140.

141. People Vs. LugodFebruary 21, 2001

FACTS: At around 12:30 a.m. on September 15, 1997
Helen Ramos the mother of the victim Nairube was
awaken by her husband because he sense that there is
someone going down to the stairs of their house. She
noticed that Nairube was no longer in her place she
was sleeping so she assumed that Nairube is just
answering to the call of nature. Nairubes blanket was
also no longer at the place where she sleep but her
slippers were still there. After 3 minutes waiting Helen
stood up and began calling Nairube but there was no
answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and she found
out that the backdoor of their house was open. She
found a pair of slippers on the top of the wooden
bench outside the backdoor and it does not belong to
any member of her family. In the morning of
September 16, 1997, she went to the police station to
report the loss of her child and also the slippers that
she found to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went
home while the police began their search for Nairube.
At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go
with the searching, Helen found a panty and she
recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing the
panty she cried. She was ordered to go home while
others continued the search. Thereafter, they
continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt
with buttons in front hanging on a guava twig. Loreto
Veloria informed him that Clemente John Lugod wore

the two items when he went to the house of Violeta

Cabuhat.
ISSUE: WON the Constitutional rights of the accused
has been violated.
RULING: Yes, the rights of the accused-appellant has
been violated. The act of confession of the accused
that he raped and killed Nairube without the
assistance of the counsel cannot be used against him
because it will tantamount for violation of his rights
under Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our
Constitution, which cannot be disregarded or ignored
no matter how brutal the crime is. On the other hand
the act of pointing out of the accused the location of
the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the
accused right to remain silent. The same was an
integral part of the uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. The accused
was acquitted.
142. People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April
1999]
FACTS
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide
and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on
the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was
the one whodrove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their getaway vehicle. The accused was then invited by thepolice for
questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the
suspects. When the police arrivedat the supposed hide-out, a

shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the

suspects.After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint
where his statement was taken on May 14, 1996.However, this was
only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to
execute a waiver of detentionin the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It
was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time
uponorders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the
accused might attempt to escape otherwise.

(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was

lawful.

authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when

theaccused is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made
immediately after the crime wascommitted; and when the one to
be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in
thiscase did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not
conducted immediately after theconsummation of the crime; rather,
it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have
personalknowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense because theywere not there when
the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not
lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in thiscase
because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the
illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waivedhis right to contest the
legality of the warrantless arrest.

HELD

143. People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)

(1)

Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy

with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care of
Isips house which was under construction adjacent to
the latters residence. The victim was a 12-year old girl
who used to frequent the residence of Isip.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were
violated.

YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his
rights to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent
counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the
accusedshould always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the
moment he is arrested by the authorities asthis is deemed the start of
custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included invitations by
policeofficers in the scope of custodial investigations.It is evident in
this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the
station, he was alreadyconsidered as the suspect in the case.
Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiriesinto an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit
information about his participation in the crime.However, the
Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
express, in writing and madein the presence of counsel.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused
made such awaiver.(2) NO. There are certain situations when

On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was

reported missing by her mother. The following
morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney
and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30
am that same day. She was found in the septic tank
wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy
showed that the victim was raped and was strangled
to death.

Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found

a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a
yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims
mother to belong to her daughter. Also, they found a
pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the
appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength
away from the septic tank were an underwear, a
leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers
positively identified by Isip as appellants belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated how the
crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower
court convicted him of the crime of Rape and was
sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
Issues: WON the appellants extra-judicial confession
was validly taken and in accordance with his rights
under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and
WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt

constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and

custodial rights.
As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt.
However, the Court ruled otherwise.
The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled
jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does not
absolve the appellant because conviction may be had
with the concurrence of the following requisites as
stated in the Rules of Court:
1.
there is more than one circumstance;the
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; andthe combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280
SCRA 141, all circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

Ratio Decidendi
The Court ruled that the appellants extrajudicial
confession was taken within the ambit of the law as
evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer
who assisted, warned and explained to him his

And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing

People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight

and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence

in its effect upon the court.

petition of the person arrested or one acting in his

behalf;

The Court agreed with the trial courts decision in

giving credence to several circumstantial evidence,
which is more than enough to prove appellants guilt
beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

5. That no custodial investigation in any form shall be

conducted except in the presence of his counsel or
after a valid waiver has been made;

The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the

developments in law that provided the rights of
suspects under custodial investigation in detail.
A person under custodial investigation should be
informed:
1. In a language known to and understood by him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language
known to and understood by said person;
2. That he has a right to remain silent and that any
statement he makes may be used as evidence against
him;

6. That, at any time, he has the right to communicate

or confer by the most expedient means telephone,
radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either
retained or appointed), any member of his immediate
family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister
chosen by him or by any one from his immediate
family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with
duly accredited national or international nongovernment organization. It shall be the responsibility
of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. That he has the right to waive any of said rights

provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

3. That he has the right to be assisted at all times and

have the presence of an independent and competent
lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

8. That the waiver must be done in writing AND in the

presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned
that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver
and chooses to speak;

4. That if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the

services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and
that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in
his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon

9. That he may indicate in any manner at any time or

stage of the process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he makes such
indication, the police may not interrogate him if the

same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation

must ceased if it has already begun;
10. That his initial waiver of his right to remain silent,
the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar
him from invoking it at any time during the process,
regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some statements;
11. That any statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings

on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10,
1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On
the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting
toJuly 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services
of counsel.The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the
date he himself hadchosen, so the committee deemed
the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating
Committee recommendedthe dismissal of Lumiqued.
DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissingLumiqued.
ISSUE:

145.

Does the due process clause encompass the right to

be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?

146.

HELD:

LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA282 SCRA 125

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel,

which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and inthe presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It
is not anabsolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in anadministrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to havecompetent and independent
counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was
not accused of any crime in theproceedings below. The
investigation conducted by the committee created by

144.c ampil

FACTS:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He
was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for
dishonestydue to questionable gas expenses under his
office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts
forreimbursements and that he had an unliquidated
cash advance worth P116,000.00.Zamudio also
complained that she was unjustly removed by
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the twocomplaints.

Department Order No. 145 was forthe purpose of

determining if he could be held administratively liable
under the law for the complaints filedagainst him. The
right to counsel is not indispensable to due process
unless required by the Constitution or thelaw.There is
nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a
non-criminal proceeding is entitled to berepresented
by counsel and that, without such representation, he
shall not be bound by such proceedings. Theassistance
of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The
legal profession was not engrafted in the dueprocess
clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that
he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at
his side.In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain
ones side.Whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee was cured
by Lumiqueds appeal andhis subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration
147. Gamboa v Cruz 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant.
During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he
was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a
robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice
and
in
the
absence
of
his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to
due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set,
hence
the
petition.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due

process violated.
Held: No. The

police line-up

was

not

part

of

the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at

such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for
a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an
urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even

plain information which

may

appear

innocent

or

innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and

there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the
waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence ofcounsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way,
deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was
duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead
opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
148. People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002]
First Division, Ynares-Santigao (J): 3 concur, 1 on
official leave
Facts: On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz
Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran,

Barangay South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo,

her husband, who had earlier gone. As she was
walking by the gate of the company compound where
they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help
because Mateo was being mauled by a group of men.
She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband
being beaten up by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito
Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the
aggressors, but was beaten herself. Luz embraced
Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel
picked up a large stone, measuring about a foot and a
half, and struck Mateos head with it. Then, Lito
approached Mateos side and stabbed him at the back,
while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed
to the East Avenue Medical Center where he later died
because of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y
Consolacion, Lito Garcia y Francisco and Richard Palma
y Ider were charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision,
finding Piedad and Garcia guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying
circumstances present, and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Piedad and
Garcia were likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Mateo Lactawan in the sum of
P50,000.00. Richard Palma was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad and Garcia
appealed.

Issue: Whether the way that Piedad was identified by

prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally
flawed; that Piedad should have been put in a police
lineup instead of being shoveled into a confrontation
with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled
out by the police as suspects.
Held: the proximity and attention afforded the
witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the
surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of
identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the lack of
counsel during the pre-trial identification process of
Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any
extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to
the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have
been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by
the police authorities, much less forced to confess to
the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia
were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad
averred during cross-examination that the police never
allowed them to say anything at the police station on
the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the
authorities.
149. People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]
First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m.
while inside a motor vehicle in the national highway at
Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y
Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away,

through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to

P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned
by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko
Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all
amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16
April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at
Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto
Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash
money. In the course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto
Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an
information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando
Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery
with homicide (as per 16 April 1993 incident).
Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993
was filed against Feliciano and Orlando Labtan
charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March
1993 incident). Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the
two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in
Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was detained
while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases
were tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation in the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the
sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the
sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and
to pay the cost.

Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez

to Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel.
Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a
competent and independent counsel when he was
questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station.
SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started
questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993
regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney
driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact
that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation
without a counsel; inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez
investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect
in the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty.
Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required
by the Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the
consequences of his action that the sworn
statement can be used against him and that it is
possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
Furthermore, Atty. Chavezs independence as counsel
is suspect he is regularly engaged by the Cagayan
de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects
who cannot avail the services of counsel. He even
received money from the police as payment for his
services.
150. People vs. Tomaquin [G.R. No. 133188 July 23,
2004]

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Thursday,

April 05, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The accused-appelant was charged with murder.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued. After
trial, accused was found guilty
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the
prosecutions evidence, aside from appellants
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence
of a barangay captain who is also a lawyer. Appellant
questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession because it was an uncounselled confession.
Accused-appellant contends that the barangay
captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an
independent counsel within the purview of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of a
barangay captain, is admissible in evidence against
him.
Held: No. Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he

must be provided with one. These rights cannot be

waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The words competent and independent counsel in
the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the
uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices
explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.
A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law
and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and
order at all times.
In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in
authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority. Who shall be deemed as such. In
applying the provisions of the preceding and other
articles of this Code, any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member
of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A
barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider
the barangay captain as an independent counsel of
appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a

peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in
direct conflict with the role of providing competent
legal assistance to appellant who was accused of
committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay
captain could not be considered as an independent
counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his
extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires
is the presence of an independent and competent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients
defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

152. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANTIAGO

PERALTA

The accused were all convicted of qualified theft for

stealing punctured BSP notes amounting to
Php194,190.On the basis of the complaint filed, one of
the accused, Ulysses Garcia, was apprehended while
waiting for apassenger bus to the BSP. It was said that,
during the custodial investigation, Garcia admitted
authorship of thecrime and named his cohorts as
accomplices. Acting on his admission, the police
officers invited the other accused for questioning.On
the other hand, Garcia claims that he was arrested
without a warrant and tortured by his interrogators
toadmit to doing the crime. However, the trial court
still convicted the accused on the basis of the
confessionsobtained from them and three perforated
notes confiscated from Garcia at the time of his arrest.

FACTS

ISSUES

151.

(1) Whether the warrantless arrest waand subsequent

search and seizure were lawful.(2) Whether the
confession of the accused and evidence confiscated
from Garcia may be admissible asevidence against
them.
HELD
(1) NO, because Garcia was not caught in flagrante
delicto or immediately after committing a crime. He
wasonly arrested five days after the police officers
were given information that the accused could
havestolen some BSP notes because they were
spending beyond their means. Still, this information
was notsupported by sufficient evidence and would

not, therefore, give rise to probable cause to merit

thewarrantless arrest of the accused.The search and
seizure were also illegal because the arrest was illegal.
Therefore, the notes confiscated fromGarcia were the
fruits of the poisonous tree.(2) NO, because they were
not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.
Even the PAO lawyer who allegedly assisted them
admitted that he was not present during the
investigation. Moreover, heonly signed as saksi or
witness on the accused's written admissions. The
Court held that competentand independent counsel
requires effective and vigilant counsel not just
someone to standby andwatch while the accused is
being questioned by police officers.
153. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs.
BENJAMIN MORIAL, defendant
G.R. No. 129295.

August 15, 2001

Facts:On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas

were killed and robbed. As a part of the investigation
and as a result of a witness testimony, Edwin and
Leandro Morial were asked several questions by the
policemen and were invited to the police station for
continuing investigation. They were turned over to
SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again
after they woke up at past 6 in the morning. That
investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted
into the admission by Leandro that he was one of
those who participated in the robbery with homicide.
With the latters consent, his statements were reduced

into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his

right to remain silent and to have a counsel, whatever
will be his answer will be used as evidence in court.
SPO4 Fernandez volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the
suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was
contacted by the former and he first met the latter at
January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After
Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the
same can be used against him as evidence in court,
the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez
with the presence of the counsel. After all the
material points were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the
investigator if he can leave due to very important
engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyers
request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked
Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his
absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty.
Aguilars absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the
investigation and propounded several more questions
to Leonardo, which the latter answered.
Issue:Whether or not Leonardo Morials right to
counsel was waived during the investigation.
Ruling:Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to
counsel during the custodial investigation; therefore
his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against him and his other co-accused. The Court
stressed out that an accused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4
Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left

after Leonardo had admitted that he and his

companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty.
Aguilar rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had
admitted the material points, referring to the
participation of the three accused to the crime. Both
are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires
that any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states
that in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted.
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilars
departure during the investigation and to answer
questions during the lawyers absence, such consent
was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his
right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless
the same is made in writing and in the presence of the
counsel. In the case at bar, no such written and
counseled waiver of these rights was presented as
evidence.
154.
155. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO
GALLARDO y GANDER et. al.
FACTS:
The case before the Court is an appeal by accusedappellants from the decision2 of the trial court finding them
guilty of murder for the treacherous killing of Edmundo
Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion

perpetuaand to pay in solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal

in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and
P150,000.00 as moral damages. Accused-appellants impute
the following errors to the trial court in admitting their
extra-judicial confessions in evidence against them; and in
finding that their guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt
ISSUE: Must the lawyer be known to the accused prior to
investigation?
Ruling:
The Court held that "while the initial choice of the lawyer in
cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot
afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final choice
as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former's appointment during the
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.
In the case at bar, although Atty. Velasco was provided by
the State and not by the accused themselves, the accused
were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to
accept him as their lawyer. They were asked and they
immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel
during the investigation. There is no requirement in the
Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial
investigation be previously known to them. The
Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and
independent counsel, who will represent the accused and
protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

156. 256 People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February

2001] Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording
Galgarins confession is admissible as evidence.

leave because appellant has the habit of mauling her

mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also
went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim,

Held: The interview was recorded on video and it

showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police officers but
to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed
been forced into confessing, he could have easily
sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood,
would have been sympathetic with him. However,
because of the inherent danger in the use of television
as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions.

removed his pants and slid inside the blanket covering

157.

police station to which he obliged. Appellant admitted to

the victim and removed her pants and underwear.

Appellant had warned the victim not to shout for help.
He proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her daughter
by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after,
the victims brother arrived and saw her crying.
Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out
late. The two decided to leave the house.
While

on

their

way

to

their

maternal

grandmothers house, victim recounted to her brother

what happened to her. They later told the incident to
their grandmother and uncle who sought the assistance
of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in his
house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the
Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because he
was unable to control himself.

158. PEOPLE VS. LAUGA

The trial court convicted the accused for qualified

FACTS:Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by

rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification

his daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was

the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

left alone at home while his father was having drinking

spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to

ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

appellants

extrajudicial

confession without counsel admissible in evidence?

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise

Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of

watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are
recognized by the local government unit to perform
functions relating to the preservation of peace and order
at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and
specific

scope

function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a

suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under

HELD: Negative.

the

inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related

of

duties

and

responsibilities

delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the

authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any

known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not
admitted as evidence, it does not warrant the acquittal
of the accused. The appellants conviction is upheld
because of the strong evidence showing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.