MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES Inc.

vs CA
FACTS
Chika version: Nag-file ug replevin si Petitioner Company for
recovery of the machineries and equipment it sold to Defendant
Company. Na-grant ang replevin, na-issue ang order commanding
the provincial sheriff to seize and take possession sa properties
Pag-implement na sa court order, na-discover nga naka-attach
ang mga machineries to the concrete foundation sa factory (it
turned out REAL PROPERTIES diay). Gihatagan ug protest letter
ang sheriff ug petitioner nga dili daw pwede ma-seize kay REAL
PROPERTIES daw ang mga machineries.
Wala nisugot si petitioner, ni-insist jud siya nga ipa-dismantle ang
mga machineries kay (1) ministerial daw ang duty sa sherif
in enforcing the court order; and (2) pwede ra daw kay
ang bond ra man sad ang mu-shoulder sa damages
Na-dismantle ang mga machineries. Ni-file dayon si Defendant
Company (with a counterbond) para mabalik ang properties. Gigrant sa court and ordered its return...
PERO, instead nga i-reinstall ug balik ang equipment, gi-bilin ra sa
sheriff sa gawas sa factory. Nireklamo si defendant nga dapat ireinstall ug balik and replace the damaged posts. Ganahan si
defendant nga ang dapat mu-pay for the reinstallation costs si
Petitioner Company.
Wala nisugot si petitioner company nga mu-pay sa reinstallation
costs. Mao ni-file siya sa case.

Petitioner (Machinery & Engineering Supplies) filed a

complaint for replevin in the CFI of Manila against Ipo
Limestone Co. and Dr. Villarama for the recovery of the
machineries and equipment sold and delivered to
defendants at their factory in Bulacan

Upon application ex-parte of petitioner, accompanied by the

affidavit of Roco (president of petitioner company) and
approval of petitioners bond, RTC issued an order
commanding the Provincial Sheriff to seize and take
immediate possession of the properties specified in the
court order

So 2 deputy sheriffs, Roco and a crew of technical men and

laborers proceeded to Bulacan for the purpose of carrying
the courts order into effect.
When they arrived, the manager of Ipo Limestone
(defendant) handed to them a letter addressed to the exofficio Provincial Sheriff protesting against the seizure of
the properties because they are NOT PERSONAL
PROPERTIES.

HOWEVER, contending that the sheriffs duty is merely

ministerial, Roco and company still proceeded with the
seizure of the property.
Rocos attention was called to the fact that the equipment
could not possibly be dismantled without causing
damages to the wooden frames attached to them.
Pero persistent man si Roco, so he insisted in dismantling the
equipment on his own responsibility, alleging that the
bond was posted for such eventuality
SUBSEQUENTLY, defendant company filed an urgent motion
with a counterbond for the return of the properties seized by
the sheriff which RTC granted and ordered the provincial
sheriff to return the machineries & equipment to the place
where they were installed at the time of the seizure
PERO, what the deputy sheriffs did was to return the
seized properties by depositing them along the road,
near the quarry of defendant company without an
inventory and without re-installing them in their
former position and replacing the destroyed posts

So defendant then asked the provincial sheriff to have the

machineries re-installed to their former position and
condition and the provincial sheriff manifested that
Roco must furnish the sheriffs office with expenses
and laborers to carry out the court order to return the
seized properties to their original condition BUT ROCO
REFUSED (baga sad ni siya ug face)

INSTEAD, what petitioner did was to file a Civil Case in the

Court of Appeals alleging that the CFI committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering petitioner to furnish the
provincial sheriff with the necessary funds and laborers to
effect the re-installation of the machineries

CA dismissed petitioners case for lack of merit finding

that the Provincial Sheriffs tortious act, in obedience to the
insistent prodding of the president of the petitioner, Ramon
S. Roco, has no justification in law, notwithstanding the
Sheriffs claim that his duty was ministerial. It was the
bounden duty of the respondent Judge to give redress to the
respondent Company, for the unlawful and wrongful acts
committed by the petitioner and its agents. If anyone had
gone beyond the scope of his authority, it was the
Provincial Sheriff however considering he acted under
the pressure of Roco, CA declared that sheriffs act
was most unusual and the result of poor judgment

Thus, this petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court.
RULING
Main Issue: Was the CA justified in dismissing the case of
petitioners? YES
Prejudicial Issue:
WON the machineries and equipment were PERSONAL or REAL
properties?

REAL PROPERTIES
When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo
Limestone Co., Inc., the machinery and equipment in question
appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete
foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that
the former could not be separated from the latter "without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in
order to remove said outfit, it became necessary, not only to
unbolt the same, but, also, to cut some of its wooden supports.
Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable
and tended "directly to meet the needs of the said industry ." For
these reasons, they were already immovable property
pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code
of the Philippines, which are substantially identical to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 334 of the Civil Code of Spain. As
such immovable property, they were not subject to
replevin.
WON the machineries and equipment were subject to REPLEVIN?
NO
The special civil action known as replevin, governed by Rule
62 of the Rules of Court, is applicable only to "personal
property."
"Ordinarily replevin may be brought to recover any specific
personal property unlawfully taken or detained from the owner
thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and
delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real
property or incorporeal personal property."
Is petitioner liable for providing the necessary expenses and
laborers to effect the re-installation of the machineries to their
original condition? YES, petitioner clearly assumed the
corresponding risk in dismantling the machineries at his
own responsibility

Moreover, as the provincial sheriff hesitated to remove the

property in question, petitioners agent and president, Mr. Ramon
Roco, insisted "on the dismantling at his own responsibility,"
stating that, precisely, "that is the reason why plaintiff posted a
bond." In this manner, petitioner clearly assumed the
corresponding risks.
Such assumption of risk becomes more apparent when we
consider that, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 62 of the Rules of
Court, the defendant in an action for replevin is entitled to the
return of the property in dispute upon the filing of a counterbond,
as provided therein. In other words, petitioner knew that the
restitution of said property to respondent company might be
ordered under said provision of the Rules of Court, and that,
consequently, it may become necessary for petitioner to meet the
liabilities
incident
to
such
return.
Lastly, although the parties have not cited, and We have not
found, any authority squarely in point - obviously because real
property are not subject to replevin - it is well settled that, when
the restitution of what has been ordered, the goods in
question shall be returned in substantially the same
condition as when taken (54 C.J., 590-600, 640-641). Inasmuch
as the machinery and equipment involved in this case were duly
installed and affixed in the premises of respondent company
when petitioners representative caused said property to be
dismantled and then removed, it follows that petitioner must
also do everything necessary to the reinstallation of said
property in conformity with its original condition.
SYLLABUS
1. REPLEVIN; DUTY OF SHERIFF IS MINISTERIAL IN CARRYING OUT
THE COURTS ORDER BUT NOT TO DESTROY; POWER OF COURT
TO ISSUE ORDER OF REINSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENTS
DESTROYED. While the seizure of the equipments and personal
properties was ordered by the respondent court, it is however,

logical to presume that the same did not authorize the petitioner
or its agents to destroy, said machineries and equipments. The
Provincial Sheriffs tortious act has no justification in law,
notwithstanding the Sheriffs claim that his duty was ministerial. It
was the bounden duty of the respondent judge to give redress to
the respondent company for the unlawful and wrongful acts
committed by the petitioner and its agents. And as this was the
true object of the order we can not but hold that same was within
its jurisdiction to issue.
2. ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF SHERIFFS DUTY. The ministerial duty of
the sheriff should have its limitations. The sheriff knew and must
have known what is inherently right and inherently wrong, more
so when a letter was shown to him that the machineries and
equipments were not personal properties and therefore, not
subject to seizure by the terms of the order. While it may be
conceded that this was a question of law too technical to decide
on the spot, it would not have cost the sheriff much time and
difficulty to bring the letter to the courts attention and have the
equipments guarded so as not to frustrate the order of seizure
issued by the trial court.
3. ID.; APPLICABLE ONLY TO RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Ordinarily replevin may be brought to recover any specific
personal property unlawfully taken or detained from the owner
thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and
delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property
or incorporeal personal property.
4. ID.; MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, WHEN IMMOVABLE. The
machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to
the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of a building, in a
fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be
separated from the latter without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove said outfit,
it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but to also cut
some of its wooden supports. Said machinery and equipment
were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry"
carried on said immovable and tended "directly to meet the needs

of said industry." For these reasons, they were already immovable

pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the
Philippines.
5. ID.; RESTITUTION; REINSTALLATION OF DISMANTLED AND
REMOVED PROPERTY IN ITS ORIGINAL CONDITION. When the
restitution of what has been taken by way of replevin has been
ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in substantially
the same condition as when taken (54 C. J., 599-600, 640-641).
Inasmuch as the machinery and equipment involved in this case
were duly installed and affixed in the premises of respondent
company when petitioners representative caused said property
to be dismantled and then removed, it follows that petitioner
must also do everything necessary to the reinstallation of said
property in conformity with its original condition.
ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents.
[Duha ka court ang involve Branch 13 ug 8 sa Cebu]
FACTS:
* Judge Francisco of RTC of Cebu Branch 13, after examining 2Lt.
Dennis P. Canoy (canoy) and other witnesses, issued a search
warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the
seizure of an Isuzu dump truck
* Respondent Canoy then seized the said vehicle and took
custody thereof.
* Later on, a civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the
recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by
Chua (petitioner) in the RTC of Cebu Branch 8, presided by Judge
Caares
* Further, Chua questioned the validity of the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the subject vehicle on the strength of
the aforesaid search warrant in the same civil action.

* Judge Caares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon

the posting of a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00)
* Later on, the subject vehicle was seized by Deputy Sheriff
Galicano V. Fuentes.
* Canoy filed a MTD and for the quashal of the writ of replevin.
* The MTD and to quash the writ of replevin was denied. A MFR
was filed but still denied.
* In the same order denying the MFR, Canoy was directed to
deliver the vehicle to Chua.
* Canoy filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying for the nullification of the orders.
* Meanwhile, a case for Carnapping entitled "Alex De Leon,
Complainant, vs. Romeo Chua, Respondent" pending preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City was
provisionally dismissed upon motion of Romeo Chua with the
following reservation: "without prejudice to its reopening once the
issue of ownership is resolved"
* CA ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed
that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy. It
applied the ruling in the case of Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez which
held:
Once a Court of First Instance has been informed that a search
warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it
cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to take
the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came
into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search
warrant. Only the court of first instance that issued such a search
warrant may order its release.
* It was also pointed out in the same case that the validity of a
search warrant may only be questioned in the same court that
issued it.

* Chua MFR, but denied. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: WON it was also pointed out in the same case that the
validity of a search warrant may only be questioned in the same
court that issued it.
RULING: We find no merit in the main issue presented before us.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals
which relied on the decision in Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez (supra).
The principle followed among courts in the dispensation of justice
is that a judge who presides in a branch of a court cannot modify
or annul the orders issued by another branch of the same court,
since the two (2) courts are of the same rank, and act
independently but coordinately.
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for
property in custodia legis.
A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is
subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.
REASON: if it was otherwise, there would be interference with the
possession before the function of the law had been performed as
to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a
defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in
the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after
the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie
Construing the Pagkalinawan case together with the Vlasons case,
we rule that where
(1) personal property is seized under a search warrant and
(2) there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be
followed by the filing of a criminal action and
(3) there are conflicting claims over the seized property,

The proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an

interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not
necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant.
MAO NA NI XA ANG MAIN JUD:
However, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be
followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar
where the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally,
without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is
resolved in favor of complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the
criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and
actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the
property seized, the proper
remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the
same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said
court.
Thus, the RTC erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of
the property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action
for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of
the "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a
probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in
jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who
presides in one court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by
another branch of the same court because they are co-equal and
independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered
to.
Pagkalinawan vs. Gomez
Facts:
The RTC of Manila presided by Judge Santos issued a search
warrant. As a result, the NBI seized an automobile which was then
held by the latter in custodia legis. Now, Norberto Dayrit filed a
replevin in RTC Cebu presided by Judge Gomez. It directed
Pagkalinawan (NBI supervising agent) to turn over the seized car
to the Sheriff of Cebu City. Pagkalinawan refused as the car was

under custodia legis as a result of the search warrant. Having

been threatened with contempt of court, Pagkalinawan was forced
to turn over the car to the Cebu Sheriff. The car was then later
turned over to Dayrit.
Later on, when the RTC Manila sought the car, Pagkalinawan could
no longer produced it, and was in danger of being held in
contempt of court. So, he filed an MR in RTC Cebu setting aside
the replevin order. It was however denied. Pagkalinawan filed a
petition for certiorari with SC. SC issued Preliminary Injunction.
As defense, Dayrit said that Pagkalinawan abused his office. The
subject of the search warrant was a different car, and that he is
the lawful owner thereof. He averred that the car was not subject
of an criminal case, and that he had no pending criminal cases as
well.
Issue: whether a court of first instance of one district in a replevin
proceeding may ignore a search warrant issued by another court
of first instance.
Held: NO.
The moment a court of first instance has been informed through
the filing of an appropriate pleading that a search warrant has
been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if
the literal language of the Rules of Court yield a contrary
impression which in this case demonstrated the good faith of
respondent Judge for acting as he did, require a sheriff or any
proper officer of the Court to take the property subject of the
replevin action if theretofore it came into the custody of another
public officer by virtue of a search warrant.
Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant
may order its release. Any other view would be subversive of a
doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose
of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial
actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if
courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with
each other's lawful orders.

Moreover, while not authoritative, this case being one of first

impression, the doctrine announced in Molo v. Yatco, which denied
an original petition filed with this Court for mandamus is
persuasive. There the petitioner alleging that by virtue of a search
warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal for an
alleged violation of the Usury Law, certain documents belonging
to him were seized and thereafter kept in the possession of the
respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, sought their return. This
Court did not oblige; mandamus did not lie, as "the one having
the legal custody thereof is the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which had ordered their seizure and which is the only one
authorized by law to return them to their owner." It is worth noting
that while the then Justice Laurel dissent his opinion being in
effect that the remedy should be granted he admitted that where
property is seized under color of judicial process and brought
under the control of the court, [it was] placed beyond the reach of
replevin or other independent or plenary remedy, . . . ." Again,
while the above ruling is not squarely on all fours, still the
governing principle does not seem to be in doubt. The remedy for
questioning the validity of a search warrant may be sought in the
Court of First Instance that issued it, not in the gala of another
Judge, and as admitted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel,
not through replevin.

La Tondena v. CA
FACTS:
An action of "replevin with damages" was filed by La
Tondea Distillers, Inc. against a person named "Te Tien
Ho," described as a "junk dealer" or owner of a "second
hand store" with "office bodega at 1005 Estrada St.,
Singalong, Manila."
In its verified complaint, 1 La Tondea Distillers, Inc. set out
the following facts, to wit: 1) that "it manufactures and sells .
. . a gin popularly known as "Ginebra San Miguel," contained

in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of ownership

"LA TONDEA, INC." and "GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL" stamped or
blown-in to the bottles which is specially ordered from the
bottle manufactures for its exclusive use;"2) that said bottles
were registered with the Philippine Patent Office 3) that use
of the bottles without written permission of the owner is
unlawful; 4) that, the sale of the gin does not include the
sale of the bottles themselves; and 5) that the defendant "Te
Tien Ho" has in his possession a quantity of the registered
bottles. It prayed to take possession of all bottles in the
possession of defendant.
Judge Santillan issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La
Tondea's posting of a bond.
The sheriff implemented the writ and seized 20,250 bottles
from No. 1105 Estrada St. Singalong from Tee Chin Ho who
signed the receipt.
The five-day period prescribed by law within which the
sufficiency of the replevin bond might be objected to or the
return
of
the
property
seized
required expired without any person objecting to the bond
or seeking the return of the bottles.
Instead an individual identifying himself as "Tee Chin
Ho" filed a pleading denominated "ANSWER (with
preliminary
injunction
and
compulsory
counterclaim)," with "leave to intervene as party who
has legal interest in the matter in litigation" and a
declaration that he was submitting the answer "as partyintervenor." He alleged that the complaint was addressed to
Te Tien Ho and at a different address (1005 instead of 1105).
It filed a counterclaim stating that La Tondena also effected a
previous police seizure of bottles which he now wants
returned.
La Tondena filed a reply and a motion to amend the
complaint as a matter of right to correct the differences in
the spelling of the name and the address.
The RTC set Tee Chin Ho's application for injunction for
hearing. It however issued on the same day, a TRO "to
preserve the status quo and to prevent further damages,

enjoining the plaintiff from seizing or otherwise confiscating

any bottles subject of the writ of seizure.
Subsequently, Judge Adduru-Santillan issued the "writ, of
mandatory and prohibitory injunction ordering the return to
Tee Chin Ho of the bottles.
This Order La Tondea assailed in the CA through petition for
certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition.
It then seasonably appealed to this Court in certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tee Chin Ho is a stranger to the
action that will allow him to file a motion to intervene
(under Sec. 7 Rule 60) instead of availing of the remedies
under Sec. 5, Rule 60
RULING: NO, because Tee Chin Ho and Te Tien Ho is one
and the same
Remedies of a DEFENDANT
A defendant or other party in a replevin proceeding against
whom a writ of seizure has alternative remedies set forth in
Section 5, Rule 60 . The defendant may avail of these alternative
options only within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer.
1. Thus if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the
property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five
days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the
value of said property, 30 and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy
thereof both requirements as well as compliance therewith
within the five-day period mentioned being mandatory. 31
2. Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon;" but if he
does so, "he cannot require the return of the property" by posting
a counter-bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6.
In other words, the law does not allow the defendant to file
a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of seizure (or
delivery) on the ground of insufficiency of the complaint

or of the grounds relied upon therefor, as in proceedings

on preliminary attachment or injunction 32 and thereby put
at issue the matter of the title or right, of possession over
the specific chattel being replevied, the policy apparently
being that said matter should be ventilated and determined only
at the trial on the merits.
Remedies of a STRANGER (not the defendant or his agent)
On the other hand, a stranger to the action, i.e., a person not a
party to the action, or as the law puts it, "any other person than
the defendant or his agent," whose property is seized pursuant to
the writ of delivery, is accorded the remedy known as terceria, a
third party claim. In lieu of, or in addition to the filing of a terceria,
the third party may, as Section 7 points out, vindicate "his claim
to the property by any proper action." This effort at vindication
may take the form of a separate action for recovery of the
property, or intervention in the replevin action itself. 34
It was thus imperative for the Trial Judge, before resolving the
motion for leave to intervene as party defendant of the person
identifying himself as "Tee Chin Ho," to determine the precise
status of said "Tee Chin Ho:" whether he was indeed a stranger to
the action, as he claims, and could therefore avail of the remedy
of intervention as a party defendant, or he was in truth a proper
party defendant, who had been mistakenly and inadvertently
referred to as "Te Tien Ho", and who therefore only had the
alternative remedies aforementioned of either (a) objecting to
the replevin bond or the surety or sureties thereof or (b) posting a
counter-bond to compel return of the property.
Circumstances pointing that Tee Chin Ho and Te Tien Ho
are one:
1) that "Tee Chin Ho" was actually served with summons at his
junk shop at Estrada Street;
2) that the bottles were actually found at his establishment, and
were there seized;

3) that Tee Chin Ho's shop is the only junk shop on Estrada Street
4) that "Tee Chin Ho" did not then protest to the sheriff he was not
the defendant named in the summons, "Te Tien Ho," or that his
address was different from that indicated in the process; instead
he asked his wife to sign his name on the sheriff's receipt wherein
he was described as "defendant," as well "on the original copy of
the summons and the writ of seizure for and in his own behalf;" 35
5) that "Tee Chin Ho" is not phonetically all that different from
"Tee Tien Ho;"
6) that "Tee Chin Ho" admitted that earlier, he had been found in
possession of empty bottles marked "La Tondea, Inc.," and
"Ginebra San Miguel," which had been seized by Manila police
officers; and
7) that La Tondea had filed a "motion to admit attached
amended complaint
At the very least, therefore, it was a matter of preferential priority
for the Judge to determine whether "Tee Chin Ho" is in fact "Te
Tien Ho," and thus enable her to know in turn, whether or not the
remedy of intervention was proper in the premises, instead of that
provided in Section 5 of Rule 60, supra. In other words, unless
there were a prior determination by Her Honor of whether
or not "Tee Chin Ho" was a proper party defendant or a
stranger to the action, she was in no position to adjudge
that this intervention as party defendant was correct. But
this is not what respondent Judge did. Without first making that
prior determination, she proceeded to pass upon the motion for
intervention; she just simply assumed and declared that Tee Chin
Ho was not Te Tien Ho. She thus appears to have acted without
foundation, rashly, whimsically, oppressively.
By his maneuver, Tee Chin Ho was able to evade the legal
consequences of the expiration of the five-day period prescribed
by Section 5 (in relations to Section 6) of Rule 10, supra; he
succeeded in recovering the bottles in question even after the
expiry of said period, and what is more, as defendant in

intervention, he was able to put at issue the propriety of the

ground relied upon for a writ of delivery, which he would have
been disqualified to do asdefendant. It was seriously wrong for
the Court to have sanctioned such a maneuver.
Mao ra ni importante guyssssss. hehe
Amendment sought by La Tondena was a matter of right
It is plain from the record that at the time that La Tondea moved
to amend its complaint to correct "a mistake in the name of a
party" and "a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description" of
that party's place of residence or business, no effective
"responsive pleading" (i.e., the answer) had been served on it by
the person impleaded in the action as defendant; for the
admission of Tee Chin Ho's answer-in-intervention (with
permissive counterclaim) was yet hanging fire and no notice of
the Court's action thereon had been served on La Tondea.
Clearly, then, the amendment which La Tondea wished to make
was a matter of right in accordance with Section 2, Rule 10. Being
directed at a "defect in the designation of the parties," it was in
truth a correction that could be summarily made at any stage of
the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse
party," as Section 4 of the same Rule 10 further provides.
The order to return the bottles from the alleged previous
seizure is wrong.
Again, the subject of La Tondea's replevin suit, as already stated,
are the 20,250 bottles seized from Tee Chin Ho. But the Court
ordered the return not only of the 20,250 bottles seized pursuant
to its writ of delivery but, also the quantity of bottles claimed by
Tee Chin Ho to have been seized from him by Manila Police
officers at an earlier date as alleged in its permissive
counterclaim.
Now, as regards these bottles earlier taken into custody by the
Manila Police, certain circumstances are germane, namely:

1) the claim therefor was made in a permissive counterclaim, it

not appearing that said claim "arises out of or is necessarily
connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's . . . claim
2) the only evidence on record is the receipt issued by the officers
involved in the seizure
3.) It does not appear that any docketing fees were paid by Tee
Chin Ho for his permissive counterclaim.
Indeed, since regularity may be assumed in the act of the police
officers in question, it may not unreasonably be supposed that
they acted in virtue of a search warrant or some order of a
competent Court a court other than respondent Judge's, which
would consequently have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the
Court a quo, to release the bottles.
Finally, it would appear that respondent Judge, in
resolving an application for a provisional remedy, in the
process already disposed of the case on the merits.
The basic issue in the action at bar is whether or not La Tondea
has a right of action to prevent the use by Tee Chin Ho (or as he
was mistakenly named in the complaint: Te Tien Ho) of the bottles
especially manufactured for it. Quoted portions of the Judges
ruling:
It is of public knowledge that when a person
purchase a drink, whatever it may be the buyer is
required to deposit an amount for the bottles and
if the empty bottles, after consuming its contents,
is not returned, then the buyer is answerable for
the empty bottle, thereby converting the
transaction to one of a sale to include the bottle
thereof and the seller would not and shall not be
permitted to complaint and recover the said
bottles until and unless the corresponding deposit
is returned to the buyer in exchange of the bottle.

Such a ruling having been handed down, what else, it may be

asked, would still have to be resolved at the trial, and stated in its
final judgment, as regards the merits of the action?
Said ruling moreover, does not seem to correct, being in conflict
with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 623.
ADVENT CAPITAL V YOUNG
FACTS:
The present controversy stemmed from a replevin suit instituted
by petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent)
against respondent Roland Young (Young) to recover the
possession of a 1996 Mercedes Benz which is registered in
Advents name.
Prior to the replevin case, or on 16 July 2001, Advent filed for
corporate rehabilitation with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City(rehabilitation court).
On 27 August 2001, the rehabilitation court issued an Order (stay
order) which states that the enforcement of all claims whether for
money or otherwise, and whether such enforcement is by court
action or otherwise, against the petitioner (Advent), its guarantors
and sureties not solidarily liable with it, is stayed.
On 5 November 2001, Young filed his Comment to the Petition for
Rehabilitation, claiming, among others, several employee benefits
allegedly due him as Advents former president and chief
executive officer.
On 6 November 2002, the rehabilitation court approved the
rehabilitation plan submitted by Advent. Included in the inventory
of Advents assets was the subject car which remained in Youngs
possession at the time.
Youngs obstinate refusal to return the subject car, after repeated
demands, prompted Advent to file the replevin case on 8 July
2003.

After Advents posting of P3,000,000 replevin bond, which was

double the value of the subject car at the time, through
Stronghold Insurance Company, Incorporated (Stronghold), the
trial court issued a Writ of Seizure directing the Sheriff to seize the
subject car from Young. Upon receipt of the Writ of Seizure, Young
turned over the car to Advent,which delivered the same to the
rehabilitation receiver.
Thereafter, Young filed an Answer alleging that as a former
employee of Advent, he had the option to purchase the subject
car at book value pursuant to the company car plan and to offset
the value of the car with the proceeds of his retirement pay and
stock option plan. Young sought the (1) execution of a deed of
sale over the subject car; and (2) determination and payment of
the net amount due him as retirement benefits under the stock
option plan.
Advent filed a Reply with a motion to dismiss Youngs
counterclaim, alleging that the counterclaim did not arise from or
has no logical relationship with the issue of ownership of the
subject car.
On 28 April 2005, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
replevin case without prejudice for Advents failure to prosecute. In
the same order, the trial court dismissed Youngs counterclaim
against Advent for lack of jurisdiction.
Notably, defendants claim is basically one for benefits under and
by virtue of his employment with the plaintiff, and the subject
vehicle is merely an incident in that claim. Said claim is properly
ventilated, as it is resolvable by, the Rehabilitation Court which
has jurisdiction and has acquired jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of this Court. Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion To Dismiss
defendant Youngs counterclaim is granted.
On 10 June 2005, Young filed a motion for partial reconsideration
of the dismissal order with respect to his counterclaim.

On 8 July 2005, Young filed an omnibus motion, praying that

Advent return the subject car and pay him P1.2 million in
damages (f)or the improper and irregular seizure of the subject
car, to be charged against the replevinbond posted by Advent
through Stronghold.
On 24 March 2006, the trial court issued an Order denying Youngs
motion for partial reconsideration.
On 8 June 2006, Young filed a motion to resolve his omnibus
motion.
In an Order dated 5 July 2006, the trial court denied the motion to
resolve.
Young filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court
of Appeals seeking to annul the trial courts Orders of 24 March
2006 and 5 July 2006.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Young and annulled the
assailed rulings of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
(1) directing the return of the seized car to Young; and (2)
ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of
damages against thereplevin bond.
RULING:
The petition is partially meritorious.
On returning the seized vehicle to Young
We agree with the Court of Appeals in directing the trial court to
return the seized car to Young since this is the necessary
consequence of the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to
prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of the replevin
case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely
ancillary in nature, became functus officio and should have been

lifted. There was no adjudication on the merits, which means that

there was no determination of the issue who has the better right
to possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain
possession of the subject car considering that it was not adjudged
as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy ofreplevin.
Contrary to Advents view, Olympia International Inc. v. Court of
Appeals applies to this case. The dismissal of the replevin case for
failure to prosecute results in the restoration of the parties status
prior to
litigation, as if no complaint was filed at all. To let the writ of
seizure stand after the dismissal of the complaint would be
adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely no
decision on the merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the
parties must be reverted to their status quo ante. Since Young
possessed the subject car before the filing of thereplevin case,
the same must be returned to him, as if no complaint was filed at
all.
Advents contention that returning the subject car to Young would
constitute a violation of the stay order issued by the rehabilitation
court is untenable. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
returning the seized vehicle to Young is not an enforcement of a
claim against Advent which must be suspended by virtue of the
stay order issued by the rehabilitation court pursuant to Section 6
of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim
Rules).The issue in the replevin case is who has better right to
possession of the car, and it was Advent that claimed a better
right in filing the replevin case against Young. In defense, Young
claimed a better right to possession of the car arising from
Advents car plan to its executives, which he asserts entitles him
to offset the value of the car against the proceeds of his
retirement pay and stock option plan.
Young cannot collect a money claim against Advent within the
contemplation of the Interim Rules. The term claim has been
construed to refer to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, or
the assertion to have money paid by the company under
rehabilitation to its creditors. In the replevin case, Young cannot

demand that Advent pay him money because such payment,

even if valid, has been stayed by order of the rehabilitation court.
However, in thereplevin case, Young can raise Advents car plan,
coupled with his retirement pay and stock option plan, as giving
him a better right to possession of the car. To repeat, Young is
entitled to recover the subject car as a necessary consequence of
the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute without
prejudice.
On the damages against the replevin bond
Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court governs claims for
damages on account of improper or irregular seizure in replevin
cases. It provides that in replevin cases, as in receivership and
injunction cases, the damages to be awarded upon the bond shall
be claimed, ascertained, and granted in accordance with Section
20 of Rule 57 which reads:
Sec. 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular or
excessive attachment. - An application for damages on account of
improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before
the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching obligee or
his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to
damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be
awarded only after proper hearing and shall be included in the
judgment on the main case. e
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party
against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim
damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomesexecutory.
The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom
the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action
the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching

obligee not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit

given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.
The above provision essentially allows the application to be filed
at any time before the judgment becomes executory. It should be
filed in the same case that is the main action, and with the court
having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application.
In this case, there was no application for damages against
Stronghold resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure
before the finality of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
prosecute. It appears that Young filed his omnibus motion
claiming damages against Stronghold after the dismissal order
issued by the trial court on 28 April 2005 had attained finality.
While Young filed a motion for partial reconsideration on 10 June
2005, it only concerned the dismissal of his counterclaim, without
any claim for damages against the replevin bond. It was only on 8
July 2005 that Young filed an omnibus motion seeking damages
against the replevin bond, after the dismissal order had already
become final for Advents non-appeal of such order. In fact, in his
omnibus motion, Young stressed the finality of the dismissal
order.Thus, Young is barred from claiming damages against the
replevinbond.
Since Young is time-barred from claiming damages against the
replevin bond, the dismissal order having attained finality after
the application for damages, the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of
damages against the replevin bond.

Sebastian v Valino
Facts:
Marblecraft, Inc., represented by its Assistant General Manager,
Reynaldo Sebastian, charges Alberto A. Valino, Senior Deputy
Sheriff, Office of the Regional Sheriff, Pasig, Metro Manila, with (1)
gross abuse of authority committed in connection with the

implementation of the writ issued by the Regional Trial Court,

Makati, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 89-3368, and (2) refusal to
enforce the trial court's for the return of the seized items.
Complainant alleges that:
1. On March 3, 1989, Private Development Corporation of the
Philippines (PDCP) filed a replevin suit against Marblecraft, Inc., in
order to foreclose the chattels mortgaged by Marblecraft. On
March 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Makati, issued a writ of
seizure directed against Marblecraft covering the chattels sought
to be replevined.
3. On November 9, 1990, at around 10:37 A.M., respondent,
accompanied by several policemen and PDCP employees, went to
the office of Marblecraft at Barrio Santolan, Pasig, to implement
the writ of seizure. Respondent and his companions forcibly
opened the lockers and desk drawers of the employees of
complainant and took their personal belongings, as well as some
office equipment issued to them. The employees filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal two criminal complaints
for robbery against respondent and his companions.
4. Respondent only showed to complainant's counsel a copy of
the writ but did not furnish him with a copy of the application for
the writ, the supporting affidavit and the bond.
6. Respondent turned over the seized articles to the counsel of
PDCP and allowed these items to be stored in PDCP's warehouse
in Taguig, Metro Manila.
7. On November 14, 1990, complainant posted a counterbond. In
an order issued on the same day, the Regional Trial Court, Makati,
approved the bond and directed the immediate return of the
seized items. After denying PDCP's motion to set aside the
November 14 Order, the trial court reiterated the
directive for the return of the seized items in its November 26
Order. Respondent did not implement the orders.

8. PDCP filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 26

Order, which was denied in an Order dated December 11, 1990.
The administrative complaint was referred to Judge Martin S.
Villarama Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, for investigation,
report and recommendation.
In his report, Judge Villarama, found respondent guilty of partiality
when he immediately turned over the seized items to PDCP, and
of willful refusal to enforce the November 14, 26 and December
11, 1990 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.
Issue: WON Valino actions in enforcing the writ of seizure proper
Held:
No
Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ
of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The
sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and shall return it
to the defendant, If the latter, as in the case, requires its return
and files a counterbond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court).
In violation of said Rule, respondent immediately turned over the
seized articles to PDCP. His claim that the Office of the Regional
Sheriff did not have a place to store the seized items, cannot
justify his violation of the Rule. As aptly noted by the Investigating
Judge, the articles could have been deposited in a bonded
warehouse.
Respondent must serve on Marblecraft not only a copy of the
order of seizure but also a copy of the application, affidavit and
bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court). Respondent did not
furnish defendant with a copy of the application, affidavit and
bond. By his own admission, he only served it with a copy of the
order of seizure (Rollo, p. 37).
The more serious infraction of respondent is his refusal to
implement the order of the Regional Trial Court, Makati for him to

return to complainant the articles seized pursuant to the writ of

seizure dated March 30, 1990.
The only action taken by respondent to implement the Order
dated December 11, 1990 was to write a letter on December 12,
1990, addressed to the counsel of PDCP, requesting the turnover
of seized articles. As expected, PDCP's counsel refused to part
with the possession of the seized articles and to issue a letter of
authorization to withdraw the same from the warehouse. Instead
of taking possession of the articles, respondent merely reported
to the Regional Trial Court that "[i]t is now clear that the
undersigned cannot implement the Court order dated December
11, 1990 by reason of the refusal of PDCP to accept or to honor
said Court order" (Rollo, p.48).
The petition for certiorari of PDCP to question the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, was filed with the Court of Appeals
only on December 17, 1990. The Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order only on December 21, 1990.
Respondent therefore had more than seven days within which to
enforce the orders of the trial court if he was minded to do so.
Respondent could have avoided getting into his present
predicament had he not turned over the possession of the seized
goods prematurely to the PDCP.
The complainant cannot be blamed if it harbored the suspicion
that respondent was beholden to PDCP. The zeal with which
respondent enforced the order of seizure in favor of PDCP was in
sharp contrast with his inaction in enforcing the three orders of
the trial court directing him to return the seized items to
complainant.
It is not for respondent to question the validity of the orders of the
trial court. It is for him to execute them. As observed by the
Investigating Judge, "[t]here is therefore no excuse for
respondent's willful refusal to implement the Order of the Court"
(Report and Recommendation, p. 10). Disobedience by court
employees of orders of the court is not conducive to the orderly
administration of justice. The display of partially in favor of a

party as against the other party erodes public confidence in the

integrity of the courts.
The Court finds respondent guilty of serious misconduct