PEOPLE vs PASUDAG

(2) Whether or not the confiscation report was an

extrajudicial confession which required the intervention of
counsel? Yes

FACTS:
Alberto Pasudag was charged with violation of RA 6425, Sec.
9 and was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal cultivation of marijuana.
SPO2 Calip went to conduct anti-jueteng operations. He
urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the public school
and saw a garden with marijuana plants in between corn
plants and camote tops. He found out from a nearby
storeowner that the garden was owned by the accused.
SPO2 Calip reported this the Chief of Police who dispatched a
team to conduct an investigation. This team went to the house
of the accused and asked him to bring them to the garden.
Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen asked a
photographer to take pictures of the accused with the plants.
They uprooted 7 marijuana plants and brought the accused
and the said plants to the police station.
At the police station, the accused admitted that he owned
the marijuana plants. He did this in front of the Chief of
Police. SPO3 Fajarito, a member of the investigation team,
prepared a confiscation report which the accused signed.
He then brought one of the uprooted plants to the laboratory
for examination. The forensic chemist found the leaves
positive for marijuana.
Accused was found guilty.
Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in
finding that the marijuana plant submitted for laboratory
examination was one of the seven (7) marijuana plants
confiscated from his garden; that the trial court erred in
concluding that the confiscation report was not an
extrajudicial admission which required the intervention of
his counsel; and in convicting him on the basis of inference
that he planted, cultivated and cultured the seven (7) plants,
owned the same or that he permitted others to cultivate the
same.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the marijuana plant may be

admitted as evidence? No

RULING:
(1) NO. The procurement of a search warrant is
required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the
person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The
Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence
obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible.
The police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from
the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to
who owned the house. He was acquainted with marijuana
plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the
backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of
the essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were
three months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe
that they would be uprooted on that same day.
"The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law
enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of
dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and
apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard
of the Bill of Rights." We need not underscore that the
protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants." "The mantle of protection extended
by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praise worthiness of their intentions."
(2) YES. The arrest of accused-appellant was tainted with
constitutional infirmity. The testimony of SPO3 Jovencio
Fajarito34 reveals that appellant was not duly informed of his
constitutional rights. He admitted that he did not inform the
accused of his constitutional rights before asking him
questions when he went to the house of the accused. He
also said that the Chief of Police did not inform the
accused of his constitutional rights as a person under
custodial investigation before the interrogation.
No counsel assisted the accused-appellant in both the
interrogation and the signing of the confiscation report.

The accused was under custodial investigation when he

signed the confiscation receipt.
Custodial investigation commences when a person is
taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in
the commission of a crime under investigation and
the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit
an admission.
The accused-appellant was a suspect from the moment the
police team went to his house and ordered the uprooting of the
marijuana plants.
The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more that mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee."40 Even if the confession or
admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without
assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such
assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ALBERTO
PASUDAG y BOKANG is ACQUITED of the crime charged
for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS ZUELA
FACTS:
Tito Zuela, Maximo Velarde and Nelson Garcia were charged
with robbery with triple homicide. They were arrested and
were arraigned with the assistance of counsel and pleaded not
guilty.
The three accused allegedly robbed Maria Abendano and
killed her, her son and her driver during a delivery of the palay
she buys and sells. Romualda, Marias sister whose store was
beside Marias, was the witness in this case.
Romualda stated that she saw the three accused board the
jeepney of Maria during a delivery. Gerardo, to whom the
palay was going to be delivered, saw Maximo inside the
jeepney during the delivery of the palay to his ricemill.
The following morning, the bodies of Maria, her son and her
driver were found. According to Romualda, the 3 accused
conceived the plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front of
Romualdas store because Maximo needed money to go to
Manila. Maximo was supposed to board the jeep while the two
others would wait somewhere else to board the jeepney and
hold-up Maria.
Lt. Idian, assisted by 2 other policemen, arrested Maximo and
brought him to the station with no warrant. He was
investigated and was asked to give a written statement in
front of Atty. Ocampo.

had them sign their individual extrajudicial statements.

RULING:

The three accused interposed common defenses: denial and

they were tortured and forced to make a confession. Tito and
Nelson also claimed that they were not assisted by counsel
when their confessions were taken.

NO. The right to counsel attaches the moment an

investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is
at this point that the law requires the assistance of counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced
admissions or confessions from the person undergoing
interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move
or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

Maximo claimed that he went with Lt. Idian because he was

told that his parents wanted to see him because his brother
died. He was shown a picture of the cadaver. Along the way,
he felt a hard object hit his head and he passed out. When he
regained consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing
a gun, Lt. Idian told him that he could choose either to die or to
sign the statement they preoared because his brother had
wronged them. He was warned not to tell anyone that he was
mauled.
Two days later, in front of Lt. Idian, Atty. Ocampo and Pat.
Refe, Atty Ocampo read a prepared statement. He refused to
sign. He overheard that he was going to be made to sign in
front of Atty. Ocampo.
According to Maximo, he was kicked in the stomach and a
gun was poked at him. He signed the statement out of
fear. He was also made to sign another statement in front
of Judge Valencia Bagalacsa. From the time he was
arrested, he was never released.

Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a

warrant. They underwent suctodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be
found in their town.

Nelson Garcia denied knowledge of the crime and claimed

that he was mauled by Lt. Idian when his group went to
Garcias house it invite him to the station. He was mauled
again at the station and to prevent injury, he just signed the
prepared statement. He also claimed that he was neither
informed of the contents nor assisted by counsel. He was
asked to copy in his own handwriting the prepared statement.
He was never released from custody from the time he was
arrested.

They stated in their confession, in their own handwriting,

that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no
one coerced them or promised them anything to admit
responsibility for the crime.

Tito also claimed that he was arrested and was mauled in

order to make him sign the prepared statement. He also
claimed that he was neither informed of the contents nor
assisted by counsel.

The three signed their individual statements in front of Judge

Valencia Bagalacsa. She followed the same procedure and
line of questioning, using the local dialect, in ascertaining the
voluntariness of the confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his
companions to leave her and the accused inside the
chamber.21 Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their
rights and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his

right to counsel. In light of these facts, we are constrained to
the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is
inadmissible in evidence. "An uncounselled extra-judicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that
is, in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence."
The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and
Nelson were likewise inadmissible in evidence because they
were executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the
fact that the reason for the absence of lawyer during the
custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area,
the Court could not be lenient in this case. The absence or
scarcity of lawyers in any given place is not a valid reason
for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled
confessions.
It was not cured by the presence of Judge Bagalacsa.
With regard to Maximo, he repeated the statements to
Romualda who related these in court. That is admissible.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted
having committed the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the
three accused may be admitted as evidence? - No.

Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's

admission sealed not only the latter's fate but also that of
appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused because the latter has

no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and

therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay,38 is
not applicable here. What is involved here is an
admission, not a confession. Wharton distinguished these
terms as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express
terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the
issue and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission
is something less than a confession, and is but an
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which
in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and
which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine witness Romualda on accusedappellant Maximo's declaration. They could have
questioned its veracity by presenting evidence in support
of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to
test Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so,
Romualda's testimony, which the trial court correctly
considered as credible, stands unscathed.
Such testimony, taken with circumstances duly established by
the prosecution, point unerringly to accused-appellants'
culpability. These circumstances are: (1) accused-appellants
and the victims were all residents of Barcelonita, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur, a small barangay where everyone knew
everybody; (2) accused-appellants Tito and Nelson helped in
the stores of the sisters Maria and Romualda a week before
the incident; (3) Romualda saw the three accused-appellants
as they boarded Maria's jeepney during its last palay delivery
to Libmanan; (4) Gerardo Atienza saw accused-appellant
Maximo with Maria's group during the jeepney's second
delivery of palay; (5) Atienza saw accused-appellant Maximo
riding in Maria's jeepney after the last delivery; (6) after the
commission of the crime, accused-appellants Tito and Nelson
no longer went to the store of Romualda; (7) accusedappellants never attended the wake of the victims, and (8)
accused-appellant Maximo fled to Manila.

PEOPLE vs ABE VALDEZ

(it is therefore inadmissible in evidence cos it was made

without the assistance of counsel)

FACTS:
RTC found Valdez guilty of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
According to SPO3 Tipay, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by appellant. The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao then formed a reaction team from his
operatives to verify the report.Inspector Parungao gave the
team specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and
arrest the cultivator of same.
The following day, said police team, accompanied by their
informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. The police found appellant alone in his
nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25
meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who
owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the
latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the
seven marijuana plants. The police took photos of appellant
standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then
arrested.
According to the appellant, he was weeding his vegetable farm
in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity
he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see
something." This unknown person then brought appellant to
the place where the marijuana plants were found,
approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of
the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything
about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told
him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so
nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.

Also, actions after the crime showed guilt.

At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew

nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police.

Other note: crime changed to robbery with homicide

ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of the accused that the
plants were his was made under custodial investigation? Yes.

RULING:
YES. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a person
suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that
juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had
furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of
appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being grown. While the police operation was supposedly
meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had
likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected
marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to
appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation
as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a
general inquiry.
In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was
already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he
was already under custodial investigation and had a right to
counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial
investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated
appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace
officer and three other armed policemen. All had been
dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may
infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom
of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest.
Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him
incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.

PEOPLE vs RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
Rodriguez and his co-accused were charged with murder.
-They were being implicated in the killing of Matias whose
body was found at the Far East Bank and Trust Company
which was on the same building where they were working as
construction workers.
SPO3 Jamoralin conducted a follow-up investigation.
Accompanied the security guard, he went to the construction
site where he found Rodriquez packing his belongings. He
saw a pair of jeans with red stains on Ricos bed. He also saw
red stains on Roriguezs shirt. Rodiguez said that he had a
wound on his neck, but when checked, there was none.
Rodriguez was then arrested and brought to the station
for interrogation.
Assisted by Atty. Lao, Rodriguez executed a sworn
statement confessing that he and appellant Rico, together
with one Rading Mendoza and two other men, killed
Matias.
They were charged with Robbery with Homicide.
On the stand, Rodriguez denied participation in the killing
and claimed that he was mauled by the policemen to
confess the crime.
Rico, testified that the policemen merely placed him
outside the room where Rodriguez was being
interrogated, and that the police did not take any
statement from him. Appellant also denied owning the
maong pants which the police said were taken from his
bed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of
accused Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also
against appellant No. Confession is constitutionally
flawed. It cannot be used against them at all.
RULING:
NO. Fundamental requisites for the admissibility
of a confession: 1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the

confession must be made with the assistance of competent

and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing.
The second requisite is lacking. They were detained for four
days. It was only on the fourth day of detention that Atty. Lao
was called, when the confession was going to be put into
writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and
appellant were arrested and brought to the police station,
they were already under custodial investigation.
In the case of People v. Bolanos, we held that an accused who
is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station
is already under custodial investigation, and should therefore
be accorded his rights under the Constitution. In this case, the
teaching of Bolanos clearly went unheeded. Rights of a person
under custodial investigation (section 12, Article III of the
Constitution)
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage
when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. When Rodriguez and appellant were
arrested by the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991,
they were already the suspects in the slaying of the security
guard, Ramon Matias, and should have been afforded the
rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, particularly the right to counsel. The records do
not show that Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their
arrest in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, were informed of
the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not
provided with competent and independent counsel during
the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the
extrajudicial confession.
Operative act:
When the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements, and not the signing by the suspect of
his supposed extrajudicial confession
Purpose of right to counsel (just in case):
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting
confession even by the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. What is sought to be
avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an

offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and

thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have
been made available to protect him from the inherently
coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such
investigation.
As to appellant, the trial court convicted him on the basis of
two pieces of circumstantial evidence which show conspiracy:
(1) the extrajudicial confession of accused implicating him as
one of the perpetrators and (2) the fact that the maong pants
allegedly belonging to appellant was found positive of type O
blood. The former being inadmissible and the latter being of no
probative value since the blood type of appellant and the
victim were not taken for purposes of comparison, there
remains nothing to support appellants conviction.

PEOPLE vs DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
> Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun,
Virgilio Santos alias Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong
were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman.
> While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,
Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong remained at
large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter.
Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
> Court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as
charged and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violations on his
constitutional rights as an accused?

counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be

allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford
the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating
officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of
his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was
"invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain,
he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he
was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle
driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and
senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution
failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to
remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the
crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against
him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by
law and the Bill of Rights.

BABST vs NIB
FACTS:
> Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal against petitioners on which
the author had been interrogated by respondents.
> Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction
over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional
guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of
imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media;
> In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of
jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction
over the petitioners; that what respondents have sent to
petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere
invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without
any compulsion employed on petitioners;
ISSUE:
Whether or nor there was legality of the issuance by
respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their
subsequent interrogation?

RULING:

RULING:

YES. A further perusal of the transcript reveals that

during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already
gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid
that he might attempt to escape.

YES. The assailed proceedings have come to an end.

The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of
invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore
been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic
as regards the aforesaid matters.

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police

investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken
into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by
law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. This concept of custodial investigation has been
broadened by RA 7438 to include "the Practice of issuing an
'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of
the same Act further provides that x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under
his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates
any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent

Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation

to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person
invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful
group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued
at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and
when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is
a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly
voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative
command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where,
as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming
that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and
this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with
law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the
wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome
interrogation.

PEOPLE vs MULETA
Rights during custodial investigation: (1) to remain silent,
(2) to have an independent and competent counsel, (3) to be
provided with such counsel, if unable to secure one, (4) to be
assisted by one in case of waiver, which should be in writing,
of the foregoing; and (5) to be informed of all such rights and
of the fact that anything he says can and will be used against
him
FACTS:
Muleta was found guilty of the crime of rape with homicide by
the RTC.
According to the prosecution:
Charito Delgado was raped. Her body was found naked, tied
to a post with a pair of jeans. Her hands were tied with a bra.
She was appellants niece.
During his custodial investigation, appellant was assisted by
counsel.
Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that
during the wake of Charito Delgado appellant became
hysterical and crying. Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of
"chlorux", after which he fell to the ground. Appellant was
brought to the Fatima Hospital.
Version of the defense:
Muleta denied responsibility of the crime and claimed that he
was just unscrupulously picked up by the NBI and forced to
admit the crime.
He also stated that when he found out his niece was missing,
he reported the matter to the police authorities.
He said that he was picked up by the NBI at Banos Gloria,
Oriental Mindoro; that he was brought at Taft Avenue; that he
was tortured; that aside from boxing and kicking him, [they]
brought [him] to a secluded place; that he was blindfolded; that
he was told to lie down on his back, his feet were tied and
water was poured on his nose; that he was forced to sign a
document which he was not able to read, that he was
forced to sign the document because he [could] no longer
bear the torture; that he did not have a lawyer at that time.
RTC found the accused guilty based in circumstantial
evidence and upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
confession. According to the RTC, the rule that the

presumption that the confession was given voluntarily has not

been overcome. The RTC also pointed out that the accused
was assisted by a counsel who even signed the the statement.
The accused did not present any evidence that he was
tortured no eyewitness, no medical certificate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of
appellant is admissible? No. WON the remaining
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is sorely
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not
valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in
violation of any of the following rights of persons under
custodial investigation: to remain silent, to have independent
and competent counsel preferably of their own choice, to be
provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one, to be
assisted by such counsel during the investigation, to have
such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights,
and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that
anything they say can and will be used against them in court.
Flagrantly violated in the present case were the appellant's
right to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation,
his right to counsel, as well as his right to have said counsel
present during the waiver of his rights under custodial
investigation.
The questions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy the
strict requirements mandated by the Constitution. Such "terse
and perfunctory statements" implied a superficial reading of
the rights of the accused, without the slightest consideration of
whether he understood what was read to him. This Court will
not subscribe to such manner of "informing" the accused of his
constitutional rights.
We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the
same date: September 19, 1993. It is thus daylight clear that
the purported sworn statement of the appellant was prepared
prior to the arrival of his NBI-procured counsel. In other words,
the sworn statement was executed and completed on
September 19, 1993, while Atty. Daquiz arrived only the
following day, September 20, 1993. Thus, when the appellant
executed and completed his purported extrajudicial confession
on September 19, 1993, he was not assisted by counsel.

We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our

hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish
confessions and render them inadmissible." This Court has
consistently held, without equivocation, that no custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it is done in the
presence of counsel. The failure of the prosecution to present
Atty. Daquiz to testify on the validity of the confession
substantiates the conclusion that the sworn statement is
constitutionally suspect and invalid. In relation to this, we
stress that the right to counsel refers to competent and
independent lawyers preferably chosen by the accused
persons themselves. This Court, as well as the court a quo,
did not have the opportunity to determine the competence and
the independence of the NBI-procured lawyer because,
despite the denial of the accused that he was assisted by
counsel, the prosecution failed to present Atty. Daquiz.
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated
by the fact that appellant exercised no satisfactory waiver of
his rights. As stated in our earlier discussions, since he was
not assisted by a lawyer when the waiver was made, there
was no valid waiver to speak of.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant
was assisted by counsel when he waived his lights, the waiver
itself was lamentably insufficient. After Atty. Daquiz was
allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this
question: "Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan
na ibinibigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon?" To this appellant
replied: "Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko nang
ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na
pamangkin ko."
To the Court, this was not the waiver that the Constitution
clearly and strictly required. Such waiver failed to show his
understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights, and the
implications of his waiver. The waiver, in order to be valid,
should have been in a language that clearly manifested his
desire to do so. The part of the sworn statement in which the
accused "waived" his rights referred to them as "mga
karapatan na ibinigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon" and "iyon"
words that were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy the
Constitutional requirements.
Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether
appellant would like to waive his rights. This was odd, because
she had been called to assist appellant in making his
confession, not his waiver. Atty. Daquiz made no effort to
determine whether the accused was treated well, or the

understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt

falls short of constitutional requirements.

PEOPLE vs TAN

On the other issue:

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented acquires
significance only when taken together with the appellant's
confession. The pattern of the tapestry, which the prosecution
would want us to see, is bound by only a single thread the
confession of the appellant. Due to constitutional infirmity, that
one strand has been cut, and thus the pattern disintegrates.
The tapestry becomes an unreadable puzzle.

FACTS:

MULETA ACQUITTED.

> Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the
crime of highway robbery with murder before the Regional
Trial Court.
> Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa
at Our Lady of Angels Academy to inform her that he will drive
Tan and Amdio to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that
Freddie was seen alive. When Freddie failed to return that
evening, Delfa inquired on his whereabouts. In the course of
such inquiry a certain Villarama revealed that the body of
Freddie was discovered on the diversion road at Barangay
Malinao. They proceeded to the said place and found the
Freddies body with 14 stab wounds.
>Relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a
tricycle was seen at Brg. Malinao, members of the PNP
proceeded to the scene and recovered a blue sidecar.
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Aguilar and Pat. Alandy invited
Tan in connection with the instant case and with respect to 2
other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their
conversation, Tan allegedly gave an explicit account of what
actually transpired. He narrated that he and Amido were
responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and death of
Freddie. He averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain
Teves of Muntinlupa for P4,000. With the help of Tan, Lucena
PNP dispatched a team to retrieve the motorcycle.
>Teves admitted that he purchase the motorcycle from Tan
and Amido and failed to present any document evidencing the
purported sale. He voluntarily surrendered the motorcycle to
the police.
> Testimony of Lt. Carlo: when he invited tan to their HQ, he
had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he
informed Tan that he was a suspect, not only in the instant
case but also in 2 other robbery cases allegedly committed in
Lucena. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside
the police station, he admitted that he did not inform Tan of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of
counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.
> Tan alleged that he had no participation in the offense
charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter
as the referral of Amido to Teves. He narrated that Amido
sought him and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on
was being offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was
indeed registered under Amidos name, he accompanied
Amido to Manila on board the motorcycle and they
approached Carandang. Carandang brought to Teves with
whom the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly

received P150 as his commission.

>Amido presented alibi as his defense: He is also a tricycle
driver and he was at Brgy. Malusak(some 7 km. from the town)
on the day in question, busy assisting in the renovation of his
mothers house. He narrated that the victim was his friend,
and therefore he could not have participated in the gruesome
death of the latter.
> RTC found Tan guilty of the crime of Highway Robbery with
Murder and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua. Due to insufficiency of evidence, Amido
was acquitted.
> Tan assails the finding of conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to positively identify him as the culprit of the crime
and to present clear and convincing circumstantial evidence
that would overcome his innocence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the supposed confession taken from
the conversion of Lt. Carlo and Tan is admissible as evidence?
RULING:
NO. The Constitution abhors an uncounselled
confession or admission and whatever information is derived
therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible evidence against
the confessant.
RA No. 7438 defines custodial investigation:
custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing
an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without
prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation
of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin
to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to
operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a
requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to

explain those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and
understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
A confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3)
it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to
counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing and
intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel.
Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made
without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence, regardless of the
absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was
assisted by counsel when he made such waiver,
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when Tan was
invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly
admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to
convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of
Tan, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are
impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed, even if
the same be initiated by mere invitation.
What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is
inadequate to warrant a conviction.
DISPOSITION Decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET
ASIE. Tan is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

MIRANDA vs ARIZONA

on each count. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

FACTS:

California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of

purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries
inflicted by her assailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser
of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at
his home. Police also arrested Stewarts wife and three other
people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and,
over the next five days, was interrogated on nine different
occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated
that he had robbed the deceased, but had not meant to hurt her.
At that time, police released the four other people arrested with
Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any of them
with the crime. At trial, Stewarts statements were introduced.
Stewart was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California reversed,
holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel.

The Supreme Courts decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed

four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In each of
these cases, the defendant was questioned by police officers,
detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was
cut off from the outside world. In none of these cases was the
defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the
outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the
questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed
statements that were admitted at trial.
Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken
in custody to a police station where he was identified by the
complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police
officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written
confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were
presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and
rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each
count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession.
Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police
in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred
three days prior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad
headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad,
where he orally admitted the robbery and was placed under
formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for
detention, where he was questioned by an assistant district
attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the
questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and the
transcript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of
first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment.
The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals.
Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police
in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and
taken to a local police station. A report was also received from the
FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California.
Westover was interrogated the night of the arrest and the next
morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the
interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-half hours of
interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions,
which had been prepared by one of the agents during the
interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These
statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of
the California robberies and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment

ISSUE:
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected
to custodial police interrogation are admissible against him in a
criminal trial?
RULING:
The Court held that there can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves. As such, the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.
The Court further held that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or
accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures
which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely.
Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.

PEOPLE vs OBRERO
FACTS:

Jimmy Obrero was a delivery boy employed by Cabosas

whose business was selling chickens to customers.
RTC found Jimmy Obrero guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Testimony of Pat. Ines (investigated the robbery with
homicide): After receiving a report of the killing, Pat. Ines and
Pfc. Sibal went to see Cabosas from which they learned that
the Cabosas received a call from Cabrera informing Cabosas
that her house had been robbed and her 2 maids killed. The
officers were told the Obrero had gone to Pangasinan
allegedly to attend the burial of his grandfather. Police officers
went to Pangasinan but failed to find Obrero. They were told
by the sister of Obrero that Obrero had gone to La Union.
Obrero confided to his sister that he had allegedly done
something wrong in Manila. Pat. Ines and his group received
information from Urdaneta Police Station that Obrero was in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They went to the place and the next
day, they were able to apprehend Obrero whom they brought
to Manila. Pat. Ines said Obrero was positively identified by
Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw running
down the stairs of the Gatlin Building with his blood in his
hands. On the same day, Obrero gave a confession in writing
with the assistance of Atty. De los Reyes, in which he admitted
participation in the killing of Berjuega and Hitta. He also
executed an affidavit stating the circumstances of Obreros
arrest. He said Obrero refused to sign the booking and
information sheet. Obreros extrajudicial confession was
presented.
Obreros extrajudicial confessison - His fellow employe,
Liwanag, proposed that they rob Cabrera in order to be able to
go to La Union to visit his family. After learning that only 2
helpers were then at the residence of Cabrero, Obrero and
Liwanag decided to pull the heist. Liwanag covered the mouth
of Berjuega to prevent her from shout but, as she tried to run
away, Liwanag stabbed and killed her. Liwanag then gave the
knife to Obrero who stabbed the younger maid Hitta from
which she died. The two divided the money Liwanag had
taken from the house. Liwanag went to La Unino, while Obrero
proceeded to Pangasinan. The extrajudicial confession is in
Tagalog and signed by Obrero in the presence of Atty. De los
Reyes.

Testimony of Atty. De los Reyes (PC Captain of the WPD

Headquarters) he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD,
representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He was
asked by Lt. Javie to assist Obrero in executing an
extrajudicial confession. He apprised Obrero of his
constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement
made by him could be used against him in court, but Obrero
said he was willing to give the statement as in fact he did,
confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
Obrero denied participation in the commission of the crime
and claimed that he was arrest without a warrant in
Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being informed of the
charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a
week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He
denied having known or seen Atty. De los Reyes before and
stated that he did not understand the contents of the
extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not
know how to read.
Obrero assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession
which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery
with homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted
him in executing his confession, was not the counsel of his
own choice. That was the reason, he said, he refused to sign
the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the
extrajudicial confession 5 times as a sign that it was
involuntarily executed by him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Obreros extrajudicial confession is
admissible?
RULING:
YES. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision (Article III;
Section 12]:
(1) Those which are the product of third degree methods such
as torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12,
(2) Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda
warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same
Section 12.
Confession was not obtained by force and threat

Obrero has show no proof of the use of force and violence

on him. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a
physical examination.
Obrero signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he
had been given the Miranda warnings. Then, he signed again
as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he
agreed to give a statement. Next, he signed again his name at
the end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his
confession. Fourth, he signed the third page at the end of his
confession. Fifth, he signed his name again on the third page
in which the jurat appears. We discern no sign that the
confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it
was signed by accused-appellant five times.
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily
executed from the fact that Obrero refused to sign the booking
and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute
the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is
no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said
sheet as well. The inference rather was that no force was used
to make Obrero execute the confession, otherwise, he could
also have been forced to sign the booking and information
sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarants
consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the
perpetrator of the crime could have given. No one except
Obrero could have stated that it was he who killed the younger
maid of Hitta, that he committed the crime together with his
townmate, Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon given
to him by Liwanag after the latter had stabbed and killed the
other helper (Nena Berjuega), details which are consistent
with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by
the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same
bladed weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its being replete with details
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of
a mind on which violence and torture have been applied.
Given without the benefit of Miranda warnings
What renders the confession of Obrero inadmissible is
the fact that Obrero was not given the Miranda warnings
effectively. Under the Constitution, an uncounseled statement
is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into an

unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures

typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect
really needs the guiding hand of counsel.
Under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that
the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the
following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his right to
remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says
can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that
he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer
will be appointed to represent him.
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda
rights to Obrero without any effort to find out from him whether
he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own
counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This
kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this Court,
has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to
transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Especially in
this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by
the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically
asked these questions considering that he only finished the
fourth grade of the elementary school.
Moreover, Art. III, Section 12(1) requires that counsel assisting
suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and
independent. Here, Obrero was assisted by Atty. De los
Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be
considered an "independent counsel" as contemplated by the
law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD
at the time he assisted Obrero.
People v. Bandula - the independent counsel required by Art.
III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, municipal attorney, or counsel of the police whose
interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station
Commander of the WPD, was part of the police force who
could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously
Obrero in the investigation, his claim to the contrary
notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render
illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial
investigation.
Obreros acquittal
Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of Obrero
cannot stand. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial
evidence of Obreros guilt consisting of the sworn statements
of Helen Moral, the househelp who said Obrero used to deliver

dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence, and Anita de los

Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in
front of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when
she saw Obrero running down the stairs with blood in his
hands. These statements are likewise inadmissible for being
hearsay. Consequently, there is no identification of accusedappellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the
corpus delicti, there is no evidence of the robbery except the
confession of Obrero which, as already stated, is inadmissible.
It does not matter that Obrero failed to object to the
introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The
lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof
which rested on the prosecution.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Regional Trial Court,
convicting Jimmy Obrero of the crime of robbery with homicide
is REVERSED and Obrero is hereby ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE vs DUERO
FACTS:
In the evening of Sunday, Fausta Condino Vda. de Duero, was
feloniously killed in her house.She sustained 2 gaping wounds
on the right cheek, two 2 wounds on the neck, another gaping
wound on the right shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A
piece of wire, which was used to strangle her was tied around
her neck. A scythe was sticking in her neck.
The gruesome crime was discovered in the afternoon of the
following day by the Brgy. Captain Prevendido. Prevendido
requested the grandson of the old woman to inform his uncle
(Salvador) of the incident. Salvador entered the house through
the bedroom window and saw his mother's lifeless and
bloodied body near the kitchen. A mallet was found on the
floor near the victim's body.
No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense.
The principal evidence of the prosecution is the testimony of
Lieutenant Lujan, the chief of police of Cabatuan. Lujan
declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he
(Severino) committed the robbery with homicide but Severino
refused to sign a confession. Severino implicated Macaya.
Lujan and his men brought Severino to Macaya's house. Lujan
found that Macaya had nothing to do with the crime. Lujan
further testified that Severino said that the money stolen from
the old woman was in Severino's house at Sitio Rizal allowed
Barrio Banguit. Lujan and his men went to Severino's house.
They did not find the stolen money.
Lujan was not the only police officer who heard Severino
Duero's confession. Patrolman Alag, a member of the
arresting team that picked up Duero and brought him at Lujan,
stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero
admitted that he took part in the robbery with homicide, that
his companions were Macaya and a certain Junior (whose
parents were Severino's godparents) and that it was he
(Severino) who induced the commission of the crime. Alag
further swore that after Macaya denied any participation in the
commission of the crime, Severino Duero admitted sole
responsibility for it and confessed that he took three thousand
pesos after hitting Fausta Duero on the head with a mallet
strangling her with a piece of wire and hacking her with a
scythe. According to Alag Severino said that the robbery with
homicide was committed on momentary impulse after Fausta
Duero, who had plenty of money, refused to lend him fifty

pesos. Alag said that Severino Duero made his confession in

the course of their conversation on the way to the police
station and not by reason of a formal investigation.

Severino's alibi.

for in-custody interrogation of accused persons:

ISSUE:

Patrolman Tormon, another member of the arresting team,

corroborated in his sworn statement Alag's declaration as to
Severino Duero's confession.

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused

of robbery with homicide on the basis of his oral confession to
the police station commander that he committed that offense
but which confession was repudiated by him on the witness
stand and which was taken during custodial interrogation
when the accused was not informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel?

o Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he

has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.

Buenaventura Hudieras, the barangay captain of Barrio

Pamulogan, which adjoins Barrio Banguit where the old
woman resided, declared in his sworn statement that two days
after the commission of the crime he was drinking liquor with
Severino Duero. On that occasion, Severino told Hudieras that
Fausta Duero was killed by clubbing her with a mallet choking
her with a piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe.
The sworn statements of Alag, Tormon and Hudieras and
others were the basis of the criminal complaint for robbery with
homicide filed by Lieutenant Lujan an in the municipal court
against Severino Duero. They did not testify at the trial most
probably because Lujan himself took the witness stand to give
evidence on the same oral confession allegedly made by
Severino to the police.
Other prosecution witnesses, Tranquilino Duero, Jose
Montao and Wilfredo Cenizal reinforced the case of the
prosecution against Severino.
At the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and
even claimed that he was maltreated by the police. Lujan in
his rebuttal testimony denied the maltreatment. As alibi,
Severino testified that he was in his house when the crime
was perpetrated. His wife Salvacion, his neighbor Lopez and
his friends, the spouses Macaya, confirmed his alibi.
The circumstantial evidence shows that the prosecution had a
strong case against Severino Duero in spite of the absence of
the testimony of an eyewitness. During the trial no objection
was interposed by the defense to the evidence on Duero's oral
confession.
The trial court on the basis of such evidence found Severino
guilty of robbery with homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
Severino Duero's counsel de oficio contends that the trial court
erred in admitting the oral testimony on Severino Duero's oral
confession, in giving credence to the testimonies of Lujan,
Cenizal, Montao and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that
robbery with homicide was committed and in not sustaining

RULING:
YES. Severino's oral confession is inadmissible in
evidence by reason of Article IV of the Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be admissible in
evidence.
All the foregoing provisions are new except the first sentence,
regarding the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare), which is the only provision found in
section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution, now
revised or expanded in section 20 (See article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 85-1 as to the right
of the accused, who is in police custody, to confer and
communicate at anytime with his counsel.)
Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that
before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and
because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently
waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in
evidence.
After discarding Lujan's testimony on Duero's oral confession,
the rest of the prosecution's circumstantial evidence against
him is not adequate for his conviction.
The new provisions in section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution were adopted from the ruling in Miranda vs.
Arizona, which specifies the following procedural safeguards

o The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,

provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.
o If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning.
o Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police
may not question him.
o The mere fact that he may have answered some questions
or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries
until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.
The above procedure was not followed by the police in this
case. Hence, Severino Duero's oral confession is inadmissible
in evidence. Without that confession, the prosecution's other
evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION the death penalty is set aside. The accused is
acquitted.

PEOPLE vs MOJELLO
FACTS:
> Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the
crime of rape with homicide in an Information.
> Appellant was arraigned, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial
followed.
> Trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
> Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a
motor launch. On an investigation, he admitted that he was the
perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by a
counsel during his custodial interrogation. His confession was
witnessed by Barangay Captains who testified that after it was
executed, the contents of the document were read to appellant
who later on voluntarily signed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by
appellant is admissible in evidence?
RULING:
YES. Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under
custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything
he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he
has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant applying Art.
III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No.
7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict constitutional requirements
on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial
confession of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in
evidence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was

undoubtedly apprised of his Miranda rights under the Constitution.
The court a quo observed that the confession itself expressly
states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights.
As further proof of the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that
while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he was
requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant.
Appellant manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio
as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he
advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even
told appellant to answer only the questions he understood freely
and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. Atty. Giduquio
represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the
present case.
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed
the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is
admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving
credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was
threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial
confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession
which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses
the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession
is tainted with duress, compulsion or coercion by
substantiating his claim with independent evidence other
than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his
affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions
will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is
whether the defendant's will was overborne at the time he
confessed. In cases where the Miranda warnings have been
given, the test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in
order to determine the probative weight of the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's
confession remains unrebutted by his failure to present
independent evidence that the same was coerced.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the
constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1, is
deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that
the admission of culpability made therein is admissible. It is
therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree itself is not
poisonous.

HARRIS vs NEW YORK

FACTS:

> Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an

undercover police officer.
>Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he
had made both sales at the request of the officer. This
statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial, the
prosecution conceding that it was inadmissible with
respect to the Miranda doctrine.
>However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make
the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer
baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the
prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.
ISSUE:
Whethr not not the use of Harris' post-arrest
statement violate his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights guaranteed by the Miranda decision?
RULING:
NO. Court held that the Miranda decision did not
mandate that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the
prosecution's case must be barred for all purposes from the
trial. The Court reasoned that the shield provided by Miranda
could not be "perverted into a license to use perjury by way of
a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances." The Court found that the speculative
possibility that police misconduct could be encouraged was
outweighed by the value of admitting the statement into the
impeachment process.
Quotes:
1. Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation
to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here
did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of
the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements been
made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be
contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury by
way of cross-examination and impeachment
2. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk

of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.

NEW YORK vs QUARLES

FACTS:
> The police were in hot pursuit of a rapist matching Quarles'
description. They found him in a grocery store. Quarles saw
the police and ran. They caught him.
> The policeman noticed that Quarles had an empty holster.
While handcuffing him, and before reading Quarles his
Miranda Warning, the policeman asked, "Where's the
gun?" Quarles told the policeman he'd stashed the gun
behind some cartons.
> After retrieving the gun, the police read Quarles a Miranda
Warning and formally arrested him. Quarles waived his right to
remain silent and told the police that it was his gun.
> At trial for the gun possession charge, the Trial Judge
suppressed Quarles' statement about the location of the gun,
as well as the gun itself. The prosecutor appealed.
> The Trial Court found that since Quarles has not been read
his rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona, his statement
was inadmissible as a violation of the 5th Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
> The New York Supreme Court affirmed. The prosecutor
appealed.
> The New York Supreme Court found that there might be an
exception to the Miranda Warning when the police are
concerned with their own safety, but in this case, Quarles was
clearly not in possession of the gun, so there was no risk to
the police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence was admissible?
RULING:
YES. The US Supreme Court reversed and found
the evidence admissible.
The US Supreme Court found that the overriding
considerations of public safety justify the police officer's
failure to provide a Miranda warning before he asked
questions devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.
The US Supreme Court found that there is a public safety
exception to the requirement for a Miranda warning.

Basically, if the purpose of the questioning is not to elicit a

confession, but for some other good (like finding a missing
weapon before someone accidentally gets hurt), then the
Miranda warning is not an absolute requirement.

PEOPLE vs FIGUEROA

The point of the Miranda warning is to deter the police from

excessively coercing a suspect into making a false confession.
But we don't want the police to be deterred from finding
dangerous weapons hidden in grocery stores.

Obet was convicted of violating Art. 14-A of RA 6425 (DDA)

for manufacturing shabu.

Compare to the exceptions to the requirement for a warrant in

search and seizure cases.

> They received a call from their informant, a woman, who

reported that a certain Obet was allegedly engaged in largescale drug trafficking in Makati City.

FACTS:

Police officers Palencia and Sorianos version:

"The officer needed an answer to his question not

simply to make his case against Quarles, but to
insure that further danger to the public did not result
from the concealment of the gun in a public area."

> They then instructed their informant to establish contact with

Obet for a buy-bust operation.

This case illustrates the difference between actual

coercion and presumptive coercion:

> After several hours, the informant reported that OBET was
already waiting for her at No. 1485 Soliman Street, Makati
City, with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she
was ready with P150,000.

> If the police had threatened to punch Quarles in the

face, then that would be actual coercion and would never
be admissible under any circumstances.
> Presumptive coercion is just a prophylactic concept to
deter the police from stepping over the line.

Miranda warning is designed to deter presumptive

coercion, but since it isn't a Constitutional
requirement, the courts are free to balance the rights
of suspects with other factors (like public safety).

> Palencia then caused the dusting of fluorescent powder over

ten pieces of authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave
them to the informant.
> When they arrived at the rendezvous area, the gate was
already open, the informant entered the premises, while
Palencia and Soriano discreetly crawled and positioned
themselves near the gate of the house. Strategically
positioned, Palencia overheard Obet ask the informant
whether she had the money. Palencia then saw the informant
hand over the money to Obet.
> While counting the money, Obet sensed the presence of
other people in the area. Obet, who was in possession of a .45
caliber pistol, fired it twice toward the direction of Palencia,
while hurrying towards the house. OBET then held hostage his
mistress, Estrella Brilliantes, and her two children for the next
three hours until the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to
whom Obet surrendered.
> PALENCIA and SORIANO brought OBET, his firearm and
the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD Headquarters for
recording purposes and, thereafter, to the NBI Headquarters.
> At the NBI Headquarters, PALENCIA and SORIANO
methodically interrogated OBET about the source of his
shabu.

> OBET eventually volunteered that his source was a certain

Betty of 263 El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City.
> When they arrived at said location for a follow-up operation,
Betty already had the gate opened for them, since Obet has
already informed Betty that he would be coming.
> Upon seeing OBET in handcuffs, Betty asked what
happened. OBET replied that he was just caught in a buy-bust
operation.
> PALENCIA and SORIANO then tried to convince Betty to
surrender the shabu that OBET insisted was hidden inside the
house.
> As Betty persistently denied the existence of the shabu,
PALENCIA told OBET to confer with Betty. After a while, OBET
proceeded to the kitchen of the guesthouse located outside
the main house, followed by Betty. OBET then promptly
pointed to what he termed as liquid shabu inside
a white pail along with other drug paraphernalia, such as a
beaker spray. PALENCIA and SORIANO seized the items.
Obets version:
> OBET testified that while he was watching television on the
night of 15 February 1997, he heard the doorbell rang.
> Upon seeing Eva Baluyot, his childhood friend, he opened
the door for her. Inside the house, Eva handed him a bundle of
money and stated that she was buying shabu from him. OBET
emphatically told Eva that he was not engaged in such illegal
trade and returned the money.
> OBET then accompanied Eva out of the house. At the
garage, OBET noticed someone peeping from the dark; so he
told Eva to go back inside the house with him. Eva ignored the
request.
> OBET thus left Eva at the garage and got his .45 caliber gun
from his house. While he was locking the door, his handgun
accidentally fired off, as he forgot that it had already been
cocked. This blast was followed by shouts of people outside
claiming that they were NBI men.
> Uncertain, OBET did not go out of the house but instead told
the alleged NBI men to call the Makati Police, specifically
Major Reyes,

> The NBI agents, however, persisted in convincing OBET to

go out of the house. He did get out of his house after three
hours when he heard the voice of Major Reyes. OBET gave to
Major Reyes his gun. The Makati Police and the NBI men
thereafter conducted a joint search inside OBET's house
which, however, yielded nothing. OBET was then brought to
the Makati Police Headquarters where the incident was
recorded. Thereafter, PALENCIA, SORIANO and another NBI
man brought OBET to the house of Betty, his former live-in
partner, at El Grande Street, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City,
upon the insistence and information of Eva Baluyot.
> Upon entering B.F. Homes, SORIANO instructed OBET to
call and tell Betty that he was already near. The gate was
already opened when they arrived, and the NBI men freely
parked their car at the garage. Then, PALENCIA and
SORIANO alighted from the car and entered Betty's house.
OBET was left in the car under the charge of the third NBI
man; hence, he knew nothing of what happened inside Betty's
house
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the acquittal of Betty will benefit
Obet by virtue of the element of conspiracy?
RULING: No. he acquittal of a conspirator likewise absolves a
co-conspirator from criminal liability. Indeed, the rule is wellsettled that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is
the act of all, and each of the conspirators is liable for the
crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that
if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged
conspirators should be held individually responsible for their
own respective acts. Accordingly, OBET's criminal liability in
this case must be judged on the basis of his own acts as
established by the quantum of proof required in criminal
cases.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not Obets constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated?
RULING: Yes. The buy-bust operation was a failure because
no shabu or other regulated or prohibited drug was found in
OBET's person and residence. No evidence was adduced to
show that OBET handed shabu over to the informant. Yet, he
was placed in custody. For what offense he was held in
custody does not, initially, appear very clear on the record. It
was established that OBET fired two shots toward the
direction of PALENCIA and SORIANO and held hostage his
mistress and her two children. Yet he was not placed under
custodial investigation for such crimes as grave threats,
coercion, illegal possession of firearms, or crimes other

than that with which he was charged.

On the contrary, OBET was held in custody and
investigated or interrogated about the source of the
shabu, none of which was found during the buy-bust
operation. In short he was held in custody as a
consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a
follow-up to link him to the source and establish a
conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. Allegedly, he
admitted that the source was Betty. On the basis of that
admission, PALENCIA and SORIANO, together with OBET,
proceeded to the residence of Betty. Needless to state,
OBET cannot be investigated for anything in relation to
shabu while under custody without informing him of his
rights to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Any
waiver of such rights should be in writing and made in the
presence of a counsel pursuant to Section 12 (1), Article
III of the Constitution. It has been held that these rights
attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e. when the
investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.
It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at
the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the
confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The
presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail
over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence,
in the absence of proof that the arresting officers
complied
with
these
constitutional
safeguards,
extrajudicial
statements,
whether
inculpatory
or
exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and
admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the
Constitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant
and more so against third persons. This is so even if such
statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given. Such
statements are useless except as evidence against the very
police authorities who violated the suspect's rights.
SORIANO admitted that the custodial investigation of
OBET was conducted without the presence of a lawyer,
and there is no proof that OBET waived said right and the
right to remain silent. No waiver in writing and in the
presence of a counsel was presented. Thus, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution any
admission obtained from OBET in the course of his custodial
investigation was inadmissible against him and cannot be
used as a justification for the search without a warrant.

ISSUE #3: Whether or not the search of Bettys house was

consented to by Betty, hence lawful.

GUMABON vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

RULING: No.

FACTS:

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional

guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that
to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
The third condition does not exist in the instant case. In
fact, Betty did ask for a search warrant. Neither can the
search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid
warrantless arrest of either Betty or OBET as intimated by
the trial court.

> Petitioners Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio

Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares were charged
and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder.
> They were imposed the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
> At the time of the petition each suffered more than 13 years
of imprisonment.
> Subsequently, the Court ruled in PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ
(99 Phil 515) that the information against the accused in that
case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery
was not warranted under Article 143 of the RPC, there being
no such complex offense.
> Petitioners thus invoke that the ruling in Hernandez be
applied to them.
> Petitioners contend that he has served more than the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed upon them
and is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being
illegal.

First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search.

Second, per the prosecution's evidence OBET was not
arrested for possession or sale of regulated or prohibited
drugs as a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He
surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two children,
although he was thereafter held in custody for further
questioning on illegal drugs.
There is no showing that the house occupied by Betty and the
articles confiscated therefrom belong to OBET. That OBET
pointed to PALENCIA and SORIANO the places where the
articles were found provides no sufficient basis for a
conclusion that they belonged to him. Even if the articles thus
seized actually belonged to him, they cannot be
constitutionally and legally used against him to establish
his criminal liability therefor, since the seizure was the
fruit of an invalid custodial investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for Habeas Corpus be
granted?
RULING:
YES. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is
shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus is the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention.
What is required under the equal protection of law is the
uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liability
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burdens or charges, those that fall within a class shall be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest.
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring.

The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when

such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance
with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted
have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for
an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of
the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime
would be made to suffer different penalties.
Doctrine in PP v. Hernandez applied retroactively (as per
Article 22 of RPC).

PEOPLE vs CAGUIOA
FACTS:
> An Information for murder was filed againsPaquitoYupo and
Respondent Judge handled the case.
> After pleading not guilty, the hearing started and the
prosecution presented its witnesses.
> Prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written
statement of the accused PaquitoYupo and his alleged waiver
of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of
his own choice was taken. After this witness had Identified the
statement of the accused and the waiver, he was questioned
on the incriminating answers in such statement to the police,
> There was an objection on the part of the defense counsel
based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in
evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without
any counsel assisting the accused in the investigation.
> Respondent judge sustained objection on the view that such
judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible in evidence
for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was
not assisted by a counsel when it was given.He likewise stated
that such right could not be waived.
> People appeals the judges ruling.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the confession admissible?
RULING:
NO.
a. It was not shown that the alleged waiver was given freely
and voluntarily. The questioning was rather perfunctory. An
even more telling circumstance against such alleged waiver
being given credence was that private respondent, a native of
Samar, then nineteen years old, was interrogated extensively
in Tagalog, no showing having been made that his
acquaintance with the language was such that he could fully
understand the import of what was asked him.
2. Can right to counsel be waived? Yes
a. Abriol v. Homeres - while there could be a waiver of the

rights of an accused, it must be intelligently waived, otherwise

a court's jurisdiction starting at the banning of the trial may be
lost in the course of the proceeding.
b. Miranda v. Arizona - the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure
a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does not make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no
questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
c. Confession clearly falls short of this standard. There was a
perfunctory opening statement asked by a certain Corporal
Conrado B. Roca of the Police Force of Meycauayan, worded
thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa
isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko
ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan
na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na
magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto at dapat mo ring
mabatid na anumanang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin
ngayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" Then
came the monosyllabic answer Opo.
d. Even the very annex submitted to the petition merely stated
that there were signatures of private respondent Yupo, the
aforesaid Roca, and a certain Roberto Sales. The day when it
was subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before Municipal
Judge Mariano Mendieta was not even specified.

PEOPLE vs GALIT
FACTS:
> A 70 year old woman was robbed and hacked by the
accused in her house.
> Witnesses pointed to the accused and his two companions.
> Accused denied participaton in crime and assails extrajudicial confession. They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The
prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer
endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to
suffer. His will had been broken. He admitted what the
investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for
pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his confession admissible?
RULING:
NO. Testimonies of the witness doesnt prove
anything. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered
from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence they have is the confession which is in admissible.
TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga
karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung
inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at
pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na
anumanang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring
ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal ditto sa Pilipinas, na
sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang
manananggol at kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang
isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI.
Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang
magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong
na ito?
SAGOT: OPO

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does

not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be
informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and
every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from
Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact,
his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two
weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives
were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation
he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment,
again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice.
These constitute gross violations of his rights.

PEOPLE vs CONTINENTE

The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.

ISSUE:

Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the

circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated
into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

FACTS:
> US Col. James Rowe was ambushed and killed while driving
his car.
> The CIS agents established through a confidential
intelligence information the involvement of appellant Donato
Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P and the
other appellant Itaas.
> With counsels present, they executed extrajudicial
confessions admitting to the crime.
> The Trial court convicted them based on the testimony of the
star witness and their confessions.
> They claim that their confessions are inadmissible.

Whether or not the statement admissible?

RULING:
YES. It must be noted however, that far from being a
mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an accused, the
aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements
contain an explanation as to the nature of the investigation
that is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants
in the ambush on April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of
U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously wounding his driver,
Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that the
appellants may choose not to give any statement to the
investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from
the appellants may be used in favor or against them in court.
In addition, they contain an advice that the appellants may
engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, they will be provided
with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both
appellants manifested to CIS Investigator VirgilioPablico their
intentions to give their statements even in the absence of
counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator
Pablico requested for the legal services of Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and Atty.
FelimonCorpuz for appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator
Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with
Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half an hour before

the investigation started. Nevertheless, the appellant

(Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even
in the absence of counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant
signedthe "Pagpapatunay" that contains an express waiver of
his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala
who also signed the same as counsel of the appellant.
No basis for torture
They admitted they were members of CPP/NPA.
Another issue: Witness testimony is straightforward, and taken
in conjunction with admission, ruling must be affirmed.

PEOPLE vs BACOR
FACTS:
> While at home, the family of Dionisio heard a gunshot and
they found him oozing with blood. They tried to bring
Dionisio(son) to the hospital but he died.
> Appellant went to the police and said he is conscience
prompted him to surrender
> They then went to PAO and he got himself a lawyer
> He was reminded of his rights, with his PAO lawyer there.
He admitted to the killing saying that Dionisio killed someone
also before.
> His statement was read to him and he swore to it before the
clerk of court, who also informed him of his rights.(remain
silent, counsel, self-incrimination)
> He now questions the admissibility of his confession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he validly waived his right to remain
silent and counsel and W/N confession is admissible?
RULING:
YES. Accused-appellants confession, as quoted in
the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its
voluntariness and spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not
deny that he surrendered to the police almost three months
after the fatal shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to
the crime because he could no longer bear a guilty
conscience. In his testimony before the trial court, he
admitted that the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn
confession was his without any claim that he was forced,
coerced, or threatened to make the confession. Indeed, the
details contained in his confession could have been known to
accused-appellant alone.
Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession without
being warned of his constitutional rights. This is not true. The
record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the
right to remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by his

counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorneys Office

(PAO); second, by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator
who took accused-appellants confession; and lastly, by the
branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta
City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom accusedappellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time,
he was asked whether he was willing to give a statement and
he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to accusedappellants contention, there is no need for a separate and
express written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accusedappellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the
authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was
being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his
extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and
with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed
of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively
waived his right to remain silent.
PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel
within the contemplation of the Constitution considering
that he is not a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney
whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the
accused-appellant. Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer in
the present case satisfies the constitutional requirement of a
competent and independent counsel for the accused.
Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with
the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before
the branch clerk of court who, before administering the oath to
accused-appellant, read the affidavit of confession to him and
informed him of his rights and the consequences of his
confession. Accused-appellant stood pat on his decision to tell
it all.

PEOPLE vs QUIDATO
FACTS:
> While having a drinking session, accused proposed to the
Malita brothers Eddie and Reynaldo to rob and kill his father,
Bernardo.
> Armed with a bolo they went to his house and hacked him
and looked for money in the aparador but couldnt find
anything and the left.
> Leo Quildato confronted his brother the appellant and he
pointed to the Malita brothers. When they were arrested, they
also pointed back at Quildato.
> Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio
Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised
them of their constitutional rights, including their right to
counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the
absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if
given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the
testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to
sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to
Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned
affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom.
> Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with
Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their
constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents
of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who
affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same.
Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the
affidavits
> Appelant denies but was convicted of parricide.
> He questions the confessions of Malita Brothers
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confessions of Malita brothers are
admissible against him?
RULING:
NO. In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution
relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and
Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the
witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The
failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character of
hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in

their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial

proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary
admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter
had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and
cross-examine him
There is no conspiracy under rule 130-the act or declaration
of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration. The inapplicability of this
provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were made after
the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the
crime. Hence, it cannot be said that the execution of the
affidavits were acts or declarations made during the
conspiracys existence.
Affidafits are inadmissible anyway- People v. compil: The
belated arrival of a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer the following day
even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled
confession does not cure the defect (of lack of counsel) for the
investigators were already able to extract incriminatory
statements from accused-appellantThus, in People vs. De
Jesus, we said that admissions obtained during custodial
interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution.
The other testimony is also inadmissible because it was timely
objected under the marital rule (cant testify against spouse)
Aquitted.

PEOPLE vs ORDONO
FACTS:
> The decomposing body of Shirley Victore, 15 years old, was
found among the bushes near a bridge. She was reported
missing 3 days before. Post-mortem examination revealed that
the victim was rape and strangled to death.
> Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio
Medina as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the
police thereupon invited the 2 suspects and brought them to
the police station for questioning. However, for lack of
evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were
allowed to go home.
> Ordoo and Medina returned to the police station one after
another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed
the crime. Acting on their admission, the police immediately
conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing.
The investigators however could not at once get the services
of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the
Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La
Union. The statements of the 2 accused where nevertheless
taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in
their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent
and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice.
Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood
their rights and did not require the services of counsel, the
investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the
Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers
of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the
giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who
admitted their participation in the crime.
> Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were
detained at the Santol police station. News about the
apprehension and detention of the culprits of the rape-slay of
Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio
announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and interviewed
them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both
accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and
narrated individually the events surrounding their commission
thereof.
> A couple of days later, the police brought the (2) accused to
the office of the PAO lawyer for assistance and counseling. In
a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Corpuz apprised each of
the accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their
confessions were already written in their dialect, explained to
them each of the questions and answers taken during the
investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the

consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the

affixing of their second signature/ thumbmark thereon.
> After a week or so, the 2 separately went back to Atty.
Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to affix their
signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the
2 accused of their constitutional rights, explained the contents
of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them
to Judge Bautista, MTC judge, who further apprised the 2
accused of their constitutional rights and asked them if they
had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured
Judge Bautista that their statements had been given freely and
voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been
coerced into giving and signing their confessions, Judge
Bautista finally asked the accused Ordoo and Medina to affix
their signatures/ thumbmarks on their respective confessions,
and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then
signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by
a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
> On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2)
accused pleaded not guilty.
> In his defense, Ordoo testified that while he was cooking at
home, the police arrived and invited him to the headquarters
for questioning. The police asked him his whereabouts on 2
August 1994 and he answered that he worked in the farm of
Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente. According to Ordoo, the
questioning took 1 hour with the police boxing him several
times on his stomach and on his side. They even inserted the
barrel of a gun into his mouth in an effort to draw out answers
from him. This being fruitless, he was placed in jail and
released only the following morning. 3 days later, the police
once again invited him to the headquarters where he was told
that he was responsible for the rape and death of Shirley
Victore.
> Medina testified that while he was pasturing his carabaos,
the police came and invited him for questioning. They asked
him where he was on 2 August 1994 and he replied that he
was carrying bananas for his aunt Resurreccion. The
interrogation lasted for about an hour with neither a lawyer
assisting him nor a relative being present, after which he was
placed in jail. Later, he was brought out and taken to a hut
near the headquarters where he was boxed, kicked and hit
with a nightstick. He lost consciousness and recovered only
after he was brought back to his cell.
> The trial court adjudged Ordoo and Medina guilty of the
crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy, and
imposed upon each of them 2 death penalties on the basis of
their extrajudicial confessions.
> The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on
the ground that constitutional infirmities attended the execution

of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of

counsel to assist them during custodial investigation thereby
making their confessions inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of the 2
accused are admissible.
RULING:
NO. Under the Constitution and the rules laid down
pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a confession to be
admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental
requirements: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express;
and, (d) the confession must be in writing. Among all these
requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an
accused's right to counsel to adequately protect him in his
ignorance and shield him from the otherwise condemning
nature of a custodial investigation. Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any
statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the
accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol
Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started
asking questions to elicit information and/or confession from
them. Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights
the police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of
practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of
the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union,
where practicing lawyers could be found. The police persisted
and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the
investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of
Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the
possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution
by the accused of their statements before the police.
Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a
lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial
confession the accused's parents, older brothers and sisters,
his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge, district

school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen

by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does not propose
that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for
counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated
therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear
two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused
must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be executed. RA
7438 does not therefore unconditionally and unreservedly
eliminate the necessity of counsel but underscores its
importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel with the
above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the
essential safeguards.
The apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the
investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective
must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused
emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8)
days later does not remedy this omission either. This aid and
valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too
late.
The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the
accused on their confessions a few days after their closeddoor meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with
the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other
witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed
one.

informing the appellant of his right followed by a monosyllabic

answer - which this Court has condemned for being
unsatisfactory.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates "the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle." It is not enough for the
interrogator to merely enumerate to the person under
investigation his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the
Constitution; the interrogator must also explain the effect of
such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject
fairly understands.
2. YES
We are left with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer
Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview was offered
to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to
whom the admissions were made and to prove through
electronic device the voluntary admissions by the 2 accused
that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense
objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity had
not been preserved as the tape could easily have been spliced
and tampered with. However, as Roland Almoite testified, it
was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered;
the voices therein were the voices of the 2 accused; and, the
defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise.

As testified to, the police informed the accused of their rights

to remain silent and to counsel in a dialect understood by
them, but despite the accused's apparent showing of
comprehension, it is doubtful if they were able to grasp the
significance of the information being conveyed. Pertinent
portions of the extrajudicial confessions:

The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused

voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed
remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held that
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and
are admissible in evidence. By analogy, statements made by
herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held
admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an
investigation as the response of the accused was made in
answer to questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. When the accused
talked to the radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law
enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their
constitutional rights.

The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoo

starkly resembles that given to Medina, thus leading us to
conclude that the advice was given perfunctorily and belonged
to the stereotyped class - a long question by the investigator

Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do
not cover the verbal confessions of the 2accused to the radio
announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights

It should further be recalled that the accused were not

effectively informed of their constitutional rights when they
were arrested, so that when they allegedly admitted
authorship of the crime after questioning, their admissions
were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights against
self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of Rights.

enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude

the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer
and duly tape-recorded are further bolstered and substantiated
by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in
the Autopsy Report/Post Mortem Findings.

To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi.

However, such allegations deserve no credit as alibi becomes
worthless when it is established mainly by the accused
themselves. Other than their lame assertions that they were
with the above-mentioned persons, the accused failed to
substantiate their defense and to give details on what
transpired that fateful day, especially since they were in the
same town where the crime happened.

As to the assertion of the accused that they were tortured and

subjected to inhuman treatment, we find such allegations
baseless. The accused were given several opportunities to
decry the maltreatment they allegedly suffered in the hands of
the police but at no time did they complain about it.

The modifying circumstance of conspiracy being present, each

of the accused shall be liable for the other's acts as well.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death."

Ordoo and Medina should be held liable for the special

complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts as
defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by RA 7659.
DISPOSITION the Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the two (2)
accused ORDONO and MEDINA are held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide on 2 counts and are sentenced each to 2 DEATH
PENALTIES.