The question of how to live is a moral one, and reasoning and questioning is
something we all do, but how are the two related? Should we spend our live in
rational enquiry? And conversely, is it rational to be moral?
leads to substantive dispute about whether its axioms can decisively delegate
certains actions as rational and offers as irrational.
Full information analyses
Other attempts to describe rationality claim that an action is rational iff we would
still want to do it had we been presented with all the relevant scientific and
factual information available in a way that was intelligible and understood.
But often what is regarded as rational is merely making the best use of the
available but limited information. For example it doesnt seem irrational to follow
the sunset in an attempt to leave the woods when you are without a map or
compass, even if given all the relevant information you wouldnt choose to do
this.
But lets apply this to desires rather than actions. An intrinsic desire (e.g. the
desire to be happy) is rational iff you would still have it after been presented with
all the relevant information.
So if a person who washes their hands 3 times an hour is told that this isnt good
for their health and that it interferes with other things they value and that its
going to kill them soon STILL decides to carry on doing it, then we must accept
their action as rational. Brandt is willing to accept this as a consequence of his
theory which isnt ideal but must be accepted because there is no better theory. I
hope to offer a better one.
Also if Brandt wishes to preserve the recommending force of rationality then we
come to further difficulties. If a complete understanding of a situation of the guts
and innards of individuals would make me want to stay away from them which
would make me lonely, then making the rational decision really recommended?
Furthermore, take the account of an egotist who deliberately avoids thinking
about the harm he causes others or the suffering he could alleviate through
sacrifice. He might think it crazy to dwell on the sort of matters that could lead
him to a life of humility and servitiude and misery, especially when hes currently
having such a great time! He will think that the rational path (as Brandt defines
it) is thoroughly unrecommendable.
2. Nature and Judgement
The problem seems to be that if we try to explain normative life in terms of
nature then we get odd and unfitting descriptions of reasons and meanings.
There are 3 elements that need to be fitted together:
1. The natural: the facts about what we are doing and thinking and feeling
2. The normative: what it is rational to do or apt to feel
3. The meaning: what we mean when we say it is rational or apt to do or feel
something
3. Analyses Broached
How are we to understand the appraisal of beliefs and feelings and behaviours as
rational? If we interpret rational as merely advantageous then we come into
some problems. For example it might be rational to belief your wife has cheated
on you if you see her fucking somebody else, but it might not be advantageous
to believe so (you might be better off believing her faithful). Likewise it might be
rational to be angry at someone whos deliberately wronged you but if you have
to live with them it might not be advantageous.
So it seems that rational also includes some sense of warranted. You anger is
rational because it is warranted by the cruel treatment of your friend. It is also
worth bearing in mind the difference between it making sense that a person is
angry and it making sense for a person to be angry. If their anger is warranted, it
makes sense that they are angry, but if their anger is going to interfere with
their work and ruin their day then perhaps it doesnt make sense for them to be
angry.
The claim that feelings can be rational or irrational implies that even the
involuntary can be rational or irrational. But this seems so, for we do not choose
the beliefs we hold, and we cannot shake them off at will, but they certainly can
be regarded as rational or irrational.
Rationality and Morality
(Two types of wrong: objective (it was a bad choice in light of all the facts)
subjective (it was bad choice given what the agent knew) The objective sense of
wrong is pretty pointless because we never know all the facts, and if we did, then
the subjective sense would do)
There are at least two conceptions of moralitys relation with rationality:
Sidgwicks interpretation in which morality is simply practical rationality and thus
all moral actions are rational and all irrational actions immoral, and a different
interpretation (adopted by Mill) in which moral considerations are just part of
what makes up rational thinking, and thus one can do something irrational that is
not immoral, or do something moral that isnt really rational.
Mill says that an action is morally wrong if one ought to be sanctioned for doing
it. He mentions legal sanctions, but lets ignore that and pluck out/create the
claim that an action is morally wrong iff it is rational for one to feel guilty for
doing it and for others to resent one for it.
But this definition is closer to capturing blameworthiness than wrongness. In a fit
of grief one may do something wrong that is not really blameworthy. What is the
difference? Morality is forward looking (agents consider whether certain possible
acts will be right or wrong) blameworthiness is backward looking.
So, when we assess whether or not someone is to blame first we assess whether
their morally desirable motivation was satisfactory, and if it wasnt then we
assess whether there are extenuating circumstances that render the agent not
responsible. Morality comes into the first part of this assessment. Thus an action
is wrong iff: it violates standards for ruling out actions. The standards are such
that if an agent in a normal frame of mind violated them because he was not
substantially motivated to conform to them, then he would be to blame.
The degree to which an action is wrong is the degree to which an agent would be
to blame if he lacked all motivation to abide by the standard.
The Norm-Expressivistic Analysis