* This article reports the first results of a larger piece of research included in a PRIN (Project of Special National Interest) funded by the Italian University and Research Ministry: Secular and Ecclesiastic Feudality in
Modern Southern Italy (15th-19th centuries). Earlier drafts were presented at
the 8th European Social Science History Conference (Ghent, 13-16 April
2010) within the session Elites strategies of survival I: families, power and
status in Early Modern Europe. Abbreviations: AGS = Archivo General de
Simancas (Sp = Secretaras Provinciales; leg. = legajo); AHN = Archivo
Histrico Nacional (Om = Ordenes Militares; exp.te/exp.llo = expediente/
expedientillo de pruebas de nobleza); ASP = Archivio di Stato of Palermo
(Cm = Commenda della Magione; f. = file; fasc. = fascicle; Alliata = archive
of family Alliata di Villafranca); NLM = National Library of Malta (Aom
= Archive of the Order of St. John; arch. = vol. of Aom); BCP = Biblioteca
Comunale of Palermo (ms. = manuscript). All the cited articles and books
of Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche are also available on-line at www.mediterranearicerchestoriche.it.
1
Joseph Bergin, The Making of the French Episcopate 1589-1661, New
Haven and London, 1996, p. 44.
DOI : 10.1484/J.RHE.5.103199
626
f. davenia
This wide perspective on the European situation, painted almost twenty years ago by Joseph Bergin, confirms the importance of ecclesiastical careers within the ranks of the Catholic
Church (bishops and cardinals) as well as religious orders (abbots
and priors) and military orders (primarily the Order of Malta) as
an increasing historiographic fact for early modern family strategies. They were, together with civil careers within the army, state
administration and city offices, one of the main paths followed by
cadet members of the nobility to build, strengthen and even enable the survival of the social prestige and political influence of
their families.2
The role of the clergy was in fact crucial in performing a valuable function of mediation, not only in relationship with other
families, aimed for example at establishing solid marriage alliances, but especially with regard to political power in order to
achieve increasingly prestigious awards (titles, offices, prebends),
and to safeguard assets most often burdened with heavy debt.
Nevertheless this strategic significance of ecclesiastical careers is an area of research which has been rarely explored very
deeply. The reason is mainly because scholars have preferred to
focus their attention on succession strategies and marriage policies adopted by the aristocratic families, aimed at the growth and
protection of family assets, primarily feudal possessions, resorting to previously unused practises like birthright and the fedecommesso (trust), 3 the equivalent of the Spanish mayorazgo.4 Viewed
2
Renato Ago, Giochi di squadra: uomini e donne nella famiglie nobili del
XVII secolo, in Maria Antonietta Visceglia (ed.), Signori, patrizi, cavalieri
nellet moderna, Roma-Bari, 1992, p. 256, 262.
3
Grard Delille, Famiglia e propriet nel Regno di Napoli XV-XIX secolo, Torino, 1988, p. 64. For more in general, see ibid., p. 25-78, also for
interesting comparisons with Sicily and Castile, where the use of such practices became established much earlier than in the Kingdom of Naples, as
early as the 15th century. For the evolution of inheritance systems in Sicily,
between the Middle Ages and the Modern Age, see Ennio Igor Mineo, Nobilt di Stato. Famiglie e identit aristocratiche nel tardo medioevo. La Sicilia,
Roma, 2001, p. 103114. On the use of the fedecommesso by families of the
Roman nobility, see Nicola La Marca, La nobilt romana e i suoi strumenti
di perpetuazione del potere, Roma, 2000, vol. I, p. 15165.
4
This is the case among many families, the Caracciolo of Martina and
the Tocco of Montemiletto in the Kingdom of Naples, the Aragona-Tagliavia
of Terranova/Castelvetrano and the Bologna of Altavilla in the Kingdom
of Sicily (see Elena Papagna, Sogni e bisogni di una famiglia aristocratica.
627
628
f. davenia
St. Peter, it was expected that he would seal the fortunes of his family by lavish gifts and favours. The phenomenon of nepotism, as we
will see, survived the Tridentine reforms by more than a century. 8
629
630
f. davenia
policy choices and, in particular for the bishops, how far it helped
or hindered their duties as tridentine reformers.
Social mobility
In order to understand the deep renewal of the Sicilian nobility, we have to begin with the long Aragonese conflict against
the old medieval feudal class, which started with the Vespri Siciliani (Sicilian Vespers) in 1282 and can be considered resolved
in 1412, when Sicily became a vice-kingdom under the Crown of
Aragon.12 In particular, under the Kings Martin I and Martin II
(1392-1410), a nobility of State (Mineo)13 arose in Sicily: in exchange for loyalty and services, the new Crown gave preeminent
social status, that is offices and financial privileges to feudal and
urban elites.
Then, from the final years of King Alfonso V (1416-1458) and the
early years of King Ferdinand II (1479-1504), this social primacy
was sanctioned by institutionalized access to urban mastre nobili,
the lists of those eligible for city offices reserved for the nobility,14
as well as to the Parliament, in the braccio militare/baronale (Military or Baronial chamber).15 In fact, as established in 1452 by
the Capitoli del Regno, that is the petitions submitted by Parliament to the king and sanctioned by him, the Baronial Chamber
of Parliament would be reserved [...] not for all feudatories but
only for the holders of inhabited lands . Moreover in 1453-54 the
first census of Sicilian feudal lands was completed. Thus, under
the direction of the crown a divided political class began to form,
12
631
f. davenia
632
Philip III
Philip IV
Charles II
tot.
princes
10
61
29
105
dukes
31
24
59
marquises
12
60
16
92
counts
13
23
tot.
16
24
165
74
279
annual
average
0.4
3.8
2.1
1.9
633
634
f. davenia
27
635
The iter for the appointment to the bishoprics and abbeys was
seemingly simple: a viceroys list of three eligible candidates was
examined by the Consejo de Italia and, based on this consulta, the
content of which was also detailed for the Camara de Castilla by
Philip II in the Instruccin de 1588, the King made the official
presentation, which was sent to the Roman Ambassador for Papal
approval. 31 Finally, in the Kingdom of Sicily, the Office of the
Protonotaro del Regno had to make executive the papal bulls of appointment (which was necessary for the royal presentation too).32
For the Malta bishopric, the first step was a grand masters list
of three eligible candidates belonging to the class of conventual
chaplains of the Order which was sent to the Viceroy for his consultation. Then the iter followed the usual procedure. 33
This iter could often become complex and long, a game of unpredictable timing (as long as three years, during which the vacant spiritual and temporal government dioceses suffered particularly from the absence of their shepherd). The Consejo de Italia
might disapprove and change the viceroys list, just as the king
could present a candidate who was not included in the Consejo
consultation, 34 and it goes without saying that the same Consejo
members sometimes proposed different candidates.35 For his part,
the Roman ambassador might influence the Consejo or kings resolution, under pressure from the papal court. Finally, a delay or
even a stop to the royal appointment could be the consequence of
apparent bureaucratic slowness in the emission of papal bulls or
31
Barrio Gozalo, La jerarqua eclesistica [see n. 28], p. 2528; Rawlings, The Secularisation [see n. 25], p. 5658.
32
AGS Sp, libros 776785 Consultas de Iglesias (1598-1698); libros 949
994, Privilegios de Sicilia (1598-1697); AHN Estado, leg. 2170, 2176, 2178,
2182, 2183; ASP, Protonotaro del Regno, Registri, vols. 447724 (15981700).
33
Fabrizio DAvenia, Partiti, clientele, diplomazia: la nomina dei vescovi
di Malta dalla donazione di Carlo V alla fine del viceregno spagnolo (15301713), in Antonino Giuffrida, Fabrizio DAvenia and Daniele Palermo
(eds.), Studi storici dedicati a Orazio Cancila, Quaderno n. 16 of Mediterranea.
Ricerche storiche, Palermo, 2011, vol. II, p. 445490.
34
Sometimes the king even appointed without the Consejos consultation
(see Barrio Gozalo, La jerarqua eclesistica [see n. 28], p. 2627).
35
On the work of the Consejo de Italia, see Manuel Rivero, Felipe II y el
gobierno de Italia, Madrid, 1998.
636
f. davenia
36
637
general, the grand master, subject only to the pope, and the celibacy obligation for its knights. The knights careers within the
Castilian Orders can be considered less ecclesiastical as they
were controlled by the king and where celibacy had either not
been an obligation since its foundation (Santiago) or had then been
abolished by a papal bull (Calatrava and Alcntara in 1540).38 In
any case, belonging to these particular kinds of religious Order
and following their rules (Statuta, Definiciones or Establecimientos)
had a different and important aristocratic meaning. The membership of the international Order of Malta represented a mark of
nobility, because of the selective requirements of entry, while the
Alcntara, Calatrava and Santiago crosses were a mark of loyalty,
granted by the king of Spain as the administrator of the Orders
to reward service to the Crown to those of not always proven nobility (in this case with the opposition of the Consejo de Ordenes). 39
As is known, very often within the same family there were even
brothers who were knights of both Orders (Malta and the Castilian ones), as well as abbots and bishops. The term teamwork is
confirmed.
The following data are important: from 1550 to 1700, there
were 433 Sicilian knights of Malta (14% of the Italian knights)
and 163 knights of the Castilian Orders.40 Sicily was particularly linked with the Order of Malta for historical and strategic
38
Martine Lambert-Gorges, Basques et Navarrais dans lOrdre de Santiago (1580-1620), Paris, 1985, p. 109112; Francisco Fernndez Izquierdo,
La Orden militar de Calatrava en el siglo XVI. Infraestructura institucional.
Sociologa y prosopografa de sus caballeros, Madrid, 1992, p. 112114. On
the incorporation of the Military Orders to the Castilian Crown, see ibid.,
p. 4856, 1306; Elena Postigo Castellanos, Honor y privilegio en la Corona de Castilla. El Consejo de las Ordenes y los caballeros de hbito en el s.
XVII, Soria, 1988, p. 2148.
39
L. P. Wright, The Military Orders in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spanish Society. The Institutional Embodiment of a Historical Tradition, in
Past and Present, 43 (1969), p. 3470; Postigo Castellanos, Honor y privilegio [see n. 38], p. 145; Fernndez Izquierdo, La Orden militar [see
n. 38], p. 91, 121; Franco Angiolini, Nobilt, Ordini cavallereschi e mobilit
sociale nellItalia moderna, in Storica, 12 (1998), p. 3756; Fabrizio DAvenia, I processi di nobilt degli ordini militari: modelli aristocratici e mobilit
sociale, in M. Rivero Rodrguez (ed.), Nobleza hispana, Nobleza cristiana.
La Orden de San Juan, Madrid, 2009, vol. II, p. 1087126.
40
Cfr. Angelantonio Spagnoletti, Stato, aristocrazie e Ordine di Malta
nellItalia moderna, Roma, 1988, p. 69; AHN Om, exp.tes and ex.llos.
638
f. davenia
639
43
Fabrizio DAvenia, Nobilt allo specchio. Mobilit sociale e Ordine di
Malta nella Sicilia moderna, Quaderno n. 8 of Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche,
Palermo, 2009, p. 5165, 164233.
44
Sire, The Knights of Malta [see n. 42], p. 83.
640
f. davenia
45
Luis Antonio Ribot Garca, La revuelta antiespaola de Mesina. Causas y antecedentes (1591-1674), Valladolid, 1992.
46
Athanasius Kircher, Splendor et Gloria domus Joanniae, in his Principis Christiani Archetypon Politicum regnatrix (Amsterdam, 1672), 83122;
Andrea Minutolo, Memorie del Gran Priorato di Messina, Messina, 1699,
p. iiiii, 55.
47
Antonino Giuffrida, La finanza pubblica nella Sicilia del 500, CaltanissettaRoma, 1999, p. 2526.
641
f. davenia
642
Palmeri, b. Sollazzo
Annamaria Lo
Giudice
Andrea LT
II branch
Scipione
Brigida Giustiniani
Placido, p. Castrorao
Antonia Rao
Palmeri, m. Sollazzo
Andrea Fortunato
Domenico
Domenico, k. Santiago
d. Saponara
2174, unfoliated, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for the appointment to the
Abbey of SS. Pietro e Paolo of Itala (13 Feb. 1678); AGS Sp, libro 988, fos
253-256, royal presentation to the Abbey of S. Angelo di Brolo (13 Jul.
1682); libro 991, fos 149-151, royal presentation to Archimandrato of Messina (26 Mar. 1686); AHN Estado, leg. 2169, unfoliated, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for the appointment to the bishopric of Siracusa (22 Nov. 1694).
50
AHN Estado, leg. 2182, unfoliated, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for
the appointment to the bishopric of Siracusa (28 Nov. 1673).
643
Nor on this occasion did the king appoint Placido, but probably not for political reasons: it was just not his turn and other
people had been waiting longer. In fact the king appointed
the theatine Giuseppe Boccadifoco, visitor to the Sicilian province for his Order.53 Although he was not even mentioned in the
consultation for the Abbey of Itala, already in September 1675
51
Ibid., leg. 2184, unfoliated, Relacin de los titulos y meritos de don Placido de Joan (12 Dec. 1678). In the consultation (10 Nov. 1676) one of the
reggenti, Vincenzo Denti from Messina, put Placido in first place on the list
for the Archimandrato (ibid., leg. 2170, unfoliated).
52
AGS Sp, leg. 1318, unfoliated, memorial of don Placido Di Giovanni
(9 Feb. 1678).
53
AHN Estado, leg. 2176, unfoliated, file Abbey of Itala (1624-1710),
consultation of the Consejo de Italia (13 Feb. 1678).
644
f. davenia
he had been recommended by the king himself for the next appointments and by April-June 1678 the Viceroy Gonzaga and the
majority of the Consejo proposed him as the main candidate for
the Mazara bishopric. On that occasion it was the turn of Carlo
Riggio, sumiller de cortina with more than 13 years court service,
formerly abbot of S. Maria de Gala and treasurer of Palermo Cathedral, in 1676 appointed to the Archimandrato of Messina, but
without being able to receive the annuity, because of the French
occupation . As in the case of Placido Di Giovanni regarding the
Siracusa bishopric in 1673, when in the same year the viceroy
Prince de Ligne proposed Carlo Riggio as the principal candidate
for the Cefal episcopal seat, the Consejo then omitted him in its
consultation, saying that although he was very worthy he could
wait 54 and so the chain continued!
However, after the suppression of the revolt, the Di Giovannis
loyalty was finally clarified and in any case, the strategy of the
Spanish Monarchy to recover the political support of some important aristocratic families in Messina, the reconstruction of
loyalty as Ribot Garca has described it,55 guaranteed the Di
Giovanni titles and privileges. In this context, Placidos influence at court, where he remained for 13 years, made it possible to
grant a habit of Santiago to his nephew Domenico in 1681. Three
years later Domenico purchased the title of duke too.
These are the same years when, as mentioned earlier, Placidos
ecclesiastical career took a new turn, in 1682-86, with his appointment to the Abbey of S. Angelo di Brolo (1682) and to the
Archimandrato of Messina (1686). The analysis of the two respective consultations of the Consejo de Italia sheds an interesting light
on the game of ecclesiastical appointments and on the conflicts
of interest that complicated its rules. The members of the Consejo
were divided on several proposals for a total of ten candidates,
four cited in both consultations and six cited in only one of them.
In two cases the kinship of one the Consejo members with the
candidates was declared: the reggente Giovanni Ramondetta with
54
645
his son Nicola, and the marquis of Balbases, Paolo Vincenzo Spinola, with Carlo Colonna, his wifes nephew. Both Ramondetta
and Balbases left the assembly after voting, customary in cases
of kinship . The latter belonged to an ancient and very powerful
family of the Roman and Neapolitan aristocracy. He was a descendant of the famous Marcantonio Colonna, admiral of the papal fleet at Lepanto and viceroy of Sicily (1577-84),56 and son of
the constable of the Kingdom of Naples who, like several Sicilian
and Neapolitan nobles, at the beginning of the Revolt of Messina
sent a hundred infantrymen and made vassals and resources from
his Calabrian estates available.57
Placido Di Giovannis other two competitors, who were also repeated in both consultations, were Giuseppe Migliaccio, abbot of
S. Maria lo Fico from 1681, and Giuseppe Impellizzeri, chaplain
of honour from 1674.
The former descended from a family belonging to lower feudal
status (with the title baron of Montemaggiore in 1526), which between the 1580s and 1640s quickly achieved important political
positions within the Sicilian parliamentary aristocracy: in 1598
Mariano I, Giuseppes great-great-grandfather, who was at the
Great Siege of Malta (1565) and at Lepanto (1571), acquired the
title marquis of Montemaggiore; in 1626 his grandson Mariano
II, Giuseppes grandfather, acquired the title prince of Baucina
(with licentia populandi and right of merum et mixtum imperium).
Both also held important public offices in Palermo and Messina
(respectively pretore and strategoto, the highest positions in the cities), and in Sicily as Deputato del Regno and mastro razionale of the
Tribunale del Real Patrimonio, the most important financial organ
of the kingdom. Moreover, Giuseppes father, Ignazio prince of
Baucina, followed his ancestors military and political career as
capitano di giustizia (police chief) in 1663 and pretore of Palermo in
1671 and 1678. However he is mainly remembered as a brave soldier with an excellent record of service to the Habsburg Monarchy
from the Dutch Revolt (1643-47) to the Revolt of Messina, when
he was general vicar in Catania, an office held at his own expense
through loss of his property and with the viceroys approval.58
56
646
f. davenia
The general vicar, who had important responsibilities in military matters [...] was actually an alter ego or agent for the viceroy , appointed by him among the most faithful of the first nobility of the kingdom on special occasions [...] such as subsistence
crises or earthquakes [...] During the war of Messina there were
[vicars] in almost all the major cities on the island , for example
Catania, Siracusa, Girgenti and Trapani. In February 1677 the
Viceroy marquis of Castelrodrigo praised the prince of Baucina
to whom he considered the citys preservation was owed. As well
as the prince of Aragona and the duke of Camastra [general vicars respectively in Girgenti and Siracusa], he said that the same
confidence can and should be placed in them as if they were Spanish .59 The report made to the viceroy by some Spanish soldiers
had probably influenced Castelrodrigos opinion. In fact they said
that the French did not want to attack Catania, although the city
was weak and open, because they well knew the vigilance and
skill of the prince who as a good and experienced soldier could
trunk their designs .60
On the other hand, don Giuseppe Impellizzeri belonged to a
provincial family of lower feudal status (with only the title baron
of S. Giacomo from 1593) within the patriciate of the small royal
city of Noto. However its members activity as large wine producers and marriages into patriciate families of the much more important Siracusa, like Landolina (for example Giuseppes mother),
as early as the 1660s and 1670s allowed access to the mastra nobile of the same city. And once again ecclesiastical careers followed
social ascendancy.61 Several Impellizzeri had been or were chaplains of honour like Giuseppe: his uncle Carlo from 1627 (later
bishop of Mazara in 1650-54), his brother Simone from 1666 and
also one of his nephews from 1674. His brother in law Francesco
was a knight of Malta (1617), as was another uncle Francesco
647
votes in Consejo
consultations
1682
1686
Carlo Colonna
Giuseppe Migliaccio
10
Giuseppe Impellizzeri
Placido Di Giovanni
Nicola Ramondetta
62
Cf. AHN Estado, leg. 2184, unfoliated, memorial of Giuseppe Impellizzeri (undated but before 6 Feb. 1678); Relaciones de los titulos y meritos of
Giuseppe and Simone Impellizzeri (20 Nov. 1683 and 30 Jun. 1681); letter
and memorial of the princess of Baucina (6 Jul. 1684); ASP Cm, f. 974, fasc.
223, proofs of nobility of Mariano Impellizzeri (1668); Minutolo, Memorie [see n. 46], p. 314316; San Martino De Spucches, La storia [see
n. 58], vol. VII, p. 112113.
63
Zito (ed.), Storia delle Chiese [see n. 24], p. 496497.
64
AHN Estado, leg. 2184, unfoliated, Relacin de los titulos y meritos of
Simone Impellizzeri (30 June 1681); AGS Sp, libro 992, fos 23840, royal
presentation (Madrid, 19 Jul. 1689).
648
f. davenia
65
AGS Sp, libro 784, fos 429 r 432 r, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for
the appointment to the Abbey of SantAngelo di Brolo (30 May 1682); libro
785, fos 55v60 r, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for the appointment to the
Archimandrato of Messina (12 Nov. 1685).
66
AGS Sp, libro 991, fos 202204, royal presentation to the Priory of
SantAndrea of Piazza (19 Aug. 1686).
649
On the real political reasons for Guerreros opposition to the Di Giovanni family, see DAvenia, Nobilt [see n. 43], p. 260263, 270.
68
AGS Sp, libro 785, fos 241r 248r, consulta of the Consejo de Italia for the
appointment to the bishopric of Siracusa (13 Jan. 1694).
69
His will is in ASP Alliata, vol. 2139, fos 190 r 197v, Notary Carlo Melardo of Messina (13 Sep. 1694).
650
f. davenia
the office by his predecessor, the Florentine fra Andrea Minorbetti, because of the earthquake of 1693 which ruined the Priorys revenue .70
As general of galleysan office whose administration, maintenance and service was funded through a loan provided by his
brother Scipione, prince of Trecastagni, and his nephew mentioned earlier, Domenico, knight of Santiago and duke of Saponara ( teamwork again),71 he worked courageously on the Aegean Sea in collaboration with the Venetian fleet, commanded by
Dominic Mocenigo and then by the Doge Francesco Morosini.72
He died at sea in 1700 when the commanding galley sank following a naval clash with a Barbary ship off the Isola delle Correnti,
on the southern tip of Sicily.73
As mentioned, however, the proofs were frequently the scene
of antagonism between urban patriciates, like those of Catania
and Messina. A very interesting and well documented example at
the end of the 1660s concerned Francesco Ramondettabrother
of Nicola, Placido Di Giovannis competitor in the consultation
for the Abbey of S. Angelo di Brolo in 1682, descending from a
famous family of Catania jurists and senatori, among which Raimondo, baron of Pardo and reggente of the Consejo de Italia (157582), but also hombre de negocios and typical representative of that
entourage of high judges [who], benefitting themselves of their
earnings from the legal profession, the ministerial auctoritas and
the upset provoked by the financial crisis, succeeded in purchasing saleable offices, effects of royal patrimony, lands and noble titles .74 Francescos father Giovanni, at the time of his sons proofs
of nobility, was judge of the Tribunale della Gran Corte (civil and
70
651
criminal court) and within some years would have also risen to
the position of reggente of the Consejo de Italia, while his uncle
Raimondo (Giovannis brother and homonymous of the greatgrandfather), would have seen his baronial title of Pardoinherited in 1652rise directly to that of prince in 1684.75
Now, when in 1669 Francesco Ramondetta of Catania presented his proofs of nobility, he recused the president of the assembly,
the lieutenant Giovanni Di Giovanni, who should have approved
them. Indeed, the two families Ramondetta and Di Giovanni had
long been in conflict: Giovannis father, Domenico, had recused
the father of Francesco, Giovanni Ramondetta, as judge in a long
trial (1654-1661) about the jurisdiction over three casaliTrecastagni, Viagrande and Pedaraonce subjected to Catania and then
bought by him. In the end, however, Francesco Ramondetta was
admitted.76
Clearly behind the scenes of his proofs of nobility there was a
conflict between two families climbing the ranks of the Sicilian
aristocracy, but belonging to patriciates of rival cities.77 In fact the
sale of the casali constituted a jurisdictional prerogative expropriation from Catania, a removal of fiscal resources and therefore a
decrease of power for the ruling elite of the city. For that reason,
already in the Revolt of 1647, Catania (at that time Vincenzo Ramondetta, Francescos grandfather was one of its senatori) strongly urged the reintroduction of the casali to the royal domain.78
Open questions
There are some open questions that are worth examining, first
of all the activity of aristocratic ecclesiastics and knights once
75
Ligresti, Sicilia aperta [see n. 58], p. 177; San Martino De
Spucches, La storia [see n. 58], vol. V, p. 413.
76
ASP Cm, f. 974, fasc. 226, proofs of nobility of Francesco Ramondetta
(1669).
77
Of course this kind of conflicts could be set families belonging to patriciate of the same city against one another. For an interesting case study
on this, referring to the proofs of nobility in the Order of Santiago, see Jos
Miguel Delgado Barrado and Mara Amparo Lpez Arandia, Poderosos y
privilegiados. Los caballeros de Santiago de Jan (siglos XVI-XVIII), Madrid,
2009, in particular p. 205213.
78
On this, see Daniele Palermo, Tra mediazione e repressione: laristocrazia catanese durante la rivolta del 1647, in Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche, 2
(2004), p. 6377.
652
f. davenia
they reached the tops of their career. It is very important to investigate the political role of Sicilian aristocratic bishops and abbots within the ecclesiastical chamber of Parliament and the Deputazione del Regno, as well as that of Grand Crosses of the Order
of Malta within the Priory of Messina and the Council of the Order (for both areas of fieldwork there are records in the Archivio
di Stato of Palermo and in the National Library of Malta). In
particular it would be interesting to establish which loyalty took
precedence in their political choices in the case of conflict situations involving their several memberships: their own family and
city, the ecclesiastic institution (the Roman Church and the Order
of Malta), the (Sicilian) kingdom or the (Spanish) monarchy. Such
an analysis might well facilitate reconstructing the existence of a
homogeneous political class or, on the contrary, a scene of multiple loyalties. In this context a good starting point would be the
revolts of 1647-1648 and 1674-1678.
Furthermore, another important line of research concerns the
pastoral work of Sicilian aristocratic bishops and, in some cases,
abbots. It would be particularly interesting to investigate further
how they administrated the spiritual government of their dioceses
or ecclesiastical jurisdiction (in particular through analysis of the
Archivio Segreto Vaticano records).
It is important, in fact, to estimate the reforming activity of
bishops, often appointed in quite non-spiritual ways,79 especially through the application of some instruments provided by the
Council of Trent (seminaries, diocesan synods, pastoral visits) and
establish comparison with Italian, Spanish and French bishops.
It is indeed worth remembering not only that, since all bishops
owed their nominations to patronage, political appointments as
such did not necessarily imply unwillingness to reform ,80 but
also that
79
The Canons of the Council of Trent were not able, or rather could not
succeed, in reforming radically the procedure for assignment and appointment of greater benefits [bishoprics first] because it was linked to political
issues (Massimo Faggioli, La disciplina di nomina dei vescovi prima e dopo
il concilio di Trento, in Societ e Storia, 92 [2001], p. 238239, 246, who also
talks of the inevitable minimalist approach to the problem during the
Council sessions as result of various and irreconcilable pressures and proposals ).
80
Po-chia Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal [see n. 8], p. 157. See
also Antonio Domnguez Ortiz, La sociedad espaola en el siglo XVII, Gra-
653
throughout most of Europe, the effective right to choose new bishops lay with secular rulers, whether by virtue of a formal concordat agreed with the papacy or, as in much of Italy, by informal understandings based on mutual interest, and part of the pressure on
bishops to play a more interventionist role within their dioceses came
from rulers concerned about religious orthodoxy as well as social order and political control. 81
654
f. davenia
ceses was 11.98 (down 3.43 for those synods published, but this
is very incomplete data). In almost the same period (1570-1789),
the average of synodal statutes promulgated in the 113 French
dioceses was 9.35.82 I think these figures, though partial, show
a uniform pastoral rate: the bishops of Sicily were no more or
less reformers than their counterparts in Italy, Spain and France.
University of Palermo
Department of Cultures and Societies
Fabrizio DAvenia
Hayden and Greenshields, 600 Years [see n. 80], p. 266, 277; Silvino Da Nadro, Sinodi diocesani italiani. Catalogo bibliografico degli atti a
stampa (1534-1878), Roma, 1960; Francesco Guglielmo Savagnone, Concili
e sinodi di Sicilia: struttura giuridica, storia, Palermo, 1910; Quintn Aldea
Vaquero, Toms Marin Martinez, Jos Vives Gatell, Diccionario de historia eclesiastica de Espaa, Madrid, 1972-1975, vol. IV, col. 24892494.
655