Libel; elements.

A charge is sufficient if the words

are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose
and understand that the person or persons
against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the
honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person
or persons up to public ridicule. Dionisio Lopez y
Aberasturi v. People of the Philippines, et al,

LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE

Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the
hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression
however, is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its
exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society.[1] Libel stands as an exception to
the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.

before the word NEVER thus making the billboard appear

as follows
CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
For which the words in the signboards/billboards were
obviously calculated to induce the readers/passers-by to
suppose and understand that something fishy was going
on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue
and reputation of Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and
hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to
the good name, character and reputation of the offended
party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards
were read by thousands if not hundred[s] of thousands of
persons, which caused damage and prejudice to the
offended party by way of moral damages in the amount
[of]:
P5, 000,000.00 as moral damages.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Dionisio Lopez
(petitioner) assailing the Decision[2] dated August 31, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
28175. The CA affirmed with
modification the
Decision[3] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cadiz City, Branch 60 finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.

Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused,

entered a plea of not guilty. During the pre-trial, the parties
stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused,
that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor
of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname
Bading and that the petitioner calls the private complainant
Bading. Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due
course.

Procedural and Factual Antecedents

Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the

early part of November 2002, while exercising his official
duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw
billboards with the printed phrase CADIZ FOREVER with a
blank space before the word NEVER directly under said
phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of
Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and
beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He
became intrigued and wondered on what the message
conveyed since it was incomplete.

On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an

Information dated March 31, 2003, the accusatory portion
of which reads in full as follows:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the
City of Cadiz, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach
the integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and
dishonor the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G.
ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with
malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended
party to public hatred, contempt and ridicule put up
billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena
Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City,
which billboards/signboards read as follows:
Thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing
extraordinary
attention
from
the
residents
of Cadiz City and passers-by over what would be placed
before the word NEVER. Later on November 15, 2002,
accused affixed the nickname of the herein private
complainant BADING and the name of the City of SAGAY

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private

respondent received a phone call relating that the blank
space preceding the word NEVER was filled up with the
added words BADING AND SAGAY. The next day, he saw
the billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING
AND SAGAY NEVER printed in full. Reacting and feeling
that he was being maligned and dishonored with the
printed phrase and of being a tuta of Sagay, private
respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer,
caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner.
He claimed that the incident resulted in mental anguish
and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus
prayed for damages.

Jude Martin Jaropillo (Jude) is a licensing officer of the

Permit and License Division of Cadiz City. While on a
licensing campaign, he was able to read the message on
the billboards. He wondered what fault the person alluded
therein has done as the message is so negative. He felt
that the message is an insult to the mayor since it creates
a negative impression, as if he was being rejected by the
people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was giving his
testimony voluntarily and he was not being rewarded,
coerced or forced by anybody.
Nenita Bermeo (Nenita), a retired government employee
of Cadiz City, was at Delilahs Coffee [Shop] in the morning
of November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner
shouting Bading, Bading, Never, Never. She and the
tricycle drivers drinking coffee were told by petitioner You
watch out I will add larger billboards. When she went
around Cadiz City, she saw larger billboards with the
phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER,
thus confirming what petitioner had said. With the
message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown
the private respondent. According to her, petitioner has an
ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was not also
forced or rewarded in giving her testimony.
Bernardita Villaceran (Bernardita) also found the message
unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an honorable and
dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the
message is an insult not only to the person of the mayor
but also to the people of Cadiz City.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards
because he is aware of all the things happening
around Cadiz City. He mentioned BADING because he
was not in conformity with the many things the mayor had
done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention
whatsoever of referring to Bading as the Tuta of Sagay. He
contended that it was private respondent who referred to
Bading as Tuta of Sagay. He further maintained that his
personal belief and expression was that he will never love
Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the
billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting petitioner
of libel. The trial court ruled that from the totality of the
evidence presented by the prosecution vs-a-vs that of the
defense, all the elements of libel are present. The fallo of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds
accused DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI (bonded)
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel
defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code and there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant thereto

hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty

of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS
of Arresto Mayor maximum as the minimum to TWO
YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision
Correccional Medium as the maximum and a FINE
of P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private
complainant the sum of P5,000,000.00 by way of moral
damages.
The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered
cancelled and returned to the accused, however the
penalty of Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby
ordered deducted from the cash bond posted by the
accused pursuant to Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to
the accused. The accused is hereby ordered immediately
committed to the BJMP, Cadiz Cityfor the service of his
sentence.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA
which, as stated earlier, rendered judgment on August 31,
2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the
RTC. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the
presence of all the elements of the crime of libel. It
reduced however, the amount of moral damages
to P500,000.00. Petitioner then filed his Motion for
Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution[6] dated April 7, 2006.
Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant
petition. Per our directive, private respondent filed his
Comment[7] on August 29, 2006 while the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) representing public respondent
People of the Philippines, submitted a Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment [8] on even date. After the filing
of petitioners Reply to private respondents Comment, we
further requested the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The OSG filed a Manifestation in Lieu of
Memorandum, adopting as its memorandum, the
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment it earlier
filed. Petitioner and private respondent submitted their
respective memoranda as required.
Issues
Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his
petition:
-WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE WORDS CADIZ FOREVER[,]
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER CONTAINED IN THE
BILLBOARDS/SIGNBOARDS SHOW THE INJURIOUS
NATURE OF THE IMPUTATIONS MADE AGAINST THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND TENDS TO INDUCE

SUSPICION ON HIS CHARACTER, INTEGRITY AND

REPUTATION AS MAYOR OF CADIZ CITY.

8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without

citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE

WORDS CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS ERECTED
BY PETITIONER ARE DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY
COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON MATTERS OF
PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH ARE THEREFORE
PRIVILEGED?

9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the

petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and,

III
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN
THE CASE AT BAR HAS NOT BEEN OVERTHROWN.
IV
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF
LIBEL AND IN HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR MORAL
DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P500,000.[9]
Summed up, the focal issues tendered in the present
petition boil down to the following: 1) whether the printed
phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used
constituted privileged communication.

Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC

that all the elements of the crime of libel are present in this
case. Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded
from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents
of the case. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts
in arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are
constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically
paragraph 4 above, instead of the general rule.

Our Ruling

10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[10]

Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the

controversial phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private
respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor
of Cadiz City. He avers that there is nothing in said printed
matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the
character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.

We ought to reverse the CA ruling.

At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final
and conclusive and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court;

The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of

Comment, asserts that there is nothing in the phrase
CADIZ FOREVER and BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
which ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or
defect, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put
him into contempt.[11]
The prosecution maintains that the appellate court
correctly sustained the trial courts finding of guilt on
petitioner. Citing well-established jurisprudence[12] holding
that [w]ords calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes
more effective
to destroy reputation than false charges directly made and
that [i]ronical and metaphorical language is a favored
vehicle for slander, it argued that the words printed on the
billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible
and the ludicrous yet they were so deliberately crafted
solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against
private respondents honor and reputation.
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a
crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or
juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.[13] For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it
must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the

victim must be identifiable.[14] Absent one of these

elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory
nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first
because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the
words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge
will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a
person the commission of a crime, the possession of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor
or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their
plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another
sense.[15] Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person or persons against whom they
were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are
sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to
hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.[16]
Tested under these established standards, we cannot
subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase
CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends
to induce suspicion on private respondents character,
integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are
no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending,
directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does
the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language
or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on
private respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial
word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In
its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon
private respondents integrity and reputation much less
convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply
worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and
dishonesty in government service, it is our considered
view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or
personal reaction on private respondents performance of
official duty and not purposely designed to malign and
besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him
of public confidence.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the
message printed in the billboards and gave a negative
impression on what it says. They imply that the message
conveys something as if the private respondent was being
rejected as city mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of
these witnesses is doubtful considering the moral
ascendancy exercised over them by the private
respondent such that it is quite easy for them to draw such
negative impression. As observed by the OSG, at the time

the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of

private respondent as mayor of Cadiz City, these
witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or
active in the project of the city government. Bernardita was
a member of the Clean and Green Program of Cadiz City;
Jude was employed as a licensing officer under the Permit
and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita
held the position of Utility Worker II of the General
Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses, according
to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could
have
verbicide
the
meaning
of
the
word
NEVER. Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could
have presented witnesses within the community with more
independent disposition than these witnesses who are
beholden to private respondent.
According to the private respondent, the message in the
billboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz that
he is a tuta of Sagay City.
We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position
contrary to the interest of the People. In its Manifestation
and Motion in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the
arguments of the petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined
stance with him, vehemently praying for his acquittal. We
quote with approval the OSGs analysis of the issue which
was the basis for its observation, thus:
During the proceedings in the trial court, private
respondent testified that the subject billboards maligned
his character and portrayed him as a puppet
of Sagay City, Thus:
Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those
billboards BADING AND SAGAY NEVER?
A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your
question, it will not only require those BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER billboard[s], it was after which additional
billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a
Tuta of Sagay. I am being maligned because of those
billboards that states and I repeat: Ang Tubig san Cadiz,
ginkuha sang Sagay, Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz and there is
a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very small,
you cannot see it in [sic] a glance.
A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message
that the signboards would like to convey to the people
of Cadiz, that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a Tuta or Puppet
of Sagay City.
Contrary to private respondents assertion, there is nothing
in the subject billboards which state, either directly or
indirectly, that he is, in his words, a tuta or puppet
of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single
prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray
Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a tuta or puppet
of Sagay City. The billboards erected by petitioner simply
say CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER[18]

Apparently, private respondent refers to the circumstances

mentioned in another billboard that is not the subject
matter in the present charge. The aforesaid facts dismally
failed to support the allegations in the instant information.
Be that as it may, private respondent nevertheless did not
specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission
on petitioners part that could have defamed him or caused
his alleged injury. While it may be that the Court is not
bound by the analysis and observation of the OSG, still,
the Court finds that it deserves meritorious consideration.
The prosecution never indulged to give any reason
persuasive enough for the court not to adopt it.
Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was
not pleased with the controversial printed matter. But that
is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself.
[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real,
is not automatically equivalent to defamation, [19] words
which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or
spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself, as the Court
ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da Wah
Council of the Phils., Inc.[20]
In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner,
both lower courts heavily relied on the testimony of the
petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of
the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER.[21] Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony, however,
reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly
relate to the discharge of private respondents official
duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter,
granting that the controversial phrase is considered
defamatory,
still,
no
liability
attaches
on
petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal
Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a
public official with respect to the discharge of his official
duties and functions and the truth of the allegations is
shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As
the Court held in United States v. Bustos,[22] the policy of a
public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with
every argument which ability can find or ingenuity
invent. The public officer may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by the
balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his
official acts.
In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement
that the elemental acts constituting the offense be
established with moral certainty as this is the critical and
only requisite to a finding of guilt.[23] In this case, contrary

to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the

appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the
controversial phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER imputes derogatory remarks on private
respondents character, reputation and integrity. In this
light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered
moot.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER & CECILLE AFABLE VS.
COURT OF APPEALS & RAMON LABO, JR., 444 SCRA
28 [November 25, 2004]
Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be
informed on the mental, moral and physical fitness of
candidates for public office.
FACTS:
1.
In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio
Midland Courier (BMC), Cecille Afable, the Editor-inChief, in her column In and Out of Baguio made the
following comments:
Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has
the most imponderables about him. People would ask:
can he read and write? Why is he always talking about
his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes
Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send
P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an
advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was
refused because he has not yet paid his account of the
last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept
all advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.
2.
In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the
following comments in her January 10, 1988 column at
the Courier:
I heard that the Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for
Cortes. Not fair. Some real doctors are also busy
campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid
their medical services with them. Since he is donating
millions he should also settle his small debts like the
reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins,
several teachers were signifying to resign and leave
Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of
Baguio.
3.
As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor,
Jr. filed a complaint for Damages before the regional trial
Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were
libelous. He likewise filed a separate criminal complaint

before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was

dismissed;

publication, the case should be dismissed since Labo

utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.

4.
Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted
with malice because he was allegedly described as
Dumpty in the Egg or one who is a failure in his
business which is false because he is a very successful
businessman or to mean zero or a big lie; that he is a
balasubas due to his alleged failure to pay his medical
expenses;

2.
Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke
public interest to justify the publication since he was not
yet a public official at that time. This argument is without
merit since he was already a candidate for City mayor of
Baguio. As such, the article is still within the mantle of
protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression
provided in the Constitution since it is the publics right to
be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of
candidates for public office. This was recognized as early
as the case of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and
the case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S.
254 where the US Supreme Court held:

The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo

has an unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of
P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the
1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its
Decision dated June 14, 1990 dismissed Labos complaint
for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner
Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on
matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity,
reputation and honesty of private respondent Labo who
was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;
On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon
Labo, Jr. damages in the total amount of P350,000.00
after concluding that the Dumpty in the Egg refers to no
one but Labo himself.
Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.
Was Labo the Dumpty in the Egg described in
the questioned article/
2.
Were the articles subject of the case libelous or
privileged/
HELD:
1.
The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that
Labo is the Dumpty in the Egg in the questioned article.
This is so because the article stated that The Dumpty in
the Egg is campaigning for Cortes, another candidate for
mayor and opponent of Labo himself. It is unbelievable
that Labo campaigned for his opponent and against
himself. Although such gracious attitude on the part of
Labo would have been commendable, it is contrary to
common human experience. As pointed out by the
petitioners, had he done that, it is doubtful whether he
could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988
elections, which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in
BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA 1, that it is also not sufficient
that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
3rd person could identify him as the object of the libelous

it is of the utmost consequence that the people should

discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for
their suffrages. The importance to the State and to society
of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages
derived so great, that they more than counterbalance the
inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be
involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of
individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at
times such injury may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private
character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged.
Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on
a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of
the private respondent who was running for the top
elective post in Baguio City at that time.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878,
January 29, 1990
Freedom of expression and of the press
Facts:
1. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted
into law;
2. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces
of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and KalingaApayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take
part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27,
1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the
ratification or rejection of the said act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or
announcers.- During the plebiscite campaign period, on

the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media

columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall
use his column or radio or television time to campaign for
or against the plebiscite issues.
4. On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V.
SANIDAD who is a columnist (OVERVIEW) for the
Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against
the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19
of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner claims that the said
provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of
expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior
restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for
those who violate the same;
5. On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from
enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;
6. On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor
General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of
the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution
No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from
expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of
BP 881, he may still express his views or campaign for or
against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.
Held:
What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the
Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use
and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants
issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums
among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is
also the reason why a columnist, commentator or
announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his
work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE
CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA
6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE
COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO
SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY
MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR
RIGHT TO EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE
PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates in a plebiscite.

While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred

from campaigning for or against the Organic Act, said fact
does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19,
Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS
STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE
FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The peoples right to be informed and to be
able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of
the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people
affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not
be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.
ACCORDINGLY, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the

multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor
Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No.
10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011. Right
to fair trial v. freedom of the press. Right to fair trial v.
freedom of the press.
Prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the righto a
fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that
there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32
journalists and media practitioners were killed on their way
to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident
came to be known as Maguindanao massacre spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of
rebellion against 197 accused. Almost a year later on
November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims,
individual journalists from various media entities and
members of the academe filed a petition before this court
praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial
in this criminal cases be allowed, recording devises be
permitted inside the court room to assist the working
journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to
govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for radio and television
coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre should be
allowed.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court partially grants pro hac

vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial
court proceedings, subject to certain guidelines as
enumerated. The present petition which asserts the
exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,
right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to
petition the government for redress of grievances, right of
free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject
to regulations to be issued by the Court. Respecting the
possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of
trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a
fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test,
applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v.
Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not
per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere

fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to

actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a
fair trial.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win
situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied
rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity
of judicial proceedings. Indeed, the Court cannot gloss
over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the
abstract discussion of key constitutional precept into the
workable context. Technology per se has always been
neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need finetuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage
and furtherance of the various rights involved, within the
guidelines.