

On September 3, 1939, France and Britain declared war on

Germany. On that same day, the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke on radio, noting that the conflict
in Europe did

USA

not affect the

but would,

directly

one

way

or another,

He

declared that the USA would stay neutral

In nazi Berlin they saw through these declarations, in
part on
the basis of experience in conducting affairs with
the leaders of
Biitain and France, who had connived at nazi
aggression for a
long time. On August 31,
1939, Franz Haider, Chief of the
Wehrmacht General Staff, noted in his diary: The Fiihrer is
calm.
He believes that the French and the British will not
enter the territory of Germany. 1 After Britain and
France declared war. Hitler accurately predicted: The
fact that they have
declared war
.
does not mean they will fight. 2
affect

its

future.

The

Polish military mission that arrived

in London on Sepwas received by General Edmund William Ironside,

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, only a week later. All
that
the British agreed to do was to supply rifles, and even
then deliveries were to start in early 1940. The pattern was
the same in
Paris. The Polish ambassador to France Juliusz
Lukasiewicz fu-

tember

My

further their mobilisation

in the

T939, there

have been no op-

Similarly, there

estimate

may

military attache in Paris

West. Neither the French

hostilities in the

are firing.

its

erations in the air.

that Poland

10.00 hours on September 7,

until

have been virtually no

nor the

is

that the French

and take no other

actions,

do not

that they

outcome of the fighting in Poland.

Every new day confirmed that militarily the Anglo-French coalition was practically inactive, that it was leaving its Polish
ally to the mercy of fate in the hope of a clash between the
Soviet Union and Germany. Later, Charles de Gaulle was to
are awaiting the

write in his memoirs:

While almost

we

were engaged on the Vistula,

of the enemys forces

all

(the

French Command. -P.S.),

save for several demonstrations, did nothing to take us to the

Rhine. 3
intentions of the Western powers were finally made clear
meeting of the Supreme War Council of the Anglo-French
coalition on September T2. Chamberlain explained that Britain
was planning to prepare for war during the next three years.

The

at a

French army would not mount a

was decided to recommend ad4
herence to the existing policy of restriction. But not even such
action was taken. The same day as the Supreme War Council
met the French Command ordered the cessation of all military
activity. This was approved by the political leadership of both
5
Chamberlain declared that Poland was
Britain and France.
6
lost in any case. On September 30, French troops were drawn

Gamelin confirmed

that the

major offensive. As a

result,

it

back to the positions they had held at the outbreak of the war.
France and Britain had the military capacity to fulfil their al'

Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1959, Vol.

I.

tildy sought an audience with

United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1956, p. 413.

J
Polskie sity zbrojne w drugiej wo/nie swiatowe), t. 1, Cz. 2, London,

too,

*962,

Edouard Daladier. In London,

Neville Chamberlain refused to receive the Polish ambas-

Gencraloberst Haider, Kriegstagebucb, Vol.

Rnde der Westofjenshe ( 1 4.8.1 9i9

50.6.1940),

I,

Vom

Polenfeldzug bis

W. Kohlhammer

gum

F.ridi

Ho rd t, Wabn mid

1948, p. 218.

p.

Memoires de

guerre. Vol.

r,

I.

Appel. 1940-1942, Lib-

rairic PI011, Paris, 1954, p. 12.

*

R.

M.

Butler,

Her Majestys Stationery

Wirklichkeit, Union deutschc Verlagsgesellschaft,

436.

Charles dc Gaulle,

J.

Verlag, Stutt-

gart, 1963, p. 4S.

Stuttgart,

Grand
Office.

Strategy,

Vol.

London, 1957,

General Gamelin, Servir. Vol.

Ill,

TT,

September

1959- June

1941,

p. 20.

La guerre (septembre 7939-/9 mat

94o), Lib rairic Plofi, Paris, 1947, p. 67.

Foreign Relations of the United Stales, 19)9, Vol.

T,

p.

425.

72

73

commitments

lied

over

to Poland. They had a

manpower, a more than
and an overwhelming superiority

Germany

in the air,

three-fold supremacy

in

Writing of the stand

taken

by

three-fold

We

were

letting

them

die, while we did nothing

to
German troops were developing
Poland. By the end of the first week

the

in

the

them down and

While it knew of the Polish leaders hostility for the USSR,

questions raised
the Soviet government gave its close attention to
Polish ambasthe
September
5,
1939
by the Polish side. On
Peoples
the
Soviet
received
by
sador Waclaw Grzvbowski was
quesraised
the
The
ambassador
Affairs.
Commissar for Foreign
supof
military
Poland,
USSR
and
between
the
tion of trade
from
other
supplies
such
the
transit
of
Poland,
and
plies for
1

land.

letting

them. 1 Meanwhile,
their offensive deep into
of September the nations
help

been largely disorganised. Polands

military leaders

were rapidly losing

of the hostilities. On September
secretly left

in

to justify our

Hie

defences had

ister Jozef

in tanks.

Britain

and France
German-Polish war, Hugh Dalton, who was
prominent
British Labour Party, noted: It
was impossible
treatment of the Poles.

On September 2, 1939, the Polish Foreign MinBeck informed the Polish embassy in London that the
own
Soviet ambassador in Warsaw N. I. Sharonov had, on his
negoinitiative, asked him why the Polish government was not
needed by Potiating with the USSR regarding the supplies

Soviet Union.

supremacy

Warsaw, stayed

for

political and
on the course
Polish government

their influence
6,

the

some time

in

Kremcnets, and then farther to Romania.

It ended
its flight in London. By
mid-September it had become obvious
that the Polish armed forces were
broken: there was no longer
nation wide resistance to the German
forces. Polands defeat, wrote Erich von
Manstein, Army Group South
Chief of Staff, was an inevitable
consequence of the illusions
harboured in Warsaw about the actions
of the Allies. The latter
passively watched the destruction of their
Polish Ally. 2
The war with nazi Germany clearly demonstrated
the ineptness of the Polish High Command and
the poor operational and
tactical training of most of the
headquarters staffs and senior
officers. There were real conditions
for drawing the entire Polish people into a war of liberation
against the nazi aggressors
as early as September
1939, but they were not

The

span of ten days of hostilities Poland has

Hugh Dalton, The

its

Memoirs 1931-194), Frederick

Athcnaum-Vedag,

Bonn,

The moment

for res-

>

Japan and the Mongolian Peoples Republic signed a document

ending the hostilities started by the Japanese military on the
this

acute

conflict

situation

for energetic steps to ensure the

defused, the

USSRs

se-

curity in the west.

its

On

September

17,

1939 Soviet troops crossed the frontier to

the

Miillcr

1955,

Documents on Polish-Soviet

London, 1961,
3

SieS c,

helping hand to brothcr-Ukrainians and

olute actions was determined with account of the situation in

the Far East, where on September 15, i 939 the Soviet Union,

Fateful Years.

London, 1957, p. 277.

Erich von Manstein. Vedorcne

brother-Byelorussians inhabiting Poland.

way was opened

The developments in Poland, which had been betrayed

by
own govern ment and Allies, were followed with anxiety in
1

cultural centres.

Khalkhin-Gol. With

PROBLEM OF THE USSRS SECURITY

Ltd..

and

cred duty to extend

countrys mil-

in foreign countries.

lost all its industrial

The newspaper Izvestia observed:

The Soviet government had to draw its conclusions from the
The Soviet government felt it was its saobtaining situation.
regions

itary defeat

and

1939, V.

in

revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. Within the

by Po-

did not mean that the struggle of the Polish

people
against nazism had ended-this struggle
continued underground

and Poland

said that the Soviet

organised

lands leaders on account of their class stand.

to the trade agree-

M. Molotov
Union intended to carry it out in full.'
The developments in the West increasingly prompted the Soto strengthen the
viet government to fundamental decisions
countrys security. The press organs of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government directly pointed to the actual
state of affairs. The Polish-German war, Pravda wrote, has

USSR

ment signed by the

fled south to

utilised

USSR. Referring

countries to Poland via the

Lublin, after which

p.

Relations.

1939 ^ 945 ,

Vol.

I.

Hciacmann,

42.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Pravda, September
Izvestia,

September

19, 1939.
30,

1939,

74

73

liberate

the population

of the Western Ukraine

and Western
which had been seized from Soviet
Russia in i 9 z 0
S multaneously the Red Army
liberated
yclornssia,

V mUS

th
P Tl! military
"f
he Poltsh
in

the Lithuanian capital

RC8i " that had llkewisc
becn ^zed by

.920. A Soviet government

note of SepdCd tHe
P lish am bassador stated'More"
ife'
Moreover the
Sovmt government cannot be
indifferent to the
e
Ukrainians and Byelorussians
inhabiting
Poland th
n
erCy f fa have becn left defence

,7

77 IF
les

T7

S,tuatlon thc Sovict government

had orR
a
dered the Red
Army
to cross the frontier and
take thc lives and
property of the population of
the Western Ukraine and
Western
Byelorussia under its protection.
An analogous statement was
broadcast over the radio by
the Chairman of the Council
of
Peopie s Commissars and the

People's

Commissar for Foreign

Affairs of the USSR V. M.
Molotov. The text of the Soviet
government s note to the Polish
ambassador in Moscow was hand-

ed to the ambassadors of
relations with the USSR.

The S V

et

all

the countries

having diplomatic
p

government combined

its
resolute actions with
with cIose attention to all
'.
possible
7.
situations. The following
gives a good indication of
this
On
9
Cn the
959
R manian ambassador to the
USSR^Mir
I
u
,
USSR Nicolac
Dianu called on the People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
on instructions from his own government, the People's Commissar
asked
.

cauti0n

him: Are there any surUnion from the fact that the Polish government, the senior
Polish military leaders, and
,00 Polish aircraft are in Romania?''
Dianu gave assurances that there
would be no incidents. 2
prises

store for the Soviet

As they awaited the Red Army thc

working people of the
Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia set up
local

government bodies (revolutionary

committees), detachments of workers guard in towns, and
of peasant militia in rural
communities^ The working
people guarded public property
and expelled
landowners, members of the
bourgeoisie and of

P KCy A C
-

P.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

>

'

the police.

The

USSR was headed by thc ComUnion V. I. Chuikov, who participated in the Red Armys action in thc West in September
l9 39, recalls: The army was ordered to move into Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine to save our kindred Byelorussians and Ukrainians from nazi occupation. I was in command of the 4th Army, which was to advance as far as Brest.
This action had nothing in common with military operations.
The population of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine
welcomed us with joy. Tanks and motor vehicles were virtually showered with flowers. Orthodox and Catholic priests
came out to meet us with icons and gonfalons. Where thc Red
Army stepped, the road to nanism was closed. Wc stopped near
struggle for reunification with the

munists. Marshal of the Soviet

frontier with the

thc present

Polish

Peoples Republic, on the

bank of thc Bug. Although a non-aggression pact had

been signed with Germany, our troops were on full combat
alert. Nobody believed Hitler would abide by any treaty if he
found it suited him to ignore it.
With massive aid from the population the Red Army comeastern

pleted

September, halting
Curzon Line, which had been insisted upon by
thc eastern frontier of Poland back in 1920. More

liberative mission at thc close of

its

at the so-called

Britain

as

people (including over six million Ukrainians

and nearly three million Byelorussians) inhabiting a territory of
190,000 square kilometres were saved from nazi bondage. The
then

12 million

conditions for building a

new

were created

life

in the liberated

lands.

The Red Armys entry

into the

Western Ukraine and Western

Byelorussia caused an eruption of anti-Sovietism

ary political quarters in Britain, France,

and the

among reactionUSA. In a mes-

sage sent to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on

October

1959, the Soviet ambassador in Paris wrote that an

segment of the French ruling quarters was using in-

18,

influential

ventions about a Soviet attack on Poland to urge the French

government to draw the logical conclusion from this and declare

war on the USSR.

Also blatantly absurd were thc assertions that the

.

Moscow, 1 94S

USSR

had

V.

I.

Chuikov, Mission

in

China,

Novy

wir.

No.

11, 1979, pp.

198-99.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

76

77

annexed the Western Ukraine and Western

Byelorussia. The
Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian
SSR
and of Western Byelorussia with the
Byelorussian SSR had nothing in common with annexation:
at a time when the young
Soviet state was weak militarily they
had been forcibly wrested
from it against the will of the Ukrainian
and the Byelorussian
reunification of the

population.

Asked whether in the situation that had

taken shape by September 17 the Soviet Union could
allow the nazi army to occupy the whole of Poland, the
French ambassador in Warsaw
Leon Noel said: That was not
possible. The Soviet Union
had to bring in its army before it was
too late. 1 David Lloyd
George, a prominent British political
figure, wrote to the Polish
ambassador in London on September
27, 1939, that the Soviet
Army had occupied territories which were not
Polish and which
had been forcibly taken by Poland
after the First World War
I he inhabitants of the
Polish Ukraine belonged to the same
race and spoke the same language
as their neighbours in the
Soviet Ukrainian Republic. He
wrote that it was of paramount
importance to pay attention to these
significant considerations
without delay out of the apprehension
that Britain might start
a war against Russia in the mistaken
belief that the character
of

its

It

would be an

intervention

was

similar to that resorted to by

act of criminal

Germany.

madness, he added,
the Russian move with that of the
Germans.

to bracket

In October-November
1939, British officials made a series of
about the Soviet Unions measures to
reinforce its
security along its western frontiers.
There was realism in these
statements, although they were made
with the obvious aim of
deteriorating Soviet-German relations.
statements

In a talk with the Soviet ambassador

to Britain I. M. Maisky on October 17, 1939, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary

foc Foreign Affairs

Stat(

Richard Butler said that government

could be no question of returning the Western Ukraine and Western
Byelorussia to Poland.
On October 20, 1939, political developments were broached
at a meeting that Maisky had
with the Minister of Supply
;

circles in Britain felt that there

Leslie Burgin and the Director-General of the Ministry

Economic Warfare Frederick William Leith-Ross. Both, the
ambassador wrote, were derisive of the sentimental simpletons
w ho were prattling about restoring Poland in its former frontiers. Both expressed their satisfaction at the fact that the USSR
had occupied the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia
(A good thing Hitler did not get them) and said that only
madmen could think of returning them to a future Poland.
Regarding the postwar world Horace Wilson, Max Neville
Chamberlains chief adviser, said to Maisky on October 27 that
Poland must be restored as an independent nation, but without
2
the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. On October 28,
Peoples
Commissariat
1939, Maisky drew the attention of the

Edward
0f

Foreign Affairs to a speech made by the British Foreign

Secretary Lord Halifax in the House of Lords on October 26,

for

which Halifax in fact (albeit in somewhat vague terms) said

had no objections to the Soviet occupation of the
Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia; Maisky also mentioned Chamberlains reply in Parliament on that same day, October 26, to a question by the Liberal MP Geoffrey Le Mesurier
in

that Britain

Mandcr, in which the Prime Minister said that the British government shared the view relative to the USSR expressed by
a
Lastly, on
Churchill in a broadcast statement of October i.
November 24, 1939, Maisky reported to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that in a talk with a Labour MP
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Richard Butler had said that, unlike Daladicr, the British government considered that there could be no question of
returning the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia to Pol-

and.

Elections to the peoples assemblies of the Western Ukraine

and Western Byelorussia were held in October 1939. These supreme legislative bodies proclaimed Soviet power and requested
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to admit these territories to the
1

Leon Noel,

op.cit., p. 5or.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

78

Ibid.

ibid.
1

2,

col.

Ibid.; Parliamentary Debates.

1570-71.
4

House of Commons,

Official Report,

Printed and Published by His Majestys Stationery Office, London,

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Vol
1939.

'

Soviet Union. This request was granted in November

1939 by
the fifth extraordinary session of the Supreme
Soviet of the
USSR. The Western Ukraine was reunited with the Ukrainian

and Finnish society

as a

rather favourably.

this

whole cannot deny that

The German envoy in HelWipert von Bliicher reported as early as 1935 that in the

sinki

eyes of Finland the Soviet

THE USSR AND FINLAND

On what were

the

relations

enemy and

sible

that

Union continued to be the only posit had

to be treated with the

therefore

maximum

distrust.^

was the Soviet governments view that by 1939 Finland,

chiefly the Karelian isthmus, had become a military springboard
It

between the Soviet Union and

Finland based at the time the Second World War broke

outs' in
December r 1 7 Soviet Russia recognised Finlands independence.
The 1920 peace treaty became the legal foundation of So-

for potential

aggression against the

the Finnish militarists gave sufgrounds for anxiety. But the main thing was in something
else. The Soviet government was concerned chiefly about the
possibility that Finnish militarism might be used by the imperialficient

made great efforts to turn Finland into a springboard

an attack on the USSR. Powerful military installations
were
built under the direction of Western military
experts at a distance of 32 kilometres from Leningrad, the cradle of the
Great
October Socialist Revolution. The fortifications, called the ManFinland

German

10 times as

able to the Finnish air force. 1

Kaleva Kckkonen

Waf and Peace

day,

New

York, 1940,

said, the

in Finland.
p.

Campaign. Military and

11;

W.

Political.

were then

avail-

close of the 1930s,

Urho

aircraft as

At the
shadow

of Hitler spread over us,

Documented Survey, Soviet Russia Toand Zclda K. Coates, The Soviet-Finnisb

i 9i9 -i 94 o, Eldon Press Ltd., London, 1941,
P.

V. Stalin said to Finnish representatives in October

is

ineffectual declarations

were

on

this

score by Finnish representatives

clearly not enough.

1938, acting through its embassy in Helsinki, the

government proposed discussing with the Finnish side
measures to strengthen the security of both countries in view of
the growing threat of war in Europe. In the opinion of the
In April

Soviet

Urho

Kaleva

Kekkoncn,

Friendship

and.

Goodneighbourly

Relations.

Speeches and Statements. 196^-196-7, Moscow, 196S, p. 38 (Russian translation).

2
Quoted from T. Bartenyev, Y. Komissarov, Thirty Years of Goodneighbourly Relations.

P-28
3

p. 20.

80

not fear Finland

curity in the northwest and improving relations with Finland.

But there was no reciprocity on the part of Finland. Positive and

Soviet frontier

experts. In fact, they could ac-

many

We do

use Finland against the Soviet

derstanding with Finland on reinforcing the Soviet Unions se-

nerheim Line, running across the Karelian isthmus were nearing

completion in 1938. These fortifications were seen as a guarantee of the impunity of troops poised for aggressive action
against
the Soviet Union. Many more aerodromes than was needed
by

commodate almost

J.

may

Hanko on a map, he continued:

where the troops of a great power will land in Finland, and however much you resisted, you will not be able to
prevent this; they will land and from there move in the direction of the Soviet Union across your country.
The Soviet government made repeated attempts to reach unThis

for

built near the

but some great power

1939. Pointing to the region of

Jointly with the leading imperialist powers, the ruling

quarters

were being

Union,

ADVANCED POST OF THE WEST

the Finnish air force

powders for anti-Soviet purposes.

ist

was not used.

with the assistance of

Soviet govern-

the bellicose anti-Sovietism of

in

USSR. The

ment did not exaggerate Finlands military potential, although

viet-Finnish relations. In 1932 the USSR and

Finland signed a
treaty on non-aggression and peaceful settlement
of conflicts.
1 here was thus a sound prerequisite for the
development of friendly relations between the two neighbouring
countries. But this
prerequisite

looked upon

Finland as a friend and support.

SSR, and Western Byelorussia with the

Byelorussian SSR.

2.

it

Small wonder that nazi diplomacy saw

620

On

the History of Saviet-Finnish Relations,

Moscow, 1976,

The Paasikivi Line. Articles and Speeches by Juho Kusti

Moscow, 1958, p. 55 (Rusian translation).

Paasikivi. 1944-

(in Russian).

81

USSR,

this

on mutual

could be effectively served by a Soviet-Finnish treaty

In Helsinki they declined discussing the

assistance.

Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, the

USSR

continued

its

efforts

and

offered to guarantee the inviolability of Finland

sea frontiers in the event of aggression against it. The

its

northwest of Leningrad.

and

March 1939

in

Union requested Finland to commit itself to resist any

aggression and help the USSR in making Leningrad more secure against attack from land and sea. In this context it was sug-

Soviet

Soviet Union to correct the frontier running north and

for the

relations with

USSR tried to defuse the tension in its

Finland and resolve the problem of ensuring the

security of

frontiers

The

facts are that the

its

above

all

by peaceful means, to use all

and prevent an armed

the opportunities offered by negotiations

conflict

with Finland. The Soviets did not desire the Finnish

gested

war, noted the American military historian and diplomat Raymond L. Garthoff. 2 Soviet diplomacy sought an agreement with

ing the islands, the Soviet government suggested something else

of territory-declaring that it was prepared to give

USSRs actions to strengthen sewhere a treaty of mutual assistance was

signed with Estonia towards the end of September 19 39, preparations were under way for signing a treaty with Latvia, and
analogous questions were being discussed with Lithuania.

that Finland lease the USSR four islands in the Gulf of

Finland that could, in the hands of an aggressor, be a serious
danger to Leningrad. When Finland rejected the idea of leas-

-an exchange

northern neighbour a part of Soviet Karelia.

its

The

Soviet-Fin-

Finland

the context of the

in

curity in the Baltic region,

on the question of an exchange of territories, conductFinland in March- April 1939, came to nothing.

nish talks

ed in

With
of the

pone

war nearer than ever after the outbreak

Second World War, the Soviet government could not post-

settling the difficult situation

on

its

northwestern frontier.

not hard to understand that in the present international

when a war is going on in the centre of Europe between leading states, a war fraught with great surprise and danIt

is

situation,

ger to

European

all

right but

is

nations, the Soviet Union has not only the

also obliged to take serious measures to strengthen

security, stated the Soviet

its

ordinary

fifth

session of

the

government report at
Supreme Soviet of the

the extra-

USSR

on

October 31, 1939. In this context, it is natural that the Soviet

government should show special concern over the Gulf of Finland, which is the sea approach to Leningrad, and also over the
land frontier, which is only some 30 kilometres away from Leningrad.

THE MOSCOW TALKS

the threat of

After setting out the Soviet proposals for settling the frontier
problems, Stalin said that from the purely military standpoint

were minimal. Paasikivi subsequently acknowledged that

were cogent and that the proposals for altering the frontier were restrained and moderate/
But the talks began in a tense atmosphere. There was no uni-

these

the Soviet arguments

ty

The British journalist Alexander Werth, who worked in Moscow practically all through the Second World War, wrote that
to him it was quite obvious that because of the possibility (and
even probability) of an attack from that direction

During the Soviet-Finnish talks, started on October 11, 1939,

were three meetings with Soviet leaders-]. V. Stalin and
V. M. Molotov. At the first meeting the Finns were represented by Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who was then the Finnish envoy
in Sweden, while the second and the third were also attended
by the Finnish Finance Minister Vaino Tanner. The Soviet government took a constructive approach and displayed goodwill.
there

it

was

among

of forces

the Finnish representatives.

in

to play the

vital

Reflecting the alignment

Helsinki, the hardliners on the delegation sought

dominant

role.

Alexander Werth, Russia

at

If on the Finnish side the talks

had

War. 1941-43, Barrie and Rocklifd, London,

1964.

Raymond
1

lishers,

Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, October

z, 1939. Verbatim Report, Moscow,
1939, pp. 17-18 (in Rus-

i-N ovember

L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, Frederick A. Praeger Pub-

New

York, 1966, p. 14.

Urho Kalcva Kekkonen, Finland:

sian).

Relations. Articles, Speeches, Letters,

sian translation).

82

G*

Road

to

Peace and Goodncighbourly

1943-1978, Moscow, 1979, p. 190 (Rus-

83

been conducted by Mr. Paasikivi, without

the participation of
lanner, as was the case in the initial
period, the talks would
probably have produced an acceptable
agreement. But Mr. Tan-

nish relations

was seen

spoiled everything and, appar-

as a prerequisite for the expansion of

between the two countries.
Rcinhold Svento, who was to become Foreign Minister in the
postwar Paasikivi government, later wrote: We could accept

Mr. Paasikivis hands, 1 V. M. Molotov said

to the
US ambassador in Moscow Laurence Steinhardt
on

This was the view of that section of opinion in Finland that

Mr

ners

participation in

the

talks

ently, tied

December

2,

1939.

What was

the subject of the talks?

The Soviet Union started

them by proposing a Soviet-Finnish mutual
assistance pact along
the lines of the pacts of mutual
assistance signed by the USSR
with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
But when the Finnish
representatives declared that a pact of this
kind would run counter to Finlands position of
absolute neutrality, the Soviet side
did not insist. It proposed going over to the
issues in which the
USSR was especially interested in the context of ensuring
its
security, notably the security of
Leningrad from the direction
of the Gulf of Finland and also from
land because of the citys
proximity to the frontier. It was proposed that
an understanding

be reached on moving the Soviet-Finnish

frontier on the Kado2en kilometres to the north of Leningrad.
relian isthmus several

In exchange, Finland would get part

of Soviet Karelia twice
the swe of the territory to be turned
over by Finland. Further,
the oiler was made to reach agreement
with Finland on the lease
to the Soviet Union for a stated length
of time of a small parcel
of land in the vicinity of Hanko Island,
at the entrance to the
Gulf of Finland, so that the USSR could build
a naval base
there. With a Soviet naval base also
at the southern entrance to
the Gulf of Finland, as stipulated in the
Soviet-Estonian

mutual

assistance pact, the building of the second base

at the northern
entrance of the gulf would strengthen the security
of the Gulf
of Finland against possible aggression by
third countries, notably

by Germany.

The Soviet

side took

some new steps meeting Finlands interAland Islands. Further, the So-

ests, in particular, relative to the

viet representatives raised the

question of reinforcing the Soviet-

Finmsh non-aggression pact with additional mutual

guarantees.
Lastly, in the Soviet proposals the
consolidation of Soviet-Fin-

economic relations

the Soviet Unions

proposal

for

an exchange

of territories.

wanted goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and

was opposed to their country being drawn into the dangerous
foreign policy and military adventures of the imperialist powers.
7

Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who was to become his countrys Prime

Minister and then President, called the Soviet proposals re-

and moderate. In his reminiscences he noted: For my

and after the talks, that the best alternative
2
for us would be to reach agreement.
But spurred on by the imperialist Western powers, the Finnish government rejected the Soviet proposals. The talks were
broken off on November 7, 1939. In Helsinki they believed that
relative to the eastern neighbour a hard line would be best. 2
Paasikivi qualified the breaking off of the talks as one of gravest and serious mistakes in a series of Finlands foreign policy
strained

part I felt, during

miscalculations

at the time.

IS PUSHED INTO
CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR

FJNLAND

Why

had Helsinki adopted a negative stand towards the SoThey had been, after all, assessed as realistic by

viet proposals?

many

Finnish personalities while the autumn talks were

progress and,

much more

so, in

retrospective. It

in

still

may be

said

with confidence, the Soviet governments report at the sixth session of the

Supreme Soviet

of the

USSR

noted, that

if

there

had been no external influences relative to Finland and if relative to Finland there had been less instigation on the part of
1

Reinhold Svento, Neuvostoliitto maailmanpolitiikan Keskipisteessa, Suo-

tni-Ncuvostoliitto-scura, Helsinki. 1959. PP- 67-69.

*

Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Maine Moskauer Mission, 1939-41, Ilolsten-Verlag.

Hamburg, 1966,
3

Reinhold

p. 115.

Svento,

Ystcivani

Juho

Kusti

Soderstrbm

Paasikivi,

Porvoo-

Helsinki, T960, pp. 67-69.

1

84

Soviet Foreign Policy.

CoUeclion of Documents, Vol.

4,

p.

47I .

History of Diplomacy, Vol.

4,

Moscow,

1975,

p.

28

(in

Russian).

85

I
some

third states to get Finland to

pursue a policy hostile towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union
and Finland would
have reached a peaceful settlement last
autumn.
Although the
So^et government reduced its wishes to
a minimum, no settlement was made by diplomatic means . 1
.

Mannerheim admits

that

among

Finlands rulers the anti-Soviet line of the Western powers

created the confidence that in
the event of a conflict with the USSR
we would not be in isolation.- Representatives of the
German Foreign Office convinced
I astor JCaarlo Rutekki Kares,
leader of the Finnish Lappo-Fascists, that they could
gain everything by war.
German
diplomat gave the assurance that if there
was a setback Finland would subsequently be compensated
by means of war 3 US
Secretary of State Cordell Hull
thanked Finland for her firm
stand in the Moscow negotiations . 4
Harold L. Ickes wrote in
his secret diary that Finland is being
used by the aristocratic

and monied
it

interests of

can to Russia, even

if

England and France to do what harm

in the end it must fall before
the supe-

and resources of Russia . 5

Thus, the imperialist powers of the
two groups were
competing with each other to bring
rior forces

in

fact

anti-Soviet pressure to bear

on Finlands leaders. On October

9, 1959, the US mission in
Finland telegraphed Secretary of State Hull
to inform him that
the instructions given to the Finnish
delegation
were quite
.

as

stiff

as

the

American and

anticipated . 0

The German mission

the

Foreign

Finnish

the Soviet

Union

Ministry

British Ministers to Finland

to

had

Helsinki had earlier pressed

prevent an agreement with

in

appropriate to intervene in Soviet-

tarists.

On November 30, 1939, the US charge daffaires ad interim

Deputy Peoin the USSR handed V. P. Potemkin, the First
ples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, a US government statement offering to act as mediator between the USSR
and Finland. Potemkin replied that the Soviet government had
hitherto conducted its negotiations without mediators. Were the
talks between the USSR and Finland to be resumed, he said,
1

they too would proceed without mediators.

British diplomacy stepped into the leading role in encouraging the anti-Sovietism of Finlands ruling circles. Criticising the
British

government

for

its

policy towards the

USSR,

a leading

who was

to
Labour Party personality Sir Stafford
Soviet
told
the
USSR,
to
the
become the British ambassador
ambassador on November 12, 1939, that some elements in the
British government were confusing provincial Finnish heads and
preventing them from settling their relations with the USSR as
2
good neighbours. Britain pressured the USSR with the threat
that relations with it would be frozen for a long time. As the
Soviet ambassador in London reported on November 13, 1939,
this was exactly how Winston Churchill put the matter in talks

Cripps,

with Soviet representatives.

15

Reactionary ruling quarters

onto a dangerous road.

Sixth Session of the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Mareh za-April

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940, p. 29 (in Russian).
Les memoires du Marechal Mannerheim, Hachettc,
Paris, 1952
p 275
Major Erwin Lcssncr, Blitzkrieg and Bluff, Q. P.

4.

New

Putnam's Sons

York, 1943, p. I4 S.
*'mla d nd
'

Wnrld Wt!r 11 *919-1944, edited by John H. Wuorinen,

mu
1 he Konald Press Company, New
York, 194S, p. 62.
0
The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. TTI,
The Lowering Clouds.

1919-194U Simon and Schuster, New York, 1954, p. 134.

0
William L. Langcr and S. Everett Gleason,
The Challenge
1917-1940, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York,
1952, p.

Vol.

it

a message of October 12 to the President

Supreme Soviet of the USSR Franklin
the
Presidium
of
of the
the claims of the Finnish miliendorsed
in
effect
Roosevelt
D.
Finnish relations. In

in

Finland thus took the country

7
.

The US President found

We

have led Finland

on,

summed

up Emanuel Celler, an American political figure, addressing the

US Congress on February 4, 1940. Finland would not have
ventured to enter into a military conflict with the Soviet Union
singlehanded. All

its

military plans, noted the Finnish

Defence

the premise that Fin-

Minister Julio Niukkancn, were based on

5
land would never fight any big power singlehanded.
1

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

to Isolation
322.

Documents on German Foreign Policy. T91X-1945, Series

D (1917-194$),
V, United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1953, PP

648

'

Tbid.

Congressional Record, Vol. 86, Pt. 13, United States Government Print-

ins Office,
5

Julio

Washington, 1940, p. 5 * 3
Niukkancn, Talvisodan pnoluslitsministeri kerloo, Porvoo Werner
-

Soder.strbm Osakcyhtid, Helsinki, 1951, p. 31.

86

87

Military preparations were stepped up in Finland

at a time
the Soviet-Finnish talks had only started. The
Finnish

On November

when

army was ordered

to be on combat alert. Troops were quickly

deployed along the frontier. The population began to be evacuated from Helsinki and some other towns, and also from

jt

est pitch at the

moment the
make people believe

tried to

talks

were broken

The

press

that Finland could fight the

USSR

off.

and win. In a book published at the time under the title

The
Defence of Finland, an officer of the Finnish General Staff named
Wolfgang Halsti argued that Finland had only one enemy,
the

USSR. 1 Towards the close of October 1939, C. O. Frictsch,

a
member of the foreign policy commission of the Finnish parliament, made tour of the troops deployed on the
Karelian isthmus near the Soviet frontier and returned with the conclusion
that Finland

12, 1939, in order to explain the Soviet stand,

published a statement refuting the foreign press assertions that the Soviet government had allegedly
declined the
latest concessions made by Finland . The
Finns made no con-

TASS

According to information available to TASS, far from

meeting the minimal Soviet proposals halfway, the Finns
are
hardening their posture. Until recently, on the Karelian isthmus
cessions.

the Finns had two or three divisions deployed against

Leningrad;
now increased the number of divisions threatening
Leningrad to seven, and are thereby demonstrating their intrac-

they have

tability.

suggested that the Finnish government immediately pull back

13-14, in an atmosphere of

war

order to avoid any repetition of provocations. Finland

by demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the
same distance, in other words, their virtual withdrawal to the
suburbs of Leningrad. Provocations by the Finns continued. All

mus

in

replied

were that the reactionary Finnish leadership had

political means for ending the tension in

the indications
off

cut

all

further

Soviet-Finnish relations.

On November

and trade representatives. It declared that it considers itself

from the commitments assumed under the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and systematically violated by the government of Finland . On the next
day the Soviet armed forces were ordered immediately to cut
4
short possible new provocations by the Finnish military. The
Finnish envoy in Moscow was informed of this by V. P. Potemkin, First Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
USSR. But the armed provocations did not cease. Hostilities
broke out between Finland and the USSR on November 30,
ic

939

CON FLIGT AND QUEST FOR

A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
When it became obvious that a military conflict was breaking
out on the Soviet Unions northwestern frontier, Britain, France,
a nd the

c -

Frictsch, Suotnen

Ibid., p.
3

T.

Bartenyev,

tions, p. 40.

80

Kohlalommoclet, Tammi. Helsinki, 194s,

p.

USA

intensified their intervention in the developments,

42.

hi.

Soviet Foreign Policy.

Soviet Foreign Policy.

Collection of Documents,

Komissarov, Thirty Years of

was forced

hysteria, the

ing of some 15 infantry divisions was massed along

the frontier
with the USSR. The Finnish army had a trained reserve of
between 300,000 and 400,000 men. 1

1959, the Soviet government

to be free

mobilisation of reservists was announced in Finland and

univerlabour conscription was introduced. An army group consist-

28,

inform the government of Finland that it had denounced the

1932 non-aggression treaty and ordered the recall of its diplomat-

to

sal

its

kilometres from the frontier on the Karelian isth-

troops 20-25

On November

has no intention of fanning this outrageous act of aggression

1

ready for war. 2

is

On November

1939, near the village of Mainila, Fin-

on the part of units of the Finnish army. It said that it hoped

2
there would be no further acts of this kind. The USSR then

the

Karelian isthmus area. Many people who took a

sympathetic
attitude towards the Soviet Union were arrested.
In Finland militarist anti-Soviet propaganda reached
its high-

26,

nish troops opened fire on Soviet frontier guards. Exercising restraint, the Soviet government declared on that same day that

Collection of Documents, Vol.

4,

p.

463.

Vol.

4,

p.

Ibid.

461.

G0 odneighbourly

Ibid., p. 465.

Rela'

Ibid., p. 467.

89

extending considerable military assistance to Finland. Their

calwere based on the self-same Munich political line of
changing the direction of the Second World War by rechannelculations

ling the efforts of all the imperialist powers, including nazi

the Soviet-Finnish

Soviet Union.

The

war could lead

to a united front against the

assistance given to the Finnish militarists was

substantial indeed. As many as 500 aircraft were sent to Finland from Britain, France, and Sweden. Over 1 1,000 volunteers
arrived in Finland from the Scandinavian nations, the USA,

and other

and Germany also helped Finland.

In the British government, the Soviet ambassador in London
reported on January 25, t 940, there was a growing tendency for
countries.

escalating the

Italy

Soviet-Finnish

through intervention by
2
Britain.
Reactionary political quarters were urging the British
government to act even at the risk of breaking off relations and
engaging in an armed conflict with the USSR.
Britain, France,
efforts in the

and the

conflict

USA

increasingly coordinated

their

Finnish issue.

As early as October 1939, the USA had supplied Finland

with 850,000 dollars worth of aircraft and other military hardware. In December 1939, with the approval of the President,
the Export-Import

Bank

of the

USA

had extended a credit of

10 million dollars to Finland. 3 Many American pilots and airfield service personnel had been sent to Finland. The White
House declared that service in the Finnish army by American
citizens would not mean violation of the Neutrality Bill. The
US government got Congress to approve giving Finland another
20 million dollars. This money was in fact imposed upon Finland: according to the information available to the Soviet embassy in Washington, the Finns had by February 1,
1940, used
not more than 3 million dollars out of the first credit of 10 mil4
lion dollars. Headed by the rabidly anti-Soviet former US Pres-

er Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second

Bloomington, 1957, p. 59.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

a fund-raising campaign
r, 200,

World War, Indiana Univer-

90

the

USA

launched

campaign brought

This

USSR

a military col-

was taking place not only with the Finnish militarists but
also with the forces of the imperialists of a number of countries
who were helping Finland with money, weapons (especially artillery and aircraft), manpower in the guise of volunteers, aggressive diplomacy, and the whipping up of anti-Soviet propaganda.

Counting on involving other countries in the military conflict

USSR, the Finnish government attempted to secure

with the

mediation of Germany and the

the

were interested

USA. But

these countries

Germany

the continuation of hostilities.

in

jected the offer, while the

moment was inopportune"

US government

said that

for concluding peace.

it

It

felt

re-

the

was only

government approached the USSR through

the government of Sweden. On behalf of the Finnish government, the Swedish envoy in Moscow Otto Winter formally informed V. M. Molotov on December 4, 1939, that the Finnish
government wishes to ask the Soviet government if it is prethen that the Finnish

pared to enter into

new

negotiations.

The Soviet government responded

first

affirmatively to the very

peace sounding of the Finns.

On

29, 1940, the Swedish Foreign Minister ChrisGunther was informed that in principle the Soviet government had no objection to signing a peace treaty with the

January

tian E.

Ryti-Tanner government, but before beginning peace negotiations

it

wished

know

to

the

terms

that

Finland

was prepared

to

terms

in

accept.'

When

the Finns insisted on

knowing the

Soviet

advance, the Soviet government obliged, forwarding

to

its

terms

government on February 23, 1940, through the

ambassador to Sweden A. M. Kollontai. These were the
transfer to the USSR of the Karelian isthmus and the northeastthe Finnish

Soviet

Ibid.

W. Langer and
4

Ibid.

Vol.

F..

Gleason, op.

cit.,

p. 397.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

dollars.

circles in

Finland.

lision

sity Press,
1

000

for

In other words, in the northwest of the

Ger-

many, into an armed struggle against the Soviet Union. In December 1939, the newspaper New York Post wrote openly that

Herbert Hoover, reactionary

ident

1 ,

History of the Great Patriotic

Moscow,

War

of the Soviet Union.

11)41-11)45.

i960, p. 271 (in Russian).

91

cin shore of

Lake Ladoga, and a lease of the Hanko peninsula

with the adjoining small islands for a Soviet naval base to
guard
the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The
Soviet government
said

it was prepared to let Finland have

the Petsamo district
and that it would be willing to sign a treaty with Finland
and
Estonia on the joint defence of the Gulf of Finland.

Further, in order to blunt Britains anti-Soviet activities,

the
Soviet government offered London the role of

mediator

in

or-

ganising Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations. On February

24, 1940,
the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign
Affairs Richard Butler handed Britains negative
reply to the
Soviet ambassador, thereby confirming that London

was actually
solidarity with the anti-Soviet line of Finlands ruling
quar-

in

ters.

On

February 26, the Finnish government declared that the

unacceptable. This declaration contradicted
common sense. In six days, on March 4, 1940, the Finnish
commander-in-chief Carl Manncrheim reported to the governSoviet terms were

ment

that in the Karelian isthmus the Finnish troops

critical position.

were

means refuted all the invendesire to bolshcvise Finland, inventions spread

energetically by Finnish and international reaction before
and
its

throughout the war.

By March
Finnish

1,

the

Red Armys advance had

government

decide

to

begin

peace

finally
talks.

made

the

Through

that the Finnish governcould consider the Soviet terms as the startingpoint for talks and that it accepted them in principle. 1
felt

ing of
it

a peace delegation

had decided

to

to

Moscow. Although on March

begin peace negotiations, that same day

it

sent

government a statement requesting additional clarifiand information." It was still hoping for assistance
from the imperialist powers and ignoring the actual state of
affairs in the war theatre. But the combined pressure brought
to bear on Finland by Britain, France, and the USA could no
longer wreck the Soviet-Finnish talks. Military defeat made
the Soviet

cation

Finland see the necessity for a political settlement of the military

conflict.

THE CONFLICT

IS

SETTLED

The USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty in Moscow on

March 12, 1940. Under the treaty, the Soviet-Finnish state frontier was somewhat altered. Primordial Russian lands passed to
the USSR-thc Karelian isthmus with the town of Vyborg, the
northern and western shores of Lake Ladoga, the area west of
the Murmansk Railway, and a section of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas on the coast of the Barents Sea. The Soviet Union
obtained a

30-year lease for the

Hanko

peninsula as the

site

of a naval base.

M. Kollontai Moscow was informed

A.

ment

Giving in to this pressure from Britain and France, the Finnish government once again procrastinated, postponing the send-

in a

ness to settle the conflict by peaceful

about

Union.

After heavy fighting Soviet troops had breached

the powerful fortifications

of the Manncrheim Line, which
Western military experts considered to be impregnable. The road
to Finlands capital was now open. But it was not
the Soviet
Unions intention to occupy Finland, although it had the military potential for doing just this. The USSR's
restraint, its readitions

In London the Finns were told in ultimatum language that in the event that discussions with the Soviet
Union should be continued, all preparations (for sending an expeditionary force. -F.S.) would be interrupted and shipments of
2
arms and economic support would cease.
the Soviet

it

Vaino Tanner writes: No sooner had the Cabinet reached

decision than it began to be pressed urgently from without.
France and England
attempted by all means at their disposal to prevent Finland from engaging in peace negotiations
with

most important provisions of the peace

Both Contracting Parties mutually undertake to
refrain from any attack upon each other, not to conclude any
alliances, and not to participate in any coalitions directed against
one of the Contracting Parties. 1 While the first part of this
Article III, one of the

treaty, states:

article

was not

new

principle

of

Soviet-Finnish

relations

its

Vaino

Stanford

Tanner,

The

Winter Wer.

Finland against Russia

University Press, Stanford. California,

1957,

p.

19 39-/940,

195.

Ibid., p. 196.
3
1

Ibid., p. 197.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

*

War and

Peace in Finland,

p.

126.

92
93

and Had been recorded earlier in the

1932 non-aggression treaty
(this provision was included
in the 1940 treaty at the request
of

the Finnish side), the latter

part on non-participation in alliances
and coalitions hostile towards the USSR
was a fundamentally

new commitment undertaken by

the government of Finland

Ihe Soviet Union attached special significance
to this as a polit-

guarantee of the future course of Finlands

foreign policy
October n, 1940, the USSR and Finland
signed an
agreement on the Aland Islands. Finland
undertook to demilitarise these islands, in other
words, to refrain from fortifying them

5, 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War

came to the conclusion that Finlands capitulation to
Russia would be a major defeat for the Allies, most damaging
1
The peace treaty of
to their prestige throughout the world.
March 12 was indeed a blow not only to the ambitions of the
Finnish militarists. On March 14, 1940, the Soviet ambassador

As

early as February

Council

ical

On

or from

letting

them be used

as

a base by the armed forces

other countries. The Soviet Union got

the right to maintain
a consulate on Aland Islands, which,
in addition to the usual
consular functions, was to monitor
Finlands compliance with
its commitments on the
demilitarisation of the islands
1

With

the

armed

with Finland settled, the USSR

ennorthwestern frontiers, above all the

conflict

sured the security of its

security of Leningrad, to the extent
prevailing circumstances. There were
or expanding relations

with

it

was

now

Finland

possible under the

favourable prospects

on

goodneighbourly

basis, in a spirit of confidence.

The outcome of the war sobered the

aggressors and
complices in the two imperialist groups.
On March

their ac

OKW

political justification for the

Soviet Foreign Policy.

occupation of Norway. 2

Collection of Documents, Vol.

Documents on German Foreign

Policy.

i 9 iS-r 945 ,

Series

pp.

II.

weakness, and indecision of the

Allies.

Soviet ambassador to Britain dated

was seen

conflict

March

report from

the

Today I listened to Chamberlain informing Parliament about the

peace treaty signed by the USSR and Finland and got further
evidence of how great the danger had been of Britain and
France intervening on the side of Finland.
More than ever
before it became clear that peace was signed opportunely. 3 At
13, 1940, said:

the sixth session of the

Supreme Soviet

of the

lotov noted that in his address to the

House

USSR
of

V. M.

Commons

Mo.

(Chamberlain) not only expressed bitter regret over the failure

to

prevent the termination of the war in Finland, thereby turnpeace-loving

world to

imperialist

soul inside

out

for

all

the

gave something in the nature of an account of

how the British imperialists endeavoured to escalate the war in
4
Finland against the Soviet Union.
see, but

ON THE ROAD TO COMPLICITY

IN CASE BARBAROSSA

The sobering effect of the outcome of the Soviet-Finnish

armed conflict did not last long on the ruling quarters in Finland.
In Helsinki the peace treaty of

was regarded

March

12, 1940,

with the

USSR

no more than an armistice to be used for settling accounts with the Soviet Union. The actions of the Ryti
government within the country were self-evident: the persecution
Was started of people who had come out for goodneighbourly

528-29.

D, Vol.

outcome of the Soviet-Finnish

France as a major setback, as a result of the vacillation,

in

4.

p. 877.
1

Affairs that the

ing his

8, 1940,
Hitler wrote to Mussolini that the
Soviet victory had to be taken
into account in the plans of
Germany and Italy for the future.
Faking into consideration the available
supply facilities he
wrote, no power in the world
would have been able, except
after the most thoroughgoing
preparations, to achieve such
results at 30 to 40 degrees below
zero (C) on such terrain than
did the Russians at the very first. 2
As, for example, Alfred Jodi
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
of the
noted
his diary on March 12,
,940, the Finnish -Russian treaty
deprives not only Britain but also us
(Germany. -P. S.) of all

France reported to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign

to

VIII,

as

J.R.M. Butler, op. cit., p. 107.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

John Midgaard,

Aschenhoug

&

April

i 94 o,

Dagcn

Co., Oslo, i960, p. 68.

OG

Forspillet,

Forkgt

AV,

Sixth Session
l

of the

Supreme Soviet

of the

USSR. March

29- April 4 ,

94o. pp. 31-32.

95

relations with the

with the

USSR; the Society for Peace and Friendship

USSR, which had been set up in May
1940, was sub-

jected to harassment: towards the close

of 1940
many of its members were imprisoned.

while

it

was banned,

Revanchist, anti-

Soviet, pro-fascist organisations

were encouraged.
As the military-political situation in Western Europe
changed
drastically in the spring and summer of
1940 there was a marked
rise of pro-German trends among
Finlands leaders. The government granted the right of transit to German troops
sent to Norway, which the nazis had occupied. The time,
place, and volume
of this -transit wms determined by
Germany entirely at its own
discretion. German-Finnish military
cooperation gained momentum: Finland received increasing supplies of
German armaments
and systematic links were established between
the general staffs
and the intelligence services of the two countries.
This did not

go unnoticed by the Soviet government. In

the

Finnish

side,

Soviet

their contacts with

representatives,

proceeding from the

terms of the peace treaty, tried to prevent
Finland from being
drawn into the preparations foe war against the USSR, and
expressed their concern over the transit of
German
troops across

Finnish territory, the

the nazi SS forces,

man

general

recruiting

and the

talks

of

Finnish

volunteers

into

between the Finnish and Ger-

stalfs.

Kaleva Kekkoncn, the decision of the Finnish military

command and the Ryti government to collaborate with nazi Ger-

many may be regarded

as the direct result of Finlands foreign

Policy aspirations during the

By April 1940 the Soviet

first

is

compelling evidence to show that Mannerheim was

the day after it had been approved

informed of this plan on

1
the German and
by Hitler. As early as the beginning of 1941
Finnish military staffs started discussing the possibilities for
military cooperation in the event of a Soviet-German war. On

January 30, 1941, the Finnish Chief of Staff General E. Heinrichs told the German side that for an invasion of the USSR
Finland would be able to deploy five divisions along the western
and three divisions along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga,
and also two divisions against the Soviet military base at Hanko.
the Finnish ruling quarters it was decided that there
would be a war against the USSR and that Finland would be
involved in that war on Germanys side.
The objectives of the Finnish and German forces that were
being massed in Northern and Gcntral Finland were defined in

Among

a directive of the

German High Command

announced
and the directive of April 20 of the

May

on

command

army was, by order of Mannerheim, placed under

German commander in Norway General

Falkenhorst.

A German

army of more than 40,000 effectives was concenon the eve of the nazi invasion of the USSR.
Finland committed aggression against the USSR together with
nazi Germany.
trated in Finland

decades after independence. 5

military leadership

3.

DEVELOPMENTS

cutants of Case Barbarossa. 3

of the small countries

the exe-

96

of the Ger-

of the

uania, Latvia, and

Commander

25-28, 1941, in Salzburg, and on June 15 a large part

of the Finnish

nyev and Y. Komissarov, consistently and deliberately

pursued a course that turned Finland into a participant
in nazi
Germanys invasion of the Soviet Union, into one of

74

and

man Norway Army. 2 The plans for interaction between German and Finnish troops were finalised at the military talks

was regarding Finland as a probable participant in a nazi attack on

the USSR. 2
The Finnish government, write the Soviet historians
T. Barte-

*
Izvcslia, October 16, 1974.
A. M. Vasilevsky, A Lifelong Cause, Progress Publishers,
Moscow, ro8i,

'

of April 7, 1941,

in operational directives of the Finnish General Staff

the

was becoming increasingly obvious that Finland

was mov
towards rapprochement with nazi Berlin. To quote
Urho

It

ing

There

cit., p.

THE BALTIC

steadfastly pursued a friendly policy towards LithEstonia. This bore out Lenin s words that

as far as concerns the bourgeois

.

we

arc,

and petty-bourgeois elements

maybe, not allies, but at any

Ibid.

History of the Second World War. 1919-1945, Vol. 3, Beginning of the

War. Preparations for Aggression Against the USSR, Moscow, 1974, p. 239
*

T. Bartenyev, Y. Komissarov, op

The USSR

IN

44.

726

97

rate

more

and more valuable neighbours than the imBut reactionary quarters, in Estonia, Latvia,
and
Lithuania were following in the wake
of the leading Western
-

perialists

reliable

'. 1

imperialist powers.

would,

ASSISTANCE TREATIESFACTOR
OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Polish bourgeois states military-political

defeat by Gerfact that nazi Germany was now
poised on the

many, die

USSRs

western frontiers, and the anti-Soviet

policies pursued by Britain and France during the period of the
phoney war' intensified the threat to the Soviet
Unions security in the Baltic region. The imperialists regarded the
Baltic region as one of the
most convenient springboards for an attack on
the Soviet Union,
for it provided the shortest route
to the most vital centres of the
worlds first socialist state, 2 writes the
Soviet historian V. J.
Sipols. As soon as any imperialist
power began planning to
strike at the Soviet Union it
immediately turned its gaze in the
direction of the Baltic.
interests of the Soviet Unions security

question

demanded measures

with Britain and

France of joint armed action

against aggression in the Baltic region,

action diat, in the event
of war with Germany, would include
British and French naval
squadrons entering the Baltic and engaging
the German navy.
Before the war broke out the USSR
had proposed that Britain
and France should reach agreement with the
Baltic countries on
the temporary stationing of British
and French fleets at the
Aland Islands, the Moonsund archipelago,
and a number of
Baltic ports in order to protect the
neutrality of these countries
against Germany. For the same
purpose the Soviet Baltic Fleet

V
ir/

Lenm
\/',

Works, Vol.

J.

September 1939, in order to contain the spread

government offered the Estonian
Foreign Minister Karl Selter to discuss the question of reinforc-

At

the close of

ing security

f lshth

oil

the eastern coast of the Baltic, having in

mind

on mutual assistance. Estonia accepted

was signed on September 28. An
proposal
was
made
to the government of Latvia. The
analogous
place
in
Moscow
on October 2-5 and ended
a
treaty
took
talks on
with the signing of a treaty. On October 10 a treaty of mutual
the conclusion of a treaty

proposal, and the treaty

assistance

At
made

was signed with Lithuania.

the talks with the Baltic states Soviet

the point that

German

diplomacy strongly

aggression against these states was

The treaties themselves, which were almost idenwere worded correspondingly. Article I of the treaties
with Latvia and Estonia (Article II of the treaty with Lithuania) stated that the contracting parties had undertaken to extend
not ruled out.
tical,

each other every possible, including military, assistance in

to

a direct attack or threat of attack by any great

European power regardless of whether this was an attack by
land or sea. The Soviet Union would extend to the armies of
each of these countries assistance in the form of armaments and

other military supplies on favourable terms.

the treaties with Latvia

of

Diplomacy. Bourgeois Latvia in the

Anti-Soviet Blaus
5

(in

Estonia

Under

(Article

Article III

IV

the

of

Union and the Baltic states, the latter granted the

USSR the right to set up naval bases and airfields and to maintain, at its own expense, strictly limited ground and air forces
in the sectors set aside for bases and airfields. A fundamentally
important point was that the treaties contained commitments not

of the Soviet

conclude alliances or to participate

to

in

coalitions

directed

against any of the contracting parties.

Under the treaty with Lithuania, the Soviet Union, with a

view to strengthening friendly relations with that country, trans-

All-Russia Conference of the RCP(B)', Collected

of the Impenal,st Powers. i 9 i -,

9 94c,, Riga, 1968. p.

and

treaty with Lithuania), in order to strengthen the mutual security

30, 1965, p. 17S.

Sipols, Secret

Soviet proposals

the event of

to prevent the territory of the

Baltic states from being used as
a springboard for aggression against
it.
At the military talks
in the summer of
1959 the Soviet government insistently raised

the

The

were rejected.

this

Ihc

necessary, also be based there.

of the nazi threat, the Soviet

MUTUAL
The

if

The USSR

cow. 1976,
2

Russian).
58

p.

in the Struggle Against the

Nazi Aggression

i9 5

Mos-

P i 945,

126 (in Russian).

Soviet Foreign Policy.

Collection of Documents, Vol. 4, pp. 45

>

45

*
3

13
7*

99

Ill

ferred to Lithuania the city and region

of Vilnius, which had

been taken from Lithuania by Poland

1920 and liberated by

Soviet troops in September
1939. Moreover, the treaty stated
that the Soviet Union would help to
defend Lithuanias western
in

newspaper Cina, that had been held

These forces have started moving and
1
stop them anymore.

in

check for 20 years.

theres nothing that can

frontier.

THE SITUATION IN THE BALTIC

REGION CHANGES RADICALLY

1 hese treaties

did not infringe on the sovereign rights

of the
Baltic states, nor did they affect their
social and state system.

They were based on the principles of equality,

non-interference
internal affairs, and mutual respect for
independence and

in

sovereignty.
J he
y were significant factors strengthening the Soviet Unions
defence capability and security in the northwest.

cut short na/i

Germanys attempts

to consolidate

its

let itself

of

economic

positive

agreements
with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are of
great

significance

to

be carried away by

them. 2 The Supreme Soviet approved

government relative to the Baltic

the policies of the Soviet

region.

its

long-standing hostility for social-

fear of any further revolutionisation of the masses.

The powers of the two imperialist groups, especially Germany,
prodded the Baltic capitals harder in an anti-Soviet direction.

ism and

tov said: We are for honest and

the concluded pacts on terms of complete
reciprocity. On the
basis of the achieved improvement
of political relations
with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet
Union took steps to
meet the economic requirements of these nations,
including the
signing of the corresponding trade agreements
with them. In a
situation where the trade of all the European
nations, including
neutral states, is facing immense difficulties,
the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR was told, these

USSR

Anti-Soviet feeling, already high in

mounted as the Baltic bourgeoisie

positions in

M. Molo1939,
scrupulous compliance with

of the

treaties.

the leadership of these states,

At the extraordinary fifth session of the Supreme

Soviet
USSR, held on October 51-Novcmber 2,
V.

the

mitments under the

More, they

key military-strategic region.

this

Subsequent developments made it plain that the governments

the actions
of the Baltic states had no intention of reciprocating
all its comhonoured
punctiliously
which
Union
Soviet
the
of

its

There was nothing in the actions of the governments of Latvia,

Lithuania, and Estonia to show that they sincerely wanted cooperation with the Soviet Union.

USSR mounted

Hostility for the

in the policies of the Baltic

ruling quarters W'hen war broke out between the Soviet Union
and Finland. In violation of its treaty with the USSR, Latvia
resecretly gave Finland military assistance. Volunteers were

Finland with the connivance? of the authorities in

It is estimated
all three Baltic countries, especially in Estonia.
Estonians
took part in
thousand
three
and
two
between
that
cruited

for

the fighting on the side of the Finnish

ership

in

the Baltic states

wards nazi Germany.

Many

began

to

armed forces. 2 The leadlean more and more to-

friends of the Soviet Union, active

Ihe treaties of mutual assistance were a factor

envigorating
the democratic forces in Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. They

fighters against fascism

were welcomed by the working people of these

countries. At
rallies and meetings the working
people demanded the curbing

ment

of people urging friendly relations with the

USSR

tonia

and Lithuania. The Soviet government drew

the attention

of the activity of fascist organisations

and

closer friendly rela-

tions

with the Soviet Union. The treaty has released

the revolutionary dynamic forces of the people,
wrote the Latvian

Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet

of the
ber 11 -November z, 19)9, pp. i -i6.
5

USSR

of

all

100

in

USSR

January 1940 in Riga,

was

intensified

harassin

Es-

with the
these countries to their violations of the treaties
violations.
of
these
consequences
and warned them of the

These warnings were ignored.

limited
Talks were dragged out on the schedule of bringing

Octo'

V.

Ibid., pp. J25-26,

Ibid., p.

were arrested

Liepaja, Jelgava, and Ventspils. There

16.

J.

Sipols, Op.

cit.,

p.

319-

101

contingents of Sovtet troops

into the territory of the
Baltic coun
the quartering of these troops
was sabotaged, and meas
ur were taken to cut off all contact
between the civilian population and Soviet soldiers.
Army units were stationed around
the Soviet garrisons in
order to isolate them. Soviet
military
personnel was placed under
heavy surveillance.
tries,

Nobody was

A >^

trai
USed by Re<i
On October t 9
!
the Soviet ambassador
1959, tb
to Lithuania reported that
people
were be, ng manhandled and
arrested for the least criticfsm
of
government or for showing any
gratitude to the USSR 1

"V

So government's concern about

the situation along the
SR s frontiers in the Baltic region
was intensified bv the
hat thC lme t0WardS subvc
in 8
treaties with
the TvfeT
Soviet n
Union was accompanied by a
marked growth

.rn

of

ary preparations in these states

and by the arming of fasorganisations. The military
leadership in
the
te Baltic states began planning an attack
on the Soviet garrisons in the event of a military
situation.
1

Mit

The

and military leadership of Estonia,

Latvia, and
Lithuania began to meet more and
more often in
political

order to

com

so idate the anti-Soviet forces

in the Baltic region
and expand
military cooperation. These
meetings forged an anti-Soviet
military alliance between Latvia,
Estonia,

mander-in-chief f thc

and Lithuania. The comLithua nian army subsequently

confirmed

that in 1940 the general staffs

of the Baltic states had
worked
plans for possible joint military
operations. This activity
VI a
tljC mUtUal assistancc
tccaties ^gned by the
LSSR with the Baltic states, which
contained the provision that
the signatory states^ would not
conclude any alliances and would
111
307 C ahtl nS dlrccted against any of the
contracting
parties

out

ZT

uV[

The reactionary quarters in the Baltic

states became increasingly active in secretly sounding
Berlin in order to obtain assurances of support from Germany.

Thc

Lithuanian

president

Antanas Smetona went farther in this

respect than thc others
In February 1940 he sent
the chief of the state security
department A. Povilaitis on a secret mission
to
nazis

to

establish

their

Berlin to request the

protectorate over Lithuania, to
take it

government did not have

under their wing politically. The nazi
this
by approximately the
begged-it promised to do
t0 be
1

autumn of 1940.
The reliance on support from nazi Germany was what nourruling quarters in the Baltic
ished thc provocative actions of the
with Germany, some
agreements
secret
states. In keeping with

three Baltic states in thc first

70 per cent of the exports of the
Ihe nazis assiduously
Reich."
Third
went
to
the
half of 1940
region.
On June 26, 1940.
Baltic
the
agents
in
planted their
in Riga John C. Wiley reported to Washington
Prime Minister had told him: ...in Latvia,
Latvian
that the
elsewhere, there was a fifth column of pro-Germans.

US envoy

the

as

tions with

102

Germany and

and thc reactionary trends in home policy, oppoprocesses were developing just as quickly in these countries:
revolutionisation of thc working people and their rapid in-

foreign policy
site

the

volvement
forces

active political life on the side of thc democratic

in

and the communist

for closer friendship

momentum.
Thc threat

parties.

powerful mass movement

with the Soviet Union was swiftly gaining

of nazism

and the

activities

of

internal reaction

Baltic states
led to a further exacerbation of thc situation in the
UlSmetona,
of
regimes
fascist
themselves. Repressions by thc

the
manis, and Pats against thc working people could not halt
ruling
the
actions
of
with
the
mounting popular disaffection
quarters in these countries.

March 3, 1940, by the

of Latvia, the April
Party
Communist
Central Committee
and the appeals
Estonia,
of
Party
Communist
Conference of the
Party of
Communist
the
of
Committee
Central
issued by the
In this situation a decision passed on

of the

people
Lithuania in April-May 1940 called upon thc working
revolutionary
of the Baltic states to step up their struggle for the

governments that were pursuing an inthe spring

creasingly provocative policy towards the USSR. By
overthrow of the

Socialist

tion o) Soviet
3

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

ruling elite of the Baltic states sought closer relaintensified thc anti-Soviet thrust of its

While the

fascist

RestoraRevolutions in 1940 in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Power, Moscow, 197s, p. 228 (in Russian)

A. A. Drizul, Latvia under Nazi Yoke, Riga, i960,

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1940, Vol.

27S

p.
1,

959

(in
.

P-

Russian,.
3

80

103

of 1940 united

anti-fascist

fronts demanding an end to

the
had been formed in all the three
Baltic
states under pressure from
the democratic forces. The task
was
set of purging the state
apparatus of fascist elements and creatin*
popular front governments. The conflict
between the policies of
tie ruling quarters and the demands
of the masses in the Baltic
states became insuperable.
Estonias Minister for the Interior
A. Jurimaa acknowledged that had
the people been allowed to
have their say the country would have
been bolshcviscd within
two months. 1 A revolutionary crisis began
fasst

ruling regimes

develop in Lithua-

to

and Estonia.

nia, Latvia,

to mili-

tary

force

to

suppress

the

reason they supported

fascist political

the

revolutionary movement.
so-called

Baltic

Week

For that
planned by

groups to demonstrate cohesion

among the antiSoviet forces in the Baltic region

and disband democratic organ-

isations.

The

oiled by the

Estonia and Latvia, which likewise acceded to the Soviet

The stand adopted by

was planned for June

working people of the Baltic
affair

the Soviet

achieved

Demonstrations calling for an end to the anti-people policies

governments swept across the whole Baltic region on June
15-21. Tremendous popular pressure compelled the ruling quar-

of the

On June 15 Antanas Smetona

Germany, the fascist regime fell, and a peoples government headed by the prominent public figure and writer Justas
Paleckis came to power in Lithuania on June 17. As a result
of revolutionary pressure from the working people, a popular
government headed by Professor August Kirhenstein was formed
ters in the Baltic states to retreat.

1940, but

15,

states

Union could not consider

was

poet and doctor Johannes Vares (Barbarus) was formed in Esto-

-2 .
be
le
'

action by the

15,

region as a bridgehead for aggression

against the
thus demanded immediate extraordinary

the

situation

USSR.

of provoca-

tions against the Soviet garrison

in Lithuania.

Moreover,

it

manded permission

de-

for additional Soviet troops to

be stationed
Lithuania in order to bring their numerical
strength up to the
level allowing them to fulfil the
terms of the treaty.
in

On

June

1940, the Lithuanian government acceded to

these requests.

1
i

16,

analogous statements were

made

to the

governments of

Essays on the History of the Communist

Party of Estonia

9 zos-J 94 os)l Tallinn, 1961, P

'

382 (in Pijssi^n),

15,

On

Part

(The

Latvia and Liwere held on July 14 and

1940. These elections were a sweeping triumph for the workpeople headed by the Communists. The Union of the Working
to the peoples sejms (diets) of

thuania and the State

ing

military-political aims in the

On June 14, 1940, the Soviet government demanded

that the
government of Lithuania take measures against
the Minister for
the Interior K. Skucas and the chief
of the state security department A. Povilaitis as persons heading the
campaign

June

on the same day.

Free elections

the policies

in

main

On

Sovie*-

it

and the

Latvia on June 20.

in

West, could

its

approved and supported

June 21, the socialist revolution

destroyed the buttress of the Konstantin Pats regime in Estonia,
and a peoples government headed by the well-known Estonian

of the ruling quarters in the Baltic

states in isolation from what
was happening in Europe as a whole.
Germany, which had
ellcct

USSR was

Latvia and Estonia on June 17.

nia

course,

the

by the working masses in the Baltic states. An additional contingent of Soviet troops arrived in Lithuania on June 15 and in

Union.

Of

re-

quests.

fled to

Popular action reached a magnitude

where the governments
the Baltic states no longer
ventured to resort openly

'

People of
of

Duma

won

Lithuania

of Estonia

99.19 per cent of the votes, the Bloc of

Working People of Latvia-97.8 per cent, and

the Working People of Estonia-92.8 per cent.

On
sions

July 21-22,
to restore

the

Soviet

supreme

power

their incorporation in the

in

USSR.

legislative

USSR

Union

bodies passed deci-

the Baltic states and to seek

In early August 1940, the sev-

enth session of the Supreme Soviet of the

requests of Lithuania, Latvia,

the
1

USSR

granted the

and Estonia for admission to the

Union republics enjoying equal rights with the other

republics. It was enough to ask the working people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, said deputy A. S. Shcherbakov at
the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, what
sort of government they wanted and give them the opportunity
1

as

Socialist

Revolutions in 1940 in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Resto-

ration of Soviet

Power,

p.

342,

Hi

104

IQ5

to state their will freely for matters to

ent from

what the bourgeois

move

politicians

in

a direction differ-

people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were unanimous

declaring chat the

new

THE USSRS RELATIONS WITH

Chapter 3

wanted. The working

BRITAIN, FRANCE,

AND

THE USA

in

was the Soviet way of life, and that

the new popular power was only the Soviet power . 1
The triumph of the revolutionary forces in Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia, the restoration of Soviet power in these republics,
and their admission as equal republics to the USSR fundalife

mentally changed the situation in this part of Europe. Instead

of creating a springboard for aggression against the

USSR

THE USSR AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH

COALITION AFTER THE OUTBREAK
OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

the

developments in the Baltic region brought the imperialists something quite different.
In the broad international

context

the steps taken by the

west and northwest in this
period signified that the maximum was done to counter fascist
aggression and the anti-Soviet activities of the Anglo-French

USSR

to reinforce

coalition,

its

security in the

to consolidate Soviet Unions position

in

the world.

By remaining militarily inactive during the German-Polish

war Britain and France in effect saved Germany from the constant nightmare of its military leaders, the nightmare of hostilbeyond all the
ities on two fronts. But in Berlin, having gone
limits of a strategic risk in September 1939, they did not tempt
fate

any

further.

Although there

in

Poland, the Wehrmacht

to

the West.

By November

we do

now make

not

on September 27,
us.

were pockets of resistance

the

it

transferring troops

had 96 large

large, time will

maximum

potential.

For that reason

Militarily,

we

units

work

use of

characterising the situation.

has a larger economic

working for

1939,

By and

on the Western front.

if

still

command began

Hitler said

it,

The
too,

massed

against us

other side

time

is

not

should not wait until the

enemy comes here; we should strike in the western direction.

The quicker the better. 1 It was then that Germanys next
strategic task was set-to crush France as the greatest force con2
As before, Germany was saved
fronting Germany in Europe.
.

by the reluctance of

its

imperialist adversaries to fight a

real

war.
Britains

strategic

conception was most clearly defined in a

War Cabinet on October 28, t 9 3

programme endorsed by the

It

boiled

turn

Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. August

1940.

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940,

p.

35

(in

Russian).

r- August 7,

down

Generalobcrst Haider,

Ende der

to the idea of passively waiting.

Kriegslagebuch, Vol.

I,

Wcstoffensive (14S. 1939-30.6.1940),

Vom

Priority

was

bis
Polrnfeldzug
Verlag,

W. Kohlliammcr

Stuttgart, 1963, pp. 86, 88.

*

Ibid., p. 90,

107

given to ensuring the security of the

British Isles against
the
German air force and navy and, in particular,
protecting British
interests in the Middle East, India,
and Singapore. 1 As regards
France, the pivot of its governments
war plan for 1940 was the
thesis that there be no large-scale
operations along the
against

To

Germany. 2

the British

seemed

it

front

that a

much
Germany. Underlying this
conception was the calculation that Germany
and Japan would
be influenced by the force of example. They
held that all that
was needed was a beginning which would fuel
the natural
aspirations of the aggressor powers and
prompt them to join
gainful

than

the

war

against

such a crusade. This conception, spread

circles, led to the belief that there

iment

to

armed intervention against

Gamelin wrote

in his

among French

would be no

serious

political

memoirs.

Foreign Affairs of the USSR that the Soviet

Union would pursue a policy of neutrality relative to them.
Further, the note
said that the Soviet Armed Forces had
entered the Western
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia and provided
the substantiation
for this extraordinary measure. Paris promptly
began looking
for a hidden meaning in the Soviet actions.
On

September

18,

Edouard Daladier put the relevant question to the

Soviet
ambassador to France Y. Z. Surits. 4 A similar question
was put
by Jean Pa yart, the French charge daffaires ad
interim
in
939>

'

Public Record Office, Cab.

66/3, pp. 36-38.
General Gamelin, Servir, Vol. Ill, La guerre
(septembre
194 ) Librairie Plon, Paris, 1947, pp. 233-34.

Iff

in

May

1939-19

mat

194.

1939, Jean Payart

London

the efforts to

On

M. Maisky. The Foreign Secretary put three basic questions

the ambassador:
1. What was the Soviet governments opinion about the

I.

to

state of

Anglo-Soviet relations and

government
Union in time of war?
the British

What was

2.

would there be sense

for

to enter into trade talks with the Soviet

the Soviet governments idea about Polands

was the existing demarcation line a tempowartime measure or was it of a more permanent nature?
3. What was the Soviet governments view of the European

future? Specifically,

Were

the principles of Soviet foreign policy (struggle

which he,
had grown used to associating with the
force or had any significant change occurred in the

the Foreign Secretary,

USSR,

Naggiar departed from Moswas appointed charge daffaires ad interim,

still

in

character of Soviet foreign policy?

On

September 26, 1939, the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs gave the ambassador the guidelines for a reply to Halifax: Relative to the first question:

to

of

if

Britain

is

USSR

sincere

it

could

and intends
USSR, for the
provided,
Western
Europe
remain neutral during the war in
towards
behaviour
itself
docs
not,
by
its
course, that Britain

begin trade talks with the

is

USSR, push it into involvement in the war. Relative to the

second question: the present demarcation line is not, of course,

the

between Germany and the USSR. The destiny

Poland depends on many factors and opposite
forces, which cannot be taken into account at present. Relative
to the third question: the principles of Soviet foreign policy have

the state frontier

of

cow

sound the Soviet stand were more

September 23-for the first time since the
outbreak of the war-thcre was an official meeting between the
Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax and the Soviet ambassador
In

comprehensive.

against aggression, support for victims of aggression),

for

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

After the French ambassador Pauie-Emile

Potemkin, the First Deputy Peoples Com-

situation?

On September 17, 1939, the governments of Britain and France

were informed in a note from the Peoples
Commissar

Ibid., p.

P.

rary

INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE APPROACHES

OF THE SIDES TO MUTUAL RELATIONS

V.

have left the British and the French governments with no objectSoviet
ive grounds for expecting any complications with the

imped

Russia,'1 General Maurice

to

missar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, on September 20, 1939.

potemkin replied that the Soviet neutrality declaration should

Union.

and French military and government

leaders

quick implementation of the design to

turn
the ongoing world war from a confrontation
of capitalist powers
into a joint military crusade
against the USSR would be

more

USSR,

the

the

future

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

109

nor changed. As regards

Soviet-German relations, they arc
determined by the non-aggression
1
pact. These replies were conveyed to the British Foreign Secretary
on September 27, 19,
1 6
da) the Peo ples Commissar for Foreign

1
the

rce
USSR

sent the Soviet

ambassador

mg: As regards

Affairs of
to France a directive stat

the substance of Daladiers question,

you may
be guided by my replies to
questions put by Halifax. 2 This
concretisation of the Soviet Unions
stand in connection with
tic ongoing war made it
clear that given reciprocity the
USSR
was prepared for normal, constructive
development of relations
Wlt
many s adversaries and for strengthening trade
and

Cm

economic links with them.

What was the response to this by

Germany's
versary For Britain and France, and
also

phoney war

imperialist ad-

for the

USA

the

Europe was a period when the

combination of
anti-Sovietism with the lack of
political and military foresight
and the absence of elementary common
sense had in many ways
practically the same damaging
consequences as the prewar Munich policy. The policy of inaction
in the hope of an anti-Soviet
compromise with the aggressor, pursued
until September
1,
1939 was continued by military inaction
in

calculated

111

achieve

coin P rornisc ^0 impel

TQCtf After
!
USSR.
September

efforts

to

Germany to a war against the

the Western powers intensified
their

to precipitate such a

war in spite of the fact that their

had now been reduced by the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. As the US
ambassador in Moscow
Laurence A. Steinhardt cabled the State
Department on September 27, 1939, there has been a
strong tendency in French
and British diplomatic circles here
to entertain the hope that
action has or will shortly arise between
the two countries (Germany and the USSR.-P. S.). This policy
towards the USSR
was supplemented by Britain and France
with strong political
and economic pressure up to attempts
to
possibilities

for this

organise military inter-

vention against the USSR.

I he selfsame Steinhardt
quite clearly described the
aims and

character of

Anglo-French diplomacy in
On October

respect

during the phoney war.

2,

the

of

USSR

1940, he wrote to

Washington: The fundamental error of Allied, and subsequentdiplomacy in respect of the Soviet Union has been
ly British,
that it has at all times been directed toward attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to undertake positive action which if not
leading immediately to an armed conllict with Germany would
at least involve the real risk of such a contingency. This activ-

Steinhardt quite rightly emphasised, had no chance of suc.It is most unlikely, he continued, that the Soviet
cess. .
ity',

Union will through any serious negotiations or agreement with

Great Britain provoke the very event which its entire policy is
designed to prevent, namely, involvement in war against the
Axis Powers.

main issues of their attitude to the USSR the postures

London and Paris coincided. A certain specific of the French
attitude compared with that of the British was that the French
government was more active in giving prominence to anti-SovietIn the

of

ism and took

relative to the
initial

less

trouble to hide behind back-up manoeuvres

USSR. The

ruling quarters in France wore, in the

period of the Second World War, more frank than those

in Britain

in

interpreting the

Munich

anti-Soviet line.

The

So-

ambassador to France Y. Z. Surits reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR on October
18, 1939, that in Paris they were still counting on setting the
viet

USSR and Germany

against each other.

Hence

the

task

of

every way what can cause

propaganda: to inflame
immediate differences between Germany and the USSR, intimidate Germany and neutral states with the bogey of Red menace arising from the present state of Soviet-German relations
and, at the same time, exercise some measure of caution in reofficial

in

gard to direct attacks on the USSR.'

and French diplomacy seized upon any occasion to

relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.
One of these occasions was the arrival in Moscow on September
British

aggravate

1939, of the Turkish Foreign Minister Sukrii Saracoglu to

negotiate a pact with the USSR on mutual assistance relative to
25,

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

R ti0m f lbC' Unit6d SmeS

(ic Papers
I9i9 ,
United States r'
Government Printing Office, Washington,
n.
*

D^ma

1956,

110

45

VoI
.

1
I,

Foreign Relations of the United Slates.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

1940,

Vol.

I,

1959

P-

616.

Ill

the

kind were started in October 1939. On October 6, 1939,

Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, told the
Soviet ambassador that the British government would like to
de\elop trade with the Soviet Union and that it was prepared

and the Balkans. He met with Laurence A. Steinwho reported to Washington on October 17, 1939:
The
Foreign Minister was frank in stating that Great
Britain had

(his

Straits

hardt,

sought to

make

tempt

drive

to

use of the T urkish-Sovict negotiations in an

a

wedge between

Germany

and the

at-

any other steps that could help to improve relations.

On October 8, 1939, the British Minister of Health Walter Elgovernments
liot spoke to the Soviet ambassador of the British
to discuss

Soviet

Union. 1

At

the fifth session of the

October

31, 1939,

V.

jupreme Soviet

M. Molotov confirmed

of the

that the

USSR 01
USSR was

do everything to achieve that aim.

continuing to abide by a policy of neutrality.

But in the French
government the new assurance about the USSR's neutrality
was
misinterpreted. Since the USSR was preserving
its neutrality,

censorship

was instructed

to give the press

USSR. Whereas formerly

a free hand relative

the directive given to the press

government was very interested in relaxing the existing

and melting the accumulated ice, and that in this context it
was willing to do something that the Soviet government would

tension

reported that after

1939, the

missar for Foreign Affairs of the

Soviet

USSR

former directives were void and

all

accept as evidence of the good faith of the British government.

Britain,

ambassador to France
the statement made by the Peoples Com3,

it

the press

was told

had become

was thinking of two possible

Moscow, headed by

steps: sending

a high-ranking

on questions of trade; recalling William

Seeds and replacing him with a person regarded as more author3
itative by the Soviet government.
On October 16, 1939, there was a talk between the Soviet
ambassador and the British Foreign Secretary. Speaking of the

could rip into us. 3

was more
than propaganda pressure in the attitude of Britain
and France
towards the USSR after the outbreak of the Second World
War
Concurrently-this applies chiefly to British diplomacy-Germanys adversaries engaged in a sort of insurance.
The aim was
to soften somewhat their anti-Sovietism and to
give the Soviet
leadership an illusion that London and Paris had
adopted a
constructive approach to the USSR and thereby avoid
pushing it, by their actions, towards Germany.
Practical actions of

said,

official, chiefly for talks

that

British
it

Eden

a responsible delegation to

UNREALITY OF DECLARATIONS
AND REALITY OF ANTI-SOVIETISM
By October 1939

to

of the talk El-

British

On November

and readiness

2
was conceivable.
On October 73, 1939, I. M. Maisky met with Anthony Eden,
member
of the Chamberlain War Cabinet. Eden asserted that
a
the question of improving Britains relations with the USSR had
been raised in British government circles. lie added that the

was to avoid, where possible, anything that might irritate

the
Soviet Union and accentuate everything that
could aggravate
clarions between the USSR and Germany,
now the general anti-Soviet campaign is being intensified, 2
the Soviet embassy
wrote.

USSR

At the end

casually asked whether an Anglo-Soviet non-aggression pact

liot

they reasoned in Paris, the anti-Soviet line

could be intensified
without fearing a Soviet-German rapprochement. The
French
to the

normalise relations with the

to

desire

governments desire to improve relations with the Soviet

Union, Halifax reiterated that he

clear that there

be the best beginning.

All

these

tion arose of
^

felt

trade negotiations would

looked like promising approaches. But the ques-

what

in fact the

British

were

offering the Soviet

something that the Soviet

Union in this
of the British governevidence
as
government would regard
ments good faith? In terms of concrete steps, nothing was offered.
Faith was, as always, proved not by words but by deeds of
sounding apart from

Ibid.
2

Foreign Relations of the United States,

1959, Vol.
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
8

Ibid.
I,

p.

486.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

2G

113

the British,
larations.

and these were fundamentally at variance with

decfact was that the British regarded their
hostile

The

acts against the

as

compatible

USSR

in that

with

continued

selfsame trade and economic sphere

contacts
with the USSR on

motivated not by Soviet trade with Germany but by the failure

ruling quarters to use our country in
0 f the British and French
Germany,
and hence their policy of vengeance
the war against

towards the Soviet Union.

questions of trade, and gave this out

as an indication of their
desire for better relations with the
Soviet Union. There indeed

and London, an aspect

blance of constructiveness to

World War broke out. The

all, surfaced soon after thc Second
USSRs efforts to prevent
of
the
subversion
prewar
Anglo-French
attempts
of the Munichmcn to
purposeful
the
war
and
a world

was some British interest in trade with

the USSR, but it was
more than overshadowed bv Londons
aspiration to give a semhope that

this

would,

first,

its relations with Moscow

in the
aggravate relations between the USSR

and Germany and, second, strengthen

Britains hand
in
the
search for a political compromise
with Germany. This aspiration
manifested itself in secret contacts with
the latter. But the main
thing was that London and, especially,
Paris were actively pursuing a policy that was anti-Soviet.
ln thc s P hcre of ade Britain and
France were fighting an
economic war in real terms against the
USSR,

t<

seeing

paramount instrument of

it

as a

political

pressure. In violation of the

universally recognised international
principle of freedom of navigation, Britain declared in
September 1939 that it would inspect ships flying neutral flags.
Under thc pretext of

down on contraband

clamping

the British

government began the illegal detention and inspection of Soviet

ships and foreign vessels" chartered by Soviet organisations.

As regards
more brazen:

the

Daladier government, its actions were

even
confiscated equipment and armaments
ordered
by the Soviet Union in France,
impounded the money and valuables of the Soviet trade mission
in Paris and of other Soviet
o reign tr ade organisations, detained
Soviet ships and freight
purchased for the Soviet Union, and so
on. All these actions
were taken precisely at a time when
diplomats of thc Anglobrcnch coalition were talking of a desire
for better relations
with the USSR.
it

One more

USSR and

isolate the

from two

French

aspect of the anti-Soviet policies pursued by Paris

that imperilled

expose

it

Soviet security most of

powers

to a strike by aggressor

fronts did not rule out the desire of the British

and

Union

mil-

to use their

own

forces to

damage

the Soviet

itarily.

When the Red Army entered thc Western Ukraine and Westtalkern Byelorussia reactionary political forces in France began
up to a decing about performing their allied duty to Poland
laration of

war on

the

USSR. The French General

Staff

worked

on plans to promote direct action against Russia, using

Ruma-

nia as a theatre of war.~

Paris also took a negative stand towards thc conclusion between the USSR and the Baltic states of treaties of mutual assist-

which strengthened peace and security in that part of

Europe. In early October 1959 Y. Z. Surits wrote to Moscow:
For a number of years our enemies have been seeking to oust
ance,

effect, was the purpose of the entire

Chamberlain made arrangements
what
Munich plan; this was
subject of Ribbentrops talks in
thc
about in Munich; this was
only five weeks of war, the
after
Paris; and here suddenly,

us out of

Europe. This,

USSR had moved

into

in

advanced positions

indeed enough to be roused to a fury.

in

Europe. This

is

'

At the close of October 1939 thc British Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the relative advantages and disadvantages
which would accrue to Britain if it were to declare war on the

Britain

and France waged their economic war against

the SoUnion chiefly on the pretext of punishing
the Soviet Union
for what they termed trade-economic
assistance to Germany.
However, in Moscow they knew what
political aims were actually being pursued by means
of these actions. As was pointed
out by the Peoples Commissar for
Foreign Affairs of thc USSR,
British and French hostile acts
against the Soviet Union
arc
viet

114

Sixth Session of the

Supreme Soviet of

Verbatim Report, Moscow. 1940,

p.

the

USSR, March

29- April

4,

194-

28 (in Russian).

VIII,
* Documents
on German Foreign Policy. 1918-194% Series D, Yol.
United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954, P- 7 * 1
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
-

8*

115

USSR. 1

In France they toyed with the idea of attacking

Soviet
very outbreak of the war.

oilfields at the

was then that Alfred Chatfield, Minister for Coordination

Defence, presented to the Committee a government
paper
under the heading Russia: Vulnerability of Oil
It

of

Supplies". This
paper contained, among other things, one of the aims
of strategic planning:
I he capture or destruction of any great
city in

Russia, particularly of Leningrad, would prove

a signal for internal anti-Communist riots.- In November
1939, "the French
foreign ministry raised the question before
the military about
planning an operation against the Soviet Caucasus. 3
I he British Cabinet and the
chiefs of staffs closely studied
the possibility of involving Japan in the war.
telegram from
the British envoy in Finland, which figured
at one of the meetings of the British Cabinet, said: I
venture to suggest (a) that

does not see favourable prospects in this matter at

The facts indicate, however, that the British
the given time.
adopted a hostile attitude towards the
0 vernment has actually
parts of Europe and
Soviet Union. We feel this every day in all
from Scandinavia (especially Finland) to the Balkans and

USSR

the

<r

Asia,
the

Near Asia,
relations

of

between the

for the better in

suggest the extreme desirability of giving car

and the most unprejudiced consideration possible to the conclusion of an
arrange-

ment with Japan. Taking into consideration the feeling.

in
London, the Japanese General Staff was at this period consider1

ing an Anglo-Japancse military alliance directed

against the
as the most probable.

USSR

In Moscow they saw the glaring contradiction

between the
declarations by the British sponsors of a constructive
line and
the general hostile course pursued by Germanys
imperialist
adversaries. On November n, 1939, the Soviet

London received a

highly important

directive

ambassador in
from Moscow,

which said: In connection with your talks with Churchill,

Elliot,
Eden, and others on the desirability of improving
Anglo-Soviet
political and trade relations, you may declare,
when the opportunity arises, that the Soviet government appreciates
their desire,
but since these persons do not decide British policy
at present
1
3

'

p.

Public Record Office, Cab. 66/3,

pp. 71-76.
Public Record Office, Cab.
80/4, p. 296.
Y. V. Borisov, Soviet-French Relations

456
*

116

(in

Russian).

Public Record Office, Cab. 66/3,

THE NORTH

FURTHER AGGRAVATION
OF THE USSRS RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN
AND FRANCE
In

Soviet

the

Unions

relations

Moscow,

with Germanys

imperialist

of their
adversaries early December 19 39 saw British assurance
with
conversation
desire for friendship with the USSR. In a

M. Maisky on December

I.

2, in spite

of the facts, Richard But-

gave the assurance that the British government had no antiSoviet-Finnish

Soviet plans in connection with the aggravation of
ler

relations.

This was far from being the case. The line towards consolidatbasis, pursued by
ing the capitalist powers on an anti-Soviet
became particUSA,
by
the
supported
and
Britain and France,
conflict.
ularly visible in the period of the Soviet-Finnish
from Paris
reported
Surits
Z.
December
Y.
2,
That same day,

that in France the

USSR

is listed as a direct

enemy.

On

De-

cember 9 the Soviet embassy reported that the Daladier government was sharply intensifying its anti-Soviet course.

On December

14,

1939,

under

pressure

from

Britain

and

of Nations played out the farce of expelOn the same day, in connection with the

France, the League

the USSR.
USSRs expulsion from

ling

the

1964,

TASS

issued

the anti-Soviet line of the

Anglo-

League of Nations,

a statement strongly denouncing

(1924-1945),

FROM ANTI-SOVIETISM TO

IN

p. 77.

and Britain

PLANNING AN ATTACK ON THE USSR

Stalin

USSR

requires a change

policy of the British authorities.

this

2.

is a more likely winner than

Herr Hitler (in the ongoing
Second World War.-R.S.) and ... is accordingly possibly
the
gi eater menace of the two
the question arises how the Soviet
(Union.--Ed.) could be damaged and I venture
accordingly to

An improvement

nothing of the Far East.

to say

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

Ibid.

117

9 9

French coalition.
In the first place, it should be stressed that
the ruling quarters in Britain and France, under
whose dictation
the Council of the League of Nations passed its resolution,
have
neither the moral nor the formal right to speak of
Soviet aggression or of condemning this aggression. 1
On December
16,

the Leagues

Council passed a resolution calling upon

member states to extend maximum assistance to Finland. The
USA introduced a moral embargo on trade with the USSR
and extended economic and military assistance to Finland. All
1939,

sorts of inventions

itary threat,

about Soviet expansionism, the Soviet miland so on were spread in the West. As before,

the initiative

in
intensifying pressure
on the USSR came
from the Daladicr government. French diplomacy played the
key
role in the USSRs expulsion from the League
of Nations.
A campaign to sever diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union, which dovetailed with the open calls for war against
the

USSR, commenced

in France in early

December

The Soviet government

sible.

armed

On December
Moscow

between the

conflict
15,

USSR and

London

sent to

assessment of the situation: The British government will continue to render Finland all possible political and
diplomatic assistance, as well as assistance with supplies including armaments. 2 On December 23 it reported: Soviet-British
relations are sharply deteriorating. 3

For

its

part,

the Soviet

government continued

presence of mind.
liam Seeds.

combine

its

and
day of 1939 V. M. Molotov had
Moscow with the British ambassador Wil-

On

an important talk in

to

with

line

restraint

the last

The Finnish

question, he said, has

now become

the most acute. For two months the USSR sought to come to an
understanding with Finland on the basis of the most minimal
wish to ensure the security of Leningrad, but this yielded nothing. V. M. Molotov stressed that had nobody incited Finland

against the

USSR

an agreement with

Soviet Foreign Policy.

p.

it

would have been pos-

Collection of Document. !. Vol. 4,

1

was,

towards the
hostile

n0

HR

Ibid.

USSR.

Relative to Britain the Soviet Union has

intentions, to

But as

acts.

say nothing of the absence of hostile

government, it not only has hostile

for the British

towards the USSR, as

intentions

but resorts to hostile acts.

is

evident in

An improvement

many

instances,

of relations between

and the USSR therefore depends above

on the USSR.

on Britain,

all

Britain

not

December 31, 1 9 9 Seeds wrote from

government bore no enmity to Great
world that
Britain, but were convinced of our acts all over the
His Majestys government was unfriendly to Russia.'
Reporting

Moscow

this

talk of

that the Soviet

AN ATTACK.

IS

PREPARED APACE

Moscow,

question could there be of an improvement of relations

with Britain and France when, as was subsequently acknowledged by the former French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud, the

What

ruling quarters in these countries

were preparing

to take an ac-

tive part in the Soviet-Finnish conflict on the side of Finland.'

Even without Rcynauds admission, archival documents irrefut-

1939 the leadership of Britain

intervene
on the side of the Finnish
to
preparing
and France was
ably prove that at the close of

from the north and the south.

January 5, 1940, the Soviet ambassador

militarists

On

in Paris reported

France
to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that in
the
in
targets
military
possible
discussing
openly
they were
USSR. These are Leningrad and Murmansk, on the one side,
and the Black Sea and the Caucasus, on the other. The ruling
quarters in France and Britain consider the
They are forming diplomatic fronts against

1946.

475 (in Russian).

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
3

being

Finland developed.

its

firm resistance to Britains anti-Soviet

is

1939.

the Soviet embassy in

aware that Finland

with the help of Britain and some other

armed
from the League of Nations
expulsion
USSRs
The
countries.
likewise not a friendly act
understand,
everybody
can
as

Anti-Sovietism became increasingly blatant in British policy

as the

is

USSR

against the

3
3

947 ,

USSR
it,

and

a belligerent.
in their

war

Ibid.

Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 418/86, p. 13.

Paris,
Paul Reynaud, La Prance a sauve IEurope, Vol. II, Flammarion,
P- T3.

119

objectives have included a struggle

against the USSR without
which they cannot conceive of a full
and final victory.' O n
January 19, 1940, the French Deputy Foreign
Minister Camille
Chau temps officially told the Senate that
France

intended to give

every possible assistance to Finland. 2

The

British

government planned to use the Polish

emigre
governments troops in Britain and France
for operations in
Finland. On January 28,
1940, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a draft report
concerning limited aspects of an
intervention by Polish troops in the
Petsamo-Murmansk

World War-London
provoke the
phis

the

Committee passed a decision

to

request the

boteign Office to study the possible

reaction of neutral nations
a large-scale allied intervention in support
of Finland, especially the reaction of Scandinavian
countries, Turkey, Italy japan
and the USA
to

and Paris looked

for an

opportunity to

into action that could be used to isolate

it.

measures that were taken to imsincere the British and the French were

design and the practical

plement

how

reveal

it

about improving relations with the USSR.

that by continuing to abide by the

in their declarations

For the

USSR

Munich

was obvious

it

political

conception

Germanys imperialist adversaries

were themselves undermining the possibility for establishing constructive relations.

On

area.

Concurrently,

USSR

February

5,

Supreme Allied Coun-

1940, the Anglo-French

passed a decision on sending an expeditionary force of over

100,000 effectives to Finland; half of this force was to be ready

cil

for departure at the close of February. In other words, preparations

were made

to

send British and French troops not to the

theatre of hostilities against nazi

Germany

but to the theatre of

I'hc

Soviet government took timely

counter-measures to block
the Anglo-French coalitions
attempts to involve the neutral
Scandinavian nations in its anti-Soviet
policy. As early as January 5, 1940, the Soviet ambassadors
in Oslo and Stockholm were
instructed to make an official statement,
on behalf of the Soviet

government,

Norwegian and Swedish foreign ministers in

connection with the continued hostile
campaign over the SovietFinnish armed conflict to the effect
that any departure from traditional neutrality and involvement
in Anglo-French
policies
would not benefit these nations. This step
by the Soviet government considerably influenced the posture of
to the

the ruling quarters

in

the Scandinavian countries.

their desire to

Sweden and Norway confirmed

have normal relations with the USSR.

Meanwhile, the general staffs of the Anglo-French

coalition
continued to plan an armed intervention
against the Soviet
Union. The French military leadership
suggested a two-phased
military operation against the USSR in
the north: the first would
be a naval expedition in Petsamo
to
cut off communication be-

tween that port and Murmansk; the

second would be the landing of a task force in Petsamo.
Archives help us to bring to light the key to
the Anglo-French
attitude to the Soviet

Union

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives

in the initial

the Soviet-Finnish conflict.

Also on February 5, 1940, the question of breaking off diplomatic relations with the USSR was raised again. Once more it
was found desirable that here the initiative should come from

The US ambassador to France William Bullitt

position is that France will not break
French
reported: The
relations
with
the Soviet Union or declare war on the
diplomatic
the Soviet Union.

Soviet

However,

if

will,

the Daladier

destroy the Soviet

possible,

if

necessary.

Union-

government did not venture

to

take

Daladier said with regret that neither Britain nor Turkey wanted the least onus for a diplomatic or military rupture with the Soviet Union. As Y. Z. Surits wrote in a
this step unilaterally.

letter

to

the Peoples

Commissariat

for

Foreign

campaign

for breaking off diplomatic relations

blackmail.

Affairs,

the

had the nature

of

On February t r, T940, I. M. Maisky had another meeting with

David Lloyd George. Lloyd George is of the opinion that since
the start of the Finnish events Soviet-British relations have been
steadily deteriorating

and are now

in

a very dangerous state.

In connection with the protraction of the operations in Finland

period of the Second

Ibid.

Union but

using cannon

Foreign Relations of the United States.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives

11)40,

Vol.

I,

p. 277.

1?0

there is the danger of their further deterioration,

and, under
certain conditions, of even a rupture and war between
the coun.

tries.

It

was most

should not allow

and

vital,

itself to

Lloyd George said, that the USSR

be provoked into breaking off relations

war in spite of all the attempts in this direction by Briand France. 1

On February 16, 1940, Richard Butler stated the British
government s view to the Soviet ambassador:
On the one hand,
he said, the British government would
like to save Finland
but, on the other, it would not
like to bring matters to a break
alone war, with the

USSR. In

the opinion of the British gov-

ernment the best way out of the situation

would be a peaceful
settlement of the Finnish-Soviet dispute.
Butler wanted to know
if such a
settlement was feasible and whether
mediation was
conceivable. He then spoke of a
localisation of the Finnish
issue. As he saw it, localisation
meant that the USSR would
be fighting with Finland, while Britain
would be helping the
latter within the limits of the day,
namely, by sending weapons,
aircraft, and other armaments, as
well as volunteers. However,
Butler said, localisation rules out the sending
of British regular

troops

to

Finland

to

Finland.

government

tish

if

it

Further,

could

was

he

agree

certain

declared

that

the

Bri-

some reduction of aid

that Sweden and Norway were
to

not threatened. In the event of such a threat

to Scandinavia Britain would without doubt intervene
most actively in the event. 2
Butlers statement eloquently revealed
the typical features of
Londons attitude to relations with the USSR

and, in particdiplomacy.
First, the statement about
localisation, which, according to
Butler, ruled out the sending of British
regular troops to
ular, the hypocrisy of British

Fin-

was made 11 days after the Anglo-French

Supreme Allied
Council had decided on sending an
expeditionary corps of over
100,000 effectives to the theatre of the
Sovict-Finnish conflict,
planning to land them not in Finland but
in Narvik and other
land,

Norwegian

ports.

These troops were

but as volunteers.
fitted

into the

to operate

The Butler formula

not as regulars

of localisation thus

planned intervention. Against the background of

was only

too plain-

Second, London continued to be worried about the excessive

aggravation of its relations with Moscow. Hence the echo, in

into

tain

let

intervention the anti-Soviet edge of this formula

j-his

statements, of the British governments desire to into play at two tables at one and the same time,

Butlers

itself,

sure

especially as the military situation

was inexorably growing worse

peacefor the Finnish militarists. Hence, the soundings about a

mediation.
of
possibility
about
the
settlement
and
ful
Lastly, Butlers arguments about the Scandinavian countries
artificial. The USSR did not threaten the neutrality
Sweden and Norway. It was the Anglo-French coalition that
was trying to make these countries renounce their neutrality and
involve them in war. As to the Soviet government, it had told
these countries that it was desirable that they should preserve
their neutrality and upheld this neutrality relative to Germany
as well. Using an invented Soviet threat to Sweden and Norway as a pretext, London and Paris prepared the ground for send-

were clearly

of

Moreover, the linking of guarantees

of the security of the Scandinavian countries with a promise of
some reduction of aid to the Finns was on Britains part a
quest, launched in advance, for an honourable way out of the
ing troops to these countries.

over the Soviet-Finnish conflict in the event nothing

came of Londons stake on the Finnish militarists. The subsequent activation of the British pseudo-constructive line confirmed that London was indeed insuring itself.
On February zi, 1940, the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign

situation

The
I. M. Maisky a directive for a reply to Butler:
To
government has no claims on Sweden and Norway.

Affairs sent

Soviet

inform the British government that it would agree to talks and an accord with the RytiTanner government only if the stated conditions for a guarantee
avoid misunderstanding

of the security of

it

would

like to

Leningrad are accepted.

But, as before, the

quarters in Britain refused to take the interests of the

USSRs security into account. London backed down from mediation on the mutually beneficial terms offered by the Soviet Union.
ruling

The course was

USSR.

still

towards military intervention against the

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

-

Ibid.

Ibid.
1

22

123

"

powers, including Gertime about an eventual regrouping of the

many, in the anti-Soviet front.

A CRITICAL POINT

At

the close of February

and the beginning of March 1940

the anti-Soviet activities of Britain and France, and also
0f
the USA, over the Soviet-Finnish conflict were
approaching a
critical point.

Writing of the aims of the Anglo-French bustle over

ian

J.

expedition to Finland defy rational analysis. For Great

when
Britain and France to provoke war with Soviet Russia

jected

I he governments of Britain and France

hurried to get the
Scandinavian countries to agree to the transit of their
expedi-

tionary forces across their territory to Finland. On March

2 the
British and French envoys in Oslo called on the
Norwegian

Foreign Ministry where they officially asked if British

and
French troops could pass across Norway. An analogous demarche
was made in Stockholm on the same day. The envoys said that
the Allied powers had already formed an expeditionary
corps
and were prepared to send it to Finland if the Finnish govern-

ment asked for British and French military assistance. In the

event Sweden and Norway faced the danger of being involved
in the war against Germany as a result of the landing of
Allied
troops, Britain and France promised to give them extensive mil-

war with Germany seems the product of a madhouse, and it is tempting to suggest a more sinister plan: switchthe war against
ing the war to an anti-Bolshevik course, so that
even
ended.
or
Germany could be forgotten
already at

the defence of small nations or the defence of

explains
the rights of the members of the League of Nations that
for
Finland
circles
ruling
French
British
and
the support of the
It

is

not at

all

against the Soviet Union, said V.

sion of

the Supreme Soviet

this

from the Swedish (March 3) and the Norwegian

governments were negative. Both countries did not

replies

into a war as the Anglo-French coalition was

prompting them. Moreover, not the least factor determin-

ing the stand

of these countries

Soviet government that

the

it

was the January warning of

would be undesirable for them

to violate their neutrality

towards the USSR.

The Soviet historian V. G. Trukhanovsky notes with justification: At the final stage of the war Britain and France were
ready to move their troops to Finland to join the Finns in fighting the USSR. But what about the war against Germany? The
former President of Czechoslovakia Edward Bcnes, who was
close to British and French government circles, wrote that in the

M. Molotov at the sixth

USSR. Ihe explanation

ses-

for

had a ready military bridge-

USSR.

PAYMENT FOR ANTI-SOVIET

BLINDNESS

(March 4)
want to be drawn
in fact

of the

that in Finland they

support
head for an attack on the
is

itary assistance. 1

The

inter-

British historvention in the Soviet-Finnish military conflict, the

P. Taylor points out: The motives for the proAlan

command ordered
operation in the
an
the massing and deployment of troops for
was set
offensive
the
West code-named Case Gelb. The date of
the inreasons,
chiefly
various
before mid-November 1939. For
implementation
the
preparations,
completeness of the military

On

October

19,

1939, the

German

military

was put off repeatedly. However, the Wchrmacht

fighting capacity was being swiftly increased. Light divisions
were reformed into panzer divisions. The artillery strength was

of this plan

and artillery pieces of a calibre

than 75 mm. The number of combat aircraft grew by

increased by 3,000 anti-tank guns

larger

winter of 1939-1940 they were bent on taking their countries into

war against the USSR and coming to terms with Germany:

Germany was then to attack only the Soviet Union, after making peace with the Western powers. The Times wrote at the
a

Quoted from V. G. Trukhanovsky, Anthony Eden. Pages Prom British

Diplomacy. /930W950J, Moscow, 19741 P- 211 0 n Russian).
Oxford,

Alan J. P. Taylor, English History. 1914-1945, Clarendon Press,

1

>965, p. 469.
1

John

Midgaard,

H. Aschehoug

124

April

1940,

Dagcn

Co., Oslo, i960, p. 75,

OG

Forspillct,

Forlagt

AV.

Sixth

Session of the

Supreme Soviet

of

the

USSR. March

29- April

4,

'940, p. 34.

125

nearly

500.

i,

By March 1940 the German army had grown to

men Nazi Germany made full use of the

3,300,000 officers and

preoccupation of its imperialist adversaries on the fronts of antiSovietism and their inaction on the western front.

Turkey and Iran w'ould permit French bombers to cross their

in the Soviet Transcauair space from bases in Syria for raids
government would be
Turkish
presumed
that
the
even
It
was
casus.
anti-Soviet intervenan
ground
forces
for
to
provide
prepared
tion.

This attitude to the USSRs southern neighbours clearly stemmed from an underestimation of the effectiveness of Soviet

PLANNING INTERVENTION AGAINST

THE USSR IN TIIE SOUTH

foreign policy,

Even

ifestations in

as

only a few weeks remained before the nazi

krieg against France, the

blitz-

Anglo-French coalition continued

a
to

occupy

itself with anti-Soviet intrigues. Its headquarters continued planning interventionist operations against the USSR in
the south.

The
March

meeting of the Supreme Allied Council held on

28, 1940, in London and attended by Chamberlain, Halisixth

fax, Churchill, and other British leaders, and also the new
French
Prime Minister Paul Rcynaud and the French military leadership, acting on the initiative of France, passed decision to bomb

the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus. Chamberlain

French that

Union

this

warned the
bombing 'would mean war with the Soviet

Concurrently, the Anglo-French

plans for concentrating in the

aimed

at the Soviet

command

Middle East

15

considered

bomber groups

Transcaucasian

oilfields. The French General

bombers from Middle East bases could
within six days destroy the Baku and Grozny oilfields and over
30 per cent of the Soviet Black Sea ports facilities. At sittings
of the hrench Cabinet on April 4 and 12, 1940, these plans were
approved by a majority of the ministers.

Staff calculated that 100

The

leaders

of the Anglo-French coalition,

the French govwere largely guided by the belief that

the participation or complicity of Turkey and Iran in this inter-

ernment

in the first place,

vention was a matter of course.

It was planned, for instance,

and French submarines would be based at Turkish
ports and have the combat mission of disrupting Soviet shipping in the Black Sea. Moreover, it was taken for granted that

major

which was working

Turkish and Iranian

role in

to neutralise anti-Soviet

man-

played

policies. Soviet policy

determining the ultimate attitude of these two

countries to the interventionist plans of the Anglo-French coalition. Neither Turkey nor Iran expressed readiness to participate
in hostilities

On

against the

USSR.

April 26, T940, the

War Committee

of the

Supreme Allied

Council considered possible military operations against the USSR

in the Caucasus with Romania as the base. Paul Rcynaud told

French General Staffs proposals for setting up air bases

in various Middle East countries and in the Balkans, including
Romania. 1 The Romanian rulers, however, were not overenthusiimplementation would inastic about these plans, for their
volve Romania in a war with the USSR. The monarchist regime
of the

Bucharest feared that military collaboration with the AngloFrench bloc would provoke counter-measures by Germany.
in

organise a military campaign against the

to
north
were
thus part of an overall anti-Soviet design
USSR in the
by Britain and France. Their anti-Soviet projects in Northern

The attempts

Europe were coordinated with their strategy on the southern

flank of the USSR and in the Balkans. A White Paper issued by
the Swedish government in 1947 stated frankly that the dispatch
of a contingent of Anglo-French troops was part of a general
Soviet Union and that beginning
plan for attacking the
March 15, this plan will be put into effect against Baku and
still

earlier through

Finland/

that British

A History of the Second World War. 1 9 39- 194 5, Vo/. 3, Beginning of

be War. Prepara lions for Aggression Against the USSR, Moscow,
1974. p. 37.
Public Record Office, Cab. 99/3, p. 12.

126

Paul Reynaud,

An

coeur dc

1951, p. 371; J.-H. Jauneaud, De

Scorpion, Paris, i960, pp. 133, 142.

War

Falsifiers of History.
II,

An

la

melee

Historical

Committee for Promotion

( it))9-i945),

Flammarion,

Paris,

Verdun a Dien-Bien-Pbu, Tes Editions du

Document on

of Peace,

New

the Origins of

York, 1948,

p.

53

World

127

NO CHANGE

IN

LONDON

Nothing fundamentally new took place in the relations between the USSR and Britain. There was a familiar pattern in
the developments: London continued to parallel its overall antiSoviet pressure with steps to get insurance.
In a talk with the Soviet ambassador on March 18,
1940,
Richard Butler said he hoped the end of the Soviet-Finnish
armed conflict would be followed by an improvement in AngloSoviet

relations.

He

sador wrote, that

hinted quite transparently,

the

ambas-

would be expedient to return to the question of trade between the two countries, in particular to a settlement of the contraband issue by some agreement. The USSR
responded quickly. On March 22, 1940, the Peoples Commissarit

basis of reciprocity. Ihis was ignored in London. In the

0 n the
British reply of May 8, 1940 there was nothing approaching concrete proposals for the

trade agreements

for Foreign

iat

Affairs

the ambassador to tell the

government would be prepared to
the British government stated it was

instructed

enter into trade talks

if

indeed ready to positively resolve the question of Anglo-Soviet

trade.

The

relevant

statement was

made

Lord Halifax by the

But Halifax tried to justify the inspection and detention of Soviet merchant ships by
the British. The British Foreign Secretary argued that if a way
was found to make sure that imports to the USSR were intended
Soviet ambassador on

March

to

27, 1940.

USSR itself the British government would

accommodate the Soviet government in the matter of
detention of freight and ships. 2 This was direct evidence
the British government sought to interfere in the Soviet

exclusively for the

willingly

the
that

Unions internal affairs

Symptomatically, a
the

with unprecedented

memorandum

British posts

concluded between the

USSR and Germany

between the two countries. It continued its efforts to prejudice

Soviet interests in both minor and, much more so, major issues
of these relations and in international problems.

Soviet

its

memorandum

stated

1940,

that

to the British

government of

the Soviet government can

not

May

20,

subordinate

trade policy to the military aims of a foreign country and

would trade both with belligerent and neutral naon the basis of full equality of the sides and of reciprocal
commitments. Some of the actions of the British government
to reduce
and restrict trade with the USSR (annulment of
Soviet contracts for equipment), the detention of Soviet merthat

it

tions

chant ships with freight for the

USSR,

the British governments

towards the USSR during the conflict between

the USSR and Finland
were not conducive to the satisfactory development of talks, TASS declared on May 22, 1940. Yet

hostile attitude

another opportunity for normalising

Soviet-British

trade

and

economic relations was thus lost on account of Londons continued anti-Soviet course.

high-handedness.

drawn up by
Economic Warfare, went so far as to
on Soviet territory to inspect Soviet exof April 4, 1940,

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE:

DOWN TO ALMOST ZERO

British Ministry of

demand

In-

and of restrictions on Soviet deliveries to that country.

The situation thus remained unchanged: London displayed
no desire for constructive talks with the USSR to facilitate a
general improvement of the political atmosphere in relations

British side that the Soviet

development of trade with the USSR.

stead, the British side raised the question of the content of the

ports.'

Nevertheless,

on April

Soviet

government showed

restraint,

and

27, 1940, agreed to restore trade relations with Britain

The Soviet Unions relations with France were even worse

than with Britain. French reactionaries were in fact steering
towards a rupture. As before, blinded by their anti-Sovietism they
did not see the imminent military menace. Characterising French
policy during the period of the phoney war, Charles dc Gaulle

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

memoirs that in Paris they were more preoccupied

by helping Finland, or bombing Baku, or landing in Istanbul-than with how to cope with

Tbid.

wrote

Ibid.

with

A
128

the

History of Diplomacy

Vol.

4,

Moscow,

1975,

p.

ifii

(in

Russian).

26

in his

how

to strike at Russia-either

129

Germany.' In diaries for the period between 1939 and 197^

the well-known French diplomat
Herve Alphand realistically
noted that the French war-time government doomed France to
defeat in 1940 by, among other things, failing to have a powerful ally such as the Soviet Union. It must be acknowledged, he
wrote, that for various reasons Sarraut, Blum, and Daladier
adopted an inconsistent posture and neglected to conclude with
the Russians a military agreement that would undoubtedly have
delivered us from war. 2
Instead

anti-Sovietism and drawing closer

government intensified its pressure on
the USSR all along the line. For example, when nationalisation
was started in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia,
which had become part of the USSR, the chairman of the Seine
Tribunal responded to a grievance lodged by the French Oil
Producers and Traders Association and ordered, as early as
December 28, 1939, the impounding of the bank accounts and
property of the Soviet trade mission in France, amounting to
some 1,000 million francs. On the next day the Soviet embassy
protested strongly to the French Foreign Ministry, demanding
the immediate cancellation of this decision, which was in vioto the

of renouncing

USSR,

trade agreement of January

n,

1934/'

In keeping with the Soviet-French trade agreement in force

1939, the Soviet

tracts

amounting

Union was preparing

to

in

sion

building.

to place in

France con-

over nine million rubles. But the French

side refused to prolong the trade agreement,

1940, denied most-favoured

exception of some kinds of

status
oil

to

and on March

Soviet goods

products).

It

15,

(with the

requisitioned the

equipment and armaments manufactured under contracts with

the Soviet Union and denied a licence for the export of some
commodities to the USSR. As a result, the Soviet Union sus-

Moreover,

police

searched

Intourist

the

offices

he Soviet embassy

Paris. I
and the former Soviet school in
an act of glaring
France qualified the police raid as
that applied only to

enemy

in

hostility

countries.

frozen. In 1940
Soviet-French relations were on the whole
compared with
cent
per
by
90
trade with France reduced

its

the French

lation of the status of the trade mission defined in the interim

in

About a hundred plain clothes men broke into

docuoccupying and searching it, and confiscating
the building,
taken
detained,
were
trade missions staff
ments. Members of the
guard, and released only after the
police
under
homes
to their
were not allowed to enter the missearch was completed. They
Paris.

ion

Soviet

the previous years

and

totalled only 4,300,000 rubles.

Paul Reynaud, who

the former French Prime Minister
had to admit
defeat,
countrys
his
for
bears direct responsibility
themselves
had
France
in
quarters
ruling
in his memoirs that the
the *JSSR and that France entered

Even

rejected

an alliance with

This

Russia
war with Germany without an alliance with
and
diplomacy,
French
of
Waterloo
was
the
defeat, he wrote,
.

the

French array.
was followed by the total defeat of the
a decisive blow
prepare
to
time
enough
given
The nazis were

it

against the West,

and

it

was

delivered.

The French army was

approached the Soviet

In desperation the French government
the French MinisUnion at the close of May 1940. On May 25
to ascertain whethAir Andre Victor Laurent-Eynac tried

ter for

France.^
government would sell military aircraft to
Cot,'
Pierre
send
to
For the talks in Moscow it was intended
friendship
of
advocate
a prominent left-wing personality and an
the talks. But with
with the USSR. The Soviet Union agreed to
William Bullitt
France
of the US ambassador to
er the Soviet

the assistance

going to Moscow.
the French reactionaries prevented Cot from
line puranti-Soviet
the
of
Summing up the various aspects

the phoney war

sued by the Anglo-French coalition during
Supreme Soviet
the
of
session
Molotov said at the sixth
V.
undertaken by
were
acts
hostile
all these
,

tained considerable losses.

On

February

5,

1940,

the

French

police,

acting

in

glaring

violation of the law, raided the premises of the Soviet trade misCharles dc Gaulle, Mcmoires de guerre, Vol.

I,

of

Lappel. 1940-1942, Lib-

rairie Plon, Paris, 1954, p. 26.

Herve Alphand, Le tonne men t

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Journal 19 19-197), Fayard,

Paris.

that

Ibid.

Europe, Vol. I, 1947 PPPaul Reynaud, La France a sauve V

Pans,
vtritc sur *919. Editions sociales.
La
Gacon,
Bolivia
J.
J.

,
z}.

9J

>

P.

9*

130

USSR

detre,

1977, p. 112.
3

the

244

131

Britain

and France in
not engaged

spite of the fact that the Soviet

Union had
any unfriendly actions towards these
countries.
It is high time these gentlemen realised that
the
Soviet Lnion has never been and will never be an instrument
of
hitherto

in

somebody

elses policy, that the Soviet Union has always pursued

and will always pursue its own policy regardless of whether the
gentlemen in other countries like it or not.

SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN VICHY

France and Germany signed an armistice on June 22, 1940 at
the railway junction of Rethondcs in Compiegne. The bulk of the
nations industrial potential, including practically the entire ironand-steel and coal industries, was in nazi-occupied Northern

and

Central France which accounted for two-thirds of the countrys

territory. These regions were also the nations breadbasket.
The
Petain regime, a dictatorship of the French reactionary bourgeoisie, settled in Vichy, a

town in unoccupied Southern France.

regime chiefly as an instrument for plundering France with the hands of collaborationists. Under the armistice agreement France was to give Germany
40 per cent of
the industrial output in the unoccupied zone,
50 per cent in the
occupied zone, and 95 per cent in the so-called forbidden zone,

Germany regarded

this

which was totally under the control of a German administration.

For the upkeep of the nazi troops in France the Vichyites paid
a daily sum of 400 million francs. But Berlin was planning more
humiliations for France.

The Soviet government was well aware of what the Vichyites

for. However, it was vital to get from Vichy
more sub-

stood

stantive information about the situation

ments political

was deep

line, especially in

and about the governview of the circumstances that

and its official stand was that of

collaboration with nazi Germany. What was going on in Vichy?
What was the general situation in occupied France? What was
the situation in workers areas under German control? How
great were the successes of the collaborationists and were their
it

in the nazi rear

Session

KJ40, pp. 2S-29.

132

of (be Supreme

Soviet

of the

USSR. March zg-April

4,

could be done to improve Franco-

Soviet relations?
1
The questions were many, wrote A. Y. Bogomolov, who
daffaires. The Soviet
was sent to Vichy in the capacity of charge
government wanted these answers.

the French authorities declared they wantUSSR. In reply the Soviet

ed to restore trade relations with the
be necessary to remove the
side pointed out that it would first
property of the
barriers that had been erected: the impounded
tons
of gold bethree
Soviet trade mission had to be released,
to the
returned
be
had
to
longing to the Soviet Baltic republics
were
barriers
these
Once
Bank of the USSR, and so on.

December 1940

In

State

France
removed the Soviet government was prepared to help
trade
resuming
of
question
the
with food and fuel. However,
It
reason.
the
ascertained
embassy
was protracted. The Soviet
the
internal
about
worried
was
was that the Petain government
political aspects of this

step.

Rumours

of the possible resump-

Union seeped through to

tion of trade relations with the Soviet
rightly as fraternal
matters
the
viewed
which
the French public,
I learned after
people.
working
French
the
to
support
Soviet

war

the

that the underground

Communist

press

welcomed

the

with great
news of a likelv resumption of Franco-Soviet trade
As 'for the Nazis, they could not object officially
enthusiasm.

themselves,
because they were trading with the Soviet Union
agents
their
through
but they probably obstructed the negotiations
"

Vichy business world and officialdom.'

Petain
By and iarge the relations between the USSR and the
on
contacts
to
reduced
government were very limited, being
1940,
December
25,
minor economic issues. Nonetheless, on
Commissar for
during a talk with the First Deputy Peoples
French ambasthe
Vyshinsky,
of the USSR A. Y.
in the

Foreign Affairs
sador

in

Moscow thanked

the Soviet government for continuing

maintain normal relations with France.

there was now a submisFrances defeat did not signify that
Axis powers. The French
the
of
flank
sive nation on the western

to

Communist
1

Sixth

What

opponents stronger?

Bogomolov,

A.

No.

7,
1

Party'

was

the leading national force

Wartime Diplomatic Missions,

and the

International

initia-

Affairs,

1961, p. 72.

Ibid., p. 95.

133

w
tor of the Resistance that

July

was beginning deep underground. On

T940, an underground issue of UHumanite

carried a
manifesto, To the People of France, signed by Maurice
io,

Tho-

and Jacques Duclos.

rez

great nation like ours will never

be

a nation of slaves. , the manifesto said.

The people are
the great hope for national and social liberation.
And it is only
around the working class, ardent and generous, confident
and
courageous, that a front for the freedom, independence,
.

and

There was a striking difference between

Paris and the comic-opera Vichy, with its
incongruous national
1940.

revolution, fascist clerical policy

and wretched attempts to play

a double game. In Paris everything was clearer,
and hence
more tragic. The French people were not crushed.
Jaqucs Duc-

pi Benoit Frachon, Catelas, and many other

and leaders of the French proletariat were active somewhere underground. The fiery applies of Maurice Thorez reached
Paris, inspiring those fine sons of the French
people, who viewed
Gabriel

los >

fighters

tnc Nazis not only as conquerors

working

class.

but as bitter enemies of the

A. Z. Manfred, a prominent Soviet historian, wrote:

France
took no part in the humiliating and shameful episode
in Montoire, when a resigned, aging marshal shook
the hand of the
airogant, triumphant Fuhrer. The voice of France was
heard in
the underground calls and leaflets of the Communist
Party, in
the first shots fired by the franc-tireurs, in the call
from London

to fiee

Frenchmen

to continue the

war

against the

German

in-

vaders.

An eminent French

writer,

who

and was unassociated with

mean Francois Mauriac said: Only
licism

never concealed his Catholeft-wing political forces-I

the working class as a whole

remained faithful to France in her distress and humiliation. 3 In

the hour of national trial, in the hour of confusion,
and incredul-

Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple. Editions socialcs,

A. Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 91.
Alexander Werth, France. i 94n-i yjj, Robert Hale

p. 150.

134

Paris,

1954,

p.

of parties

the initiators of 'the

underground.'

4.

179.

When
Britain

London, 1956,

the government of

(May

10,

situation in

new

mistake of the
fault

Winston Churchill came

to

power

in

appeared for a largely

1940) the prerequisites
were indications
There
Sovict-British relations.

new government of a desire to correct the

Chamberlain Munich Cabinet, through whose
The
was reached at the 1939 negotiations.

in the attitude of

the

no agreement

illusions about coming to

Churchill government did not share the
had counted onpredecessors
extent
its
terms with Hitler to the
was threatexistence
Britains
far,
too
nazi expansion had gone
Realising that the war
ened, and Allied France had fallen.
Churchill, a sworn
bitter,
and
long
be
would

with

Germany

enemy

that Britain
communism, could not but understand
opened up possibilities
the Soviet Union. This awareness

of

needed
for improving Soviet-British

relations.

FORGE OF INERTIA
IN LONDONS ACTIONS
paralleled its
however, the Churchill government
for new relaneed
the
about
government
statements to the Soviet
with actions that were a clear
tions between the two countries

Actually,

Munichmen. Churchill
throwback to the anti-Soviet policy of the
by that segment
and his associates continued to be influenced
were implacable in their hatred
of the British ruling circles that
leaders sometimes acted as
of the Soviet Union. The British
that in the course of the war
though they were blind to the fact
and potentialities deteriorate
Britains international positions
and Cooperation. From
Manfred, Traditions of Friendship
Moscow, 1967. P-M5
Relations,
Soviet-French
History of Russo-French and

the

Ltd.,

SOVIET-BRITISH RELATIONS AFTER

THE DEFEAT OF FRANCE

re-

juvenation of France can be formed. 1

Soviet diplomats clearly saw the distinction between
the French
collaborationists and the true France. Bogomolov visited
Paris
at the close of

the
and leaders, who for long years had held
its vanguard-the
and
class
working
the
helm of state power,
leading force, as
Communist Party came forward as the nations
Resistance movement that commenced deep
itv

(in

Russian).

133

on

this

immeasurably. The Churchill government did not renounce the

attempts to put the USSR in a subordinate position, often trying
to speak with it in the language of strength and seeking to
use

Mayakovsky and entered into talks

whose custody these
French government in

the interests of British imperialism. This duplicity in the

British governments attitude towards the USSR remained the
principal hindrance to the development of Soviet-British rela-

military-political positions

in

it

tions.

On May

20, 1940,

Lord Halifax, who continued

to hold the

post of Foreign Secretary in the Churchill government,

Soviet ambassador

the

and

informed

government had decided urgently

nent political figure

who

to

him

send to

that

summoned

the

Moscow

British

a promi-

could by means of personal talks with

Soviet leaders ascertain on the spot the possibility of improving

Anglo-Soviet relations generally and concluding a trade agreein particular. If the Soviet government had no objections,

ment

rhe British

Moscow

to

government would
as

its

like to

send Sir Stafford Cripps

special representative. 1

The Soviet government

agreed to Cripps appointment as ambassador but considered

it

superfluous to give him a special status. On June 2, 1940, the

Foreign Office informed the Soviet embassy in London that the

government had appointed Cripps ambassador without

mention of any special mission. 2 On June 12, Britains new
ambassador arrived in the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1940, Butler had informed the Soviet
ambassador that the new government wanted to begin talks anew
and on an entirely different plane. It was prepared to sign an
agreement with the USSR on the basis of commodity exchange.
British

On May

25,

Warfare, told

Hugh Dalton, the Minister

M. Maisky that he regarded

1940,
I.

for
as

Economic

absurd the

stand of the former British government on the question of trade

talks with the USSR. Previous memoranda must be considered

and void, and

null

all

negotiations must begin from the begin-

The new British government, Dalton said, seriously dean improvement of relations with the USSR and decided
to put an end to all sorts of notes and memoranda and act in
ning.

sired

new way. Moreover,

course

it

in

had decided to

Londons anxiety

over

matter with

deterioration of

the sharp

the

were.

ships

Britain

after France

c-

gave way to alarm

of
correspondingly more interest on the part
was
There
feat.
USSR.
the
with
relations
constructively promoting
the British in
sent a personal message
On Tune 25, 1940, Winston Churchill
Stalin through the
the Soviet government J. V.
to the head of
been no messages
had
There
Cripps.
British ambassador Stafford
In the
stated:
message
The Churchill
of this kind before.
hambeen
have
relations
past-our
nast-indeed

in the recent

pered bv mutual suspicions.

arisen

which

makes

it

But

since then a

desirable

new
our

that both

factor has

countries

contact, so that if necessary we

should re-establish our previous
regards those affairs in Eumay be able to consult together as
2
us both . Churchill offered
interest
rope which must necessarily
government any of the vast
to discuss fully with the Soviet
present attempt to pursue in
problems created by Germanys
stages of conquest and
Europe a methodical process by successive

absorption."

The Soviet government once again showed

its

readiness to ap-

constructively. Soviet-British trade

proach relations with Britain
represented by Cripps, got under
talks, in which Britain was
covered the military
way in Moscow on June 15, 1940. They
political and eco
the
problems in
situation in Europe and the
USSR.
the
nomic relations between Britain and
that the Churchill government
expected
been
have
It might
policy Britain had been
would finally reconsider the unrealistic
summer of 1940
the USSR. However, in the

pursuing towards

that created new

government embarked upon actions
o
re use
t
relations,
obstacles to improving Soviet-British

the British

the
three Baltic republics with
recognise the reunification of the
the Baltic Soviet repu
USSR; it impounded gold belonging to
^
seized
24 Estonian and Latit
banks;
lies and held in British
sai
the
in a special camp
vian ships in British ports and put

token of the change of the general

the Soviet ships Selenga and

release

World War, Vol.

Winston Churchill, The Second
9'
Cassel and Co. Ltd., London, 1949. P-

II,

Their Fines, Hour

1
2

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives,

Ibid.

Ibid., p.

120

137

136

who wanted

to return

home. The

Foreign Affairs of the

these unlawful actions.

USSR

Peoples

Commissariat

0r

systematically protested against

The zigzags in British policy towards the USSR placed

Stafford Cripps in a difficult position; he urged
strengthening relations
with the Soviet Union. It seemed to him,
writes the British
historian Eric Estorick, that every step
he made in Moscow
to create better relations with
the Soviet
Government was

fol-

lowed promptly by some stupid counteraction on the part

of the
Government at home.
He thought the British Government
had played straight into the hands of the Germans. 1
.

Time passed, but through London's fault there was no fundamental change in the state of Soviet-British relations.
Meanwhile,
it was becoming crucial for
Britains rulers to abandon their
former principles. In a telegram to London dated
October 13,
1940, Cripps put forward some realistic considerations. He suggested certain change in Britains anti-Soviet
stand on the
grounds, above all, that in the long run the Soviet government

did not want

Germany to win and hoped that it would be posGerman threat by agreement with the Axis

sible to contain the

powers

until the

USSR was

feat them. Cripps noted that

strong enough to cope with and deit was futile to expect, while
mak-

ing no constructive proposals to the

government would take

ers and Japan.

The

USSR,

risk of quarreling

that

the

n, 1940, Vyshinsky gave a

Meeting with Cripps on November
On November 19
proposals.
British
negative assessment to the
from the Soviet
information
to
Vyshinsky stated that, according
is the Foreign
rumours
the
of
embassy in London, the source
days telling
few
past
the
over
have been
Office,

whose

officials

Cripps offer of October 22

various journalists about the
to the US Si
On November 17, 1940, the US ambassador
of State that
Secretary
US
the
Laurence Steinhardt reported to
placed, the
been
has
he
which
in
position
in his anger at the
suspicious of
was
he
that
intimated
Ambassador (Cripps .-P.S.)
Office, saying that there were
sabotage in the British Foreign
who were so hostile to the
individuals in the British government
prefer to risk the Empire rather
Soviet Union that they would
2
place .
than permit a rapprochement to take
Churchill government clear >
This and other actions of the
was still aiming not to
indicated that the British government
but to aggravate the
improve relations with the Soviet Union
and Germany in the hope of hastrelations between the USSR
This was borne out also by the
ening a conflict between them.
activity on international isstepping up of Londons anti-Soviet
.

sues affecting the security of the

COMPLICATED ROAD TO REALISM

Soviet

IN CHURCHILLS POLICIES

with the Axis pow-

government practically dismissed all of Cripps

suggestions. Moreover, it engaged in a major provocation
against
the USSR. On October 22, 1940, Stafford Cripps
called on
the First Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign
Affairs of the
British

USSR

A. Y. Vyshinsky and, on behalf of the British government, proposed the signing of a trade agreement with
Britain
to be followed by a non-aggression pact similar to
the one concluded with Germany. The British ambassador stressed that this
proposal was confidential. 2 However, in early November, the
British Foreign Office leaked the content of these proposals
just

USSR.

meeting with the new

Soviet ambassador had his first
Eden' on December 27,
British Foreign Secretary Anthony
pseudo-construcLondon was beginning another round of

The

1940.

approaches to relations with the USSR.

irreconcilable contradicEden said he believed there were no

tive

that good relations

between Britain and the USSR and
He promised o
possible.
between the two countries were quite
Soviet amThe
relations.
such

tions

make

every effort to establish

wanted to promote the imshould be taken, in parsteps

of Soviet-British relations

bassador noted that

provement

if

Eden

really

before the head of the Soviet government was to visit

Berlin.
1

pany,
2

Eric 'Estorick,

New

Stafford Cripps: Master Statesman,

York, 1949, p. 239.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

The John Day Com-

Stales. 1940, Vol. I, P- 6*9Foreign Relations of the United

Lord Halifax as Foreign Secretary
from
over
took
Eden
Anthony

December

10,

1940.

139
138

ticular, to clear the

atmosphere over the Baltic issue. On

JanuRichard Butler said that Eden was considering
94
the
best approach to improving Anglo-Soviet
relations. He then intimated that the British government
ary

r,

3,

would prefer to pass over

and get the question of a trade agreement
off
the ground; if this proved to be
impossible it would want a
trade agreement in exchange for
ending the Baltic issue.
Tfus was another British attempt to square
incompatible problems. The USSR responded
correspondingly. On February i,
1941, V. M. Molotov received Cripps, telling
him that
the Baltic issue

the So-

viet governments expectation

that relations with Britain

improve had not been justified. On the contrary,

USSR had taken no hostile actions against Britain,
resorted

to

a series

would

while

the

London had

of unfriendly acts

towards the USSR in

1940, which testified to the British governments
unwillingness to
improve relations between the two countries.
Molotov cited the
Baltic republics issue (gold, ships,
2
and so forth)
This was

as an example.
the official Soviet reply to the British
governments

proposals.

On February 24, 1941, Cripps informed Vyshinsky that he had

been instructed to meet with Eden in Istanbul
on February 28.
In

this
lin's

connection, on his own initiative, he wished

to
opinion on whether it would be desirable

know

Sta-

and possible for

meet with Eden to consider Anglo-Soviet
relations.
On the next day Vyshinsky told Cripps that the Soviet government felt that the time has not yet come for
resolving major
problems by a meeting with Soviet leaders,
especially
t le latter to

since such

a meeting has not been prepared politically. 4

On

April 18, 1941, the Soviet government received

a note-

memorandum from

worth}
in the

event the

Cripps.

The ambassador wrote

that

war was

protracted over a long period of time

some quarters in Britain might like the idea of ending
the war with
Germany on German terms that would give the nazis
unlimited
scope for expansion eastward. This sort

might have support

in

the

USA

Soviel Foreign Policy Archives.

2

Ibid.

of idea, he pointed out,

as well. 5 Cripps thereby sugges-

hinted that there could be another anti-Soviet collusion by

tively

world imperialism.
There were, of course, grounds for believing this hint. The
basis for a deal with the nazis at the USSRs expense had been

by long years of connivance with nazism and by the logic

Lord
of the Munich conception. For example, on March 7, 1940,
number
of
memlarge
Charles Roden Buxton, on behalf of a
bers of the House of Lords, had sent Chamberlain a memorandum urging peace talks with nazi Germany with the argument
laid

that Hitler

is

in a difficult position, especially in

regard to Rus-

sia, and because of the conflicting views in Germany on the

1
Russian question. The British historian Ian Colvin writes:

There

hand

was an innuendo in many of these offers that a free

Germany.-?. S.) against Russia in the East must be

(for

among the peace prizes."

The Cripps memorandum was more than a warning that there
might be another anti-Soviet plot by imperialism. The ambassador clearly tried to pressure the Soviet government, to compel it to renounce its policy of non-involvement in the war. It
should be remembered, he concluded, that the government of

Great Britain is not interested so directly in the preservation of

the Soviet Unions inviolability as, for instance, in the preservation of the inviolability of France and some other West European nations. Cripps asked whether the Soviet government intended to improve its relations with Britain or wished to leave

them

as they were.
In reply Cripps was told that his formulation of such questions was unaccountable and incorrect because it was the British,

not the Soviet, government that had

reduced our relations to

their present state?

At
British

the close of

government

March 1941
to

intelligence dispatches

the conclusion that nazi

led the

Germany was

USSR. In a letter to Stalin dated April

British ambassador, Churchill wrote:
the
and forwarded by
3
I have sure information from a trusted agent that when the
Germans thought they had got Yugoslavia in the net-that is
preparing to attack the

to say, after

March 20-they began

to

move

three out of the five

3
4
*

140

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Public Record Office. Premier, 1/443.

The Daily Telegraph, January

1,

197T.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

141

panzer divisions from Romania to Southern Poland. The

moment they heard of the Serbian revolution this movement
was

tary mission, representing the three

countermanded. Your Excellency will readily appreciate the

on their experience, and to

sig-

nificance of these facts . 1

the

Thus, British policy itself devalued even that Londons

formation which was based on facts.
In

air force units in the

its

Codeword Barbarossa, a work by

It

in-

American researcher Barton Whaley, it is noted that the Soviet government

was under no illusion about Germanys plans and it sought to
keep the country out of the war until 1942 when the Red Army
would have rebuilt to the unassailable state. 2 Further, Whaley
the

USSR,

at the close of

March 1941

ment was showing

that by

its

actions the Soviet govern-

were its desire to prepare the ground

for the possibility of a rapprochement with us. 5 Speaking on
behalf of Churchill on June 13, Anthony Eden told the Soviet
ambassador that if war broke out between the USSR and Germany in the immediate future the British government would be
as

it

USSR

with

Winston Churchill

Winston

S.

Churchill,

The Second World War, Vol.

Alliance, Casscl

Barton

and Co. Ltd., London, 1950, p.

Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa

Massachusetts, 1973,
3
II

p.

Ill,

The Grand

the

MIT

Press,

THE SOVIET UNION

AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHY DID ROOSEVELT NOT VENTURE

TO BREAK OFF RELATIONS?
.

In
V.

our

relations

M. Molotov

of the

USSR

with

the

United

on March

of

States

said at the sixth session of the

29, 1940, there has

America,

Supreme Soviet

been over the recent

would say, a deterioration

moral embargo against the USSR,

period neither an improvement nor, I

if

we

discount the so-called

an embargo that makes no sense, especially after the conclusion of peace

between the

US

statement to the

ambassador
that the

in

USA

USSR and

Finland. 3 Conveying this

Secretary of State Cordell Hull the Soviet

Washington K. A. Umansky noted:

We

hold

likewise pursues a policy of neutrality, but that

between the two biggest neutral powers, the USSR

and the USA, leave much to be desired and suffer, in the first
place, from the US governments discriminatory line in trade
with the USSR.
Although Hull promised nothing, he adopted
the relations

new

tone and spoke for the

first

time of the possibility of im-

Soviet policy towards the

War was

USA

in

the

initial

based on a readiness

period of the

to establish con-

Cambridge,

226.

Ibid., p. 237.

1
2

Her Majestys Stationery

London, 1962, p. 149.

*
W. N Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. I, His Majestys
tionery Office and Longmans, Green and Co., London,
1952, p. 656.
142

radio

that Britain

5.

Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War,

-

his

in

He declared

would be on the side of the USSR in the Soviet-German war,

for by helping the Soviet Union Britain would be saving itself/

Second World

320.

a mili-

enunciated

speech in the evening of June 22, 1941.

proving relations.
1

USSR

took the ruling quarters in Britain a long time to arrive at

the decision that

prepared to extend every possible assistance to the

to the

arms of the service to pass

promote economic cooperation with

via the Persian Gulf or Vladivostok.

points out that information received from the capitalist countries

about Germanys preparations for an invasion of the USSR was
extremely contradictory. In fact, the torrent of misinformation

was so heavy, Whaley writes, that even the government of Japan, Germanys strongest ally, regarded these preparations as nothing more than a maneuver designed to camouflage an intention to invade England/
But as the menace of fascism mounted the logic of events
compelled the Churchill government to assess the situation realistically. Commenting on April 22,
1941, with regard to one of
Cripps telegrams received from Moscow, Churchill admitted:
They (the Soviet Government) know perfectly well their danger and also that we need their aid. 4 Cripps informed London

Middle East, send

Office,

Sta-

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

The Times, June

23, 1941.

Sixth Session oj the

Supreme Soviet of the USSR. March 29 - April

4,

940, p. 41.
4

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

143

structive relations
viet

between the two countries. However, the

Sogovernment had to take into account the constant
anti-com-

munist slant of the policy actually pursued

by the ruling quarters
in the

USA.

17, ^939, the First

USSR

eign Affairs of the

Deputy Peoples Commissar for ForP. Potemkin drew the attention of

V.

US ambassador Laurence

the

USA

Steinhardt to the growth of anti-

spects similar to the line followed in

tive" attitudes towards the USSR on
the part of Britain sprang
from the calculation that Soviet-German relations
would grow

some cases, taking the form

and its agencies in the USA.
In reply Steinhardt said that this was the first time he was
hearing of this and believed that it was the result of the
growth of general agitation caused by the war in Europe. Although it was hard for the US government to prevent irresponsible

worse and were activated whenever Britains

position deteriorat-

pronouncements

ed in the face of the nazi threat. Approximately

the same motives
prompted a similar course of the Americans. The
distinction
was that the US stand was influenced not only
by the German
factor but also by the policies of another
aggressive

measures would be taken. But the situation remained unchanged.

Harold L. Ickes notes that the conflict with Finland had trig-

Soviet feeling in the

Throughout the

initial

period of the Second

World War US
in some reLondon. The construc-

diplomacys attitude to relations with the

USSR was

imperialist

power-japan. But the new elements

unproductive general declarations.

in

it

were reduced

to

and direct Japanese militarism against the USSR.

However, they
were well aware that the USSR was the major force
in opposition to

japan

in the

Far East, and for that reason

US diplomacy
USSR to the point

preferred not to take the relations with the

When the threat to US interests from Japan mounted there were approaches to the USSR in
a new tone. It is
noteworthy that in the USA they felt that general
declarations
of rupture.

about a desirability of improving relations with the

compatible with an anti-Soviet policy on major

USSR

were

international

sues

and

bilateral

relations

as well as in lesser matters, going, to

the Interior

Harold L.

is-

USSR and the USA,

quote the US Secretary of

between the

Ickes, as far as resorting to a policy of

constantly kicking the Soviet government in the

face. 1
When the USSR took steps to reinforce its security in the
west in September 1939, the
adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

USA

Nevertheless, in the
of the general

The

959 l 94 I >

144

USA

situation

there was a perceptible worsening

around Soviet-American relations. On

Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. Ill,

Simon and Schuster, New York, 1914, p.

that

of direct actions against the

by

is,

in

USSR

individuals,

nevertheless

the

necessary

gered a large-scale anti-Soviet campaign in the USA that was

joined not only by the press but also by government quarters.
All the attempts of Soviet representatives in the

USA

to explain

encountered the insuperable antiSoviet barrier erected by the most conservative elements in the
White House.*

the Soviet stand

In Washington they did everything they

could to divert Japan
from expansion in the sphere of the USA's
imperialist interests

October

On November

on

this issue

30,

1939, the

US government

me-

offered to

came

USSR

at the

and Finland. This offer

Union had exhausted all possible political
and diplomatic means of removing tension in its relations with
Finland. In this situation the US initiative was aimed at support-

diate between the

time

when

the Soviet

ing the aggressive ambitions of the ruling quarters in Finland.

The Soviet government rejected such mediation".

The true measure of American peaceableness was

the

USAs

military, economic, and financial aid to the Finnish militarists.

At the same time, under the moral embargo announced by

US President on December 2, 1939, no American aircraft

and spare parts to them, as well as aluminium, molybdenum,
and aircraft equipment could be exported to the USSR. 'I he
embargo covered plant, patents, and other documentation for
the production of high-octane petrol. There naturally was a sharp
deterioration of Soviet-American relations as a result. During
the second quarter of 1940, US exports to the Soviet Union
dropped by nearly 50 per cent, compared with the previous quartthe

The Lowering Clouds.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

456.

The

1020

Secret Diary of Harold likes, Vol. Ill, pp.

134-35.

143

May

In

cr.

1940 these exports went down to a record low-to

However,

less than half a million dollars.

As

December 1939 a resolution demanding a rupture

USSR was submitted to the Congress on the claim that

early as

with the

the terms of the establishment of diplomatic relations between

USSR and the
had been violated by the Soviet Union.

USA

the
1

his

was

so at variance with the facts that on January 18, 1940,

Cordell Hull had to refute the charge.

ter

to

the

Senate he wrote that the

On
US

February 8, in a letgovernment had no

Soviet government of

grounds for making a representation to the

violations of any of the commitments assumed by the USSR
in the agreements of November 16, 1933.
In February 1940, the US Under-Secretary of State Sumner
Welles visited Rome, Berlin, London, and Paris. The Soviet

Union was not included in his itinerary. In this connection the

Soviet ambassador to the USA noted on March
3, 1940: An
early end to the war obviously does not enter into Roosevelts
calculations and would become an urgent issue only if Welles
discover an opportunity to drive a wedge between us and
Germans.
In the view of the Soviet embassy, Welless mission
was to find out how far the Germans were amenable to be-

he invasion

Germany they were completing preparations

Norway and Denmark and were therefore

in

of

tor
in-

frightening Britain and France. In accordterested

for the talks with Welles the German
directives
their
ance with
spoke mainly of Germanys determination to end this

above

all in

officials

war victoriously.
The Roosevelt administrations attitude to relations with the
USSR in the early months of 1940 was thoroughly analysed by
for ForA. Gromyko in a letter to the Peoples Commissariat
A.

eign Affairs.
lations

Why

and why

is

did Roosevelt not venture to break off rethe prospect of a break hardly probable both

these elections
before the presidential elections of 1940 and after
is not in any
here
question
The
if Roosevelt remains President?

on Roosevelt part towards the USSR. The

special attitude

let-

compelling Roosevelt to abter goes on to list the basic reasons

with the USSR.
off
relations
stain from a step like breaking

Although

USSR

hates the

it

implacably as a socialist country

energy
that is steadily growing stronger despite the enormous
bourAmerican
it,
the
against
countries
number
of
spent to set a

ing used against the Soviet Union and, at the same time, to
enable Roosevelt to win the image of a peace-maker before the

knows that the Soviet Union will exist.

The Far Eastern problem. Although they are very bitter
about the improvement of our relations with Japan, the US finanthat the
cial tycoons and the Roosevelt administration still hope

presidential elections. 2

USSR will remain a force

'

The British Permanent Under-Secretary

of State Sir Alexander Cadogan subsequently wrote: We had
the distinct impression that Welles had in mind an outline for
peace which would not require elimination of Herr Hitlers Naregime. 3

zi

Welles' mission was clearly linked to Roosevelts public state-

ment of February 9, 1940, about the USAs intention to go

on helping Finland in the war against the USSR. 4 The American diplomat Jay Moffat noted that Welles had come out for
breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 5

geoisie

By breaking

in opposition to

off relations

with the

Japan

USSR

in the

Far East.

Roosevelt would

se-

undermine his prestige as the president who established

these relations. There is no doubt at all that this would reduce
riously

Republicans
Roosevelts chances for re-election in 1940, for the
political
election
the
hands
in
would have an extra trump in their
game...

As regards

USSR

the charges that the

is

spreading communist

ideology in the USA, encroaching on the US state system, and so

on, they are all intended to befuddle the people and are used

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

pretext for reaction to strike at all the progressive

1 a<organisations in that country with, of course, the Communist

Ibid.

ty of the

chiefly as a
1

The Daily Telegraph, January 1, 1971.

4
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
War-arid Aid to Democracies, Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,

Roosevelt,

New

Vol.

York,

146

repent Moffat.
setts,

Papers. Selections

from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay

as the

main

target.

4,

1941.

p. 79.

The Mofjat

USA

Pier-

10 *

1919-11)4},

Harvard University

Press,

Cambridge, Massachu-

1956, pp. 280-81.

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Series

D, Vol. VIII,

p.

i 9

147

Commercial

are also of

interests

who

are groups of the bourgeoisie

market

for their goods.

some

see the

significance.

USSR

There

as a fairly good

rupture of diplomatic relations would

inevitably affect the trade relations between the two countries.

The aforesaid, however, gives no grounds for drawing the

conclusion that in the future reactionary elements will not

seek
a rupture of relations with the USSR. 1

Earlier, on July 15, 1940, the

the assets in the

USA

US

adiministration had frozen

of the Baltic republics

and

their citizens,

involving these

assets,
payments or operations
Bank
of the
State
and impounded gold bought previously by the
banks.
Estonian
USSR from Lithuanin, Latvian, and
Nothing good can be said about Soviet-American relations

prohibited any

was the description of their state

in the Soviet

governments

port to the seventh session of the Supreme Soviet of the

on August

ANTI-SOVIET BARRIERS TO
THE NORMALISATION
OF SOV ET-AMERI CAN RELATIONS

The

1,

1940.

threat to the

ening of the Axis

the signing of

In the meantime, the developments in Europe did not favour

the Anglo-French coalition. The fall of Belgium and France's
imminent collapse worried the White House. In the Congress
there

was a growing body

of opinion that the Soviet

Union should
Anglo-French coalition. On
June 2, 1940, Ickes noted in his diary: Apparently ever since
Churchill took over in England he has been attempting a rapprochement with Russia. When I get to see the President, one of
be drawn

the

to

the things that

side

want

the

of

to suggest to

him

is

we might

that

be able

to help this

rapprochement through diplomatic channels. 2

Soviet-American trade and economic talks opened in Washington in April 1940. For the Soviet Union they were conducted by
the Soviet ambassador to the USA K.A. Umansky and the counsellor of the Soviet

embassy A. A. Gromyko. What the Soviet

delegation insisted upon was that the USA should cease all discrimination against the USSR. Washington had to reckon with
the firm stand of the Soviet Union.

retary Cordell Hull on July

1,

note from the State Sec-

1940, said that the

US

administra-

was prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Government in

an endeavor to maintain between the United States and the Soviet Union commercial relations of as normal a nature as
is postion

sible in the present international situation. 3

Ncverthelcsss, the

USSR,

USA

continued its hostile acts against the

especially on the so-called Baltic issue.

\
3

14ft

Secret Diary of

Harold L.

USA increased with the considerable strength-

powers

as

a result of the defeat of France,

the Tripartite Pact,

Hitlers expansionist designs

Britains difficult

with regard

to

position,

South America, and,

American-Japanese conSeptember 28, 1940, after a conference of Roosevelts inner cabinet Harold Ickes wrote: It is incomprehensible to me that we should not make every effort to be on as

particularly, the further aggravation of

On

tradictions.

friendly terms as possible with Russia...

if

England should

the world.

fall,

At a

rate

we

are going,

the United States wont have a friend

in

This feeling was articulated more and more often in political

USA. For example, a bulletin issued

American Foreign Policy Association in June
1940 pointed out that the United States was facing the prospect
Asia.
of finding itself in complete isolation from Europe and
The Association urged rapprochement between the two most powand public

circles in the

by the influential

neutral states-the USA and the USSR. The bulletin also

revealed the anti-Japanese motives of this recommendation, saybe
ing that the USA's efforts to safeguard its interests should
erful

complemented with the signing of a Soviet-American agreement

obliging the signatories to support Chinas independence and to
maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia.
On August 13, 1940, a number of leading newspapers

in

the

USA published an article by Admiral Yates Stirling, which had

a wide repercussion. Stirling wrote: Our own relations with
Moscow during many periods in the last twenty years have not
been cordial. Yet, fundamentally, Russia and the United States
need not approve Russias form of governshould be friends.

We

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

lhe

re-

USSR

Ickes, Vol. Ill, p. 192.

Foreign Relations of the United Slates. 1940, Vol.

Ill,

1955. pp. 323-24.

The

Secret Diary of

Harold

L. Ickes, Vol. TIT, pp. 3.10-4 1.

149

I
ment but we should

realize that in

interests are parallel with those of the

On

many

respects our practical

U.S.S.R

. 1

US

Under-Secretary of State Sumner

July 27,
2
Welles said in a conversation with K. A. Umansky: It is time
our two countries thought not only of present relations but also
1940, the

of future months and years, which

may be fraught with new dang-

two powers. Is it not time to remove the causes of

which there are more than enough in the world, to
end the bitterness in the relations between our countries?"
Umansky replied that there were two conditions for eliminating
ers for the
friction of

this

bitterness:

First, the cleansing of our relations of acts of

discrimination and violations of the rights and interests

USSR

of the

US government agencies and, second, the relations bethe USA and the USSR should be approached as relations
by

tween
between two great, politically and economically independent
powers.
Evaluating this initiative by the US government, the Peoples
Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR wrote to the Soviet
ambassador in Washington on July 31, 1940: Welles has unquestionably sought to understate to us the aggravation of AmcricanJapanese relations and the intensifying struggle between the USA
and Japan for supremacy in the Pacific. Moreover, Welles statement was motivated by a desire, in connection with the commencement of the session of the Supreme Soviet, to smooth over
the acrimony in the pronouncements made against us by US
statesmen, notably by Welles himself."

On August 6, 1940, an understanding was reached between the

USSR and the USA on prolonging for one year, until August 6,
1941, the American-Soviet trade agreement. This understanding

was formalised by an exchange of letters between the Peoples

Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR A. I. Mikoyan and
the US charge daffaires in Moscow Walter Thurston. Meanwhile, talks on Soviet-American economic relations were resumed
in Washington. K. A. Umansky and A. A. Gromyko had a series
of meetings with the IJS Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles
at the State

'

on August 7, 1940, Welles declared.

At the start of these talks,
contradiction between
is not a single
As in the past,. .. there
which, in the view
ideology,
over
USA, except
the USSR and the
of the

US

the normalisation
administration, should not hinder
countries.
the
between
relations
of the

and improvement
Declarations

by

its

made an

hard-line stand.

M.

26,

American government
government has to go on asking the
economic and
unfriendly or discriminatory
to annul some of the
day not even
this
the USSR. To
political measures taken against
embargo
moral
as
decisions such
the American governments
canbeen
have
whatever,
grounds
for which there are no

viet

celled .

2
.

by the Soviet Union:

However, a few things were achieved
document for an exdraft
the
Agreement has been reached on
been given Amerhave
we
gold
of
change of notes on the import
;

tonnage; the conditions have

ican tonnage, notably oil-carrying
commission at the \\ ugh
our
of
been improved for the work
has stated its readgovernment
American
Aeronautical Plant; the
and other American specialists to
iness to permit assemblymen
there has been a virtual cessago to the USSR; in recent months
our organisations and ot incition of American nagging against
mail service has been established
dents involving our citizens; a
that has been denied to
across the Pacific, which is something
number of public statements
the Germans; Welles has made a
satisfactorily, and so on,
asserting that the talks arc proceeding
from the Soviet ambassador to
said a report of January 4,
Welles. But
summing up five months of talks with
the
the talks either
wrote,
ambassador
all more important issues, the
or were being
equipment)
of
yielded inadequate results (the sale
the American
to
testified
or
protracted (the moral embargo),
especially over the.question ot

W,

USA

governments continued hostility,

western frontiers.
recognising the Soviet Unions

The American

were aimed
ev
Sovict-Japancse
preventing an improvement of
between
relations
the deterioration of

governments

Department.

abided

Commissar for Foieig

1940, the Peoples
the SoMolotov said to Steinhardt: To this day

On December
Affairs

SA

impression, but in fact the I

said,
tactics in these talks, the report

relations,

at

ploring the possibility for

1

The

New York

Times, August

Soviet foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

13,

1940.
1

ibid.
Ibid.

151

150

USSR and Germany, and

the

using trade to influence Soviet for-

eign policy . 1

On

US State Department announced

embargo against the Soviet Union had been liftfrom Sumner Welles to the Soviet ambassador said
government had decided that the policy enunciated

January 22, 1941, the

that the moral

ed.

letter

that the

US

in the Presidents

statement to the press of December 2,

1939,
as a moral embargo would no longer

and usually referred to

be applied to the USSR. Nevertheless, the USA

continued its
discriminatory actions against the USSR even
after the moral
2

mounting
pared for rapprochement with the USSR in spite of the
on
ambassador
Soviet
threat from fascism. After a talk with the
England
nor
Neither
February 16, 1941, Harold Ickcs noted:
have played a good hand so far as Russia is concerned since

we

Hitler began to run

amuck and even now, when

the

immediate

come
so very
frank
in
very
Oumansky
is
Russia.
with
understanding
to some
country
is conas
his
policy
so
far
foreign
our
of
his criticism
cerned and on the facts I suspect that he is not without justifica-

future

critical,

is

we

are

making no

real effort to

tion.'

embargo had been lifted. For instance, in the period

between
January 1 and May 1941 the US government denied
export licenses or held up freight worth
29 million dollars. Of the new

What was American diplomacys approach to the relations with

the USSR towards the close of the initial period of the Second
World War? Indicative in this respect is a State Department mem-

contracts placed by Soviet organisations totalling

49,900,000 dollars, refusals were received
for the sale of goods worth 38 million dollars. Unacceptable terms were often made for the
contracts
on the remaining sum. 1 his line of action

orandum

was continued

'

weeks before the Great Patriotic War.

The US government showed its hostility

until

the last

ters,

for

USA:

example,

in the attitude to

also in lesser mat-

Soviet organisations in the

were put to the delivery of mail to the Soviet

embassy, Soviet newspapers and books
ordered or subscribed
to by Soviet organisations were
destroyed, and so on.
The US embassy in Moscow contributed to Washingtons
hard
obstacles

towards the Soviet Union. Ambassador Laurence

Stcinhardt
wrote to the Secretary of State on June
17, 1941: I am wholeheartedly in accord with the line of policy
which the Department
has decided to adopt in its relations with
the Soviet Union... If
the policy which the Department has
now laid down is strictly
adhered to without deviation, the prestige
of the United States
will be enhanced. 4
line

The USAs

anti-Soviet actions remained the main factor

inhiba positive development of the relations between
the two
countries. These actions devaluated
Washingtons declarations
about desiring an improvement of
political relations with Moscow. ft was quite obvious that the US leadership
was not pre.

iting

of June 21,

garding the situation

1941: Reports which ace coming in reEastern Europe make it clear that we

in

should not exclude the possibility of outbreak of

war

in

the

immediate future between Germany and the Soviet Union. In

case war does take place we are of the opinion that our policy
with regard to the Soviet Union, at least during the early stages
of the conflict, should be as follows:
should offer the Soviet Union no suggestions or ad(1)

We

vice unless the Soviet

(3)

If the

Soviet

Union approaches us...

Government should approach

us directly re-

should so far as possible, without interfering in our aid to Great Britain and to victims of aggression
or without seriously affecting our own efforts of preparedness,
questing assistance,

we

on exports to the Soviet Union, permitting it

even to have such military supplies as it might need badly and
which wc could afford to spare...
fact
(5) We should steadfastly adhere to the line that the
that
it
not
mean
does
that the Soviet Union is fighting Germany
relax

restrictions

defending, struggling for, or adhering to, the principles in international relations which we are supporting.
should make no promises in advance to the Soviet
(6)
is

We

Union with regard to the assistance which we might render in

case of a German-Soviet conflict, and we should take no commitment as to what our future policy towards the Soviet Union or

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

2

Ibid.

Ibid.
4

152

Foreign Relations of the United

Slates.

94 ,

Vol.

T,

1956,

pp.

764-65.

The

Secret Diary of

Harold

L. Ickcs, Vol. TTT, p.

153

Russia might be. In particular

later

if

should engage

no undertak-

in

Chapter 4

make it appear that we have not acted in good

should refuse to recognize a refugee Soviet gov-

ing which might

faith

we

we

ernment or cease

to recognize the Soviet

Ambassador

THE SOUTHWEST AND

THE BALKANS
IN

Washing-

in

ton as the diplomatic representative of Russia in case the Soviet

Union should be defeated and

be obliged to leave the country.

Owing

to this

the Soviet

government should

approach of the American side and

its

anti-

Soviet actions, the tension in American-Soviet relations remained

right up to the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet

Union.
*

and vigorous actions were the

anti-Soviet
of the
principal factor that led to the breakdown
the USA
Britain,
France,
and
trends in the policies pursued by
The
Anglo-French
the
Second
World
War.
in the early period of
coalition paid a very high price for rejecting military and politi-

The Soviet Unions

cal

cooperation with the

in the

summer

steadfast

USSR

against fascism at the negotiations

of 1939. France

was crushed

dinated to na/i diktat; Britain found

national developments in 1939-1941

militarily

itself sorely

made

it

and subor-

pressed. Inter-

plain that the bour-

geois states could not alone cope with the nazi military machine.

The

failure of the conspiracy of the

joint aggression against the

USSR,

two

imperialist groups for

the further

aggravation

of

contradictions between them, and the forced realisation by the

ruling quarters in Britain

and the

USA

that the

Munich

policy

had no prospect created prerequisites for the formation in the future of the anti-Hitler coalition and showed that the policy pursued by the USSR was correct. A particularly important circumstance was that in the extremely complex situation of the early period of the Second World War Soviet diplomacy was able to preserve restraint and prevent a drastic exacerbation of relations with
its

numer-

future allies in the anti-Iiitler coalition despite their

ous attempts to

damage

that cooperation with the

in

USSR

the

By 1938 Germany had stepped

realised

in the struggle against fascism

leport
region, followed by Italy.
trade of the countries of this
Geiman
Economic Council (the
issued by the Central European
urged the tota
* 939
September

Commerce) on
restructuring of the economy

Chamber

of

Europe with the purpose

[Nazi
struggle

expansion

in

9
of the countries of Southeastern
,

of meeting the Third Reich

require

fierce
Southeastern Europe developed in a

endeavoured to rewith Britain and France, which

been unregion (positions which had

store their positions in this

appeasing
dermined by the Munich policy of

German

fascism)

military-economic resources of
prevent Germany from using the
them into their military orbring
the countries of this region, and
the supply of Romahinder
to
tried
Britain
In particular,

bit.

the interests of the

Nazi Germanys adversaries

became

USSR.
West gradually

Second World War naz. Germany

In the initial period of the
Eufor supremacy in Southeastern
steadily stepped up its drive
its prowas
region
this
nazis most to
rope What attracted the
Moreover, bearing in mind the esximity to the Soviet Union.
when the Anglo-French sea blocksons of the First World War,
traditional sources of raw materade deprived Germany of many
raw
sought to resolve the problem of
ials, in Berlin they now
Europe.
expense of Southeastern
materials and food largely at the
foreign
into first place ,n the

nian

oil to

pressed
Germany. In 1939-194 France

for military-

Cut Ergdnzungsraurn fur Deutschland.

Sudosteuropa als mrtsebaftlieber
u
timber
9 [Fur
stages. August-D
achten des AUtteleuropdiscben Wirlschaf

vital to their existence.

Foreign

Relations

of

the

United

Stales.

1941,

Vol.

I,

pp.

766-67.

Dienstgebrauch), Berlin, 1940.

P-

lf>-

155

and trade agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. In Paris and London they hoped to form a Balkan
bloc under their aegis.
General Maurice Gamelin writes in his memoirs that the Anglo-French Command was set on enticing Germany into undertaking operations in the Balkans instead of concentrating its eff1
orts against France To this end there were a minimum and
a
political

maximum

plans: the

first

provided for landing an Anglo-French

task force at Salonika; the second envisaged sending British and

French infantry, combat aircraft, and naval units to the Balkans.

was presumed that these would be joined by units

of Frances allies-Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, and
Turkeyto bring the combined force up to tio divisions. Of course, concedes Gamelin, the burden of the war would fail on other peoMoreover,

side.

We

have brought new forces into the game on our

would have gained time. 2 Enlarging upon the Bal-

kans bridgehead idea to Anthony Eden in a letter of March 28,

1941, Churchill frankly spoke of the anti-Soviet thrust of
this
plan, namely, to make German expansion in the British sphere

and create additional incentives for the nazi

of interests difficult

leadership to

ble,

move

if

its

not impossi-

is

it

in

the Bal-

better business to take

it

efforts

reinforce security along the Soviet Unions

to

southwestern frontiers and

combine a rebuff

to

It

a united front were formed

kan peninsula Germany might think

out of Russia.

USSR.

earlier against the

he wrote, that

In

the other states bordering on the

to

in the

Balkans Soviet diplomacy had

Germanys and

also Italys expansionist

ambitions with opposition to the anti-Soviet policy pursued by
Britain and France in these regions.

TROUBLESOME RELATIONS
WITH ROMANIA
1

policy pursued by Romanias

cated problems for the

General Gamelin,

USSR

Servir,

Vol.

in

III.

monarchy created compli-

the southwest.

La

Romania stood

guerre (seplembre

1959-19 mat

1940), J.ibrairic Plon, Paris, 1947, p. 110.

2
Ibid.
3

Winston

liance, Cassell

156

for

its

hostil-

Soviet Union. The most vivid manifestation of

ity towards the
blocked the possibility of seriously
its anti-Soviet policy, which
improving Soviet-Romanian relations, was Romanias determina-

had unlawfully seized from the

USSR. These were Bessarabia and also Northern Bukovina, the
population of which had declared for incorporation in the SoRoviet state as early as 1918. Moreover, the ruling quarters in
combinaanti-Soviet
any
to
join
in
prepared
mania were always
tion

to cling to territories

tions of imperialist

it

powers.

CAPTIVE TO ANTI-SOVIETISM

in

Bourgeois historians attribute Romanias anti-Soviet activities

the early period of the Second World War mostly to fear of

aggression by the Soviet Union, to the fear of the Romanian

leaders that Romania would share the plight of bourgeois Poland, from which the USSR had allegedly seized the eastern
regions in September 1939.
larities

in the position of

Churchill, The Second World War, Vol.

and Co. Ltd., London, 1950, p. 151.
S.

The Grand Al-

there

were

(before

simi-

its

de-

but not in the context presented by bourgeois historians.

Both countries held Soviet territories, the possession of which
came to them against the will of the Soviet state at a time of its
military weakness.

Both countries clung to these

territories

and

obstructed the restoration of justice in every way. What in the

West is termed as fear of Soviet aggression by the Romani-

an rulers was in fact the fear of a thief in possession of what

belonged to somebody

else.

1917, taking advantage of the trials being

experienced at the time by the young Soviet Republic, boyarruled Romania sent an occupation force into Bessarabia. Strong

Back

in

December

from the Soviet Republic against this encroachment on

on
its territorial integrity compelled Romania to retreat, to sign
which
under
agreement
Soviet-Romanian
t
a
March 5-9, 9 8
Romania relinquished its claims to Bessarabia. The agreement
protests

clearly recorded Romanias pledge that it would pull its troops

out of Bessarabia in the course of two months and refrain from
engaging in or supporting any military, unfriendly or other similar actions

III.

As a matter of fact,
Romania and Poland

feat),

The

USSR

it

We could

ples.

among

out

against the Soviet Republic.

But a month later, on April 9, 1918, the government of Alexandru Averescu announced the annexation of Bessarabia. Brit157

ain, France, Italy,

signing with

and Japan were accomplices in this action,

a protocol on Bessarabias incorporation

Romania

Romania and recognising

was signed without

in

protocol

this annexation as lawful. This

the participation of the Soviet gov-

ernment and against its will and the will of the Bessarabian
population. Another arbitrary act was the Romanian military occupation of the northern part of Bukovina, inhabited mainly by
Ukrainians, despite the fact that the Peoples Assembly of Northern Bukovina had declared for that territorys incorporation
in the

Soviet Ukraine.

The

seizure of Bessarabia fueled the aggressive ambitions of

Romania's

rulers,

making them highly interested

in all sorts

of

anti-Soviet crusades. In Bucharest they held that the destruction or fragmentation of the

USSR would

enable them not only

retain the seized territories in perpetuity but also to acquire

to

new

Romania at the expense of the USSR. Like Poland, Romania was used as a springboard of imperialist anti-Soviet policy and was one of the
links in the cordon sanitaire against the USSR. This policy of
the Romanian leaders was in conflict with the interests of the Roterritories

and thus

create a Greater

manian people, who saw the Soviet Union as a true friend.

Throughout the period between the two world wars the Soviet Union did not recognise the annexation of Bessarabia. The
Soviet government demanded a just settlement of the Bessarabian question, in particular, in a note to the governments of Britain, France, Italy, and Romania of November i, 1918. When
the protocol on bringing the Briand-Kellog pact into force ahead
of schedule was signed in Moscow, on February 9, 1929, the Soviet government also declared that in Sovict-Romanian relations
there were outstanding issues. In his report to the 1 6th Congress
of the CPSU the General Secretary of the Partys Central Committee J. V. Stalin said: They talk about international
law,
about international commitments. But on the basis of what international law have the allied' gentlemen
taken
Bessarabia
from the USSR and gave it into the bondage of the Romanian
boyars?.
If this is called international law and
international
commitment, what is called robbery then.
.

The Romanian government did everything

it

could to contrib-

wrecking the Anglo-French-Soviet talks in 1939. In ApGrigore Gafencu told

1939 the Romanian Foreign Minister

ute to
ril

British politicians that

Romania would not

join a universal as-

system relying on Russia for this would compromise

1
Romanias relations with Germany. In a conversation with the
Turkish President Ismet Inonii on August 11, i939> King Carol

sistance

Romania declared that Romania would not permit the

Russian army to enter its territory even to go to the assistance of
opposed to
an embattled Romanian army. lie was emphatically

II

of

signing a pact on mutual assistance with the

USSR/

Bucharest on September 4, i939>

A communique published
had broken out Romania was
that
stated that in view of the war
to which it has adhered
stand
peace
maintain
a
to
determined
in

working to secure concord with all neighbouring counHowever, shortly before this, on August 27, 1939, Gafenhad assured the German envoy in Bucharest Wilhelm Fabricithat Romania would supply Germany with oil, raw materials,

hitherto,
tries."

cu
us

and farm products.

Romanias rulers intended to join in the world armed conflict
only when there was no doubt about its outcome. For that reason,
while drawing closer to the Axis powers, bourgeois-landowner
Romania continued its balancing act, preserving its links with
Britain and France. The fascist dictator Ion Antoncscu later described Romanian monarchys foreign policy as a game at two
tables. This policy

choosing the
rialist

gave the Romanian leaders the

moment

possibility of

with the strongest impe-

group.

In early April 1939

teral

for finally siding

London and

Paris gave Bucharest unila-

guarantees. Before the outbreak of the

war

the

Romanian

government had agreed to the transit of British military supplies

to Poland and promised a base for storing them and assembling
aircraft. The Anglo-French imperialists had several plans for
helping Poland with troops via Romania. According to German
intelligence, the Romanian government entered into negotiations

N.

I.

Lebedev, The Downfall of Fascism in Romania, Moscow, 1976,

p-

2 30 (in Russian).
1

16th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks),

June 26-July
Russian).

158

i),

19)0.

Verbatim Report, Vol.

Ibid., p. 234.

Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, Series D, Vol. \

United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1956, p. 3 6 3
3

i,

Moscow,

1930,

p.

51

(in

II,

159

with Romania is, in

favourable to them. Peaceful collaboration
convenient
to Germany
more
circumstances, much
the present
conquest.
effortless
possibly, even its

with Britain in September 1939 on the landing of British

and
French troops in Romania. 1 But impressed by the nazis
successful offensive in Poland, which was left to the
mercy of fate by
its Western allies, the Romanian
government seriously doubted
the value of the Anglo-French guarantees, although it
had no intention of renouncing its political ties with Britain
and France.
It may be said that towards the
close of 1939 Britain and
France had to some extent paralysed German influence
in

and consolidated

nia

their

own

chan,

The Soviet governments decision

and Italy
it could get from Britain, France, Germany,
demanded
USSR,
and
against
the
crusade
began
a
they
if
confirmation of the British and French guarantees in the event of
assistance

Roma-

influence, 2 the Soviet embassy

Bucharest reported.

in

However, the further prospects for Romanias foreign policy

manoeuvres were determined mainly by the stand adopted in
Berlin where it was held that owing to the key position
occupied
by Romania in the Balkans, Germanys relationship
to
other Balkan countries, Italy and especially Soviet
Russia
fected by it in the most decisive manner. 3 In early

the
af-

is

March

was received by
Romania on December 14, 19 39- The British envoy in Bucharest
Britain
that
Reginald Hoare told the Romanian government
Romanias
eastern
and France would extend their guarantees to
frontiers only if Turkey should immediately go to the aid of RoItaly.

if

no opposition were to

France, for

its

foe

feared on the part of

part, declared that Turkeys stand would

Romania would get British and French assistance in the event of a war with the USSR.
Although Britain and France were prepared to encourage the
decide whether

anti-Soviet slant in

Romanias

policies, these imperialist

states

did not feel they should join in the planned adventure of

Romanian rulers on any terms. They sought to create a

he anti-Soviet character of

Romanian foreign
Red Army liberated

policy' became
more pronounced after the
the Western
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in September
1939. On September 21, Grigore Gafencu made the following statement to

the Italian envoy

a Romanian-Soviet war.
Britains official reply about the guarantees

mania, and

1939,

Helmutt Wohlthat, rapporteur of the Reich Ministry of Economics,

su 3e sted that Romania should cease building up
its own industry and concentrate on agriculture. The ruling
quarters in Romania were prepared for this, and an economic agreement
was
signed with Germany. Romania was thus on the way to
becoming
an agrarian appendage of nazi Germany.
I

to repulse the provocations

military triggered an outburst of anti-Sovietism

of the Finnish
began ascertaining the dimension of the
Romania
in Bucharest.

the

more

convenient situation for aggression against the USSR. At .that

particular moment they counted chiefly on a spread of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. Moreover, their

own

interests in the

war

required safe southern flanks, while

the attitudes of Italy and Turkey at the close of 1939 were not
reliable enough for the actions Bucharest was hastening.

German group

Bucharest Pellegrino Ghigi: Poland and

Romania have hitherto been performing the function of a barrier
against Bolshevism. Romania cannot go on performing
that func-

against the

tion singlehanded 1 Concurrently,

Nevertheless, in combination with Germanys course, aggresthe USSR

sive hostile actions by Britain and France towards

up

its

in

Romanian diplomacy stepped

Germany. As the Ital-

efforts to secure the support of nazi

envoy

ian

German

in Bucharest reported to Rome on

September 25, the
representatives were confident that the situation was

encouraged militarist ambitions among Romanias leaders and

gave them unfounded hopes. In Bucharest the crown used virtually every opportunity to demonstratively accentuate its claims

Documents on German Foreign

'

P.

E.

I'landin,

Politique frangaise.

Policy, Series

1919-1040,

D, Vol. VIII,

Paris,

to
r

954

p.

Les Editions nouvelles,

'947. P- 3*7-

Documents on German Foreign Policy,

Document i Diplomatics Italians, Nona

reria cldlo Stato,

1G0

Rome, 1954,

p. 226.

Soviet territories. In the period between September 1939 and

end of June 1940, i.e., until the Bessarabian question

"was actually settled,

Sovict Foreign Policy Archives.

'

the

most of the members of the Romanian gov-

Series D,
scrie:

Vol. XT, i960, p.

1959-1)4), Vol.

I,

la

Ibid., p. 257.

281.

Grigore Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, Frederick

Libftd.,

U-UCi

Muller

London, 1945, pp. 274, 276.

1G1

ernmcnt

visited Bessarabia singly

given an anti-Soviet edge. In

fied

its

its

and

Each tour was

Romania intensi-

together.

foreign policy

search for anti-Soviet alliances, playing not only at the

two tables of the imperialist groups but also at all other tables
where a political game was in progress to the detriment of
the USSR's interests. Romania actively built up its armaments
and did not conceal the Eastern orientation of its military policy. Lastly, propaganda campaigns of a sharply anti-Soviet
character went on continuously throughout the country.
The Soviet embassy in Romania summed up Bucharests political activities

during the

first

months

of the Second

mobilisation the condition of the proletarian sections of the popuis daily deteriorating. The concentration of new contingents

lation

has not been officially announced, but people receive individual

call-up papers obliging them to report immediately to their
1

units.

The armys accelerated armament, the countrys militarisation,

and the anti-Soviet hysteria were evidence of the growth of adventurist feeling among Romanias rulers and led to a further
rise of tension on the southwestern frontiers of the Soviet Union.

World War:

LEANING TOWARDS GERMANY

At

the close of 1939 and the beginning of 1940 Romania was

active in the anti-Soviet preparations for a meeting of the Council
of the Balkan Entente. The Romanian government was the prin-

conduit of the anti-Soviet combinations of Britain and

France. It set great hopes on a military campaign against the So-

cipal

Union when the war with Finland broke out. 1

The Romanian press systematically urged an attack on the

viet

USSR. The militarist mood in Bucharest could not pass unnoticed

either. The Soviet embassy reported on January
1940:
5,
Iroops continue to be massed in Bessarabia and Bukovina.

According

rumours emanating from local military circles, the

Romanians were planning to concentrate some 20 divisions against
2
the USSR. In a radio broadcast on March 18, 1940, George
to

Tatarescu declared: The iron and stone belts along our frontiers must be completed, and in connection with the nations ar-

mament

must be resolved without delay. 3 In the

spring of 1940 the Romanian government demonstratively mobilised the army, calling up more than a million reservists. At
the same time it requested Germanys assistance in building an
this question

eastern rampart along the Dniester under the guise of a railproject. Romanias military expenditures, which amounted

way

to 3,600 million lei in

1936, had grown

by 194c.
Romanias militarisation aggravated the economic difficulties
the nation was already experiencing. In February 1940 the Soviet embassy in Bucharest noted: On account of the continued
4.

-fold

The
the

pledged

1C2

(in

Russian).

to increase these supplies to

9,500,000 tons of

2,400,000 tons annually.

oil

to supply

annually.

Germany

with

nearly

Western Europe in the spring of

whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria in
Romania. Romania intensified its efforts to turn Bessarabia and
Northern Bukovina into a springboard against the USSR. Injanuary-March 1940 the Romanian military organised 26 provocations along the Soviet-Romanian demarcation line on the Dnies-

German

military successes in

1940 served as a signal for

Romanian aircraft intruded into Soviet air space. The fascist

Romania openly came out against the USSR. The
police in Bucharest unceremoniously detained staff members of
the Soviet embassy. Romanian reaction intensified military-poter.

quarters in

145

itself

George Tatarescu promised

p.

milita-

manias leaders took an even bigger step towards satisfying Berlins military-economic appetite: the Romanian Prime Minister

Ibid.

1975.

crucial

11

Ibid.

Moscow,

most

Ribbentrop said that these pledges turned out

entirely satisfactorily and fully safeguard our vital interests in
deliveries of petroleum. Then, at the end of March 1940, Ro-

4,

its

oil.

In this connection

History of Diplomacy, Vol.

resolve one of

Under an agreement signed

with Romania in September 1939, Berlin got the Romanians to
supply 1,200,000 tons of oil annually. In March 1940 Romania

Soviet foreign Policy Archives.

Romania was leaning towards Germany enabled

basically to

ry-economic problems-that of

1
1

fact that

latter

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. Vlll, p. 926.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. IX, 1956, p. 5 Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Moldavia, Kishinev,

*968, p. 243 (in

li

Russian).

1G3

terror against the population of Bessarabia

lice

and Northern

Bukovina.

The

facts

were

that

Romanias

rulers

were taking Romania

ever deeper into servitude to the fascist states. In April 1940

Fabricius reported to Berlin that the King, the Court Minister,
the Minister President, Foreign Minister,

hold fast to the line of policy.

On May

28, 1940,

and

War

in alignment with

Romania and Germany signed

Minister

all

Germany. 1

the so-called

oil

under which Romania pledged itself to supply Germany

with oil and oil products in exchange for a large quantity of arms
from the war trophies captured by the nazis in Poland. These arms
pact,

were necessary to strengthen Romanias political position with

respect to Russia, Tatarescu explained to the nazi envoy in
Bucharest. In a conversation with Fabricius on May 28 Tatarescu sought to make it clear that Romania was prepared for practically total

collaboration with

Germany,

stressing that he

speaking not of Romanias neutrality but of

its

was

orientation to-

wards Germany. 2
In Bucharest they continued to be preoccupied chiefly with the
I!

i|

retention of the eastern territories seized

from the USSR. At

a conference on April 19, 1940, chaired by the Romanian king

and attended by Tatarescu and Foreign Minister Gafencu it was
decided to resist the Soviet Union if it should insist on a settle-

ment

of the Bessarabian question.

military attache in
of General

tions

Tony Albord,

the French

Budapest who visited Bucharest on the instrucMaxime Weygand, wrote that the Romanian

government had massed troops along the Dniester and subordinated the nations economy to Germany. 3
1 he speed with which Romanias rulers were drawing closer
to

Germany and the

growing anxiety
it

escalation of anti-Sovietism in

in

Moscow. The Soviet

necessary to intensify

On March 29,
Affairs of the USSR

tion.

its

Romania caused
government deemed

efforts to settle the

Bessarabian ques-

Commissar for Foreign

declared: ...We have no non-aggression
pact with Romania. The reason for this is the unresolved.
question ... of Bessarabia whose seizure by Romania the Soviet Union
1940, the Peoples

although it has never raised the question of

has never recognised,
statement demorecovering Bessarabia by force of arms. This
imperialists
lished the inventions of the

was planning aggression against Romania

Molotov emphasised
territories that had been wrested from it.
... of Soviet-Roworsening
that there were no grounds for any

Documents on German Foreign

164

cannot be said that the activation by the Soviet Union of

it
by
the question of Bessarabia, a territory that belonged to
It

was

rights,

The

entirely unreflccted in Bucharests policy.

Soviet

embassy in Romania noted that the strengthening of the Soviet

Unions international position and the fading of the hopes for
conflict
active assistance from Britain in the event of an armed
government
Romanian
compelled
the
Union
have
with the Soviet
about
reconsider its attitude towards the USSR. There is talk
to

But
improving economic relations between the two countries.
rapwants
a
government
Romanian
the
obvious
that
quite
it is
prochement without the settlement of outstanding political probMinlems. When the Soviet ambassador met with the Foreign
.

on June 21, 1940, and the question of ways

and means of improving relations between the USSR and Romania was brought up the Soviet ambassador noted that it was
Ion Gigurtu

ister

necessary above

all

to settle outstanding political issues, parti-

cularly the question of Bessarabia. Gigurtu

subject.

this

As

before,

evaded talking about

Romania was not prepared

to reach a

peaceful, just settlement of the Bessarabian question.

On June 26 the nazi envoy Fabricius reported to Berlin that

Carol
isfying
if

this

Romanian government had no intention of satthe Soviet demand for the return of Bessarabia, and that
4
demand was made, they were determined to fight.

II

and

the

disquieting situation

took shape

along the Soviet-Roma-

government
nian demarcation line. On April 20 the Romanian
from
V.
M. MoloApril
memorandum
of
1940,
replied to a
9,
unactotally
offered
reply
incidents.
The
frontier
tov about
15

Policy, Scries D, Vol. IX, pp. 61-62.

49
Tony Albord, Weygand devant Ic probleme oriental (1939-1940), La
Revue des deux mondes, June 1965, pp. 333-34.
Ibid., p.

relations.

manian

'

1940.
'

Union

that the Soviet

in order to recover the

Sixth Session of

the

Supreme Soviet

of

the

USSR. March

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 194a, p. 4 (in Russian).

Ion Gigurtu was Romanias Foreign Minister from June

29- April

4,

to

July

4,

1940.
3

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Scries

D. Vol. X,

1957. P-

*9-

165

ceptablc explanations: of the 15 incidents eight were denied

together and counter-claims were made on five (one was not

this

in-

of the

USSR.

USSR

23, 1940, the Romanian military organised two or three frontier provocations every

a thing of the
the speedpresent international situation demands
oast, and the
past in
the
from
of outstanding issues inherited
iest settlement
between
peace
foundations of a lasting
order finally to lay the
necessary and
Soviet Union considers that it is

week. 2

opportune

Romania admitted that it was to blame only in one

From the moment the memorandum was sent there had

vestigated).
case.

been other frontier incidents, including

In the period between April 20 and

firing at

Soviet patrols. 1

May

Romanian

leaders were by now uncondiGermany. On May 16, 1940,

Carol II told the German envoy that Romanias future depended solely on Germany. 3 On May 25, 1940, Gafencu went so far
as to tell Fabricius that the king was absolutely ready to coop4
erate with Germany.
In foreign policy the

tionally

From

taking

their

the aforesaid

cue from

it

will be seen

sertions of bourgeois historians that

assistance from

how

slanderous are the

Romania had

to

as-

look for

Axis powers against Bolshevik pressure

the

and that having secured the return of Bessarabia and Northern

Bukovina in June 1940 the Soviet Union pushed Romania into
the embrace of the German Reich. The decision to take the cue
from Germany up to an alliance with it had been taken, of
course, before the Bessarabian question was settled politically. However, in May-June 1940, the Romanian ruling elite did
not manage to formalise its final switch to the camp of the Axis
powers: Berlin and
tees as long as

it

Rome

refused

to

give

Romania guaran-

did not satisfy the territorial claims of Hor-

with Romania, the immediate

Union. Further, the statereturning Bessarabia to the Soviet
quesThe government of the USSR holds that the
er

ment said:

Bessarabia

tion of the return of

is

tion of the transfer to the Soviet

closely connected with the ques-

Union

population is linked to
where the overwhelming majority of the
destiny, a common
historical
common
the Soviet Ukraine by a
The Soviet governlanguage and a common ethnic composition.
return Bessarabia
to
Romania
government of

ment invited the

Soviet Union. It expicsand transfer Northern Bukovina to the
would accept this
government
sed the hope that the Romanian
proposal of the

and thereby make it possible to settle the

between the USSR and Romania by peaceful

USSR

prolonged conflict
1

means.
among the rulThis proposal whipped up anti-Soviet histeria
Council was convened, the
ing quarters in Romania. The Crown
1940. As soon as the siton
June
27,
morning
sitting lasting all
envoy to convey to
ting was over Carol II asked the German
.

Romanian

frontiers

Ibid., pp. 455-36.

Series

D, Vol. IX,

and

the mobilisation

give an explicit reply to

to protract the
the Soviet proposals. In Bucharest they intended
time. To this
settlement of the question of Bessarabia for a long
on June
declared
end the Tatarescu government hypocritically
for
sense,
broadest
in the
27 that it was prepared immediately,
of
basis
the
on
proposals
a friendly discussion of all the Soviet

Policy,

Bukovina

of that part of

of

Romania did not

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Tbid.

Documents on German Foreign

166

is

to address, togethin the interests of restoring justice

settlement of the question of

The government

an envoy in Moscow Gheorghe Davidescu: The Soviet Union

never reconciled itself to the forcible seizure of Bessarabia, and

weakness of the

the countries, the

ly,

On June 26, 1940, the government of the USSR declared its

principled stand to the Romanian leaders through the Romani-

'

that the military

to Romania. Concurrentfor sending a German military mission

2
of the Romanian army was ordered.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
OF A TERRITORIAL QUESTION

Now

Hitler his request for guarantees of the

thy-ruled Hungary.

and again by the goverment

has been publicly stated time

al-

p.

349.

Soviet Foreign Policy.

pp. 515-16
s

Collection of Documents, Vol.

4.

Moscow,

(in Russian).

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Series

D, Vol. X,

p.

19-16.

requested Germany,

concord.

it

via,

to state their

At the same time

Greece, and Turkey

Italy,

Yugosla-

attitude to the

Soviet

These countries recommended

conflict with

the

USSR

that

Bucharest should

settle

for Bucharest,

would otherwise
would be unable

lose

Romanias

they were
oil

worried

that

they

without which Germany

war against the USSR in the future.

In a broader sense nazi Germany was apprehensive that its massive effort to penetrate Romania and turn it into a bridgehead
against the USSR would be disrupted. However, the nazi representative in Bucharest Manfred von Killinger intimated unequivocally to the Romanian leaders that a concession to the
Soviet Union in this question would be purely temporary.
Because the Romanian statement was, in effect, evidence of
to fight a

reluctance to settle

the Bessarabian

question,

acceptance of this proposal.

its

That same day troops of the southern army group under Gen
eral of the Army G. K. Zhukov crossed the Dniester and entered
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Moldavian, Russian, and
Ukrainian brothers, said an address of the Soviet Command to
the population, the great hour has come of your liberation from
the yoke of the Romanian boyars, landowners, capitalists, and
secret police.

The

stolen Soviet land, Bessarabia,

returned to the Motherland. 1

By

nightfall of

now

is

being

June 30 the entire

had been cleared of the occupationists.

The Soviet frontiers were restored along the Prut and the Danube. Thus were foiled the designs of Romanias ruling elite,
encouraged by imperialist states, to use Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina, which occupy a territory of 51,000 square kilometres
and had a population of nearly four millions, as a springboard
in the war that was being planned against the Soviet Union. The
Soviet frontiers were now more than 200 kilometres farther to
territory

History of the Second World War. 19)9-1945, Vol. 3 Beginning of

the War. Preparations for Aggression Against the USSR
Moscow, 1974,
,

p.

371

(in

Russian),

power was restored and

socialist

reforms were carried

seventh
2, 1940, the

territories. On
out in the liberated
the
of the USSR passed a law on
session of the Supreme Soviet
the
and
Republic
Socialist
Soviet
formation of the Moldavian

Soviet Socialist Republic of tic

incorporation in the Ukrainian

Akkerman,
Northern Bukovina and also the Khotin,
population was
the
which
in
Bessarabia
of
and Izmail districts
passed just before the
predominantly Ukrainian. This decision,
was of immense significance
outbreak of the Great Patriotic War,
power in
restoration in 1940 of Soviet
to the USSR. The
with the Moldavian ASSR,
Bessarabia and its reunification

territory of

said

Leonid Brezhnev, was an act of

historical justice.

TOWARDS WAR AGAINST THE USSR

the Soviet

government demanded a direct reply to its proposals for a peaceful settlement. On June 28 the Tatarcscu government announced

in the

of vital centres

August

by peaceful means. In Berlin, the

principal capital

security'

reinforced the

southwest of the USSR.'

Soviet

stand.

its

west. This

the

between
no longer figured in the relations
BukoNorthern
and
Bessarabia
the USSR and Romania. After
an
Soviet-Roman.
mixed
a
vina were reunited with the USSR,
the
between
boundary
the
commission was set up to demarcate

The

territorial issue

conditions
plot it on the map. The
relagoodneighbourly
of
establishment
were thus created for the

USSR and Romania and

between the two countries.

,
already linked its desBut bourgeois-landowner Romania had
The first German units began
tiny with that of nazi Germany.
1940. The Soviet embassy in
arriving in Romania in September

tions

Bucharest noted: The arrival of

signifies

Romanias

final

political

German

troops in

Romania

and economic subordination

m the Balkans.
Germany and further German penetration
on the Black Sea
The gaining of the foothold by the Germans
to

and the building

of the Soviet

to the interests
of air bases are a direct threat

Union.

The Antonescu
in early

'

military-fascist

clique, that

September 1940, was guided

came

to

in its foreign policy

power
by un-

Socialism, Part Seven, Novosti

Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and
57Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1975 P3
Archives
Policy
Foreign
Soviet
2

LL

169

163

*
disguised hatred of the Soviet Union. In

November 1940 Anto-

nescu went to Berlin where he signed a protocol on Romanias

Pact concluded between Germany,

adhesion to the Tripartite

and Japan.
In a talk with Hitler on November 22, 1940, Antonescu repeatedly stressed that Romania would be prepared to fight
alongside the Axis Powers for the victory of civilization. 1 Meeting with Keitel on the next day, Antonescu informed him in detail of Romanias military preparations along the Soviet-RomaItaly,

nian frontier and, generally, of Romanias preparations in the

event of a war against the USSR. Antonescu saw this war as an
easy promenade; for the Romanian blitzkrieg, he said, it
would suffice to commit two motorised divisions, which would
without trouble break through the front and advance in the
direction of Kiev, etc. Without disclosing details about Germanys plans of aggression against the

USSR,

Keitel assured Anto-

Germany would do everything to make Romania feel

had the backing of the German army. 2 Berlin highly appreciated the anti-Soviet zeal of Romanias rulers. Before leaving
Germany, Antonescu had another meeting with Hitler, at which
the latter said without mincing words that Germany would
stand up for her (Romania-!^.) in every respect, in the political as well as the economic field. From now on the existence of
the Rumanian State would be backed by the entire German
Wehrmacht. 8
The Soviet embassy in Bucharest pointed out that the idea
of turning Romania into an official protectorate has now been
abandoned by the Germans exclusively for economic and tactical considerations (to avoid giving other Balkan countries a negative impression and thereby hampering Germanys subsequent
plans). All the steps taken both in the military and economic
spheres must be considered from the standpoint of an eventual
war against the Soviet Union.
nescu that
it

for example, to secure the repatriation up to

of Bessarabia
December 16, 1940, of some 220,000 inhabitants
parts
various
in
Northern Bukovina who had been living

tions.

It

managed,

and
of Romania.

An

In order to settle

all

170

propaganda was started

Bellicose anti-Soviet
the close of

May

1941. In Bucharest

war with

the

in

Romania

at

USSR was

re-

In
garded as a means of considerable territorial aggrandizement.
t
May 10, 94 i.
a telegram me to his envoys in Berlin and Rome on
Antonescu wrote that there had to be a common rontier beBestween Romania and Germany. He had his eye not only on
2
had
Antonescu
and
Hitler
and Bukovina, he explained.
I

sarabia

Munich on June 11, 1941- At this meeting the Romanian side was informed of Germanys decision to attack the
prepared to
Soviet Union. Antonescu said in reply that he was
USSR, all
the
against
war
for
the
place at the Fiihrers disposal
a meeting in

of

political,

Romanias military,

and

Germany would

social

resources.'

Hitler

not remain in debt: for

its
confirmed that nazi
BuNorthern
and
Bessarabia
recover
could
help Romania
kovina and would be allowed to occupy other Soviet territories,

right

up

to the

Dnieper.

Two days after Germany attacked the USSR Molotov had a

behalf
meeting with the Romanian envoy Gafencu. Speaking on
setthe
of the Soviet government, he pointed out: Following
has
government
tlement of the question of Bessarabia the Soviet
relagood
have
no
on Romania and its sole desire is to
claims

tions with

it.

The Soviet government

told

Germany

that

it

con-

problems peacefully the Soviet governRomanias anti-Soviet ac-

restraint in the face of

3
'

transfer to the

Bank
Romanian national bank of the lei redeemed by the State
Bukovina.
Northern
and
of the USSR in Bessarabia
However, the efforts of the Soviet government to normalise
resistance in Burelations with Romania encountered growing
they were
because
this
interest
in
all
lost
charest where they had
Trade
and ecoUnion.
Soviet
the
attack
to
expecting Germany
Romania.
and
USSR
between
the
ceased
but
all
nomic relations

ment showed

on the

agreement was signed

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Scries

D, Vol, XI,

p.

665.

tical

Ibid., p. 687.

Ibid., p. 690.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

A.^A. Shevyakov, German Imperialism's Economic and

(in Russian).
Aggression in Romania (1916-1941), Kishinev, 1963, P- Mi
1962.
Vol.
XII,
Series
D,
P- 997Policy,
Foreign
Documents on German
International Military
Trial of the Major War Criminals Be I ore the

Nuremberg,
Tribunal, Vol. VII, International Military Tribunal,

Military-Poli-

1947. P- 307-

171

side red the giving of the so-called guarantees to Romania

to he
a breach of good relations between the Soviet Union
and

Roma

nia.

Its

understanding of these guarantees

is

that

Romania was

made dependent on Germany, that it was subordinated to

the
will of the German National-Socialists. The
Soviet government
regarded the entry of German troops into Romania as the
occupation of Romania by German forces. We can now see
that
Romania

has gone further along that path

in the piratical attack on the Soviet Union.

and

is

We

have drawn

participating
all

conclusions from this fact, although Romania has not

ventured
to declare war on the Soviet Union openly and
say what it wants
from the USSR. Romania is participating in the piratical

sharing

their

die

USSR

Romania by

that

countrys rulers.

THE USSR AND BULGARIA

In the early period

between the

of the Second

World

War

the relation

USSR and

mania, and Poland treated Soviet foreign policy with undisguised

between the USSR and Bulgaria there was, in "effect,
no basis for serious inter-state contradictions. As perhaps
no
hostility,

in

other East European country, in Bulgaria there was

a powerful
socio-political trend in favour of rapprochement
and friendship

with the Soviet Union. Resting on historical tradition,

this trend
mirrored the sincere feeling of all progressive people
in Bui
garia.
In the early period of the Second World
War the government
of Bulgaria adhered in principle to approximately the same
foreign policy conception as the ruling quarters in some
other
states

neighbouring on the USSR. In Sofia they tried to manoeuvre

between the Anglo-French and German-Italian imperialist groups,

and

172

compelled

it

to

restrain

its

anti-Sovietism. All

became increasingly inclined towards

the same
rapprochement with nazi Germany. Soviet diplomacy countered
this

trend as best

it

could.

THE USSR OFFERS GUARANTEES

OF BULGARIAN SOVEREIGNTY
At an audience given by the Peoples Commissar for Foreign
SepAifairs of the USSR to the Bulgarian envoy A. Antonov on
tember 20, 1939, Molotov was asked whether in the event there
It
was a need for it Bulgaria could count on Soviet assistance.
reciprocity.
of
basis
on
the
but
only
can, Molotov replied,
The readiness to place the relations with Bulgaria on a basis of
cirequality and mutual benefit up to assistance under difficult

determined the USSRs approach to its relations

A key element of this course was the offer of a
treaty of mutual assistance made to Bulgaria in September 19 39

cumstances

with Bulgaria.

This was also the direction of other Soviet initiatives in regard

Commisto Bulgaria. For example, in a directive of the Peoples
sariat for

Foreign

Affairs to

the Soviet

ambassador

was

in

Sofia

instruct-

Lavrentyev of November 12, 1939, the latter

Bulgarians find
tell the Bulgarian government that if the
themselves in any trouble they can count on the Soviet Union
A.

I.

ed to

Soviet
not abandoning them and that, if they so desired, the
assistance
effective
them
Union would be prepared to render
But the ruling quarters in Bulgaria showed no readiness to rethe indigspond
the timely Soviet offers. This attitude aroused
.

to

nation of the masses.

The government

received over 340,000 in-

dividual and collective messages from approximately 1,500,000

people demanding that it sign a pact of mutual assistance with
1

rials,

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives,

lean-

Bulgaria were determined by a number

of circumstances. The Soviet governments
point of departure
was that between the USSR and Bulgaria there were less divi
sive elements than in the Soviet Unions relations
with the other
states along the USSRs European frontiers.
While Finland, Ro

pro-German

Bulgarias rulers

war

people of

The

icy

in the betrayal of the interests of the

aspirations.

heightened in proportion to the military succesing in Bulgaria

Europe. However, in combination
ses of the nazis in Western
of the Bulgarian people in favour
sentiment
with the widespread
vigorous Soviet foreign polUnion,
Soviet
with
the
of friendship
breaking off relations with
from
Sofia
monarchist
prevented

USSR, and our stand will stem from the fact .

The war against the Soviet Union marked the highest point

against the

anti-Soviet

'

Soviel-B ul garia n Relations and Contacts. Documents

Vol. 1. Moscow, 1976. P- 465 (in Russian).

and Other Mate-

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

173

m
USSR.

the

Progressive socio-political

forces

that

in

country

were well aware that the safeguarding of Bulgarias independence

and sovereignty was linked inseparably with the establishment
of friendly relations with die USSR. The feeling favouring
friendship and cooperation with the USSR was shared by
large segments of the people. This feeling was based on profound
respect
for the USSR and on the understanding that
an improvement of
the relations with the Soviet Union held out
immense advan-

~
Towards

basis.

the close of 1940 Bulgarias debt to

Germany had

risen to 1,200 million leva.

ruling elites proneness to

The

hamper

development of

the

re-

to restrict them to the economic

lations with the Soviet Union,
of anti-Soviet manoeuvring
policy
bv
its
motivated
was
sphere,
in
also by the anti-Soviet activities of the imperialist states

and

Bulgaria.
28, 1940,

on March
the Soviet embassy in Sofia reported
increased
been
during the past month, March, there has

As

and French pressure on Bulgaria in order to subordiConaspirations.

nate Bulgarian foreign policy to Anglo-French

tages for Bulgaria.

British

At tlie close of 1939 and the beginning of 1940 some headway was made in Soviet-Bulgarian relations. An air convention
was signed on December 11, 1939. Until the beginning of

arc
according to available
closer
any
moves
threatening that if the Bulgarian government

1940
Soviet-Bulgarian trade and economic relations were not
based
on treaties. The first Soviet-Bulgarian treaty on trade and
navigation and also a trade and payment agreement
for 1940 were
signed on January 5 and came into force on February

Lnder

5,

1940.

information,

currently,

to

the Soviet

Union

the British

government

will

denounce the

credit agreement and have Bulgaria pay all its debts.'

for Foreign
In another report to the Peoples Commissariat
about the
conclusions
its
the Soviet embassy summed up

Affairs

months of

early
policy pursued by monarchist Sofia during the

more than

balancing between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany.

per cent of Bulgaria's trade turnover. Soviet

supplies of scarce goods, especially oil and
cotton, were of major
15

significance to the Bulgarian

economy.
Ihe trade negotiations with the USSR coincided in
time with
the elections to Bulgarias National Assembly
in January T940.
It was the view of the Soviet embassy
in Sofia that the attitude
towards the Soviet Union has now become, in
Bulgaria, a keyissue of the political struggle not only
between the class parties
but also between the various sections of the
Bulgarian bourgeoisie
fighting for power. In the election campaign
both the govern-

ment and opposition delegates urged

closer,

friendly

relations

with the USSR.*

However, having signed the trade agreement with

the USSR,
government displayed no willingness to go further

British

the

agreement the USSR was to import nearly 1,000

million leva worth of goods from Bulgaria; this
amounted to
the trade

up
1940: The Bulgarian government has stepped

its

policy of
.

Fence-

At present the Bulgarian

sitting now symbolises this policy.
relations.
economic
only
maintain
to
wants
government
between the two
balancing
of
policy
rulers
the
For Bulgarias
.

was largely a cover for their pro-German

because the)
sentiments which were not particularly publicised

imperialist coalitions

were
rope.

in Eunot very sure about the military-strategic situation

secret
no
made
But in their contacts with Germany they

still

194 the German repreForeign Minister

the
sentative Carl Clodius was assured by
Finance Minister
the
Daskalov,
I. Popov, the War Minister G.
Germany was
that
leaders
D. Bozhilov, and other Bulgarian

of

where

their sympathies lay. In

Bulgarias sole natural ally.

May

The general impression, Clodius

the Bulgarian

figures, above
reported, is that the important political

than economic links.

Bulgaria s economic dependence on Germany
grew rapidly.
On October 11, 1939, Bulgaria and Germany signed a
number

policy one of alignKing, consider as the only possible foreign

3
assured Axis
constantly
Sofia
Monarchist
Germany.

of secret economic
to

import
R

,
in the

la rge

Ablova
',J'

War

and

political

agreements enabling Germany

quantities of food from Bulgaria on a clearing

Co Perlion Between

the Soviet

and Bulgarian Peoples

Against Fascism (1941-1945), Moscow,

1973.
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives,

174

p.

40

(in

all

the

ment with

representatives that
ples

interest in the

it

the Bulgarian working peoof friendly relations with the

would ignore

development

USSR.
1

Ibid.

Russian).
3

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Series

D, Vo!. IX,

p.

?.7-

175

m
Starting from approximately September 1940, i.e., after
Germanys military successes in Western Europe, the Bulgarian leaders began to speak openly of Bulgarias readiness to
collaborate
with the Axis powers. Visits to Germany by Bulgarian leaders
be-

In the latter half of

with the

assumed a mass

special units

began

to arrive in

tourists as early as the spring of 1940.

the

number

By

the

autumn

closer to na/i

Germany

analogous statement to the Prime Minister Filov. In early

came

Bulgaria

mined

is

in the spring

all.

to turn

it

but a

German

colony.

The Germans are

into their colony completely

government

and

this

is

and

garia

USSR

the

USSR.

the Balkans as a whole.

The General

Secretary of the

Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev

was sent to Bulgaria on a special mission in November 1940.10

a talk with King Boris 111 on November 25, 1940, he renewed,
on behalf of the Soviet government, the proposal for a pact of
friendship and mutual assistance with Bulgaria. This proposal
was made also through the Bulgarian envoy in Moscow Ivan
Stamenov.
For Bulgaria this pact would have been a guarantee of its independence. But the monarchist ruling elite was pushing the coun-

deter-

try in the opposite direction, completely ignoring the nations in-

do not want closer relations with the

for personal mercenary considerations, but they will not

terests.

The wording

of a rejection of the Soviet proposal

drafted with heavy pressure from a

was

in Sofia at the time.

On

German

was

military mission that

the day Sobolev arrived, a confer2

ence held by the king decided to reject the Soviet proposal.

However, despite the Filov governments refusal to sign a
treaty, the Soviet initiative

a major action by the

in that part of

USSR

was seen
in

its

in the

Balkan countries as

struggle against the nazi threat

Europe. For instance, as the Soviet embassy

in

Soviet foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

Ibid.

17.fi

with

In the autumn of 1940 the Soviet government intensified its

efforts to stem the spread of nazi Germanys influence in Bul-

something

2
it because they are afraid of the
people. The Soviet ambassador was told about the Bulgarian armys sympathy for the
USSR by the Bulgarian publicist Gankovsky on March 2, 1940:
section of the officers feel that rapprochement with the Soviet
Lnion is the single factor that will actually guarantee Bulgarias
independence. 3

improve relations

SOVIET OPPOSITION TO GERMANY

elite

admit

effective steps to

into conflict with the feeling of the

The Bulgarian government

does not definitively state its attitude towards the USSR because
it fawns upon the palace and fears
the people. The palace and

USSR

demand

ing of the Ministry for the Interior.

the Bulgarian people do not want.

the

Novem-

Despite police harassment, slogans calling for a Soviet-Bulgarian

mutual assistance pact were renewed almost daily on the build-

and summer of 1940 increasworking masses

who, contrary to the ruling elite, wanted relations of friendship
and mutual assistance with the USSR. Speaking to the Soviet ambassador on April 7, 1940, about this feeling of the Bulgarian people, Professor P. Stainov noted :The sympathy of the
entire Bulgarian people for the Soviet Union has never been greater. This
stems not from sentimental reasons such as historical and blood
kinship, but from reality. The Bulgarian people link with the
Soviet Union their idea of freedom and material welfare.
Today
ingly

in

ber 1940 six workers delegations from various districts of Sofia

called on the National Assembly and a number of ministries to

of 1940

had grown to 30,000. They were

quartered in groups of 300-400 in the main towns. There were
at least 1,000 German officers at Bulgarian war plants,
the air
force, motorised units, and anti-aircraft defence units.'
The growing speed with which Bulgarias rulers were drawing

and appeals were distributed

scale. Leaflets

members of the National Assembly signed a

letter to the government demanding a mutual assistance pact with
1
the USSR. A group of Bulgarian intellectuals tried to hand an

Bulgaria in the guise of

of such tourists

1940 the movement for closer relations

including the signing of a mutual assistance pact,

Forty-eight

Sofia.

came more frequent in the latter half of 1940. Germany was visited by King Boris III, the Prime Minister B. Filov (twice),
and
the Ministers for foreign affairs, agriculture, trade, and industry.

German

USSR,

Ibid.

R.T. Ablova, op.

12-26

cit.,

pp. 37, 38, 63-65.

377

Belgrade reported

to Moscow, Yugoslav public opinion assessed

the Soviet initiative as an important action in the Balkans in fa-

vour of peace, against

Documents

German

of the peoples

aggression.

trial of

where they told the Germans that Bulgaria would adhere to the
2
Tripartite Pact. But out of fear of public indignation it was decided to keep this deal with Hitler secret. At the same time rumours were spread in monarchist Sofia to the effect that Bulgarias policy had the approval of the USSR and that the Soviet
government did not object to the presence of German troops
in Bulgaria. On January 13, 1941, these falsehoods were refuted in a TASS statement. 3
Moreover, on January 17, 1941, the Peoples Commissar for
Foreign Affairs of the USSR lodged a protest with the German
ambassador von Schulenburg in connection with the massing of

Romania for the purpose of entering and occupying Bulgaria and also occupying Greece and the Straits.
troops in

This action, the protest said, could lead to turning Bulgaria into
a theatre of hostilities. 4
In a political survey of Bulgarias foreign

and domestic policy

embassy wrote: Prior to Bulgarias adhesion
to the Tripartite Pact the Bulgarian government maintained a
more or less friendly attitude towards the USSR. It tried
for 194T the Soviet

to give the impression that Bulgarian-Soviet relations

were im-

proving. This policy put the government in a stronger position

in the country and enabled It to balance on the international
scene. It established commercial relations with the Soviet Union,

was to its advantage economically as well. It was slower

agree to an expansion of cultural relations and did all it could
to avoid any political rapprochement with the USSR. It was
ready to display friendliness towards the Soviet Union mostly

for this

the Bulgarian government

edge of its policy. In February 194U for example, it banned the showing of Soviet films.
of
All Bulgarian-Soviet societies were closed after the arrival

178

USSR and

for a pact with the

against Bulgaria

joining the nati bloc was headed by the Bulgarian Workers Parwas defined
ty (Communists). The main aim before the nation

seventh plenary meeting of the partys Central Committee

January 1941 as the struggle to prevent Bulgaria from joining

at the
in

and to ensure the signing of a pact with the USSR.

autumn of 1940 to the summer of 1941 there were
continuous actions in Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Pleven, and other
towns in support of a pact with the USSR and against an althe fascist bloc

From

the

with Germany.
The Bulgarian government hypocritically tried to
USSR to believe that it was motivated by good faith.

liance

the

get

On

February 28, 194T, the General Secretary of the Bulgarian Foreign

Ministry D. Shishmanov told the Soviet ambassador A. A. Lav
rishchev: The Ministerial Council has today decided to sign
the agreement

on Bulgarias adhesion

Bulgarian government

to the Tripartite Pact.

The

believes that adhesion to that pact will

from maintaining and developing good relations

with the USSR and neighbouring countries and requests that you
assure the Soviet government of this. On the next day, March
1, the Chief of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministrys Political Departnot prevent

ment

it

Altynov handed Lavrishchev a statement with the

I.

formation that the Bulgarian government had agreed to

in-

German

troops entering Bulgaria.

The

protocol on Bulgarias adhesion

was signed

in

Vienna on March

1,

1941.

to

the Tripartite

At the time

this

Pact
cere-

mony took place German troops were already entering Bulgaria. The monarcho-fascist clique in Bulgaria dissembled, declaring to the Soviet

Union

that the permission for

German

troops to

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

D. Sirkov, Bulgaria's Foreign

3

Germany

German troops.
The movement

Policy.

/03I-794 j, Sofia,

1979, pp. 262-65

Ibid.

Bulgarian).

(in

closer to

increasingly revealed the anti-Soviet

to

to

it

nothing.

As Bulgaria drew

Bulgarian monarcho-fascists

indicate that as early as November 1940 Bulgarias rulers were

prepared to subscribe to the Tripartite Pact. On November 17,
1940, Boris III and the Foreign Minister Popov went to Berlin

German

within the limits of protocol formalities that committed

Pravda, Junuary

3
1

13, 1941.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

P-

12*

ibid.

Soviet-Bulgarian Relations and Contacts. Documents and Other Materials,

545 -

179

enter Bulgaria had been given in order to preserve peace in

the Balkans. The Soviet government categorically rejected this
hypocritical argument, stating

on March

that

was untenable

it

and that such policy was leading not to the strengthening of

peace but to an extension of the war and to Bulgarias involvement in it. 1 Two days earlier the Peoples Commissar for Foreign
Affairs had made it clear to the German ambassador in Moscow
that the Soviet Union was interested in the preservation of Bulgarias independence.*

The Bulgarian people gave the nazi troops a hostile reception

with slogans such as Germans, Get Out of Bulgaria!, Down
On
with Nazi Germany!, and Long Live Free Bulgaria!
March 6, 1940, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Workers
Party (Communists) issued a Declaration denouncing the countrys joining in the fascist bloc

had been drawn

try

and saying

into the fascist bloc

that

now

and the

that the coun-

fire of

war was

raging on Bulgarias frontiers friendship and mutual assistance

USSR was

way to avert catastrophe.

Bulgarias rulers thus turned away from friendship and mutual
assistance with the USSR. Subsequently, in the indictment of
with the

the only

the Chief Peoples Prosecutor of the Peoples Court of Bulgaria

it

was noted that acceptance

of the Soviet proposal in the in-

ternational situation obtaining at the time

way towards

would have gone a long

saving Bulgaria and the Balkan peninsula.*

However, even

as late as

the spring of 1941

the Bulgarian

leaders were apprehensive of allowing relations with the

to deteriorate drastically.

embassy on

among

May

19,

According

to a report

1941, anti-Soviet agitation

the Bulgarian people.

USSR

from the Soviet

is

not popular

Taking also foreign policy

factors

account, the government officially declares that it wants

good friendly relations with the Soviet Union. .. It needs this to
enhance its prestige in international politics and also to reduce
the gap between it and its people, for there is nothing that unofficial anti-Soviet propaganda can do to destroy the Bulgarian
peoples affection for the Soviet Union, an affection that has deep
4
social, national, and historical roots.
into

2
3
*

180

Soviet Foreign Policy.

Collection of Documents, Vol. 4, p.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

R.T. Ablova, op.

cit.,

p. 37.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

545.

THE USSR AND HUNGARY

3.

of its reThe Soviet Union wanted a positive development

were
no mathere
nations
two
the
Between
lations with Hungary.
relations
problems or mutual claims that could complicate the
Soviet Union and Hunthe
September
them.
In
1939
between
that were severed in Februgary resumed diplomatic relations
joined the Anti-Comintern Pact.
ary 1939 after Hungary had
relations was welThe Soviet Unions decision to resume these
treaty
Sovict-Hungarian
by the Hungarian people. The
jor

comed

and payment agreeon trade and navigation and also the trade
visit to
ment signed in Moscow on September 3, 194, after a
benextremely
were
delegation
the USSR by a Hungarian trade
and
flaming
already
war
world
the
eficial to Hungary. With
curtailed,
Hungarys economic links with many countries sharply
vital to
were
Union
Soviet
the
with
agreements
trade economic

Hungarian industry.

The long years

of intensive anti-Soviet

propaganda

by the

the brutal harassment of proponents of friend-

Horthy regime and

between the peoples of the USSR and Hungary had not
sympathy for the first
killed the Hungarian working peoples deep
out the Communist
socialist country. After the world war broke
extremely difficult
under
Party of Hungary, which functioned
that friendstressing
work,
conditions, continued its explanatory
of
condition
fundamental
a
were
ly relations with the USSR
legal
Communists
the
initiative
of
the
On
genuine independence.
the workpublications printed a series of materials acquainting
policies and
social
and
nationalities
CPSUs
the
ing
with
ship

people
with scientific and cultural

life in

tion were translated into the

the

USSR.

Soviet works of

fic-

Hungarian language.

BELLICOSE

MOOD

OF THE HORTHY REGIME

The

relations

between the

USSR and Hungary

did not develop

This was
actively in the early period of the Second World War.
of the
policies
anti-communist
mainly due to the anti-Soviet and
with
ties
strengthening
in
interest
Horthy regime, to its lack of
the Soviet Union.
It

would have

ti-Soviet coalition

more if there had been an anof imperialist powers, includgroups

two
of the

suited this regime

181

mg

the USA. In a message to Hitler

of November 3, 1939, t
ile
Hungarian Regent Miklos Horthy concentrated on the
idea of

Hungarian General

crusade against the USSR. He recalled with

regret that in 1918
there had only been a half-hearted response
to the proposal of the

allies,

It

Britain, Italy,

Of

course,

this

day for 21 years.

am

happy. 2

the Soviet

Union a dim view was taken of Horprogramme with its underlying idea of creating a Greater Hungary through
the inclusion of territories of
thys foreign policy

neighbouring states formed after the First

World War on the
rums of the Austro-IIungarian monarchy.
Horthy was eager to
incorporate in Hungary the Transcarpathian

and

also Transylvania,

Backa and Banath,

Romania. These am-

which belonged to
a decisive element of the foreign policy
pursued by
the bourgeois-landowner oligarchy
of Hungary.
bitions

were

Also they underlay the military policy

of the Ilorthy
which had placed a huge burden of
war

clique,

preparation on the
country. In the period from mid-1938
to 1941 inclusive, Horthy
Hungary s military expenditures totalled
over 5,000 million pengos, which was in excess of the
countrys annual national income/
Since Hungarys rulers did not
have enough strength to impose their will on other peoples they
went to all lengths to draw
closer to the imperialist states that
could help them. Combined
with rabid anti-communism, this policy
led Hungary into the orbit of Germany and Italy. At
the same time Hungary's rulers did
not abandon their hope of getting the
support of the Axis im-

my

is

take part

firm belief, General

in this

during

The intertwining of the Hungarian rulers

anti-Sovietism, anti-commumsm, and revanchist plans was
with particular clarity
seen in a

m emorandum

of General Henrik Werth, Chief

of the

documents on German Foreign Policy,

Scries D, Vol. VIII, p. 178.
:
Quoted from A I. Pushkash, Hungary During
the Second World War,
Moscow, 19 66, p. 197 (in Russian).
J

Ibid., p.

129.

Werth wrote, that we should

German-Russian

war.

We

should

war:

.for

terests require a

from the Christian-national idea, and by our anti-Bolshevik posture in the past
.

and

in

for politically

the present;

wc have

definitively linked ourselves to the

Axis powers;
.for on
Hungary.

of

this

depends the further extension of the

territory

The hostility of the Horthy leadership towards the Soviet

Union was such that as early as the first half of 1940 Hungary
was regarded in Soviet military-political planning as a potential

Germany in its contemplated aggression against the

USSR. 2
The Pal Tclcki government made some attempts to balance
between the two imperialist groups, but nothing came of them

ally of nazi

perialist rivals.

from the standpoint of our future our vital, national inweakening of the Russian neighbour and his distancing from our frontiers
.
.for we are bound to this by our world view, which stems
.

Ukraine (then part

of Czechoslovakia), the Yugoslav

districts of

memorandum was writby Germany and its

USSR

basic political provisions mirrored the attitude of the

its

not remain idle

have waited for

this

most bellicose section of the Horthy leadership towards the

USSR throughout the initial period of the Second World War.

French Marshal Ferdinand Foch for an

alliance against Soviet
Russia and for a war against it by the combined
forces of France.

Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Horthy assured

Hitler that whatever Hungary could
spare was at his disposal.
Also indicative was Horthy s reaction to
the news from Berlin that Germany had begun
hostilities against the USSR:
I

Although

Staff.

ten shortly before the attack on the

during the very

relative, its

rulers led

first

months of the war. This balancing was very

essence being chiefly that a section of the Hungarian

by the Prime Minister Count Tclcki did not support

the nazis as actively as the latter wished. In Budapest they count-

Germany

more consideration to Hungary,

Romania. Germany
even had to demand assurances from the Hungarian leaders that
they would not attack Romania. Towards the close of T939, after angry shouts from Berlin, the Horthy government unconditionally reaffirmed that it would follow in Germanys wake.
ed on inducing
especially to

its

to give

territorial

claims, chiefly in

As was noted by Carl Clodius, the German

1

representative at the

Hungary and the Second World War. Secret Diplomatic Documents of

the Period of the War, Moscow, 1962, p. 254 (in Russian).
A. M. Vasilevsky, A Lifelong Cause, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981,

Eve and

the
2

p- 74.

182
183

Hungarian-German economic

Economy Varga,

the spring of 1940,

the
(Horthy, the Minister for the

talks in

authoritative political elements

the Chief of the General Staff Werth.-P.S.)

are fully aware that Hungarys policy can only be conducted in

close concert with that of Germany and Italy and that they are
determined to act consistently with this in the economic field. 1
The USSR figured as a major factor in Hungarian foreign pol-

summer and autumn of 1940 when the Hungarian rulattempted to achieve one of their central aims, that of annex-

icy in the
ers

To secure Berlins assistance, the Horthy regime

was threatened by the USSR, although it had no
grounds for saying so. For their part the nazis, who were encouraging rivalry and discord between Romania and Hungary, proceeded from the premise that an excessive exacerbation of Hungarian-Romanian relations and an armed conflict between them
could draw the USSR deeper into Balkan developments and reinforce its positions. This prospect was entirely at variance with
the calculations of the Axis powers. As a result of the so-called
Vienna arbitration, on August 30, T940, Germany and Italy decided to award Northern Transylvania to Hungary. German diplomacy got Romania to accept this verdict unconditionally ining Transylvania.

claimed

it

timidating

it with the prospect of Russian intervention.

The
same bogey was used time and again relative to the Hungarians.
The main purpose of the arbitration was to tie Hungary and
Romania closer to Germany with this additional means of bring-

ing pressure to bear on both countries.

HUNGARY
As

part of

Germany

its

JOINS

THE TRIPARTITE PACT

USSR
On November 20,

preparations for aggression against the

escalated

its

activities in

Hungary.

1940, Hungary became the first Axis satellite to adhere to the

Tripartite Pact. Nazi propaganda used this act for another slan-

derous campaign against the USSR, alleging that Hungary adhered to the pact with the collaboration and full approval of
the USSR. There was an immediate response from the Soviet
Union: on November 23 this falsehood was refuted in a TASS
statement.
1

Documents on German Foreign

Soviet Foreign Policy.

184

Policy,

Scries

D, Vol. IX,

Collection of Documents, Vol. 4

p.
p.

258
534

The

Union strongly condemned Horthy Hungarys com-

German

aggression against Yugoslavia.

statement on

to Hungarys attack on
the Soviet governments attitude

Yugo-

published on April 13, I94G declared: The

particularly
ernment cannot condone this Hungarian action. A
by
government
adverse impression has been made on the Soviet
four
only
Yugoslavia
against
the fact that Hungary started a war
lastmonths after it had signed with that country a pact on
Soviet gov-

slavia,

ing friendship.

Given all the willingness of the Horthy clique to serve nazi

Germanys interests, there were elements in the ruling quarters
the nazi economic expansion and
at Hungary who could see that
of the status
political diktat were gradually depriving Hungary
of the
foundation
principal
the
Although
of a sovereign nation.
Hunby
the
questioned
was
not
Berlin
policy of alliance with
antiand
anti-Sovietism
far
as
especially
as
garian leadership,
in Budapest the feeling did not endisappear that there should be a more circumspect approach
strength for
to the Axis powers, that Hungary should save its

communism were concerned,

tirely

war in a no-lose situation.

the national feelings of the Hungarian people, gentradiuine respect for their national dignity and revolutionary
in
ceremony
In
a
tions was demonstrated by the Soviet Union.
troops
seized
by
standards
on March 20, 1941, battle

intervention in the

As regards

Moscow

Hungarian national liberation movement

was suppressed in 1849 were turned over to Hungary. This genHungarian
erous gesture, which earned the admiration of all

of Nicholas I

when

the

working people, acquired special political significance against

the background of the undisguised nazi diktat that had reduced

Hungary to the status of a satellite.

The Horthy regime continued to deepen its collaboration
with Germany against the USSR. At the beginning of February
combat units at Ger1941 Hungary pledged itself to place 15
its war
manys disposal for a war against the USSR, to complete

German

troops tran-

also to the districts adjoining

Yugoslavia,

preparations along the Soviet frontier, give

sit

to the frontier

and

and ensure supplies to them across Hungary. At the close of May

Carpathian group of
1941 the Horthy regime began forming the
Hungarian
1

Soviet

plicity in

forces for a

war

against the

USSR.

Ibid., p. 549-

185

Among

Hungarys leaders there was some disagreement only

over the time of their involvement in nazi aggression. The more

circumspect wanted to wait a little in the belief that, among

USSR would

other things, Germanys invasion of the

facilitate

Germany on an anti-Soviet
crusade against the USSR, which
would, in turn, make Hungarys participation in this crusade
a reconciliation between Britain and
basis and, consequently, a

a winning venture. The more impatient of Horthys associates, the

Regent himself, and the brass hats were eager to tell Berlin about
Hungarys voluntary joining in the war against the USSR.
In a memorandum to the Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy on
June T4, 1941, the Chief of the Hungarin General Staff Henrik
1

Worth wrote: Our

association with the

Axis powers makes
Hungarys participation in the war mandatory. This is necessary
also because wc can count on a further expansion of the country's territory

only

we

if

of the Axis powers.

staunchly and loyally abide by the policy

As a reward wc

shall

most certainly recover

the territories of historical Hungary. Authoritative quarters in

all

Germany have always

hinted

this,

while the policy hitherto pur-

sued by the Axis powers allows one to be quite certain of this. 2

On June 23, 1941, the government of Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. The Hungarian envoy in Mos-

who forwarded

cow,

this

decision to the Soviet government on

the evening of June 23, was told that the Soviet Union had no
claims on Hungary and no aggressive designs against it. 3 But it

was no longer

possible to hold the

Horthy clique back from

at-

hostilities
planned, this was used as a pretext for beginning
that day, without
On
on
June
1941
dawn
USSR
at
27,
the
against
Minadvance approval by the Hungarian parliament, the Prime

Laszlo Bardossy officially declared a state of war between

Hungary and the USSR, referring to an uprccedentcd Soviet
ister

rights
attack in violation of the Hungarian peoples sovereign
his
pockin
When Bardossy was pronouncing these words he had

et

from the Koszyce aerodrome chief that the

a written report

bombing was the work of German aircraft

Also on that day Bardossy sent the Hungarian envoy
1

many Dome

the

German

Ger-

in

Foreign

Sztojay instructions to
governMinistry that in each decision it makes the Hungarian
with
powers,
Axis
the
ment wishes to act in full concord with
the Reich

tell

government

in the first place

2
.

was not the Horthy regime that expressed the actrue attitude to the
tual will of the Hungarian people and their
of the Hungarmajority
vast
The
USSR.
on
the
piratical attack
USSR, while
the
against
war
the
deplored
people
ian working

Of

course,

it

most conscious segment headed by the Hungarian Comthe

munists opposed it actively. At a sitting on June 28, 194U
Hungary noted
Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Hungary was
that in the obtaining situation the chief danger to
their

German

subservience to

its

fascism and that

it was in the best

war against the So-

Hungarian people to halt the

to be
Union. This, the Hungarian Communists declared, had 3

interests of the

viet

aim of

the

of the nations classes

all

and

political parties

tacking the Soviet Union.

dirty provocation

scripted

by the

German Air Attache

Futterer and the Chief of the Hungarian General Staffs Operational

Department Laszlo was used by

the

Horthy regime as a

USSR. In accordance with this scenario, German aircraft bearing Soviet insignia bombed Koszvee,
Mukachevo, Rachov, and other towns, killing many civilians. As
pretext for attacking the

Laszlri

realised

Bkdossy became Hungary's Prime Minister

the failure of this foreign policy

after Pdl

and committed

suicide

Teleki had

on April

J.

1941.

Hungary and the Second World War, p. 154.

V. L. Issraelyan, L. N. Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggressors. The GermanItalian- Japanese Fascist Bloc. Its Rise and Fall, Moscow,
1967, p. 126 (in
R ussian).

The

Soviet

THE USSR AND YUGOSLAVIA

Union went

to great lengths to

prevent fascist ag-

Many

factors obstructed
gression from spreading to Yugoslavia.
and
independence
for
struggle
Soviet support for that countrys

These were, above all, its economic and political

followdependence on Germany and Italy which was heightened
French
British
and
also
in
June
194.
defeat
ing Frances
Yugoslavia
to
place
determined
were
states
fascist
activity. The
became predomin economic bondage. As early as T9 56 Germany

sovereignty.

2
3

Hungary and the Second World War,

pp. 246-47.

Thick, p. 262.

A.

I.

Pushkash,

op.cit., p. 227.

187

inant in Yugoslavias foreign trade; by 1940

trade had risen to 60 per cent.

its

share of that

trade agreement signed by Ger-

many and Yugoslavia in October 1940 made the latter country

more dependent on Germany than ever before. The Yugoslav
1

government pursued a policy of complicated balancing between

the two imperialist groups.
Anti-communism and hostility towards the Soviet Union were
part and parcel of the foreign policy pursued by monarchist Yugoslavia. This was one of the few European countries that had
no diplomatic relations with the USSR. Until early 1940 a whiteguard emigre mission occupied the building of the former legation of tsarist Russia in Belgrade.

However, the growing threat from Germany made the Yugoslav government increasingly interested

with the USSR.

Tt

had

the country, the public

to take into

normalising relations

in

account also the situation in

mooch Many Yugoslav

patriots

saw

the

USSR

as the nations mainstay against fascist aggression.

The
working people and influential political forces pressed for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. At the close of March 1940,
acting through the Soviet embassy in Turkey, the Yugoslav government offered the USSR to establish economic relations be-

tween the two countries. 2 A trade and navigation treaty, an accompanying protocol on the maintenance of a Soviet trade mission in Yugoslavia and an interim Yugoslav trade delegation in
the USSR, and a trade and payment agreement for t 940-1 941
were signed in Moscow on May 11, i940. In 1940-1941, trade
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was to amount to 176
million dinars. The Soviet Union expected to import copper and
concentrates of lead
and zinc ore from Yugoslavia and
export farm and other machinery, kerosene, cotton, and other
:

commodities. 4
After the successful completion of the economic talks and the
exchange of the instruments of ratification the USSR and Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations. This

June 25,

940.

was announced on

with
of diplomatic relations
In Yugoslavia the establishment
struggle
the
of
as an act in support
the USSR was welcomed
countrys soverwagod by the peoples of Yugoslavia for their
When it
nazism.
from
mounting threat
eignty in the face of the
envoy
appointed
been
became known that Milan Gavrilovic had
all
from
telegrams
and
many letters
to the USSR he received
restrengthening
towards
Yugoslavia, urging him to work
over

arrival
July 6, on the occasion of the
PlotniA.
(V.
Belgrade
in
ambassador
of the first-ever Soviet
capital calling
Yugoslav
the
in
demonstration
kov), there was a
for an alliance with the USSR.
negative reaction to the
In Germany and Italy there was a
and the USSR.
Yugoslavia
between
relations
the
of
normalisation
Mameli and
The Italian envoy in Belgrade Francesco Giorgio
Mascia
daffaires ad interim in Moscow Luciano
lations with the

charge

Italys

Rome that the establishment of diplomatic

between the USSR and Yugoslavia was prejudicing the

reported to

anti-Soviet line
the Balkans, devaluing the preceding
1
departure
Gavrilovcs
Before
of the Yugoslav ruling quarters.
von HeViktor
Yugoslavia
in
for the USSR the German envoy

negative
warned him unequivocally that Berlin had taken a
1
Moscow.
in
attitude to his mission
supremacy
Germany and Italy were counting on unchallenged

eren

footholds in the
Balkans, gaining possession of strategic

in the

Germany,

Black and Aegean seas, and controlling the Straits.

at the close of 1940,
the Soviet embassy in Belgrade reported
the unexpectedness
with
Union
Sovit
the
paralyse
to
intended
of

actions in the Balkans.

its

plans
important Soviet counter-measure to the German
the
m
prestige
and
influence
for undermining the Soviet Unions
to
handed
representation
Balkans was, among other things, the

An

Moscow, on the
von Schulenburg, the German ambassador in
demarche by the
This
Danube issue on September 10, 1940.
statement about
TASS
corresponding
Soviet government and the
desire to see the

Danube problems

"

History of the Second World War. 1919-1941, Vo!.

Soviet Foreign Policy. A Collection of Documents, Vol.

3,

p.

258.

4,

p.

502.

Glance

J.

Ibid., p. 504.
1

Ibid.

Press,
5

settled, reported the

Policy. A
N. D. Smirnova, Fascist Italys Balkan
Russian).
*7 i
Moscow,
1969.
PP;73 (*
History (1916-194'),
2
Yugoslavia in Crisis. 1914-41, Columbia
1

11

relations

Axis po-

sitions in

USSRs

USSR. On

B.

New

at

Diplomatic
University

Iloptner,

York-London, 1962. PP-

77 -? 8

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid., p. 514.

189
108

F
Soviet embassy in Belgrade, were a painful setback for the
proGerman elements in Yugoslavia. Further, the embassy wrote
that the transfer of German troops to Romania in the
autumn
1

of

1940 was accompanied by heightened German diplomatic acBulgaria and Yugoslavia. In September the German gov-

USSR can give the Soviet government

by these countries with the
1
preserving
peace in the Balkans.
effective instruments for
Succumbing to heavy pressure from nazi Germany, Yugoslavia
joined the Tripartite Pact

tivity in

ernment demanded

transit for

German

troops and military sup-

Yugoslavia in the direction of Salonika for the alleged purpose of backing up important German operations in Afplies across

rica.

"Yugoslav diplomatic

was an outburst

there

on March

25, 1941. In response to this,

of public outrage in the country. Rallies

and demonstrations protesting against the treachery of the ruling quarters swept across the whole of Yugoslavia. Workers, servicemen, and students took part in the protest movement. Many

includes giving

thousands of peasants marched to the towns. In the early hours

of March 27, in order to forestall the initiative of the masses,
a coup was accomplished by a number of bourgeois groups and

embassy wrote.
On October 17, 1940, the Soviet government instructed its
ambassador in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav government that

also the brass hats leaning towards Britain and the USA. They
deposed the Prince Regent Pavel and the Cvetkovic-Macek government, installed the under-age Peter II on the throne, and
formed a government under General Dusan Simovic, Commander of the Yugolsav Air Force. The Simovic government did not

circles pointed out that this demand

Germany a io-kilometre corridor and the right to
bring in German troops to guard it. The granting of this demand
would turn Yugoslavia into a German protectorate, 2 the Soviet

the Soviet Union "shows understanding for Yugoslavia and

for
the struggle of the Yugoslav people for their political
and eco-

nomic independence. 2
In this situation the USSR took steps to reinforce political
support for Yugoslavia. On November
5, 1940, in a talk with A.

Y.
Vyshinsky, the First Deputy Peoples Commissar for
Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, on the latest developments in the
Balkans
Milan Gavrilovic noted that the situation was steadily deteriorating. It was not to be excluded that German
troops would ent-

denounce the protocol on Yugoslavias adhesion to the Tripartite

Pact but did not venture to ratify it. The Yugoslav Communists
were very active in the events of March 1941- Articulating the
seewill of the people, they urged an alliance with the USSR,
infreedom
and
peoples
Yugoslav
the
guarantee
of
ing it as the
dependence.

er Bulgaria. The envoy stressed that the interests of

the USSR
coincide with the interests of all Balkan states, with the
interests

Because the coup was on the whole directed against Germany

and thus constituted an extremely undesirable factor on the eve
of the invasion of the USSR, Hitler decided to attack Yugoslavia. At a special conference of the Wehrmacht High Command

of Yugoslavia in particular. 1

on March

In

its

recommendations

long-term Soviet diplomatic actions, contained in the political survey for the
latter half of 1940,
the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia wrote that the Soviet
for

Union

"can and should oppose the shift of the flames of war to this
part
of Europe. But the success of Soviet actions presupposes
active
Bulgarian and Yugoslav opposition to British and German intentions to

move

the

war

to the

Balkans. Only sincere rapprochement

all
27, 1941, Hitler announced his intention "to make
preparations to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national
2
unit. He added that had the coup taken place during the Bar-

barossa operation the consequences to us would have been

more

serious.

reSoviet diplomacy promptly supported Yugoslavia in its

people
the
pressure
from
sistance to the German threat. Under

new Yugoslav government sent a delegation headed by MiGavrilovic, who held the post of Minister Without Portfolio,

the
lan

for talks
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

'

Ibid.

Ibid.
1

Ibid.

with the Soviet government.

treaty of friendship

and

Ibid.

Trial of

the

Major War Criminals

XV, 1948,
Vol. xxvni,

Tribunal, Vol.
ibid.,

190

much

Before the

International

Military

p. 476.
p. 22.

191

non-aggression was signed by the

USSR and

Yugoslavia

Mos-

in

attested to the USSRs de5, 1941. This step was

termination to rebuff German fascism in the Balkans. In view

cow on April

the inevitable nazi

of

with the

USSR

aggression against Yugoslavia the treaty

ranged beyond the framework of bilateral

inter-

state relations, acquiring considerable international significance.

This treaty consisted of five

articles.

Under

Article

the

two

countries undertook to refrain from any attack on one another

and

to respect

each others independence, sovereign rights, and

that should cither
of
the

territorial integrity. Article 2 stated

contracting parties be subjected to attack from a third state, the

other contracting party undertakes to observe a policy of friend-

toward

ship

it.

wording substantially-in favour

from the commitments usually given

This

Yugoslavia-differed

non-aggression treaties.
ble moral
for

its

and

The

signing of this treaty

of
in

was considera-

support for Yugoslavia at a bitter time

political

peoples.

However, nazi Germany was preparing to attack the USSR in

the immediate future and was now stopping at nothing. At dawn
on April 6 it perfidiously attacked Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavias military defeat soon followed-thc forces were
much too unequal. On April 15, 1941, the Yugoslav government
ordered the army to cease hostilities. But on that same day the
political force which headed the Yugoslav peoples resistance to
the nazi invaders

made

itself

Know

heard.

that this struggle

end in victory even if the enemy, who is stronger, now overwhelms you... The Communists and the entire working class of

will

Yugoslavia will hold out

in the front ranks of the peoples strug-

won, 2 stated an adthe Communist Party of Yu-

gle against the invaders until final victory

dress of the Central

Committee

of

goslavia to the peoples of that country.

in

is

The

resistance

movement

Yugoslavia was an armed struggle from the very outset.

Soviet policy in the Balkans created some conditions for narrowing the gap between Soviet and British positions. Of course,
the British sought to protect their imperialist interests
1

J.
1

192

B. Hoptfier, op.

cit.,

p.

in

307.

History 0/ the Second

World War.

2939-/945, Vol.

3,

p.

266.

the

in
to nazi aggression
Balkans. Nevertheless, Soviet opposition
to improve Sovict-British
helping
factor
serious
was
a
Balkans
rhe

eolations

The

and mobilise

drive to

efforts against nazi

strengthen

the

Germany.

Soviet Union

security

in

the

a major direction of Soviet

southwest and in the Balkans was

World
diplomatic activity during the early period of the Second
exWar. Above all, the USSR consistently countered Germanys

pansionism and gave a rebuff to the anti-Sovietism in the poliYugoslavia.

of the rulers of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
cies

At the same time it showed constant readiness to establish

goodneighnot only normal relations with these countries but also
the settlecquiality,
and
bourly relations based on .security,
means.
peaceful
ment of outstanding problems by

IN

Chapter 5

more circumspection than

diplomatic struggle, and in this situation
Soviet foreign policy. The need for
ever had to be displayed by
to be weighed against the risk
better relations with Turkey had
dangerous traps set up by both imperialist
of being lured into
Turkeys rulers had to be
creoups. Moreover, the manoeuvres of
good times in response to
in
and steps taken

THE SOUTH

constantly

watched

Ankara.
Both imperialist coalitions were attracted by Turkeys conpossibility of using Turkish tertrol of the Black Sea straits, the
Middle East, and T urkey s proxthe
ritory as the shortest route to
of the Soviet Union. I he \igregions
imity to vitally important
to win Turkey to their
groups
belligerent
orous efforts of the
by the German ambasTurkey
for
side were called the duel
Papcn.
von
Fran/,
sador in Ankara

anti-Soviet trends in

There were many obstacles to Soviet diplomatic

the

USSR

secure in

the

The

south.

neutrality

the Soviet Unions three southern neighbours

Afghanistan - could not be reduced to a

The two

imperialist coalitions

were

efforts to

make

proclaimed by

- Turkey,

Iran,

and

that

The nazi leaders attached serious significance to the fact

forces.
among the Middle East states Turkey had the largest armed
against
They regarded Turkey as an important factor in the war
the oncoming war
Britain and France and, more broadly, in
wanted Turkey to
against the USSR. The German government

common denominator.
win

goiftg to all lengths to

the foreign policy orientation of these countries; nor was there

consistency in the policies pursued by their leaders, particularly

of Turkey and, to a large extent, of Iran. Quite often

and Tehran based

their calculations

Ankara

Axis and elaborated a far-reaching plan for pensignificance

etrating Turkey economically and politically. The
gauged
by the
can
be
Berlin attached to the fight for Turkey
join the fascist

on situation changes, pursu-

ing the line of supporting the strongest.

In keeping with the basic task of ensuring the

USSRs

secu-

differentiated in accordance with

prepared

to

how

far these countries

develop positive relations with

the Soviet

von Papen, a past .master of espionage, subversion, and

Germany s aminternational provocations, was sent to Ankara as
fact that

were

bassador in April 1939-

Union.

its

vigilance relative to the ac-

tive anti-Soviet

imperialist coalitions, notably

Britain

game that the two

and Germany, were playing

in

Soviet diplomacy did not relax

that

was

rity Soviet policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan

Special attention

Turkey, Iran, and Afghan-

they did not feel that this was too

cooperation .
high a price for Ankaras political and military
powers
In their duel for Turkey both grdups of imperialist

used the Soviet threat bogey to intimidate Ankara.

6
Speaking to the Soviet ambassador in London on October
I

and peace along the Soviet Unions southern frontiers

depended on the attitude of Turkey, which had a common land frontier with the USSR in the Transcaucasus and controlled the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. With a war raging,
the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea straits, and the Black
Sea itself were becoming a theatre of an increasingly intricate
Security

London

THE USSR AND TURKEY

THE IMPERIALIST DUEL FOR TURKEY

AND THE POSTURE OF THE USSR

largely

region also in the British and

capitals, especially in

ficulties for Britain, in

to this

London. The Bulgarian historian

Although
the unending financial and ecoL. Zhivkova writes:
government created great difTurkish
the
of
demands
nomic

French

istan.

was given

it was particularly
I939) Winston Churchill said that for Britain
Sea, for if it
the
Black
important that Germany did not get to
move
inevitably
would
it
seized control of the Danube estuaries

L. Zhivkova, Anglo- 7 urkish Relations 1933-/939,

'

Moscow,

1975, P-

(Russian translation).
13 *

195

\\

on to Asia Minor, Iran,

and

India.

line of British policy in Southeast

he

From this stemmed

the basic

was from

this angle

Europe.

It

said, that friendship with Turkey and also the

possibility,
case of emergency, of sending naval vessels to the Black
Sea

in

were important
ed the

official

1
to Britain.

This statement by Churchill

broken out. Turkey continues to have good relations with Britain

and France and also with their enemies. Molotov remarked that
report
the Soviet stand is known to the ambassador from the
delivered at the session of the Supreme Soviet. It was not our
fault that the talks which the USSR had with Britain and France

'

reflect-

British interpretation of Britains central objec-

Balkans and the Middle East in the

tive in the

Turkish ambassador to the USSR Ali Haydar Aktay. In the enintention

suing talk Aktay declared that his government has no
war
that has
relation
to
the
in
decisions
new
of adopting any

initial

period of the

Second World War. However, here, as in other cases, the second

aspect of British policy in this region was omitted deliberately.
London was very eager to draw the USSR into such diplomatic

The fault lies with the British, the French,

and the Poles. We had to look for other opportunities to allow
the Soviet Union, which does not want to participate in the war
if it is not attacked, to pursue a policy of peace. Aktay asked
whether the Turkish government could hope for an early conyielded no results.

combinations in this region as would, in one way or another, provoke an aggravation of Soviet-German relations. British
and
French diplomacy tried to benefit from the Soviet Unions natural desire to reinforce its security in

the Black Sea and the

and gradually involve the USSR in the process
of building up Anglo-Franco-Turkish allied relations in order
to
get the most advantageous
unilateral commitments
from the
USSR with as little compensation for them as possible. As the
British and Turkish manoeuvres around the Soviet Unions negotiations with Turkey on a mutual assistance pact, held in the
autumn of 1939, showed, London and Paris tried to push the

Black Sea

USSR

and Turkey. Mochanged and rehad

lotov replied that the international situation
been
and will resaid,
has
quired study. The Soviet Union, he
will
find a comcountries
the
two
Turkey,
and
main a friend of
clusion of the talks on a pact

straits

into a confrontation with

Germany without

giving

mon

any

two countries will continue to be friendly. We, he continued,

have to study the present situation in order to determine our
stand towards Britain and France. If we reach agreement, war

lations.

The struggle to prevent the Black Sea straits from being used
against peaceful states by an aggressor from any of the two im-

will not

groups was of particularly great significance to Soviet

uncertainty and

its

Ibid.

196

the

Turkey

the basis of this

conclusion:

Evi-

the strained atmosphere of

of conjectures about the Soviet stand

like to

parade strong friend-

treaty proposed by the Turkish government.

Moscow, on

sorts

On

following

On September 8, 1939, Saracoglu invited the Soviet ambassador and handed him Turkeys reply to the Soviet governments
statement of September 4. This reply contained the draft of a

guarantee equivalent assistance to the Soviet Union in the same

The

draft had the

following fundamental points:

a) In the event of aggression by European powers in the Black

same day, V. M. Molotov received the

Soviet foreign Policy Archives.

all

the

towards Turkey Inonii would now

2
ship between the two countries.

itself, the Turkish President Ismet Inonii that if the

question
arose of guarantees of Soviet assistance to Turkey in the event it
was attacked in the region of the Straits, Turkey would have to

to the region of the Straits.

dently, in order to defuse in

On September 4, 1939, the Soviet government inambassador in Ankara A. V. Terentyev to tell the
Foreign Minister Sukru Saracoglu and, if an opportunity presents

In

come

conversation Terentyev drew

foreign policy.

region.

and would remain a friend of Turkey. The Turkish government,

he said, notes with gratification that the relations between the

sincerely interested in an improvement of Soviet-Turkish re-

structed

USSR

On September 7, 1939, the Turkish President Ismet Inonii

declared in a conversation with A. V. Terentyev that he wholeheartedly welcomed the Soviet statement that the USSR had been

serious guarantees on their part. All this was carefully camouflaged with repeated assurances that Britain and France
were

perialist

language.

between the

MbkK
'

Ibid.

197

justified

government's
rejecting the Soviet
would not be used
Straits
that the

Sea region, including the Straits, against Turkey and the USSR,
the High Contracting Parties will cooperate effectively and render each other all the support and all the assistance in their

fntee.

power.

insuperable
Turkeys rulers raised an

Parties will cooperate effectively

each other

all

the support

and

and render

There was heightened

October
talks in Moscow. On

British government and

Turks had consulted with the
wording of the Anglo-Turkisl
suggested some changes in the
gov
upon earlier, and that the Bntis
treatv that had been agreed
that
stressed
proposals, Butler
ernment had accepted the Turkish

cow

was noteworthy that in accordance with this draft, which

was agreed upon by the British and the. French, the USSR would
have to go to war against Germany in the event it attacked Turkey. For its part, Turkey would not have to help the USSR in
the event it found itself in a state of war with Britain and France.
This approach did

not, of

sides into equal account

course,

take

and was thus

motivated by security

the

security

clearly one-sided.

interests,

the Soviet

of

the treaty of the pro

would not object to the inclusion in

under no circumstances
vision that Turkey would
was prepared to accept
against the USSR and that it

the

Never-

of
the Straits to the warships

government

The Turkish Foreign Minister Sukrii Saracoglu

cow on September 25, 1939. The subject of the

MOSCOW
was a

lateral rhutual assistance pact limited to the region of the

Straits. In addition, the Soviet

sive

powers

to the

on the

USSR.

Union during

the talks. Saracoglu repeatedly stressed that an Anglo-French-Tur-

kish pact had already been negotiated and had not been signed

only because the Turkish government

sult

with

Moscow

first.

not be used against the

felt

it

was necessary

USSR

because Turkey had introduced

would never go to war against

The Bulgarian historian L. Zhivkova quite rightly

a reservation that

it

to con-

Saracoglu declared that this pact could

USSR. 2
notes: By

the

latter's

terms

it

could, in

The Soviet

the 1923
terms. It proposed reaffirming
ign a P ct on such
Saracoglu re-

not

Neutrality with Turkey.

Treaty of Friendship and
jected this proposal.

Ibid.
2

Ibid.

Thus, the Saracoglu proposal

with
an unequal military alliance
kev - bring the USSR into
and
Italy
colUs.on w.th
Anglo-French bloc and precipitate a
Ang
time
q
instrument this
Germany. Using Turkey as its
achieve in a new way the a
to
endeavoured
French diplomacy
Union in the sumthe talks with the Soviet
it had pursued at
commitments
unilateral
USSR with
mer of 1939, i.c., to bind thc
coulc
consequently,
and,
government saw this trap

1
1

British

Black

government wanted

In order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet

bi-

would not be used by aggres-

detriment of the

nations.

and Germany withitself at war with Italy

to Turkey have found
and Fr
of assistance from Britain
out havTng any guarantees
T
throu
could indirectly

arrived in Mostalks

all

thc closure

diplomacy actually pursuing tin e

Had
the USSR and Turkey?
interference in the talks between
Turkey
with
pact
assistance
thc mutual
the Soviet Union signed
fulfilment of its commitments

What aim was

SOVIET-TURKISH TALKS IN

solid guarantees that the Straits

the

Britain

agreed to begin talks with Turkey.

Sea and the

17,

awaited to

It

theless,

real guar-

The commitments undertaken by Turkey in accordance

with Articles a and b cannot compel Turkey to take action
that would place it in a state of armed conflict with Great Britc)

ain or France.

have

told thc So ~
1959, R- Butler
wished
London that thc British government
vict ambassador in
es sfdly.
consummated
negotiations were
the Sovict-Turkish
and only
had been drawn up long ago
treaty
Anglo-Tutkish
An
Saracoglu was in Mosbe signed. Saying that while

the assistance in their power...

all

to

by aggressive powers
obstacle to the signing o

r pmutual assistance offered by Sovie

the bilateral treaty on
who
Minister,
Foreign
Turkish
n.atives at the talks with the
September 1939of
close
the
at
Moscow
came to
around the
British diplomatic activity

b) In the event of aggression by European powers against

Turkey or against the USSR in the region of the Balkans, the

High Contracting

wish

L. Zhivkova, op.cit., p. *43Archives

Soviet Foreign Policy

199
198

Parallel with the talks with the USSR the Turkey government
conducted negotiations with Britain and France which ended on
October 19, 1939, the day after Saracoglu returned from Moscow, with the signing in Ankara of an Anglo-Franco-Turkish

treaty on mutual assistance.

Under

that treaty

go to the assistance of Britain and France

breaking out in the Eastern Mediterranean.
to

Saracoglu

made

Turkey undertook
event of war

in the

The Soviet-Turkish

talks

helped to clarify some of the political

interest to the USSR. There was one more

issues which were of
significance: although the negotiations
little
no
of
circumstance

adversaries of the USSR

yielded no result, this did not, as the
lhis was largely clue
hoped, exacerbate Soviet-Turkish relations,
to prevent anti-Soviet feeling
to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy

from growing

in

Ankara.

a revealing admission in a talk with the So-

ambassador in Ankara on October 26, 1939. The AngloFranco-Turkish pact, he said, was initialled before his departure

viet

for

Moscow, and the

signing

was put

off only on account of the

be held between the Turkish Foreign Minister
and leaders of the Soviet government. For his part, the ambassador conveyed to Saracoglu the Soviet governments view of the

talks that

were

to

Turkey had signed with Britain and France: The

Soviet government feels that the conclusion of this treaty
without the adoption of the amendments proposed by 11s puts
Turkey
at risk. The Soviet government cannot be a party
to this busitreaty that

ness.

On
USSR

October
of the

3T, 1939, informing the Supreme Soviet of the

negotiations with Turkey, V. M. Molotov said:

All sorts of fables are being spread abroad about the

substance
of these negotiations. Some assert that the USSR
has demanded

the districts of

Ardahan and

Kars... Others allege that the

USSR

has demanded a modification of the Montreux

Convention and
preferential rights in the question of the Straits. This
too, is an

invention and a
bilateral pact on

and the

Straits.

Actually, the issue was the conclusion of a

mutual assistance limited to the Black Sea area

lie.

The USSR

felt, first,

that the conclusion of such

a pact should not induce

it to take actions that could bring

it into
an armed conflict with Germany and, second, that
the USSR
should have the guarantee, in view of the threat
of war, that
Turkey would not permit warships of non-Black Sea states
to
pass through the Bosphorus into the Black Sea.
Turkey rejected
both these Soviet reservations and thereby made it impossible

to

sign the pact. 2

TWISTS IN TURKISH POLICY

the attenSoviet diplomacy missed no opportunity to draw
a positive
need
for
to
the
Turkey
in
tion of government quarters
and for
countries
two
the
between
relations
development of the

where some
greater understanding between them in a situation
the
supporting
were
Turkey
of
press
and
the
political forces
the
with
connection
West
in
the
in
started
campaign
anti-Soviet
armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland.
SaIn a talk with the Soviet ambassador on January 5, 1940,
an
adopted
indeed
racoglu admitted that the Turkish press had
But he assured
incorrect attitude towards the Soviet Union.
reflect
the views
way
the ambassador that the press did not in any
posanti-Soviet
the
agreed
that
of Turkeys leaders. Further, he

was not helping to strengthen relations

between Turkey and the USSR. In response to the Soviet am-

ture of the Turkish press

take effective
to
Saracoglu promised
Turkish press.' As was noted by the SoTurkey, the Turkish government, which adhered

insistence

bassadors

steps in regard to the

embassy

viet

in

to a clearly anti-Soviet

stand in the early months of 1940, was

then compelled to modify

outwardly.

its

attitude towards the

USSR

at least

tendency was laboriously surfacing

This was seen quite
in the policies of the Turkish government.
Anglo-French calculation on
clearly in Ankaras attitude to the
acts from the south.
aggressive
drawing Turkey into anti-Soviet
Concurrently,

In

London and

realistic

Paris

they

felt

Turkey could be Induced

participate in the planned aggression.

Acting on

this belief,

to

on

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

ber

Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet

of the USSR, Octo-November 2, i 9i9 Verbatim Report, Moscow,
1939, p. 21 (in Russian).

31

200

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

201

January

19, 1940, the

British

leadership,

French government, in agreement with th

General Maurice Gamelin and

instructed

Admiral Francois Darlan to plan an invasion of the Caucasus

There was an analogous premise in the British Plan M. A. 6 and
the French R.

P. plan, both of

which provided for bombing

raids in the southern regions of the USSR. Both plans had been
elaborated in the spring of 1940. Moreover, in Gamclins report
On the Conduct of War of March 16, 1940, it was noted that
the French forces in the Levant (Syria and the Lebanon)
could
I.

count on operations by Turkish troops in the Transcaucasus.

Turkeys political and military leaders did not at once express
1

their

negative attitude

to

the planned

aggression

against the

USSR. This was what reinforced British and French hopes that
Turkey would participate in an invasion of the USSR. But what
counted was the end result-Turkey told London and Paris that
it was unwilling to be a partner in organising
an attack on the
USSR. In so doing the Turkish government
Anglo-Franco-Turkish military alliance treaty

referred

to the

of October

T9

1939, which stated that the undertaken commitments could not

compel Turkey to take action whose results or consequences

would involve it in an armed conflict with the USSR. 2

In the summer of 1940 the situation in the Mediterranean was
visibly compounded by Italys entry into the war. It
seemed
under the terms of the Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty Turkey
would join its allies against nazi Germany and fascist Italy. How
ever, on the plea that it was inadequately armed Turkey
did
not honour its commitments under the
1939 treaty. While it had
that

a treaty on

mutual assistance with Britain and France, Turkey

took increasing account of Germanys military successes in Western Europe and refrained from any political actions of
an antiGerman character. Ankaras increasing tilt towards Germany
did not pass unnoticed by Soviet diplomacy, which had to act
accordingly.

With

the situation in the Balkans aggravated by Italys invaGreece at the close of October 1940, the USSR showed
understanding for Turkeys concern over the new develop-

sion of
its

A History of the Second World War, 1919-194$, Vol. 3, Beginning of

War. Preparations for Aggression Against the USSR, Moscow,
1974, pp.

the

46-47 (in Russian).

its line towards a positive development of

At the same time, the Soviet Union
Turkey.
with
its relations
to draw it into military conattempts
against
remained vigilant

m cnts

flicts

security.

its

imperialist powers continued their duel over

Turkeys foreign policy orientation, and Ankara manoeuvred in

order to achieve a reconciliation of what was in fact incompatible.

diplomacy was preoccupied with the idea of formfront with the purpose of preventing German exBalkan
ing a
London went on using the bogey
pansion in Southern Europe
British

military bases in Turkey.

of a Soviet threat to obtain sites for
President Ismet
In a letter of January 31, 194T, to the Turkish

Britain

Tnonu, Churchill wrote that

was the only country

that

agcould really safeguard Turkey against the Soviet Unions

in
based
forces
bombing
gressive designs. Powerful British
adding
Baku,
oilfields
of
Turkey, he insisted, could attack the

dependent upon the supply from these oilfields.

and far-reaching famine would follow their destruction.
A British military mission was sent to Turkey in February
Dar194T. It inspected fortified sectors in Eastern Thrace, the
that Russia

is

At talks in Ankara, in which the British

Anthony Eden and the Chief of the Imperial

danelles, and Izmir.

Foreign Secretary

General John G. Dill participated, the British

Squadron to
urged Turkey to permit the British Mediterranean
released
enter the Black Sea via the Dardanelles. A communique,
on
place
on March 1, T941, stated that the two governments

General

Staff

Alliance and
record their firm attachment to the Anglo-Turkish

agreement on the Balkan problems that were closely

Britain. In this
linked to the common interests of Turkey and
planned Balthe
way efforts were made to draw Turkey into

their full

'

kan front.
Impressed by Germanys military successes in the West, Turaggression.
keys rulers were increasingly inclined to assist nazi
reactionary
in
the
mirrored
frequently
more
This was more and
press that printed

all

sorts of provocative fabrications

viet policy towards Turkey

'

Winston

liance, Cassell

Ibid., p. 47.
3

202

without guarantees of

Meanwhile the

and continued

S.

Churchill,

and Co.

r
.

Under

these

The Second World War, Vol.

Ltd.,

London, 1950, pp.

20,

about So-

conditions the Soviet

Ill,

The Grand Al-

33.

Ibid., p. 31.

The New York Times, March

1,

1940

203

government found

it

necessary to take steps to counter the growth

German influence in Turkey.

On March 9, 1941, A.Y. Vyshinsky
bassador Ali Haydar Aktay and made
of

am-

the following statement:

the British

ambassador Cripps, who has just returned from Turkey, that Turkey fears that if it is attacked
by any foreign power
and has to defend its territory with arms in hand,
the

Soviet

will take

advantage of its difficulties and attack it. I am

authorised to state on behalf of the government and the
Peoples
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that this presumption is
totally
at variance with the stand of the Soviet
government and that, on
the contrary, should Turkey be attacked by a foreign
power and
forced to defend its territorial inviolability with
arms in hand,
can, in

accordance with the non-aggression pact between it

and the USSR, count on the full understanding and
neutrality
it

of the Soviet

The

Union. 1

and non-aggression with

two countries undertake in the
consult with one another in a friendly spirit on all ques-

ten-year

future to
tions

their

affecting

not officially

the

common

interests".

Britain remained

between Turkey and

abandon

its

An

analogous treaty

in force.

neutrality stand,

Turkey

While

it

did

tilted visibly

and military cooperation with

Berlin. In this situation the Soviet government had to begin taking major military measures to strengthen the USSRs frontier
region. These
in the Transcaucasus and in the entire Black Sea

towards an expansion of

political

measures strongly influenced Turkish policy and the overall situation on the Soviet Armed Forces' southern flank during the

Great Patriotic War.

Germany attacked the USSR, Turkey proclaimed

extended various assistance to the fascist agbut
its neutrality
materials and permitting
Germany
strategic
selling
gressors,

When

nazi

German and

Union informed London of this anti-German diplomatic action. On March 10, 194
i, Vyshinsky invited Sir Stafford Cripps and told him of the content of the
statement made
by him on March 9 to Aktay. Cripps expressed satisfaction. 2
On
March 25, 1941, a statement was published in Moscow

friendship

of

treaty

Germany, under which

nazi

invited the Turkish

The Soviet government understands from advice received

from

Union

Italian warships to use the Straits.

Soviet

in

the

USSR

for

its

which

reassured the Turkish government that if Turkey

were
attacked it could count on the full understanding
and neutrality
of the USSR. 3 In connection with this
statement the Turkish
government expressed gratitude to the Soviet government
and,

THE USSR AND IRAN

In Tehran and some other capitals of the countries bordering

on the USSR, Soviet diplomacy was actively opposed by two
main forces throughout the initial period of the Second World
War. These were British and German diplomacy. After the war
broke out Britain and Germany competed fiercely for Irans for-

After Germany had achieved further military

successes in the
Balkans, notably after its conquest of Yugoslavia and
Greece,
the Turkish leadership drew closer to the Third
Reich. Turkeys
President fnonii and Hitler started corresponding

and economic orientation.

and the Germans operated on a parallel course,
so to speak, using one and the same tactic to win Iran. They
spread rumours of a Soviet threat to Iran and posed as defenders. At the same time, attempts were made to use Iranian
territory for anti-Soviet purposes. The narrow-class policy of
Irans rulers, who had for many years cultivated anti-communism
in internal and external affairs, prevented Tehrans assessing the

the eve of

international situation realistically. Iranian neutrality, proclaimed

part, declared that

situation

it

if

the

USSR

found

could equally count on the

full

itself in a similar

understanding and

neutrality of Turkey. 4

regularly. On
the nazi sneak invasion of the USSR there was
a
further zigzag in Turkeys policy: on June iS,
194T, Turkey signed
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.
Soviet

Foreign

Policy.

204

Ibid.

Collection

British

on September
that the

Ibid.

The

German

"

1946, p. 547 (in Russian).

eign policy

of

Documents,

claimed
Vol.

4,

Moscow,

4,

USSR
to

1939,

was

flimsy.

diplomats constantly assured the Iranian government

had

aggressive intentions relative to

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Scries D, Vol.

Government Printing Office, Washington, 1962, p. 1051.
1

Iran,

and

be guarantors of Irans independence.

XII. United St;ues

205

>

the USSR was unjustifiably conIranian, historians assert that

southern frontiers and that Soviet
its
of
safety
cerned over the

TOR THE OBSERVANCE

OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The

Soviet Unions principled attitude towards Iran had been

adopted
Soviet

in the years

immediately following the establishment of

February 26, 1921, between the

power. The treaty of

RSFSR and

Persia recorded the Soviet governments repudiation

and agreements signed by tsarist

Russia and infringing the rights of the Iranian people. Guided
in its relations with the peoples of the East by the Leninist policy and the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet government declared its refusal to take part in any action against Irans
of all the treaties, conventions,

sovereignty.
Article

of the treaty played a special role in Soviet-Iranian

World War. Untwo countries undertook to

prevent the formation or presence on their territory of organisations or groups of persons
whose object is to engage in acts
of hostility against Persia or Russia. 2 On October i, 1927, the
legal
foundation of Soviet-Iranian relations was reinforced
with a guarantee and neutrality treaty.
relations during the early period of the Second

der

paragraph

of

Article

In their totality, these

the

treaties,

especially

several

of

their

were the framework within which Soviet foreign policy endeavoured to keep Irans leaders. Of course, its aims were
not confined to this framework. The Soviet Union made a considerable effort to normalise trade and economic relations with
Iran, especially as these relations considerably shrank after the
trade treaty between the USSR and Iran ceased to be effective
in June 1938.
The Iranian yearbook Universe for 1967/68 contains some
Iranian foreign policy documents showing that at the close of 1939
and in early 1940 Iranian diplomatic representatives in Moscow
provision,

repeatedly assured the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

of the

USSR and

the Iranian

the Soviet embassy in Iran that the attitude of

government was

friendly."

Some

bourgeois, including

diplomacy

1969,
u

p.

active

against

non-existent

that

aiven out for pressure from

Moscow on

Iran.

lo one extent or anIn reality, the situation was different,

breach of the provisions of
other Irans rulers acted constantly in
were erectSoviet-Iranian treaties. For example, obstacles

basic

artificially

ed

to the

work

of official Soviet representatives in

of the new Soviet-Iranian

Iran, especially prior to the conclusion
harassed Soviet citipolice
trade treaty of March 25, 1940. The
was placed unPahlevi
in
club
Soviet
zens working in Iran. The
by the Iranian
measures
repressive
der police surveillance. The
Soviet films
of
release
the
of
cessation
government led to the
Ministry and other government agencies
in

The Foreign

Iran.

mission in
and ministries stubbornly ignored the Soviet trade
no trade
was
Tehran. Moreover, it was stated that because there
1

agreement the trade mission should be closed.

as well.
The situation on the Soviet-Iranian frontier was uneasy
by the
provoked
From time to time dangerous incidents were
acthe
at
connived
Iranians. Moreover, the Iranian authorities
the Soviet-Iranian state frontier.
August 1940 there were
In the period between January 1939 and
citizens from IranSoviet
attacking
38 instances of such gangs

tivities

of

armed gangs along

ian territory.

IMPERIALIST POWERS FIGHT FOR IRAN

Ger-

The political line followed by Irans rulers encouraged

the way not onmany to count on Iran as a springboard opening
Soviet Central
the
and
Baku
also to
ly to British possessions but
broke out
War
World
Second
Asian republics. As soon as the

German General

sion of

Middle East

Staff

began working on plans for the inva-

countries, including Iran.

The

policy of the

147.

Ibid., p. 148.
S.

L.

Agayev, Iran: Foreign Policy and

1925-1941, Moscow, 1971,

206

superfluously

claimed, faithfully abidanti-Soviet trends in Iran, which, they

legitimate and justified desire
ed by neutrality. The USSRs
commitments is
both sides should comply with their treaty

the
History 0/ Soviet Foreign Policy 191J-1945, Progress Publishers, Moscow,

was

p.

308

(iu Russian).

Problems

of

Independence,

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

207

Iranian leaders facilitated also the attainment of the nazis immediate aim in Iran, namely, the wide use of that countrys

raw materials and food

resources. In October 1939 Iran

and Ger-

many

signed a secret protocol guaranteeing the supply of strategic raw materials to the Third Reich. German trade and economic

penetration of the Iranian market proceeded at such a pace

that in

940-1 941 Germanys share in Irans trade went up to

45.5 per cent, while that of Britain

ge Lenczowski,

who was

dropped

to

4 per

Geor-

cent.

the Polish press attache in Iran at the

time, gives the following assessment of Iranian-German relations:

Such a policy was beneficial to both Germany and Iran, because

permitted them to continue and even to increase their mutual trade. An outright alliance between the two countries would
have presented unnecessary inconveniences to both of them. Iran
might have become a theater of hostilities because of possible
British action, and consequently Germany would have lost a valit

uable source of supplies. 1

March 21, -1939, and March 20, T940,

Germany amounted to 393,300,000 rials,
from Germany totalled 159,600,000 rials. Most

In the period between

the Iranian export to

while imports

of the large industrial

by

German

firms.

The

and transport projects in Iran were built

political physiognomy of German assist-

ance was revealed in various ways. For instance the ceiling of

the waiting hall of the railway station built in

Tehran by

the

Germans had the shape of a swastika. The German colony in

Iran, which was virtually a fifth column, numbered nearly 5,000.
The circumstance largely explained the fact that the German
mission was well informed about what the Iranian government
was doing. 2
Thus, anti-communism and indulgence with regard to proelements led the Iranian government into drawing clos-

German

er to nazi

Germany. American

diplomats

in

Tehran

Germany knows that Irans fundamental orientation

the West rather than Russia, and as Great Britain is
not considered powerful enough to render effective

Germany

is

is

at present

assistance

posing as Irans next friend. The Shahs fear of com-

in

George Lenczowski, Russia and the West

Big-Power Rivalry. Cornell University Press,
2

noted:

towards

in Iran,

New

1918-1948.

York, 1949,

A
p.

munism

him

leads

to

hope that Hitler may yet protect Iran

1

against a Bolshevist invasion.

This was the situation in which Soviet diplomacy continued

relations with Iran and ensure
its efforts to win good neighbourly
constructive development

of

Simultaneously, the

treaties.

relations

these

USSR

on

the

basis

tations of anti-Sovietism in the policy of Iran's leaders

anti-Soviet activities of

ol

resolutely countered manifes-

Germany and

Britain in Iran.

and the

Had

it

not

on the part of the USSR, the anti-communanti-Soviet

ist trends in the Iranian leadership, inflamed by the
intrigues of the imperialist powers, would probably have drawn
Iran away from normal, let alone friendly, relations with its
been for

this policy

northern neighbour.

It

was

largely

due

to Soviet

diplomacy that

some positive changes took place in Soviet-Iranian relations during the

first

half of 1940.

were the dramatic changes in the

realistic account that was taken
more
international situation and a
themselves. The war had
leaders
by
the
Iranian
of the situation
goods
via
the Persian Gulf. Morcflow
of
the
reduced
sharply
os-er, British military and economic assistance to Iran had diminAlso of no

ished.

On

little

significance

the other hand, the absence of conditions for normal

USSR, above all the absence of a new trade trea-

trade with the

ty following the denunciation of the

also for the

tory

normal

was hurting

former treaty

transit of Iranian

in

1938, and

goods across Soviet

terri-

the interests of business circles in northern Iran.

Public opinion as well as Iranian businessmen were demanding

a new trade treaty with the USSR.
Soviet embassy wrote from Tehran that the German occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium and then the defeat of

The

France could not but be assessed in Iran as a crippling blow to

Britains ability to resist. These successes not only shook but also

undermined confidence in Britains strength. The Iranian government hastened to use the situation for its own purposes. It knew
that the Soviet government would not remain indifferent to the
stand taken by it in the war between Britain and Germany. Iran
was faced with the problem of proving to the Soviet government

Study
167.

'

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1940, Vol.

Printing Office, Washington, p. 637.

Ill,

United

States

Government
208

1426

209

would show

contacts with Iran had paved the way for a further constructive
telegramdevelopment of relations between the two countries.

was the more constructive stand adopted by the Iranian government at the Soviet-Iranian talks on a new trade treaty that began in Moscow on January 24, 1940. The basis for these talks was the Soviet draft of a
treaty of commerce and navigation submitted to the Iranians as

jne from the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the

Soviet ambassador in Tehran M. Y. Filimonov stated: The treaputs an end to the long treaty of commerce signed on March 25
tyless period and is unquestionably an important step towards

intention to adopt towards Britain a course that

its

Iran's non-complicity in British plans ."

An

important factor contributing to

early as

March

this

4, 1939.

between the

This stand by Tehran acquired increasing importance in view

of the Anglo-French imperialist coalitions interest in using Iran

against the USSR. The most graphic expression of this interest

was the British and French planning of aggression against the
USSR from the south. A report on the vulnerability of Soviet
oil-producing regions submitted by the British Minister for Coordination of Defense Lord Alfred Chatficld to Britains Chiefs of
Staff Committee in October 1939 listed suitable sites for allied air
bases for bombing raids against the Soviet Transcaucasus. The

named included

"suitable places

Ardcbil, and Iranbidi. 2

In

the Iranian airfields at lgdir.

General Maurice Gamelins report

on the conduct of the war of March

Britain could take the initiative

against the

USSR

However,

from Iranian

in

16, 1940, it was noted that

conducting land operations

territory.

responded nega-

and French attempts to use Iran in their antiwas a significant indicator of the effectiveness
of Soviet policy towards the southern neighbour.
tively to British

RELATIONS REMAIN UNEASY

Iranian-Soviet treaty of

commerce and navigation, in which

were retained, was signed in

the basic terms of the 1935 treaty

Tehran on March

25, 1940. Iranian imports of Soviet goods

to consist of annually established

quotas

were

sum not less

Provision was made

for

than the value of Soviet imports from Iran.

for simplifying the licensing of imports and exports. Further, the
treaty established the status of the Soviet trade mission.

In the Soviet
1

210

it

was

felt

History of the Second.

World War,

relations

Iran.

commodity exchange was set in the treaty

on either side. But in 1940 this exchange fell
short of the target. As was envisaged at the Sovict-Iranian talks,
the Soviet Union sent a trade delegation to Tehran to specify the
nomenclature for trade between the two countries, but for a long

The volume

at

150 million

of the

rials

time the Iranian government .delayed the settlement of this issue.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the fact that in accordance with

government had granted Iran the right

government tried to
use this right to expand economic relations with Germany. But
the USSR categorically forbade the transit of armaments, ammunition, and military supplies generally, and also some other
items. For that reason in its trade with Germany Iran had to go
the 1921 treaty the Soviet

of transit across Soviet territory, the Iranian

that normalisation of trade

on using the main transit route across Turkey.

Despite the Soviet Unions desire to follow up on what had

economany
about
bring
countries
did
not
two
ic
perceptible improvement in their political relations. This was
chiefly due to the inconsistency of the Iranian leaders and the
continued anti-Soviet activities of the imperialist power. The
Shah is abiding by his traditional policy of manoeuvring between
been achieved in

3,

relations with Iran, the settlement of

and although the situation is difficult for Iran,

, 2 the
to improve relations with the USSR
Soviet embassy reported from Tehran.
The Iranian government continued to violate Sovict-Iranian
treaties and agreements. It denied visas to members of the trade
mission, and delayed the issue of visas to other Soviet officials
the big powers,

he

is

doing nothing

for as long as six months. Staff

tutions in Iran
1

1919-194$, Vol.

its

relations between the

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

A
*

Union

and further development of economic

USSR and

in the long run the Iranian leaders

Soviet plans. This

The

the normalisation

pp. 44-45.

Ibid., p. 47.

14 *

were subjected

Documents on German Foreign

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

members

to arrest

of official Soviet insti-

2
.

Policy, Scries

D, Vol. IX, 1956,

p.

380.

211

The Soviet government

protested strongly against actions of

Speaking to the Iranian ambassador Mohammed Saed

October
on
19, 1940, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign
Affairs S.A. Lozovsky cited instances of impermissible acts against
Soviet citizens in Iran. The ambassador was told that instances
of this kind convince us that far from doing anything to stop
such actions, the Iranian government is evidently even encourthis kind.

aging them.

As regards

the ambassadors assurances of the sincer-

and friendship of the Iranian government towards the USSR,

we shall judge this mainly by actual deeds and facts, not by
1
words.
In the spring of 1941 the nazis began clearing the ground for
a fascist coup in Iran.
Thus, during the initial period of the Second World War the
ruling quarters in Iran played an intricate game. In its relations
with the USSR Tehran was inconsistent, often bringing situation
considerations into its calculations and neglecting to act as a good
neighbour. Nevertheless Soviet policy kept Irans rulers from
ity

med

June 26, 1941, the Iranian ambassador in

Saed said in a verbal note to the Soviet

Moscow Mohamgovernment: On

from its government, the embassy of Iran has the

honour of informing the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that in the situation created by the war between Germany
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the government of
instructions

Iran will observe

full

neutrality.

expressed

gratitude

THE USSR AND AFGHANISTAN

In a report on Afghanistans

the

Britain. Relative to
were most zealously manufactured by
about the so-called
press,
British
inventions, spread by the

with regard to Afghanistan, the

we have, on instructions
Soviet embassy in Kabul
Affairs, informed the
Foreign
for
Commissariat
from the Peoples
that these inventions
Foreign Ministry on February 13, 1940,
policy pursued by t ic
have nothing in common with the actual
aggressive plans of the

USSR

reported,

sincerely wishes to preserve

home and

foreign policy in 1939

half of 1940, the Soviet

*
8

212

and further promote

peaceful relations with Afghanistan.

Afghans reacted very
As the Soviet embassy reported, the
the sixth session of
at
favourably to V.M. Molotovs statement
March
29, *940, that the
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on
of military camUnion
Soviet
fantastic plans attributed to the
Red Army are so
the
on
by
so
and
paigns against India, the East,
only be believed
can
kind
this
of
absurdities
obviously wild that
influence of British propaganda
by madmen. However under the
continues to have doubts. In order to

its

Afghan government

the

embassy in Kabul described

Soviet-Afghan relations as normal and even friendly. This
was its assessment of political and economic relations. Soon after
the Second World War broke out, on September 5, 1939*
Molotov had a meeting with the Afghan ambassador in Moscow
Sultan Ahmed Khan. The Afghan government had instructed its
ambassador to ascertain whether the USSR would continue its
first

reply.

that

stress the peaceful nature of

and the

positive

this

for

Kabul on
officially by
The policy of neutrality proclaimed
belligboth
pressure from
September 3, 1939, came under strong
Afghan
the
incline
endeavoured to
erent imperialist groups, which
diplomacy
Soviet
anti-Sovietism.
active
towards
government
provocative
the
leaders
systematically explained to the nations
Soviet threat to Afghanistan
nature of the inventions about a

USSR, which

sliding entirely into an anti-Soviet stand.

On

and whether transit routes across Soviet

replied.
for it. Why not, Molotov
open
territory would be
what and how
know^
must
organisations
trade
However, our
to transport. Ihe ambassador
much goods the Afghans want
H-ade with Afghanistan

calm public

opinion

the

particularly in response to

Soviet-Afghan relations and thereby

newspaper l slab has systematically,
our repeated representations, printBritish press

in the colonial
ed refutations of the rumours spread
into a milis also prepared to enter
Afghanistan
that
to the effect
USSR.
the
against
Iraq
itary alliance with Turkey, Iran and
government did not rule out an expansion of

The Afghan

above all with Germany,

influence inAtghanpredominant
enjoy a

economic relations with the

but Britain continued to

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

Ibid.

fascist states,

Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid.

213

istan.

According to the Soviet embassy

trend in

Kabul, the pro-British

Afghanistan remained strong even after the Angloin

French coalitions catastrophic military setbacks

in

the

spring

and summer of 1940. Holding the view that in this war with
Germans and Italians the British will not hold out for long, some
of the most influential members of the Afghan government,

directed against the

agreements of a military or political character
into war with
drawn
be
country
one
should
other side, and that
neutral.
remain
would
country
other
a third power the
Afghanistan on
Desiring to continue promoting relations with
goodneighbourliness and good will, the Soviet governthe basis of

ment resumed

talks

of
with Kabul on some important questions
2

being closely linked with the British, have nonetheless been hoping that something would save Britain. Presently the Afghan
governments foreign policy rests on this hope. 1

As

in the case of the Soviet

diplomacy sought

British

move

away from

to

Unions other southern neighbours,

tie

Afghanistan

closer

to

and prevent

itself,

from
promoting goodneighbourly relations with the USSR. The antiSoviet manoeuvres of the Chamberlain and Churchill cabinets,
which encouraged anti-communist feeling among the Afghan leadit

its

neutrality posture,

it

were not always consistently "rebuffed in Kabul. A dispatch

from the Soviet embassy in Kabul noted: It cannot be said that
the Afghan government is entirely unaware' of the tremendous
strengthening of the USSRs internal and international positions.
However, class, reactionary feudal-landowner thinking continues
ers,

prevent the Afghan government from embarking on a sincere

development of relations with the USSR. 2 As in Turkey and
Iran, British diplomacy seemed to emulate with Berlin in intimto

idating the ruling

quarters

in

Afghanistan

with

the

Soviet

threat lie, seeking to sow suspicion about the USSRs intentions,

and encouraging anti-Soviet propaganda.
The Soviet government countered the anti-Soviet intrigues of
the imperialist powers with a course towards developing goodneighbourly relations with Afghanistan, a course founded back
in the early years of Soviet power. Alongside the 1921 SovietAfghan treaty of friendship, also of immense importance was the
treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression signed in Kabul
in 1 9 3 t
The latter treaty envisaged mutual non-interference in
internal affairs and the prevention of armed groups and organisations hostile to the other side from being formed on the territory of any of the two countries. Moreover, it stipulated that
neither the USSR nor Afghanistan would join in alliances or

frontier issues.
a bilateral character, notably on
An Afghan memorandum stated that Afghanistan could accept

regards frontier issues, first, they

were covered fulwere the subject of ongoing talks; second, they
up
on this matter;
that was being drawn
ly by the agreement
in principle, to
agreed,
and, third, the Soviet Union had already
frontier
to the full satthe
of
the redemarcation of land sectors
question of
the
that
agreed
was
It
isfaction of the Afghan side.
specialbut
a
treaty
not
by
decided
would be

the final Soviet proposals.

As

aid to Afghanistan

understandaccordance with the actual situation/* These

undermutual
of
spirit
in
a
of
1940
ings, reached in the spring
finalised in 1946
were
atmosphere,
constructive
standing and in a
signed together with a fronin the form of a protocol that was
ly,

tier

in

agreement.

A trade agreement for a term of one year and a volume of

signed on July 23, 1940,
trade totalling 164 million afghanis was
between the representative of the Soviet Vos-

as a result of talks

Kabul and the Afghan Minister of the

Bank. With this
National Economy, Chairman of the National
trade was
foreign
Afghanistans
agreement the USSRs share in
tokintorg organisation in

from 25-25 to 42-45 per cent.

countries intended to
This agreement was evidence that both
under warpromote their traditional goodneighbourly relations
links
strengthen
to
taken
time conditions as well. Every step

to rise

The new treaty,

with the Soviet Union is met with approval.
Afghanistan
between
trade
of
expansion
which provides for an

(in

Soviet Foreign

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

Documents, Vol.

break was made

in

Moscow,

14.

these talks from

1968,

pp.

_
February
,

mid -1939

to

392-95

194 t0

enable the sides to draft their proposals.

3

Policy

Russian).

'

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union.

1946,

Moscow, *95*.

PP-

4 1 '44

(in Russian).

215
214

and the USSR, is likewise to be lauded, 1 the newspaper I slab

wrote on July 27, 1940.
In June 1940 and then in February 1941 the government of
Afghanistan reiterated its decision to be neutral in the war. But

addition to greetings, the firm desire of Afghanistan to promote

and strengthen friendly relations with the USSR and that in this

the facts indicated that

1941, the day after Germany perfidiously attacked

Khan,
the USSR, the Afghan Foreign Minister Ali Mohamed
the
officially
told
acting on instructions from his government,

direction the
in its

its policy of benefiting by the contradicbetween the belligerent imperialist groups sometimes had the
trappings of manoeuvring, which created conditions for German
penetration of Afghanistan. The nazis were eager to have Afghanistan as an ally and hence to disrupt its neutrality. Thus, in the

On

tions

summer

of

1940, acting through

its

envoy

in

it

would be able

to

expand

In

the

summer

Afghan government would

with the USSR.'
of the

goodneighbourly relations with Afghanistan

goodneighbourly

justified

itself

en-

and complex situation of the early period

of the Second World War. Compared with the Soviet Unions
other neighbours in the south-Turkey and Iran-Afghanistan
was more than the above-mentioned countries in solidarity, al-

territorially

tirely in the strained

this suggestion.

bogey.

do everything

phrase twice.

relations that had taken shape between the two countries.

The Soviet Unions course towards maintaining and promoting

In order to bring pressure to bear on Kabul German diplomacy decided to make more active use of a familiar weapon - anti-

Sovietism and the Soviet threat

to

relations

This was an important manifestation

through the acquisition of India's northern areas. The Afghan gov-

ernment declined

last

23,

maintain and strengthen friendly

Kabul, Germany

province of India. Afghanistan was promised that in the event

assisted this rising

it

June

Soviet ambassador in Kabul that the

suggested that Afghanistan should organise a rising of the Pashtun tribes against the British authorities in the northwestern frontier

Afghan government was prepared

power. The ambassador repeated the

though not entirely, with

this course.

of

T940 the German and the Italian press alleged that the Soviet
Union was preparing to attack Afghanistan and India. The newspaper Islab, which reflected the view of the government, published
a statement by the Afghan ambassador in Ankara, which said:
I see no such danger. The USSR and Afghanistan are friends
and the relations between them are friendly. I do not believe

that the peace of the Eastern countries will

During the initial period of the Second World War the Soviet
Union was consistent in its efforts to promote goodneighbourly
relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Its firm and, at the
same time, constructive policy significantly influenced the stand
of Turkeys and Irans rulers, holding their anti-Soviet aspira-

USSR

tions in check.

or that the

USSR

be endangered by the
wishes to attack India across Eastern

countries. 2

On

April

Afghan ambassador Sultan Ahmed Khan,

who had just returned from Kabul, called on Deputy Peoples
Commissar for Foreign Affairs S. A. Lozovsky. The ambassador
congratulated the Soviet government on the consistent policy of
peace that the Sovieit Union had from the beginning of the war
to

7, 1941, the

the present been firmly pursuing in

countries.

Stressing that

its

relations with other

Afghan government had the best

feelings for the government of the USSR, the ambassador declared that his Prime Minister had instructed hi m to convey, in
Quoted from

L.

B.

the

Teplinsky,

1919-1969, Moscow, 1971, pp. 105-06

2

216

Ibid.

30 Years of

(in

Russian).

Soviet- Afghan

Relations,

serious test of the efficacy of Soviet foreign policy along

the countrys southern borders

was the attitude taken by Turkey

and Iran to the Anglo-French plans for an invasion of the Caucasus and the bombing of the Transcaucasus. Neither Turkey nor
Iran were persuaded to subscribe to these plans.
on
Although the Iranian government violated the treaties
which Soviet-Iranian relations were based and although the two
imperialist groups conducted an active anti-Soviet diplomacy in
Iran, the latter did not enter the orbit of the na/i bloc. Nor did
Turkey, in fact, become a member of that bloc, although it took

significant steps
1

towards rapprochement with Berlin.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

217

The Soviet Union pursued a

consistent line towards preserv-

IN

Chapter 6

THE EAST

ing and developing good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan.

During that period Soviet policy was for Kabul the decisive international factor ensuring the neutrality course it had chosen to
follow; it helped Afghanistan to ward oft" the intensifying attacks
on its neutrality and also the attempts of Britain and Germany
to incite

Afghanistan against the USSR.

During the

initial

national situation

in

period of the Second

World War

the inter-

Asia, notably the Far East, confronted So-

with tasks whose importance and magnitude

were almost coftiparablc with those that Soviet diplomacy was
working on in the most important political directions in Europe.
viet foreign policy

In the Far East militarist Japan stood poised against the Soviet
Union on a huge geographical springboard. Nazi Germanys imperialist partner and' the strongest capitalist

pan was

the

main threat

to the

USSR

power

in

Asia, Ja-

in this region. In the late

1930s the Japanese militarists had twice tested the

solve to rebuff their aggressive actions.
The military alliance with the fraternal

USSRs

re-

Mongolian Peoples

Republic was of inestimable significance to the USSR. In the protocol on mutual assistance between the USSR and the MPR,
signed in March 1936, the sides undertook in the event of a military attack

on one of the Contracting Parties, to render each

other every possible, including military, assistance.' By request

of the Mongolian government there were in Mongolia Soviet mil-

and technical experts who were helping to train

military personnel and jointly reinforce the defence of Mongolias Far Eastern frontiers. The Soviet Union and the Mongolian
itary advisers

Peoples Republic bent every effort to normalise international relations in the

in

Far East.

Soviet-Mongolian Relations. 1921-1974. Documents and Other Materials,

i, Moscow- Ulan-Bator,
1975, p. 340 (in Russian).

two volumes, Vol.

219

Sakhalin, and
Komsomolks-on-Amur, Sovetskaya Gavan, North

MILITARY AND POLITICAL

SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka.

DESIGNS AND POLICY

OF IMPERIALIST POWERS

springboard for an invasion

Japan fortified the Manchucaa-Korea
including
13 fortified areas,
fortifications,
of the USSR. New
frontier. In 1939
Soviet-Manchurian
along the

1.

Throughout the

between 1939 and 1941 the leaders of imperialist Japan were completing the principal phase of their preparations for the struggle to redivide the world in collaboration with
In the period

main European partners in an imperialist coalition, nameGermany and Italy. When the Second World War broke out

their
ly,

the Japanese militarists further accelerated their buildup of the

material resources for the aggression they were planning. While

1938 the output of the military branches of Japans industry

2.7 times greater than that of the civilian extracting and

in

was

manufacturing industries, in 1940 the disparity increased to 4.5

times. Compared with 1939, the production of arms and military
equipment rose as follows in 1940; artillery by 51 per cent,
tanks by 82 per cent, and machine-guns by 24 per cent. Suffici-

armaments had been stockpiled

ent

spending

itary

in the

1940/41

for 95 divisions. Japans mil-

fiscal

year absorbed over 80 per

cent of the national budget.'

In the continuing war with China Tokyo sought to expand its

seizures in that country. Moreover, plans were laid

territorial

for alternative military operations: either in the north against

USSR,
The

the

allies.

or in the south against the

USA,

and their
was made de-

Britain,

priority of each of these alternatives

pendent on the prevailing international situation. The strategic

Plan Otsu (war against the USSR) envisaged the seizure of
the Soviet Far East. In accordance with a decision adopted by
the Imperial General Staff at the close

was

to be

made

lary operations

in the direction the

were

to be

of 1940 the

main thrust

Maritime region, while

conducted

ancil-

in the direction of Blago-

veshchensk with the objective, in the first phase, of seizing Vladivostok, Iman, Blagoveshchensk, and other towns. The objective
of Nikolaevsk-on-Amur,
the seizure
of the second phase was

A History of t be Second World War, 1959-194'}, Vol. 3, Beginning of

War. Preparations for Aggression Against the USSR, Moscow, 1974. P- l8 4

entire initial period of the

were built hastily

and 1940 the Kwantung

Second World

War

enlarged from nine to 12 divand men. The armies of the

isions manned by 350,000 officers
and Inner Monpro-Japanese puppet governments of Manchoukuo
headquarters of the Northern Mil-

were

golia

Army was

also reinforced.

and
up on Hokkaido in December 1940,
itary District
the
and
South Sakhalin,
troops were deployed in North Japan,

was

set

Kurile Islands.
for aggression, the Soviet
In view of the Japanese rulers bent
armed forces along its
government had to maintain large
not only important to the deFar Eastern frontiers. These were
the Japanese army in China,
fence of the USSR but, by fettering
liberation struggle of the
were also a major prop for the national
militarists.
Chinese people against the Japanese
Far East were
efforts to ensure its security in the
.

The USSRs

that the governments of the

greatly complicated by the fact
^
apdefeat) aspired to
USA, Britain, and France (prior to its
UniSoviet
the
of
expense
the
at
pease the Japanese militarists
saw these countries acon The period between 19 39 and 1941
variant of the Munich policy.^
tively continuing a Far Eastern
retain its colonial
The government of France was hoping to
of a .broad political compromise
possessions in Indochina .by means
rechannel Japanese expansion northwith Tokyo that would
policy of supporting China.
ward. Paris abandoned its former
thc British ambasAs for Britain, as early as September 8, 1939,
Foreign
Robert L. Craigie handed the Japanese

sador in Tokyo
proposing a peaceful
Minister a message from Lord Halifax
October
1939 British warIn
settlement of the China incident.
Singapore. After
to
ports
from Chinese
_

ships

were withdrawn

Frances defeat,

when Londons

potential for sufficiently strong

coloin the sphere of its Asian

resistance to Japanese expansion

policy
Britain further invigorated its
nies had been undermined,
exclusively
this appeasement
of appeasing Japan, confining

the

Ibid., p.

1 8 1.

(in Russian).

221

220

to the southerly thrust of

Tokyos ambitions. In order

to

support

the Japanese blockade of China, the British signed an agreement

with Japan on June 20, 1940, on joint actions against violators

and of the security of the Japanese armed forces in

July 17 the sides signed another agreement in Tokyo
under which Britain undertook to prevent the transit of military
supplies to China across Burma. Lastly, in August 1940, on
Japanese insistence, British troops were pulled out of the settlements in Shanghai and Tientsin.'
of order

On

China.

The hopes

US imperialists had of coming to terms

disputed issues continued to determine their
attitude to Japanese militarism. Washington was still counting
that the

with Japan over

'

on the development of Japanese expansion against the USSR.

This was the angle from which the USA regarded Japans projected southerly expansion.

At

first

it

was

felt

in

Washington

was to be undertaken chiefly to acquire the

needed for aggression against the USSR. As
was denied serious US military, political, and

that this expansion

strategic resources

regards. China,

it

economic support.

With. Japans appeasement getting priority, the US leaders

abstained from effective attempts to limit Japanese aggression,
despite the fact that USA had powerful, especially economic, levers for such attempts. The USA was Japans main supplier
of

many

much as 60 per cent of Jaand oil-products came from the USA. 2 As for raw mate-

strategic materials. In 1940 as

pans oil

rials for the steel industry, the Japanese have themselves

estimated that in 1940 imports of iron scrap from the USA accounted
for 25 per. cent of Japanese steel output. 3 In September
1940 the
Americans imposed some restrictions on the export of iron and

steel scrap

More,

in

pig iron,

Japan but this hardly affected the actual supply.

compared with 1940, the US export to Japan of
sheet steel, and metal scrap increased from four to five
to

1941,

times in terms of value. 4

War
'

th e

US A

At

the beginning of thq Second

World

accounted for 33-35 per cent of Japans imports.'

History of the Second. World War. 1939-1945, Vol.

j, p. 171.
Japans Decision for War, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California,

>967^ PP- 187-88.

appeasing Japan and

All this indicates that for the sake of
the American leaders
USSR,
redirecting it northward, against the
security. Japan renational
deliberately risked their countrys
for aggresresources
material
the
ceived direct aid in building up
ultimately
was
calculations,
sion, which, despite Washingtons
directed against the

an political leaders and historians,

in the

Pacific,

Against

this international

3,

Moscow,

p.

204

groundlessly allege that

activities

Ger-

of

feature of the situation in the

a noteworthy
outbreak of the Second World War. As
the
following
East
Far
diplomatic tactics in the
soon as the war began Berlin revised its
the Soviet Union in
down
Far East The long-term aims of tying
and encourage fricJapan
the Far East with^thc help of militarist
conflicts and even
military
to
relations up

man diplomacy were

tion in Sovict-Japanesc
In the obtaining situaa major war, were temporarily conserved.
to use Japanese eximportant
more
tion Germany felt it was
immediate aims
Reichs
Third
the
of
pansionism to achieve some
reasons Bertactical
For
France.
and
in the war against Britain
to a temporary stabilcontribute
to
prepared
therefore
lin was
mediaSoviet-Japanese relations and even offered its

isation of

will
achieved, Ribbentrop explained, Japan
southerly
East Asia in a
be able freely to extend its power in
2
purpose of this Gerdirection and penetrate even farther. The

tion.

If this

is

man peace-making was

to direct the forces

of

the

Angloorder to

French coalition and also of the USA against Japan

France in Europe. After
secure the speedy defeat of Britain and
of the USSR in the
invasion
Germany got down to planning its
evapstabilisation
this
in
interest
latter half of 1940 Berlins
in

orated.

ly
1958,

who

background, the

Such a change of priorities

Vol.

stra-

principal adversary in Asia.

its

,,

War

unprecedented

economic aid to the naAs during the

the USSR had extended
World War, try to recall as seldom
Second
of
the
initial period
economic assistance that was exand
military
real
the
as they can
Japanese militarism,
tended on a mammoth scale by the USA to

Ibid., p. 6.

History of

this

was the hope that there

tegic miscalculation by the US
wonder that AmericSmall
Munich.
would be a Far Eastern
leaders

USA. Underlying

due to the

fact

that in

in

German diplomacy was

August and

September

large-

1939

the

(in

Russian).
1

222

History of the Second

World War. 1939-1945, Vol.

3,

p.

295.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

223

USSR had

reinforced

its

security in the

things, signing a non-aggression pact with

lomacy was thus able

a

fairly

rare,

West by, among other

Germany. Soviet dip-

towards the

to ensure,

externally paradoxical

latter half of

in the

camp

September 1, 1939, Japan was the vanquished side. In the

from May to September 1939 it lost 660 aircraft. The
casualties of the Japanese and Manchurian troops amounted to
period

52,000-55,000, including nearly 25,000 killed.

On

In the Far East September

of the most aggressive imperial-

1,

1939, was not a peaceful day

four months of fighting

USSR. There had been almost

between Soviet-Mongolian
vaded fraternal Mongolia

and Japanese troops, which invicinity of the Khalkhin-Gol

River on May 11. The hostilities against the USSR and the MPR
were a war of aggression by the Japanese, 1 as was subsequently stated by the International Military Tribunal for the
Far
East at the Tokyo trial of major Japanese war criminals.
forces
in

the

In a telegram congratulating

Red Army

units on the victory

Khalkhin-Gol, the Peoples Commissar for Defence of the

Marshal K.Y. Voroshilov wrote: In the battles against
the presumptuous Japanese invaders our units defended not only
the Soviet Unions friend, the Mongolian Peoples Republic, not
at the

USSR

only the inviolability of the treaties signed by the Soviet government, but also Soviet territory extending from Lake Baikal to
Vladivostok. This provocative attempt of the Japanese to seize
territory pursues the aim of creating a bridgehead for
an attack on the USSR, on the Soviet Trans-Baikal region. 2

Mongolian

The

was mounted on July 2, 1939, by the Japanese armed forces together with Manchurian troops had been
repulsed by a Soviet-Mongolian group that had only one-third
of the enemys numerical strength. The Japanese July offensive
failed, but the enemy continued bringing up new forces, includoffensive that

M. Y. Ragmsky, S. Y. Rozcnblit, International Trial

panese War Criminals, Moscow- Leningrad, 1950, p. 199 (in
Soviet-Mongolian Relations. 1921-1974, Vo],

224

1,

p.

429.

of the

Major

Russian).

Ja-

September

1939, the Japanese ambassador in

9,

Moscow

on the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign

( Affairs of the USSR and suggested an armistice and the formation of two commissions to demarcate the frontier between the
USSR and Manchoukuo and between Mongolia and Manchoukuo.
True to themselves, the Japanese militarists went so far as to
resort to threats. Togo hinted that Japan had concentrated large
forces in the conflict area and that further heavy clashes could
2
be expected. But the fact of military defeat was unquestionable,
and in Tokyo they knew it. The Japanese government suggested
turning the Khalkhin-Gol area into a demilitarised zone. Further,
the ambassador declared that the Japanese government wished
to have a trade treaty with the USSR. On a broader plane, Togo said, the Japanese government wanted an improvement of

Togo

Shigenori

group.

for the

from

On

1939,

situation

SOVIET-MONGOLI AN VICTORY
AT THE KHALKIIIN-GOL

artillery

the fortress of Port Arthur.

emplified Soviet diplomacys skill in using imperialist contradictions not only between the two groups of imperialist states divid-

ed by war but also

China and heavy

ing crack Japanese air units from

under which its

main potential enemy in Europe was prompting the main potential enemy in Asia to stabilise relations with the
USSR. This ex-

ist

its

called

relations with the

The

USSR wanted
deemed

( over,

USSR

Japanese received

it

in general.

a cessation of

reply on the following day:

hostilities.

the

The Soviet government

expedient to set up the suggested commission.

More-

agreed that a commission should be formed to settle conflicts and suggested restoring in the Khalkhin-Gol area the situation that existed before the conflict, in other words, to leave
it

Mongolia and Manchoukuo unchanged

withdraw troops from that frontier. Further, it was stated that the USSR was prepared to sign a trade treaty with Ja-

the old frontier between

and

to

pan.

But

in

Tokyo

they did not accept the suggestion for restoring

the former frontier in the

1

Vol.

A
i,

Moscow, i960,

M.

S.

Kapitsa,

Khalkhin-Gol area and

15-26

for the simul-

of the Soviet Union,

1941-1945,

p. 244.

V.

I.

Ivanenko,

Mongolian Relations), Moscow, 1965,

3
L. N. Kutakov, A History of
Moscow, 1962, p. 231 (in Russian).
4

War

Great Patriotic

History of the

Friendship

p.

102

(in

Won

in

Struggle

(Soviet-

Russian).

Soviet- Japanese

Diplomatic

Relations,

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 231-32.

225

withdrawal

taneous

and

Soviet-Mongolian

of

another two years to reach the technical level as well as that of

armaments and mechanisation demonstrated by the Soviet Army
1
area. This factor subsein the fighting in the Khalkhin-Gol

Japanese-Man-

churian troops from the frontier. Japan proposed that the Japanese-Manchurian and Soviet-Mongolian troops should remain
get the conflict settled the Soviet

quently influenced Japanese evaluations of the prospects of the

German-Soviet war, and these proved to be on the whole more

posal.

realistic

along the line held by them on September

1939. In order

to

government accepted this proTroops thus remained on the lines held by them at 13.00
hours Moscow time on September 15. An understanding was
reached on the formation of a mixed commission to define the
frontier between Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the recent war
theatre.

The
itary

results of the conflict

and

political victory of the

Tokyo,

its

utter devotion to

and the

MPR

its

its

USSRs contribution

readiness to defend friends, and

internationalist duty.

SOVIET DIPLOMACY REBUFFS

THE POLICY OF PRESSURE

to the

The durability and

Yumjagiyn Tse-

denbal, have been tested time and again by our enemies, an example being the heavy fighting in the Khalkhin-Gol area. In keep-

and
Union helped

ing with the principles of proletarian internationalism

charging

its

internationalist duty, the Soviet

dis-

country and

contributed

rialist forces in

War and

Foreign Ministry gave the following assessment

of the internal forces in Japan on basic interalignment
of the
national issues: Japans main aim is necessarily an early con-

to the

the Far East."

subsequently.

in

German

clusion of the China conflict.

Foreign Policy.

Collection

of

Documents, Vol.

4,

May

x6, 1957.

The old

supporters of a policy

Army,

therefore

see-

England if we can
dissuade the Soviet Union from supporting Chiang Kai-shek.
Recognition of the British as the common enemy is growing in
.

military

and

continue

its

activist circles.

China

. .

The Government

is

policy without consideration for

determined to

England and

warring powers out of

is hoping soon to force the troops of the
England
arc increasingly
hostile
to
forces
The
the settlements.
tremendous
increase
expect
a
circles,
which
business
opposed by
.

Anglo-Saxon countries as a result of the European

Further Ott wrote that the interests of two economic

in exports to

Moscow,
1

1946, pp. 461-62 (in Russian).

Pravda,

especially in the

the possibility of further cooperation against

conflict.
Soviet

Germany,

oriented toward

Fumimaro Konoye admitted to the

Tokyo Eugen Ott: It will take Japan

In September 1939 Prince

German ambassador

ber of disputed issues in the hope of getting some unilateral adreflectvantages. But Japanese diplomacy was double-dealing,

towards strengthening the anti-impe-

The Khalkhin-Gol victory spelled, in fact, military assistance

to China in its war against the Japanese invaders. Moreover, it
contributed to ending the Munich policy of the Western powers
in Asia, chiefly the attempts Britain and the USA were making
to precipitate a major war between the USSR and Japan.
As regards Japan itself, the defeat seriously affected its expansionist plans and was a big factor restraining Tokyos antiSoviet aspirations both in the early period of the Second World

Taking the outcome of the military conflicts with the Soviet

Union in 1938-1939 into account, Tokyo saw that there was no
alternative to conducting negotiations with the USSR on a num-

dispatch
ing the political in-fighting in Japans ruling quarters.
September
Ott
of
8, 1939,
Eugen
ambassador
from the German

the

Mongolian people with its armed forces against Japanese aggression and thereby saved the freedom and independence of our

226

reached

2 THE USSR AND JAPAN:

NEGOTIATIONS, 1939-1940

not only

strength of Mongolian-Soviet friendship, said

attack the

the nazi blitzkrieg strategy.

settlement were a major mil-

USSR

testified to the

struggle against aggression,

'

Germany would

USSR

the Japanese expressed doubts about the feasibility of

Far East but also on a broader plane. The rebuff to the

Japanese imperialists

its

information that

Washington.

and

and

in the

When

than the forecasts of, say, London

p.

15 *

Quoted from

History of the Second

World War. i9}9 m *945t Vol.

3,

182.

227

in Japan. One was interested chiefplundering China and other Far Eastern nations, the other

groups had come into collision

ly in

wanted

make

to take

in Europe to
raw materials, ar-

advantage of the military situation

super-profits by selling the belligerents

1

maments, ammunition, food, and other items

Seeing the need to prevent any exacerbation of relations with
Japan and to restrain aggressive ambitions in Tokyo, the USSR
displayed a readiness for a broad dialogue with Japan covering trade, economic and political problems. Parallel with resuming talks with the USSR, the Japanese leaders began sounding
.

Soviet intentions with the assistance of German diplomats in order to bring pressure to bear on the USSR by joint efforts. The

German ambassador wasted no time. When the newly-appointed

ambassador in Tokyo K.A. Smetanin paid a protocol visit
to the German embassy soon after his arrival, Eugen Ott took
Soviet

the earliest opportunity to say that Japanese military circles had

changed

their attitude to the

USSR

and were now interested

in

and signing a trade treaty as soon

Ott ended with the assertion that Japan's military
circles wished to have a non-aggression pact with the USSR. 2
Meeting with the Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of
the USSR on October 4, 1939, the Japanese ambassador in Mossettling all outstanding issues

as possible.

cow Shigcnori Togo

said that since the USSR had agreed to sign

a trade treaty he was authorised to submit a draft. He declared
that agreement should be reached in principle and that the de-

could be discussed in Tokyo with the Soviet ambassador,

rhe Japanese proposals provided for most-favoured nations

tails

status relative to customs tariffs

On November

13,

1939,

on exports and imports. 3

forwarded

Shigenori Togo

setting
flicts.

and a trade

treaty,

the

and the

up of a commission to define frontiers

Appended

and settle conwere draft proposals for formprevent conflicts between the

to the declaration

ing commissions to settle

and

sion.

days later the Japanese Foreign Minister Kichisaburo

Nomura handed K. A. Smetanin the draft of an agreement on
of which
the functions of frontier commissions, the formation
the
Khalin
conflict
the
ending
was envisaged in the agreement

Two

khin-Gol area, and the draft of a fishing convention. Nomura

declared that the Japanese government wished to begin talks on
a long-term (eight-year) fishing convention. Further, he said, To-

kyo was interested in actively facilitating the settlement of the

question of payments for the East China Railway and requested
governments
the ambassador to convey to Moscow the Japanese
1
treaty
trade
on
a
the
talks
speed
up
desire to
On November T9, 1939, agreement was reached on the com.

position, functions,

228

Series

D, Vol. VIII,

ed on the settlement of the misunderstanding between Japanese

firms and Soviet organisations on the fulfilment of contracts
placed by the Soviet side. The Peoples Commissariat for Foris

prepared forth-

Moscow."
Togo handed Molotov a memorandum
Japanese government on the question of fishing. In and

with to begin trade talks

On December

1,

in

1939,

of the
outside Japan, the ambassador said, the fishing question has
always been regarded as an indicator of the relations between

relations
Japan and the USSR. Since Japan wants to improve the
earliest
posthe
desires
naturally
it
countries,
two
between the

settlement of the

memorandum: The

fishing

questions.

Togo read out the

upon

draft fishing convention, finally agreed

28-29.
*

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

for defining

would begin its work in Chita, and the second half of its sittings
would take place in Harbin. On the same day the Japanese
ambassador was handed the following statement of the
ticaty:
Soviet government on the question of concluding a. trade
the
that
The government of the USSR expresses confidence
baswill
be
treaty or interim agreement on trade and navigation

sible

Documents on German Foreign Policy. 19111-194},

United States Government Office, Washington, 1954, pp.
2
L. N. Kutakov, op. cit., p. 244.

and venue of a mixed commission

the frontier between Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the KhalkhinGol area. According to the agreement, the mixed commission

eign Affairs states that the Soviet government

to

Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a declaration listing

the points which Japan believed could be discussed. It envisaged
the signing of a fishing convention

USSR, and Manchoukuo and between Mongolia and Manchoukuo, and also draft proposals for a frontier demarcation commis-

Ibid.
Ibid.

229

China

on November

9,

1936

..

envisages leaving in force the fishing

convention signed by Japan and the

the documents

all

appended

counting from January

to

1937.

1,

it,

USSR

for the

Above

the stabilisation, for the

same period,

fishing

to

sectors

leased

all,

sariat for

this draft recognises

the

main part of

subjects

of

the

and,

Soviet

the

on

the

state

in-

dustry the sectors with catches of up to five million poods...'

This draft convention was drawn up on the basis of the afore-

mentioned 1936 draft convention, but inasmuch as three years

have elapsed since it was finally agreed upon it includes amendments taking into account the state of the fishing sectors during
this

period.

it regretted that
Foreign Affairs of the USSR declared
the instalment
of
payment
Japanese government was delaying

term of eight years,

of the

Japanese

other hand, placing at the disposal

in 1928, as well as

East
question of the last instalment for the
t0 settle the
CommisPeoples
the
connection
Railway, Tokyo stalled. In this

on a

the
East China Railway as a result of which
time.
long
a
for
postponed
fishing convention were
on the quesOn December 27, 19 39, a Soviet draft protocol
Its Article 1
Togo.
to
handed
convention, was
talxs

for the

tion of a fishing

between Japan and tic Ln.on

documents
all the accompanying
of Soviet Socialist Republics, as
in force unti
remain
will
1928,
that were signed on January 23,
proposed that this proDecember 31, 1940. The Soviet Union
by a new convention which was
tocol should later be replaced

The

stated:

fishing convention

The submitted document was based on

the Japanese 1936 draft

had been declined by the Soviet Union. The Soviet government had no intention of reconsidering its stand. Another point
that had to be taken into consideration was that Manchoukuo,
which was totally dependent on Japan, had not paid the last instalment for the East China Railway. As in 1938, the USSR did
that

not intend to sign a fishing convention until the Japanese govern-

ment honoured its guarantees relative to the payment for the East
China Railway. On December 15, 1939, the Peoples Commissar

USSR told the Japanese ambassador

government did not consider it could conclude a
fishing convention on the terms proposed by Japan. However, it
was prepared to negotiate a long-term fishing convention on acceptable terms. To this end the Japanese government had at least
to honour its guarantees regarding payment for the East China
Railway that was to be made in March 1938. If the Japanese
government understands our point of view-well and good, if
4
not, is its business, the Peoples Commissar said, ending the talk.
Subsequent developments showed that the firm stand taken
by Soviet diplomacy and also the need to reckon with the interests of Japanese business circles, who were insisting on the
for Foreign Affairs of the

that the Soviet

'

settlement of the question of fishing in Soviet waters, compelled

the Japanese
1
2

government

One pood -16

to give in.

kilos.-Tr.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

However, having promised

being negotiated.
amendment about
Tokvo accepted the Soviet draft, making an
The government of
instalment for the East China Railway.
the

prepared to
Manchoukuo, the Japanese ambassador said, is
on the day
even
China Railway
pay the instalment of the East
amount
exact
the
agreement provided
following the signing of the
government
it must pay the Soviet

regarding the

it is

But

it

has a wisi

that after this lnstalmen

to purchase goods of Ja-

USSR

fishing

tocol to be accepted

and requested

to specify

the

points

that

of notes.

should be left in the exchange

on the same day
The Japanese side received the reply
purchase goods of Jato
agrees
1 The Soviet government
amount of two-thirds
the
to
manufacture
panese and Manchurian
Railway.
China
East
of the last instalment for the
protocol prolong2. So as not to delay the signing of the
to accepting
object
not
do
we
for
1940
convention
ing the fishing
Article

of the said protocol without

amendments.
not less

recording that
The Japanese ambassador suggested
would be spent on the purchase of
than two-thirds of the sum
Manchurian manufacture. This, he exof Japanese and

goods
1

Ibid.
Ibid.

of payment, and

specified.

should use that sum

is
Regarding the interim
panese and Manchurian manufacture.
the draft proconsidered
agreement Togo declared that he
paid the

3
1

way

is

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

231

230

would make it easier for him to secure payment of the

interest on the entire sum of the overdue instalment. The Soviet
government gave its consent. 1
Both agreements-on the East China Railway and on prolonging the fishing convention- were signed on December
31,
1 939 The Soviet government and public opinion,
the newspaper
plained,

lzvestia wrote, attached great significance to the normalisation

of Soviet-Japanesc relations and were prepared to contribute
to
3
this normalisation.

The settlement
for the

of the question of paying the last instalment

East China Railway cleared the way for a new long-term

fishing convention.

However, the

further successful course of the

talks was impeded by Japanese procrastination over the definition

of the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier in the Khalkhin-Gol area.

The

mixed

commission,

Soviet-Mongolian,

began

its

work

in

gether 16 sittings:

and

consisting

of

representatives

of

Japanese-Manchoukuo delegations,
Chita on December 7, 1939. There were altofrom December 7 to 25, T939, in Chita and
a

from January 7 to 30, 1940, in Harbin. The views of the sides

were totally antipodal. 4 In this situation the Soviet government
did not deem it possible to go on negotiating a new fishing convention as long as the question of the frontier between Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the area of the recent hostilities was
not settled. The impression was created that the unsettled state
of the frontier issues

ruling quarters in the

relations with the

Having made

was needed by Japan largely

USA that it was not striving

to
to

show

the

normalise

USSR.

headway in settling some problems

with Japan, the Soviet Union pressed forward
against Japanese procrastination in order to create a new
politin

its

significant

relations

ical foundation for these relations. There was a favourable

response to this from Japanese business circles interested in developing trade and economic relations with the USSR. The firm
stand taken 'by the Soviet Union towards the talks on prolonging the fishing agreement and on the question of the East
China

Railway du ly impressed the Japanese. Japans

1

Soviet foreign Policy Archives.

Soviet Foreign Policy.
Collection of Documents,
Ibid., pp. 480-81.

Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1921-1974, Vol.

1,

p.

557.

Vol. 4,

and
pp.

mili-

477-79.

of

success

Japanese embassy in Moscow

believe that Russia will fall apart
to write: It is quite absurd to
Russia with its enormous territory,
as soon as war breaks out.
suffer defeat so
vast resources, and large population will not
official of the

ments prompted an

easily.

getting to realise that

Some Japanese political leaders were

USSR with
tle could be won from the
the Soviet

talk with

ambassador

in

lit-

and pressure. In a
Tokyo K.A. Smetanin on
threat

Minister Hachiro
January 19, 1940, the new Japanese Foreign
USSR and Japan
2
the
between
Arita noted that lately relations
to improve them
help
to
happy
have begun to improve and I am
had
to stress that
again
felt
he
Arita
further. Two weeks later
has
the relations between the two countries
that
Japan
Diet
in
the
declared
Arita
changed. Tn early 1940
issues beintended to secure the settlement of key outstanding
4
trade and
of
development
the
in
Interest
tween it and the USSR.
with the USSR grew in Japanese business cir-

the atmosphere

in

economic relations
President of the
cles. Vice Admiral Saionji,

North Sakhalin,

said during a visit

concession in

oil

to the Soviet ambassador on

he was confident there could be underUSSR.

standing and friendly relations between Japan and the
improve
wanting
to
Notwithstanding its statements about

February

1940,

5,

fha.t

no hurry to tackle the

the undersettlement of unresolved problems or abide fully by
February
28, 1940, the
standings that had been reached. On
Foreign MinJapanese
ambassador in Tokyo called on the

USSR, Tokyo was

relations with the

in

Soviet

ister to protest against

delayed

After

government.
1)

from

less

History of the

He

cited,

The Commerce Department had

issuing permission to firms to

r Quoted

meet contracts from the

Second World War. 1959-1945, Vol.

than five months in office the Nobuyuki

Abe

Yonai became, the

on January 14, 1940. Admiral Mitsumasa
Minister.
ter with Hachiro Arita as Foreign
3

December
among other

breaches of the agreement of

31, 1939, by the Japanese

things, the following facts:

political

by the defeat suffered by

the Khalkhin-Gol and also by the
the Japanese armed forces on
These developSoviet foreign policy actions in Europe.

deterred
tary leaders continued to be

3,

cabinet resigned

new Prime Minis-

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

February

1940-

lzvestia,

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

2,

233

Soviet trade mission on account of the payments for the

East
China Railway; 2) in spite of a prior understanding the Chosen

Bank had

refused to transfer one-third of the payments for the

East China Railway to the State Bank of the USSR;

3) the question of the Matsuo Dockyard meeting its commitments had
not
been settled. 1
This firm Soviet stand compelled Tokyo to modify its attitude at the Soviet-Japanese talks on defining the frontier be-

tween Mongolia and Manchoukuo in the region of the conflict

on the Khalkhin-Gol. These culminated on June
9, 1940, in an
agreement that determined the frontier line in that region. 2

The talks on a new fishing convention, in which Japanese businessmen were particularly interested, were resumed in midr940. Japan continued to insist on a prolongation of the 1928
convention for ten years without any modification. On June 20,
1940, the Soviet government declared that some alterations arising from the changes which had taken place had to be introduced
into the convention. It believed that the convention
had to be
based on the principle that fishing grounds would be leased to

Japanese subjects by auction. It considered that leasing fishing

grounds without auction was unacceptable, but Japan insisted on

own

its

The

proposals.

talks

POLITICAL FOUNDATION
OF SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS
ambassador

in

Moscow

sug-

1925 Peking Convention, which was in turn based on the 1905

Portsmouth Treaty, signed after Japans perfidious attack on

number

of provisions that gave

Japan

unilateral advantages. In particular, the Peking Convention left

in force the territorial provisions of the Portsmouth
Treaty, which

gave Japan South Sakhalin, a primordial Russian territory in

the Far East. When the Soviet government signed this convention in 1925 it declared that it did not share with the former
tsarist government the political responsibility for
concluding the
Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

234

June

10,

1940.

iokyo they

Eastern frontiers.

It

the concessions in

1
North Sakhalin. Togo recommended

that his

begin
government should accept this Soviet offer. Scheduled to
Japan-in
by
postponed
were
the
talks
in the summer of 1940
was decided to wait for a clarification of the develop-

Tokyo

it

ments in Western Europe.

summer
After Germanys military successes in Europe in the
for the USSR to
ever
than
imperative
more
became
of 1940 it
attention was
ensure its security in the Far East. Considerable
report to the sevgiven to this region in the Soviet governments
USSR held in early
enth session of the Supreme Soviet of the
that
August 1940. It can be recognised, V. M. Molotov said,
improve
desire
to
by and large there are some signs of Japan's
. 2

relations with the Soviet Union.

report stressed that in

The

Europe was
There was a revival of

military-political alignment of forces in

conducive to activating Japans policy.

expansion could
hopes in US ruling quarters that Japanese
-1940 the Japaof
July
end
be steered northward. At the
confoi tilmeasures
of
programme
nese government adopted a
programThis
situation
international
changes in the
.

ing to the

me

envisaged Japanese political

hegemony

in the

South Seas and

East Asia Co-prosperity

the building, on that 'basis, of a Greater
links with Gerstrengthening
for
provided
Sphere. Moreover, it

many and

Italy

ative to the
tions

with

and concluding a military alliance with them. Relrelathe task was set of speedily regulating

USSR,
4

it.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet of the

'

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940,

Ibid., p.

p.

50

(in

USSR. August

1- August 7,

Russian).

31.

Izpestia,

thus quite plain that in

criminatory provisions of past years.

begin talks
Nevertheless the Soviet government agreed to
as a major
talks
such
of
fact
the
very
on a neutrality pact, seeing
Fai
s
Union
Soviet
the
along
peace
step towards strengthening
abolishing
on
talks
begin
to
offered
also

U) 4 o
1

was

determining a new politwanted to obtain a unilateral benefit in

to retain the disrelations,
Japanese-Soviet
ical foundation for

The new

gested that talks should be started on a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. The Japanese felt that it should be founded on the

Russia, and contained a

It

situation remained explothe world, including the Far East, the

appetite is growing.
sive. As regards Japan, its imperialist

were unproductive.

In early July 1940 the Japanese

Portsmouth Treaty.

History of the

War

in the Pacific, Vol.

3,

p. 67.

235

Soviet diplomacy saw as alarming Japans heightened

activity
in a bid to strengthen cooperation with Germany
and Italy.

diplomacy, for
further

part,

its

was

increasingly

pushing

Nazi
towards a

consolidation of the fascist

group of imperialist states.

ambassador in Tokyo Eugen Ott to impress
upon the Japanese government that Japan should be
interested
in strengthening Germany. In a telegramme of
September 9, 1940,
Ott informed Ribbentrop of the predominant Japanese assessments of the international situation and of the prospects for
Berlin instructed

its

Japans foreign policy.

became convinced

The

ruling quarters in Japan,

that although

Germany had

Ott wrote

signed a non-ag-

gression pact with the USSR, it had not changed its

unfriendly
attitude towards the USSR and continued to be
well disposed
to the Anti-Comintern Pact and
to the idea of a tripartite alliance. In other words, having started practical
preparations for
a war against the USSR, nazi Germany once more
changed its
tactics

and began

to solicit

Japanese support for these prepara-

tions.

In July 1940, preparing to sign the tripartite

pact, the nazi
and. Japanese representatives drew up
a preliminary document
setting forth the basic commitments of the
sides and speaking
of greater

harmony between Japan, Germany, and

Italy.

way affect the political status which exists at present

between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Rus2
But it is no secret that this article was included in the
sia.
camouflage its anti-Soviet thrust. The truth was that
to
pact
Japans ruling quarters hoped to use this pact with the express
purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the USSR. At the sitting
of the Privy Council's committee of inquiry on September 2, 1940,
the Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka said that Japan will
help Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war.
not in any

Japanese trade and industrial

European

in

establishing a

3.

USSR Togo
return

home

subsequently wrote in his memoirs that upon his

from Moscow he was astounded by the enhanced in-

fluence in Japan of those

who were

pinning their hopes on the

Tripartite Pact. 1
In

their

official

the Tripartite Pact

Soviet-Japanese

statements Japans political leaders claimed

was a vehicle facilitating the regulation of

relations.

ferred to Article

5,

To

substantiate

this

claim

they

re-

After

956

236

pp. 46-43.

Togo,

SOVIET-JAPANESE NEUTRALITY

the

Molotov

visit to

Berlin

November 1940 had

in

brought to light the entire magnitude of the contradictions between the USSR and nazi Germany, it became more imperative
than ever for the Soviet Union to prevent
lation
ist

and a simultaneous attack by nazi

its

international iso-

Germany and

1940, the Soviet government presented to

Japan its own draft of a neutrality pact. In Moscow it was seen
that this pact could be signed in parallel with the settlement of

major issues

of

18,

Soviet-Japanese relations.

The USSR proposed

that the pact should be signed concurrently with the abolition

It ofof Japanese coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin.

which stated that the terms of the pact do

be Cause of Japan, Simon and Schuster,

New

York,

militar-

Japan.

On November

Slugenori

in effect

PAGE

new order

were to extend their utmost assistance to it. The posture adopted by the Japanese
government
was eloquent evidence of the growth of expansionist
ambitions
among Japan s ruling classes. The Japanese ambassador
to the

concessions in

ment.

Under

allies

oil

a non-aggression rather than a

neutrality pact. It also suggested postponing the settlement of
all disputed issues between the USSR and Japan until after the
pact was signed. This was unacceptable to the Soviet govern-

what was

signing of

pact Japan stipulated special rights for itself

as an Asian
power situated far from the western and African fronts but
in Asia. Its

associated with fishing

North Sakhalin hoped to use the Soviet Unions desire for better relations with Japan to obtain concessions in the economic
sphere and try to purchase North Sakhalin. In the last resort it
was planned to obtain larger concessions in North Sakhalin.
On October 30, 1940, the Japanese government proposed the

this

having the decisive role to play

circles

Northwestern Pacific and with coal and

in the

Documents of German Foreign

Policy,

1918-1945,

Series

D, Vol. XI,

i960, p. 205.
s

L. N. Kutakov, op.

cit.,

p.

273.

237

fered guarantees that for five years Japan would receive 100,000
tons of Sakhalin oil annually on the usual commercial terms. 1

Japan turned

this

down. From Tokyo there came a counter-

buy North Sakhalin

in order finally to settle disputed issues between Japan and the USSR. Japanese diplomacy was,

offer to

relation

in

to

Sakhalin, trying to get what

it

failed to get at

Portsmouth in 1905 after tsarist Russias military defeat. The

Soviet government declared flatly that this Japanese offer was
Confronted with

this firmness, the

Moreover,

waived

Japanese government beat

demand

for a new fishing

convention based on the terms of the 1928 convention, and stated that it was prepared to sign an interim agreement for 1941
retreat.

it

its

on the pattern: of the 1940 agreement. As a

on January
20, 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan signed an agreement
prolonging the former fishing convention to the end of the year
and on the formation of a Soviet-Japanesc commission to draw
up a new fishing convention.* This positive consummation of the
economic talks between the USSR and Japan improved the possibilities for resuming exchanges of views about a Soviet-Japanesc
neutrality pact. Acting on Matsuokas recommendation, on February

3,

result,

1941, the Japanese government endorsed a foreign po-

programme under the heading Principles for Conducting

Negotiations with Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. 3 On
February 11, 1941, Matsuoka informed the Soviet ambassador
that he was going to Berlin on the invitation of the German
government and could stop over at Moscow. The Soviet government agreed to receive him.
On March 26 Matsuoka left for Berlin where he had a series of
talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop. One of the cardinal subjects
of these talks was the question of Soviet-German relations and
the stand Japan would take in the event Germany went to war
against the USSR. Ribbentrop told the Japanese Foreign Minister: If one fine day the Soviet Union takes a stand that will
be considered menacing by Germany the Fuhrer will crush Ruslicy

sia.

new

ruling quarters
on the Third Reichs victory in advance, the
of Soviet terdivision
the
Japan feared they would be late for
Germany
s side
on
forthwith
war
into
ritory. But to plunge
southward.
expansion
than
attractive
seemed to them to be less

Tokyo did not rule out the possibility

German war would draw the USSR, Britain, and

Further,

USA

closer

rejected

Japans

of
rcct-Tokyo renounced the discriminatory provisions
resumed.
iant of a neutrality pact. The talks were

its

var-

e began
USSR,
the
by
rejected
with repeating the Japanese offer, already
prebe
would
exchange Japan
to purchase North Sakhalin. In
Treaty
Portsmouth
pared to substitute other agreements for the
some of their
and the Peking Convention and to renounce

Matsuoka

Moscow on

arrived in

April

7,

1941-

Soviet government rejected this offer point

of his departure
blank. Until the last moment-until the day
the question of
on
budge
Moscow-Matsuoka refused to

fishing rights.

The

from

abolishing the Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin.

In a talk with J. V. Stalin, the Japanese Foreign Minister

meaning of hakko
as he himself writes, to explain the
spelled the uniwhich
roof,
ichiu (eight corners under one
of
Japan). Stalin
aegis
the
under
Asia
fication of the whole of

tried,

Paul S chmidt, the interpreter at these talks, recalls that

History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-ipSo, Vol.

1,

Moscow, 1980,

p.
1

January 21, 1941.

History of the War in the

Izvestia,

238

that a Soviet-

the

subsequently
together on an anti-German basis. In this case, by
terrisouthern
for
USA
the
and
Britain
beginning a war with
linked to
USSR
the
north
the
in
would
have
tories Japan
situation was
these Western powers by common interests. This
emphatically
taken into account by the Soviet government which
unfounded claims. This calculation was cor-

415.
1

stage

in

unacceptable.

words Matsuoka, who had hitherto sat impassively

Matsuoka: When
blinked in surprise. In parting Hitler said to
able to report to
be
longer
you return to Japan you will no
and the Soviet
Germany
your Emperor that a conflict between
that
Japan would
him
Union is ruled out. Matsuoka assured
always be a faithful ally of Germany."
would enter
In Tokyo they understood that the world war
Banking
USSR.
the
attack
on
with nazi Germanys

at these

lag,

Pacific,

Vol.

5,

pp. 211-12.

Paul Schmidt,

Bonn, 1958, pp. 5

M. Y. Raginsky,

auf diplomatise her

Statist
3 1

S.

37

Biihrte,

v)zyu) 45 Athenaum-Vcr>

Y. Rozenblit,

op.

cit.,

p. 255.

239

ignored the profusion of words that were designed to divert

the talk from the main thing. Then the Japanese Foreign Minister raised the question of Sakhalin. It was clearly
intimated to
him that this matter was not subject to discussion. Nor was any

impression

made by

although there had been doubts about whether Japan and the
USSR would agree to record the existing situation in a docu1
ment. US policy, he said, would remain unchanged. Despite

US

the attempts of

some newspapers wrote

Matsuoka gave in.

The USSR and Japan signed a neutrality pact in Moscow on
April 13, 1941. The sides agreed to maintain peaceful and
friendly relations and mutually respect each others territorial integrity and inviolability. The pact stated
that should one of the
Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part

along

Iran.

of one or several third powers, the other Contracting

Party will
observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict. 1 The
pact was concluded for five years. In the appended Declaration

the

USSR

undertook to respect the territorial integrity and inManchoukuo. For its part, Japan gave a similar
pledge with regard to the Mongolian Peoples Republic. 2
violability of

In addition to signing the neutrality pact,

Matsuoka made

promise that the question of abolishing the Japanese concessions

in North Sakhalin would be settled within
a few months. This
was reiterated by Japan on May 31, 1941, in a new statement
forwarded to the Soviet government through the Japanese ambassador in

Moscow Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

undertook to

settle the

In this statement Japan

question of abolishing concessions not later

than within six months after the signing of the neutrality

pact.
Ihis pact was a heavy blow to the plans of the nazis,
who
were speeding up their preparations for an attack on the USSR.
It can be said that this pact had the same
effect on Germany
as

the Soviet-German non -aggression pact had had on

Japan eighteen months earlier-it undermined unity among
the aggressor powers relative to the USSR.

dhc

pact caused confusion also in Washington. In order to

save appearances, Secretary of State Cordell Hull told pressmen
on April 14, 1941 that the pact had not come as a surprise

the

USA. The US

ensured

History of Soviet Foreign Policy.

cow, 1969,
2

p.

1917-1945,

Progress

Publishers,

Mos-

meant a diplomatic setback

for

USSR had

press agreed that by this act the

won freedom

of action

western frontiers.

neutrality pact

put paid to the Far Eastern

Munich

had been threatening the interests of the USSR as well

as of China and other Asian countries. In Fcbruary-March 1941
talks began in Washington between the Japanese ambassador
to the USA Kichisaburo Nomura and the US Secretary of State
Cordell Hull, both of whom focussed on a division of spheres of
Influence between the USA and Japan in China and the PacifFurther, they discussed questions pertaining to a joint defence
against communism. The imperialists of the USA and Japan
ic.

failed to find a

common

language chiefly because each

felt

the

was much too big.

Sober-minded Western diplomats held that the Japanese-Soviet
neutrality pact would help to stabilise the situation in the Far East.
On June 5, 1941, the US ambassador in Moscow Laurence A.
Steinhardt said to S.A. Lozovsky, Deputy Peoples Commissar

others appetite

neutrality pact
the

USA.

between the

Actually, this

USSR,

that he did not think the

and Japan was aimed against
pact was one more step towards the pre-

Foreign Affairs of the

for

USSR

servation of peace in the Pacific.

To

those

who

asserted that

the Soviet-Japanese pact imperilled the United States, he replied

that the Soviet

Union had a dangerous neighbour

in

the west

and wanted to ensure peace in the east. He

2
have acted exactly in the same way. The British Ambassador

personally would

Cripps regarded the neutrality pact as

anti-German since its only object can be to protect the Russian
Eastern frontiers in the event of an attack on the west by Gerin

Moscow

Sir Stafford

many.
However, for

all its

Ibid.

418.
*

significance as a factor strengthening the

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

E.

Ibid.

pany,

240

it

policy that

1
1

that

flank in the Far East and

its

its

The

to belittle the pacts significance,

officials

provocative suggestion, borrowed from

the nazi arguments at the Berlin talks in November
1940, that
the Soviet Union should move in the direction of
India and
his

1626

Estorick,

New

Stafford.

York, 1949.

Cripps:

Master Statesman, The John Day Com-

P- 2 4.

241

Soviet Unions security, the neutrality pact with Japan did not

other reliable roads: the Japanese navy was blockading the coun-

mean

trys

the total elimination of the threat of Japanese aggression.

Just as with

Germany

regard to

following the signing of the

coast, while British

Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the Soviet government did

not relax its vigilance in the Far East. This vigilance was absolutely
tion

August 1941.

When

continued

became quite obvious

it

in

Tokyo

that

Kwantung Armys

of the

TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE WAS

A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE USSR

until

The

transfer

During the

Germanys

Barbarossa plan had failed, Japans leaders decided to switch

their attention to expansion southward.

of

USSR.

AID

justified- vacillation over the final choice of the direc-

for further Japanese aggression

and French authorities were obstruct-

ing the transportation of freight from the

some

large air units and also units of Japa-

nese ground forces from North China to the south was started
1

only in September 1941.

Soviet policy towards militarist Japan in

1939-1941 cooled
ardour of the proponents of northward expansion among
the rulers of Japan. Now, more than ever, in Japan they realised
that there was no easy road for Japan in the north. As a result Japans rulers had largely to revise their Northern ambitions and wait for a more propitious time to realise them.

initial

period of the Second

World War
financial,

the

USSR

and other

continued to extend considerable military,

material assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle against

Japanese militarism. This was the determining

factor

for

the

development of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Ever since Japan invaded China, the Chinese ambassador
in Moscow Yang Zc said in a talk with V.M. Molotov on Sepits
1939, the Chinese government has been getting
Union.
Soviet
the
material,
from
and
greatest assistance, moral
Besides, China has been getting some aid from other countries.

the

tember

They remained

There are rumours that Japan wants to improve its relations with
Britain, the USA, and France, and this may negatively affect
China for these countries will stop to supply what little ma-

state of expectation

in this

practically through-

out the duration of the Second World War. The actions taken

by Soviet diplomacy in the Far East tangibly helped to strengthen the USSR's security in the face of the mounting threat
from nazi Germany, and contributed to the preservation of
peace in the Far East. Nothing came of the attempts of the
Western powers, notably of the USA, to bring about a clash
between the USSR and Japan. Japan did not join nazi Ger-

many

in attacking the

USSR.

when

Europe, freight continued

Soviet Union to China-along

in the

the world
to

war was already raging

flow uninterruptedly from the

across

summer

go on doing so. For our own security we are taking serious steps,
1
but aid to China will, as before, continue. None other than
Mao Zedong acknowledged at the time that following the out-

break of the war between China and the Japanese invaders no

imperialist state extended real assistance to the Chinese people,
and that the Soviet Union was the only country that helped them

people of China in the

the northwestern highway from

Xinjiang to Lanzhou. This road had been
built practically anew with Soviet assistance; it was completed

Alma-Ata

We

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO

In September 1939,

of 1939. This route

was a key

242

V.

i.

Chuikov, Mission

in

China,

invaders.

Novy

rtiir ,

No.

war

against Japan in the context of

complex military-political situation in China itself. In Chongqing the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek
presumed that Germany and Japan would inevitably attack the
USSR. This, it believed, would be a very favourable development as it would divert Japan from continuing the war in China

and permit the Kuomintang

to use all

its

forces against the Chi-

artery nourishing
1

Chinese resistance to the Japanese

1

have been supplying.

have been helping China, Molotov replied, and will

terials they

with military aircraft and material resources.

The Soviet Union pursued its principled line of helping the

THE CHINESE PEOPLE

in

10,

There
12,

were

no

T979, pp. 218-22.

'

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Mao

Zedong.

Selected.

Works, Moscow, 19531 Vol.

3,

p-

190 (Russian

translation).

16

243

1^1

nese Communists. For that reason, while

it

accepted assistance

from the Soviet Union, the Chongqing government sought

Active,

gravate Soviet-Japanese relations.

to the

sustained

to ag-

resistance

Japanese invaders did not enter into Chiang Kai-sheks

plans.

The anti-communism

into account in

Tokyo.

of
It

the

Kuomintang

was taken

leaders

therefore not accidental that even

is

cooperation with China on an anti-Soviet basis was not ruled

out by Japanese military and political planners. Professor of His-

Akira Iriye of the University of Rochester, USA, who reviewed Japanese publications on the Second World War, notably
the seven-volume The Road to the Pacific War: A Diplomatic
History Before the War, writes that the authors conclusively
showed that militarist Japan nurtured aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union. His analysis of documents of Japans
military leaders brought him round to the conclusion that in
Tokyo the possibility was studied of cooperating with China
tory

I'

against the Soviet Union.

Towards

war acquired

the character of

The Japanese occupation

of a large part

China was exhausting the country. The. nature of the situawhich was exercising no little influence on international politics in East Asia, was duly assessed by the Soviet
leadership. They realised that the Kuomintang government was
of

tion in China,

pursuing a double-faced policy: taking part, albeit inconsistentin the united

ly,

anti-Japanese

forces and, at the

output

industrial

of
were disrupted. In 194U when the level
years, the unoccupied
previous
with
compared
peak
reached its
and only 116 tons of
regions produced 4,400 tons of pig iron
Suffice it
1
The Chinese army was conformably equipped.
steel.
four
between
had
army
to note that during the war the Japanese
more
airtimes
and five times the fire power of the Chinese, 13
2
in
industry
war
no
was
There
craft, and 36 times more tanks.

China

to

speak

of.

the Soviet Unthe military hardware sent to China by

skies were
nations
The
important.
ion, aircraft were the most
Japan the
with
war
the
virtually open for the aggressor-prior to

Of

all

A
aircraft.
Chinese air force had not more than 150 combat
the
by
Japanese
the
destroyed
by
large part of these had been
The remnants avoided the enemy in order to save
close of 1937.

the close of 1940 the

a protracted conflict.

primitive agriculture were

hundreds of millions of people, and the
had brought the Chiaggravated by what the war with Japan
centres and key trannese people. China lost its main industrial
between individual regions
sport arteries, and the economic links

same time,

front

of

Chinas socio-political

For
Chongqing government was
which the government reflected

fighting against these forces.

that reason Soviet assistance to the

commensurate with the extent

to

the interests of the Chinese people.

Moscow

held that in the

the planes.

4
.

Soviet aid drastically

changed

the

situation.

In

19 37-1 941

Beginning with February 1938

China was given
China. After the very first
in
fought
airmen
Soviet volunteer
volunteers the Chinese command decided
1,250 aircraft."

battles involving Soviet

mercenanes-the
could do without the services of foreign
squadron manned by them was disbanded.
the ChiThe effective actions of the Soviet volunteers enabled
the
result,
a
As
nese command to step up the war in the air.
which
aircraft,
Japanese had to move the bases of their bomber
the front,
had formerly been sited at airfields 50 kilometres from
this did
But
between 500 and 600 kilometres.
that

it

to a distance of

fi-

was assistance not to the government but to

the Chinese people, who were fighting for their independence.
nal analysis this

1S40-194S. Statistics, MosHistory of China's Economic Development,

Russian).
.
cow, 1958, p. 156
War
Assistance to the Chinese People in toe
*
B. A. Borodin. Soviet
(in Russian).
146
p.
Moscow,
1965,
-1941,
Against Japan, 1937

SIGNIFICANCE
OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR CHINA
Soviet assistance

view

was of tremendous importance to China in

which that country had found

of the difficult situation in

itself.

The

centurics-old backwardness, the perennial hunger of

8
1

Ibid., p.

145-

G. Bertram,

On

(Russian translation).

the Fronts of

North China,

w
Moscow,

1940.

Reminiscences of Soviet Volunteer

In Chinese Skies, 19)7-1940,
Russian).
Moscow, 1980, p. 7 0 11

.
282

P'

a
Am
let
-

The

Origins of the Second

Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,

New

World War,

York, 1971,

edited by

E.

M. Robertson.

p. 252.

245

244

not help. In early

autumn 1939

long-distance heavy bombers

a Soviet volunteer squadron of

made two raids on Hankou,

More than a hundred

principal Japanese air base in China.

the
Ja-

panese aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Prior to these raids

Soviet airmen had participated in major air operations such as
the bombing of Japanese air bases on Taiwan and a raid on Japan during which a million anti-war leaflets were dropped. Fight-

innumerable air battles.

More than 200 Soviet airmen were killed

er planes fought

just cause of the

in the battles for the

Chinese people.

China was supplied with small arms, cannon, mortars, armoured vehicles, aircraft, ammunition and fuel. In 1939 Soviet
credits to China totalled 250 million dollars.
This was over
eight times more than the sum of the loan granted to China by
1

USA in 1939; British credits did not exceed three million

pounds. But even these small credits from the Western powers
were granted at an annual interest of 4-6.5 per cent provided
they were repaid with scarce strategic materials. Soviet aid
the

was of an
exceed

entirely different character: the interest rate did not

per cent and the credits

were chiefly repaid with farm

3
produce. In the Western countries China had to pay for armaments in hard cash. The Soviet Union supplied weapons as part
of

its

credits.

Soviet military advisers,

I.

Chuikov,

P.

I.

Batov,

who
M. I.

K. M. Kachanov, V.
Pankevich, and S. S. Ochncv,

included

continued to render the Chinese people unstinted assistance. By

the beginning of T941 there were 140 Soviet advisers in China. 3

Embodying

in practice the traditions of proletarian internation-

they

helped the Chinese command to solve major

problems and to train troops. They did not have

alism,

operational

an easy time-much of their advice was

left

Kuomintang

many

military

mintang generals

leadership

and

in

unheeded by the

Kuothem from the

instances

tried to limit their role, isolate

Chinese soldiers and population, attached intelligence agents to

them, kept them under surveillance, and so on.

To some

extent Soviet military and other material assistance

to China restrained the reactionary aspirations of the Kuomin1

:
1

246

History of the Second World War.

B. A. Borodin, op. cit., pp. 146-51.

History of the Second

World War.

1959-1945, Vol.

tang government. For example, by early 1940

that

the Kuomintang was moving towards

p.

clear

supplies to the. 8th and

anti-Japanese national front. It stopped
and increased
new 4th armies of the Communist Party of China
situation was such
The
armies.
these
attacks
on
the armed
used against the nations
that Soviet aid was in danger of being
permit this. The Soviet
progressive forces. The USSR could not

armaments
government declared that it would halt supplies of
the spring
In
Chinese people.
if they were turned against the
representatives
between
of 1940 talks were opened in Chongqing
of the

CPC and

the

Kuomintang on

the restoration of the unity

of action against the Japanese imperialists.

negative response
In imperialist Japan there was a sharply
struggle of the
liberation
to Soviet assistance to the national
in the war
could,
China
Chinese people. Until the close of 1941
from the
only
armaments
with Japan, count on supplies of
the USA
from
assistance
military
USSR, because its hopes for
expectations
the
to
Contrary
illusory.
and Britain proved to be
USSR did not
of Japans rulers, the neutrality pact with the
ambassador
Soviet
the
As
China.
towards
policy
affect Soviet
Minister

China A.S. Panyushkin said to the Chinese Foreign

Wang Chonghuo, the relations between the USSR and Japan
Soviet-Chicould not under any circumstances negatively affect
2
more acutely in
In early 1941 when China was
nese relations
sent it 200 bombneed of aircraft than ever, the Soviet Union
volunteer airmen fought in China
ers and fighter planes. Soviet
Patriotic War when they
right until the outbreak of the Great
had to return to defend their own homeland.
scholar B.A. Borodin justifiably writes: There

to

The Soviet
was not a

single

event

ple that left the Soviet

Union

in

the

of the Chinese peo-

life

indifferent.

Communiques from

life, struggle, and

the fighting fronts, information about the
by Sopronouncements
and
China,
privations of the people of
in
workers
and
publicists,
leaders,
viet Party and government
indepenfor
struggle
Chinas
of
support
in
science

culture

and

dence were highlighted by the Soviet

1

3.

had become

it

a rupture with the

173.

press.

Ibid., p. 177-

M.

S.

Kapitsa, Soviet-Cbmese Relations,

Moscow, 1958,

p.

D
299 on k.us'

'4$

ian).
J

1959-1945, Vol.

5,

p.

173.

B. A. Borodin, op.

cit.,

p.

128,

Chapter

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

AND ITALY

cal operation

German

by the

the Canaris Plan after

continued

in

chief. Preparations for this operation

Soviet-German non-aggression
the

its

of

spite

code-named

military intelligence

pact.

was aimed at using the condiGerman-Polish

war to orchestrate, with the
tions created by the
and groups in
organisations
anti-Soviet
emigre
involvement of
collaboration with the Wehrmacht, a peoples rising in Eastern Poland and its subsequent spread to the Soviet Ukraine. The
end purpose was to wrest a part of the Ukraine from the USSR.
In substance, this operation

LATENT CONFLICT WITH

GERMANY DURING THE PHONEY
1

This operation had been prepared in the course of several years.

Back in 1937 the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

WAR IN EUROPE

and the Abwchr reached an agreement on collaboration

The beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has

powerfully affected public opinion here, 1 the German
ambassador in Moscow von Schulenburg reported to Berlin

men

war was now on

the USSRs own doorstep. The non-aggression commitment
determining Soviet-German relations was no guarantee against provocations and other acts by Germany to the detriment
of Soviet
interests. A war was gaining momentum,
Germanys military machine was operating in high gear, and in this
situation the Soviet
leadership had to show the utmost vigilance and
preparedness to
respond to any complications. At the extraordinary
fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at
the close of August
1939 V. M. Molotov had stressed that the Soviet-German nonlull

Leipzig.

OUN

headquarters headed by one of the

set up to direct the Ukrainian

ringleaders

rising.

The

version division of

German

military intelligence.

order was issued after August 23, 1939, to countermand

the Canaris Plan. On the contrary, after inspecting German units

on the southern front in Poland the Abwehr chief Rear Admiral

Canaris said at a conference on September 1 1, 1939 If the Ukrainian rising were to be started now it would be directed against
Poland and Russia. The headquarters of the German ground
:

forces also

demanded

the

commencement

of the operation in the

Ukraine. As the Soviet scholar L. A. Bezymensky

writes,

the

On

September 12 Canaris ucgently requested instructions from Keitel, who gave permission
for subversive activity on behalf of the Wehrmacht High Command. This decision was approved by Hitler. On September 13
course of events was as follows:

The facts now available to historians confirm that the nazis

could have been expected to launch large-scale anti-Soviet actions
is

No

our vigilance. 2

An example

Western Ukraine

to enter the

threads of the overall direction of the rising led to the sub-

BEGINNING OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN

MILITARY CONFRONTATION
AND ANTI-IIITLER ACTIONS
BY THE USSR

September 1939.

camps were

Rvko Jary was

'

in

trained at special

German troops. Propaganda to the Western Ukraine

was beamed by German transmitters in Vienna, Graz, and

1959. It could not have been otherwise, for the

aggression treaty cannot

po-

together with

on September

6,

in

subversion in the East. Subversive groups totalling 12,000

litical

Canaris ordered the

Lists

the plan for a military-politi-

1
.

tember 17

Documenls on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945, .Series D, Voi. VIII.

United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1954, p. 13.
Extraordinary Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet
0/ the USSR. August
? 8 -September
/,
7939. Verbatim Report, Moscow.
1939, p. 20; (in Russian).

movement

of the

Everything was ready but early

OUN

units

attached to

morning of Sephe was informed that Red Army units had started a
in the

During the German -Polish war General Siegnnind Wilhelm

of the 14th Army, which advanced from Upper Silesia

command
tion of

List
in

was

in

the dircc-

Cracow.

248

I
249

campaign

liberation

to

reunify Western lands with Byelorussia

and the Ukraine. As one Abwehr officer wrote

was the end of all hopes that had latterly blossomed so
in his

uriantly.

diary,

it

lux-

September 1939 the troops of the Kiev and Byelorussian special military districts were alerted for combat and operations control headquarters were set up for the Ukrainian and Byelorussian fronts. At the same time, an exercise of reserves was
conducted by a number of military' districts. The Red Armys liberative operation in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia was started at a time when the German forces had not only
In early

of

war and

cultural,

had

as a trophy. I

and

structure

political

to reduce this economic, social,

to

a heap of ruins.

mon-

genocide was started in the Governorship-General and in the Polish territories incorporated in Germany. For instance, nearly 3,500 Polish scientists and workers
strous

in

programme

culture

and

closed during

of

were

art

killed

and higher and secondary schools

extraordinary

the

serordcntlichc Bcfriedungsaktion) alone.

witz) death

The

camp was

up on Polish

set

by the

steps taken

USSR

and Western Byelorussia were

action

pacification
2

(Aus-

The Oswiecim (Aus-

soil in

relative to the

1940.

Western Ukraine

thus objectively an effective coun-

aggression-a large territory of continental

reached the Western

ter-measure to nazi

pulse the nazi invaders compelled restraint on the part of the

Europe was removed from the sphere of the imminent nazi occupation. For the first time since the nazis came to power in
expansionist
_ ermany and the non-stop implementation of their
powerful
barrier was
Poland),
a
plans (Austria, Czechoslovakia,

Bug and San rivers but also crossed to their

eastern banks in a number of places, entered the territory of
the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, and moved farther to the east. The Soviet governments determination to re-

steps taken

USSR

by the

prevented any fur-

ther deterioration of the strategic situation for the Soviet Union.

Inaction by the

USSR would

German armed

the

vital

centres. This

Yet there was no open confrontation

:rected to these conquests.

German leaders.
The emergency'

have resulted

in the

appearance of

forces in operational proximity of

was

precisely

the view

of

with Germany. In the situation prevailing in September 1939 this

required an accurate account of the balance of strength and wise
statesmanship.

the USSRs

On

political

USSR

British

September

28,

1939,

Germany

signed a treaty with the

that established a line of demarcation

along

the

rivers

circles on the strategic aspects of the Soviet actions with regard

to the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. But that the
Russian armies should stand on this (Curzon.-P.S.) line was

Western Bug and Narcv. This demarcation followed approximateUSA

ly the Curzon line proposed by Britain, France, and the
in 1919 as a frontier based on ethnic principles. The demarca-

clearly necessary for the safety' of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern front has been

tion along rivers

created which Nazi

Germany does

Churchill declared in a speech

October

1,

not dare assail,

broadcast by

British

Winston
radio

on

1939.

The tragedy

people showed what lay

Western Ukraine and Western

that befell the Polish

in store for the population of the

Byelorussia from September 1939. Speaking of the new order

in the Governorship-General created by the nazis in occupied

Poland,

its

head Hans Frank declared: I received ... an extra-

ordinary order to ravage

1

and

L. Bezymensky,

On

this

Ltd.,

in that

it

prevented direct con-

between the Soviet Armed Forces and the German Wehrmacht. But none of this changed the crucial fact that from the
latter half of September 1939 onward the Soviet Armed Forces
ere in confrontation with the armed forces of the strongest and
tact

most aggressive power of the imperialist camp.

Following the general political guideline laid down in Berthe
lin, namely, to show restraint and so far avoid provoking
exacerbating
the
sitfrom
desisted
Germans
Soviet Union-the
uation.

The

Soviet

Union

replied in kind.

Our

officers,"

V.

I.

region mercilessly as a territory'

the F.ve of the

World War

II.

Open, New Times, No. 33. T979, p. 26.

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol.
London, 1949, p. 4 3

Behind the Scenes

Stanislaw Piotrowski,

Warsaw, 1956,

in the
2

was important

1.

Cassel and

Co.

Dyemiik Hama Franka. Wydavnictwo Prawnicze,

p. 96.

Internationale

Hefte der Widerstandsbewegimg, No. 8-10. March 1963.

.P- 109.

251

250

9 9

Chuikov

often had to go to the

recalls,

German

headquarters

They were received with respect,

examined and their demands,
The German troops did
based on the agreement, were met.
demarcation

to specify

their objections

were

lines.

ne

not engage in provocations.

We

ing the

USSR. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War

number of defence and other milthe Soviet Union had a large
made it possible
itary-industrial facilities that during the war

of us believed the sincerity of their friendly effusions.

faith in the wise policy pursued by our party and in

Few
had

industry in the

our strength, showed restraint and, at the same time, lost no

time to reinforce our defences against these questionable friends.
None of us had any doubts that the non-aggression pact with

mass production of tanks, aircraft, cannon ammunition, and other armaments.

of defence
Special importance was attached to the building
to

Germany was temporary and forced.

Of the utmost significance was that
and the Soviet government responded
frontation with Germany with a large

the

Communist

start the

As a result, as early
cent of the country s
per
as 1940 these regions produced 28.9
coal,
steel,
its
of
35.9 per cent of its
pig iron, 32.2 per cent
1
metals.
non-ferrous
its
most
of
and
oil,
11.6 per cent of its

factories in the countrys eastern regions.

Party

to the direct military con-

and milfollowing
months
itary-economic decisions during the first few
the
the outbreak of the war. As early as September i, 1 9 39
military
universal
passed
a
law
on
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
conscription, which juridically formalised the switch of the Armed
Forces to a cadre basis. The term of conscription for privates
and non-commissioned officers of the ground and air forces was
series of military

The Party

new divisions were formed. In September t 3

Bureau of the Partys CC passed a decision to modernise existing and build new aircraft factories; the plan was

of 1959: tens of

the Political

double the capacity of the Soviet aircraft industry. In

December 1939 the KV-t heavy and I-34 medium tanks were
adopted for service. These marked a qualitatively new stage
to nearly

the development of world tank construction. The militaryeconomic decisions adopted up to the close of 1939 ensured a
more than 3 3 per cent growth of the Soviet defence industrys out-

in

The Soviet Unions course towards a speedy reinforcement of

mounting threat from
its defence capacity in the face of the
nazism refutes the legends about a Soviet deal with Germany
The Partys economic policy, during these years was aimed

1.

Mission in China, Novy mir, No. n, 1979.

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vol.

I.

Chuikov,

Moscow,

1970.

p.

120;

The

Soviet

Armed

1978, pp. 226, 229-30, 234 (both in Russian).

252

Forces.

History,

P5,

the devel-

attention to

Such

restructuring
penditure of material and labour resources and the
indeed was,
and
could
be,
of technological processes. All this
possible to
not
it
was
because
done only beginning from 1941
outbreak
the
before
production
switch the entire economy to war

was important to create in peace-time the conditions

put the
under which, if war broke out, it would be possible to
production
the
mass
ensure
and
footing
economy on a war-time
created in the picof military hardware. The defence industry

of war. It

war years ensured an adequate supply of the Armed

industrys
modern weapons. Nevertheless, while the defence
in
shortcomings
serious
were
there
unquestionable,
advances were
Forces with

work.

its

The economic
period the

V.

its

armaments was the

tanks, aircraft, artillery systems, and other
industry personnel. Afresult of the efforts of the entire defence
for the Armed Forces,
ter these armaments were tested and adopted
their mass production.
the Party and the government ordered
production of new armaments required an enormous ex-

substantially increased

for the
opment and manufacture of equipment and weapons
first-class
Red Army on the eve of the war. The development of

increased to three years, and in the navy-to five years. The deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces commenced in the autumn

put in 1940.

the productive forces

hanks to the
production capacity of each industrial enterprise. J
precedyears
the
class in
efforts of the Party- and the working
of
expansion
substantial
Great Patriotic War there was. a

attentively

more rationally, speeding up

use of the
construction programmes, and making the utmost

a t locating

USSR

which became much stronger during the

was not involved in the world war, was the

base,

*99-

Book

Mosc<-'

the
p.

History of the Second World War. 1959-1945, Vol.

Against the USSR,

War. Preparations for Aggression

3,

Beginning of

Moscow,

1974.

380 (in Russian).

253

1/1

foundation of the Soviet Unions defence potential during the

tivated through

Great Patriotic War.

In the period of under two years

USSR was drawn

into the

Second

that

elapsed

World War

before

the

the numerical

Armed

Forces was almost trebled: 125

hundred
new warships were comnew divisions were formed. A
months
in 1940.
span
of
n
missioned within the short
between the bethe
period
in
commissioned
The naval units

strength of the Soviet

compromise with the Anglo-French

ginning of 1939 and 1941 increased the Soviet navys aggregate

displacement by 107,718 tons for surface ships and by 50,385
tons for submarines. Another 269 modern vessels were under

At its plenary meeting in

Central Committee made it incumbent

construction at the close of 1940-

March 1940 the Partys

upon the Peoples Commissariat

for Defence to carry out a fundamental reorganisation of the system of training of army and
navy personnel and to simulate real combat situations as closely
as possible in all exercises.

outside of bilateral relations

STRAIN OF INVISIBLE

continued

to

determine

the

rela-

between the USSR and Germany. Germany was for the time
being abiding by the terms of the pact and there were no grounds
1939, the
for freezing bilateral contacts. On September 28,
governments of the USSR and Germany exchanged letters on
expanding trade between the two countries. These letters recorded the decision of the sides to draw up an economic programme
tions

of an increase of

Soviet-German trade

to the highest level

reached

were no direct and open colliin the past. The

countries
was increasingly used by Bersions between the two
what
it
went
so far as to term friendly
lin as an indication of
hoped
that by dinning this
Germany
relations with the USSR
the
West it would get
Munichmen
in
heads
of
the
claim into the
fact that there

the

maximum

was going on between

were incompatible.
war-time September did not pass before one of the
come
contradictions between the Soviet Union and Germany had
research by Soviet
scientific
into
brought
data
new
The
head.
to a

The

first

show how purposefully

experts on the history of the Baltic region

German diplomacy

built

up

its

political influence in the Baltic

order to turn these states into Germanys satellites. For

example, Germany demanded that Lithuania enter the war on
Germanys side against Poland and thereby make it possible
states in

to be brought into Lithuania. Gcrman-Lithuanian secret negotiations, held from the end of August to September 20, 1939, produced the draft of a document headed

Wohrmacht

for the

Agreement on the Defence

of

Germany and

Lithuania will come under the wardship of the German Reich.'

Under this treaty the Lithuanian army was in fact to be placed

On September 25, 1939, Hitler signed

No. 4 prescribing the stationing of troops

under Wehrmacht control.

the secret directive

East Prussia sufficient for a swift occupation of Lithuania

2
even if it should resist. In the case of Latvia Germany deliber-

in

evaded

tely

to

that

fortune

we

failed

to

conquer

Estonia

as

early

as

1939.

OcIn this situation, at the close of September and in early

foreign
policy
series
of
tober 1939 the Soviet Union launched a

out of the bargaining for a wide-ranging political

Andrei Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House. Moscow, 1972, pp. 19-20;
S. G. Gorshkov, The Nations Naval Power, Moscow, 1979, p. 198 (in Rus-

respect the neutrality

reaffirm a readiness to

proclaimed by that nation despite the requests from the Latvian

government. Expansionism determined Berlins calculations relawas our mistive to Estonia, as well. Himmler lamented: It

However,

an intensifying foreign policy strug-

Lithuania envisaging the conclusion of a military treaty. The

that
substance of this document was determined by the provision

DIPLOMATIC BATTLES
pact

had been ac-

the USSR and Germany. Practically

on the Soviet Union were becoming
bordering
countries
all the
Here the strategic aims of the sides
struggle.
of
this
the theatre

gle

Provisions of an

The non-aggression

coalition that

channel of secret diplomacy.

the

Socialist Revolutions

tion of the Soviet Power,

2
2

of

1940

Moscow,

in

Lithuania,

Latvia and Estonia. Restora-

1978, p. 217 (in Russian).

Tbid.

Times

to

History of

Our

the

Estonian Soviet

Day,' Tallinn, 1958,

p.

Socialist

Republic

(From

Ancient

584 (in Russian).

sian).

255
254

actions to reinforce

its

security in the Baltic region.

These

were pleased
and France had undertaken the main role in bringing about a worsening of external conditions for the USSR in
the northwest, thereby freeing Germany from any special need to
exert an extraordinary effort in that direction. To a large extent
the nazi calculations were based on the hope that by their antiSoviet policy Britain and France would ultimately provoke a sharp
reaction from the USSR, up to a military opposition to this policy,
and thereby fuel tension to a breaking point in the Soviet Unions
relations with Germanys imperialist adversaries. Nothing could
be more desirable for Germany, wrote Juho Niukkanen, a

in-

of

cluded mutual assistance treaties with Estonia (September 28),

Lama (October 5), and Lithuania (October 10). Germany was
concentrating on its preparations for an offensive in the West

and refrained from open actions against the USSR in connection with these developments. But Berlin was obviously against
the signing of the mutual assistance treaties between the USSR
and the Baltic states, and German diplomacy sought to obstruct
or, if possible, wreck the negotiations on these treaties.
The leaders of the Anglo-French coalition at once saw the antiGerman thrust of these steps by the USSR. In a talk with the
Soviet ambassador on October 6, 1939, Winston Churchill declared that Britain had no reason to object to the Soviet actions
in the Baltic region. The ambassador reported to Moscow: Churchill is well aware that the mutual assistance treaties between

USSR and

the

raum
1939,

the Baltic states diminish the possible Lebens-

for Hitler.'

Speaking to

Lord Halifax acknowledged

I.

M. Maisky on October

16,

that the Soviet Unions treaties

with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had stabilised relations and

2
were a contribution to peace in Eastern Europe.
Throughout the first half of 1940, counting on using the Baltic
region as a springboard for invading the
reinforced

ly

May

its

USSR, Germany

position in Lithuania, Latvia

1940, in the presence of Goring, Keitel,

active-

and Estonia. In
Rosenberg, and

Bormann, Hitler put forward the strategic line, saying: All the
3
Instead of
Baltic states must be incorporated in the Reich.
creating a springboard for aggression against the

velopments in the Baltic in the

summer

USSR,

the de-

of 1940 led to some-

thing quite different-the victory of socialist revolutions in Lithuania, Latvia,

and Estonia.

ed from without, had broken out, nazi diplomacy believed that

protracted war would best serve Germany's
would hold most of the Soviet Unions attention

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

Ibid.

interests

it

Soviet Union.

British
,

joyfully that the

it was noted
were getting more and more deeply involved in anti-Soviet activities and increasingly becoming diverted from the war against Germany. This was why in early

the

and

January

between

In Berlin

the French

1940 Berlin ignored a Finnish request for mediation

USSR and Finland. Meanwhile, on January n,

ithe

when

the conflict was at its height, the German envoy in Helsinki

Wipert von Blucher strongly advised a tougher stand towards the

USSR. 2

what Germany was up to. On January

17, 1940, the Soviet ambassador in London wrote to the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: The German Foreign
Soviet diplomacy saw

Ministry

is

now

pursuing the line of playing off the

USSR

against

and France-using the Finnish events to this end in

the hope of causing a final rupture between. Moscow and the
Western powers-and of prolonging the Finnish war, allowing
for support to Mannerheim from neutral states (Sweden, Norway, Italy.-/5 SJ in the shape of Scandinavian volunteers or
troops from Britain and France.
In early December 1939 the Soviet government learned that
Germany and Italy were getting together to extend military assistance to the Finnish militarists and that Berlin was encouraging Italys military supplies to Finland. The Soviet government
was quick to act. On December 9 von Schulcnburg reported to
Britain

11

The Second World War. Papers of Scientific Conference Dedicated to

Moscow,
20th Anniversary of the Victory Over Nazi Germany, Book

1966, p. 302 (in Russian).

2a6

for

to the detriment

the

Finnish political leader of those days, as a British action against

In the northwest, where the Soviet-Finnish conflict, orchestrat-

efforts to strengthen its security. In Berlin they

its

that Britain

Juho Niukkanen, Tavlisodan puoiustttsministeri kertoo,

Werner

Soiler-

strom, Porvoo, 1951, p. 24S.

Documents on German Foreign

1726

Policy, Series

D, Vol.

VIII, 1951, p. 650.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

257

Berlin:

Molotov asked me

to call

on him

this

afternoon and told

few days Italy had

that Germadelivered about 50 pursuit planes to Finland, and
declared
Molotov
planes.
ny had permitted the transit of these
that
and
outrageous
and
that Italys conduct was provocative
with visible agitation that during the

me

last

Government would demand an explanation by Italy

completely
account. Germanys complicity, however, was

the Soviet

on this
incomprehensible to the Soviet Government.
Signed on March 12, T940, the peace treaty between the

German

greatly strengthened

settlement of the conflict

The

its

position in the Baltic region.

was a

bitter

disappointment to

Germany subsequently

endeavoured

to

Soviet-

aggravate

For example, in the spring and summer of 1940 German diplomacy sought to disrupt the talks that
were being held between the USSR and Finland on setting up
mixed firms to develop the nickel mines in the Petsamo district.
The Soviet Union officially protested to Germany. Nevertheless,
an agreeat the close of July 1940 Germany and Finland reached
Petsamo
the
cent
of
per
ment whereby Germany would get 60
commitFinlands
of
violation
nickel ore. This was in flagrant
But
1940.
March
12,
ments to the USSR under the treaty of
Finnish relations.

Finland was already moving towards participation

As

in aggression

USSR.*

part of

its

efforts

to counter the

nazi designs the

USSR

sought to help the small North European nations. On April 13,

Denmark and Norway and
1940, after the nazis had overrun
von Schulcnburg was
ambassador
Sweden,
were threatening
government was
Soviet
that
the
terms
told in no uncertain
of Sweden and
neutrality
the
preserving
in
definitely interested
violatexpresses the wish that Swedish neutrality should not be

ed.

from

least

get-

Italy.'

to the

relations
However, an aggravation of Sovict-Romanian
Germany. In
for
undesirable
was
conflict
point of an armed
the oil supplies irom
Berlin it was felt that this would imperil
purveyor of oil.
Romania, which was Germanys main foreign
able not only
Because of this circumstance the Soviet Union was
and neutralise
avoid a clash with Germany in the southwest
to

possible

Berlin.

against the

for at
Romania would be in a position to fight the USSR
on
counting
also
was
Romania
four months. He added that
ting aviation assistance

USSR

and Finland upset the calculations of the nazis. The

Germanys
envoy in Finland von Bliicher reported to Berlin that
that the
and
eroded
seriously
been
influence in Finland had

USSR had

Europe nazi Germany continued its anti-Soviet

with the US envoy in Buactivities in Romania. In a conversation
Foreign Minister
Romanian
the
charest F. Gunther in June 1940,
to receive a
shortly
hoping
was
Ion Gigurtu said that Romania
supplies
these
with
that
and
armaments
large quantity of German
In Southwest

German

was being

tion

counter-measures

when

the Bessarabian ques-

compel Berlin to take into

Romania on the terms for a

settled, but also

acset-

count the Soviet proposals to

the German Foreign
tlement of that question. On June 25, 1940,
Reich government
the
Ministry informed von Schulenburg that
to reach
necessary,
if
Rumania,
would be prepared ... to advise
question.
a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian

German diplomacy redoubled

time
ing

quarters

in

saw

as

which

it

At

same

the

rulits efforts to fan, in the

Romania, nationalism and revanchist feeling,

antieffective means of keeping Romania on an

Soviet course.

German diplomacy was also very active

proaches of the USSR. In particular, it tried

at the southern apto lure

Turkey with

promising to restore some Arab

the bait of territorial acquisitions,
result of the First World War,
a
lost
as
had
states which Turkey
Greek islands at the Aegcertain
Turkey
to
and also to transfer
2
Dardanelles. In Berlin they realised that the
ean entrance

to the

principal obstacle to

key could be the

diplomacys plans relative to iut

alliance with the USSR. Ernst Weiz-

German

latters

sacker, State Secretary

of

ed the German embassy

German Foreign
in

Ankara

to

Ministry,

instruct-

prevent any rapproche-

United States Gov1

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1940, Vol 1
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 1959, PP- 47 S- 79
!
P- 1 5
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. X, 9
,

Documents on German Foreign

Policy,

Scries

D, Vol. VHI.

p.

506.

2
11

Ibid., p. 914-

M. Andreyevs! and K. Dmitrieva, The Soviet Union and Swedish NeuSecond World War, International Affairs, No. 9, 1959 P- O-

trality in the

258

Eleanor Bisbce. The

New

Turks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phi-

ladelphia, 1951, p. 18717 *

259

in the vicinity of

Odessa, Kamenets-Podolsk, Minsk, and the en-

.
virons of Leningrad

The same

line

Afghanistan. In

was pursued by Germany

his political

and

relative co Iran

report for 1940 the Soviet embassy

Tehran wrote: German influence has grown perceptibly

in

in

2.

fact that

indicates that
Irans

accompanied by

has been

German

a considerable enlargement

of

the

trade apparatus. Hundreds of experts, businessmen, tour-

and other persons of the most diverse professions have come

ists,

to Iran.

major factor enabling the

ti-Soviet activities in the south

USSR
was

its

to counter

Germanys an-

principled course towards

developing equitable and mutually beneficial relations with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan in combination with a strong stand
against manifestations of anti-Sovietism in the policy of the ruling

BILATERAL RELATIONS

WITH GERMANY: TRADE

AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Germany is Irans biggest trading partner

Germany has begun to play an important role in
economy. The promotion of Germanys trade with Iran

The

Iran.

The trade and economic aspects of the

USSR and Germany were unique in some

relations

between the

respect. In a talk with

ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps on August 7, 04 ,

the USSR comthe Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of
Noting
relations.
trade
pared Soviet-German and Sovict-British
the British

Germany was

that

continuing to

sell industrial

plant to the So-

stressed that with Britain

Union, the Peoples Commissar

the British have not
arc not managing this; on the contrary,
. 2 Within a relatively short
contracts
even fulfilled out: former

viet

we

the political

equipment from
period of time the USSR received important
studied Gerspecialists
Soviet
of
number
Germany. Quite a large
nothing of
including the war industry. There was

the

the

quarters. This course

gave the USSR's southern neighbours an

alternative, actually the only alternative, to

being drawn into

and economic orbits of the imperialist powers of

two warring groups.
By the middle of the summer of 1940 the USSR had completed important measures to reinforce security at its European
frontiers. All of these

measures were aimed, one way or anoth-

at reinforcing the positions of the

er,

inevitable collision with

German

Documents on German Foreign

2 G0

develresources of the future adversary-a highly

and
industry
industrial power-in order to develop Soviet

technological

in the face of the

oped

noteworthy assess-

strengthen the countrys defence potential.

the
In a collection of articles published in

which placed German troops at an advantage, arc still telling

on the condition of the Soviet forces. One can see that the advantage of the German troops would have been far greater had
the Soviet troops had to meet the German thrust not in the vicinity of Kishinev, Lvov, Brest, Belostok, Kaunas, and Vyborg, but

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

industry,

country, lhc
kind in the relations with any other capitalist
was determined by a
Soviet attitude to trade with Germany
economic, scientific, and
desire to make the utmost use of the

USSR

fascism.

ment of the military-strategic aspect of these measures by the

USSR was given by J. V. Stalin soon after nazi Germany had
begun its perfidious invasion of the Soviet Union. In a personal message to Winston Churchill of July 18, 1941, Stalin wrote:
The results of Hitlers unexpected denunciation of the nonaggression
pact and the sudden attack on the Soviet Union,

'

man

Policy, Series

D, Vol. IX, 1956, pp.

27-2S.

noted: In

showed

consistently

in

1977

the Soviet

1S

Union

trade relations with Germany

was a hard-bargaining, intractable partner
pursued his own economic and defence interests.

its

that

FRG

who

it

The

that Soviet supplies of

opinion, frequently voiced by researchers
for the German warsupport
raw materials were a substantial
the volume and range
consideration
into
fails to take

time economy

and got from Germany.

of the supplies that the USSR demanded
agreed to increase
USSR
the
the
close
of
1940
For example, at
the USSR
Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
Ministers of Great Britain Durthe
Prime
the
USA
and
Presidents
of
with ,he
Moscow, 1976, P- 9 O n
ing the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1943, Vol. 1,
1

Russian).
-

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

261

its

dependence upon

of

which

it

was

in

short supply

itself.

requests for additional supplies of

new demands

USSR made

raw materials the

deliveries of machine-tools, trucks,

for

and

also

armaments. 1

The

fabrications about Soviet economic assistance to

Germa-

ny were completely demolished by the USSR. One of the rebuttals came from the Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In
a speech in the spring of 1940 he said that Britain and France
2

their attempts to justify their hostile acts relative

foreign
trade with the allegation that by our trade with
Soviet
to
Germany we are helping the latter in the war against Britain and

were continuing

is not worth a
compare the USSR with,
say, Romania. Everybody knows that half of Romanias foreign trade is with Germany, while the proportion of Romanias

France.

It is

not hard to see that this allegation

brass farthing. All one has to

Hi

iLliJl

national

product

do

the exports

in

basic items such as oil-products

the proportion of the

USSRs

is

to

Germany

to

and grain

national

much

is

instance,

of, for

larger than

product in our exports

Germany. Nevertheless, relative to Romania the governments

of Britain and France do not resort to hostile acts and do not
consider they can demand that Romania stop trading with
Germany. The attitude to the Soviet Union is entirely difto

ferent.

Germanys oil resources totalled 10 million tons:

of these 500,000 tons were produced by Germany itself, 800,000
tons by the countries occupied by the nazis, and 8,700,000
tons by Germanys European allies, with bourgeois-landowner
In mid- 1 941

Romania accounting

for the bulk of this amount. Altogether, in

period between

the

augmented by

its

1939 and

allied

Germanys

1941

resources,

of

tendentiousness

Germany

to

1939-1943, Droste Verlag, DQsseldorf,

Supreme Soviet

Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1940,

Dietrich

194 5, Vol.

1,

Eichhnltz,

p.

1977, Pof the

2S

the

overcome

Friedrich Forstmeier, Hans-F.rich Volksmanu, Kriegswirtschafl

Sixth Session of the

1940.

oil

and the occupied countries, increased

This clearly reveals the

20-fold.
charge that the Soviet Union helped

tung.

The Soviet diplomatic

In response to Germanys

uad

Riis-

382.

USSR. March

19- April

sa

1939-194, Akademievcrlag, Beilin, 1971, p- 223.

and foreign trade organisations

A re
of trade With Germany.
agreement
cd.t
Soviet-German

German government.

Two

Aiimicf

TO

agreement of. August 19,

agreements, chiefly the credit
contracts in Germany
Soviet
provided for placing

,959, which
in the course of

two years

linn

marks and the

of

per cent. Talks

to be

sale of

covered by a credit of 200

180 million marks

worth of Soviet

th
and economic relations between
goods, underlay the trade
rate
interest
extended at an
USSR and Germany. The credit was
USSR
October
,939 between the
in
started
5

the signing of

11, 1940, with

and Germany ended on February
the Soviet Unton was to
which
under
an economic agreement
manufac
materials in exchange for
supply Germany with raw
armaments.
tured goods, including
used the opportunities opened
_

An

up

in

indication
its

trade

of

how

the

USSR

and economic

relations with

Germany

is

the

aircraft
representatives of the Soviet
experience of a group of
delegaade
of
a
members
as
industry who went to Germany
Kch
aucraft
study
of the groups task was to
tion.

Gman

One

member
items to be purchased.
nology up to the selection of
wrote
Yakovlev,
S.
A.
designer
aircraft
of this group, the noted
were
wc
Berlin
in
arrival
our
few days after
in his memoirs:
Ernst Udet, deputy to Hermann

received by Colonel-General
was
at the time. General Udet
Goring who was Air Minister
Ministry and
technological division of the Air
in charge of the

4,
1

Kriegswirtschajt.

and

the
port on the fulfilment of
One is struck by the coot
stated:
signed on August >9, 1939,
proposals t
firms in submrtting
dinated actions of the German
1
schedules.
delivery
prices and
our requests both in terms of
our
process
to
time
long
German firms take an unwarrantcdly
firms
German
the
Conclusion the behaviour of
requests
maximum
and all commitments calls for
fulfilling our requests
out
fulfilling
and caution on our part in
important since the b
This is all the more
Germans.
to the
policy of
at present reflects the
haviour of the German firms

{in Russian).

Geschichte der deutschen

materials

raw

service

overtones

the political

sources

external

939j une

P.

Scvostyanov,

On

the

Eve

1941, International Affairs,

of

No.

the
4.'

Great Battle,
97 &.

P-

"

September

1959 -

263
262

had close

links

Messerschmitt, Dornier, Heinkel, and other

aircraft manufacturers.
lie told us at once that he had been
to

show

us

all

the aircraft, engines,

and

equipment used by the German air force.

After we had acquainted ourselves with the air equipment,
we began to doubt whether what the Germans had been showing
were the latest models. But a tour of the factories allayed most
of our doubts. The serial production of aircraft and engines and
the equipment used by the faotories quite convincingly indicated that what we were shown in Johannisthal comprised the bacontacts

German

with

representatives

on economic mat-

was active in upholding the interests of the

was seen clearly by the Germans. In a telegramme of December 19, 1939, from Moscow on the drawing
ters the

Soviet side

Soviet Union. This

up of a Soviet-German economic agreement the leaders of the

German
we had
sisted

delegation noted: As we expected, our first talk, which

today with Mikoyan, led to complications: Mikoyan in-

on the German compensation deliveries being made up of

The Soviet government inon an affirmative reply to the summary list, sent to Berlin

military supplies as far as possible.

sisted

of military contracts, including individual items that

have been
have declined the possibility
of delivering the following items: two cruisers-the Seydlitz and
conclusively declined in Berlin.

the Prinz

Eugen- the

We

blueprints of the Bismarck, heavy naval

mm cannon, mines, and torpedoes of the latest designs,

and plant for the production of artillery shells. The Soviet government considers, however, that nothing less than the deliver}'

guns, 240

the listed items will be an adequate equivalent to supplies

of

all

of

raw materials. 2

On December

1939, the

22,

enburg complained

to

German ambassador von

V. M. Molotov:

A. Yakovlev, Purpose of

My

There

is

Schul-

considerable

Notes of an Aircraft Designer, Moscow, 1974. PP- 168-72; P.A. Zhilin, How Nazi Germany Planned the Invasion of the Soviet Union (Calculations and Miscalculations), 2nd enlarged

programme

government, which

is

p.

438.

in

Unions

Soviet

is

wishes

in

the military

exhorbitant, and the

state of

war,

cannot

German

grant

these

W1

whenever the Germans

There was a resolute Soviet reaction
of the trade and economic
did not comply fully with the terms
on April 6, 1940, von
agreements with the USSR. For instance,
Mikoyan had pointed to
Schulenburg reported to Berlin that
no drasdeliveries from Germany. As long as
matter, he said,
this
change for the better takes place in
Germany there
from
and as long as no effective supplies come
deliveries of
resuming
Union
can be no question of the Soviet

tic

and oil.
t

Soviet-German contacts on
There was a constant strain in
trade and economic matters.
Soviet Union the nazis
After they had decided to attack the
the USSR to divert its
with
trade
sought time and again to use
Pacts
for a History of
Basic
entitled
attention. In a book
Georg J Tomas,
General
Economy,
Armament
German War and
armaments department, wrote:
chief of the OKWs economic and

grain

On August

the Wirtschaftsriistungsamt
14, the Chief of

dur-

Marshal Goring, was informed that

ing a conference with Reich

delivery to the Russians only until

the Fiihrer desired punctual
we were to have no further interest
the spring of 1941. Later on
. 3 However
the
the Russian demands
in completely satisfying
firms
German
that
recommended

Ministry
fulfilled
contracts even if they could not be
Soviet
accept
should
pretendWhile
contracts.
within the schedules stipulated in the
commitments, Germany used every
ing that it was meeting its
of equipment to the Ubb
opportunity to back down on supplies
and foreign trade
diplomacy
Under these conditions Soviet
political benefits
obtain
to
efforts
organisations redoubled their

German Foreign

with Germany, lrade talks

from trade and economic relations

Life.

Moscow, 1966, pp. 216-17 (both in Russian).

Akten zur Deutschen Answer ligen Polilik 1918-194). Aus dem Arcbiv

des Deutschen Auzwdrtigen Amts,

the

between representatives
no common language

in particular,

has been found on

The Soviet
field.

P.

Kcpplcr

Verlag

KG,

Baden-Baden,

Archives.
Soviet Foreign Policy

J.

edition,

Frankfurt on Main, 1961,

USSR and Germany;

of the

talks

economic

the

the delay of coal

of the Luftwaffes equipment.

In

in

instructed by Goring to

sis

disagreement

W.

Briigcl, Ste.lin.und Hitler.

Pakt gegen Europe, buropave.las,

na

ITibe Major War Criminals before

*bunal, Vol. hi, Nuremberg, 1947. P- 3 3

^Trial

the.

\ icn-

International Military Tri-

265

264

took place in

Moscow

on an increase of

sisted

and

of scarce machine-tools

ly

November 1940. The Soviet side inGerman exports to the USSR exclusive-

in

industrial

"/"cd

plant. In this connec-

urgently needed.

it

the

total

with goods worth

of

287,700,000 marks.

reported to Bertion the German representative Karl Schnurre

us the things
buy
from
to
desired
only
lin: The Soviet Union

which

r s.sr
USSR

THE NAZI THREAT GROWS

3.

After the Soviet delegation led by the Peoples Commissar

Novemfor Foreign Affairs returned to Moscow from Berlin in
delegaA. S. Yakovlev, who was a member of an economic
continue
to
assignment
government
on
a
behind
tion, remained
ber,

studying the

German

cow, he writes, I

aircraft industry.

from the railway station.

know whether

the

of air equipment.

summoned

was
.

Stalin, as

Upon my
the

reported that now, as a result of

the real level of their aviation technology.

And

the

this

rtr

enter their heads that the

they

received.

give

Late that night, before letting

curie.
I952 to a narrow
else.
anyone
nor
nomical matters. Certain y

peaceful

respite,

Yakovlev noted, "was

anchor

gain in time

was precious

especially for our aircraft in-

22,

1941,

showed

that the Soviet

Union had done

in

all

Documents on German Foreign

A.

S.

Yakovlev, op.

cit.,

p. 220.

Policy, Scries

D, Vol. XI,

1960, p

Ibid., p. 221.

'

..

in

Ludendorlt

d
.

of ecor the first instance

.
ores.
the
and
oil
wheat
.

>

to

an d to

1 thousand years.'

resources but

the

it

Bolshevism
also the centre of

was

op.
P. Sevostyanov,

The

Origins

edited

of

W-

by

cit., p.

Larry
Press,

Oxford,
Ibid., p.

97 3

P-

i,rau S y

A. Leach,

II7-

Second World Ws>

^
R. Louisj John Wiley

the

'

1
3

it

Not only was

P
*

so firmly

writes, was for

of conquest against
dcske for Lebensraum.
of fulfilli e
Hitler the main means
territories rich in
vast temt
of
USSR the possessor

Critics,

Jwc

**

1959-1940 it allowed developing new, modern combat

1941.*
aircraft and launching their serial production by
The results of the implementation of the economic agreement
between the USSR and Germany from February n, 1940, to

dustry: in

June

jxpkmmg

A war

in our favour.

working

The

Bt our true object

of the

in

genome

Each day

that had
English historian, notes

to

quotes Hitler
glish historian,

good as
me go home,

outStalin, said: Organise the study of the German aircraft by

overcome
Learn
to
our
latest.
with
them
people. Compare

them.

programme-had now

open op an area
is
The goal of the Ostpolitik
Barry
million Germans.for a hundred

as

of

underlylng

he planned

when

ns

tenet that in

one forcc capable

tte wa^

the

in

could

J%T* tha

**

international

us

Heinkelof this technology purchased by us-Messerschmitt-io9s,

representative
1 00s,
Junkcrs-88s, Dornier-21 5s, and others-arc
I said that
of the present state of Germanys aircraft industry.
successes
their
myopic
by
it was my firm belief that rendered
thought
the
never
let
subjugating Europe, the Germans

Russians

Hemis P he

^S^LSsldre
become
^

thiid

that the models

hegemony. In
drive for world
was
everything
nazi leaders

the Eastern

us in their sales

could say quite definitely that the Germans had shown

trip, I

its

Kremlin virtually
before, was very keen to

to

Germans were not deceiving

I

return to Mos-

A tainn

-Wbons,

Taylor

and

His
,

W>. a d "

IK

12-

267
2 G6

s.

Eberhard Jackel, a West German

cession of the individual elements

The
programme

scholar, writes:

of Hitlers

on several ob,ectrves.
foreign policy. It concentrated
powers and consoli
coalition of aggressor
First, to reinforce the
the preleader. Second, to complete
date Germanys role as the
ensure
USSR
the
against
paration of geographical bridgeheads
and
Balkans,
the
Eastern Europe and
total German hegemony in
bordercountries
in
positions
qualitatively reinforce Germanys
to create a situation 1
Third,
south.
the
in
USSR
ino on the
no allies on the internatiowhich the Soviet Union would have
German
the
after
alone,
let
nal scene cither before or,
further
from
USSR
the
divert
to
attack. Fourth, to do everything
create
and
capability
strengthening its security and defence
to the
Germany
form
threat
the illusion that there was no
in

suc.

major phases. The first phase was to restore Germanys military power and conclude an alliance with Britain
and Italy. The purpose of this alliance was to enable Germany
into three

fell

complete unhindered all the preparations for settling accounts

with France. In the second phase there would, definitely, be war
to

with France that would permit not only putting an end to Frances
striving

for

hegemony

Europe

in

expansion eastward.
in

And

would,

but

Germany from

time, eliminate the threat to

at

same

the

the rear during

its

only then, after Frances destruction,

war

the third and last phase there could be a great

of con-

send a GerSeptember 19, 1940, Hitler decided to

20,
September
next
day,
the
on
man division to Romania, and
to that country.
sent
be
to
mission
1940, he ordered a military

quest against Russia-which would be very simple militarily for

would no longer be any

there

On

July 22, 1940, Hitler ordered

conception of the war,

all

As

obstacle.'

begin

to

USSR. The

planning of an invasion of the

and

the

operational

strategic aims, the over-

preliminary

were

timetables

of

conference:
2
1 941.

German armed

the

Hitler declared

forces.

at

Russia must be demolished.

The war was

to last five

of
the

autumn of 1941.
By mid-November 1940 the German command had drawn up
a more detailed plan of war against the Soviet Union. It was at
first code-named Otto. The elaboration and specification of the
strategic guidelines for this war continued until the latter half
of December 1940. As the English historian Alan Bullock points
out, There was nothing improvised about Hitlers attack on

Of

was the one taken farthest in advance and most carefully planned for. 2
T11 accordance with the task of preparing for war against the
USSR in approximately August 1940 a shift of accents was begun

Russia.

all

his decisions

Eberhard Jackel, Frankreicb

poli/ik

im

zweiten

Wel/krieg,

in Hillers

Europe. Die dculsche Frankreicb

Verlags-An seal t,

Stuttgart,

1966,

PP. 20-2 T.

Gencralobcrst Haider, Kriegstagebuch, Vol.

dung

W-

ini

England

bis znrn

Knhlhainrucr Vcrlag, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 49.

The Origins r,j the Second World War,

Macmillan and Co.

Ltd.,

II,

Beginn des Ostfeldzuges

New

to

Von
(1.

7.

der gephmten Lart11)40-21:

6.

11)41),

Norway

edited

by E. M. Robertson,

20, 1940, the mission

across Finnish territory.

German

military units ap.

and Japan signed

to support one
undertook
states
Tripartite Pact. The aggressor
means at
military
and
economic,

On

September 27, 1940, Germany,

another with

their disposal

Italy,

all the political,

if

power not
one of them was attacked by any

in-

the Japanese-Chincse confiic

volved in the European war or
secret
this pact and a number of
secret protocol appended to
for comechanism
the
of
creation
provided for the
.

agreements

and
three countries m military
ordinating the policies of the
military technology, mutual supplic,
naval matters, the economy,
manand also technical personnel, and
of military equipment,

the pact boiled down to

power The political essence of
powamong the three aggressive imperialist
tion and cooperation
the
dividing
gaining world supremacy and
ers with the aim of
interac-

world among themselves.

1

York. 1971, p. 218.

September

German

to the

peared in Finland, too.

it

Deutsche

High Command

German troops in Romania.

was instructed to be in charge of
agreement with FinOn September 22, 1940, Germany signed an
convoyed by German troops
land on the transit of war materiel

this

The time-spring
months; it was to end by

early as

In the directive of the German

of
military mission in Romania

specified on July 31, 1940, at an enlarged conference of the top

echelon

German

Documents on German Foreign

Ibid., P- M4Ibid., PP-

M8-49-

Policy,

Series

D, Vol. XI,

P-

U'-

The

pact

was directed

against Britain and the

USA, and

also

despite the camouflage given to its anti-Soviet

the political
tenor by the provision that the pact did not atfect
ulterior aim
The
status between the signatories and the USSR.
Ott pointed
Eugen
Tokyo
of the pact, the German ambassador in
to bring
was
out in a tclegramme to Berlin of October 4, 1940,
bar
East.
the
and
in
Europe
about a new alignment of forces in
the
USA
repulse
be
to
could
for achieving this aim
against the

USSR

about
dupe world pubhc opinion

inventions in order to

acter of the forthcoming

Soviet-German

tal cs.

The means

and put the Soviet Union out of

4.

example,

action.

NOVEMBER

IN

that che

USSR wanted

a strong posi-

open the road to India

wanted
was asserted that Russia

SOVIET-GERMAN POLITICAL

CONFRONTATION

the char

1940

Iran

Afghanistan It
3
to the
dancllef as a free outlet

that this meetmg

newsmen offered the opinion
^

of a protocol msi
20 beyond the framework
not 8
allegedly
agreements
c c
nv P t -German

tical of the

TOP-LEVEL TALKS

Direct contacts between the leaders of the two countries

November were

the central

development

in

Soviet-German

in
re-

Berlin these contacts

lations during the latter half of 1940. In
significance
were regarded as a foreign policy measure of special

aimed

at lulling the vigilance of the

strengthening
lision

On

its

USSR,

diverting

security in the west, and bringing

it

it

from

into col-

Stalin a
1940, the nazi leadership sent J.V.

13,

its actions relative to Romania

Pact, and so on. In
Tripartite
and Finland, the signing of the
visit Berlin in his
invited
to
was
the same letter V. M. Molotov
1
character of
divertive
purely
The
official capacity for talks.

letter

German

this

it

tried to justify

on Germanys
before the
day
Hitler
a
signed
by
future
the

initiative

military plans for

was revealed

in a directive

^^^tLdcTmmitmcnt.

were

rS fe"

filkd
-

Bunl!

issued in

prelude
Berlin talks were the
Irott that the forthcoming
Japan, aud
Stance of four powers-the USSR, Germany,

BeZ
of a
11

the character
attempts to misrepresent
Hatly rejecting Berlins

with Britain.

October
in which

lsE##|=;
been engaged
th

ia along the

ZTdmer

European

frontiers of the

Soviet delegation arrived

USSR

German diplomacy

November 12, 1940. Point 5 of this directive

have been initiated with the aim of
discussions
read: Political
period. Regardless
clarifying Russias attitude for the coming
talks

of

began, on

what

the East

tinued.

foi
results these discussions will have, all preparations
conwhich already have been orally ordered are to be

Having announced
1

their

initiative

the

nazi

started

Germany,

Ibid., p. 5JI.

Italy

lllci

another

iXmic
i

Ibid., pp. 292-97. 3

l l-

(in

L F

relations. It

to
and a four-power commitment
expand
and to
sphcrcs 0 f influence

was proposed that the

Filippov. Notes

or,

the Third Reich,

USSR

should sub-

Moscow, i9?o. PP- 4-*5

Russian).

271

270

scribe
that

to

declaration

territorial

its

territory of the

Ocean.

Union

south

centre

aspirations

Soviet

The Soviet Union declares

stating:

in

national

the

of

the direction

of

Indian

the

in

on November 13 and 14. The head of

the Soviet delegation had two meetings with Hitler. Both were
unproductive. At the first talk Hitler mainly held forth on the

The

talks took place

overall military-political situation in the world,

argument

that Britains

hammering the

defeat by the Axis powers was inevi-

He maintained that Germany was in firm control of

whole of continental Western Europe, and that the German
Italian forces in Africa would very soon throw the British
of that continent. Therefore, he declared, the main thing
table.

to divide the British colonial heritage,

and he would

the

and
out

was

like to

The head

of the Soviet delegation refused to be

a discussion of imperialist geopolitics.

He

drawn

into

put to Hitler concrete

incisive questions related to ensuring the

security

of

the

USSR

and other East European nations, including the questions

of what the purpose was of the presence of German troops in
Finland and of the German military mission in Romania. Hitlers
purely formal explanations were found to be unsatisfactory
and were rejected. It was pointed out to him that in the case
of Finland it was obvious that Germany was massing troops
there. In Romania there were much too many military men
for a single mission and that, besides, the transfer of troops
was continuing. Evading an answer Hitler said he lacked information.

Then

Hitler started off again about his fantastic plan for the

division of the world, writes V.

M. Berezhkov, who

together

with V. N. Pavlov (First Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Berlin) as the interpreter took the minutes of the talk for the Soviet
side.

Britain, Hitler declared,

would be defeated and occupied

German forces within the next few months, while

would for many years be unable to pose a threat to
by

Europe.

It

was therefore time

to consider creating

der throughout the world. As for the

warm water

to

ports.

the

USA

new
a new or-

German and

the

the Italian

no point in discussing schemes

peace and security
ment was only interested in preserving die
Union.
Soviet
the
of the countries bordering on
interruption and proceeded
Hitler paid no attention to this

British Empire now

expound his plan for the division of the
conversation began
The
leaderless.
that it was about to become
seeming not to
Germans
the
with
to assume a strange character
.
And this went on for two and a
hear what was said to them

to

From Moscow, where

the delegations report on

011

Carman Foreign

Policy,

Scries

D, Vol. XI,

pp.

508-09.

first

mcc

Soviet delegation

next
the security of the USSR, lhc
the issues directly affecting
tense
more
even
was
meeting with Hitler, held on November 14,
that Finland was
re-emphasised
side
Soviet
The
than the first.
Wehrmacht. It Jointed out that
being virtually occupied by the
cr
available to the USSR, the

according

to

information

Soviet

along the
man troops were reinforcing their positions
immediate withthe
demanded
frontier. The Soviet government
of replying,
Instead
Finland.
drawal of German troops from
repercussions of a conflict
Hitler spoke of far-reaching
resorted to the language
the Baltic region, in other words,
threats.

Hitler said

it

in

was not

Then, returning to a conciliatory tone,

inconsequential matters. But he
worth wrangling over minor,
matters. Turkey, Bulgaria Rothese
to precisely.

was returned
these countries? Hitler
mania-what was Germanys policy in
the German and
regarded
government
Soviet
was told that the
the talks in
before
shortly
Romania
to
Italian guarantees given
Berlin

a^dkccted against

the interests of the

Valentin Berezhkov, History

Diplomacy), Progress Publishers,

1826

272

its

categonca
immediately examined, came
ing with Hitler was
was to be rejected and the
instructions: the German proposal
of
was to continue demanding an expiananon

governments, he said, they had already outlined their spheres of

Documents

s
Hitler to say that he cou
governSoviet
The
kind.
of this

Here Molotov, interrupted

half hours.

hear the Soviet considerations' on this score.

and

was interwhich included Europe and Africa. Japan

the Soviet
explained,
basis, Hitler
ested in East Asia. On this
frontier
its
south
of
territory
Union might show interest in the
access
it
give
would
Ocean, which
the direction of the Indian

interests,

USSR. The

Soviet

the Making (Memoirs of World War

Moscow, 1985, PP- 26 2 7

11

>

273

side

demanded

the

annulment of these guarantees, to

showed the world that Germany,

have come to an agreement
Italy Japan, and the Soviet Union
about a Soviet-Geron the spheres of interest. The propaganda
wrote: The talks

which

could not be done.

Hitler at once replied that this

Molotov then asked

Then what would Germany say

if

in

its

man compact

in-

looking

Molotov

to

invited
After the talk with Hitler, Ribbentrop
There Ribevening.
Wilhelmstrasse in the
his residence in the
principle
in
agree
to
expedient
bentrop said that it would be
ground,
his
stood
Molotov
on the matters touched on by Hitler.
as
expianation
an
for
wait
to
asking, if they would have long
Rib
Finland
.
and
Romania
were in

why German

troops

it the
hide annoyance that
bentrop replied without trying to
he
what
with
itself
concern
to
Soviet government continued
tie
through
discussed
be
could
they
inessential questions,

called
3
usual diplomatic channels. For

all

poses (the talk ended on this note.

practical

The

intents

and pur-

Soviet delegation

Berlin.

left

departure was
protocol aspect of the Soviet delegation s
courtesy: a
and
pomp
the
of
remained
significant. Not a trace
After the
words.
official
of
exchange
cold send-off and a dry
.

The

ballyhoo-German newspapers
meetings the nazis continued their
negotiations were of
kept trumpeting that the Berlin
significance.
1

On November

17, 1940, the

historic

newspaper Das Reich

Ibid., pp. 32. 33 -

Moscow von Schulenburg was

in-

*The German ambassador in

Ibid
continue the talks begun in
formed on November 26, 1940, that in order to
conditions, namely: Gerof
number
a
Berlin Germany would have to meet
Finland immediately; within the next
from
withdrawn
to
be
had
troops
man
by the conclusion of a mutua
few months Soviet security had to be ensured
Bulgaria. The ambassador at
and
Union
assistance pact between the Soviet
no reply.
was
there
but
Berlin,
terms
to
these
conveyed
3

continued.

south-western

Bulgaria guarantees similar to

borders the Soviet Union gave
had given to Romania.
those which Germany and Italy
he almost
What,
visibly.
Hitler
annoyed
This statement
guaranfor
asked Moscow
screamed in reply, has King Doris
consult
to
any case I shall have
tees? I know nothing of this. In
Europe.
of
in this part
with Mussolini. Italy is also interested
were by chance
Germany
If
threateningly:
And then he added
find them
would
Russia it
for sources of friction with

to

Berlin
1

view of Moscow

area adjacent to
terest in the security of the

in

PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS
IN MOSCOW AND IN BERLIN
What were

and practical conclusions in MosSoviet-German talks? J he brief on

on November
the Soviet ambassador in London

the assessments

about the results of the

cow

these talks sent to

for Foreign Affairs stated:

1940, by the Peoples Commissar
lay their hands on
As the talks showed, the Germans want to
security on the patTurkey under the pretext of guaranteeing its
out to us is the promise
tern of Romania, and the carrot held
Convention in our favour and
of reconsidering the Montreux
should help them in this matter. \X e did
it is suggested that we
17,

first, Turkey must remain

not give our consent for we consider that,
can be improved
independent and, second, that the Straits regime
its back. It
behind
not
Turkey and
as a result of our talks with
very
would
Japanese
and the
is quite obvious that the Germans
and
Gulf
Persian
the
much like to push us in die direction of
such
consider
we
for
question
declined to discuss this
India.
2
advice from Germany inappropriate.
visit
to Berlin enabled the SoOn a wider plane the Molotov
another firm rebuff on
yet
intrigues
viet leaders to give German
Germanys intentions.
nazi
of
some
a high state level and clarify
drawn about the
were
conclusions
In the Soviet Union important
the USSR. In
affected
it
how
about
and

We

international situation

the

first

place,

it

was noted

that an

Anglo-German

imperialist

hardly probable. Naturally, this allowed

rethe long term as a potential ally. As

compromise was now

counting on Britain in
of them-Bulgaria, Romania, and
gards the Balkan states, three

satellites; CzechoHungary-had been reduced to, in effect, nazi

about to be enslaved. As
slovakia was enslaved; Greece was
binding itself by close ties with
for Turkey, it was also bent on

Quoted from

I.

F. Filippov, op.

cit., p.

34

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

once

18 *

274

275

be

nation that could

Germany. Yugoslavia was the only Balkan
of the anti-Hitmember
potential
a
as
to some extent regarded
Soviet governthe
conclusions,
these
ler camp. Having drawn

on the questions raised by Germany

As will
from Ribbentrop.
any more, despite constant reminders
governSoviet
probing by the
be seen, this was a sounding out, a
not
did
which
of the Hitler Government,

ment did not return

to talks

ment

of the position

lead,

and could not

lead, to an

The Soviet Unions

agreement of any

rejection of the nazi

kind.

programme

tor divid-

Pact,
offer to join the Tripartite
ing up the world and of the
binfrom
troops
demand for the withdrawal of German

and

its

land and an end to

ing the security of

German expansion
the USSR, notably

regions directly affect-

in

in Finland, Eastern

Eu-

approaches to the Soviet Union

rope, the Balkans, and the southern
convincing evidence that
were assessed by the nazi leaders as
the

USSR would

not

manoeuvres and saw the

fall for distracting

EastGermanys actions
growing threat to its security from nazi
Gcr
that
conclusively
realised
ern Europe. In Berlin they also
conflict with
into
USSR
the
bringing
many would not succeed in
would not even discuss any
Britain and that the Soviet Union
Soviet-British relations In
aggravate
that could

combinations

the results of the November

generalising the reaction in Berlin to
Heinz IloUdack notes:
historian
German
contacts, the West
itself against the WestMoscow had no intention of committing
Germany on controversial issues reern powers and to yield to

Europe.
ambassador

lating to Eastern

The

British

Sir Stafford

n
u
Cripps sent the Bntisl
visit to Berlin,

Molotov
Foreign Office his evaluation of the
had been negative and
meeting
the
of
result
the
writing that
keep their freedom of action and
that the Russians wanted to
to get their support and
had not responded to Hitlers efforts
Near and Middle East
cooperation in German moves in the
thinking was articulated by
the German leaders, their

As

for

Historical
Falsifiers of History. Art

Document on

the Origins of

New

World

York, 1948, p. 59
_
War 11, Committee for Promotion of Peace,
Die diplomaliscben llintcrgrun e
* Heinz IloUdack, Was wirklich geschah.
und Doknmente, Nymphenburger \erder deutseben Kriegspolitik. Darstellung
lagshandlung, Munich, 1949. PP- 24-4i-

276

p. 146.

the

against
into the great combination

England. Churchill sum me

As was expected, the Soviet

up the talks in Berlin as follows:
"
project.
German
Government did not accept the
contacts in NoThe outcome of the Soviet-German top-level
histobourgeois
some
of
assertions
vember gives the lie to the
was a watershed of sorts
that the Molotov visit to Berlin
rians

Novem-

prior to
Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, that
and that
Germany
to
in
giving
been
ber 1940 the USSR had
visMolotov
after the
real tension appeared in these relations
event,
exceptional
The talks in Berlin were in no way an
it
relations during the
Soviet-German
in
watershed
let alone a
War. This outcome was naearly period of the Second World

in

the relations be-

from the angle of the general trends

the angle of the approach
tween the two countries and also from
problems that figured in the talks,
of each of them to the specific
Soviet-German relations,
thing that the tension in
in

tural

another

it is

hitherto mostly latent,

now

surfaced

unmistakably.

of this tension

The

new

which developed

was hence chiefly the form

However, Berlin of course,
sharp political confrontation.
a
into
negative
Soviet Unions
the
had earlier been aware of
phoEurope after the
Eastern
factor

attitude

to

its

moves

in

The Soviet Unions insistence on

ney war had come to an end.
Finland, its anxiety over the
from
the withdrawal of nazi troops
and its demand that GerRomania,
German military presence in
pact were all
non-aggression
the
many abide by the terms of
of Gergrowth
the
countering
of
policy
elements of the Soviet
man activity in areas adjacent to the USSR.
change prior to and after the
This policy was pursued without
those countries and reNovember talks, and it covered not only
Berlin. For example, in early Sepgions that were mentioned in
an official protest to Gertember 1940 the Soviet Union lodged

verdict. Ambasagainst the so-called Vienna arbitration

Molotov asked me to call
sador von Schulcnburg wrote that
Government to the fact that by its
the attention of the German

many

XTI, 1962, P- 3 IQ
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol.
Vol.
II, Their Finest
War,
World
Winston S. Churchill, The Second
-

British Foreign Policy in the

Llewellyn Woodward,
Her Majestys Stationery Office, London, 1962,
5

USSR,

contacts with
who, referring to the November
Husrev Gercde on
Germany
in
told the Turkish ambassador
to draw Russia
herself
exerted
March 17, i 94 i: Germany had
Hitler,

Second World

War
V

Hour,

p.

520.

277

had violated article III of the Non-Aggression Pact,

which provided for consultation V
As Germany stepped up its activities in Northern Europe, the
Soviet government instructed the Soviet ambassador in Sweden
A. M. Koliontai to assure the Swedish government that unconditional recognition and respect of the full independence of
2
Sweden is the unalterable position of Government. Premier
Hansson, Koliontai reported back to the Peoples Commissariat
action

it

for Foreign Affairs, received our assurances with obvious satisfaction. He asked me to convey his sincere gratitude to the Soviet

Government

for

its

statement which

is

so important for

the anti-Soviet sentiments of Bulgarias

envoy in Berlin
monarchist elite. In a talk with the Bulgarian
Bulgaria had
said
Hitler
N. Draganov on November 23, 194.
envoy that
the
assuring
to harden its policy towards the USSR,
the Soviet
with
relations
its
of
it should not fear a deterioration
the Triadhere
to
to
Bulgaria
wanted

Germany encouraged

Union.' Nazi diplomacy

partite Pact as early as possible

and thereby block Bulgaria

tempt to develop relations with the

USSR

at-

in a positive direction.

Hitler
Russia with accomplished facts,
addDecember
1940
on
3,
meeting
second
told Draganov at a
would
Russia
Pact,
Tripartite
the
to
adhered
ing: If Bulgaria
2
automatically take her hands off Bulgaria.

One must

confront

Sweden. It is moral support to the cabinet in its policy which is

striving to keep Sweden out of the war and at the same time consolidate friendly relations with the USSR. . The Premier sever.

al

times

the

stressed

value and importance of the assurances

In the evening of
al

December

18,

194. Hitler signed a gener-

directive on hostilities against the

No.

2t

USSR

for all

arms under

and code-named Case Barbatossa.

conveyed by me.
On September 7, 1940, Sweden and the USSR concluded a
trade treaty. Expressing the sentiments of Swedish businessmen
Senator Iljalmar Branting told the Soviet ambassador that the
consolidation of good-neighbour relations between Sweden and
the Soviet Union with a trade treaty is a real guarantee against
4
the peaceful occupation of Sweden by Germany.
Despite the counter-action by the USSR, Germany pressed

for-

ward with its foreign policy preparations for aggression. In November 1940, for example, acting through the German military
attache 'in Budapest, the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff
General Haider sent General Henrik Werth, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, a message notifying the latter that operations would begin against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. In
the same message Haider made it clear that a decision had been
taken

in

Germany

to attack the

USSR. In

this

war, possibly

against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Haider

wrote, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own
interests.

THE NAZIS SPREAD

THE SOVIET-GERMAN CONCORD

LIE

The preparations that were now under way in Germany for

activation
war against the USSR were accompanied by a further
outset
of the
very
of the line Berlin had been pursuing from the
that
lie
the
spread
to
Second World War: no effort was spared
relations
cordial
and
there were good, almost friendly

with the

Soviet Union. But

now

the

this line

motivations for

were different. While before the defeat of France German dipagencies

lomacy, the intelligence' service, and the propaganda

myth of Soviet-German concord mainly to perin the

suade the British and French leaders that Germanys rear
nazi
accept
the
to
them
compel
East was reliable and thereby
compromise,
it was now
anti-Soviet
wide-ranging
terms for a
fabricated the

found

necessary above

aggression against the

all

to

USSR

camouflage the preparations for

and weaken the Soviet Unions

efforts to reinforce its security.

Also indicative
Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XI, p. 1.
2
N. Andreycva and K. Dmitries^a, The Soviet Union and Swedish Neu68
trality in the Second World War, International Affairs, No, 9, 1959. P-

is

kept their

own

allies

the fact that for a long time the nazis had

misinformed, even though this was often

'ibid.
*

Documents on German Foreign

Policy, Series

D. Vol. XT,

p.

676.

Ibid., p. 69.
!

Trial uf the

Major

War

Criminals, Vol. VII,

P-

Ibid., p. 770.

279
278

in conflict

Much

with the actual requirements of their preparations for

USSR. An example is Hitlers message to

December 31, 1940, in which the situation was de-

Mussolini of

picted in optimistic terms:

would

Union

relationship with the Soviet

wc

on the point of concluding a trade agreement

and that therefore the hope is

are

is

tory to both parties,

satisfacjustified

still

for example, a speech delivered

convulsions that are

period of violent

fraught with

The

nazis

assurances of

peaceableness, their false

prise.

From

its

the Soviet

declara-

and
was going on between irreconcilable adversaries who
undertake
any major foreign policy action without takdid not
ing the possible response of the other side into consideration.

trys

The misinformation spread by the nazis by far not always deluded serious observers even in countries close to Germany. In
a report of June 20, 1941, to the Chief of the Hungarian General

USSR.

would say

Ibid., p.

that

humanly possible
it

is

USSR. In

the prevailing

become

situation

recalls

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Germany had subjugated almost

the entire industrial com-

was substantially boosted

and its mouth watered still more. The danger of a German at. 2
tack on the Soviet Union grew larger

so bent on destroying Soviet

is

had to make haste,

plex of Europe,

Soviet Russia have run so

that a military conflict with

directly, or, in the last resort,

government did all in its power to break this ring

any case erode the nazi attempts to undermine the counsecurity even before hostilities were started against the

We

General Henrik Werth on the state of Soviet-German reHungarian military attache in Germany Colonel Alexander Homlok wrote: The political, military, and economic
is

it

the

for

A. M. Vasilevsky. Fascist Germanys new action in Western

Europe, the take-over of France in addition to smaller states,
augmented our premonitions. We had to reckon with the fact

lations the

Russia as a great power that as far as

sores

or, in

Staff

deep and the German Reich ...

government knew

and trade representatives abroad

that following the end of the pho-

the Soviet

struggle

Germany and

military,

gression, or participate in

festering

contradictions between

political,

ney war in Europe nazi Germany had become increasingly active in forming around the Soviet Union a ring of allies and satellites who would serve as springboards for the impending ag-

hypocritical smiles did not change the fact that a fierce

tions

explosive international situation obliges us to be in constant mobilisation readiness so that nothing fortuitous catches us by sur-

and camouflage preparations for the aggression. In April 1941

the USSR was invited, with a show of pomp, to participate in
the Leipzig Fair. That same month a bilateral protocol was signed
on regulating the frontier along a sector of the Baltic Sea
region. In this connection, too, rumours were spread that something positive was planned in Soviet-German relations, that
there might be an exchange of visits by prominent statesmen,
that even J. V. Stalin might visit Berlin.

to fore-

its

military potential

inevitable."

99}

Hungary and the Second World. War. Secret Diplomatic Documents

the Eve and the Period oj the War, Moscow. 196:, p. 25? 0 Russian).

290

is,

very serious consequences. And since we

another
ist countries, it goes without saying that to one extent or
highly
complex
and
This
we feel the tremors of this earthquake.

nazis tried to use every development in the bilateral relations between the USSR and Germany to conceal the tensions

misinfor-

a great deal

are encircled by capital-

The

'

of

to heighten the mobilisation readiness of the peo-

indication of this

entered a

rossa.

see I

USSR

on November 5, 1940, by M. I. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at an institution of
higher learning in Moscow. I he international political situation,
he said, is now highly unstable. Increasingly enveloped in the
flames of the second imperialist war, the capitalist world has

open can also be solved in a reason4

able manner. As a matter of fact, this was only the close of
the second week following the endorsement of Case Barbathat the difficult points

An

ple.

very good, that

present

Germanys campaign

then, did nazi

was being done

add-... that the

like to

less,

mation delude the Soviet government. In the

aggression against the

of

M.

A.

I.

Kalinin. Selected

M. Vasilevsky,

Works, Moscow, 1975,

pp.

503-04

(iu

Russian).

Lifelong Cause, Progress Publishers. Moscow, 1981,

291

the USSR AND ITALY

the substance of

Romes

USSR.

with the

hostile attitude to relations

^
Germanys chief partner in Europe was
the imperialist plans for achievsolidly linked with the nazis by
new order m
establishing a fascist
ing world supremacy and
that these
held
was
it
Berlin,
Europe and Asia. In Rome, as in
.

Italian fascism, nazi

Second World

Italian fascism the

Foe

Wat

broke out at rath-

were

for aggression
inopportune time-military preparations
While the nations manpower resources
far from being complete.
the Italian armade it possible to form up to 150 divisions,
divisions on account
mys strength did not exceed 75"8
1
In combination with the intenof a shortage of armaments.
situation would develop
tion to wait and see how the strategic
non-belligerent power stand
this circumstance explains the
Mussolini assured
maintained by Italy until June to, 1940.
moment
to be your resetintends at this

er

Hitler: Fascist Italy

ve.

policy

was

not so

The central issue for Romes imperialist

was asserting itself in
much expansion in Europe-Germany
possessions. Ihc
colonial
continent-as the acquisition of new
lian leaders

claimed that Italy

had no

the

Union. Germany
not

on.lv

to

Ita-

free outlet to the ocean.

The more its populawas hemmed in by the Mediterranean.

greater would be the damage
tion and strength grew the
prison were Corsica
from this confinement. The bars of its
were Gibraltar and
Tunisia, Malta, and Cyprus. Its warders
Sl

policy in, above all, breakthe objective of Italian

After this there would be only one
ing the bars of this prison.
what ocean? To the Indian
aim-the march to the ocean. But to

They saw

between Libya and Abyssinia

Ocean across
North Africa? In both
Or to the Atlantic across French
from both the British and the
cases there would be resistance
that lies

the
Italys colonial interests,

war with Greece, and

the hostil-

Northeast and North

against
ities begun by Rome
inof Italian diplomacy for an
Africa reduced the opportunities
change
not
did
But
this
Union.
the British in

Soviet
tensive fight against the

s.

Economy, Moscow,
Vishnev, Fascist Italys Military

S
s
'

lettres secretes

du Pavois,

echangees par Hiller el Mussolini

Paris, 1946, p- 57

(i

1946. P- 4

94 o-i) 4 )),

destroying the Soviet

settle their

own

countries for cooperating with

many, but also to reward other
others that were laying
thcm-Finland, Romania, Japan, and

claim to Soviet territory.

showed an interest in organising
Italian diplomacy invariably
of the two imperialist groups.
an anti-Soviet conspiracy of states
out Mussoday after the world war broke

As

early as the third

Germany,

Italy,

conference of
urged calling an immediate
up the terms for a Germandraw
to
Poland
Britain, France, and
settlement between therm
Polish armistice and the subsequent
on account of the speed with
This idea lost its meaning at once
of a governgoing on and the virtual absence

which the war was

the
ment in Poland. On September 25, 1939
feelers
out
put
Attolico
Bernardo
in Berlin
,

0"

Italian

ambassador

out it the
the Westwith
peace
a
German leadership was prepared to sign
January
of
3, 1940Hitler
ern powers. In a personal message to

by the need to
Union. Russia is

all

In

practical

to find

peace-making was motivated above

against the Soviet
unite the whole of Europe
1
wrote 111 concluDuce
the
Europe,
alien to

Mussolini wrote that

Italy's

terms, the international

face to face

most

interests of

Italy

the Soviet

closely in Southeast

came
Mediterranean.
the Balkans, and the Eastern

Union and

Ft

first

of the USSR,
and Italy intended, at the expense
were
differences, of which there

lini

It

the Sudan

aims could not be attained without

Europe,

Italian imperial-

countries of these
its positions in the
isms attempts to reinforce
expense-had also an anti;Soviet
regions-chiefly at Britains
for
conflict with the efforts ol Soviet
thrust for they came into
and
Covertly
the security of the USSR.
civil policy to strengthen
Soviet Unions endeavour to ensure
the
countered
overtly Italy
of its relations with Bulgaria, Romania,
a positive development

Afghanistan.
Hungary, Yugoslavia, Turkey and

Editions
1

Documents on German Foreign

Policy, Series

D, Vwl. VIII,

p- 60S.

203

202

i,y

in the

Romes bid

autumn of 1939

to

form a Mediterranean

The Italian
(Balkan) bloc likewise pursued hegemonistic aims.
at
the time:
Rome
reported
to
envoy in Kabul Pietro Quaroni
Italys policy, especially our actions to

under our

states

followed here.
anti-Russian

Our

the

policy

the

of

aegis

in

policy

peninsula,

here

interpreted

closely

is

essentially

as

Afghans assume that one of the mainsprings

of

Italys

manoeuvre

present
in order

freedom of
and counter any advance by
ranean.

is

form a bloc of neutral

Balkan

the

it

activity
to

in the

is

retain

a desire to

actions

Russias

observe

Balkans and the Mediter-

major vehiAnti-Bolshevism was not only an aim but also a

Italian fascists used every opcle of Romes foreign policy. The
speak of their anti-communist leanings and fan

portunity to

was a Soviet threat to the countries of

use the
Southeast Europe and the Balkans. The purpose was to
the

myth

that there

chamthe
smokescreen of anti-Sovietism to portray Italy as
imperialist
Italys
ousting
thereby
pion of these countries,
rivals.
_

Anti-Soviet aims were at the root of Italian diplomacy

far distant from Italy.

to hurt Soviet interests in regions

actions

When

appeared in Soviet-Japanese
the possibility of some improvement
were defeated at the Khalmilitary
relations after the Japanese
Galeazzo Ciano instructed
Minister
Foreign
khin-Gol, the Italian
Auriti on October 12,
Giacinto
Tokyo
in
the Italian ambassador
this improvement.
prevent
power
to
his
in
1939, to do everything
to step
instructed
were
countries
different
Italian embassies in
on December 22,
up their anti-Soviet activities. For instance,
energetic steps to
take
must
You
Auriti:
cabled
T939, Ciano
policy and promote the traget Japan to adopt an anti-Bolshevik
ditional anti-Russian trends

among

the ruling quarters in Japan.

adopted and reaffirmed

Stress the anti-Bolshevik orientation
Italy.

111

While

it

clearly

saw the anti-Soviet and anti-communist nature

the
of the policy of the Italian leadership,

USSR

tried to avoid

rule out the possibilaggravating relations with Italy. It did not

D. D.

'

/.,

now

sene:

1959-1945, Vol.

II,

Stato,

Libreria dello

Rome,

diplomatic,
of developing normal
the
However,
country.
with that

tL

P- i

government

Rome

d.d

in the USSR
Italian firms from purchasing
all it could to prevent
the con
result
a
As
other markets.
goods that could be bought in
Italian
anc
Rome
in
trade miss, on
facts between the Soviet
co tes.pon
to
reduced
foreign trade organisations were actuary
:

dence

on speeding up the

issue

already purchased goods in the

of

USSR

tC

Fascist
sibilities

had
and on other minor mat-

licenses to firms that

USSR

Romes hostility towards the

development
for any appreciable

subverted the pos-

of Sovtet-Itahan rela-

policy became particularly

anti-Soviet accent in Italy's
between the So
the armed conflict
sharply pronounced during
political supextend
to
steps
Rome took
Viet Union and Finland.
In early
militarists.
Finnish
to the
port and military assistance
Ciano
Galeazzo
Minister
December 19 J 9 the Italian Foreign
thank
who
md
Fink
of
Minister
wrote in his dfary: I receive the
asks
h,s country, and who
me for the moral assistance given to
to
part
out
specialists. No objection on
for arms and possibly
Th
sent.
,
planes have already been
the sending of arms; some
long as Germany will
however, is possible only so
Germany consent? The Mims
will
longer
traffic But how much
settled, and confides
side of the question is
ter replies that that
to Finland, turnherself has supplied arms
to me that Germany
the Polish
stocks especially from
ing over to her certain

The

>

b0
I,?

November 1959

hysteria
anti-Soviet propaganda reached
tha
declared
had
Ciano

initially
proportions in Italy, although
of Sovict-Finmsh tela
development
the
in
interest
Italy had no
rampage of an 1
protested strongly against the

tions

The USSR

^"

Italian fascists On Deccn1

Sovietism on the part of the
demoncrowd of fascist-minded youths
1939 for instance, a big
note
Soviet
A
Rome.
in
embassy
Soviet
strated in front of the

was handed

to the Italian

Foreign Ministry on December

4,

039

embassy declares a strong prostating among other

and hopes that mea
demonstration
scandalous
test against this
things: ", .-.the

'The
1946,

1957

trade and economic tela-

p.

Ciano Diaries.

177

1939-/943,

Doubleday and Company,

New

York.

7.

Ibid., p. 532.

285
-

lor organising
surcs will be taken to duly punish those responsible
repeated.
not be
it and that such incidents will
1

reached such proportions

repeatedly
that the Soviet government was compelled to protest
of the
Cabinet
Chief
of
the
to the fascist government. In reply the
anti-Soviet campaign

The

Foreign

Minister

that Italy

theory.

Anfuso declared on December

Filippo

has always abided

anti-Bolshevik

policy

and

Soviet diplomacy

anti-Soviet activities

no opportunity to use

lost

by

iS

countering Italys

In

Italy

in

Germany and

its

influence in

Rome

Musorder at least partially to blunt the anti-Sovietism of the

conthe
of
taking
the
line
extent
solini government. To some
in

between the imperialist allies into account was effecthe offensive

tive. Preoccupied as it was with preparations for
between
confrontation
felt
a
leadership
nazi
against France, the
tradictions

Italian ally

its

and the

USSR was

undesirable at this moment.

time for this had not yet come.

the
that
January 19, 1940, von Ribbentrop requested the Italian charge
to Rome
daffaires in Germany Massimo Magistrati to convey

Berlin held

On

unnecessarinot to aggravate relations with the Soviet Union

at a meeting with the
ly. Ribbentrop repeated this to Mussolini
latter in

Rome on March n,

i940.

ached

on a

in principle

legation.

managed

However,

to inhibit a

visit to

Moscow

after the Soviet

to receive this delegation

Rome

by an Italian trade de-

Union

stated

its

willingness

procrastinated.

This was due not only to the anti-Soviet feeling of the Italian
leaders-thcrc had always been a surfeit of this feeling. In the

Germany, which had started its direct prepersistently

parations for an invasion of the USSR, had begun to
Bercontacts.
Soviet-Italian
promote
to
slow down all the efforts

autumn

inblocked the already timid claims of Italian diplomacy to

Berinformed
Rome
instance,
T
for
i94
February
dependence. In
>

/.,

none

srie,

Ibid., pp. 452-61.

Vnl.

II, p.

in

Rome was

instructed to cu

which he did with little trou e.

onwards relations between the
From the latter half of 1940
on account of the MusUSSR and Italy were in effect paralysed

governments anti-Soviet policy.

solini

G
Gm

he
for war against the USSR
In the period of preparations
its time
of
Mussolini
man leadership did not hasten to inform
Italian m.lita
Berlin did not insist on direct
table. In principle,
partEuropean
avid
inhibit any hopes its
rv assistance so as to
to
u.
best
be
would
leaders felt it
ner had for spoils. The nazi
and
Mediterranean
the
Axis interests in
Italy as a guardian of
.

by Britain.
thereby block any possible activity
On
idea of what was brewing
But the Italian fascists had an
GenItalian
the
of
May 30, 194., Mussolini told the Chief
o a
that he foresaw the possibility
eral Staff Ugo Cavallera
Russia and that we could not
:

conflict

between Germany and

Stay out of this because

it

involved the struggle

com-

against

496.

USSR

decision to attack the

n'idet 'informed Mussolini of his

3
In the night of June 22 I94>.
on the very eve of the invasion.
hostilities
Berlin with the news that
after a telephone call from
,

had commenced against the

Mussolini at once issued inthat Italy

leadership should be told
hours
o,.oo
from
with the USSR as

USSR

structions that the German

would declare a state of war

aspiration to be
anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, and
to enable
order
up the world in
actively involved in carving

Rab^

The Cer
Kutakov, Diplomacy of Aggressors
V. L. Issraclyan, L. N.
Moscow,
.967,
PP- *> 4
Fail,
and
Rise
Fascist Bloc. Its
-

tnon-ltalian-Japanese
" 5

Policy, Scries D. Vol. XIT p. 929.

hold that
Issraclyan and L. N. Kutakov
V.
L.
The
s plan
first time about Germany
the
for
informed
probably
the Italians were
in the
meeting
Hitler-Mussoltn.
matt* the USSR on June ,, .941. detins 3

^''boclZents on

Soviet

r",

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

D. D.

The German ambassador

short these contacts,

of 1940 nazi

lin

views.

:i

worsening of relations
with Italy for some time. There was some progress im economic
relations between the two countries, and the Italian government
agreed to begin trade with the USSR. An understanding was reSoviet diplomacy

between the diplomat, c representaan exchange of views

situation in the
Italy on the international
tives of the USSR and
There was a
straits^
Black sea
Balkans and the status of the
exchange o
this
to
from the naz.s
sharply negative reaction

li f

German Foreign

historians

Hitlet-Mnssolin tffa are

Recotth if this part of the
been published. V. L. Issraelya
far
have so
from the German documents that
106-07.
cit.,
op.
pp.
L. N. Kutakov,
1

287

206

imperialist coalition of aggressor powers to establish a

der, and the political and military alliance with nazi

were the factors that made

nazi aggression against the
territorial claims

no

new orGermany

Union. With the aid of the Wehrmacht and the party-state ma-

USSR

from

on the USSR,

let

in

its very first day. Italy had

alone any other causes for

The

LAST MONTHS WITHOUT WAR:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR

years,

to the

USSR had
War

Great Patriotic

to
it

man

played havoc with the former international pattern, substantially

restructured international relations in its favour, and secured a

dominant position for itself in the capitalist part of

Indeed, was it possible at the very outbreak of

the world.

the

of 1941 nazi

Second

Germany was
in

in

of strength

between the

USSR and

the

288

D. Eichholtz, op.

cit.,

p. 223.

for setting

up a Ger-

the basis of these recommendations the

Danube

states,

and the

German

Baltic region,

and then

to

colonies in Africa, the Belgian

itself

(in

Central

Southeast Asia.

German

terms of economic potential and raw material reSoviet

sources was shaping out by no means in favour of the

fascist bloc in

On

Third Reichs aggregate resources to 81,500,000 tons. The USSR

(in annual terms) produced half as much pig iron and steel. In
the production of coal Germany even without the occupied and
dependent countries-was far ahead of the USSR, while the potential of these countries nearly doubled Germanys resources:

than at the start of

territories

drew up recommendations

annual terms) was producing more than 36 million

tons of pig iron and steel, but the German-controlled potential
of its European allies and the occupied countries increased the

ny
[

and South China and then

The balance

six times larger

Japan occupied huge

European

Congo, French Equatorial Africa, and British Nigeria.

Let us briefly compare the economic indices of the USSR and
Germany just before the nazi aggression. In mid-1941 Germa-

Germa-

in a matter of 24 hours. It took the nazis only

Militarist

fields the strongest positions at

incorporate the former

ed for 44 days. The British expeditionary forces suffered defeat

and, abandoning their arms, were evacuated to Britain. Nazi
troops overran some Balkan countries. In mid- 1941 the territory
the war.

all

Colonial Reich.

dinavia, the

two months to occupy Norway. Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg ceased to exist within 19 days, while France resist-

controlled by

monopolies), our aim must be to use

German

space was to be enlarged to include the whole of Scan-

this

World War
ny would have been in occupation of 11 countries? And yet it
was so. It crushed bourgeois-landowner Poland in 32 days and
overran

said on October 3, 1940, at a sitting of the GreatGroup (the central head-

idea was put forward of greater economic space for Germany that would embrace Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway. Subsequently,

and political
the outbreak of the war. By force of arms it had

Denmark

was

eign Ministry

entirely different military, economic,

summer

in the history of

The European dimenimperialism. In

German
sion was now seen as not enough by
May 1940 the Economic Policy Department of the German For-

important to take into consideration the objective fact that

the imperialist coalition of aggressor powers headed by Germany

to foretell that by the

positions

that basis, to control the course of events.

THE SOVIET-GERMAN CONFRONTATION

months prior

command

enterprises, especially industrial enterprises, so as to be able, on

is

group than at

it

capital to seize in

NEW CORRELATION OF FORCES

In order to appreciate the difficulties that the

seizing

huge military-industrial complexes

quarters of the

DIPLOMACY NARROW DOWN

face during the last

wms

er Council of the Imperial Industry

was now an

first

IN

capital

Europes economy.

twentieth-century monopoly capitalism were emerging, notably

in Germany, and also in Japan and Italy. Within the next few

war.
6

German monopoly

chine

Italian fascism a participant in the

1
Anatomic cles Krieges. Neue Dokumenle fiber die Rolls des deulschen
Monopolkapitals bei dcr V orbereitung und Durcbjiibrung dcs zweiten Weltri
eges, VEB Deutschcr Verlag der Wissenschaftcn, Berlin, 1969, p. 293.
2
den Krigszielcn des faAnatomic der Aggression. Incite Dokumcnte

ebistiseben deutschen Imperialismus

3

D.

Eichholtz, op.

History of the Second

D. Eichholtz, op.

1926

cit.,

cit.,

im z^eilen Weltkricg,

Berlin, 1972, pp. 42-54.

p. 223.

p.

World War. 19)9-194 5, Vol.

3,

p.

377

223.

289

Of machine-tools Germany alone had three times as many as the

world.
in 1941 and was the largest producer in the
Germany was producing 75 pet cent
In the summer of 194

USSR

more armaments than on September

1,

this period the

1940, to June

output of tanks amost doubled.' From August 1,

or overhauled
22, 1941, the Luftwaffe received nearly 7,700 new
3
in 1941 was
firearms
combat aircraft. The monthly output of
are
almost 80 per cent above the 1939 level. But these statistics
economic
account
the
for Germany only; they do not take into
1

potential of the occupied countries

and

or

territories

the

re-

sources of Germanys allies.

USSR the enemys armed

mustered by the biggest
to
be
ever
powerful
forces were the most
under
arms nearly 8,500,000
had
Germany
countries of the world.
brigades. The strike
seven
divisions
and
comprising
214
effectives,
and motorised
panzer
consisted
of
Wchrmacht
the
35
of
On

the eve of the invasion of the

force

The Luftwaffe had over 10,000 aircraft."

The pillaging of occupied countries and the exploitation of

divisions.

and mid-1941 the resources that Germany could count on (includits allies and the occupied countries) grew as follows:

ing those of

iron orc-7. 7-fold; copper ore- 3. 2-fold; bauxites-22. 8-fold

roleum-20-fold;

aircraft.

and mortars

Gescbichte der dnetschen Arbeiterbewegung, Vol.

Dietz Veflag, Ber-

5,

1966, p. 287.

lin,

3
1

History of the Second

World War. 19)9-194),

Vol.

3,

p.

288.

World War, the former did all it could in the prevailing situaThe Soviet national income grew at a faster rate: compared
with the 1937 level, in 1940 the national income of Germany increased by 25 per cent, while that of the USSR by 33 per cent. 3
Soviet defence spending in 1940 reached the record proportion

Headed by

the

Communist

Party, the Soviet people readied

Armed

Forces for resistance to aggression at the cost of colossal effort and material privation. But the USSR could not surtheir

Germanys military-industrial potential, especially as

whole of continental Europe had been harnessed by Germany. Almost all of the countries in the bloc headed by Germany had a mobilised war industry, vast raw material and adequate manpower resources. In history there is nothing
to compare with the military and economic power concentrated
pass

nazi

now

practically the

hands of the Soviet Unions adversaries.

in the

Awareness of the actual correlation of forces between

USSR and the nazi bloc on the eve of the Great Patriotic

German

industry in the

War

oj 1959-1945,

Moscow,

1956, p. 11

Helmut

Schnittcr,

Rus-

Der

pre-

In the military-economic race forced upon the Soviet Union by

the nazi aggressive bloc during the initial period of the Second

Ibid., p. 289.

(in

pet-

for the

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 341-

cattle-3. 7-fold.

of 32.6 per cent.

petroleum.
1940 Romania supplied 60 per cent of Germany s
World War
Second
of
the
outbreak
between
the
In the period

and

and over 5,000 pieces

war with the USSR. Italy had a
land force of 1,340,000 effectives and an air force with nearly
2,500 combat aircraft. By mid-June 1941 Finland had increased
its armed forces to 650,000 officers and men; it had 307 combat
aircraft in its air force. Romania increased its armed forces to
703,000 officers and men; there were some 700 combat aircraft
in its air force. The Hungarian army had somewhat over 200,000
officers and men; the Hungarian air force counted 269 combat
of ordnance

prewar national income. On April 1, T 94 L the Wehrmacht was

enbeing armed and serviced by nearly 5,000 factories and other
divisions
German
Ninety-two
terprises on occupied territories.
were using French and other captured vehicles". In September
'

visions, 16 brigades, nearly 1,000 aircraft,

tion.

crops-4-fold

In military terms nazi Germanys allies provided 29 infantry di-

economic resources led to an unprecedented growth of Germanys military-economic potential. In the course of the first 17
months of the world war the nazis seized in the occupied coundouble Germanys
tries of Europe materials and property worth
their

grain

the

War

sian).
7

Gerhard burster,

Heinz

Helmut

Otto,

msiscb-deutsche Generals tab 1640-196 j, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966.

5
Burkhar Muellcr-Hillebrand, Das Jleer 1955-1945, Vol, IT, Die BMzfeld
Main, 1956,
Ziige 1959-1941. Verlag von E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Frankfurt on
P-

D.

Eichlioltz, up.

History of the Second

cit.,

p. 223.

World War.

1959-1945, Vol.

3,

pp.

334-38.

Ibid., p. 381.
4

io 5 19 *

290

Ibid., p. 382.

291

made

it

imperative

for the Soviet leaders to

do everything

to

stave off the nazi aggression as long as possible.

In February 1941 Germany began a secret transfer of troops
to the Soviet frontiers.

The information

received by the General

the Peoples Commissariat for Defence,

Staff,

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs made

increasing

threat of

aggression.

Some

clear

it

and the Peoples

that there was an

information

about nazi

Germanys preparations for an attack on the USSR was received

by the Soviet government also from foreign sources, but it had
with the fact that any information coming from the
governments was from countries that were pursuBritish
US and
and had repeatedly demonstrated their hosaims
imperialist
ing
tility towards the USSR.
to reckon

In a talk with Winston Churchill in August 1942, J.V. Stalin

need any warnings. I knew war would come,
1
but I thought I might gain another six months or so. Alexan-

said: I did not

meetings with Soviet

leaders, by saying that they were fully aware of the danger of
a German attack but still hoped that they could put off the evil

Worth summed up

der

autumn when the Germans would not

and then by 1942, Russia would be better prepared

hour-at
tack;

war.

his impressions of

least

the

till

at-

for

SOVIET DIPLOMACY CONTINUES

THE STRUGGLE
were moving towards aggression against the USSR. From December 1940 onwards the Third
Reichs entire colossal machine stood restively poised. In Berlin
there

was no

its allies

and

satellites

vacillation about the invasion. Soviet political coun-

ter-measures to Germanys hostile acts in the countries adjoining

could no longer cardinally change the situation: the

USSRs European neighbours in northwest and southwest had already become bridgeheads or accomplices in invasion, while the

USSR

the

had been in existence since September 1939.

and military strength denied alternathe countries along the Soviet European frontiers,

Polish bridgehead

Germanys
tives
1

Ltd.,
2

to all

political diktat

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. IV.

London, 1951, p. 443
Alexander Werth, Russia at War. 1941-1945, Barrie and

don, 1964,

Cassell

&

ished drastically.

The negative consequences

USSR

encirclement

by

foreign
capitalist countries, which restricted the opportunities of its
months
last
during
the
policy, came to light with particular clarity

before the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. Nazi Germany

intensified its anti-Soviet activities in Southeast Europe and other
regions adjoining the Soviet Unions frontiers. Among these acTripartite Pact,
tivities were the involvement of Bulgaria in the

more German troops in Romania and Finland,

the armed invasion of Yugoslavia a day after the signing of the
Soviet- Yugoslav Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression, and
the stationing of

the intrusion by

German

aircraft into Soviet air space.

The

So-

viet government protested strongly against these acts but avoided

immediate confrontation. But the political struggle between the
USSR and Germany was growing sharper.
For example, after the Soviet government had made a statement to Germany on January 17, 1941, through its embassy in

Berlin, E. Weizsacker, the State Secretary of the

German Foreign

The Russian ambassador called

on me today. He declared: The Soviet government has reand
peatedly stated to the German government that Bulgaria
the
USSR
security
zone
of
the territory of the two straits are a
and it (the USSR -P.S.) cannot remain indifferent to develop-

Co.

ments that are endangering

ment deems

security.

Hence, the Soviet governit

will regard the appear-

terests.

and non-aggression was signed in Mosand Yugoslavia on April 5, 1941. Germanyclear that it took a negative attitude towards this treaty.
In reply ambassador von Schulenburg was told that this Germanys posture would have no effect on the Soviet Unions attitude
to Yugoslavia. The Soviet government has carefully considered
2
its step and adopted a final decision.

treaty of friendship

cow by
made it

J.

Lon-

it

its

necessary to warn that

ance of any foreign troops on the territory of Bulgaria and the

two straits as a violation of the Soviet Unions security in-

Rockliff,

of the

Ministry, wrote in his diary:

Germany,

while their ruling quarters, impelled by anti-Sovietism, did not

look for an alternative, submitting to strength. Diplomacy s posdiminsibilities for putting off the commencement of aggression

the

W.

USSR

Brugel, op.

cit.,

p.

289.

Soviet Foreign Policy Archives.

p. 120.

293

292

mnffrence of the nazi leaderFebruary 1941

Ill

reported that

the Soviet embassy in Iran

a
nazi agents were actively engaged in efforts to turn Iran into
particularly
USSR,
against
the
subversion
and
spying
base for

key areas of
in

number

the Soviet rear. Fascist associations had been formed

towns situated near the Soviet fron-

of Iranian

and also in Iranian ports on the Caspian-Pahlevi, Bandarc

Shah and others. Subversive groups were being trained there
Soviet Turkmenistan.
to be smuggled into the Baku oilfields and
From Kabul the Soviet embassy reported in early 1941 that
German agents had stepped up their anti-Soviet activities in Afghanistan. The German colony was distributing propaganda leaffeeling among
lets and brochures designed to provoke anti-Soviet
gangs were
subversive
the Afghan population. More terrorist and
smuggle
tried
to
and
posts
frontier
organised that attacked Soviet
and
Uzbekistan,
Turkmenia,
into
German spies and wreckers
had
agents
fascist
that
disturbing
Tajikistan. It was particularly
basmaches
also
with
and
emigres
White
established contact with
tier

(gangs of fanatics led by former landowners.-/^.).'

In Iran and Afghanistan Soviet diplomacy continued
to

weaken German

its

efforts

influence in these countries.

Soviet policy in the Balkans and also North Europe was evidence of the Soviet Unions firm intention to continue defending
fascist threat.
the interests of small countries in the face of the

1941, Milan Gavrilovic, a former Yuas follows:

goslav envoy in the USSR, assessed the situation
on secretly
carried
.the anti-Soviet activities which had been
the
Finland,
in
previously
by Germany for a considerable time

Subsequently, on June

6,

and the Ukraine had aroused increasing concern in

The Soviet Government endeavoured to impede
Moscow.
German action in the Balkans by its assurance to Turkey, by its
statements relative to Hungary and Bulgaria, and by the signaThe sigture of the Non- Aggression Pact with Yugoslavia.
German
the
lost
upon
not
incidents
was
nificance of these several
Baltic States,
.

Government.
Indeed,

saw the

Walter Schcllenbcrg,

anti-fascist thrust of

member

intelligence elite, recorded in his diary Hitler

of the

Ger-

assessment

Unforbs ""claims

= t f-

other words, that Stalin

would

soon be ready for

Hitler reflected the

Ibid.

Foreign Relations of the United

Vyl.

>956. pp-

ac^Ugrava-

"fore

Leach of Britain, notes that

was increase
with the claim that there
to attack the USSR
confirm over
towards Germany. But the
hos' Ihy by the USSR
were marnly
the second half of ,940
Finland and Rumania in
> and the
r
decision to attack Russia in 9 4
foe outcome of Hitler's
of
deterioration
Thus, the
policy that attended it.
tv

changes o

Russo-German

was

relations

far

more

the result than the cause

East.
of wit-Ws decision to strike in the

a cc the USSR and Germany

strained relations between
friendship
between them despite the _
Cd the bilateral contacts
the
instance,
For
nazis.
the
spread by
legend that was still being
to Get
transfer
the
of
question
German authorities raised the
residing in territories reunitmany of persons of German origin
government
,939-1940. The Soviet
ed with the Soviet Union in
persons.
such
of
departure
avc its consent to the voluntary

The

The Soviet Union protested

Germany time and again m

frequent frontier incidents. The

to

connection with the increasingly

German military attache in Moscow

Wernet Tippelskirch report

The Secretary General of the

ed to Berlin on April aa,

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
today and delivered to

'^Yarry
States.

war wtth Ger-

While such statements by

blame for this ag_
relations, they put the
tion of Soviet-German
arguments
inventing
Hitler was
stavation on the Soviet Union.
referring
Union,
Soviet
impending attack on the
to justify the
prev
to a
resort
to
readiness
and its
Soviet aggressiveness
arguments" were later used
tive strike. These
sreptesent
German aggress.on and m
historians to whitewash
mote
in the West have
gn policy. Serious researchers
of theng Bar;
juggling with facts. One
ha , nee denounced this
H.tler )ust,fied hts deers on

V^Tschdlmberg,

Soviet
quoted as saying that the
Ruman.a
and
Bulgaria
with regard to Finland,

^HitlerYas
4

.94,

in Berlin they distinctly

Soviet foreign policy.

man

0 f the

Leach,

me

summoned me

a note verbale, in

Memorten, VerUs

fur Politik

German Stntesf Apia#

Russia.

to his office

which the urgent

und Wirttchaft, CotiUy-'SW.

P-

J S I-

r
request

is

again

violations of the

made

that

we

take measures against continuing

boundary of the

USSR

by German planes. Vio-

had increased considerably of late. From March 27 to

1
80 such cases had occurred.
The Soviet embassy in Berlin made wide use of the bilateral
contacts with Germany to rescue prominent anti-fascists, progressive scientists and writers, and leading personalities of the communist movement form the clutches of the Gestapo. A long struggle was waged, for example, for the release of Paul Langevin, a
leading French physicist and a confirmed anti-fascist. This struggle
was joined by Soviet diplomats in Vichy, France. As a result Jean-Richard Bloch, a prominent French writer and Com-

lations

April

was

munist,

also released. Staying in

Moscow

after

his

release

Bloch did much to mobilise world opinion against nazism.

LAST WEEKS
AND DAYS OF PEACE
the end of

March

persistent

rumours began

to circulate in

were named: April 6, April 20, May 18 and, finally, June 22. The Soviet embassy kept Moscow informed of all
these alarming signals. Over a period of several months we at
the embassy were able to observe how Germany was steadily
taking steps that were obviously designed to prepare for operations on the Eastern Front, writes Valentin Berezhkov. In

formation

about these

preparations

reached

from various

us

First of

all

that in

there

were our friends

in

Germany

itself.

We

various parts of the Reich and particularly in Ber-

groups like Die Rote Kapelle continued to funcunderground. Overcoming immense difficulties and at times

lin, anti-fascist

risking their lives the

Union

German

anti-fascists contrived to

of the danger that threatened

it.

At a conference

of senior officials of

Documents on German Foreign Policy,

V. M. Berezhkov, op. cit., pp. 65-66,

warn the

They passed on

important information about the preparations being

Germans for an attack on the USSR."

just

returned

opinion about the

from Moscow, told them of J. V.

danger of nazi aggression against the USSR. They
were instructed to closely review all the available information
s

on

this matter.

was compiled towards the end of May.

Germany had practically completIts main conclusion was
of the Soviet Union and
invasion
for
an
ed its preparations

circumstantial report

that

that the scale of these preparations left

no doubt that troops and

hardware had been massed. Documents indicated plainly that

Germany was ready to attack the Soviet Union at any moment.

CPSU Central Committee and the CounCommissars instructed the Peoples Commissarithe
ats for Defence and the Navy to accelerate the build up of
Armed Forces. As early as February 1941 the Soviet government
had endorsed the plan for mobilisation into the Red Army.
In this situation the

cil

of Peoples

13, 1941, the Soviet

General

Staff

ordered the trans-

administrations from

and four army

early June almost 800,000 men
were called from the reserves for re-training. All were assigned
infantry divisions

interior to frontier districts. In

as reinforcements for the troops of the western military districts

fortified sectors near the frontier.

and

This allowed bringing up

to strength nearly 100 infantry divisions, some fortified sectors,

air force units, and other troops. On June 14- 9 I 94 C the com.

mand

of frontier districts

ments

to field

and 25; on

command

was

move

instructed to

posts in the

front depart-

period between

June 19 orders were received

to

June 21
camouflage aero-

units, military installations and other objectives.

But the planned mobilisation and organisational measures were
not completed on account of a miscalculation in determining the
time of the nazi attack; besides, the countrys economic possibilities did not allow them to be carried out in the time allocated

dromes, army

sources.

Soviet

who had

ambassador,

increased

fer of 28

ious dates

tion

1941 the

Stalin

On May

Berlin that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union. Var-

knew

May

8,

At

in early

Berlin

made by

the

the Soviet embassy in

by history.

The political and state leaders

ing and exerted maximum efforts

D. Vol. XI, pp. 602-03.

country saw war com-

to delay the Soviet

Unions

entry into it, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky

wrote in his memoirs. This was a sensible and realistic policy.

'

Series

in the

Ibid., p.

72;

temilioru/l Affairs,

Koblyakov, On
No. 5, 1970, p. 90,

T.

the

Way Home

from Berlin. 194 1 -

^n~

297

CONCLUSION

dipimplementation required above all, a skilful conduct of

especially with the
lomatic relations with the capitalist countries,
Its

aggressors.

.
.

The whole problem,

down

in

to the length of time

my opinion, he continues, boiled

we had to continue that policy. After
,

war preparations on Sothe last month; that was

viet borders quite openly, especially in
speed} moexactly the time when we should have carried out a
footing,
full
war
bilization and transferred border districts to a
had
imwho
Stalin,
building up strong and deep-lying defences.
evidentwas
policy,
foreign
mense influence on Soviet home and
all,

Nazi Germany actually had made

decisions
unable to seize the right moment. New and urgent
with
lives,
our
in
epoch
were needed, opening a new historical
give
to
not
so
as
time
the
same
maximum vigilance observed at
ly

the Nazis a pretext for accusing us of aggressiveness.

While exercising the utmost caution, the Soviet government

Germany
used diplomatic means to make it more difficult for
on
end,
June
94 U the
To
this
Union.
14,
Soviet
to attack the
J
quartSoviet
that
stating
report
TASS
published
a
Soviet press
for the rumours
grounds
no
are
there
opinion
that
the
ers are of
attack the
about Germany intending to denounce the pact and
USSR. This report, which was mainly a military-political soundthe Soviet go\ing of Germanys immediate intentions, mirrored
off the output
ernments striving to use every opportunity to
German
the
from
break of war. However, there was no reaction
necwere
explanations
now it considered that no
government

by

essary.
it

Germany had completed

for

war and

could not be stopped by diplomacy.

govNevertheless, in an attempt to preserve peace the Soviet

ernment
in

its

preparations

tried

once more to contact the

the evening of June 21.

On

German government

instructions from the

government

Schulenburg to discuss
V. M. Molotov invited ambassador von
same night, at 00.40
That
relations.
the state of Soviet-German
Berlin was sent a
in
ambassador
Soviet
hours on June 22, the
with von Schulentalk
Molotovs
of
content
the
telegramme with
Ribbcntrop or
with
meet
to
instructed
ambassador
was
burg. The

deputy and raise the same questions.

the GerThis mission remained unfulfilled: a few hours later
man armed forces perfidiously invaded the Soviet Union.
his

A. M. Vasilevsky, op.

cit.,

p. 84.

pe-

years, the
Covering a span of a little less than two
stretch of time belast
the
riod of the Second World War was
This was an exWar.
Patriotic
fore the outbreak of the Great
relatiinternational
In
Union.
Soviet
tremely difficult time for the
to be maxihad
there
fascism,
German
ons, notably with regard to
initial

forces in the world.

realism in assessing the balance of
was complemented
fascism
German
The mounting threat from
imperialGermanys
of
activities
anti-Soviet
by the unremitting
counall
the
anti-Soviet thrust of almost
ist adversaries, by the

mum

militararound the USSR. In the Far East Japanese

Union
Soviet
For the
ism was awaiting its hour for aggression.
internain
directions
political
there were no calm and reliable
converging on it from
at the time. Danger was

tries situated

tional relations

practically everywhere.
security were tackled
Problems involved in the Soviet Unions
and the SoCommittee
comprehensively by the CPSU Central
internationof
dynamics
with the
viet government in accordance
of
spectrum
entire
the
of
account
al developments and with
two
the
with
relations
Unions
factors determining the Soviet
countries. The stratimperialist groups and with neighbouring

egy and

tactics, the

general foreign policy activity of the

USSR,

Soviet diplomacy in ensuring

the methods and main guidelines of
its international position
strengthening
and
security
the USSRs
the internationwere directed towards the central aim of creating

enabling the Soviet people successfully to continue

for defence against the
building socialism and actively prepare
from German
imminent threat from world imperialism, notably
al conditions

fascism, which

was

its

strike force,

299

Vigorously championing

the interests of the Soviet

Soviet foreign policy in 1939-1941

was the

people,

policy of the power-

which was based on the Leninist principles of

and peaceful coexistence. In its in-

ful socialist state

proletarian internationalism

with the peoples of the USSR. The victory of the revolutionary

forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was of immense significance. Th peoples of these countries found salvation from capoppression in uniting with the USSR. The Soviet Union
thereby discharged an internationalist duty to the entire revolu-

italist

ternational

was

activity

that the

the

Communist

greatest contribution

Partys
to the

process consisted in strengthening the

USSR

point of departure

world

revolutionary

as the

main achieve-

ment and bulwark of the world proletariat. The efforts of

Communist Party and the Soviet government to consolidate

the
the

main foreign policy objectives in 1939T94T and over a longer term, chiefly in providing better conditions for repulsing fascist aggression during the Great Patriotic

factor in achieving the

result of the

field of foreign policy

Second World

was

Communist

that the Soviet Unions involvement

resources,

first place, for whose solution

was so little time.
The results of Soviet foreign policy activity during the initial
period of the Second World War are of colossal significance in
terms of the historical perspective as well. The USSR, a developed
socialist society now building communism, exists within
the
state frontiers that were ensured chiefly in 1939-1940.
During the first years following the establishment of the Soviet

government, the imperialist powers took advantage of young

Soviet states weakness to impose predatory arrangements rela-

European frontiers. In 1939-1940 this historical injustice was redressed. The peoples of Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina were reunited
1

USSR

that act

in ensuring the security

its

firmation that the foreign policy activity of the Soviet

Union was

on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

The Soviet Unions persistent and vigorous actions were the
main factor in preventing in 1939-1941 the consolidation of the
effective

camp on an anti-Soviet basis. The foreign policy of

Communist Party saved the Soviet people from a war against
combined forces of imperialism. This was one of the cardinal
imperialist

the

results of Soviet foreign policy

Nazi Germanys adversaries

to

that

realisation

the

struggle against fascism

during that period.

in the West gradually came round

cooperation

was

vital to

contributed to the failure of the

ters in Britain,

with

USSR

in

the

them. Soviet foreign policy

Munich

France, and also

the

in the

policy of the ruling quar-

USA,

all

of which were

seeking to resolve the internal contradictions of the imperialist

system at the expense of the USSR. The events of 19 39-1941
dramatically demonstrated the danger of the policy of encouraging

and

USSR, of playing all

The strategy of appeas-

inciting aggressive forces to attack the

sorts of anti-Soviet cards to this end.

ing the fascist aggressors booinerangcd catastrophically for

its

its

History of Soviet Foreign Policy. 1917-1980, Vol.

cow, 1980, p. 417 (iq Russian),

J00

is

western frontiers was recognised finally and completely by

conference. This was con35 nations that took part in the

of

problems, military problems in the

there

USSR

bilateral treaties

European Conference on Security and Cooperation. By

all

War was

defence industry in the face of the

tive to

in

the foreign policy activity of the

and reorganising the work of the

imminent war. However,
some of the problems linked to the nations defence were not
solved. On account of the shortage of resources and the lack of
time many of the planned measures were not carried out in
full .
But it is also true that never before had the Soviet political and military leadership been faced with so many challenging
military-industrial

of the existing state frontiers of the

between the USSR and socialist

countries, between the USSR and the FRG, and between Poland
and the FRG, and also in the series of agreements on West Berlin, and the treaty on the basis of relations between the GDR
and the FRG. Lastly, this is confirmed by the Final Act of the

Partys activity in the

postponed and the possibility was

given for further strengthening its defence capacity, expanding its
in the

The immutability
recorded

Soviet Unions international position and security were a major

War.
The principal

tionary process.

1,

1917-194), Mos-

architects.

By

foiling the

and the

USA

to

many attempts
provoke the

of

USSR

the Anglo-French coalition

into

a clash with nazi Ger-

Soviet foreign policy brought London, Paris,

and Washington round to understanding that such cooperation

many prematurely,

301

would not be achieved by bringing pressure

to

bear on the

USSR

deal with Hitler behind its back. The ruling

more lesson
quarters in Britain, France and the USA learned one
the USSR
use
to
namely, that their attempts
39- 94
of

or trying to

make a

1,

their imperialist interests

in

were invariably cut short and

led

USSR

but

with the
not only to a deterioration of their relations
international
overall
also to a deterioration of their

positions.

the creation of the

All this provided important prerequisites for
that Soviet polishowed
and
anti-Hitler coalition in the future

was

correct.

The

Soviet Unions entry into the

cy

war

as a result of the nazi

process of turninvasion was the decisive factor completing the

liberation.
of
war
just
a
into
War
ing the Second World
played by the
Fascisms defeat, in which the decisive role was
triggered a powerful wave of socio-political
the
across the entire planet and strengthened
swept
changes that
forces of peace world-wide.
no policy was possiIn the situation obtaining in those years
the very first day
ble save that pursued by the Soviet Union from
the vital inwith
consistent
of the Second World War. It was

Soviet Union,

also of the peoples of

terests not only of the Soviet people but
possibility
of a military
the
other countries. Our Party foresaw

clash with the forces of imperialism

country and the people for defence.

and had been preparing the

The socio-economic

achieve-

and the ideoments gained during the prewar five-year plans

the building
in
won
society
Soviet
of
logical and political unity'
the Great
in
victory
peoples
our
of socialism predetermined
Patriotic

The
al

War.

prehistory of the Second

point that

disunity

World War

bears out the cardin-

war must be fought long before

and weakness

it

breaks out. The

of the anti-war forces in

the

West

al-

a very important lesson

to start the war. This is

unity,
world's progressive forces for vigilance,
the
of
calling all

lowed the nazis

and an active struggle against war.

The present international situation

fundamentally from
neither cancel socan
Imperialism
the situation before the war.
forces,
progressive
the
cialisms gains nor halt the advance of
peoples.
of
independence
movement for the liberation and
differs

the

L.

I.

Publishers, Moscow,
Brezhnev. Following Lenins Course, Progress

in
The peoples of Europe have been living
alignment
the
years. The historic changes in

development and perfection

of

peace for neatly 4

of social forces, the

qualitatively

weapons o

new
and

technological

that

it

scientific
mass destruction as a result of the
dimension to the problem
new
entirely
revolution have given an
the CPSU and the international
of war and peace and enabled

possi

is

communist movement to draw the conclusion

another world war.
and objectively necessary to prevent
significance of the othet
Nor has anything been lost of the
and Soviet foreign policy of the
lessons of international relations

.1

period of i939 _I 94i,

there is a pressing need
The most important of these is that
in
opposition by all countries interested
for consistent and timely
policy,
aggressive
of
preserving peace to any manifestations
with an incomparably greater
in our day are fraught

which

threat than those

which led

to the

Second World War. To an

for the participation of the

equal extent this applied to the need
after war breaks out but
decisions-not
masses in foreign-policy
war.
fighters for the prevention of
as active and conscious
events of 40
to be learned from the

major lesson

Another

peace forces is disasthat a split in the ranks of the

the great cause of struggle
trous, that these forces must unite in
their approach to other matters.
for peace despite differences in
the Great Patriotic War, tie
Lastly, today, as on the eve of
policy of peace, in which the
Soviet Unions Leninist foreign
organically combined
state and class interests is

years ago

is

defence of

its

with humane concern

for the interests of all

mankind,

is

a fac-

prevent
for a successful struggle to
tor of paramount significance
Soviet
the
policies,
war While resolutely resisting aggressive
tension,
international
Union is consistent in its efforts to ease
war danger, and ensure
end the arms race, eliminate the seats of
peaceful coexistence.
of
principle
the triumph of the Leninist
the Soviet state in
and
CPSU
the

The meaningful work of

of the 24th and 25 th
implementing the historic Peace Programme
of the awareness
evidence
striking
Congresses of the CPSU is
duty
internationalist
and
role
growing
bv the Soviet Union of its
convincing y
moreover,
and,
conditions
historical

the new
Leninist foreign policy of peace.
boars out the continuity of its
enlarged upon the
The 26th Congress of the CPSU creatively
mternaProgramme to bring it into line with the current

in

Peace

1972, p. 22.

303
302

tional situation

and advanced

a scries of

new

proposals. All the

Soviet initiatives are permeated with the striving to end the

present aggravation of international relations, advance towards
a deepening of detente

arms

to limit the

Now,

of practical

as before, the preservation of peace

aim

eign policy

measures

is

the central for-

CPSU and the Soviet state. Taking the

World War into account, the Soviet Union

of the

lessons of the Second

is

and the adoption

race.

sparing no effort to prevent a repetition of that tragedy.

USSR
life of

To

is

The

determined to do everything to exclude war from the

humanity for

all time.

the imperialist doctrine of aggression

and war the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state counterpose the tested doctrine of peace, peaceful coexistence, and
equality of all nations, big and small.
In this context the words said by the General Secretary of

the Central Committee of the

dium

of the

CPSU and Chairman of the Presithe USSR Konstantin Chernenko

Supreme Soviet of

sound extremely topical: When

peoples,

foreign

policy,

it

diplomacy,

everything. In the world arena,

comes

there

to

do

can
are

the

also

security

lot.

of

But not

political

for-

ces to whom goodwill is alien and who are deaf to the voice
of reason. And here the restraining might of our defence potential plays an irreplaceable role. Today it is not only a guarantor

of the Soviet peoples

of universal peace .
1

Pravda,

May

29, 1984.

creative

labour,

but

also

guarantor