1NC

1NC
U.S. withdrawal from South Korea wrecks the overall nuclear non-prolif regime--causes global prolif
Van Jackson 9-9, Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New
American Security, and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, 9/9/15,
THE POVERTY OF LIBERTARIAN THINKING ABOUT THE U.S.KOREAN ALLIANCE,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/the-poverty-of-libertarian-thinking-about-the-u-s-koreanalliance/
Second, were the U nited S tates to abandon South Korea, the global taboo against nuclear
proliferation would dissolve and new nuclear powers would emerge, starting with South
Korea. The spread of nuclear weapons is inimical to U.S. interests, which is why the United
States maintains a massive bureaucracy dedicated to the issue of arms control and
disarmament. When South Koreas President Park Chung-Hee saw indications of U.S.
abandonment in the 1960s and early 1970s, he launched a clandestine nuclear program that was
only shut down in response to U.S. assurances. And after North Koreas multiple attacks against
South Korea in 2010, a discourse among the countrys policy elites emerged calling for an
independent nuclear capability, something that the majority of South Koreans favored at the
time. South Korean elites have linked their willingness to refrain from going nuclear with the
continuation of the U.S. alliance. If South Korea, an otherwise upstanding member of the
international community, violated the nuclear nonproliferation norm, it would need to be
punished and isolated like its neighbor to the north, or otherwise risk a norm violation
cascade , since norms die when actors witness norm violations going unpunished. But perhaps
Bandow simply doesnt see the value in preventing the emergence of new nuclear states.
Effective global nonprolif regimes key to prevent global great power war
The Economist 15, The new nuclear age, 3/7/2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21645729-quarter-century-after-end-cold-warworld-faces-growing-threat-nuclear
A quarter of a century after the end of the cold war, the world faces a growing threat of nuclear conflict
Iran may at last agree to curb its nuclear
programme. In exchange for relief from sanctions it will accept, in principle, that it should allow intrusive inspections and limit
WITHIN the next few weeks, after years of stalling and evasion,

how much uranium will cascade through its centrifuges. After 2025 Iran will gradually be allowed to expand its efforts. It insists
these are peaceful, but the world is convinced they are designed to produce a nuclear weapon. In a barnstorming speech to
Americas Congress on March 3rd, Binyamin Netanyahu, Israels prime minister, fulminated against the prospect of such a deal (see
article). Because it is temporary and leaves much of the Iranian programme intact, he said, it merely paves Irans path to the bomb.
Determined and malevolent, a nuclear Iran would put the world under the shadow of nuclear war. Mr Netanyahu is wrong

about the deal. It is the best on offer and much better than no deal at all, which would lead to
stalemate, cheating and, eventually, the dash to the very bomb he fears. But he is right to worry
about nuclear warand not just because of Iran . Twenty-five years after the Soviet collapse, the
world is entering a new nuclear age. Nuclear strategy has become a cockpit of rogue regimes and
regional foes jostling with the five original nuclear-weapons powers (America, Britain, France, China and
Russia), whose own dealings are infected by suspicion and rivalry. Thanks in part to Mr Netanyahus efforts, Iran commands
worldwide attention. Unfortunately, the rest of the nuclear-weapons agenda is bedevilled by complacency and neglect. The fallout
from Prague After the end of the cold war the world clutched at the idea that nuclear annihilation was off the table. When Barack
Obama, speaking in Prague in 2009, backed the aim to rid the world of nuclear weapons, he was treated not as a peacenik but as a
statesman. Today his ambition seems a fantasy. Although the world continues to comfort itself with the thought that mutually
assured destruction is unlikely, the risk that somebody somewhere will use a nuclear weapon is growing

apace. Every nuclear power is spending lavishly to upgrade its atomic arsenal (see article). Russias

defence budget has grown by over 50% since 2007, and fully a third of it is devoted to nuclear weapons: twice
the share of, say, France. China , long a nuclear minnow, is adding to its stocks and investing heavily in
submarines and mobile missile batteries. Pakistan is amassing dozens of battlefield nukes
to make up for its inferiority to India in conventional forces. North Korea is thought to be capable of adding a
warhead a year to its stock of around ten, and is working on missiles that can strike the west coast of the United States.
Even the Nobel peace laureate in the White House has asked Congress for almost $350 billion to undertake a decade-long
programme of modernisation of Americas arsenal. New actors with more versatile weapons have turned

nuclear doctrine into guesswork. Even during the cold war, despite all that game theory and brainpower, the Soviet
Union and America frequently misread what the other was up to. India and Pakistan, with little experience and less contact, have
virtually nothing to guide them in a crisis but mistrust and paranoia. If weapons proliferate in the Middle East, as
Iran and then Saudi Arabia and possibly Egypt join Israel in the ranks of nuclear powers, each

will have to manage a

bewildering four-dimensional stand-off. Worst of all is the instability . During much of the cold
war the two superpowers, anxious to avoid Armageddon, were willing to tolerate the status quo. Today the ground is
shifting under everyones feet. Some countries want nuclear weapons to prop up a tottering state. Pakistan insists its
weapons are safe, but the outside world cannot shake the fear that they may fall into the hands of Islamist
terrorists, or even religious zealots within its own armed forces. When history catches up with North Koreas Kim dynasty, as
sooner or later it must, nobody knows what will happen to its nukeswhether they might be inherited, sold, eliminated or, in a last
futile gesture, detonated. Others want nuclear weapons not to freeze the status quo, but to change it. Russia has started to

wield nuclear threats as an offensive weapon in its strategy of intimidation. Its military exercises routinely stage
dummy nuclear attacks on such capitals as Warsaw and Stockholm. Mr Putins speeches contain veiled nuclear threats. Dmitry
Kiselev, one of the Kremlins mouthpieces, has declared with relish that Russian nuclear forces could turn America into radioactive
ash. Just rhetoric, you may say. But the murder of Boris Nemtsov, an opposition leader, on the Kremlins doorstep on February
27th was only the latest sign that Mr Putins Russia is heading into the geopolitical badlands (see article). Resentful,

nationalistic and violent, it wants to rewrite the Western norms that underpin the status quo .
First in Georgia and now in Ukraine, Russia has shown it will escalate to extremes to assert its hold over its neighbours and convince
the West that intervention is pointless. Even if Mr Putin is bluffing about nuclear weapons (and there is no reason to think he is),
any nationalist leader who comes after him could be even more dangerous. Towards midnight China poses a more distant threat,
but an unignorable one. Although Sino-American relations hardly look like the cold war, China seems destined to

challenge the United States for supremacy in large parts of Asia; its military spending is growing by 10% or more a year.
Nuclear expansion is designed to give China a chance to retaliate using a second strike, should America attempt to destroy its
arsenal. Yet the two barely talk about nuclear contingenciesand a crisis over , say, Taiwan could

escalate alarmingly . In addition Japan, seeing Chinas conventional military strength, may feel it can no longer rely on
America for protection. If so, Japan and South Korea could go for the bomb creating, with North Korea, another
petrifying regional stand-off. What to do? The most urgent need is to revitalise nuclear diplomacy .
One priority is to defend the nuclear N on- P roliferation T reaty, which slows the spread of
weapons by reassuring countries that their neighbours are not developing nukes . It was essential that
Iran stayed in the treaty (unlike North Korea, which left). The danger is that, like Iran, signatories will see enrichment and
reprocessing as preparation for a bomb of their ownleading their neighbours to enrich in turn. That calls for a collective

effort to discourage enrichment and reprocessing , and for America to shore up its
allies confidence . You dont have to like the other side to get things done. Arms control became a vital part
of Soviet-American relations. So it could between China and America , and between
America and Putins Russia . Foes such as India and Pakistan can foster stability simply by
talking. The worst time to get to know your adversary is during a stand-off. In 1960 Albert Wohlstetter, an American nuclear
strategist, wrote that, We must contemplate some extremely unpleasant possibilities, just because we want to avoid them. So too
today, the essential first step in confronting the growing nuclear threat is to stare it full in the face .

Asian prolif specifically causes nuclear war

Stephen J. Cimbala 15, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State
University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy,
2015, p. 149

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout

Asia . Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal
configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreasnot including the
United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous
temptation toward nuclear preemption . Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit
the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy.19 A five-sided nuclear
competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing
nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran . An
arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation
strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not
excluding preemptive war , defenses and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an unrestricted
nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war . It
would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict ; (2) states may
have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a
decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical
malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue
commanders; and (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret
the others defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a
mistaken preemption.

1NC
The United States should declare to the Peoples Republic of China that in the
event of Korean unification, the United States will not move its armed forces above
the current Demilitarized Zone.
The United States should increase its third-party sanctions against North Koreas
exports and financial sector, including but not limited to designating North Korea
as a primary money-laundering concern under Section 311 of the Patriot Act
The United States should offer monetary rewards for information leading to
interdiction of consignments bound for North Korea.
Solves Chinese security concerns about U.S. troops in a united Korea
Michael McDevitt 11, Vice President and Director, Center for Naval Analyses Strategic Studies,
February 2011, Deterring North Korean Provocations,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/north-korea-mcdevitt
Preparing to deal with hostile actions by North Korea is intertwined with deterrence. The cruel
irony that the alliance faces is that while it possesses escalation dominance with both
conventional and nuclear weapons, it is disadvantaged by geography because of Seouls location.
This susceptibility to conventional attack combined with Pyongyangs track record of high risk
behavior have, until recently, made the allies reluctant to test the Kims willingness to escalate if
the alliance retaliates.
Whether this new more aggressive stance will have the desired effect and make Kim Jong-il more risk-averse remains to be seen, as
does the willingness of alliance leaders to actually go through with a stronger and riskier response to a provocation. What the

alliance can do is to continue to employ a full range of diplomatic and economic responses.
Nevertheless, so long as these traditional methods do not have whole-hearted support from China
the retaliatory effect will be limited. To solve this problem the alliance must somehow persuade
Beijing that its security concerns are understood and will not be compromised if actions Beijing
takes to punish North Korea destabilize the Kim regime. In other words, the allies should attempt to
assuage Beijings strategic concerns regarding U.S. presence north of the DMZ . Washington and Seoul
can also implement but should not state a more negative assurance to China. In response to the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island,
for example, the allies conducted drills in the West Sea (or Yellow Sea), which China has warned it considers a sensitive area. These
drills were a tangible reminder of the costs Beijing assumes because of its tolerant approach to North Korean behavior.

Tighter financial sanctions solve nuclearization---denies North Korea the

resources for weapons and forces the regime to make concessions
Joshua Stanton 14, attorney and former U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea, advised the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on North Korea issues, and Sung-Yoon Lee, assistant
professor of Korean studies at Tufts Universitys Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Financial sanctions could force reforms in North Korea, Feb 20 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-northkorea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html
Many believe that U.S. sanctions against North Korea are maxed out. In fact, U.S. sanctions are
relatively weak . There are no travel sanctions against North Korea (as with Cuba) nor any against human rights violators (as with Sudan, Iran and Belarus). Critically ,
there are no broad-based, third-party sanctions against North Koreas exports or financial
sector . Iran and Burma are designated as primary money-laundering concerns under
Section 311 of the Patriot Act, which restricts their access to the global financial system. But
North Korea, the worlds most notorious counterfeiter and money-launderer, is not . Import sanctions were

relaxed between 2008 and 2011, and Americans can still export to North Korea if they obtain a license. Opponents of sanctions argue that they would harm the most vulnerable North Koreans. But North Koreans
are not hungry because their government is poor. Kim Jong Un has more than $1 billion in European banks and hundreds of millions more in China. In the 1990s, while an estimated 600,000 to 2.5 million North
Koreans starved to death, Kim Jong Il bought dozens of new warplanes but impeded the delivery of food aid. The World Food Program sought $98 million last year to feed hungry North Koreans. In 2012 alone, by

South Korean government estimates, Kim Jong Un spent $1.3 billion on his missile programs, an amount that could have eliminated North Koreas food deficit for years. Although multiple U.N. Security Council
resolutions ban North Korea from importing luxury items, Kim recently spent $300 million on a water park, a fitness center, a dolphin aquarium, a 3-D cinema and a ski resort stocked with Canadian

There is good reason to believe that cutting Pyongyangs links to the global financial
system could force changes in its behavior. In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury
sanctioned a Chinese bank for laundering money, including counterfeit dollars, for then-leader
Kim Jong Il. The sanctions blocked the banks access to corresponding accounts in U.S. financial
institutions that led to the global financial system; this caused a run on the bank and nearly destroyed it.
snowmobiles.

Other banks around the world , questioned by the Treasury Department about their North Korean deposits, began to block or close
those accounts. Soon, Kim Jong Il was financially isolated. He began selling his gold reserves to sustain his regime. One North
Korean diplomat told a U.S. counterpart, You finally found a way to hurt us. The bipartisan
North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act would block the offshore accounts that pay for
Kim Jong Uns extravagant lifestyle, weapons programs

and the secret police, border guards and others who terrorize the North Korean people. Kims

rule has been marked by brutal purges and crackdowns. Financial pressure could undermine his capacity to seal borders, frighten his people and buy the loyalty of North Koreas elites. A financial strategy also
would be harder for China to undermine than a diplomatic strategy or traditional trade sanctions. In 2005 and again last year, Chinese banks shunned North Korean deposits that were targeted by the United
States. The Chinese government may not share Washingtons or Seouls security or humanitarian goals, but Chinese banks would not risk their access to the global economy to save Kim. And without the help of
Chinese banks, Beijing would find it difficult to continue propping up Pyongyang.

make better decisions

Financial sanctions should aim to force the regime to

about North Koreas wealth, to add an additional deterrent to protect the United States and its allies

and to present Kim with

a clear choice between reform and collapse . Diplomacy has failed to curb North Koreas growing threat. Pyongyang is on the brink of nuclear
breakout. It may be helping Iran achieve the same goal. It has contributed to Syrias weapons programs. It has abducted dozens of foreign nationals. And governments that make war against their own people

Financial pressure was key to bringing Iran to the bargaining table. It could
give diplomats the leverage they need with Pyongyang . Improvements in human rights should be an essential first test of
North Koreas acceptance of transparency. To get there, the Obama administration should lead the world in denying the Kim dynasty the
tools it uses to brutalize its people and threaten the world.
eventually look for new victims.

1NC
Withdrawal would start with the U.S. transferring wartime operational control of
the ROK armed forces back to South Korea
Doug Bandow 14, aff guy, 7/28/14, South Korea: Forever Dependent on America,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/south-korea-forever-dependent-america
At the same time, there is widespread fear, mostly among South Koreans, that transferring OPCON would encourage America to
abandon the ROK. But retired U.S. Gen. Ronald Griffith shared the concern: the first step to withdraw U.S.

forces is turn over the command . Thats step number one, and its a slippery slope.
Of course, the United States has permanent military deployments in Japan and across Europe without exercising operational control
of host nations militaries. Moreover, the very concept of abandonment is odd. Washington has defended the South for sixty-four
years. Given the dramatic change in the regional-threat environment, withdrawing American forces would be a natural act of good
sense.
Indeed, OPCON merely is the symptom, since it grows out of the 1953 defense treaty, mutual in name only. A bizarre
insistence that commitments cannot change with circumstances similarly afflicts the planned redeployment south of U.S. forces.
Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of the U.S. Forces Korea,advocates retaining a troop tripwire north of Seoul to ensure automatic
American involvement in any conflict: there may be a need operationally to leave some residual in those areas just for proper
defense and response. He called the ROK the Pentagons second highest priority, after only Afghanistan.
But why? The ROK mattered in 1950 not because of its intrinsic importance, but because it was part of a larger hegemonic struggle
with the Soviet Union. That world is gone.
Washington gets little out of the alliance today. Certainly nothing from protecting the ROK, which is able to defend itself. Some
policy makers view U.S. troops stationed there as dual use, ready to confront China as well as North Korea. However, Seoul has no
interest in turning its permanent neighbor, the PRC, into a permanent enemy to advance U.S. interests elsewhere in the region.
Some Americans, such as Army Lt. Col. James Minnich, argue for broader ties, a comprehensive, strategic alliance reaching
human trafficking, peacekeeping and climate change. Yet collaboration in none of these areas requires a formal military alliance.
Using support for green-energy research as an excuse to maintain a military tripwire along the DMZ is, frankly, bizarre.

It is time to transfer op erational com mand of South Koreas military back to Seoul. But the
change should not stop there. Americas troops should go home , phased out over the next
couple of years . More important, the defense treaty should be terminated, transforming the alliance from a relationship of
dependence into one of cooperation.

Causes South Korea to agree to deploy THAAD missile defense

Clint Work 14, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicagos Committee on
International Relations, 7/9/14, South Korea: Dependence in the Age of OPCON,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/?allpages=yes
While OPCON transition gives rise to concerns over the credibility of the U.S. commitment, it also heightens the
possibility of entrapment for Seoul . Which is to say, the necessary steps toward transfer of
control could involve the ROK in U.S.-driven policies that it would rather avoid . This is
evident in the case of missile defense. The ROK is undoubtedly concerned about the DPRKs missile
program and recently stated that its own Korean Air and Missile Defense system (KAMD) is incapable of
independently intercepting the DPRKs Rodong-class weapons. While it has various plans to upgrade
its low-tier system, Seoul recently stated that it is
Altitude Area Defense (

open to the potential U.S. deployment of a Terminal High

THAAD ) battery to the Korean Peninsula. This could signal Seoul harnessing a U.S.

commitment in order to avoid strategic decoupling or abandonment , but it could also lead to
entrapment.
On the one hand, Seoul is open to the THAAD deployment because it offers another layer of defense at no initial cost. Also, the
system could potentially be

integrated into KAMD through a later purchase, thus enhancing Seouls ability to
more independently deter the threat from Pyongyang. Taking on full operational control
would require as much . At this point, Seoul denies it has plans to purchase such a system . On
the other hand, many U.S. officials and defense analysts view the potential THAAD deployment as another step towards integrating

the ROK into the larger US-led ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. In fact, there has been speculation that Washington is
pushing Seoul to join its Missile Defense system as quid pro quo for delaying OPCON transfer. The U.S. has pressured

South Korea to join its regional system for some time, which the ROK has thus far officially
refrained from doing, due mainly to the negative impact it would have on its increasingly important
bilateral relationship with China . Beijing views the U.S.-led regional system as a counter
to its own assets. While deployment of the THAAD battery would be under USFK command and does not officially indicate
Seouls entry into the U.S. BMD system, it is certainly perceived as a step in that direction. This likely explains why ROK Defense
Minister Kim Kwan-jin stressed the peninsular-nature of the potential THAAD deployment. Assurances and lack of official
integration notwithstanding, the THAAD systems X-band radar puts Chinas key coastal regions well in

its sights. Thus, the ROK could find its efforts to enhance its defense capabilities entrapping it ,
almost ineluctably, in

a situation where it appears to be taking the U.S. side in the growing

U.S.-China divide.
THAAD deployment in South Korea causes Chinese nuclear buildup---they see it as
a crucial threat to their nuclear deterrent
Teng Jianqun 15, Director of the Department for American Studies and a senior research fellow
at the China Institute for International Studies, PhD in international relations from Peking
University, Apr 1 2015, Why Is China Unhappy with the Deployment of THAAD in the ROK?
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-04/01/content_7793314.htm
during his visit to South Korea, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu
reiterated
Chinas concern on the possible deployment of US THAAD in South Korea .
On March 16, 2015

Jianchao in talks with his counterparts

1 Taking into account geopolitics

and international relations, why has China taken such a strong position against this program? What are the US reasons for pursuing this program? Can South Korea accept the US invitation to participate? These questions are now puzzling the countries in this
region. The Missile Defense Project is a Silver Bullet in the Hands of the United States As everybody knows, missile defense from TMD to NMD has long been a dream for the United States. THAAD is an important part of the current missile defense program.
Originally standing for theater high altitude area defense, today it signifies terminal high altitude area missile defense. The THAAD missile defense program was first proposed in 1987, and instructions to build this capability were transmitted to industry in 1990.
After several rounds of failed tests, in June and August 1999, the first successful tests were conducted. According to its design, it is to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase by using so called hit-to-kill technology.
Renamed from HIGH to TERMINAL, the change in wording shows the main concerns of this program. Technically speaking, the killing part carries no warhead, which relies on the kinetic energy of the impact to destroy the incoming missile. Such a hit would
minimize the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic missiles; and nuclear tipped ballistic missiles would not explode upon a kinetic energy hit. Although THAAD was designed to intercept Scuds and similar weapon systems, it also has the capability to

What worries countries most is the radar systems used by THAAD, which include the Xband active electronically scanned array system
with the
surveillance distance of 1300 kilometers, such a ground/sea based radar system, of course,
would cover a large area of China and Russia.
To some Chinese scholars, such a system is actually a silver bullet in the hands
intercept ICBMs.

the worlds largest ground/air-transportable system as a forward sensor for ICBM missile defenses. The United States mentioned

that such a radar system is to be used to scan any missile launched by the DPRK in this region and would do no harm to the strategic balance among the three nuclear weapon states, Russia, China, and the United States; however,

Already these systems are being deployed in Alaska and Japan, and in 2014, China repeatedly criticized the United States for X-band radar

deployment in Kyoto.

of the U

nited

S .
tates

Their argument is based on several reasons: 1) a missile defense system is a bullet-to-bullet game, which still needs time to perfect its capacity in many aspects; 2) as a defense system, it could not be efficient in

reacting to an attack from any point in a 360 degree defense circle; 3) in the planned deployment, while facing Russian and Chinese multiple launches at the same time, THAAD only succeeds in a small percentage of cases. On the one hand, Russians and Chinese
would not perceive this system as efficient, since it could not provide 100 percent protection; on the other hand, the two countries are showing great concern over the strategic impact of it. China Raises Its Voice against the Deployment of a Missile Defense System

in Northeast Asia From the late 1980s, experts and officials have paid great attention to the missile defense program of the United States, first TMD and later NMD. If one looks at the US missile defense deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, one can find a circular

several experts argued that Washington has appeared

determined to surround China with its anti-missile systems from Alaska to Taiwan
chain already in position along the eastern part of China. In a paper published on February 22, 2010,

According to the US-based Defense

News, Taiwan became one of the largest global buyers of the Patriot missile defense system following Japan, the ROK, the UAE, and Germany. Quite a few Chinese military experts have noted that Washingtons proposed weapons deal with Taiwan is a key part of US

Chinese experts consider the US anti-missile system in

Chinas neighborhood to be a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union
strategic encirclement of China, and that the missiles footprints extend from Japan to the ROK and Taiwan.

. The

ring encircling China can also be expanded at any time in other directions. Analysts say that China has been closely monitoring US-India missile defense cooperation since any integration of India into the US global missile defense system would profoundly affect
Chinas security.

The U

nited

tates

has already succeeded in Japan and Taiwan; so the ROK would become

a crucial part of this chain.

against it in Northeast Asia, as seen in white papers and speeches. On August 12, 2009,

missile defense program

For at least the past two decades, not only have scholars and experts shown concern over the US missile defense program, but also Chinese officials have raised their voice

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told

that the
would do no good to regional peace and stability
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

by some countries in the Asia-Pacific region

, adding that China

opposes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. China has joined all related international treaties and mechanisms, put in place a comprehensive system of laws and regulations compatible with the relevant international legal regime, and strictly
enforced UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and other non-proliferation resolutions.

should be abandoned.

The practice of seeking absolute strategic advantage

Countries should neither develop missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability nor deploy weapons in outer space. His speech gave the world a clear-cut signal that China was not in

favor of any kind of missile defense system, which, he explained, would harm the stability in the region.2 Chinas concerns over the US missile defense program have repeatedly been cited in official publications. The white paper on China National Defense of 2010
said, International military competition remains fierce. Major powers are stepping up the realignment of their security and military strategies, accelerating military reform, and vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies. Some powers
have worked out strategies for outer space, cyber space and the polar regions, developed means for prompt global strikes, accelerated development of missile defense systems, enhanced cyber operations capabilities to occupy new strategic commanding heights.
Some developing countries maintain the push towards strengthening armed forces, and press on with military modernization. Progress has been made in international arms control, but prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains

complex, there is still much to do to maintain and strengthen the international non-proliferation mechanism.3 Chinas senior officials take every opportunity to express their concerns over the US missile defense program. On April 12, 2012, Luo Zhaohui, DirectorGeneral of the Department of Asian Affairs with the Foreign Ministry, during an online chat hosted by Peoples Daily, noted that after the DPRK announced its intention to launch a satellite, the United States stepped up coordination with Japan and the ROK to
prepare to adjust its military deployment in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. He said, The Chinese government always insists that (countries) should start by maintaining global strategic stability and promoting strategic mutual trust between major
powers to handle the issue of missile defense prudently.4 According to Reuters, a US defense official said on March 26, 2014 that the United States was seeking to build a missile defense system in Asia and the Middle East, similar to the one in Europe, to help
relevant countries ward off threats from Iran and the DPRK, and prevent possible long-range missile threats against it.

Luo said, Building a missile defense system in the

Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and regional strategic stability

, and go against the

security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. He continued that China over decades had clearly demanded through various channels that the United States fully respect and take care of the security concerns of relevant parties, including China, act
prudently on the issue of missile defense, and solve the problem of missile proliferation through political and diplomatic means. We also urge relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific region to act prudently in cooperating with the US on missile defense, and not

develop or deploy missile defense systems that exceed the needs of its development. Luo added that China also firmly objects to providing assistance in missile defense to Taiwan in any way.5 China has taken a very clear-cut position on the possible deployment
of the US THAAD. During a briefing in October 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move damaged peace and stability in the region. She made the comment after media reports said the US military had delivered X-band radar to the
Kyogamisaki military base in Kyoto. The radar to scan for missile launches from the DPRK was expected to start operation within 2014. She said, Some countries have pushed forward anti-missile system deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to seek unilateral
security, which runs against regional stability and mutual trust as well as peace and stability in Northeast AsiaThis move causes even more concerns, under the backdrop of complex and sensitive regional situation. She called on relevant countries to proceed from
the broader picture of regional peace and stability and be committed to maintaining regional security through political and diplomatic means. Relevant countries should not take their own security concerns as excuses for damaging others security interests.6 By
the end of 2014, the discussion over the possible deployment of THAAD in South Korea again preoccupied the media in China and the ROK. In November 2014, Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong warned that if South Korea allows the United States to deploy

the THAAD battery on its soil, it would hurt Seoul-Beijing relations. Why Is China Not Happy with the Possible Deployment of THAAD in the ROK? We should discuss this issue from a wider scope since the deployment of THAAD has already gone beyond the
boundaries of technological development of missile defense by the United States. It is of geopolitical and strategic significance for international relations in Northeast Asia. Starting from the early 1990s after the Cold War ended and the United States largely
abandoned its Star Wars plan initiated by the Reagan administration, South Korea has been very cautious in responding to invitations from the United States to participate in missile defense programs. There are many reasons to explain its cautious response: 1) the
sensitivity of the programparticipation would damage its security environment as North Korea, China, and Russia would make South Korea a target; 2) technology related to missile defense program has been so uncertain that even the United States has doubted its
capacity in dealing with the so-called missile threat from North Korea; and 3) South Korea has its own ambitious KMD plan, which mainly targets the short or medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea, while THAAD mainly targets ballistic missiles over
5000 kilometers in range. In May 2013, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US military had already carried out site studies of potential areas in South Korea where the THAAD battery could be deployed. The US government could induce Seoul to agree to
deepen its anti-missile cooperation with Washington and Tokyo. Despite repeated entreaties by the United States, Seoul has refused out of a desire to avoid antagonizing China and historic mistrust of Japan.7 South Korea says its missile defenses are aimed at
fending off a tactical missile strike from North Korea. The United States argues that having an integrated US-South Korea-Japan system would improve response times in the event of a missile attack by Pyongyang. Admiral James Winnefeld, the vice chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a conference in Washington said that with the unpredictability of the North Korean regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this sort of thing in the future elsewhere in the region.8 Why suddenly has South Korea been
reconsidering its reluctance to participate in the missile defense program of the United States? There are several possible explanations: 1) fast development of the DPRKs nuclear and missile technologiesespecially after the third nuclear test by the DPRK, we have
witnessed a growing debate in South Korea on the possibility of cooperation with the United States on the missile defense program; 2) the publics increasing nervousness about securityunder the threat of the DPRKs artilleries and missiles, the South Koreans will

feel much more comfortable when they can see some kind of missile defense program on their territory; and 3) the traditional alliance between the United States and South Korea, which needs a new driving force to go forward at this moment. The deployment of
US THAAD has become, at least to some extent, a hot potato in South Korea. On the one hand, it would provide South Korea new protection in missile defense though it is not strong enough to give a 100 percent guarantee. On the other hand, South Korea again has
to take full consideration of the response from relevant countries. China has already repeatedly reiterated its position on the US missile defense project in Northeast Asia, expressing great concern not only about THAAD but also about the entire missile defense
program. Russia now is facing two fronts in fighting against the US missile defense program, both in the Asia-Pacific region and in Western Europe. The DPRK, as the major target of the US program, will continue to criticize the deployment of any advanced weapons
system in this region. These responses from the relevant countries will exert a strong negative impact on the security situation. Park Geun-hyes administration should thoroughly study this before any decision is made related to the US missile defense program. The
opposition to the US deployment of a missile defense system in this region should not only be a technical or security matter. Behind the curtain of competition is the relationship among the United States, China, and South Korea. The pivot or rebalancing strategy by
the Obama administration is a double-edged sword for the regional countries. China has recognized the pressure from the United States on its security. South Korea has also recognized the pressure from the United States. The enhancement of the traditional alliance
has already become one of the most important pillars to rebalance other countries. As we all have witnessed recently in the more than two years since President Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-hye took office, the relationship between China and South Korea has
entered a new stage. China has adjusted its policy toward the DPRK and ROK by trying to have a more balanced relationship with the two. Under such circumstances, the Park administration should not be willing to stop such good momentum in cooperation with

the possible deployment of the US THAAD system in South Korea

will test relationships among China, South Korea, the United States, or even Russia .
China has raised its voice against this program. If
necessary, China will take some solid measures to counter the power of the US missile defense
program, including updating and increasing the number of its conventional and
China. THAAD Has Become a Tough Choice for US Allies In conclusion,

It is not simply a

military project for the sake of South Korean and US security. Other factors are already involved, and

nuclear warheads.

South Korea has become the most important area for the United States deploying systems such as THAAD. South Korea used to be very cautious toward the US proposal, but today has become more

flexible to the possibility in consideration of geopolitics, the economy, and the security relationship.

Causes arms racing and accidental nuke war

Alexander Kolbin 12, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Coordinator at the PIR
Center, China and Nuclear Disarmament, in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical
Necessities, google books [pages not numbered]
In any event, if China were to build up its nuclear arsenal, that would have negative effects for the
entire system of regional security in Asia Pacific. Faced with such a scenario, Japan and
South Korea might try to acquire their own nuclear capability. Such a move by China could also
trigger a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan 69 and have a very adverse
impact on Russian- Chinese strategic dialogue. Besides, a rapid increase in the numbers Of Chinese
nuclear weapons would disturb the strategic balance in Asia Pacific, prompting the United States and its allies to
speed up their missile defence deployment in the region. Finally, a sharp increase in the size Of the Chinese nuclear
arsenal would probably mean that Beijing has abandoned its current defensive posture,
including its no-first-use commitment. At the very least. that commitment would become more
of a propaganda tool than a practical strategy. Such an increase could signal a transition to the
"launch under attack" strategy, whereby Beijing would try to reduce to a minimum ,
the time between the enemy'S strike and the launch Of its own nuclear missiles. That would
require advanced and highly reliable early warning systems which, according to various
sources, China either does not have at all or is only just beginning to deploy. According to some sources,
at present China stores nuclear warheads separately from the missiles. A number of researchers believe this is because China "lacks reliable
technical means for preventing unauthorised use Of nuclear weapons ".

Korea
Troop withdrawal undermines deterrence against North Korea---triggers full-scale
war
Tom Nichols 14, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct
at the Harvard Extension School, 7/31/14, WHY A KOREAN PULLOUT IS A REALLY BAD
IDEA, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/
In a recent article for War on the Rocks, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee recommended that President Obama pull
troops immediately from South Korea. Lee based his argument mostly on cost, noting that South Korea was now
a wealthy country with an advanced military that should assume the burden of its own security. At the operational level, there might
be a case for improved savings. As a strategic matter, however, it is a seriously flawed proposal.
First, lets dispense with the argument of cost. Lee rightly notes that the non-personnel costs of the U.S. presence in South Korea run
over a billion dollars a year, with the Republic of Korea contribution lagging behind at about $765 million. Not to put too fine a point
on this, but: so what? Americas Korea commitment is hardly a budget-buster. (The United States is a country that spends nearly
$60 billion a year on pets.) Moreover, Lees recommendation does not take into account how budgets are actually passed: he notes
that the President can redeploy most, if not all, of the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea and utilize the conserved budgetary
allocations to mend domestic delinquencies, such as the beleaguered [VA] and the continued automatic spending cuts.
Well, in theory the President could try and do that, but thats not how it works. Money in the budget is simply not that fungible.
Savings in one place say the Department of Defense cannot usually be earmarked for use in another say the Department of
Veterans Affairs. Otherwise, Congress would be trading off pieces of departments in order to plug holes in other departments all day.
Its not impossible, its just unlikely; the VA, the DoD, and the general deficit do not all exchange funds across budget lines at will.
But lets agree that no one wants to waste any taxpayer money. Thus, the more important question is whether a force on the Korean
peninsula is worth even one dollar; Lee thinks not, and it is here that he avoids far more important problems than cost.
Lee sidesteps the fact that our ally, South Korea, is technically still at war. We have a truce, not a

peace, with North Korea. That may not matter much to us, but it matters to Koreans, North and
South . Had Pyongyang undergone regime change of some sort a few decades ago and finally dispensed with the bizarre Kim
dynasty, or had not successfully tested three nuclear weapons since 2006, we might be having a different conversation. In some
better world, I would agree that we could ramp down our Korean presence. We just dont happen to be living in that world.
Because hes looking at this as an operational and budgetary problem, Lee seems less concerned
about deterrence and resolve than I am. He argues that the South Koreans are capable of
defeating the North if attacked. That might be true, but where deterrence is concerned, it is also irrelevant .
The issue isnt whether the South can win: its making sure that the South doesnt have to
fight the North in the first place .
This is where the argument becomes even more convoluted: once U.S. conventional forces are gone, Lee offloads any further burden
of deterrence onto the U.S. nuclear guarantee: The OPCON transfer would not change the security guarantee of extended
deterrence under the United States nuclear umbrella. In this concept, apparently, the South is protected not only by its own topnotch military, but by a promise on the part of the United States to start using nuclear weapons in Asia even if there has not been a
single American casualty and even if North Korea does not use nuclear weapons in an attack on the South.
Here, Lee wishes away the deterrence problem by presenting nuclear weapons as a kind of dummy variable that puts the deterrence
equation right should the U.S. conventional withdrawal throw it out of balance. The United States, however, removed nuclear arms
from the Peninsula over two decades ago and has since politely refused any further discussion about returning them there. Yet
Lees strategy essentially amounts to saying: Were leaving, immediately and much to the chagrin of our ally, but everyone be
warned: we have nuclear weapons.
This is merely an updated version of the Eisenhower-era strategy (such that it was) of Massive Retaliation, and it is based on the
same idea: to save the cost of expensive conventional forces by replacing them with vague nuclear threats. Massive Retaliation was a
poor substitute for a strategy even in its day. It was more an act of desperation than any kind of actual deterrent, an obvious attempt
to rely on a U.S.-based nuclear crutch rather than a sturdier force in Europe. It was unworkable and dangerous, and it was soon
junked.
Speaking of history, perhaps we

ought to think about the historical record before simply pulling out of

Korea . Kims grandfather, Kim Il Sung approached Soviet leader Josef Stalin repeatedly after World War II to
seek permission for an invasion of the South. Stalin, fearing a greater war, refused him, and later
only relented when the eldest Kim pointed out that the Americans, by treaty, had finally quit
the Peninsula

in 1949 and

returned home. This, for both Stalin and Kim, was an indication that an

invasion would not provoke a U.S. response. This was a terrible miscalculation, and it was
grounded in a U.S. troop withdrawal .
The North Koreans, particularly the old marshals of the Korean military for whom the Korean
War is still a sacred memory, would no doubt love to see a replay of 1949 , and would consider it
a great victory. They would be able to gloat that they had achieved what even their big brothers in China
had been unable to do for over 60 years: a Korea whose soil is completely untainted by
American boots . Moreover, removing American troops from Korea will signal to the
Chinese that we want no further U.S. presence in their region, and remove one more
complication in any Chinese strategy of expansion or intimidation .
In sum, a pullout would raise North Koreas stature , reduce Chinas dwindling influence over
its client, and leave Pyongyang in its own eyes a peer to Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. How is any of
this a good idea?
U.S. presence deters South Korea from escalating conflict and ensures small
provocations dont spark full-scale war---and the U.S. will never initiate a conflict
so they cant win offense
Clint Work 14, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicagos Committee on
International Relations, 3/26/14, North Korea & Human Rights: Tolerating the Intolerable,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/north-korea-human-rights-tolerating-the-intolerable/
The current situation as it stands with the DPRK is one without a military solution. Not only does the maxim
if you break it you own it (as Paul Whitefield recently noted) apply, but a far a more obvious reason persists. That is, the DPRK
has nuclear weapons. No revolution in military affairs is going to guarantee with absolute
certainty that such weapons will be eliminated before North Korea could use them. Moreover, the
U.S. itself, despite its heavily militarized orientation toward the North, has prevented
the ROK from taking escalatory actions in response to what are normally considered acts
of war. As Daniel Pinkston writes: The U.S. political and military leaderships are unwilling to fight
a full-scale war in Korea over the shooting down of an aircraft, the sinking of a ship , the
insertion of KPA Special Forces for limited operations, or firing artillery on a fishing village. Bruce Cumings
describes the U.S. presence as dual deterrence or civil-war deterrence, meaning the
simultaneous deterrence of North Korea from starting a conflagration and of South Korea
from escalating it. What is more, nuclear weapons notwithstanding, even the DRPKs conventional capabilities (though
dated and far less advanced than U.S. and ROK arsenals) make very real Pyongyangs threat to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. Though
an all-out conflict would likely bring about the end of the DPRK as a sovereign state, it would very likely inflict immense damage on
the South Korean capital, threaten Tokyo, and potentially bring about larger instability in the region before its demise. In sum,
bringing the regime down through greater pressure is not possible , both because key
regional powers will not allow it and the military option is untenable in any rational (and
moral) calculation. The very real potential for even greater human suffering and destruction is simply too prohibitive a risk. This
leaves the third option, engagement.

China
Zero chance of U.S.-China escalation---every side has obvious incentives to
maintain peace
Anthony H. Cordesman 13, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS; and Ashley Hess,
MA in international relations from Seoul National University, June 2013, The Evolving Military
Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Volume II,
http://csis.org/files/publication/130513_KMB_volume2.pdf
China does not have a military presence in North Korea, but might well support the DPRK in
any conflict it felt could threaten the survival of its regime, totally defeat the DPRKs forces,
and/or bring ROK and US forces near the DPRK-Chinese border. The disposition of Chinese
military forces near the Koreas can be seen in Figures IV.39 to IV.42, and Figure IV.43 shows
the command structure of the Chinese military. It is clear that China can already deploy massive
amounts of ground and air forces in a Korean conflict if it chooses to do so, but faces major
qualitative limits relative to the forces the US can project into the Koreas and the overall US
power projection capabilities in the Pacific.
At the same time, China has strong incentives to avoid and contain any conflict in the
Koreas or Northeast Asia that would lead to such a confrontation with the US, just as the US
and ROK have equally strong reasons to avoid any conflict that would lead China to
intervene on the DPRKs behalf. Such scenarios seem both unlikely and worst case
contingencies which all three powers have every reason to avoid.
U.S. presence doesnt antagonize China---both sides know itd be downsized under
unification inevitably
Kim Chang-soo 15, Korea National Strategy Institute director, interviewed by Kim Ji-hoon,
staff reporter, The Hankyoreh, 8/5/15, [Interview] What does USFKs changing role mean for
Koreas future?, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/703241.html
As the US-China rivalry becomes more defined and inter-Korean relations change, the nature and standing of US Forces Korea
(USFK) has become the topic of ever greater debate. Long a stabilizing presence in a divided Korea, USFK is now being

called an advance guard in checking China, leading some to fear that a backlash from Beijing
could further hamper the peninsulas eventual reunification. The Hankyoreh sat down with Korea National
Strategy Institute director Kim Chang-soo in Seouls Yeouido neighborhood on July 31 to hear his take on the significance of USFKs
changing role.
Hankyoreh (Hani): Theres been talk about how USFKs role has been changing from a line of defense

against North Korea into a check against China.

Kim Chang-soo (Kim): Its a worst-case scenario . Imagine what would happen if theres a conflict between China
and Japan in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. We cant rule out the possibility of the US getting involved through its alliance with
Japan, and then South Korea getting pulled in through its alliance with the US. If USFK bases near the West [Yellow] Sea at
Pyeongtaek and Osan function as outposts in the containment of China, South Korea will end up getting dragged into conflict in
Northeast Asia.
Hani: Do you think its possible for a Chinese backlash against USFK to become a factor impeding

reunification between North and South Korea?

Kim: China cant quarrel with the South Korea-US alliance or USFK in and of
themselves. What it takes issue with is the deployment of weapons that threaten China, like
THAAD (the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system). It also doesnt want a kind of unification by
absorption scenario that would leave it facing off against US forces across its borders.
Hani: Is there any way to preventing a backlash from China?

Kim: A lot of the animosity

between North Korea and the US forces could be resolved through steps
such as an inter-Korean confederation and peace agreement signing. If we pursue reunification in
that manner, there may not be a large USFK facing China directly across its borders.
Hani: Has the South Korean government developed any ideas for the role and future of USFK after reunification?
Kim: The one who had the most pioneering debate on a post-reunification role for USFK was Kim Dae-jung [South Korean President
from 1998-2003]. During the inter-Korean summit of June 15, 2000, he communicated that the USFK would have to remain even
after reunification for the sake of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and [then-North Korean leader] Kim Jong-il said, That
accords with my perception. After that, the debate over USFK became more energized. South Korean government officials started
talking about maintaining and using USFK as a precaution against an uncertain security situation after unification. As for myself, I
called for a different role. My idea was that the

USFK should be scaled down after unification from a

deterrent against the North to a balancing power in Northeast Asia.
No US-China war
- No policy goal is worth risking nuclear war
- Communication solves miscalc.
- Measured retaliation more likely
- Geography reduces threat perceptions
Zachary Keck 13, Current Managing Editor of The National Interest, former Managing Editor
of The Diplomat, previously served as Deputy Editor of e-IR, his work has been featured in
Foreign Policy, The National Interest, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs, and World Politics Review,
Why China and the US (Probably) Wont Go to War, 7/12, thediplomat.com/flashpointsblog/2013/07/12/why-china-and-the-us-probably-wont-go-to-war/
But while trade cannot be relied upon to keep the peace, a U.S.-China war is virtually unthinkable because of two other
factors: nuclear weapons and geography. The fact that both the U.S. and China have nuclear
weapons is the most obvious reasons why they wont clash, even if they remain fiercely
competitive. This is because war is the continuation of politics by other means, and nuclear
weapons make war extremely bad politics. Put differently, war is fought in pursuit of policy ends, which
cannot be achieved through a total war between nuclear-armed states. This is not only because
of nuclear weapons destructive power. As Thomas Schelling outlined brilliantly, nuclear weapons have not actually increased humans destructive capabilities. In fact,
there is evidence to suggest that wars between nomads usually ended with the victors slaughtering all of the individuals on the losing side, because of the economics of holding slaves in nomadic societies.

What makes nuclear weapons different, then, is not just their destructive power but also the certainty and immediacy of it.
While extremely ambitious or desperate leaders can delude themselves into believing they can prevail in a conventional conflict with a stronger adversary because of any number of factorssuperior will, superior
doctrine, the weather etc. none of this matters in nuclear war. With nuclear weapons, countries dont have to prevail on the battlefield or defeat an opposing army to destroy an entire country, and since there are

every leader can be absolute certain that most of their country can be
destroyed in short-order in the event of a total conflict . Since no policy goal is worth this
no adequate defenses for a large-scale nuclear attack,

level of sacrifice , the only possible way for an all-out conflict to ensue is for a miscalculation of
some sort to occur. Most of these can and should be dealt by Chinese and the U.S. leaders
holding regularly senior level dialogues like the ones of the past month, in which frank and
direct talk about redlines are discussed. These can and should be supplemented with clear and
open communication channels , which can be especially useful when unexpected crises
arise, like an exchange of fire between low-level naval officers in the increasingly crowded waters in the region. While this possibility is real and
frightening, its hard to imagine a plausible scenario where it leads to a nuclear exchange
between China and the United States. After all, at each stage of the crisis leaders know that if it is
not properly contained, a nuclear war could ensue, and the complete destruction of a leaders
country is a more frightening possibility than losing credibility among hawkish elements of
society. In any case, measured means of retaliation would be available to the party wronged, and
behind-the-scenes diplomacy could help facilitate the process of finding mutually
acceptable retaliatory measures. Geography is the less appreciated factor that will mitigate the
chances of a U.S.-China war, but it could be nearly as important as nuclear weapons. Indeed,
geography has a history of allowing countries to avoid the Thucydides Trap, and works against a

U.S.-China war in a couple of ways. First, both the United States and China are immense ly
large countriesaccording to the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. and China are the third and fourth largest countries in the world by area, at 9,826,675 and 9,596,961 square km
respectively. They also have difficult topographical features and complex populations. As such, they are
virtually unconquerable by another power. This is an important point and differentiates the current
strategic environment from historical cases where power transitions led to war . For example, in Europe
where many of the historical cases derive from, each state genuinely had to worry that the other side could increase their
power capabilities to such a degree that they could credibly threaten the other sides national
survival. Neither China nor the U.S. has to realistically entertain such fears, and this will lessen
their insecurity and therefore the security dilemma they operate within. Besides being immensely large countries,
China and the U.S. are also separated by the Pacific Ocean, which will also weaken their
sense of insecurity and threat perception towards one another. In many of the violent
power transitions of the past, starting with Sparta and Athens but also including the European ones, the rival states were located in
close proximity to one another. By contrast, when great power conflict has been avoided, the states have
often had considerable distance between them, as was the case for the U.S. and British power
transition and the peaceful end to the Cold War. The reason is simple and similar to the one above: the difficulty
of projecting power across large distancesparticularly bodies of waters reduces each sides
concern that the other will threaten its national survival and most important strategic interests .
True, the U.S. operates extensively in Chinas backyard, and maintains numerous alliances and partnerships with Beijings neighbors. This undeniably heightens the risk of conflict. At the same time, the British
were active throughout the Western Hemisphere, most notably in Canada, and the Americans maintained a robust alliance system in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Even with the U.S. presence in Asia,
then, the fact that the Chinese and American homelands are separated by the largest body of water in the world is enormously important in reducing their conflict potential, if history is any guide at least.

Regionalism
South Korea is a leader now
Jojin V. John 14, Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, November 2014,
Becoming and Being a Middle Power: Exploring a New Dimension of South Koreas Foreign
Policy, China Report, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 325-341
The period post the 2008 financial crisis has witnessed a paradigm shift in South Koreas (henceforth
foreign policy .1 The new foreign policy posture features a strong emphasis on Koreas global role, in
terms of a substantial increase in its international contribution. To this end, the Global Korea foreign
policy strategy refers to a Korea that leaves behind a habit of diplomacy narrowly geared to the
Korean Peninsula, and adopts a more open and enterprising posture that sees the world stage as the
appropriate platform for its foreign policy and national interest (Cheong Wa Dae 2009: 13). Korea seized the
Korea)

opportunity to enhance its international influence by hosting the G20 Summit in 2010. Thereafter, Seoul has further expanded its
diplomatic activism by convening more international meetings such as the Fourth High-level Forum for Development Effectiveness
in 2011 and the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012. Korea has also expanded its participation in and contribution

to issues of global development, international security and climate change.

The Global Korea foreign policy strategy projects a middle power or junggyun guk role for Korea and
categorically defines the thrust of the new foreign policy initiative as middle-power diplomacy
(junggyun-guk oegyo). The period has witnessed unprecedented attention being paid to the
concept of the middle power in Korean foreign policy debates, particularly among the political
and diplomatic elite. The discourse of middle power has, in fact, become the dominant
framework shaping Koreas international role . It is aimed at strategically positioning Korea as an
influential country between a few great powers and small powers in the international system. This article observes that even though
the middle power role of Korea was officially projected and popularised during President Lee Myung-baks administration (2008
13), it is not an unfamiliar concept in the Korean context. Prior to 2008, the concept was used mainly as an analytical category
among academics and policy analysts to locate Koreas position in the international order. The shift in the middle-power
discourse, from an analytical category to a political ideology, reflects the internalisation of
middle-power identity in Korean foreign policy . This has had a significant impact
on Koreas foreign policy outlook. An analysis of middle-power diplomacy not only illuminates the
emerging trends in Korean foreign policy, but also reflects Koreas motivations, interests
and strategies

in the international order.

The concept is still, however, a work in progress and various

stakeholders are actively engaged in

localising the concept to appropriately suit Korean conditions . This article argues that the
adoption of middle-power rhetoric in official foreign policy discourse reflects the evolution of a
new dimension in Korean foreign policy that is clearly distinguishable from traditional foreign policy.
Traditionally, Korean foreign policy has mainly focused on affairs in the Korean peninsula and managing inter-state relations
which has often led to a narrow focus on Koreas relations with big powers (Moon and Kim 2004: 252). The new dimension can be
termed structural foreign policy2 which seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental
structures at the international level.

U.S. presence is key to the effectiveness and scope of South Koreas leadership--provides the psychological security necessary for ROK policymakers to focus on
issues beyond the peninsula
Andrew ONeil 15, Professor of Political Science and Head of the School of Government and
International Relations at Griffith University, June 2015, South Korea as a Middle Power:
Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/middlepower-korea/p36623?cid=otr-marketing-use-middle_power_korea
In addition to unilateral declarations by a growing number of states that mirror their national-role conception as middle powers,
one tangible example of the persistence of middle-power identity is the so-called MIKTA initiative.
Formed in September 2013 at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia, the

purpose of MIKTA was described

by the ROKs foreign minister as playing a bridging role between

countries with different views on the international stage and expanding their role in establishing a better
world order by taking advantage of individual middle power countries diplomatic assets and
cooperative mechanisms.8 The most recent meeting of MIKTA was held on the sidelines of the November 2014 G20
summit; the joint communiqu reaffirmed the groups intention to play a bridging role between advanced countries and developing
countries on key global issues.9
South Korea as a Middle Power: Global and Regional Dimensions
Insecurity and a sense of vulnerability have traditionally been at the heart of South Koreas perspective

of the outside world. Understandably for a country that is wedged between larger powers (the shrimp among the whales)
and has been invaded and conquered many times, the ROK is anxious about its long-term security. As Don Oberdorfer and Robert
Carlin have observed, geography has dealt Korea a particularly difficult role, with it suffering nine hundred invasions in its two
thousand years of recorded history and five major periods of foreign occupation.10 Since its formation in 1948, South Koreas

foreign policy vision has grown to be global in scope. Although the Korean War was essentially a civil war, it was
also an international conflict involving many nations. The provision of UN-sponsored forces to counter North Koreas invasion
ensured that the Korean War had a strong global dimension. Although for Koreans it was a calamity, it was the first limited war of
the Cold War era. Few of the participants had much of an appreciation of Korean history, but the United States and its allies
appreciated the geopolitical significance of the peninsula and the major test that North Koreas invasion posed in containing
communism internationally.11

For most of its existence, South Koreas primary preoccupation has been how best to deter
North Korean aggression while coexisting peacefully with its capricious northern neighbor .
This balancing act has been pursued by Seoul through a mixture of covert and high-profile diplomacy with Pyongyang and of
crafting the ROK military into one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world.

Strengthening the alliance

with the U nited S tates has also been a major part of South Koreas national strategy . Over time, the
U.S.-ROK security alliance has come to be characterized by increasing ideological solidarity,
which since the late 1980s has been reflected in a shared commitment to democratic principles and
greater alignment of worldviews.12
The central challenge for successive ROK governments has been to persuade North Korean elites that coercion will be actively
resisted while at the same time keeping the door open for meaningful interKorean dialogue, including on reunification. This has
taken various formsfrom Park Chung-hees back-channel dialogue with Pyongyang to Kim Dae-jungs Sunshine Policyeach
strategy yielding mixed results. North Koreas emergence as a nuclear weapon state has further complicated South Korean strategy
by providing Pyongyang with enhanced coercive power during future crises and the potential ability to deter the United Statesand,
for that matter, Chinafrom intervening militarily on the Korean peninsula. Some South Korean politicians have called for the
reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear forces to ROK territory, and a smaller minority has even broached the possibility of
reactivating South Koreas nuclear weapons program, which was abandoned in the late 1970s.13 From Seouls perspective, gaining
U.S. and Chinese support to restrain Pyongyang from using its nuclear inventory as cover to conduct small-scale but highly
destabilizing acts of violence (as in 2010) may become a more salient consideration over time.

Export-led economic growth has been the other major element of South Koreas postwar
national strategy . Indeed, the size and global reach of the ROK economy is today the single
most important capability underpinning South Koreas claim to middle-power
status . It is easy to forget that the ROKs economy was smashed by the Korean War and that Seoul had to rebuild it from the
ground up. After 1953, successive ROK administrations (particularly that of Park Chunghee) built a system of authoritarian
developmentalism, in which the national security state partnered with major conglomerates (chaebol) to exercise strict control of
the domestic labor market.14 This model had unfortunate consequences for political and civil rights, but it produced stunning levels
of economic growth, and the rate of absolute poverty dropped from just over 40 percent of all households in 1965 to just under 10
percent by 1980.15 The fraught transition to democracy after Park Chung-hees death in 1979 and recovery from the damaging
regional economic crisis of 199798 tested South Korea, but Seouls successful navigation of both challenges marked a significant
milestone in the countrys national development.
The alliance with the U nited S tates has been integral to South Koreas achieving goals of
economic development and managing the threat from North Korea. The presence of U.S.
conventional and (until 1991) nuclear forces on South Korean territory has provided Seoul with
extended deterrence that has allowed successive governments to keep defense expenditures
lower than they would otherwise have been able to. Apart from deterring North Korea, the U.S. presence
in Northeast Asia has also provided Seoul with reassurance that a resurgent Japan and an
increasingly confident China will be counterbalanced by Washington. In the current context, this is
important because suspicion and hostility toward Tokyo run deep among many South Koreans ,
and although the ROK values its economic relationship with neighboring China, South Korean policymakers are undoubtedly aware

of the need to maintain some distance strategically from Beijing.16 As with many other U.S. allies, extended

deterrence has
furnished South Korea with an existential safety net that fosters confidence among
policymakers that they can pursue a relatively independent foreign policy agenda .
As was evident in the Roh Moo-hyun period, the confidence underlying this autonomy has at times even
manifested itself in policies that run directly counter to Washingtons policy preferences ,
including acute tensions with the George W. Bush administration in relation to North Korea policy.17

U.S. alliances dont preclude Asian regional integration overall---theres sufficient

positive momentum now despite the U.S. alliance structure
Chen Jimin 13, Ph.D is an Assistant Research Fellow for the Institute for International and
Strategic Studies at the Party School of Central Committee of C.P.C., 8/24/13, Are U.S.
Alliances Hindering Integration in Asia?, http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/are-u-s-allianceshindering-integration-in-asia/
Finally, the U.S. alliance system in Asia impedes the regional integration process . The international
political environment today is marked by deepening economic globalization, expanding regional integration, diversifying
international political actors, and a sweeping transformation of the global power structure, as the East rises relative to the West.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the butterfly effect in international politics and economics has had repercussions for most
countries. Regional integration offers significant protection from the negative impacts of globalization. With vigorous economic
activity, complex geopolitics and cultural diversity, Asian countries have faced many challenges in advancing regional integration,
especially in Northeast Asia. As key players in the region, Japan, Korea and China are entangled by history and territorial disputes.
Since 2010, Sino-Japanese relations have been poor. The Obama administrations pivot or rebalancing strategy should be
understood as part of this deterioration. Moreover the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan remove some autonomy in
policymaking in those countries, which severely restricts the effectiveness with which they can advance regional integration.

However , Asian countries share a common interest in bolstering regional cooperation. This
process should

move forward irrespective of the effects U.S. alliances , especially in

Northeast Asia .
First, promoting Northeast

Asian cooperation requires a correct understanding of history as well as the

ability to overcome the negative impacts of rising nationalist sentiment . Obviously, China, Japan,
South Korea are the most critical actors here. But because of historical factors and conflicting
interests, many efforts like the FTA negotiations have stalled, which is unfortunate for the building of mechanisms for
regional cooperation. Establishing a correct view of history and reining in the rising nationalist sentiment are thus
essential if we are to move forward. Of course, the two issues are related, and accepting history would be the first step in
breaking the ice.
Second, to facilitate Northeast Asian cooperation, and achieve integration, regional states must have autonomy and play the leading
role. Although the United States has important interests in Asia, the main role in promoting regional cooperation should
be played by

Asian countries themselves. Of course, this does not mean excluding the U nited S tates

from integration . The goal should be for Asian states to have the lead, but for the system to be inclusive.
In the
geo-economics landscape, relations among China, Japan and South Korea are very close, which
gives these countries a shared interest in promoting regional economic and trade
Third, Northeast Asian cooperation must avoid the pan-politicization phenomenon. Northeast Asia is a contradiction.

cooperation . But at the same time, the three countries have a complicated dynamic in the geopolitical
context. If political factors hijack economic and trade issues, all efforts at integration will come
to naught. Therefore, in pursuing cooperation in the Northeast Asia, China, Japan and South Korea must discriminate between
trade and the economy on the one hand and politics on the other, avoiding pan-politicization.
Fourth, and finally, Northeast Asian cooperation should be advanced with a

gradual, incremental
approach, starting with the easy things first. Northeast Asian countries have a common need to stimulate economic
growth. Conditions are ripe for the creation of an economic community . Closer
economic ties could then in turn create a solid foundation and provide conditions conducive to the
building of a comprehensive regional cooperation mechanism , comprising economic,

security, political issues and other core elements. Although there would undoubtedly be many hurdles and
constraints in this process, with political will and wisdom, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia , and
even in Asia generally, has a real chance.
China refuses participation in any multilateral security mechanism---means the
U.S. alliance system is the bedrock of security coop and balancing in the region
Gudrun Wacker 15, Senior Fellow in the Asia Research Division at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, May 2015, Security Cooperation in East Asia: Structures,
Trends and Limitations, http://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2015_RP04_wkr.pdf
While the region is facing a broad range of security challenges, it is at the same time home to a complex web of
bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. In place of one regional mechanism, several partially overlapping
organizations have emerged in East Asia. Some of them deal exclusively with security issues; others address additional issues as well.
In contrast to (Western-)Europe, all of them are characterized by weak institutionalization.

However, the hard backbone of security in Pacific Asia is provided not by these diverse
regional forums but by the five bilateral security alliances of the US (hubs and spokes). In view
of the fact that China has been growing stronger in the last ten years, including in military terms, these
alliances seem indispensable , which is why they have become closer and more intensive.
Thanks to its growing economic significance for the neighboring countries, which was accompanied by a diplomatic charm
offensive,2 China had initially improved its standing in the region after the late 1990s. Since 2009, however, Beijing seems

to
have squandered a large part of this political capital again by assuming a stance that is perceived
as aggressive.3 Up until the mid-2000s it was widely hoped particularly in Southeast Asia that by integrating it in regional
organizations, one could gradually socialize China. But this optimism has largely vanished due to Beijings behavior primarily
towards smaller neighbors, but also towards Japan.
Although China acceded to nearly all regional organizations between the early 1990s and the mid- 2000s, it remained

strictly opposed to any multilateralization

or internationalization of

existing territorial

disputes. Beijings position is that solutions can only be brokered

marked
bilaterally . That is why those countries that have frictions with China above all Japan and the
Philippines are increasingly
region.

seeking the backup of the US

and support of other partners in and beyond the

No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,
October 2012, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial
crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater
internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict , there
were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East,
border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global
public disorder.

aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global
average level of
peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.38 Interstate violence in particular has
declined since the start of the financial crisis as have military expenditures in most sampled
countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent
conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker
concludes, the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic
exclusion that might have been expected.40
The

Peace Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that The

None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has
clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up
of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of
other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the
Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was
unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The
key word is contained, however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the

proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look
impressive . As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome
has been only the most severe global recession since World War II and not even worse must be regarded as fortunate.42

2NC

CP

Overview
Second it offers monetary rewards for information leading to interdiction of
shipments bound for North Korea---that crushes their ability to circumvent
sanctions by encouraging their facilitators outside the country to turn each other
in for competitive advantage
John S. Park 14, research associate at MIT, The Key to the North Korean Targeted Sanctions
Puzzle, The Washington Quarterly 37:3 pp. 199214,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Park_Fall2014.pdf
In summary, sanctions have strengthened the North Korean regime by forcing it to innovate. The large North Korean state trading companies did not constitute the innovationtheir newly formed procurement

More efficient Chinese middlemen-centric

procurement networks based in a globalizing Chinese national economy have replaced the
channels with unique Chinese middlemen operating in the globalizing Chinese national economy did.

North Korean regimes previous method of conducting direct transactions and utilizing its
freighters for shipment. The scale of this innovation grew significantly after then-Premier Wen Jiabao signed a set of economic development, tourism, and education agreements in
October 2009 that, while sounding innocuous, served as political cover under which Chinese companies could justify their growing commercial activities with DPRK state trading companies. For instance, under
the main UN Security Council resolutions passed in response to North Koreas nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, there are specific clauses that permit member states to engage in economic development and
humanitarian activities with North Korean entities. These clauses comprise a loophole which Chinese companies use to justify their commercial interactions with North Korean state trading companies.47

Sanctions are the central pillar of U.S. counterproliferation policy, but

they are too often discussed in simplistic terms. Like any policy instrument, sanctions will have costs, benefits, and unexpected consequencesboth good
and bad. The early results of this research with North Korean defectors suggest that we need to have a better understanding of how sanctions
work in practice. We also need to closely examine, in particular, the countermeasures that
Implications for U.S. Counterproliferation Policy

targeted regimes might take , as well as those of groups that work with them. Too often, the discussion of sanctions focuses on their impact on a regime leader in
specific or the government in general, rather than at the level of the broker, the client, and the middleman. The focus also often centers on governments and not the private business entities with which they
interact. Understanding the positive and negative effects of sanctions requires an additional lens, one that sees markets. It is a field of research as well-suited to business analysts as to nonproliferation and

North Koreas new procurement architecture may

also introduce new vulnerabilities . Defectors describe intense competition between
counterproliferation experts. This reality affords policymakers some opportunities. For example,

and within hwa-gyo and private Chinese middlemen groupings.48 Given that these middlemen
periodically utilize procurement channels which transit through congested ports in Singapore
and Kuala Lumpur, monetary rewards leading to the interdiction of North Korea-bound
consignments could prove to be effective in disrupting DPRK procurement networks. For
these middlemen, this incentive program could present opportunities to expose and
nullify a competitor .

AT: Perm
Perm fails---withdrawing troops crushes negotiating leverage and signals that our
diplomatic efforts arent credible
Geoffrey Fattig 13, MA candidate at UC San Diegos School of International Relations/Pacific
Studies, Spring 2013, A New Approach to North Korea: Empowering Regional Actors by
Reducing the American Military Footprint, http://www.iargwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/A%20New%20Approach%20to%20North%20Korea
%20-%20Geoffrey%20Fattig.pdf
This risk would be amplified rather than minimized through a new engagement policy with its longstanding
adversaries, especially with

American troops leaving the Peninsula. Rather than acting as a catalyst

for change, such a move could embolden the DPRK to maintain its current posture,
and lead to the regime becoming more belligerent and difficult to engage . Indeed, many
analysts regard the songun, or military first, foundations of the Kim regime as being an insurmountable barrier to
meaningful progress through negotiation and dialogue.xxiii According to this view, the only thing that North Korea
understands is strength, and a combined strategy of engagement and military
withdrawal on the part of the U nited S tates would be sending exactly the wrong signal .
Combining sanctions with military resolve is key to comprehensive deterrence--sanctions alone dont solve
Duk-min Yun 14, Chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Ph.D. in Political
Science, Keio University, and Wooseon Choi, Nov 1 2014, Breaking the North Korean Nuclear
Deadlock: a Global Action Plan, https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/breaking-north-korean-nucleardeadlock-global-action-plan
Providing incentives will act as an important component of the global action plan. But these steaks must also come with hammers the international community must
be willing to implement consistent sanctions according to UN resolutions while firmly
showing its will to impose stronger sanctions in case of further provocations. In order to achieve this, the United
States and South Korea should strengthen their coordination with Japan. It is also critical to maximize Chinese cooperation. China has become a lifeline for North Korea: about 90 percent of North Korean trade,
including its oil and food imports, depends on China.6 North Korea also uses China as an important conduit for international financial transactions. Thus, for effective sanctions, Chinese participation is
paramount. South Korea can help here by upgrading its political relationship with China. South Korea and China have actually improved their relationship in recent years, while North Koreas relationship with
China has been strained due to the nuclear problem. To help, the United States and South Korea need to institutionalize a trilateral strategic dialogue with China as a coordinating channel. The first 1.5-track
trilateral dialogue was held in Seoul last year. Recently, China has been more willing to use tough measures in dealing with North Korea, although it has not been willing to risk destabilizing North Korea. During
the June 2013 Sunnyland summit and President Parks June 2013 visit to China, Chinese leaders attitude revealed that they have begun to realize the importance of effective pressure in pursuing the
denuclearization of North Korea. In fact, China has actively participated in the UN sanctions adopted after the third nuclear test of North Korea while holding off on Kim Jong-uns visit to China. The Bank of
China cut off doing business with North Koreas primary foreign exchange bank, the Foreign Trade Bank,7 and it was further reported that China has stopped its oil export to North Korea since early this year,
except for some oil products such as gasoline and kerosene.8 This

pressure through sanctions should combine with military

resolve to strengthen comprehensive deterrence . The U nited S tates and South Korea
must reinforce

their

capabilities and show their firm will to punish any North

Korean military provocations , but Washington and Seoul must not act provocatively themselves.

AT: China
China doesnt need to get on board---financial sanctions scare off Chinese banks
even if the Chinese government tries to undercut them
Joshua Stanton 14, attorney and former U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea, advised the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on North Korea issues, and Sung-Yoon Lee, assistant
professor of Korean studies at Tufts Universitys Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Financial sanctions could force reforms in North Korea, Feb 20 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/financial-sanctions-could-force-reforms-in-northkorea/2014/02/20/61d1a3a4-99ab-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html
There is good reason to believe that cutting Pyongyangs links to the global financial system
could force changes in its behavior . In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a Chinese
bank for laundering money, including counterfeit dollars, for then-leader Kim Jong Il. The sanctions blocked the banks access to
corresponding accounts in U.S. financial institutions that led to the global financial system; this caused a run on the bank and nearly
destroyed it. Other banks around the world, questioned by the Treasury Department about their North Korean deposits, began to
block or close those accounts. Soon, Kim Jong Il was financially isolated. He began selling his gold reserves to sustain his regime.
One North Korean diplomat told a U.S. counterpart, You finally found a way to hurt us. The bipartisan North Korea Sanctions
Enforcement Act would block the offshore accounts that pay for Kim Jong Uns extravagant lifestyle, weapons programs and the
secret police, border guards and others who terrorize the North Korean people. Kims rule has been marked by brutal purges and
crackdowns. Financial pressure could undermine his capacity to seal borders, frighten his people and buy the loyalty of North
Koreas elites. A

financial strategy also would be harder for China to undermine than a

trade sanctions. In 2005 and again last year, Chinese banks
shunned North Korean deposits that were targeted by the United States . The
Chinese government may not share Washingtons or Seouls security or humanitarian goals, but Chinese
banks would not risk their access to the global economy to save Kim. And without the
diplomatic strategy or traditional

help of Chinese

banks, Beijing would find it difficult to continue propping up Pyongyang .

Solves Nuclearization
Independent of negotiations, sanctions undermine North Koreas capacity for
prolif and solve their international signaling args
Bruce Klingner 13, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, Heritage Foundation, North
KoreanCuban Arms Shipment Shows Need to Tighten Sanctions, July 22 2013,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/north-korean-cuban-arms-shipmentshows-need-to-tighten-sanctions
Critics of U.N. and U.S. sanctions frequently question their effectiveness, since they have not yet
forced Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. But neither did repeated
bilateral and multilateral efforts

at negotiation and unconditional engagement.

Adopting such

a narrow

viewpoint overlooks the multifaceted utility of sanctions : They send a strong signal
that the global community will uphold U.N. resolutions. If laws are not enforced and defended, they cease to have
value. They show that there are consequences for defying international agreements by imposing a heavy penalty on violators. They constrain
North Koreas ability to acquire the components, technology, and finances to
augment and expand its arsenal . They impede North Korean nuclear, missile, and
conventional arms proliferation . In conjunction with other policy tools, they seek to modify North Korean behavior.
The U.N. Panel of Experts concluded that while the imposition of sanctions has not
halted the development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it has in all likelihood considerably delayed
the [North Korean] timetablechoked off significant fundin g which would have
been channeled into its prohibited activities [and] hampered its arms sales and
illicit weapon programs.
from exporting

sensitive

The resolutions

nuclear

and missile

are also crucial in preventing the country

tech nology.

Financial sanctions empirically have a massive psychological effect that deters

circumvention and dissuades North Korea
Alexander C. Kaufman 15, business editor of The Huffington Post, citing Sung-Yoon Lee, an
assistant professor of Korean studies at Tufts University's Fletcher School, North Korea
Sanctions Must Target Regime To Bruise Economy, 1/2/15,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/02/north-korea-sanctions_n_6408348.html
It's difficult to sever North Korea's trade networks. Under a United Nations resolution enacted to pressure the

country to abandon its nuclear weapons program, countries are given broad authority to search ships for North Korean cargo. "Not
all countries have the capacity to exercise that ability," said Kelsey Davenport, director for non-proliferation policy at the nonprofit
Arms Control Association. "Countries don't always quickly report back if there are concerns, and we don't hear about issues until
months later."

However, sanctions have been most effective against North Korea when

imposed on financial institutions that manage the country's treasure . In 2005, the
Treasury Department began investigating B anco D elta A sia, a small family-owned bank in the Chinese
gambling enclave of Macau. Under Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the department was granted a mandate with a broad set of tools to
pursue any money laundering connected to terrorist groups. Wielding its newfound financial weapon, the Treasury warned
that the

bank would be barred from any dealings in the U.S. financial system , causing a run

bank. Cut off from about $24 million, North

on the

Korea became a financial pariah as banks and other

institutions began to back away , fearing similar actions by the U.S. " Despite the fact that
the U.S. has no trade with North Korea, there were no bank accounts in the U.S. frozen ,
and this was not the subject of some U.N. measure , the North Koreans found themselves

isolated in a way they never felt in recent memory ," Juan Zarate, author of a book on Section 311 called
Treasury's War, said in a 2013 Q&A with The Wall Street Journal. " It

was the first time the North Koreans called

the White House to initiate talks . They began and ended every conversation saying they wanted their money
back." The sanctions were eventually lifted under the George W. Bush administration after Pyongyang began testing nuclear
weapons in 2006. But the sanctions announced on Friday could

be aimed at cultivating

a similar

fear

among financial institutions and within the current North Korean regime . "They
have the effect of instilling some psychological doubt in Kim Jong Un ," said Sung-Yoon
Lee, an assistant professor of Korean studies at Tufts University's Fletcher School. "Is that going to change Kim Jong Un's
behavior overnight? No. But the longer the duration and greater enforcement of sanctions, the strong
the U.S. will be when negotiating
and alleged role in breaching Sony's servers, the

later on." To effectively punish North Korea for its diplomatic belligerence

U.S. must make it difficult for regime leaders to

access their money , Davenport said. " The Kim regime's primary concern is regime
survival, not the well-being of the North Korean people," she said in an interview on Friday. "Pressures on the economy alone
will not drive the Kim regime to make decisions in the same manner that other countries would."

China Advantage

Not Threatening
China doesnt care---theyd never be stupid enough to think wed use USFK against
them and they know wed draw them down in the event of reunification---thats
Kim
Goldstein
a magazine affiliated with the Chinese Navy ran a series of articles in August 2012 that evaluated
the possible role of US tactical nuclear weaponry that may be deployed to the Korean Peninsula
as a part of new and evolving AirSea Battle doctrine. Such deployments, the article concludes,
constitute a huge threat to Chinas capital, as well as northeastern industrial centers and naval
bases
U.S. forces in Korea dont antagonize China
Tommy R. Mize 12, Colonel, U.S. Army, MA in Strategic Studies, U.S. Army War College,
12/3/12, U.S. Troops Stationed in South Korea, Anachronistic?, http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562829
It is clear that U.S. forward deployed forces in the Pacific, such as those stationed in South
Korea, have contributed to regional stability in the past. But will they continue to do so in the
future or will they become a potential point of friction between the U.S. and China as Chinas
power continues to grow? It is difficult to assess the future, but currently there appears to be
little cause for concern that forward deployed U.S. forces in South Korea are a point of
friction between the U.S. and China. In fact, it is likely China prefers to have U.S. forces in
South Korea given shared concerns over North Korea. Some believe that Beijing may prefer to
maintain a divided Korean Peninsula out of fear that a unified Korea may lead to greater
instability in the region. Strategically, North Korea is currently a buffer between China and the
democratic influence of Japan and South Korea.68 While there is debate amongst different
Chinese thinkers about policies China should adopt regarding Sino-North Korean issues, the top
priority of current policy is to maintain stability and peace on the peninsula. Current Chinese
policy also concludes that it is too early for a unified Korea and that this should only be achieved
by peaceful means.69
U.S. presence prevents ROK investment in capabilities to deter China which would
be destabilizing
Bonnie Glaser 11, senior fellow in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies; and David Szerlip, consultant for the US government on
issues related to Chinese military modernisation and a former researcher for the Freeman Chair
in China Studies at CSIS, 2011, US Allies Respond: Japanese, Australian, and South Korean
Reactions to Chinas Military Modernisation, China Perspectives,
http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5712?file=1
South Koreas security strategy remains heavily geared towards a North Korean contingency. Chinas military modernisation has not
escaped notice, however, with some worrying that Beijing could block a favourable outcome in the event of a Korean contingency.

S outh K orea launched a major military modernisation program in the middle of last decade
that was meant to equip the country to address other regional threats. This ambitious program has been scaled
back, however, and the more advanced military capabilities that would be needed to confront
China have given way to those that would assist US forces in a conflict with North Korea.
S outh K orea has sought to revitalise its alliance with the US and is hoping that the US
can continue to provide a credible deterring presence to potential aggressors. Yet South

Koreans also seek to avoid exacerbating tensions with China and therefore do not favour forms
of cooperation with the US that could be perceived by Beijing as threatening . S outh K oreas
security strategy in the coming decades will likely be shaped primarily by inter-Korean affairs,
although its focus could shift more towards China , particularly if Seoul sees China as negatively
affecting inter-Korean relations.
Various internal and external factors will affect the pace and scale of future Japanese, Australian, and Korean responses to the
modernisation of Chinas military, including domestic politics in each country, economic sustainability, and unpredictable
developments such as natural disasters. Yet even more important will be Chinese diplomatic and military behaviour and perceptions
of American power. Benign Chinese policies will assuage concerns throughout the region about Chinas military, while repeats of
incidents such as the September 2010 Senkaku row will fuel insecurity.

Confidence in the US ability to maintain

its security commitments in the region will encourage all three countries to forego
independent responses or accommodations to Chinese military power that could
be destabilizing .

No War
No China war --- they'll be restrained because of economic and political concerns
Stutter 14 3/19/14 Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at George
Washington University, China-US Focus, March 19, 2014, "Why China Avoids Confronting the
U.S. in Asia", http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/why-china-avoids-confronting-theu-s-in-asia-2/
Forecasts talk of U.S. retreat from domineering China or an inevitable U.S.-China conflict. However,
enduring circumstances hold back Chinese leaders from confronting America , the
regional leader. Domestic preoccupations Chinese economic growth and one-party rule require stability. And
protecting Chinese security and sovereignty remains a top concern . Though China also
has regional and global ambitions, domestic concerns get overall priority.

President Xi Jinping is

preoccupied with uncertain leadership legitimacy , pervasive corruption, widespread

mass protests, and unsustainable economic practices. Beijings reform agenda requires strong
leadership for many years. Under these circumstances, Xi was unusually
accommodating in meeting

President

Obama

in California in 2013; he seeks a new kind of major power relationship.

Xi also presides over Chinas greater assertiveness on territorial issues that involve the United States, but
thus far

Chinese probes avoid direct confrontation with the superpower.

interdependence

Mutual

Growing economic and other U.S.-China interdependence reinforces

constructive relations . Respective Gulliver strategies tie down aggressive, assertive , or

other negative

policy tendencies through

webs of

interdependence in bilateral

and multilateral

relationships . Chinas insecurity in Asia Nearby Asia is Chinas top foreign priority. It contains security and sovereignty issues (e.g.
Taiwan) of highest importance. It is the main arena of interaction with the United States. Its economic importance far surpasses the rest of world
(China is Africas biggest trader but it does more trade with South Korea).

Asian stability is essential for Chinas

economic growththe lynch pin of Communist rule. Facing formidable American

presence and influence and lacking a secure periphery , China almost certainly calculates
that seriously confronting the U nited S tates poses grave dangers.
China is dependent on the US and wed crush them in a war
- Chinese military inferiority
- Economic interdependence
- American alliance system
Artyom Lukin 14, Professor @ Far Eastern Federal University (Russia), Imagining World War
III -- In 2034, 8/4/2014, The World Post (partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen
Institute, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/world-war-iii_b_5646641.html
three reasons war is unlikely anytime soon . First, despite the double-digit annual
growth in its defense budgets, China's military still significantly lags behind the U.S.'
Second
China depends on America much
more than the other way round. China is still critically reliant on the U.S and its allies, the EU
and Japan, as its principal export markets and sources of advanced technologies and knowThere are

It will take China 15 to 20 years

to attain parity or near-parity with the U.S.-Japan allied forces in the East Asian littoral.

, for all the talk of mutual interdependence,

how. Overall, China's dependence on international markets is very high , with the trade to
GDP ratio standing at 53 percent. China imports many vital raw materials, such as oil and iron

ore.
China would be extremely vulnerable to a naval blockade ,
which is likely to be mounted by the U.S. in case of a major conflict.
As most of its commodity imports are shipped by the sea,

Both for economic and strategic reasons, the Chinese government pursues

policies to reduce the country's reliance on foreign markets, trying to shift from an export-oriented model to domestic sources of growth. It is also making efforts to secure raw materials in the countries and regions contiguous to China, like Central Asia, Russia or

Third, China would

have to confront not the U.S. alone but also America's Asian allies, including Japan, Australia
and perhaps India.
The bottom line: over the next 15 to 20 years a major war in
Burma, so as to reduce dependence on sea-born shipments. However, at least for the next 15 to 20 years China's dependency on the West-dominated global economic system is going to stay very significant.

Thus China needs at least one major power ally and some lesser allies. Whether China dares to pose a serious challenge to the U.S. will, to a large extent, hinge upon Beijing and Moscow forming a Eurasian

geopolitical bloc. This is already happening now, but it is going to take some more time.

Asia is highly unlikely because Beijing will be playing a cautious game . Even if a
military clash does occur, it will be short , with China being quickly routed by the
preponderant American force .

However, around 2030 the balance is bound to undergo considerable changes, if China is successful in: 1) closing military gap with the U.S.; 2) making its economy

less reliant on the Western markets and overseas raw resources; and 3) forming its own alliance structure.

Regionalism

South Korean Leadership

The ROKs already adopted an effective diplomacy---based on independent Korean
priorities---its effective
Jojin V. John 14, Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, November 2014,
Becoming and Being a Middle Power: Exploring a New Dimension of South Koreas Foreign
Policy, China Report, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 325-341
The absorption of the middle-power concept into the Korean foreign policy framework is
indicative of the fact that Korea is becoming more self-assertive in its political, economic and
cultural role in the international community. To this end, the Global Korea foreign policy
declares: Our contributions abroad should not be pursued merely as instruments of assistance.
They should be seen from the comprehensive perspective of Koreas international standing and
potential to serve overseas (Cheong Wa Dae 2009: 27). Enhancing the countrys reputation does
not constitute an end in itself, from Seouls perspective; rather, it contributes to cultivating
international relations according to Koreas own ideas . With the aspiration of playing a
bigger role, middle-power diplomacy has been popularised6 and has gained much domestic
support .7 It has been instrumental in providing the necessary ideological underpinning for
shaping Koreas global diplomatic activism. Discourses on soft power, network power and public
diplomacy have been employed as useful ingredients in assisting Koreas middle-power
diplomatic strategy to obtain domestic support and international legitimacy (Lee 2012b: 14; Kim
Sangbae 2014: 3).
South Koreas doing everything it possibly can to make its leadership effective
now---its working---zero reason this advantage is unique or the plans key
Jojin V. John 14, Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi, November 2014,
Becoming and Being a Middle Power: Exploring a New Dimension of South Koreas Foreign
Policy, China Report, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 325-341
The middle-power diplomatic initiative is a new chapter in Korean foreign policy , in the sense that it
adopts the rhetoric of a confident and outward-looking state, one that seeks recognition and a greater involvement in multilateral
institutions.

Even though middle-power diplomacy is still in its incubation period, it has played a

substantial role in projecting Koreas influence and visibility on the international stage. The
G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 laid a solid foundation for Seouls leadership and the unveiling
of Koreas middle-power activism. By concurrently serving in 2010 as the host and chair of the G20, the Republic of Korea (ROK)
played a leading role throughout the entire process of the summit, from setting the agenda and organising discussions to drawing
conclusions (Kim Sung-han 2013). The hosting of G20 was seen by President Lee as the best opportunity to promote his Global
Korea policy agenda. The G20 summit was the first major multilateral diplomatic event hosted by Korea. The designation of Korea
as host is regarded as a diplomatic triumph for Seoul, opening a new chapter in Korean diplomacy. It was the recognition of Koreas
significance as a major economic power. However the most direct factor contributing to this was Koreas caliber and contribution
displayed at the G20s first summit meeting in Washington and the second one in London, particularly Koreas active role in
balancing agenda items on divisive issues and adopting action programmes and also mediating discord over the G20 membership.
Koreas middle-power diplomatic posture is illustrative of five important features. First, Seoul defines its role largely as an
intellectual or soft power contributor, based on its own experience of development, from its geopolitical and strategic
position between East and West and North and South (Kim Sung-han 2013). This aspect is reflected in the words of President Lee,
the architect of Koreas global oriented foreign policy, The world can be split into two groups; one sets global

rules, and the other follows. South Korea has successfully transformed itself from a
passive follower into an active agenda setter (quoted in Oliver and Pilling 2010).
Second, three important areas can be identified in which Korea is active and has managed to
make its influence significant . These are international security , development and
environment and climate

issues. To

rationalise limited resources and aspirations to be

influential in international affairs, a middle power like Korea would be compelled to prioritise
its objectives, and focus on them in order to achieve the desired results.
The third feature of Koreas middle-power activism is its facilitating role. Organising international meetings has become the most
visible strategy of South Koreas middle-power activism in recent years. Cooper et al. (1993: 24) observe that facilitating is a strategy
commonly associated with middle powers in exerting their influence during the early phase of their diplomatic activism. Such
countries undertake the facilitators role for associational, collaborative and coalition building activities at the international level.
Apart from the 2010 G20, Korea organised the 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid, the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit 2012, and
the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace in 2013. Koreas commitment to multilateralism and the rule of law is illustrated in its efforts to
organise high profile multilateral summits and meetings to facilitate the negotiation of international norms and rules.
Fourth, coalition-building has become the mainstay of Koreas middle-power diplomatic practice in
recent years. While Korea does not have enough political influence to pursue its objectives alone, it

does have enough

political influence to convince like-minded states of their shared goals. Korea was instrumental in
the formation of MIKTA, an informal middle power consultative body, including Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey
and Australia, in 2013. The Korean government refers to this initiative as one between middle-power nations that share core values
of democracy and free market economy and have the willingness and capability to contribute to the international communitys
development (Shin 2013). For Korea, the grouping has the potential to play an important role in widening
the countrys diplomatic aperture, beyond an alliance with the U nited S tates and a focus on
relations with the four surrounding major powers.
Fifth, playing a mediating role at the global level is another important characteristic of Koreas middle-power diplomacy. This
constitutes the essence of middleness in middle-power activism and can be found at different levels and in different contexts. For
example, Korea not only acts as a bridge between developed countries and developing countries

but also between conventional aid donors and new donors . Koreas diplomatic activism and its different
characteristics can be illustrated by a detailed empirical analysis of its engagement in different areas. The following section analyses
Koreas participation in international security, issues of development and environment and climate change.

U.S. Not Key

Regionalism will either fail because of ingrained nationalism, or succeed because
shared interests overwhelm politics
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu 10, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific
University, March 2010, Regional Governance and Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Cases of
the Environment and IT,
http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/workingPapers/RCAPS_WP099.pdf
This article highlights two aspects of regional governance: objective and process. The objective of governance is shown in its
definition: to manage common regional affairs and draw cooperative action. The common regional affairs contain

a
wide range of issues that are likely to be managed with collective, not individual, efforts by state and nonstate actors in a specific region. In recent years, several scholars have examined bilateral and regional relations in East Asia in
terms of risk management (Wishnick, 2009; Nesadurai, 2009). Risks are unintended results of economic and technological
decisions, which are previously undertaken with fixed norms of calculability, connecting means and ends or causes and effects (Beck,
1999: 4; 2000). Risks are created by the expansion of transboundary phenomena and activities as well as
growing uncertainty about consequences resulting from them. The examples of such risks are

the deterioration of

the global environments , a likely financial turmoil , a possible terrorist attack , and the
global diffusion of infectious diseases . Nobody in developed and developing countries can escape from the trap of
such risks, and the societies on the globe are required to respond to the challenges posed by risks by developing various kinds of risk
communities.
In Northeast Asia, history and memory has exerted a profound influence on the evolution of

regional affairs by stimulating nationalist hatreds among the peoples. The historical factor has
disturbed the development of common cohesion and regional institutions that manage common
affairs for the states and societies. However , the necessity of risk management might change
this fundamental constellation of interstate relations at least in specific policy areas . While risk
has seemed a purely negative phenomenon, it may be seen at the same time as a positive phenomenon too, when it involves the
sharing of risks without borders (Beck, 1999: 16). Risks, which hold boundary-crossing character and high-level uncertainty,
might become a linchpin to unify states with diverse identity and interests by providing a
rationale for initiating and advancing cooperative actions. The perception of common risks and the necessity
of cooperative risk management might become a catalyst in encouraging the governments in Northeast
Asia to promote substantial talks on effective measures to reduce the probability of risk occurrence and its unfavourable
effects.

Econ Defense
Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war
Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International
and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol.
25, No. 4, p. 403-425
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the
more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum
sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of
the current

economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine

democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies . While these
dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead
the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that
economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more
internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become
discredited , it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and
mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or
even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought
that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that
the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone
suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about
greater economic conflict , it will not make war thinkable .
Interdependence means zero chance that economic decline causes war
Leslie H. Gelb 10, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations; was a senior official
in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to
1979, November/December 2010, GDP Now Matters More Than Force, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
89, No. 6
To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to grow their economies, and
they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing traditional military and strategic
competitions to escalate into wars . In the past, U.S. enemies--such as the Soviet Union--would have rejoiced at the
United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in blocking the spread of both
Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in Afghanistan, such as
large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no great nation is challenging the balance of power in either Europe or Asia. Although
nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another in explosive situations.
Given the receding threat of great-power war, leaders around the world can afford to elevate economic priorities as never before. To
be sure, leaders throughout history have pursued economic strength as the foundation of state power, but power itself was equated
with military might. Today, the prevailing idea is that economic strength should be applied primarily

toward achieving economic--not military--ends . Money is what counts most, so most nations limit their
spending on standing armies and avoid military interventions. What preoccupies most leaders is
trade, investment, access to markets, exchange rates, additional riches for the rich, and a better life for the rest.
This trend is plain among the rising regional powers known as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and
China) and among such others as Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. Although these countries' leaders have major
security concerns--such as India with regard to Pakistan--their paramount objective has become economic

strength. For most, economic growth is their prime means of fending off internal political
opposition.

China makes perhaps the best case for the primacy of economics. Although it might emerge as a spoiler decades hence, Beijing
currently promotes the existing economic order and does not threaten war . Because Beijing has been
playing the new economic game at a maestro level-- staying out of wars and political confrontations and
zeroing in on business--its global influence far exceeds its existing economic strength. China gains extra power
from others' expectations of its future growth . The country has become a global economic giant without becoming a
global military power. Nations do not fear China's military might; they fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.

1NR

Deterrence

ROK Restraint Link

War games prove presence restrains South Korea from escalating
David Santoro 2-1, senior fellow for nuclear policy at the Pacific Forum CSIS; and John K.
Warden, militant Hawaiian secessionist, 2/1/16, Americas Delicate Dance Between Deterrence
and Assurance, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/americas-delicate-dance-betweendeterrence-assurance-15076
The fundamentals of extended deterrence and assurance were demonstrated at a track-1.5 table-top
exercise that the Pacific Forum CSIS ran in Maui, Hawaii in July 2014. The exercise featured teams of
U.S., Japanese and South Korean nationals from academia, think tanks, government
and the military managing an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula. It began with the sinking of a
Japanese vessel by North Korea in the Sea of Japan/East Sea, leading all three teams to recommend that the United States, with
logistical support from Japan, strike the North Korean naval base that supported the attack. The U.S. team acted out of concern for
Japans security, the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance and, by extension, the credibility of the entire U.S. alliance system. In the
second move, North Korea retaliated with an artillery barrage against South Korean farmland north of Seoul (killing several people)
and a nuclear detonation over the Sea of Japan/East Sea (with no initial casualties). While the U.S., Japanese and South Korean
teams disagreed over how to respond, many felt that the United States needed to put an end to North Koreas active nuclear weapons
and long-range missiles. The U.S. team, in line with the 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, felt it could not allow Pyongyang to
escalate [its] way out of failed conventional aggression. It was also motivated by a desire to hold North Korea accountable for
breaking the nuclear taboo and to send a message to other states that future nuclear use would have severe consequences.
The responses of the U.S., Japanese and Korean teams were somewhat predictable and in line with common understandings of
extended deterrence and assurance. But the Maui exercise also exemplified that, at times, the United States

seeks to discourage, or deter, actions by its allies and, conversely, assure its adversaries.
U.S. efforts to deter allies and assure adversaries should not be surprising. Deterrencethe act of using fear of consequences or
punishment to change a countrys calculus and inhibit behavior has been a key feature of alliance relationships,
just as assurancethe act of using declarations or guarantees to inspire confidence in how a country will act in particular
circumstanceshas been central to adversary relationships. But in the twenty-first century, more so than
during the Cold War, the United States faces increasingly complex challenges in managing its alliance
and adversary relationships.
Deterrence in Alliance Relationships
Elements of deterrence have long been discussed as a key component of alliance relationships. In his study of alliances during the
1815-1945 period, Paul Schroeder concludes that alliances are not only weapons of power, but also tools of management or, as he
puts it, pactum de contrahendo (pacts of restraint). But the deterrence factor in alliance relationships was perhaps best captured
by nineteenth-century Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck who, after allying his country with Austria to stop Viennas
provocative policies toward Russia and prevent a major war, famously remarked that in every alliance there is always a horse and a
rider.
The fundamentals of the current U.S. alliance system are no different. As Victor Cha explains, the United States established

tight and deep bilateral alliances with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan after World War Two both to
contain the Soviet threat and to exercise control over, as he puts it, potentially rogue allies that could
entrap the United States in unwanted wars. Washington set up processes that allowed it to
persuade allies of the need for caution and mechanisms for joint decisions that
constrained their options. Perhaps more important, there was an implicit, background threat: if you
escalate too far on your own, the United States may not support you. Because allies were
militarily dependent on the United States, they were deterred from overreacting when
crises arose and, for that matter, from initiating crises in the first place .
The Maui exercise exhibited the tension that sometimes exists between the United States and its allies.
Following Pyongyangs attack against South Korea, South Korean participants stressed that
retaliation would likely be automatic initiated by commanders in the field before
consultation with Washington, and possibly even Seouland go beyond a proportionate
response , striking vital North Korean targets. American participants, while fully recognizing
South Koreas right to respond unilaterally at the local conventional level, worried that such a

military response would escalate the conflict . Some pointed to the 2013 U.S.-South Korea
C ounter- P rovocation P lan, which includes procedures for consultation for a combined
U.S.-South Korean response . Others noted that there may be a difference of interpretation
between U.S. and South Korean officials about which North Korean targets should be included
in a retaliatory strike. In short, the U.S. team wished to maintain control over South

Korea and was prepared to restrain, constrain and

actions.

possibly even

deter , some of Seouls

AT: Kelly
Kelly concludes neg---their ev is just him switching sides
Robert E. Kelly 14, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political
Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, 10/17/14, US retrenchment from Korea
(part 3): A response to my critics, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/USretrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspx
I do not say all this to be testy or contrarian. My own gut feeling, per my USFK experiences
above, is for the US to stay in Korea . This is probably because I think North Korea is just
about the worst place on earth. I am open to being convinced on this, and I kinda want to be. I
imagine a lot of people instinctually feel the same way. But that's not a replacement for clear,
obvious need for the US to be here.

UQ
Uniqueness for our disad is perfect---theres a latent risk of North Korean
provocations but overall theyll be fairly chill now
Kim Eunjee 1-19, reporter for VOA News, 1/19/16, Experts Warn of Further Provocations by
North Korea, http://www.voanews.com/content/experts-warn-of-further-provocations-bynorth-korea/3153934.html
No rth Ko rea could take further provocative actions after the latest nuclear test that drew
strong protests from the international community, experts in Seoul warned.
With its fourth nuclear test, the communist country is likely to accelerate its effort to seek the status of a nuclear-armed state,
experts said. Washington reaffirmed its position that it would not give Pyongyang such a recognition.
We do not and will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, and actions such as this latest test only

strengthen our resolve, said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in a statement after the test.
Kim Tae-woo, a nuclear expert who specializes in the North Korean nuclear issue, said Pyongyang will pursue its longstanding
demand for a peace treaty with Washington while keeping nuclear weapons.
Nuclear-armed state
North Korea wants the nuclear recognition without joining the NPT, said Kim in reference to an international treaty aimed at
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and related technology.
The peace treaty that they are seeking is an attempt to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, Kim added.
Last week, Pyongyang offered to halt nuclear tests in return for an end to joint military exercises between Washington and Seoul and
a peace treaty with Washington.
Some warned Pyongyang

could conduct a long-range rocket launch or another s ubmarine- l aunched

b allistic m issile test in response to fresh sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.
Existing U.N. sanctions ban Pyongyang from conducting any launches using ballistic missile technology.
Jeon Ok-hyun, a former senior official with South Koreas National Intelligence Service, said North Koreas

provocations

against So uth K orea is also a possibility.

North

Koreas provocations could come in various forms , including cyberattacks and

military actions , said the former intelligence official.

Internal politics
A senior South Korean official, who asked to remain anonymous, said Pyongyangs

internal politics could aggravate

the situation, citing the absence of Jang Song Thaek and Kim Yang Gon.
Jang, Kim Jong Uns uncle, was executed in late 2013. Kim Yang Gon, Pyongyangs top official on Seoul, died in a mysterious traffic
accident last month. Jang and Kim were known as moderates.

With both gone, Pyongyang is likely to harden its stance on Seoul , according to the official.
The official warned Pyongyang could respond to Seouls resumption of propaganda loudspeaker
broadcasts militarily , which could trigger a military confrontation between the two sides.
Nam Seong-wook, former president of the Institute for National Security Strategy, a research institute run
by South Koreas National Intelligence Service, expected Pyongyang to take a low-key approach
toward Seoul for the time being .

AT: SK Solves
Joint US-ROK deterrence is the only effective option against North Korean nuclear
threats
Hong Kyudok 15, Professor of International Relations, Sookmyung Women`s University,
formerly Deputy Minister for Defense Reform at the Ministry of National Defense, 6/11/15,
Option 1: Enhancing Military Deterrence, http://www.theasanforum.org/option-1-enhancingmilitary-deterrence/
On April 14-15, 2015 in Washington, Park and Obama administration defense officials agreed to
establish the ROK-US Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) to integrate the response to North
Korean nuclear, other WMD, and ballistic missile threats. The DSC is a combination of the
former Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and Counter Missile Capability
Committee (CMCC), and it seeks to actualize 4D operationsdetect, defend, disrupt, and
destroy. To deter and respond effectively to North Koreas nuclear and missile threats,
interoperability of the two forces needs to be enhanced and upgraded .
Pyongyang will return to the negotiating table only when its nuclear option is no longer
viable . The Park government has done its utmost to find incentives through various diplomatic
channels; however, it also needs to demonstrate that North Koreas nuclear capability can be
deterred by employing non-nuclear strategic weapons.31 The good news is that confidence in
the joint counter capability is growing in the face of Pyongyangs continuing missile
firings and rhetoric of nuclear preemption. Paradoxically, the Park Geun-hye governments trust
building efforts can only be effective when Pyongyangs strategic superiority over Seoul begins to
lose its momentum. Negotiating from strength has long been recognized as ideal. This is
especially so with Pyongyang. There is no alternative but to put strengthening South Koreas
deterrence capabilities first on the list of strategic options.
Withdrawal crushes C4ISR---the ROK cant fill in
Robert E. Kelly 14, associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political
Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University, 10/17/14, US retrenchment from Korea
(part 3): A response to my critics, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/10/17/USretrenchment-from-Korea-(part-3)-A-response-to-my-critics.aspx
In August, I wrote a couplet on the US military commitment to South Korea, trying to illustrate arguments for both a US retrenchment and for staying.
I am happy to say that these posts swung me an invite to a roundtable discussion at US Forces Korea (USFK) to present my arguments. I also got some
feedback from my friend, veteran Korea-watcher Dave Maxwell. Some of this sheds extra light and deserves a response. At USFK, unsurprisingly, most
of the listeners

strongly supported the retention of the US military in Korea. There seemed to be two
is definitely a
concern that South Korea is not ready to defend itself without US assistance (a concern I think Dave
main sets of concerns, one specific to Korea and the other about the US position in Asia and the world. First, there

Maxwell and many others share). This is why the proposed 'OPCON' transfer (transferring wartime control of South Korean troops from Washington to
Seoul) is now tied to South Korean capabilities, rather than to an arbitrary date. Whenever

I talk to US military personnel in

Korea at conferences and such, I always come away nervous that the ROK is more vulnerable than a lot of
us think. Particularly on things like missile defence and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), there

seems to be a strong consensus in the US professional

military community that the ROK cannot do this alone, and may never be able to. Specifically, a
lot of the C4ISR assets the US shares would be exorbitantly expensive, if not
impossible, for Seoul to try to recreate on its own , thereby heavily impinging on
readiness . So there is a strong efficiency argument for simply continuing the current
relationship

in which US 'networked battlefield' technologies are a powerful force multiplier, in particular for the South Korean Army.

Effective ISR is key to deterrence and prevents miscalc---failure causes unintended

escalation
General Curtis M. Scaparrotti 15, Commander, United States-Republic of Korea Combined
Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea, statement before the House
Armed Services Committee, Apr 15 2015,
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20150415/103307/HHRG-114-AS00-WstateScaparrottiUSAC-20150415.pdf
Our top concern is that we could have very little warning of a North Korean asymmetric
provocation, which could start a cycle of action and counter-action, leading to unintended
escalation . This underscores the need for the Alliance to maintain a high level of
readiness and vigilance, and to do so together . Critical Capabilities. During the recent SCM, our national
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening the combined defense of South Korea. They also confirmed several critical capabilities
the Alliance must improve to ensure continued readiness to respond. These are: Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance, or ISR . Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, or C4I. Ballistic Missile Defense, or BMD.
Critical Munitions. We must continue to pursue ISR capabilities . The Alliances ability to distinguish
the indications and warnings associated with an impending North Korean asymmetric or
conventional attack directly impacts the Alliances decision space . Investments here can
mitigate the risk of miscalculation and escalation by providing a more accurate
and timely picture of North Korean actions .
The plan shifts reliance exclusively to the nuclear umbrella---thats not credible for
either deterrence or assurance
Tom Nichols 14, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct
at the Harvard Extension School, 7/31/14, WHY A KOREAN PULLOUT IS A REALLY BAD
IDEA, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/
This is where the argument becomes even more convoluted: once U.S. conventional forces are gone, Lee offloads
any further burden of deterrence onto the U.S. nuclear guarantee: The OPCON transfer would
not change the security guarantee of extended deterrence under the United States nuclear
umbrella. In this concept, apparently, the South is protected not only by its own top-notch military, but by a
promise on the part of the United States to start using nuclear weapons in Asia even if there has
not been a single American casualty and even if North Korea does not use nuclear
weapons in an attack on the South.
Here, Lee wishes away the deterrence problem by presenting nuclear weapons as a kind of dummy
variable that puts the deterrence equation right should the U.S. conventional withdrawal throw
it out of balance. The United States, however, removed nuclear arms from the Peninsula over two
decades ago and has since politely refused any further discussion about returning them there. Yet Lees strategy
essentially amounts to saying: Were leaving, immediately and much to the chagrin of our ally, but everyone be
warned: we have nuclear weapons.
This is merely an updated version of the Eisenhower-era strategy (such that it was) of Massive
Retaliation, and it is based on the same idea: to save the cost of expensive conventional forces by
replacing them with vague nuclear threats. Massive Retaliation was a poor substitute for a
strategy even in its day. It was more an act of desperation than any kind of actual deterrent, an
obvious attempt to rely on a U.S.-based nuclear crutch rather than a sturdier force in Europe. It
was unworkable and dangerous, and it was soon junked .

AT: Bandow
Reject libertarian critiques of the alliance like Bandow---their authors structurally
underestimate the war-preventing effect of U.S. presence---risks nuclear war
Van Jackson 9-9, Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New
American Security, and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, 9/9/15,
THE POVERTY OF LIBERTARIAN THINKING ABOUT THE U.S.KOREAN ALLIANCE,
http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/the-poverty-of-libertarian-thinking-about-the-u-s-koreanalliance/
While rare, arguments in favor of abandoning the U.S. alliance with South Korea are not new, and are
always reduced to narrow costbenefit transactions. The Donald Trump-like simplicity of
this approach obscures an honest assessment of the issue and the purported solution. The case of
Korea is instructive of the numerous high risks and hidden costs in libertarian
arguments about U.S. foreign policy.
As he has occasionally done for decades , Doug Bandow of the libertarian Cato Institute recently
reanimated the abandon Korea argument in The National Interest. His justifications change slightly
over time to adapt to circumstances, but the punchline remains. There are many reasons to take issue with the
libertarian line of reasoning about Korea and alliances in general especially given recent research findings. I nevertheless limit my
focus here to the hidden costs of libertarian reasoning, measured in terms of foreign policy fallout.

A basic understanding of causes and consequences in international relations is crucial

to any fair consideration of foreign policy, yet familiarity with even crude causal relationships
seems entirely missing from arguments to abandon the R epublic o f K orea, one of Americas
oldest and most directly threatened allies. Three basic insights from international relations highlight some of the hidden costs of a
libertarian approach to the U.S.Korea alliance.

First is the opportunity cost of war prevention altogether. Bandow assigns no value to the
war prevention role of the U.S. presence in Korea, yet even fairly dovish scholars like David Kang
acknowledge that the deterrent effect of the U.S. military presence is what keeps the peace on
the Korean Peninsula. The fact that South Korea is capable of self-defense does not mean it is
capable of deterring North Korean on its own, or that the departure of U.S. forces from the
peninsula wont lead to North Korean military adventurism . North Koreas history of violence
shows that even U.S. power has been insufficient to prevent low-intensity North Korean attacks. So if youre South Korea,
and your capital city of ten million people is within artillery range of an egoistic dictator armed with nuclear
weapons, you dont want to take any chances by messing with a successful deterrence
equation , and neither should the United States. The logic of confrontation and conflict still
prevails in Korea. As long as that remains the case, removing the U.S. alliance from the picture puts in
jeopardy a precarious peace that has managed to hold for more than 60 years.

AT: Defense
Disregard old defense---escalation management is uniquely tricky right now--entrapment risk is high
Daniel A. Pinkston 1-28, Ph.D., lecturer in international relations with Troy University in
Seoul; and Clint Work, Ph.D. student at the Jackson School of International Studies, University
of Washington, 1/28/16, New Realities, Old Fears: Escalation on the Korean Peninsula,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/new-realities-old-fears-escalation-on-the-korean-peninsula/
Alliance tensions over abandonment and entrapment fears come sharply into focus at times
of conflict escalation or the possibility of escalation. Therefore, understanding escalation
dynamics and the processes for de-escalation and the restoration of deterrence is an
important aspect of U.S.-ROK alliance management . The DPRKs recent nuclear
test , SLBM ejection tests, and advancements in other asymmetric capabilities such as cyber warfare make escalation management more complicated and difficult for the alliance.

Ukraine Impact
Troop withdrawal from South Korea crushes the perception of U.S. military
resolve and credibility around the globe---particularly NATO deterrence in
Ukraine
Tom Nichols 14, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and an adjunct
at the Harvard Extension School, 7/31/14, WHY A KOREAN PULLOUT IS A REALLY BAD
IDEA, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/why-a-korean-pullout-is-a-really-bad-idea/
In a recent article for War on the Rocks, U.S. Army Major Christopher Lee recommended that President Obama pull
troops immediately from South Korea . Lee based his argument mostly on cost, noting that South
Korea was now a wealthy country with an advanced military that should assume the burden of its own security. At the operational
level, there might be a case for improved savings. As a strategic matter, however, it is a seriously flawed proposal.
First, lets dispense with the argument of cost. Lee rightly notes that the non-personnel costs of the U.S. presence in South Korea run over a billion dollars a year, with the Republic of Korea contribution lagging behind at about $765 million. Not to put too fine a
point on this, but: so what? Americas Korea commitment is hardly a budget-buster. (The United States is a country that spends nearly $60 billion a year on pets.) Moreover, Lees recommendation does not take into account how budgets are actually passed: he notes
that the President can redeploy most, if not all, of the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea and utilize the conserved budgetary allocations to mend domestic delinquencies, such as the beleaguered [VA] and the continued automatic spending cuts.
Well, in theory the President could try and do that, but thats not how it works. Money in the budget is simply not that fungible. Savings in one place say the Department of Defense cannot usually be earmarked for use in another say the Department of Veterans
Affairs. Otherwise, Congress would be trading off pieces of departments in order to plug holes in other departments all day. Its not impossible, its just unlikely; the VA, the DoD, and the general deficit do not all exchange funds across budget lines at will.
But lets agree that no one wants to waste any taxpayer money. Thus, the more important question is whether a force on the Korean peninsula is worth even one dollar; Lee thinks not, and it is here that he avoids far more important problems than cost.
Lee sidesteps the fact that our ally, South Korea, is technically still at war. We have a truce, not a peace, with North Korea. That may not matter much to us, but it matters to Koreans, North and South. Had Pyongyang undergone regime change of some sort a few
decades ago and finally dispensed with the bizarre Kim dynasty, or had not successfully tested three nuclear weapons since 2006, we might be having a different conversation. In some better world, I would agree that we could ramp down our Korean presence. We
just dont happen to be living in that world.
Because hes looking at this as an operational and budgetary problem, Lee seems less concerned about deterrence and resolve than I am. He argues that the South Koreans are capable of defeating the North if attacked. That might be true, but where deterrence is
concerned, it is also irrelevant. The issue isnt whether the South can win: its making sure that the South doesnt have to fight the North in the first place.
This is where the argument becomes even more convoluted: once U.S. conventional forces are gone, Lee offloads any further burden of deterrence onto the U.S. nuclear guarantee: The OPCON transfer would not change the security guarantee of extended deterrence
under the United States nuclear umbrella. In this concept, apparently, the South is protected not only by its own top-notch military, but by a promise on the part of the United States to start using nuclear weapons in Asia even if there has not been a single American
casualty and even if North Korea does not use nuclear weapons in an attack on the South.
Here, Lee wishes away the deterrence problem by presenting nuclear weapons as a kind of dummy variable that puts the deterrence equation right should the U.S. conventional withdrawal throw it out of balance. The United States, however, removed nuclear arms
from the Peninsula over two decades ago and has since politely refused any further discussion about returning them there. Yet Lees strategy essentially amounts to saying: Were leaving, immediately and much to the chagrin of our ally, but everyone be warned:
we have nuclear weapons.
This is merely an updated version of the Eisenhower-era strategy (such that it was) of Massive Retaliation, and it is based on the same idea: to save the cost of expensive conventional forces by replacing them with vague nuclear threats. Massive Retaliation was a
poor substitute for a strategy even in its day. It was more an act of desperation than any kind of actual deterrent, an obvious attempt to rely on a U.S.-based nuclear crutch rather than a sturdier force in Europe. It was unworkable and dangerous, and it was soon
junked.
Speaking of history, perhaps we ought to think about the historical record before simply pulling out of Korea. Kims grandfather, Kim Il Sung approached Soviet leader Josef Stalin repeatedly after World War II to seek permission for an invasion of the South. Stalin,
fearing a greater war, refused him, and later only relented when the eldest Kim pointed out that the Americans, by treaty, had finally quit the Peninsula in 1949 and returned home. This, for both Stalin and Kim, was an indication that an invasion would not provoke a
U.S. response. This was a terrible miscalculation, and it was grounded in a U.S. troop withdrawal.
The North Koreans, particularly the old marshals of the Korean military for whom the Korean War is still a sacred memory, would no doubt love to see a replay of 1949, and would consider it a great victory. They would be able to gloat that they had achieved what
even their big brothers in China had been unable to do for over 60 years: a Korea whose soil is completely untainted by American boots. Moreover, removing American troops from Korea will signal to the Chinese that we want no further U.S. presence in their region,
and remove one more complication in any Chinese strategy of expansion or intimidation.
In sum, a pullout would raise North Koreas stature, reduce Chinas dwindling influence over its client, and leave Pyongyang in its own eyes a peer to Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo. How is any of this a good idea?

Lees proposal also takes place in a vacuum, as though nothing else is happening in the world. By
focusing on costs and planning in one part of the map, Lee treats foreign policy as a menu from
which one may pick and choose options at will, rather than as a coherent whole . American
credibility is under attack on all fronts: Russia, Syria, and Iran are but three places where
perceptions of resolve matter. (Or would have mattered, had we cared enough to insist on being more proactive two or
three years ago.) What message would it send, as Ukraine is being dismembered and NATO
struggles with its responses, if the United States leaves behind an ally still in a state of war?
If the only goal is to move 28,000 U.S. troops around a map and save some money, Major Lees withdrawal
looks like a terrific idea. Again, however, this is operational myopia : it may well be that on the gaming
table, the South can defeat the North without U.S. help, but this is not about operations, it is about strategy.
Specifically, it is about politics, including trying to shape the enemys perceptions and willingness to
engage in risk . The regime in Pyongyang is the same one that attacked in 1950, and is still at war with one of our closest
consequences of yet one more American disengagement, after a string of foreign policy
disasters, might well end up costing far more than any budget-conscious planner could envision.
allies. The

Effective NATO deterrence stops nuclear war

Thomas Frear 14, Researcher at the European Leadership Network, previously held posts at
the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies and within the British Parliament; ukasz Kulesa,
Research Director at the European Leadership Network; and Ian Kearns, co-Founder and
Director of the European Leadership Network, November 2014, Dangerous Brinkmanship:
Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014,
http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/files/2014/12/Dangerous-Brinkmanship.pdf
This mix of beefed-up military postures along the NATO-Russia border, more aggressive
Russian activities, and the readiness of Western forces to show resolve in the face of the challenge, is

ripe with potential for escalation . In the current environment, any incident that results in
a loss of life or in extensive damage to one side or the other would be likely to provoke a response involving an
increased alert level, higher tempo of military operations in border regions, or even direct punitive military action. This
could feed a spiral of growing tensions that may be difficult for any side to completely
control or stop .
4. AVOIDING UNINTENTIONAL ESCALATION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The threat of escalation embedded in current developments needs a concerted

crisis management

response.
Recomendation 1: The Russian leadership should urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its more assertive military
posture, and Western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading Russia to move in this direction.
Russia should return to its pre-March 2014 patterns of behaviour. Some will argue that this is unlikely but the Russian leadership
most likely understands the prohibitive costs of a direct military conflict with NATO countries and has a strong interest in avoiding
such a direct confrontation, the end consequences of which could not be predicted.
Nevertheless, Russian leaders currently seem to be assuming that Western countries would back off

from direct confrontation if an incident spirals out of control , and therefore Russia can continue with a more
assertive policy. This is an unwise assumption and a gamble at best.
Besides that, Russian actions have resulted so far in an unprecedented mobilization of NATO and adjustments of Swedish and
Finnish defence policy, contrary to any Russian expectations of appeasement. A key challenge for Western diplomacy

now therefore is to combine clear red lines in relation to Russian behaviour, increases in NATO force deployments and a
strengthened deterrence posture, with efforts to persuade Russia to end its military
posturing in its own, as well as everyone elses, national security interests.
This is all the more important because current crisis management arrangements are inadequate. The NATO-Russia Council has
barely met since the crisis in Ukraine erupted. Despite some phone contact between senior Russian and NATO military officials,
there are also currently few, if any effective exchanges of information on military deployments in the Euro-Atlantic area. EU-Russia
crisis management arrangements also do not exist.
While many have commented on the fact that we have entered a new period of confrontation in relations with Russia, few have
commented on the need for that confrontation to be managed or on the steps necessary to manage it.
In our view, a diplomatic dialogue with Russia about the danger of what is going on is vital. In addition, a number of additional crisis
management steps now need to be understood and operationalised, not only in Moscow, but across the Euro-Atlantic area. These
include:
Recomendation 2: All sides should exercise military and political restraint
Civilian leaders in all of the countries concerned need to emphasise and continuously reiterate a default message of military restraint
and ensure that message runs right through the military chain of command. The NATO leadership specifically should

make sure that its procedures for handling incidents involving the Russian military and other agencies
are universally understood and interpreted throughout the Alliance and are guided by the principle of restraint and
adequate response . The less ambiguity there is in terms of rules of engagement, the better.
In addition, political leaders in the entire Euro-Atlantic area must remember that Ukraine is not the only potential flashpoint in
Russia-West relations. There are unresolved conflicts surrounding Moldova/Transdniestria; Georgia/South Ossetia/Abkhazia; and
Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. It is in no-ones interest that one or more of these should erupt. Political leaders in
both NATO and Russia must use all their influence to ensure none of the local actors involved take steps that could trigger a new
wave of escalation.
Recomendation 3: All sides must improve military-to-military communication and transparency
All sides should also make sure that reliable channels of communication exist at bilateral and NATO-Russia level to be used for rapid
communication in the event of a serious incident. These channels could be used to investigate the incident itself and to communicate
to the other side the nature and scope of measures being taken in response to it.

The overall level of predictability regarding armed forces activities in the border areas should
also be increased in order to reduce the current level of tensions . Both sides could and should expand on

transparency and confidence and security building measures agreed in the OSCE framework, such as those in the Vienna Document.
It may also be useful to begin work on a sub-regional regime for the Baltic Sea area, involving additional mechanisms for
consultation in the case of unusual military activities, information exchange on troop deployments and exercise schedules,
inspections and evaluation visits, and notification and observation of exercises.
Some will argue that these measures are difficult to see in the current political climate, but by taking them,

The
alternative is to perpetuate a situation in which mistrust, fear and shortened leadership decision
times characterise a volatile standoff between a nuclear armed state and a nuclear armed
alliance . To perpetuate that reality in the circumstances described in this report is risky at best . At worst
political leaders can take the fear and threat of a short warning military attack by one party on another off the table.

it could prove catastrophic .

AT: Deterrence Failing

No escalation because of U.S. deterrence---our evidence assumes the most recent
tensions and provocations
Van Jackson 15, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on
Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, 8/24/15, Preparing for the Next Korean War,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/preparing-for-the-next-korean-war/
How do you fight and win with one hand tied behind your back? U.S. and South Korean officials would do well to figure out, quickly.
A dark cloud descended over the Korean Peninsula last week as a series of North Korean actions along the DMZ

escalated tensions to the highest level since 2010.

Despite ongoing talks between the two sides, tensions remain

high. The prospect of limited war on the Korean Peninsula is all too real, and the alliance must reorient its preparations accordingly.
Ive spent most of my tenure since leaving government warning about limited war in Koreaa conflict in which both sides avoid
nuclear exchanges, no invasion of Pyongyang occurs, and both sides limit their objectives and the means of attaining them to eschew
conquest. In limited war, a return to the status quo may count as a victory. If that sounds perverse, its because weve become

accustomed to an image of war as an all-or-nothing affair; no goal short of total enemy surrender will do.

Not
so in a world of limited wars.
I raised this issue in congressional testimony earlier this year. I noted it in subsequent op-eds, and in a Center for a New American
Security report for Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. Ive discussed it before the media, and at conferences. And in a forthcoming
report for the U.S.-Korea Institute, I attempt to sketch how the alliance might adjust to a future of limited wars .

The most recent mini-crisis brings the point home in disturbingly clear fashion: the risk of limited war on the
Korean Peninsula is increasing with time.
Ive identified a number of mutually reinforcing reasons why this is so, and why the reality of limited war actually gets more likely
with time.

Nobody Wants Nuclear War Not Even Kim Jong-un

Every Korea expert Ive ever met believes North Koreas primary goal is regime survival. Yet most of these
same experts believe that Kim Jong-un is capable of anything and theres no telling what he might do. To put it
politely, thats cognitive dissonance . If we know North Korea seeks regime survival, then we
know something about what its keen to avoid. Even Kim Jong-un must know there are certain
actions that would end him and his regime nuclear attacks , the destruction of Seoul, or a mass
invasion of South Korea. Kim Jong-un isnt a Millenarian or a Jihadi; his goal isnt suicide. So unless we want to
shrug our shoulders and say anything could happen, we should have some modest confidence that
Kim wont pursue the extreme actions that North Korean media routinely threaten.
South of the DMZ, the incentives to avoid a nuclear conflict are just as strong . For starters,
60 years of restraint when faced with North Korean violence suggests that, in the United States especially, there is a
strong desire to avoid the risks of escalation and conflict in general. Plus, no sitting president
American or South Koreanwants to go down in history as the first president to usher in the era of nuclear
warfighting. The cost in lives would be abhorrent, and theres a high risk that such a situation would rapidly erode the nuclear
nonproliferation regime.

North Korea Cant Invade the South

In June 1950, North Korea launched a large-scale invasion of a South Korea with only a token ability to resist and no meaningful
U.S. military presence. This is the classic scenario that experts and military planners often imagine when they think of another
Korean War. Yet theres now a heavily armed DMZreplete with a large minefield, no lessseparating

the North and South, and the South Korean military is better trained and equipped than any force North Korea could muster.
North Koreas air force and navy services are vastly inferior to the technologically advanced South Korean
military. And the U.S. military presence in and commitment to South Korea is far more

than symbolic .
The point is that no

military leader would look at the military balance on the Korean

Peninsula especially not a leader in the North Korean Peoples Army (KPA)and think that it makes sense for
North Korea to invade South Korea. The former might have cause for conflict, but waged asymmetrically, not as a
head-on frontal assault. Invasion of the South is militarily impossible. This North-South military imbalance is worsened by a KPA

that lacks the logistics and sustainment capacity required of an invasion; the KPA is numerically large, but regularly diverted from
military tasks to perform agricultural and industrial labor functions to support a moribund economy. The KPA isnt a force thats
capable of a long duration military campaign.