01 HEINE v.

NEW YORK INSURANCE COMPANY

Facts:
- New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian
Insurance Company, both New York Corporations, were sued
by German complainants for the recovery on some two
hundred and forty life insurance policies made and issued by
the defendants in Germany.
- Defendants were incorporated in New York, but they have
statutory agents in Oregon. Summons were served upon these
agents.
- Complainants argue that because the court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties, it has no discretion but to
proceed with the case, regardless of where the cause of action
arose, or the law by which it is controlled, or the residence or
convenience of the parties and witnesses, or the difficulty the
court would encounter in attempting to interpret and enforce a
foreign contract, or the interference with the other business of
the court.
Issue: W/N the Oregon court should take cognizance of the case? No
Ratio:
- To require the defendants to defend the actions in this district
(Oregon) would impose upon them great and unnecessary
inconvenience and expense, and probably compel them to
produce here (three thousand miles from their home office)
numerous records, books, and papers, all of which are in daily
use by it in taking care of current business.
- It would also result in delay, inconvenience, and expense to
other litigants as the case would no doubt consume months of
the time of the court.
- As to the complaints argument, the court said that it is a matter
resting in its discretion. It may retain jurisdiction, or it may, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, decline to do so, as the
circumstances suggest. The courts have repeatedly refused, in
their discretion, to entertain jurisdiction of causes of action

arising in a foreign jurisdiction, where both parties are nonresidents of the forum.

02 IN RE: UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION

Facts: Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL), incorporated under Indian
Law in 1934, is 50.9% owned by a New York corporation named
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). UCIL is a manufacturer of
pesticides. On 3 December 1984, the chemical plant of UCIL in
Bhopal, India had a tragic disaster in the form of a leak of a highly
toxic gas (Methyl isocyanate) used in the production of pesticides.
Unfortunately, the prevailing winds on 3 December 1984 was from
Northwest to Southeast which forced the highly toxic gas to the
overpopulated hutments adjacent to the chemical plant. Over 2,100
dead and over 200,000 injured. Livestocks and crops were also killed
and damaged.

Ruling: The consolidated case is dismissed on the grounds of forum

non conveniens under the following conditions:
1. UCC shall consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
India, and shall continue to waive defenses based upon the statute of
limitations;
2. UCC shall agree to satisfy any judgment rendered against it by an
Indian court, and if applicable, upheld by an appellate court in that
country, where such judgment and affirmance comport with the
minimal requirements of due process;
3. UCC shall be subject to discovery under the model of the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after appropriate demand by
plaintiffs.
Ratio: Cited case: Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

145 actions have been filed and joined at US District Court (Southern
District of New York) on 6 February 1985. However, these cases were
superseded by a consolidated complaint filed on 28 June 1985.

Piper teaches a straightforward formulation of the doctrine of forum

non conveniens. A district court is advised to determine first whether
the proposed alternative forum is "adequate."

On 29 March 1985, the Indian Government enacted the Bhopal Gas

Leak Disaster (Process of Claims) Act (Bhopal Act) stating that the
Government of India has the exclusive right to represent Indian
plaintiffs regarding this incident. On 8 April 1985, the Government of
India filed a complaint in the US District Court (Southern District of
New York). This involves around 487,000 claimants.

1. Preliminary Considerations
"At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court
must determine whether there exists an alternative forum."
a. Innovation in the Indian Judicial System
Indian Legal System is a common law system from the
British which makes it friendly to the US Legal System
in terms of appellate structure, the rule of stare decisis,
the role of the judiciary as "guardian of [India's]
democratic structure and protector of citizens' rights."
b. Endemic Delays in the Indian Judicial System
However, American Courts suffer delays too. Moreover,
Bhopal Tragedy legislation will not be treated in an
ordinary fashion. The Bhopal Act permits the cases to
be treated "speedily, effectively, equitably and to the
best advantage of the claimants."
c. Procedural and Practical Capacity of Indian Courts
Plaintiffs contend that the Indian legal system lacks the
wherewithal to allow it "to deal effectively and
expeditiously" with the issues raised in this lawsuit.
i. Limited capacity of Indian Bar

UCC filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated action on the grounds

of forum non conveniens that the action should be transferred before
the Union of India.
Forum non conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to decline
jurisdiction, even when jurisdiction is authorized by a general
venue statute.
Issue: WoN the case should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non
conveniens?

ii. Attorney General of India will handle the

claimants
iii. The substantive tort law of India is not
sufficiently developed to accommodate the
Bhopal claims
iv. India lacks certain procedural devices which are
essential to the adjudication of complex cases,
the absence of which prevent India from
providing an adequate alternative forum
2. Private Interest Concerns
a. Sources of Proof
UCC argues that virtually all of the evidence which will
be relevant at a trial in this case is located in India.
b. Access to Witnesses
Most witnesses whose testimony would relate to
questions of causation and liability are in India.
Engineers from UCIL and Humphreys and Glasgow
and other subcontractors, of whom there are hundreds,
are located in India. Shift employees from the possibly
malfunctioning units, safety monitoring personnel,
those responsible for training, safety auditing,
procurement, compliance with regulations and other
operations might be required to testify. More than
likely, many of these potential witnesses do not speak
English, and would require translators.
c. Possibility of View
Plaintiff argues that a viewing of the plant and hutments
would probably not be of utmost importance in
determining liability, and this consideration is not
afforded great weight on this motion.
3. Public Interest Concerns
a. Administrative Difficulties
As is evident from the discussion thus far, the mere size
of the Bhopal case, with its multitude of witnesses and
documents to be transported and translated, obviously
creates administrative problems.
b. The Interests of India and US
Plaintiffs, and especially amicus curiae emphasize this
point of argument in opposition to the motion to

dismiss. Concerned with the asserted possibility of

developing a "double-standard" of liability for
multinational corporations, plaintiffs urge that
American courts should administer justice to the
victims of the Bhopal disaster as they would to
potential American victims of industrial accidents.
The Court concludes that the public interest of India in
this litigation far outweighs the public interest of the
United States. This litigation offers a developing nation
the opportunity to vindicate the suffering of its own
people within the framework of a legitimate legal
system. This interest is of paramount importance.
c. The Applicable Law
The lex loci delicti analysis used in other jurisdictions
indicates that the law of the state where the tort
occurred should be applied. The place in which the tort
occurred was, to a very great extent, India. Other states
apply the "most significant relationship" test, or "weight
of contacts" test, which evaluate in which state most of
the events constituting the tort occurred. The contacts
with India with respect to all phases of plant
construction, operation, malfunction and subsequent
injuries are greater in number than those with the
United States.

03 FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK v. CA

Facts:
1. First Philippine is a bank under conservatorship. Mercurio
Rivera is its Manager of the Property Management
Department. Ejecito is an assignee of the original plaintiffs
Demetria and Janolo.
2. This is a case of specific performance with damages against the
bank, its Manager Rivera and Acting Conservator Encarnacion.
The basis of the suit was that the transaction had with the bank
resulted in a perfected contract of sale.
3. The issue regarding the sale arose because according to the
bank there was no perfected contract of sale and that River who
transacted with Demetria and Janolo had no authority to bind
the bank.
4. The sale was perfected after a series of letter exchanges and
meetings between Demetria and Janolo as buyers and Rivera as
the representative of the Bank, as sellers. Initially, the buyers,
in a letter offered to buy the properties of the bank in Laguna
for 3.5M.
5. The bank refused the offer but made a counter offer of 5.5M.
The buyers initially refused the 5.5M counter-offer, but after
another meeting with Rivera and the banks VP, Demetria and
Janolo wrote Rivera informing him of his acceptance of the
5.5M offer.
6. Thereafter, the conservator of the bank was replaced by
defendant Encarnacion.
7. Because the buyers never heard again from the bank, they
began sending demand letters to have the sale consummated.
They also sent checks for the amount of 5.5M. But to no avail.
Hence the case at the RTC was filed on May 16, 1988.
8. On March 14, 1991, Henry Co, a majority stockholder of the
bank, filed a motion to intervene alleging that he had
substantial interest to resist the complaint. The RTC denied the
motion because of the trial had already been concluded.
Eventually, the RTC ruled in favor of Ejercito (first case).
9. On July 19, 1991 while the case was pending before the CA,
Henry Co filed a derivative suit (second case) with the RTC of
Makati to declare any perfected sale of the property as

unenforceable and to stop Ejercito from enforcing or

implementing the sale.
10. Meanwhile the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in the first
case.
11. During the appeal at the SC, Ejercito prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground of forum-shopping.
ISSUE (TOPICAL):
Was there forum-shopping on the part of the bank? Yes. The filing
of two apparently different actions but with the same objective
constitutes forum shopping.
RATIO:
Where a litigant (or one representing the same interest or person) sues
the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged
violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief
is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendencia in one case is a bar to
the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata
and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. In either case, forum
shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground to ask for
summary dismissal of the twoi (or more) complaints or petitions, and
for the imposition of the other sanctions, which are direct contempt of
court, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary action against the erring
lawyer.
Applying the foregoing principles in the present case and comparing it
with the Second Case, it is obvious that there exist identity of parties
or interests represented, identity of rights or causes and identity of
reliefs sought.
The original complaint in the court a quo which gave rise to the instant
petition was filed by the buyer (herein private respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest) against the seller (herein petitioners) to
enforce the alleged perfected sale of real estate. On the other hand, the
complaint in the Second Case seeks to declare such purported sale
involving the same real property as unenforceable as against the Bank,
which is the petitioner herein. In other words, in the Second Case, the
majority stockholders, in representation of the Bank, are seeking to
accomplish what the Bank itself failed to do in the original case in the
trial court. In brief, the objective or the relief being sought, though

worded differently, is the same, namely, to enable the petitioner Bank

to escape from the obligation to sell the property to respondent. The
filing by a party of two apparently different actions, but with the same
objective, constituted forum shopping.
Related to the topic:
Before making a ruling on the issue, Justice Panganiban first
historicized the origin of the doctrine of forum-shopping.
Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international
law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the
forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or
excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and
harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a
more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the
principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in
conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where
it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Blacks Law Dictionary says that forum-shopping
occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular
court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable
judgment or verdict. Hence, according to Words and Phrases, a
litigant is open to the charge of forum shopping whenever he chooses a
forum with slight connection to factual circumstances surrounding his
suit, and litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their
differences without imposing undue expense and vexatious situations
on the courts.
In the Philippines, forum-shopping has acquired a connotation
encompassing not only a choice of venues, as it was originally
understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. In
either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the
litigant actually shops for a forum of his action. This was the original
concept of the term forum shopping.
Eventually, however, in the Philippines, instead of actually
making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the
encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in all available
courts, or invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. This practice

had not only resulted in conflicting adjudications among different

courts and consequent confusion inimical to an orderly administration
of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties
to the action. Thus, forum-shopping had acquired a different concept which is unethical professional legal practice. And this necessitated or
had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouraging or
altogether prohibiting the practice. What therefore originally started
both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic law as a legitimate device
for solving problems has been abused and misused to assure scheming
litigants of dubious reliefs.
OTHER ISSUES:
1. WON the contract of sale was perfected. YES. The requisites of
a perfected contract is met. The object was the properties in
Laguna. The prize was certain 5.5M. The bank intended to sell
the property.
2. WON Rivera had authority to transact with the buyers. YES.
He was clothed with apparent or implied authority to act for the
bank in the matter of selling its acquired assets.
3. WON the contract is enforceable. YES. Although the contract
was not reduced in writing as required by law, the letters the
parties exchanged constitute sufficient memoranda since they
include the names of the parties, the terms and conditions of the
contract, the price and description of the property as the object of
the contract.
4. May Conservator Encarnacion revoke the contract? NO.
Violation of non-impairment clause. The only revocation a
conservator can do is that of void, voidable or unenforceable
contracts.

04 THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL.

LTD. vs. NLRC1
PARDO, J. G.R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000
Facts:
Private respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker
employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate
of Oman.
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the
Sultanate of Oman, respondent Santos received a letter dated
May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager,
Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent
Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a
friend of his.
Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position as
printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased
benefits. The position was slated to open on October 1, 1988.
On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk
mailed a ready to sign employment contract to respondent
Santos. Santos then wrote the Palace Hotel and acknowledged
Mr. Henk's letter. Respondent Santos enclosed four (4) signed
copies of the employment contract (dated June 4, 1988). He
notified them that he was going to arrive in Manila during the
first week of July 1988 and would go to China on November
1988
1 Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)
and the Manila Hotel International Co., Limited
(MHICL).When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still
a government-owned and controlled corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Hong Kong. MHC is an "incorporator"
of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock.
By virtue of a "management agreement" with the Palace
Hotel (Wang Fu Company Limited), MHICL trained the
personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.

After landing in China, he signed an amended "employment

agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effective November 5, 1988.
In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the Palace Hotel. The
Vice President (Operations and Development) of petitioner
MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment
agreement under the word "noted".
The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his
employment would commence September 1, 1988 for a period
of two years. It provided for a monthly salary of nine hundred
dollars (US$900.00) net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a
year.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent
Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at
the Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to
business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in
China (Tiannamen Square incidents).
On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel
and Mr. Shmidt as respondents. (He probably sued MHC
because it was the one who trained him). The Palace Hotel and
Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither
participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
LA ruled in favor of Santos. NLRC affirmed the LA decision.
Hence the appeal of the petitioners. Petitioners question the
jurisdiction of NLRC to hear this case.

Issues:
1.) W/N NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. NO.
2.) W/N MHC and MHICL are liable. NO.
Ratio:
1. Under the principle of Forum Non-Conveniens, the NLRC was a
seriously inconvenient forum.
The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions
and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the
Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino

citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all
cases involving our citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. Respondent Santos was hired directly by
the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to
the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed.
He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized
recruitment agency of the government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision.
The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar:
Not Convenient. We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient
forum given that all the incidents of the case from the time of
recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the
Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of
the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines."
Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are nonresidents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. Neither can an intelligent
decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as
such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of
the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
contract was made).
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines.
Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter while he
was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel
in the People's Republic of China.

No power to determine the facts. Neither can the NLRC determine

the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts
complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The
NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen
Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace Hotel
as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. Even
assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such
would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace
Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws
of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its
person was not acquired.
2.)
MHCs liability
Although MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent
(50%) of its capital stock. However, this is not enough to pierce the
veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC. Our jurisprudence
tells us that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is
not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.
MHICLs liability
Respondent Santos predicates MHICL's liability on the fact that
MHICL "signed" his employment contract with the Palace Hotel. This
fact fails to persuade us. The Vice President (Operations and
Development) of MHICL, Miguel D. Cergueda signed the
employment contract as a mere witness. He merely signed under the
word "noted".
Mr. Cergueda merely signed the "witnessing part" of the document. As
opposed to a party to a contract, a witness is simply one who, "being
present, personally sees or perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator, or

eyewitness." One who "notes" something just makes a "brief written

statement" a memorandum or observation.
There was no employer-employee relationship between MHICL and
Santos. It did not select respondent Santos as an employee for the
Palace Hotel. He was referred to the Palace Hotel by his friend, Nestor
Buenio. MHICL did not engage respondent Santos to work. The terms
of employment were negotiated and finalized through correspondence
between respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk, who were
officers and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL.
Neither did respondent Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the
power to control his conduct. Finally, it was the Palace Hotel, through
Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated respondent Santos'
services.

05 HASEGAWA v. KITAMURA
GR No. 149177 / 23 Nov 2007 / J. Nachura
FACTS

Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., a Japanese consultancy

firm providing technical and management support in the
infrastructure projects of foreign governments, entered into an
Independent Contractor Arrangement with the respondent
Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national who was a permanent
Philippine resident.

Nippon assigned Kitamura as project manager for the Southern

Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project following a contract with
the Phililppine government.

When STAR was nearing completion, DPWH engaged Nippon

for engineering and construction supervision of the BongabonBaler Road Improvement Project. Respondent was named as
project manager in an appendix to his contract.

Nippon's general manager for its International Division,

petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, informed respondent that his
contract will not be renewed anymore, and his services would
only be engaged up to the substantial completion of the STAR
project in March 2000.

Respondent through his lawyer requested a negotiation

conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that respondent's contract was for a fixed
term and refused to renegotiate the renewal of the ICA.
Procedure

Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and

damages with the RTC at Lipa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the claim can
only be heard in Japanese courts following the principles of lex
loci celebrationis and lex contractus.

RTC DENIED MTD, on the ground that matters connected

with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law at the
place of performance.

Petitioner filed certiorari with the CA. CA DISMISSED the

petition for lack of statement of material dates and insufficient
verification and certification against forum shopping. Petitioners

filed a second certiorari, raising the same issues, which was

denied on the ground that lex loci celebrationis was not
applicable because the validity of the written agreement was not
put into issue in the pleadings.

Rule 45 to the SC of the CA decision.

ISSUE / HELD

W/N the subject matter jurisdiction of Philipppine courts in

civil cases for specific performance and damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may
be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex
contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or
forum non conveniens. NO. Petition for review denied.
RATIO
Procedural (may not be relevant)
1 The first decision of the CA dismissing the Rule 65 petition due
to procedural defects was not a dismissal with prejudice and thus
petitioner can refile (which they did). However, the petition for
review with the SC had no proper authorization for Hasegawa to
file it, with the authorization only encompassing the petition filed
in the CA.
2 The verification and certification were issued only by NIppon's
president and CEO, not the Board of Directors, which makes it a
fatal to Nippon's case. Hasegawa verified and certified the
petition only for his behalf, and not for Nippon. The rule on
substantial compliance does not apply (old rule).
Substantive (relevant)
1 There was a change in theory between the original motion to
dismiss in the RTC, the Rule 65 in the CA and the Rule 45 in the
SC.
a In the original MTD, petitioners' argument is the applicable
law would be Japanese law following the principles of lex
loci celebrationis and lex contractus.
b In the CA, petitioners raised the defense of forum non
conveniens,
c In the SC, petitioners raised that local courts have no
substantial relationship to the parties following the state of
most significant relationship in Private International Law.

2
3

2
3

There are three phases in resolving conflict of laws problems: (1)

jurisdiciton, (2) choice of law and (3) recognition and
enforcement of judgment.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are distinct concepts. The question
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
Only jurisdiction is at issue here. In assailing the trial court's
jurisdiction in this case, the petitioners are actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction. Since jurisdiction is conferred by law,
the movant in an MTD must show that the court cannot act on
the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to
adjudicate the claims.
In this case petitioners do not claim that the TC is not properly
vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the controversy. What
they raise as grounds to question are the principles of:
a lex loci celebrationis - law of the place where a contract is
made.
b lex contractus - law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed
c "state of the most significant relationship" rule - to
ascertain what law to apply, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties.
All of the above refer to the choice of law, and not jurisdiction.
Further, petitioners have not pointed out any conflict between
Japanese and Philippine laws. Before determining which law
should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation
requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be
used to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. It is not included in
Sec. 1 Rule 16 (motions to dismiss) as a ground. Second,
whether a suit can be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
said doctrine is a matter addressed to the judgment of the trial
court, which here decided to assume jurisdiction. The propriety
of dismissing a case on this principle requires a factual
determination hence this principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense.

06 FLEUMER v. HIX
G.R. No. L-32636
March 17, 1930
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W.
FLUEMER,
petitioner-appellant,
vs. ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Fleumer, the special administrator of Hix, presented the latter's will
for probate in the Philippines.
According to Fleumer the said will was executed was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia, in 1925, by Hix who had his residence in
that jurisdiction
Fleumer alleges that under W. Virginia law, will is duly executed.
TO PROVE W. Virginia law, Fleumer submitted a copy of Section
3868 of Act 1882 as found in West Virginia Code + Certified by
the Director of National Library.
Judge of First Instance Tuason denied the probate of the document
alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased.
ISSUE: whether the will should be denied probate - yes
HHELD:
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in
our courts. Such laws must be proved as fact. Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in sec. 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the
sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in sec. 301 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at
the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established.
The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony
of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate
that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence
of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed
the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the
law of West Virginia seems to require.

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator
had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact
consisted of the recitals in the will and the testimony of the
petitioner.

07 PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. BOHANAN

G.R. No. L-12105

January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.

PHILIPPINE
TRUST
CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and
MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:

The wife, Magadalena, and her two children question the

validity of the testamentary provisions, claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitime.

Issue:

WON Phil. Laws, which provide for legitimes, is applicable, or

the Nevada Laws?

Held:
Apply Nevada law. The Nevada law does not provide for legitimes,
hence, project of partition is affirmed.
WRT wife

Facts:

April 23, 1944, C.O. Bohanan executed his last will. On April
24, 1950, the CFI admitted the will to probate. The CFI held
that the will was in accordance with the laws of Nevada, to
which Bohanan was a citizen. The court named Phil Trust Co.
as the executor.
On Jan 24, 1956, Phil Trust executed a project of partition. The
total estate, after deducting admin expenses, is P211,640 in
cash. Of this amount, 90k was given to C.Os grandson,
Edward George, and one-half of all shares of stock of several
mining companies to his siblings, F.L. Bohanan and Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. To his children, Edward
Gilbert and Mary Lydia, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each,
or a total of P12,000.

No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife

exists in the State of Nevada and because of the divorce, there
was no conjugal property to speak of, hence she can no longer
claim any portion of the estate left by the testator.

The court found that C.O. and Magdalena were married on Jan
1909, the divorce was granted in 1922 and in 1925, Magdalena
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time
of C.Os death.

Magdalenas right to Bohanans estate had been passed upon

adversely against her in the 1955 order, which became final
considering no appeal was made by Magdalena. This order
pertains to the 1953 motion to withdraw P20k from the estate,
filed by Magdalena, chargeable against her share in the
conjugal property. The court held that there was no conjugal
property to speak of by virtue of the divorce decree.

WRT children

What does the Phil Law provide?

o The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides
that successional rights to personal property are to be
governed by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil
Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil
Code.)

What is the national law of the decedent?

o In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was
found out and it was decided that the testator was a
citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected
this as his domicile and his permanent residence.

What does the national law provide?

o The laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his
properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws
of 1925, Every person over the age of eighteen years,
of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or
her estate, real and personal, the same being
chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts.).

o SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An

official record or an entry therein, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. . . . (Rule 123).

But the court cant just take judicial notice of foreign laws. It
must be introduced in evidence first.
o The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be
proved in our courts in the form and manner provided
for by our Rules:

Was it introduced in evidence?

o Not introduced at the hearing of the project of partition.
But the Nevada provision was introduced in evidence
by Phil Trust during the 1950 probate and by
Magdalena during the hearing of her motion to
withdraw funds. The children, as other appellants, do
not dispute the said Nevada law.
o Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained
to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law
having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.

08 ELSERCE A. GRAY v. FRANK M. GRAY

Supreme Court of New Hampshire Carroll.; September 4, 1934.
Facts:

The parties are husband and wife, and residents of New

Hampshire. While they were travelling from New Hampshire to
Maine, an accident occurred causing injuries to the wife. The
accident happened in Maine.

Elcerse (wife) filed an action in New Hampshire for damages

arising out of personal injuries allegedly cause by the husband.

Frank (husband) filed a special plea that "Under the laws of said
state of Maine, the plaintiff being the wife of said defendant is
barred from maintaining this action." The plaintiff's demurrer to
this plea was overruled.

Issue: Can the wife recover damages in New Hampshire for tortious
act allegedly committed by the husband in Maine, another state? No.
Using the lex loci principle, the wife has no cause of action against her
husband according to the law of Maine.

Held:

If there is no ground of action in the sovereignty where the tort is

alleged to have occurred, there is none anywhere. If there is a conflict
between the lex loci and the lex fori, the former governs in torts the
same as in contracts, in respect to the legal effect and incidents of acts.
. . . Therefore, whatever would be a defence to this action if it had been
brought in the state of Maine is a defence here, although it would not
be if the cause of action had arisen in this state. (Beacham v.
Portsmouth Bridge)

Plaintiff: would like to distinguish the present case upon the ground
that the act complained of was a delict, in the sense that it was not
made innocent by Maine law; and the only reason a recovery could
not be had in Maine is the spousal relation of the parties (because
Maine law prohibits spouses to sue one another). Since they are
residents of New Hampshire (where no prohibition exists), the suit for
acts done in Maine may be brought into New Hampshire and
maintained there.
Court: The argument fails to distinguish between status and the
incidents which local law attaches to the status. The parties are
husband and wife. That status they took with them into Maine. But the
incidents of that status are those prescribed by the law of the place
where transactions take place (or where the accident occurred).

In Lee v. Chamberlin (a guest passenger case), the guest passenger in

an automobile remains such after crossing the state line. But his
recovery in New Hampshire for injuries caused by his host's ordinary
negligence depends upon which side of the state line the accident
occurred. If it happened in another state, there could be no recovery,

even though the parties are residents here and the suit is in this
jurisdiction.

The defendant's act is a delict by the lex loci. It would have been
actionable if committed here; and, as to persons in general, it is
actionable there. But because of the particular relation of the parties,
the law there (in Maine) is that there is no cause of action in the
special instance. The plaintiff fails here because there is no cause of
action at the place where the acts complained of were done. An
examination of the Maine law shows that the theory behind the rule
(prohibiting spouse to sue the other spouse) is not merely that there is
a prohibition of suit, but that the acts complained of do not give rise to
any cause of action. There has been no breach of legal duty.

Much objection has been made, both by some recent writers and in
argument here, against any theory of vested right or obligation. If such
theory were based upon the idea that a sovereignty is under legal
compulsion to recognize the foreign cause of action, there might be
force in the argument. No one denies that the parties may have vested
rights, or obligations, in the jurisdiction where the transaction
occurred. But because another sovereignty adopts the rule that it will
enforce the right or deny recovery as the event would be according to
the lex loci, it by no means follows that it is the law of the forum that
such course is obligatory upon such sovereignty.

Local conduct should be governed by local law. Rules of conduct have

no force to regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction which made the
rules, save as their operation is enforced by control over parties found

within the jurisdiction. In the great majority of cases complaints of

conduct are adjusted in the jurisdiction where the conduct took place.
It is desirable that the remedy be the same, wherever the action is
brought. Foreign law is enforced here because it is our law (New
Hampshire law) that the foreign law shall govern the transactions in
question. The other view, that to some indefinite degree our law
should govern the foreign transaction, would export our law into
foreign territory. The law is territorial, conceived of spatially as
governing within the jurisdiction, and creating there rights and
obligations which will be respected and enforced elsewhere.

As to the renvoi argument:

It is urged that renvoi (in a suit by a non-resident upon a cause arising
locally his capacity to sue will be determined by looking to the law of
his domicil rather than to the local law) should be recognized; the
whole theory of applying the lex loci is unsound and should therefore
be abandoned, and actions for foreign torts should be decided
according to local law (meaning: since the case is brought in New
Hampshire by New Hampshire spouses, the case must be decided
according to New Hampshire law despite the fact that the accident
occurred in Maine). One answer to this is that the rule that the lex loci
shall apply is so firmly established that it should be followed, unless
very grave defects therein call for reform. We see no such defects.
Also, if the principle of renvoi was open for consideration, the plaintiff
would fail for lack of proof that the doctrine prevails in Maine.

09 ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R.R. v. CARROL

10 AUTEN v. AUTEN
(Fuld, J.,1954, Court of Appeals of the State of New York)
Quick summary and doctrine: Husband leaves behind wife and 2
children in England and remarries in NY. Wife goes to NY, obtains a
separation agreement with terms for support. Wife goes back to
England. However, husband reneges on agreement. Wife sues in
English court. No result. Sues in NY court. Dismissed because of
defense that English suit repudiated the agreement which contained a
waiver of action in all jurisdictions. Held: Deviate from generally
accepted rules (lex loci contractus and lex loci solutionis) and apply
Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory. English law governs
because England has the most significant contacts: British subjects,
wife and kids live in England, British currency in agreement, etc. NY's
role is only as place of payment. Suit in NY court reinstated.

Harold admitted agreement but one of his defenses (in a motion to

dismiss) was that the suit in England effectively repudiated the
agreement. NY lower court agreed with husband and dismissed the
case. Appellate court affirmed (but permitted Marguerite to assert any
cause of action before the English suit in an amended complaint). So
Marguerite appeals to Court of Appeals of the State of NYCA.
Issue: Choice between NY and English law.
Held.
NYCA English Law is controlling.
Generally accepted rule is for issues of execution of a contract, it is the
law of the place where it was made that governs. For issues of
performance, the law of the place of performance.

Facts:
Harold and Marguerite Auten married in England with 2 kids from
1917-1931. Harold deserted them and went to New York, obtained an
Mexican divorce, and married another woman. Marguerite went to
NY and attempted to settle. They made a separation agreement.
Harold would give support every month (50pounds) and that neither
should sue in any action relating to their separation and that the wife
should not cause any complaint to be lodged against the husband in
any jurisdiction by reason of said alleged divorce or remarriage.
Marguerite went back to England.
Harold failed to live up to the agreement but made a few payments.
Marguerite filed petition for separation in an English court, charging
Harold with adultery. Harold was served summons in NY. Counsel
advised that it was the only method by which she could collect money
from Harold (only for enforcement of agreement, not repudiation of
the agreement). Case never went to trial (but did order support
pendente lite).
Harold still didn't pay. So Marguerite went back to NY and filed suit
there for a total of $26,564 based on the separation agreement.

But not strict rule. Modern methods in choosing law now rationalize
the results achieved by the courts in decided cases.
The Center of Gravity or Grouping of Contacts theory deviates
from general rules and chooses the law of the place which has the most
significant contacts or having the most interest with the matter in
dispute. Also gives effect to the probable intention of the parties.
In this case, English law governs when the theory is applied because it
is the state with the most significant contacts (agreement is between
two British subjects, married in England, children there, lived there for
14 years, wife and children continued to live there). Agreement also
states that payment is in English currency, that first payment be made
immediately before she sailed back to England, that husband may visit
the children if he goes to England. The state of NY only serves as the
place where payment is to be made (to a trustee in NY for the account
of Marguerite and her children).
The probable intention of the parties is for English law to govern since
the wife is a stranger to NY so she couldn't have intended for NY law
to govern. The husband is also still a British subject.

Reversed. Complaint reinstated.

11 HAAG v. BARNES

e) All contributions for support have always been made from

Chicago

(1961)
In contrast, NY contacts are of far less weight and significant:
FACTS: An illegitimate child was born to Norman Barnes (Illinois
lawyer) and Dorothy Haag (New York legal secretary). Haag traveled
to Chicago, Illinois prior to the childs birth, where Barnes promised to
shoulder her hospital expenses. They then entered into a support
agreement in Chicago providing that Barnes would pay $275/mo until
the child reached 16 y/o in exchange for his release from any other
obligation. The agreement contained a choice-of-law clause in favor of
Illinois law which upheld such agreements if the sum was at least
$800. Meanwhile, NY law gave no binding effect to agreements by
parents of an illegitimate child unless it was judicially approved.
Haag and the child returned to NY and filed an action for support.
Barnes interposed the Illinois agreement as bar to the instant
proceeding.
ISSUES & RULING
1) WON Illinois law applies
YES. Under traditional conflicts rule: The agreements choice-of-law
clause and the fact that it was drawn and signed by complainant Haag
in Illinois are conclusive factors resulting in application of Illinois law.
But even if the clause and place of execution are not given conclusive
effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining
which jurisdiction has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute. These factors plus other significant contacts point to Illinois
law. Among the other Illinois contacts are:
a) Both parties are designated in the agreement as being of
Chicago, Illinois
b) Defendant Barness place of business has always been in
Illinois
c) Child was born in Illinois
d) Agents (except for a third alternate) and attorneys who
drew the agreement are Illinois residents

a) Child and mother presently live in NY

b) Part of the liaison (sexual affair) took place in NY
When these contacts are measured against the parties clearly
expressed intention (choice-of-law clause) and the more numerous and
more substantial Illinois contacts, it cannot be denied that the center
of gravity of this agreement is Illinois and that, absent compelling
public policy to the contrary, Illinois law should apply.
In this case, even looking only at the financial provision ($275/mo),
the welfare of the child is fully protected. The public policy of the
State is satisfied. Illinois law applies.
2) WON the Illinois agreement bars the proceeding
YES. Under Illinois law, the agreement bars the present action for
support.

12 BABCOCK v. JACKSON
Georgia Babcock v. Mabel Jackson / 12 N.Y. 2d 473 / May 9, 1963 / J.
Fuld
FACTS

On September 16, 1960, Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr.

and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents of Rochester, New York,
left the city in the Jacksons car for a weekend trip to Canada. As
they were driving in Ontario, Canada, William lost control of his
car and crashed it on a stone wall along the highway. As a result,
Georgia was seriously injured. Upon her return to NY, she filled
an action against William, alleging negligence on his part in
driving his car.

At the time of the accident, the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario

was in force in Ontario that provided: "the owner or driver of a
motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of
carrying passengers for compensation, is not liable for any loss
or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any
person being carried in *** the motor vehicle".

Even though there was no guest statute that barred recovery

of damages under New Yorks law on torts (as referred to in cited
cases such as Higgins v. Mason and Nelson v. Nygren), the
Jacksons moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
law of the place (lex loci delicti) where the accident occurred
governs and that Ontario's guest statute bars recovery.

Trial Court (Special Term) dismissed the complaint, agreeing with

the Jacksons
Appellate Division affirmed dismissal without opinion. Lex loci
delicti principle governs the case.
ISSUE / HELD

WON the applicable choice of law rule may be used in

consideration of other factors which may be relevant to the

purposes served by the enforcement/denial of the remedy asked

for? NO.
RATIO
Substantive (relevant)
The traditional choice of law rule states that the substantive rights
and liabilities arising out of a tortious occurrence are determinable by
the law of the place of the tort. It had its conceptual foundation in the
vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a foreign tort
owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury
occurred and depends for its existence and extent solely on such law.
However, the vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited
because it fails to take account of underlying policy considerations in
evaluating the significance to be ascribed to the circumstance that an
act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities which
arise out of that act. According to the decision, the problem with the
vested rights theory was that it affects [decisions to] concrete cases
upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations
involved. As applied to torts, the vested rights doctrine ignores the
reasons and interests of the jurisdiction applying a statute for the
resolution of particular issues. As a result, there was an increased
criticism of its application by commentators, as well as abandonment
or modification of its use by judicial bodies.
The Court cited Auten v. Auten as an example of the abandonment of
the traditional rules, with its application of the center of gravity or
grouping of contacts theory of the conflict of laws. In the Auten
case, the Court put emphasis on the law of the place which has the
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute". Such theory was
also (implicitly) used in the case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines where
the Court weighed the interests of the different jurisdictions involved
to determine their bearing on the issue of the extent of recovery for the
injured parties.
Using the grouping of contacts theory in the case, the Court pointed
out that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater and
more direct versus Ontarios minimal interest. The cause of action
involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result of the
negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile,

garaged, licensed and insured in New York, in the course of a weekend journey. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole relationship with the
occurrence is the purely fortuitous circumstance that the accident
occurred there.
However, the Court here noted that the issue in the case was not
whether the defendant committed an offense against an Ontario road
law for motorists generally or whether he violated some standard of
conduct imposed by Ontario. Rather, the issue was whether the
plaintiff is barred from recovering damages for a wrong concededly
committed while she was a guest in the Jacksons automobile. As to
that issue, it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where
their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to
end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the
accident, which has the dominant contacts and the superior claim for
application of its law.
Although the rightness or wrongness of Williams conduct may depend
upon the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the
automobile passes, the rights and liabilities of the parties which stem
from their guest-host relationship should remain constant and not vary
and shift as the automobile proceeds from place to place. Such a result
accords with "the interests of the host in procuring liability insurance
adequate under the applicable law, and the interests of his insurer in
reasonable calculability of the premium."

The Court also took into consideration the fact that New York's policy
of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused
by his negligence cannot be contested, as State Legislature had
repeatedly refused to enact statutes limiting or barring recovery for
cases of similar import to Georgias (wherein she received injuries as a
guest travelling with the tortfeasor). On the other hand, Ontario has no
conceivable interest in denying a remedy to a New York guest against
his New York host for injuries suffered in Ontario by reason of
conduct which was tortious under Ontario law. The object of Ontario's
guest statute, it has been said, is "to prevent the fraudulent assertion of
claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance
companies". Obviously, the fraudulent claims intended to be
prevented by the statute are not availing in the case of Georgia, who is
claiming not against defendants from Ontario or their insurance
companies, but against defendants from New York and their insurance
companies.
The Court concludes therefore, that where the issue involves standards
of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of the place of the
tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other issues must
turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on the law of
the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution of the
particular issue presented.