ATLAS MINING VS CA

On June 5, 1973, Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development

Corporation (ATLAS) entered into an operating agreement with
the heirs of Manuel Cuenco and Jose P. Velez (collectively
referred to herein as CUENCO-VELEZ) whereby in
consideration of royalties to be paid by ATLAS to CUENCOVELEZ, the former was granted the right to explore, develop
and operate twelve (12) mining claims belonging to the latter
located at Toledo City, Cebu.
On June 17, 1973, ATLAS entered into a similar agreement
with the Biga Copper Mines Exploration Company (BIGA
COPPER), a partnership composed of Pablo B. Gorosin,
Francisco B. Gorosin, Pedro B. Gorosin and Vicente T.
Garaygay (collectively referred to herein as the BIGA
PARTNERS). Subject of this Operating Agreement are thirtyone (31) mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at
Toledo City, Cebu.
It appears, however, that of the total mining claims "leased" by
ATLAS from both the CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER,
nine (9) mining claims overlap. These nine (9) overlapping
mining claims became the subject of Mines Administrative
Cases Nos. V-727 and V-750 whereby under date of February
12, 1974, the Director of Mines resolved the same in favor of
CUENCO-VELEZ. BIGA COPPER appealed this decision to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a
decision dated April 14, 1974, in DANR Cases Nos. 3936 and
3936-A, affirmed the decision of the Director of Mines. This
later decision was appealed to the Office of the President
under O.P. Case No. 0435.
During the pendency of this appeal in the Office of the
President, the parties, namely, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA
COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. 2 This
compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually
lay claim over the nine (9) overlapping mining claims.
Earlier, ATLAS alleged that when it started the operation of its
Carmen Project, which includes some of the mining claims
subject of the aforestated Operating Agreements with BIGA
COPPER and CUENCO-VELEZ ATLAS received numerous
letters from third- parties claiming that they were assignees of
BIGA COPPER and the BIGA PARTNERS over the mining
claims. These third-parties claim that as such assignees, they
are legally entitled to receive the corresponding royalties from
the mining operation. In effect, they ask ATLAS that they be
substituted to the rights of BIGA COPPER and the BIGA
PARTNERS under the operating agreement.
ATLAS allegedly conducted a verification of the said demands
and later on confirmed that before the registration of the
Articles of Partnership of BIGA COPPER, the BIGA
PARTNERS sold and/or assigned some of their respective
shares, rights, interests and participations over the mining
claims to third parties 3 and that BIGA COPPER, acting
separately from the BIGA PARTNERS, likewise sold and/or
assigned its undivided shares, interests and participations over
the mining claims to third parties. 4
On the other hand, a certain Alejandro T. Escano wrote ATLAS
informing the latter that he is an assignee of CUENCO-VELEZ
with respect to the three (3) mining claims which CUENCOVELEZ retained under the compromise agreement with BIGA
COPPER. Escano, alleged that CUENCO-VELEZ had
assigned to him fifty percent (50%) of their rights, interests and

participations in the said mining claims. 5 In turn, CUENCOVELEZ advised ATLAS that their assignment to Alejandro T.
Escano was already revoked or rescinded for failure of the said
assignee to fulfill the conditions contained in their deed of
assignment. 6
In the light of the foregoing situation, ATLAS instituted a
petition for declaratory relief with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 16669-R. Cited as respondents therein were BIGA
COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some
thirty-one (31) assignees. 7
To reiterate the first issuecan a person who is not a party to a
contract file a petition for declaratory relief and seek a judicial
interpretation of such contract?
We rule in the negative.
Declaratory relief has been defined as an action by any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance,
executive order or regulation to determine any question of
construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights
and duties thereunder. 27 The only question that may be raised
in such kind of petition is the question of "construction' or
"validity" arising under an instrument or statute. 28
Corollary to this is the general rule that such an action must be
justified such that no other adequate relief or remedy is
available under the circumstances. 29 This, in turn, can be
explained by the fact that the only object of a declaratory action
is merely to terminate uncertainties in an instrument or a
statute. The judgment of the court concerned cannot extend
beyond a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties to
the action or provide for corrective relief. 30
The declaratory action flied by ATLAS is within the ambit of
Presidential Decree No. 1281. It is not an entirely different or
distinct cause of action.
DY POCO VS COMM. OF IMMIGRATION
The petition for declaratory judgment was based on the
allegations that petitioner-appellant is a Filipino, having been
born in 1910 in Cebu City, out of wedlock, of a Filipino mother,
Susana Apura, who died in 1928, and a Chinese father, Dy
Poco, who died in 1915; that believing himself at first to be a
Chinese, petitioner secured alien certificates of registration in
1947 and 1951; that in 1952, petitioner-appellant, realizing his
mistake, petitioned the Commissioner of Immigration for
cancellation of his name from the list of aliens, which petition
was denied. On petitioner's request for reconsideration of said
ruling, the Secretary of Justice, to whom the matter was
referred, rendered an opinion (Op. No. 72, s-1965) sustaining
the stand of the Commissioner, for the reason that the
nationality of the mother and the illegitimate status of petitioner
had not been satisfactorily established. Upon being required,
subsequently, by the immigration authorities to secure an
immigrant certificate of residence, petitioner instituted the
present declaratory relief proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
HELD: "where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact
would be determinative of issues rather than a construction of
definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly

expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for

declaratory judgment."4 And, here, the material issues are the
citizenship of the mother and the illegitimacy of the petitioner,
and the rights and status of the latter which are sought to be
declared are dependent upon those disputed issues.
It may be observed further that our Rules contain no similar
provision. Taking into consideration the nature of a proceeding
for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to
declare rights, and not to determine or try issues, 5 there is
more valid reason for us to adhere to the rule that a declaratory
relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would
have to be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed
facts.6

Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil. 675

Facts: Plaintiff Juan Edades brought this action before the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan seeking a declaratory
judgment on his hereditary rights in the property of his alleged
father and incidentally the recognition of his status as an
illegitimate son of Emigdio Edades. The Edades siblings and
their father (who was still alive) filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The motion to dismiss was
sustained by CFI Pangasinan, which held that an action for
declaratory relief just for purpose of clearing away doubt,
uncertainty, or insecurity to the one's status or rights would be
improper. Juan Edades appealed.

the nationality of her alleged father or her alleged relation with

him.
Issue:
Whether it was proper for Lim to be repatriated as a Philippine
citizen
Held:
NO. The procedure for the repatriation of a female citizen of
the Philippines, who has lost her citizenship by reason of
marriage to an alien, is as simple as it can possibly be. All that
is required of her, upon termination of her marital status, is for
her to take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper civil
registry.
It is also apparent that Lims objective is to settle her political
status prior to marriage. As a consequence, her petition is, in
effect, one for a declaratory relief, which, the Court has
repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of
natural persons.
Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action that
may lie only when any person, interested under a deed, will,
contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights affected
by statute or ordinance, demands construction thereof for a
declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. Also,
there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by which
any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a
court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.
Appealed decision reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the present action can be maintained.

Ruling: Yes, but not as an action for declaratory relief. The
case does not fall under the authorized causes for an action for
declaratory relief. It does not concern a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument. It does not affect a statute or
ordinance whose construction or validity is questioned.

Board of Optometry vs. Hon. Colet

122241 July 30, 1996

The case is neither predicated on a justiciable controversy,

considering that the father is still alive and there are no
successional rights yet to be resolved.

The Revised Optometry Law of 1995 was approved into law.

The private respondents here filed with the RTC for a
declaratory relief, among others, to protect their Constitutional
rights because allegedly, said law would affect their operation
and inflict serious and irreparable injury to their legal rights.
They were not able to prove, however, their juridical
personality. Thus, they also assert that such action is in their
capacity as taxpayers and citizens suit, and therefore pray to
bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers public
health (in the nature of a taxpayers suit).

But the action is not merely aimed to determine the hereditary

right of Juan. It has also the aim to establish his status as an
illegitimate child. Since this is his right, the action can prosper.
Disposition: Case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

1.

LIM V. REPUBLIC 37 S 783

Facts:
Petitioner Felisa Lim is a former Philippine citizen who has
acquired her Chinese citizenship by marrying a Chinese. In this
case, she intends to reacquire her Philippine citizenship and to
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to China.
Despite the Philippine governments (Republic) opposition, the
lower court declared that Lim may be so repatriated.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, now raises that
the lower court has erred in declaring Lim a repatriated citizen
since, among other things, she has not duly established either

G.R. No.

Facts:

Issue: WON the private respondents have a legal interest in

the controversy; and WON the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination.
Held: No and no.
As a special civil action for declaratory relief, its requisites are:
(1) the existence of a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial
determination. On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at
least the first and fourth requisites are wanting.

For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private
respondents must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring the action. Thus, they cannot be deemed
real parties in interest. They cannot also claim such legal
personality under a taxpayers suit because, among others,
they failed to allege the existence and prove the requisites of a
class suit.
And since an actual case or controversy means an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, it cannot be
disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy
involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand,
and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to
rights or obligations under the law subject matter of this case.
Ollada vs. Central Bank
May 31, 1962
Dela Llana vs. Comelec
December 9, 1977

G.R.

No.

L-47245

Facts:
Dela Llana filed a petition for prohibition or declaratory relief
against respondents from holding a referendum with the issue,
Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in
office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the
organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for
in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the
Constitution?, alleging that such is unnecessary because the
people, on several occasions, had already expressed their
assent to the incumbent Presidents continuance in office and
their approval of his programs of government.
Issue: WON a declaratory relief is proper in this case.
Held: No.
The subject matter of this case is a political and non-justiciable
question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less,
of the decision to call for a referendum. The power to
determine when a referendum should be called and what
matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the
political branch of the Government, the exercise of which
involves consideration of a multitude of factors political, social,
economic, etc. - normally outside the periphery of competence
of the courts.

G.R. No. L-11357

Facts:
Ollada, a CPA authorized to practice accounting at Central
Bank filed in the CFI a petition for declaratoy relief after his
petition for a writ of prelim injunction had been dismissed in the
CFI assailing the enforcement of the Bank with two
requirements for CPAs, re: that the applicant CPA should sign
a statement under oath and that, upon accreditation, a CPA
would be governed by the rules and regulations of the Central
Bank and not by those of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants. He alleges that because of these requirements
he had suffered serious injury, and that such enforcement has
resulted in the unlawful restraint in the practice of CPAs in the
Office of the Central Bank. The CFI dismissed the petition.
Issue: WON a declaratory relief is proper.
Held: No.
The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after
a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In
the present case such is precisely the situation arising from the
facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously
claimed by petitioner himself, respondent had already invaded
or violated his right and caused him injury all these giving
him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has
been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it is
sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach
which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an
action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is
not available through the means of other existing forms of
action or proceeding.

G.R. No. L-5204, Hospicio Obiles v. Republic, 92 Phil. 864, 49

Off. Gaz. [No. 3] 923
Republic
of
the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC

March 27, 1953

G.R.
No.
L-5204
In re: The petition for declaratory relief of Hospicio Obiles
and for cancellation of erroneous registration as alien.
HOSPICIO
OBILES,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Moises
C.
Kallos
for
appellant.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres
and Florencio Villamor for appellee.

obligation, responsibility, or liability. As the petitioner himself

candidly admits in his complaint, he is only afraid lest this
registration might involve the loss of his Filipino citizenship.
This supposed fear in the mind of the petitioner is not what the
law considers as an actual controversy, or a justiciable
controversy, which requires the intervention of the courts of
justice in order that the rights, obligations, or liabilities arising
therefrom may be predetermined. In effect, petitioner's
allegations of fact in his petition are entitled to no more than an
advisory opinion, because a ruling on the effect of the
registration by petitioner involves no actual, genuine, live
controversy affecting a definite legal relation. (Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments, pp. 29, 30.)

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Albay dismissing petitioner-appellant's petition for
declaratory relief. In his petition, petitioner alleges that he is a
Filipino citizen by birth and parentage, residing in Bacacay,
Albay; that in the year 1941, because "of erroneous belief and
fear of criminal prosecution," petitioner registered himself with
the municipal treasurer of Bacacay as Chinese alien, but that
notwithstanding said registration he never intended to give up
his Filipino citizenship, and that he continued to hold himself
out as a Filipino citizen. Against this petition the Solicitor
General filed an opposition, alleging that the petition contains
no cause of action and that no actual controversy has arisen
against anyone, and that if the petitioner desires to establish
his Filipino citizenship, he should do so in another separate
proceeding. The court sustained the above opposition, holding
that there was no actual controversy involved in petitioner's
petition, because petitioner is merely in doubt as to his right
and no one disputes his claim; that any declaration that the
court might render in the premises will not terminate the
controversy, and it, therefore, dismissed the petition. Against
this judgment, petitioner has prosecuted this appeal claiming
(1) that the lower court erred in holding that no justiciable
controversy existed, and (2) that the decision will not terminate
the controversy.
the requisites of an action for declaratory relief under Rule 66
of the Rules of Court. This rule is as follows:
SECTION. 1. Construction. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or
duties thereunder.
The deed or written instrument, which petitioner claims and
believes to have given rise to his cause of action, is his
supposed registration as an alien filed in the office of the
municipal treasurer of Bacacay in the year 1941. This
instrument is not a contract in which another party or person is
involved. It is a unilateral act of the petitioner himself not
affecting nor binding anyone else but himself, not creating any
right or obligation on the part of any other party or on that of
the state, and, therefore, no one has interest therein except
himself. By such registration petitioner has not become a
Chinese alien. By such declaration alone no rights and
obligations are created, no status fixed or determined. The
registration, however, may be used as evidence against the
petitioner himself. There is no allegation in the petition,
however, that by reason of such registration any official of the
Government has taken steps, or is intending to take steps or
threatening to take steps, to hold the petitioner to any

ANGELES
S.
SANTOS,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PATERIO AQUINO, as Municipal Mayor of Malabon, THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABON, A.A. OLIVEROS, as
Municipal Treasurer of Malabon, Province of Rizal,
respondents-appellees.
Arsenio
Paez
Ireneo V. Bernardo for appellees.

for

appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
This action purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer
of the petition seeks to have Ordinance No. 61, series of 1946,
and Ordinance No. 10, series of 1947, of the Municipality of
Malabon, Province of Rizal, declared null and void; to prevent
the collection of surcharges and penalties for failure to pay the
taxes imposed by the ordinances referred to, except for such
failure from and after the taxpayer shall have been served with
the notice of the effectivity of the ordinances; and to enjoin the
respondents, their agents and all other persons acting for and
in their behalf from enforcing the ordinances referred to and
from making any collection thereunder. Further, petitioner prays
for such other remedy and relief as may be deemed just and
equitable and asks that costs be taxed against the
respondents.
The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine
Concepcion," located and operated in the Municipality of
Malabon, Province of Rizal, and the respondents are the
Municipal Mayor, the Municipal Council and the Municipal
Treasurer, of Malabon. The petitioner avers that Ordinance No.
61, series of 1946, adopted by the Municipal Council of
Malabon on 8 December 1946, imposes a license tax of
P1,000 per annum on the said theater in addition to a license
tax on all tickets sold in theaters and cinemas in Malabon,
pursuant to the Ordinance No. 58, series of 1946, adopted on
the same date as Ordinance No. 61, the same series; that prior
to 8 December 1946 the municipal license tax paid by the
petitioner on "Cine Concepcion" was P180, pursuant to the
Ordinance No. 9, series of 1945; that on 6 December 1947, the
Municipal Council of Malabon adopted Ordinance No. 10,
series of 1947, imposing a graduated municipal license tax on
theaters and cinematographs from P200 to P9,000 per annum;
that the ordinance was submitted for approval to the
Department of Finance, which reduced the rate of taxes
provided therein, and the ordinance with the reduced rate of
taxes was approved on 3 November 1948; that notice of
reduction of the tax rate and approval by the Department of
Finance of said graduated municipal license tax provided for in
said Ordinance No. 10, as reduced, was served on the

petitioner on 12 February 1949 when the respondent Municipal

Treasurer presented a bill for collection thereof; that Ordinance
No. 61, series of 1946, is ultra vires and repugnant to the
provisions of the Constitution on taxation; that its approval was
not in accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10, series of
1947, is all null and void, because the Department of Finance
that approved it acted in excess and against the powers
granted it by law, and is unjust, oppressive and confiscatory;
and that the adoption of both ordinances was the result of
prosecution of the petitioner by the respondents because from
20 July 1946 to 8 December 1947, or within a period of less
than one and a half years, the Municipal Council of Malabon
adopted four ordinances increasing the taxes on
cinematographs and theaters and imposing a penalty of 20 per
cent surcharges for late payment.
This is not an action for declaratory relief, because the terms of
the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning which require a construction thereof by the Court. And
granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance may be
drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief, such relief
must be asked before a violation of the ordinance be
committed.1 When this action was brought on 12 May 1949,
payment of the municipal license taxes imposed by both
ordinances, the tax rate of the last having been reduced by the
Department of Finance, was already due, and the prayer of the
petition shows that the petitioner had not paid them. In those
circumstances the petitioner cannot bring an action for
declaratory relief.
Angeles S. Santos, the petitioner, does not aver nor does he
testify that he is the owner or part-owner of "Cine-Concepcion."
He alleges that he is only the manager thereof. For that reason
he is not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater
known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be affected by the
municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not
entitled to bring this action either for declaratory relief or for
prohibition, which apparently is the purpose of the action as
may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that
actions must be brought in the name of the real party in
interest2 applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for
declaratory relief.3 The fact that he is the manager of the
theater does not make him a real party in interest.4

Office
of
the
Solicitor
General
(OSG),
reconsiderationbut it was denied. Hence, this petition.

RULE 63
DECLARATORY
REMEDIES

RELIEF AND

sought

SIMILAR

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person

interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ANDRES SINGSON

TO BE ADMITTED OR TO BE DECLARED A CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES. ANDRES SINGSON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Mabanag, Elegir & Associates for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

REP VS ORBECIDO

On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.

Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly
V. Orbecido.

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of La Union

dated July 15, 1963 setting aside and declaring null and void
its previous decision declaring petitioner a citizen of the
Philippines in Naturalization Case No. 30.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (FC).

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization on October 12,

1959, with an alternative prayer that he be permitted to present
evidence of his Philippine citizenship and declared a Filipino
citizen accordingly. After due publication and hearing, there
being no opposition from either the office of the Solicitor
General or the Provincial Fiscal, the lower court received the
evidence for the petitioner. On August 9, 1960 it rendered its
decision holding that inasmuch as petitioner was already a
Filipino citizen as borne out by the evidence presented, there
was no need to give due course to his petition for naturalization
since it would serve no useful purpose for him. Accordingly, the
lower court granted petitioner's alternative prayer and declared
him a citizen of the Philippines.

No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court

granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the

The above-mentioned conclusion was arrived at after the lower

court found that:

In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
sometime in 2000, learned from his son that hiswife had
obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent
Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California
with her child by him.

From the evidence adduced, it appears that the

petitioner has from the time he became of the age of
discretion been considering himself a Filipino citizen
as shown in his residence certificates, stating therein
his citizenship as a Filipino. He did not register
himself as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration.
When he reached the age of majority, he started
exercising the right of suffrage and in 1941 made his
declaration of intention to elect Filipino citizenship. He
explained that if he filed his petition he only did so
because he wanted to secure a categorical
declaration about his citizenship in order to avoid
further molestations by some agencies or persons,
who according to him, constantly pestered him about
his status.
The evidence further conclusively show that said
petitioner was born in the Philippines with a Filipino
mother and a Chinese father who were not legally
married during their cohabitation up to the time of their
death. These are not contradicted by any evidence
presented in this case, because as a matter of fact no
opposition whatsoever has been registered by the
government through either the office of the Solicitor
General or the office of the Provincial Fiscal of La
Union. In the case of Leon Retunil Sy Quiamsuan vs.
Republic of the Philippines (49 0. G. 492, February
1953), the Supreme Court ruled:
When the evidence in applicant's possession
proves in his opinion that he has already the
status of a Filipino citizen as would make it
unnecessary to press further his petition for
naturalization, he may be declared a Filipino
citizen in the same proceedings. There is
nothing in the law which would prohibit this
alternative procedure. This course has been
followed in a number of cases (Palanca vs.
Republic, L-301, April 7, 1948; Santos Go vs.
Government, 52 Phil. 543; Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952).
The State did not appeal from the aforequoted decision.
However, after the lapse of more than two years or on
December 17, 1962, the Solicitor General filed a petition to set
aside the decision and to declare the same null and void on the
following grounds:
(a) At the time of the hearing of his petition, the herein
petitioner had not always deported himself to be a
Filipino citizen and in fact he had registered himself
with the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese and was
thereby issued on August 29, 1950, his Alien
Certificate of Registration No. A-105940 at San
Fernando La Union; and
(b) That whatever rights petitioner has to Philippine
citizenship by virtue of his alleged "illegitimate birth" of
a Filipino mother, granting the same to be true, he had
already forfeited when he expressly renounced his
rights and privileges as a Filipino citizen, as contained
in his affidavit executed on October 19, 1948 and
wherein he expressly considered himself to be a
citizen of China.
Petitioner opposed, and the Solicitor General replied to the
opposition. After petitioner's counter-reply the case was set for

hearing. At the hearing the parties did not present evidence but
submitted a "stipulation of facts", which was actually nothing
more than an enumeration of the pleadings submitted and the
proceedings which transpired in relation to this case.
Paragraph 7 thereof particularly raised as a legal issue the
proposition that "the Government cannot reopen this case or
attack the decision collaterally in this same proceeding
inasmuch as the decision rendered herein did not confer
Philippine citizenship upon petitioner, but merely confirmed his
Philippine citizenship, . . . ."
On July 15, 1963 the lower court issued an order declaring the
decision rendered on August 9, 1960, which found petitioner to
be a Filipino citizen, void and of no force and effect. This order
is based principally on an affidavit (Annex "A") dated October
19, 1948, allegedly executed by petitioner. In said affidavit
petitioner appears to have expressly renounced all his rights
and privileges as a Filipino citizen in the event that he should
be considered as such by virtue of his having been born out of
wedlock of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
The question before us is whether or not the lower court erred
in setting aside its previous order declaring petitioner a citizen
of the Philippines. Appellant contends that inasmuch as the
original decision did not confer Philippine citizenship upon him
but merely confirmed such citizenship, the doctrine of res
judicata and laches prevents the Government from attacking
collaterally the questioned decision more than two (2) years
after its rendition. On the other hand, appellee argues that
although the petition for naturalization granted petitioners
alternative prayer that he be declared a citizen, that fact alone
did not operate to convert the case into a petition for
declaratory relief nor did the judgment place appellant beyond
the reach of legal remedies available under the Naturalization
Law.
The order declaring petitioner a citizen in the naturalization
proceeding was obviously predicated on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) that the evidence presented by him in support of
his claim that he is a Filipino citizen is true and reliable; and (2)
that the court a quo believed at the time it rendered its decision
(August 9, 1960) that it could properly declare petitioner a
citizen in the same proceeding should the evidence presented
so warrant, apparently relying on the ruling in Sy Quiamsuan
vs. Republic (92 Phil. 675), which was favorably cited in a later
case (Sen et al. vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955),
as follows:
We find no error on the part of the lower court in
allowing (petitioner) to present proof regarding his
Philippine citizenship in (naturalization) proceedings
when, in his opinion, the evidence in his possession
proves that he has already that status as would make
it unnecessary to press further his petition for
naturalization. There is nothing in the law which would
prohibit this alternative procedure. In fact, this course
has been followed in a number of cases wherein the
very evidence presented to substantiate the petition
for naturalization rendered the latter unnecessary and
the court proceeded to dismiss the case after
pronouncement that petitioner is already a Philippine
citizen. Such a pronouncement is inevitable if we have
to sanction the petition for dismissal and it is unfair
and unjust to quash the proceedings if the claim for
Philippine citizenship is not substantiated.

At the time the lower court rendered its decision of August 9,

1960, declaring petitioner a citizen of the Philippines, the ruling
in the Sy Quiamsuan and Sen cases was no longer controlling.
The lower court thus premised that decision on jurisprudence
which had already been modified, particularly by the case of
Suy Chan vs. Republic (G. R. No. 14159, April 18, 1960),
which held:
1. Under our laws, there can be no action or
proceeding for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply
a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an
act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of
the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon,
and make a pronouncement relative to, their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power. . . . At times, the law permits the acquisition of
a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial
decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing
the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a
given person is part of our citizenry.
The above ruling was reiterated in the case of Yu Chin vs.
Republic (G. R. No. L-15775 April 29, 1961), where this Court
declared:
The above holding, being the correct exposition and
interpretation of the law involved, overrules our
holdings in Pablo y Sen et al. vs. Republic, G. R. No.
L-6868, April 30, 1955, and other previous cases, to
the effect that the court can make a declaration that
an applicant for naturalization is a Filipino citizen in
the same naturalization proceedings if the evidence
so warrants. (The Suy Chan ruling was also quoted
with approval in Santiago vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-14653, January 31, 1963)
It would seem therefore that the decision of August 9 was the
result of an erroneous appreciation of the applicable
jurisprudence at the time. Even so, however, the error did not
necessarily render the decision void, and the same would
acquire force and effect unless reversed on appeal or set aside
on other recognized grounds, such as fraud in its procurement.
One such ground is that relied upon by the Solicitor General
here, namely, the fact that in 1948 petitioner executed an
affidavit which reads as follows:
That I am duly registered under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 162732-V, issued at San Fernando,
La Union on May 30, 1947;
That in the year 1927, I was admitted or landed here
in the Philippines and was issued LCR No. 7641045575 issued at Manila on December 16, 1927;
That even if I was admitted as a son of P.I. citizen, I
have always exercised my rights as a citizen or
subject of China for the reason that I was already at
the age of majority when I first arrived in this country
and that I have always registered under the
Immigration Act of 1940;

That if I am considered as a Filipino citizen as shown

in my LCR Co., I hereby renounce all right and
privileges accorded to a Filipino Citizen and therefore
consider myself now as a citizen or subject of China.
The contents of the aforesaid affidavit were not revealed by
appellee in his petition and his failure to do so led the court to
declare him a citizen. If appellee had really executed the said
affidavit there can be no doubt that the court a quo correctly set
aside its previous decision. But appellee has raised the
genuineness and due execution of the affidavit as an issue,
and in fact denied the same as well as the truth of its contents,
in his opposition to the Solicitor General's principal motion
below.
The stipulation of facts, upon which the parties agreed to
submit the case for resolution, does not show any admission
by appellee of the genuineness and due execution of the
affidavit in question. All that was stipulated on in this respect is
that when the Solicitor General filed his petition to set aside the
decision of August 9, the affidavit was attached thereto as an
annex. When the court a quo set aside its original decision
without affording appellee a chance to present evidence to
rebut the Republic's allegation of fraudulent representation by
him, it virtually deprived him of his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and the
case remanded to the court below for further proceedings in
connection with the motion of Solicitor General to set aside and
annul the decision declaring petitioner a Filipino citizen. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Tadeo v. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan

G.R. No. L-16474

January 31, 1962

Padilla, J.

Facts: Spouses Maicong and Acosta filed a complaint for

damages against petitioner for allegedly allegedly preparing a
deed of sale in favor of one Bongato of their parcel of land and
fraudulently inducing them to sign the deed of sale which they
did sign under the belief that it was a partition of their conjugal
partnership property that the spouses had asked petitioner, a
lawyer and notary public, to prepare and ratify. Thereafter, the
spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner. The civil
case was however dismissed. Later, the court dismissed the
criminal case on the ground that the dismissal of the civil case
which was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal
case which arose from the same transaction alleged in the civil
case. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint for declaratory relief
against the spouses praying that the deed of quitclaim
executed by them in favor of Bongato be declared the genuine
document representing the true intention of the spouses and
that petitioner be relieved from civil and criminal liability arising
from the part he had taken as lawyer and notary public in the
drafting and execution thereof. After petitioner instituted the
complaint for declaratory judgment, the spouses again filed a
complaint for estafa against petitioner.

Issue: Whether petitioner has the right to bring an action for

declaratory relief against the spouses?

DISPOSITION: Petition is denied.

Teodoro v. Mirasol, G.R. No. L-8934

Held: No, petitioner is not entitled to the relief prayed for.

Petitioner is not one of the contracting parties to the deed of
sale executed by the spouses but took part only as notary
public before whom the spouses acknowledged the execution
thereof. Not being a party to the deed, petitioner is not entitled
to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or
duties thereunder need be declared. In addition, petitioner has
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In the appropriate case and at the opportune time, he may
set up all defenses available to him and may appeal from an
adverse judgment

Tanda v. Aldaya, 98 Phil. 245, January 30, 1956, Bautista

Angelo
FACTS: Tanda filed an action for the annulment of a certain
contract of sale with pacto de retro executed between him and
Aldaya with the Court of First Instance (Cavite). The court
declared that the contract was valid. Tanda filed a motion to set
aside judgment and a motion for new trial which were denied;
thus, prompting him to appeal with the Court of Appeals. Said
court certified the case to the Supreme Court, which likewise
upheld the validity of the said contract.
After the decision became final and executory and the record
was returned to the court of origin, Tanda filed an action for
declaratory relief questioning the correctness or validity of the
decision and contending that the decision is considered within
the words "other written instruments" provided in Section 1 of
Rule 66 (now Rule 62). Aldaya filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the case states no cause of action and moved for
the withdrawal of Original Title No. 114 in order that his
ownership may be consolidated and a new title will be issued in
his name. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the
withdrawal of the original title. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Can a court decision be a subject of an action for
declaratory relief being under the words "other written
instrument?
RULING: No, it cannot be. It is not considered within the
purview of the words "other written instrument" since the Rules
of Court already provided the ways by which an ambiguous or
doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of
resorting to the rules on action for declaratory relief e.i. motion
for reconsideration, new trial, relief from a judgment, etc.
Appellant availed some of the legal remedies mentioned just
that the same were denied for his claim was found
unmeritorious.
Most importantly, the same could not be subject of declaratory
relief because of the principle of res judicata. The case had
been fully litigated and reached its finality. It is conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with it. The same cannot be
disturbed by the courts.

FACTS: Defendant and plaintiff entered into a two-year lease

contract, which would expire on October 1, 1952 and could be
renewed for another two years upon written consent of both
parties.
On October 15, 1952, defendant wrote plaintiff that the lease
already expired. He gave plaintiff notice of termination since
plaintiff lost interest in renewing the lease.
Plaintiff filed an action for specific performance and/or
declaratory relief in CFI alleging that it is not true that he lost
interest since defendant allowed him to renew the lease; that
defendant is barred from denying it; and that he has already
paid. Plaintiff prayed that the court fix the extended period of
lease to 2 years and that defendant be required to pay P10,000
moral damage.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court has
no jurisdiction; that there is a pending unlawful detainer case in
MTC between the parties; and that plaintiff's claim is barred by
Statute of Frauds.
Plaintiff replied that the unlawful detainer suit in MTC was filed
after plaintiff's action in CFI and that the former must be
dismissed. Besides, plaintiff is claiming for moral damages,
which the CFI must determine.
CFI dismissed the case and denied plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration since the issue on extension of lease can be
resolved in the ejectment case even if it was filed later, as ruled
in Lim v Lim.
Plaintiff argues before SC that there is no identity between
unlawful detainer case and his case since this one is for
specific performance or for declaratory relief and that this suit
includes a claim for moral damages, both of which the CFI can
only decide, not the MTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is
proper.
HELD: NO. Action for declaratory relief is meant only for those
cases where a contract is desired to be construed prior to its
breach because of an impending controversy and that the
parties may be informed of their rights. Here, the lease contract
had already expired and there has already been a breach;
hence, the action for declaratory relief is no longer proper.
Even if proper, there is no longer any need for the action since
the matter could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit.
The claim for damages is merely an incident of the main
question of whether or not plaintiff should be allowed to
continue the lease for two years more. He may not assert it in
the action for declaratory relief, as an excuse or reason for
continuing his suit.