The ad hominem fallacy (one argues attacking the person who sustains the

contrary): 3 One ought to reject the suggestion of Sr X to augment the efficiency of

the universities. Given that he tries to be an impresario, one cannot request that he
understand our proposal to educate the youth, not to obtain earning. 1.3 Languages
and metalanguages. In studying logic we shall be studying propositions in certain
languages and the relations between them. In order to study these propositions we
will have to utilize a language, like Spanish for example. We will have, for the most
part, various levels of the language: the language in which arguments are written
will be the object under study and the language utilized to study them. This last one
is the metalanguage. This difference of levels is found it common parlance, but the
context helps us to identify the level in which one is speaking. Let us consider for
example, the two following sentences: George Sand was a lover of Chopin. George
sand was the pseudonym of Aurora Dupin. In the first case one is affirming
something about a person. George sand denotes a person and one says that the
expression is using. In the second one affirms something about an expression,
George Sand is mentioning. In logic at times it is not so clear when one is denoting
or referring using an expression. For example, with this convention one writes: Paris
is the capital of France and Paris has five letters. 1.4 Historical summary.
Traditionally one distinguishes between deductive logic, whose principles are used
to obtain conclusions from given premises, and inductive logic, which draws out
general conclusions from given facts which serve as evidence for them. This
distinction is obsolete because the problems of induction are treated now in the
methodology of the natural sciences. For us, then, logic means deductive logic. In a
strick sense deductive logic is divided in two: the logic of propositions and the logic
of predicates. The logic of propositions is so named because in it the propositions or
sentences form the unique category of basic semantics. Other propositions are
simple and are not analyzed, others are composed and are analyzed through
decomposing them by means of propositional connectives (and or, not, if. Then)
into simpler propositions. This logic is studied in detail in chapters 4 and 5. In
predicate logic the simple propositions are decomposed into simpler parts, which
thus form the second semantic category: the category of names. Names appear in
propositions united with predictates (thus, the name predicate logic) which express
properties and relations, functioning as words (This logic is studied in chapters 7
and 8). In a broader sense logic also comprehends various theories of language like
logical syntax and logical semantics. Modal logics (which study concepts such as
necessity, possibility, contingency etc) and the study of paradoxes and fallacies also
enter into this broder aspect of logic. Although the theory of propositional logic is
anterior form a logical point of view, to the logic of predicates, it is ultimate
antecedent to the first historically. The first system of predicate logic was created by
Aristotle in the fourth century BCE in his monumental work the Organon, a title
which reflects the point of view from which logic is a tool for refining thought. In his
work, Aristotle described and classified valid syllogisms (those in which the
conclusion in effect follows from the premises) and he demonstrated through
counterexamples the invalidity of certain syllogisms. He also initiated the
development of modal logic. One of the most important characteristics of the work
of Aristotle is that one could give using his syllogisms the principle logical forms
thanks to, for the first time in the history of logic, the use of variables or letters in

order to represent arbitrary propositions. Modern logic began I nthe 17 th century

with Leibniz and from then its development has been broadly related with
mathematics. The programme of Leibniz was the construction of a universal
language, a general calculus of though and a general methodology. He applied
successfully mathematical methods to the interpretation of the Aristotelian
syllogistic, and his vision concerning artificial languages and the reduction of reason
to arithmetical calculus was brought to its ultimate fruition in the work of Godel and
the emergence of the computational sciences. During the second half of the 19 th
century the foundations were developed for the great development of logic which
has been the case since then. The English mathematician George boole published in
1854 a work titled An Investigation into the Laws of thought on which are founded
the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities. With this work one
considerably progressed to continue the intentions of Leibniz to create an algebraic
calculus for the laws of thought. Boolean algebra has as many interpretations in
propositional logic as in that of predicates. The focuse of the german mathematician
Gottlob Frege was distinct. He was interested in the concept of number. He thought
that the notion of a natural number could be reduced to logical concepts and that,
therefore, it could be demonstrated that arithmetic was a part of logic. A formal
reduction of arithmetic to logic was given by Frege in Grungesetze der Arithmetik
Begriffsschriftlich. Another aspect in the study of logic and the foundations of
mathematics began with the creation of the theory of sets by George Cantor, as a
new mathematical discipline. Cantors theory was not deductive, like that of Frege,
but rather it was so to say in a pre axiomatic state. For Cantor a set was a collection
of dinstinct objects defined by our perception or our thought. A set was uniquely
determined by its elements. With these concepts Cantor created one of the most
beautiful and profound mathematical theories, with which gave a start to the study
of the so called transfinite cardinals. In 1902 Bertrand Russell discovered a paradox
which attacked Freges system as much as Cantors. It is called Russells Paradox
which hconsists in defining the set R whose elements are precisely those sets which
are not sets of themselves. Is R an element of itself or is it not? If it was the case,
then, by definition, it would have to satisfy the property defined and thus it would
not be an element of itself. But if it is not an element of itself then it satisfies which
defines R and in consequence it would be an element of R, that is, it would be an
element of itself. This is a contradiction. Russells paradox was not the only paradox
which hhad been discovered at the end of the past century and at the beginning of
this one. There were paradoxes in the theory of sets which involved the conept of
cardinality and there were semantic paradoxes, some which dated from the time of
the greeks, like the liear paradox and other recent discoveries. Liar Paradox. A man
says I am lying. If he is lying then what he says is true and for that reason he is not
lying. If he is not lying, then what he says is true, thus that he is lying. Berrys
paradox 1906. There are only a finite number of syllables in Spanish. For that reason
there is only a finite number of expressions in Spanish which have less than 40
syllables. There is, therefore, only a finite number of natural numbers denoted by an
expression in Spanish with less than forty syllables. Let K be the smallest natural
number not denoted by an expression in Spanish of less than 40 syllables. The
expression in italics denotes K and has fewer than 40 syllables. Grellings paradox.
An adjective is called autological if the property denoted by the adjective is satisfied

by the adjective itself. An adjective is heterological if the property denoted by the

adjective does not apply to the adjective itself. For example, blue is heterological
while polysyllabic is autological. Consider the adjective heterological. If it is
heterological then it does not satisfy the property denoted by itself and therefore it
is not heterological, and if it is not heterological then it satisfies the property
denoted by itself and, therefore, it is heterological. The analysis of the paradoxes
leads to various suggestions to eliminate them. The three principal proposals, from
the beginning of this century, were the following: 1 The logicist proposoal. Headed
by Bertrand Russell. Despite having encountered contradictions in the theory of
frege, Russell continued believing that arithmetic could be derived from logic and
that, in consequence, all mathematics could be founded in logic. In his intent to
demonstrate this he produced, in collaboration with Whitehead, Principia
Mathematica. This work soon became a classic of logic. With respect to the
paradoxes, Russell argued that a vicious circle aristed which consisted in supposing
illegitimate totalities. He noted that self-reference is present in all the paradoxes
and he suggested stratifiying language in order to avoid an expression which
predicated something of itself. This is called the theory of types. This theory greatly
influenced Zermelo, who in 1908 produced an axiomatic theory for Cantorian set
theory which eliminated all the known paradoxes of the theory. The intuitionist
proposal. A more radical approach was adopted by Brouwer and his intuitionist
school. They believed that the root of the paradoxes was in the concept of the
infinite, and that the problem was in generalizing from the finite case to the infinite
case. For them it made no sense to speak of infinite totalities. They also rejected the
universality of certain logical laws, such as the law of the excluded middle: p or non
p. Heyting made a systematic study of the principles of classical logic which the
intuitionists accepted and this school gave origin to a type of nonclassical logic
known as intuitionist logic. 3. The formalist proposition. This is the proposal of the
german mathematician David Hilbert and his school. Hilbert was so interested likie
Frege in the axiomatic method but, as a difference between them, he did not give
any importance to the interpretation of the symbols of a formalism. For him
mathematics was a collection of formal systems without meaning and the work of
mathematics was the demonstrate that these systems were consistent, that is to
say, without contradicitons. The discipline which would occupy itself wit hthe
demonstration of the consistency of mathematic theories would not be mathematics
propery, but rather a new discipline which he called metamathematics. His project
was, then, the development of a logical mathematical system within which all of
mathematics would be immersed and which would be consistent. This program
received a huge blow from the hands of the Austrian mathematician Godel, who in
1931 demonstrated that any formal system sufficiently strong to capture arithmetic
is either incomplete (that is to say, there exist truths indemonstrable within the
system) or it is inconsistent (that is, contradictory). But although the work of godel
destroyed hilberts program, it helped the development of a neglected field in
mathematics: that of determining which methods are valid in the resolution of
problems. Godel in that work developed the concept of recursive functions, those
which were previously proposed as the formal counterpart of the vague and intuitive
notion of a calculable function. Other mathematicians and logicians were trying to
do exactly this, to give a satisfactory response to the question concerning what we

mean to say when we affirm that a function is effectively calculable. From here
arose various concepts, in part from the recursive funcitons of Godel: the lambda
definiable functions of church and the turing computable functions of turing. In
1936, it was demonstrated that all of these concepts, although superficially
different, were equivalent. Wit hthe proliferation of cokmputers, the studies in logic
and the theory of algorithms have acquired a new impetus. Originating in studies in
modeling the functioning of the brain, there arose the concept of automata: and
later it was discovered that their existed an interrelation between them and with
formal languages. The most general version of an automata is the turing machine.
To date other links with logic have been developed within the field called Artificial
Intelligence, such as the automatic demonstration of theorems, logic programming
etc. Chapter 2 Preliminaries of the theory of sets. A fallacy of ambiguity: If
everything were expressable in the theory of sets then the empty set would have
the quality of omnipresence, since it is in every et: from which it follows that God,
being the only omnipresent being, would be the empty set. Thus, God does not
exist. Popular mathematical clulture. This is a reference chapter whose objective is
to set out the uniform terminology and notation in the entire text. A detailed and
intuitive exposition upon these themes can be read in the book by Halmos. 2.1
Basic definitions. We can think about sets as collections of objects totally
determined by their elements. Generally we will denote sets with majuscule letters
and their elements with minuscule letters. The basic relation is that of pertinence. If
x is an element of a set S we say that x pertains to S and we write x { S. With
regard to this not being the case, we write ~(x { S). Two sets are equal if and only if
they have exactly the same elements. There are two ways of describing sets. 1. By
means of extension. Giving a list of all the elements of the set. Thus, A = (s1sn)
means that A is the set whose elements are s1.sn and only them. 2. By means of
comprehension. Giving a property satisfied by all the elements of the set and only
by them. If p is a property, A = {x : P(x)} means that A is the set of all those objects
which have the property P. Examples a [ {a}. b. {x,y} = {y,x} = {x,x,y}. c. With
regard to the set which has no elements we shall know it as the empty set and it is
denoted by 0. One way of defining it by comprehension is (). Definitiion. Let A and B
be two sets. We say that A is contained in B or that A is a subset of B if and only if
every element of A is at the same time an element of B. Notation: (). Proposition
2.1, for every two conjuncts A and B it holds that A = B if and only if A is a subset of
B and B is a subset of A. Notation. If A is a subset of B but A is not equal ot B then
we write (), and we say that A is a proper subset of B. Proposition 2.2 Let A, B and C
be arbitrary sets. Then the null set is a subset of A, A is a subset of itself, and if A is
a subset of B and B is a subset of C then A is a subset of C. Exercises 1 Demonstrate
proposition 2.1 2 Demonstrate proposition 2.2. 3 prove that the empty set is unique.
2.2 operations with sets Definition if A is a set then the powerset of A is the set P(A)
= {X : X is a subset of A}. That is to say that for every X, X is an element of P(A) if
and only if X is a subset of A. In particular, the empty set is an element of the
powerset of A and A is a member of its own powerset. Definition; let A and B be two
arbitrary sets. The following sets are defined: A union B = x such that x is an
element of A or x is an element of B, the union of A and B. A intersection B = x such
that x is an element of A and x is an element of B, the intersection of A and B. A
slash B = x such that x is an element of A but is not an element of B (the

difference). A delta B = A intersection B slash A union B (the symmetric difference).

In general, if F is a family of sets () is defined as: upward horseshoe F = x such that
x is an element of B but some B is an element of F. downward horseshoe F = X such
that x is an element of B but every B is an element of F. Definition. Two sets A and B
are disjoint if and only if their union is equal to the null set. Many times it is
convenient to introduce a fixed set U such that every set considered is a subset of
U. We shall call this set the universal set. Then one can speak of the complement of
a set A, denoteated by A superscript c or by A, which is the set of all the elements
of U which do not belong to A. That is, A = U\A. Theorem 2.3 Let a and B be two
sets contained in some set U. Then, (). Demonstration, exercise for the reader. 2.3
Relations. The ordered pair a, b is defined as {{a}, {a,b}}. For n as an element of
N, the n ary ordered (a1.an-1, an) = (a1. A-1 an) here, a 1 is defined as a1. This
definition is given by recursion, see section 2.5. The given definition using the
language of set theory owes itself to Kuratowski. It is possible to give other
definitions, on the condition that one rescues the idea of ordered succession,
expressed in the following proposition. Proposition 2.4 (a1., an) = (b1,.,bn) if
and only if for every I, 1 is less than or equal to I and I is less than or equal to n, it
holds that ai is equal to bi. The Cartesian product of two sets A and B, denoted by A
x B, is the set A x B {(a,b) : a is an Element of A and b is an element of B}. A x A
also is denoted by A^2. Also by recursion one may define, for n element of N, the
set A^n = A^n-1 x A = {(a1,,an): a1,,an element A}. Definition. Let A and B be
two sets. A relation from a to B is a subset of A x B. Notation: if R is a relation we
write aRb in place of (a,b) element of R. Definition: if R is a relation from A in B the
domain of R is the set dom R :: the range of R is the set :: and the field of R ::: dom
R U rang R. An n ary relation in a set A is a subset of An. Examples 1 the null set is
an n ary relation in A for every A. 2 The identity in A, Ia = ::: is a binary relation in A.
An is an n ary relation in A. The unary relations in A are the subsets of A. Definitions.
Let R be a binary relation in A, we say that R is reflexive, if and only if aRa,
antireflexive if and only if :: symmetric if and only if aRb implies bRa, antisymmetric
if and only if aRb and bRa implies a = b, transitie if and only if aRb and bRc implies
aRc, connexive, if and only if aRb or bRa implies a = b. Definition. Let A be a set. A
partial order in A is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation in A. a total
order in a is a partial connexive relation. Notation : or simply ::. Given a partial order
inA, we may define a binary relation in A as () if and only if (). () is a strict order. The
partial orders can be represented graphically using trees. The anterior diagram
represents a partial order in the Set a ab c d e such that a is the maximal element,
d and c are incomparable, b is incomparable with d and c but is greater than e and
less than a. The branches of a tree represent total orders, since in the same branch
all the elements are comparable among themselves. A total order is represented as
a tree with only one branch. Functions and cardinality. Definitions. Let a and b be
two sets. A function f from a to b is a relation from a into b such that dom f = a for
every a element of a there exists a unique b member B such that a,b member f.
Notation f; a arrow b. if a,b member of f we write f(a) = b. if f ; a arrow b and g; b
arrow c then the composition of f and g is defined, g circle f ; a arrow c by means of
the rule g circle f(a) equals g(fa))) for a member A. Definition. An n ary operation
upon a set a is a function of an in A. Definitions. Let f; a arrow be be a function.
Then we say that f is injective or one to one if and only if . F is superjective or

above if and only if.. f is bijective if and only if f is injective and upon. If there
exists a bijective function between a and b then the elements of a are in
correspondence wit hthe elements of B in a form such that to each element of A
there corresponds one of B and viceversa and thus they have the same number of
elements. Definitions. It is said that two sets have the same cardinality if and only if
there exists a bijective function nbetween them. A set A is finite if and only if it is
empty or there exists a n N such that 1,. ,n has the same cardinality as A. A set
which is not finite is infinite. Not all the infinite sets have the same cardinality. A set
is denumerable if and only if it is bijectable with the natural numbers. A set is
countable if and only if it is finite or numberable. Examples a set of the integer Z is
numberable. Q, the set of the rational numbers is denumberable. R, the set of the
real numbers is not denumberable. Proposition the union of a denumberable family
of sets is numberable. Mathematical induction At the end of the 19 th century, when
it was attempted to ground mathematics by means of axiomatic systems, Giuseppe
peano formulated an axiomatic system for the natural numbers. The primitive
concepts that is to say, not defined of his theory were the following: set, successor
and belongs to. The five axioms of peano were the following. Zero is a natural
number. 0 is not the successor of any natural number. Every natural number has a
successor. Two natural numbers with the same successor are equal. If s is a set of
natural numbers such that 0 belongs to s and every time a natural number belongs
to S also its