HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CHAPTER 3

Cross-Examination
The questioning of a witness or party during a trial, hearing, or deposition by the party oppo
sing the one who asked the person to testify inorder to evaluate the truth of that person's te
stimony, to develop the testimony further, or to accomplish any other objective. The interrog
ationof a witness or party by the party opposed to the one who called the witness or party, u
pon a subject raised during direct examinationtheinitial questioning of a witness or party
on the merits of that testimony.
When does cross-examination happen?
The board principle is that where a witness has been called by a party and taken the
oath/affirmation, then whether or not examination-in-chief occurs, the other party or parties
have the right to cross-examine.
This will occur immediately after examination-in-chief, it can occur when a witness is
tendered for cross-examination. This arises when the party calling a witness does not wish
to ask that witness any question themselves, but nevertheless calls the witness so that
he/she can be sworn and then cross-examined if the other party chooses. This is a matter
that is discussed between counsel before the trial starts.
Who can cross-examine?
A witness can be cross-examined by the opponent of the party calling the witness and any
other party to the proceedings, e.g. co-defendants. You cannot cross-examine your own
witness unless he/she has been declared hostile by the judge
Who may be cross-examined?
All witnesses can be cross-examined except:

A witness required by witness summons merely to produce a document;

A witness called and sworn by mistake because it is discovered before he/she begins
examination-in-chief, or where the questioning has barely begun, that they are
unable to give evidence on the matter in question;

A witness called by the judge (very unusual).

Purpose of cross-examination
The purpose of cross-examination is three-fold:
1. To elicit evidence in support of your case;
2. To cast doubt on, or undermine the witnesss evidence so as to weaken your
opponents case, and to undermine the witnesss credibility;
3. To put your case and challenge disputed evidence
Types of questioning in cross-examination

Leading questions are permitted/to be encouraged;

Counsel has a duty not to waste the courts time and money on irrelevant matters;

The judge has the discretion to prevent cross-examination, which is unnecessary,

improper or oppressive;

You must also be aware of the relevant provisions in Code of Conduct

Cross-examination on credibility
One of the aims of cross-examination is to cast doubt on, and undermine the witnesss
evidence. Questions can therefore be put in cross-examination with a view to attacking the
credibility of the witness. The credibility of a witness depends upon the witnesss:

Knowledge of the facts to which he/she testifies;

Disinterest;

Integrity;

Veracity (i.e. truthfulness), and

Duty to speak the truth by virtue of the oath.

When cross-examining as to credit there are certain limits placed on the extent to which you
are entitled to cross-examine and the manner in which you are entitled to cross-examine.
The general rule is that answers relating to collateral matters (i.e. matters going only to
credit and which are otherwise irrelevant to the issues in the case) are final. This is known as
the rule of finality of answers to questions on collateral matters.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23305

June 30, 1966

BENEDICTO C. LAGMAN, doing business under the firm name and style "MARCO
TRANSIT", petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, its officers and/or agents, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Antonio J. Villegas for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman originally filed, on 6 August 1964, with this Court a petition
for declaratory relief seeking a declaration of his rights under the so-called "provincial bus
ban" ordinance (No. 4986, approved on 13 July 1964 by the City Mayor) of respondent City of
Manila, with prayer for writs of preliminary and permanent injunctions to restrain and enjoin

said respondent, its officers and/or agents, from enforcing and implementing said ordinance.
At first, this Court, in its resolution dated 11 August 1964, dismissed said petition without
prejudice to action, if any, in the lower court; but, upon herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental petition to convert said petition into one for prohibition,
on the ground, among others, that respondents have been actually enforcing said ordinance
effective 17 August 1964, this Court reconsidered its first resolution, gave due course to the
petition and required respondents to answer. This Court did not, however, issue the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for.
As disclosed by the record, the facts are:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Service Commission
(by a decision, dated 20 March 1963, in PSC Case No. 61-7383) to operate for public service
fifteen (15) auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of
passengers and freight, on the line Bocaue (Bulacan) Paraaque (Rizal) via Meycauayan,
Marilao, Obando, Polo, Malabon, Rizal, Grace Park, Rizal Avenue, Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz
Bridge, Taft Avenue, Libertad, Pasay City and Baclaran, and vice versa. Within Manila, the
line passes thru Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, McArthur Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P. Burgos, Taft
Avenue and Taft Avenue Extension. Pursuant to said certificate, petitioner, who is doing
business under the firm name and style of "Marco Transit", began operating twelve (12)
passenger buses along his authorized line.
On 17 June 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to Section
18, paragraph hh, of Republic Act No. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila), that reads:
The Municipal board shall have the following legislative powers:
(hh) To establish and regulate the size, speed, and operation of motor and other
public vehicles within the city; to establish bus stops and terminals; and prohibit and
regulate the entrance of provincial utility vehicles into the city, except those passing
thru the city."
enacted Ordinance No. 4986, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic On Roads and Streets
Within The City of Manila, and For Other Purposes", which the City Mayor approved, on 13
July 1964, effective upon approval thereof. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance, insofar
as it affect the certificate of public convenience of petitioner, are quoted below, to wit:
SECTION 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical traffic congestion in the City
of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best
interest of public welfare and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations
are hereby Promulgated:
RULE 1. DEFINITIONS
A. Definition of Terms. When used in this ordinance and in subsequent ordinance
having reference thereto, unless the context indicates otherwise:
(a) The terms "provincial passenger buses" and provincial passenger
jeepneys' shall be understood to mean those whose route (or origin-

destination) lines come from or going to points beyond Pasay City, Makati,
Mandaluyong, San Juan, Quezon City, Caloocan City and Navotas.
RULE II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF PROVINCIAL PASSENGER BUSES AND JEEPNEYS
1. Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be allowed to enter
Manila, but only through the following entry points and routes, from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30
P.M. every day except Sundays and Holidays:
(a) Those coming from the north shall enter the city through Rizal Avenue;
turn right to Mt. Samat; right to Dinalupihan right to J. Abad Santos; left to
Rizal Avenue towards Caloocan City;
(n) Those coming from the south through Taft Avenue shall turn left at Vito
Cruz; turn right to Dakota; turn right to Harrison Boulevard; turn right to Taft
Avenue; thence proceed towards Pasay City;
RULE III. FLEXIBLE SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE
1. In order that provincial commuters shall not be unduly inconvenienced as a result
of the implementation of these essential traffic control regulations, operators of
provincial passenger buses shall be allowed to provide buses to shuttle their
passengers from their respective entry control points, under the following conditions:
(a) Each provincial bus company or firm Shall be allowed such number of
shuttle buses proportionate to the number of units authorized it, the ratio to
be determined by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau, based on his observations
as to the actual needs of commuters and traffic volume; in no case shall the
allocation be more than one shuttle bus for every 10 authorized units, or
fraction thereof.
(b) No shuttle bus shall enter Manila unless the same shall have been
provided with identification stickers as required under Rule IV hereof, which
shall be furnished and allocated by the Chief, Traffic Control Bureau to each
provincial bus company or firm.1wph1.t
(c) All such shuttle buses are not permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or
drop passengers along the way but must do so only in the following places:
(1) North
(a) J. Abad Santos corner Rizal Avenue, or vicinities
(3) South
(a) Harrison Boulevard, between Dakota and Taft Avenue
GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 4. Any violation of the provisions of this ordinance and of any other ordinance
regulating traffic in the city, shall be punished by a fine of not less than P20.00, nor
more than P200.00, or by imprisonment for not less than five (5) days nor more than
six (6) months, or both such fine or imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
On 17 August 1964, the Mayor of respondent City of Manila, through its police agencies,
began actual enforcement of said ordinance and prevented petitioner from operating his
buses, except two (2) "Shuttle" buses, along the line specified in his certificate of public
convenience.
Petitioner Lagman claims in his original and supplemental petitions that the enactment and
enforcement of Ordinance No. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
Thus, he contends that the routes within Manila through which he has been authorized to
operate his buses are national roads or streets, and the regulation and control relating to the
use of and traffic of which (roads) are vested, under Commonwealth Act No. 548, in the
Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; but, since said ordinance was not proposed nor approved by the executive
officials mentioned in said Act, its enactment and enforcement is a usurpation of the latter
officials' functions, and said ordinance is, therefore, unauthorized and illegal.
He also contends that the power conferred upon respondent City of Manila, under said
Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, does not include the right to enact an
ordinance such as the one in question, which has the effect of amending or modifying a
certificate of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission because any
amendment or modification of said certificate is solely vested by law in the latter
governmental agency, and only after notice and hearing (Sec. 16[m], Public Service Act); but
since this procedure was not adopted or followed by respondents in enacting the disputed
ordinance, the same is likewise illegal and null and void.
He further contends that the enforcement of said ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and
unreasonable because the city streets from which he had been prevented to operate his
buses are the cream of his business.
He finally contends that, even assuming that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid, it is only the Public
Service Commission which can require compliance with its provisions (Sec. 17[j], Public
Service Act), but since its implementation is without the sanction or approval of the
Commission, its enforcement is also unauthorized and illegal.
In his memorandum, petitioner adds as contention therefor that although his buses fall
within the definition of the term "provincial passenger buses" under the disputed ordinance
his route line having terminal outside the City of Manila and its immediate suburbs they
merely "pass thru the city"; hence, its operation is covered within the saving clause of the
above-quoted Section 18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, and he should not have
been prevented from operating his buses within the city streets specified in his certificate of
public convenience.
On the other hand, respondent City of Manila, in its answer to the original and supplemental
petitions, maintains that its power to "prohibit and regulate the entrance of provincial public
utility vehicles into the City, except those passing thru the City", as provided in its charter, is
an explicit delegation of police power which is paramount and superior both with respect to

the administrative power of the Director of Public Works, under Commonwealth Act No. 548,
to regulate and control the use of, and traffic on, national roads or streets and to the
administrative authority of the Public Service Commission, under Section 16 (m), of the
Public Service Act, to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience.
It also maintains that the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 have been repealed by
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 917; and, even assuming that the former has not been so
repealed by the latter, Ordinance No. 4968 does not contravene Commonwealth Act No. 548
because, even assuming that a repugnancy or conflict exists between this Act and Section
18 (hh) of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, the latter provisions prevails over the former.
Republic Act No. 409 being a special law and of later enactment. Neither does Republic Act
No. 409 contravene Section 16 (m) of the Public Service Act, Section 17(j) of the latter Act
having imposed a duty in the Public Service Commission to require any public service to
comply with any ordinance relating thereto.
Lastly, respondent, in its reply memorandum, maintains that since petitioner admittedly
engages in business within the city limits by picking up passengers therein, his buses do not
merely pass thru the city; and they are not, therefore, covered within the saving clause of
Section 18 (hh), of Republic Act No. 409, as amended.
In our opinion, the present petition for prohibition should be denied.
First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act No. 409, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is a special law and of later enactment
than Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended), so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the
latter acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548 and
146. In Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561, this Court said:
for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule of statutory construction
that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law
or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates
of passage.
It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or
authority upon the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and
traffic on national roads or streets. This being the case, section 18 (hh) of the Manila Charter
is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.
It is a well settled principle that, because repeals by implication are not favored, a
special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law,
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. (Baga vs.
Philippine National Bank, 52 O.G. 6140).
Where a special act is repugnant to or inconsistent with a prior general act, a partial
repeal of the latter act will be implied or exception grafted upon the general act. (City
of Geneses vs. Illinois Northern Utility Co., 39 NE 2d, p. 26)

Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provisions of the Public Service
Act. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under its Section 16 (m), to
amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, yet
there is no provision, specific or otherwise, which can be found in this statute
(Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting power in the Public Service Commission to
superintend, regulate, or control the streets of respondent City or suspend its power to
license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this right or authority, as
hereinabove concluded, is conferred upon respondent City of Manila. The power vested in
the Public Service Commission under Section 16 (m) is, therefore, subordinate to the
authority granted to respondent City, under said section 18 (hh). As held in an American
case:
Ordinances designating the streets within a municipality upon which buses may
operate, or prohibiting their operation in certain streets do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission over motorbus common carriers, so long
as the ordinances do not prevent or unreasonably interfere with the utility's operation
under the certificate or franchise granted by that Commission. (Stuck vs. Town of
Beech Grove, 163 N.E. 483; 166 N.E. 153).
That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to
deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic, in the
streets subject to their control, is made evident by section 17 (j) of the Public Service Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 146) that provides as follows:
SEC. 17. Proceedings of Commission without previous hearing. The Commission
shall have power, without previous hearing, subject to established limitations and
exceptions, and saving provisions to the contrary:
(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines,
and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto,
and to conform to the duties imposed upon itthereby, or by the provisions of
its own charter, whether obtained under any general or special law of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner's contention that, under this section, the respective ordinances of the City can
only be enforced by the Commission alone is obviously unsound. Subsection (j) refers not
only to ordinances but also to "the laws of the Philippines", and it is plainly absurd to assume
that even laws relating to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of
the Commission; and the section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement of
laws and that of municipal ordinances.
The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand
compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission's powers are
merely supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the
enforcement of laws primarily rests.
Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be validly assailed as
arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence to
substantiate this charge, it is not disputed that petitioner has not been totally banned or

prohibited from operating all his buses, he having allowed to operate two (2) "shuttle" buses
within the city limits.
And finally, respondents correctly maintain that petitioner cannot avail of the saving clause
of said section 18 (hh), he having admitted that his buses engaged in business within the
city limits by picking up passengers therein; hence, they do not merely "pass thru the city".
Wherefore, the instant petition for prohibition should be as it is hereby, dismissed. With cost
against petitioner

Benedicto C. Lagman.
G.R. No. L-12592, 8 March 1918 (Supreme Court of the Philippines)
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed
affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol,
Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The complainants charged
that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in consideration of favorable decisions.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The
judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the
justice of the peace be removed from office. After filing a motion for new trial, the judge of
first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace
of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become the
defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were
libelous. The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of
them to pay a nominal fine. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review of the
evidence.
Held:
Defendants are acquitted. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith
surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The
charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper
functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest
endeavour to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good
citizenship.
History of freedom of speech in the Philippines. Freedom of speech as cherished in
democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for
revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" (The
Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non,"
which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms,
must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipino
delegates." The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of
Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Liberty to comment on the conduct of public men in free speech. The interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer

under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less
than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to
any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary -- to
any or all the agencies of Government -- public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy. (See the cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L.R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs.
Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial
conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is
wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot
criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively muzzled.
Right to assemble and petition. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear
of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
Privileged communication. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable
and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
"The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free
and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some
instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'" (Abbott vs.
National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privileged communication; qualified. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified.
With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a
prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. In the usual case malice can be
presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving
malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice. But a privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such
excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141463. August 6, 2002]
VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER
DEPUTIES and PURA KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated
January 28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47422, which dismissed the petition to prohibit Judge
Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, from issuing a writ of
demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff and deputy sheriff of the same court from
implementing an alias writ of execution. Also assailed is the resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated December 29, 1999 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689, covered by TCT Nos. 111267
and 111266, in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. This parcel of land was adjacent to certain
portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, namely, Lot 707-A and 707-B, registered in the
name of Herminigilda Pedro under TCT Nos. 16951 and 16952, respectively. On October 29,
1964, Herminigilda sold Lot 707-A and 707-B to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots
and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots.
Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, who purchased a portion of Lot 707-A-2,
Lot 5, Block 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC), Psd-42965. The parcel is now #33 Doa Regina
St., Regina Village, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The other portions were registered in the
name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.
Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q12918, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano
Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang
Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an
assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for
three decades.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly
and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them:
(a) to solidarily pay the plaintiff Tandang Sora Dev. Corp. actual damages in the amount of
P20,000 with interest from date of filing of the complaint;
(b) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by
defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
(c) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own
expense;
(d) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with interest
computed from the date of filing of the complaint;
(e) to relocate the boundaries to conform with the Commissioners Report, particularly,
Annexes A and B thereof, at the expense of the defendants.[3]

10

As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners,
through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they
were occupying.
On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order dated March 30, 1998, from the
trial court stating as follows:
Before the Court for resolution is the Ex-Parte Motion For The Issuance of A Writ of
Demolition, filed by plaintiff, through counsel, praying for the issuance of an Order directing
the Deputy Sheriff to cause the removal and/or demolition of the structures on the plaintiffs
property constructed by defendants and/or the present occupants. The defendants-heirs of
Herminigilda Pedro filed their comment on the said Motion.
Considering that the decision rendered in the instant case had become final and executory,
the Court, in its Order of November 14, 1997, directed the issuance of an alias writ of
execution for the enforcement of the said decision. However, despite the service of the said
writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject property, they failed to
comply therewith, as per the Partial Sheriffs Return, dated February 9, 1998, issued by the
Deputy Sheriff of this branch of the Court. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the
structures in order to implement the said decision.
WHEREFORE, the defendants are hereby directed to remove, at their expense, all
constructions, including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiffs
property, within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Order; otherwise, this Court will issue a
writ of demolition against them.
SO ORDERED.[4]
To prohibit Judge Vivencio Baclig of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City from issuing a
writ of demolition and the Quezon City sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction on April 17, 1998. [5] Petitioners alleged that they
bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in
interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition
issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would
amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on January 28, 1999. It held that as buyers
and successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived
their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order in
Civil Case No. Q-12918. Thus, for lack of merit, the petition was ordered dismissed. [6]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition, where
petitioners aver that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-12918 CAN ALSO BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT
IMPLEADED AS PARTIES THERETO.

11

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING PETITIONERS TITLE
DESPITE THEIR BEING BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH AND INNOCENT PURCHASER AND FOR VALUE.
III.
PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CONSIDERING THAT THEY STAND TO
SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY IF ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION AND THE SPECIAL
ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT A QUO IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-12918 FOR THE DEMOLITION OF
ALL THE STRUCTURES ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WERE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT EVEN GIVEN THEIR DAY IN COURT.[7]
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may
be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for
value and builders in good faith.
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced
against them. They argue that the appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling
in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz[8] in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano
Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case No. Q-12918
even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. Petitioners submit that Medina is
not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different from the
circumstances in the present case.
In Medina, the property in dispute was registered under Land Registration Act No. 496 in
1916 and Original Certificate of Title No. 868 was issued in the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). In 1949, Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built
houses on the lot without the PRCs consent. In 1959, PRC sold the lot to Remedios
Magbanua.Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case No. C-120 to annul the
sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court dismissed
the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate the lot and surrender possession
thereof to Magbanua. The judgment became final and executory. When Magbanua had paid
for the land in full, PRC executed a deed of absolute sale in her favor and a new title was
consequently issued in her name. Magbanua then sought the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. C-120.This was opposed by petitioner Medina who alleged that she owned the
houses and lot subject of the dispute. She said that she bought the houses from spouses
Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman, while she purchased the lot from the heirs of the late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. The latter held the land by virtue of a Titulo de
Composicion Con El Estado Num. 4136, dated April 29, 1894. In opposing the execution,
Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, claiming that she was
not a party in Civil Case No. C-120, thus, she could not be considered as a person claiming
under Ramos and Mangahas.
When Medina reached this Court, we held that the decision in Civil Case No. C-120,
which had long become final and executory, could be enforced against petitioner even
though she was not a party thereto. We found that the houses on the subject lot were
formerly owned by Mangahas and Ramos who sold them to spouses de Guzman, who in turn
sold them to Medina. Under the circumstances, petitioner was privy to the two judgment
debtors Mangahas and Ramos, and thus Medina could be reached by the order of execution

12

and writ of demolition issued against the two. As to the lot under dispute, we sustained
Magbanuas ownership over it, she being the holder of a Torrens title. We declared that a
Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein,
and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens
title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to
the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with
property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears
on its face.
Medina markedly differs from the present case on major points. First, the petitioner
in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the original
action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners
acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-12918. Second, the right
over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based
on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by
the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right
over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully
recognized Torrens title.Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their
own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her predecessor-ininterest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land
under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered
property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. [9] It is our
view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the
legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case
who merely relied on a mere Titulo de Composicion.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for
value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he
pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property. [10] The determination of whether one is a buyer
in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to
determine in a petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take
into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[11] The instant case is covered by this exception to the general rule. As found by
the Court of Appeals and not refuted by private respondent, petitioners purchased the
subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising.[12]Civil Case No. Q-12918 was commenced
sometime in 1969. The Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the purchase of the land
took place prior to the institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918. In other words, the sale to
petitioners was made before Pura Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could
reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still
free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for
value.
The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? We note
that this is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could
not be done. Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the

13

first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial and even
during proceedings before the Court of Appeals.[13] Nevertheless, we deem it proper that this
issue be resolved now, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of
this case. On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is
his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. [14] As earlier discussed, petitioner
spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of
Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in
1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q12918, that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil
Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they
were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over
the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon.
[15]
Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said
case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ of
execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day
in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by
writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. [16] In our view, the spouses Victor
and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
January 28, 1999, and its resolution dated December 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing
Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition
petitioners. Costs against private respondent.

Appeals dated
No. 47422, are
the decision in
issued against

SO ORDERED.
Human Rights Law Case Digest: Stonehill V. Diokno (1967)
FACTS:

In violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code, 42 warrants were issued against petitioners or the
corporation where they are officers to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of their books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) which
are the subject of the offense.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case,
a writ of preliminary injunction be issued alleging the search warrants to be void since

14

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law
ISSUE:
W/N
the
seizure
is
valid
HELD: YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void; searches and seizures
made
are
illegal;
that
the
writ
of
preliminary
injunction
issued

the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein
may be.
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
2 points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and - not met
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. - not
met
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners

personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search
the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to
search for personal properties books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense
for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to

15

question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized
as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the
same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from
the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different
from that of the corporation.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by

the
Philippine
Department
of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case
No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio
Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the
motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice

16

(DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August
23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against
private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of
Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision
became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo
Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,-a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.

17

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the
petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case
No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will
further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be
forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or
if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they
further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused,
real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the
accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it
was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail;
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee
has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition
is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired,
thus:

18

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not
the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a
prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court,
speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available
only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara
v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional
provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance
the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth
of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that

19

the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The
vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and
crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have
been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former
Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states
gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the
right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person
to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold
the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise been
detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who
are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.

20

The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for
failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his
appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court
opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some
of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail
was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled
that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be
released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the
Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the
detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing
him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution
of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding
state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but
one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he
fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such

21

"will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting
state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall
not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of
a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged
restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that
the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on
the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only
by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and

22

convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition

cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear
and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he
is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and
his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) is a United States Supreme Court case involving
issues of privacy in balance with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
principles of freedom of speech.[
Facts of the case
In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in
their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released
unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which
two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's
ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an
article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's
experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages
against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on
Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari.
Question
Is a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected
under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the
lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that
it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court
explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press
statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or
inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.
James Hill filed suit in New York against the magazine's publisher, Time, Inc.[2] The suit
asserted Life had violated privacy law in the state, by conflating the Hill family with fictional

23

events which had not actually occurred. [2][4] The legal argument drew upon the notion
of false light as related to privacy law.[6] After an initial ruling against Life magazine, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division remanded the case for a new trial.[3] After litigation
through the court system in New York, a decision was found in favor of the plaintiff, with
damages awarded of US$30,000.[6][4]
Richard Nixon argued the Hill position before the Supreme Court.
Time, Inc. appealed the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Hill family position was
argued by lawyer Richard Nixon, who later became the President of the United States.[6] The
position of Life magazine was argued before the Court by attorney Harold R. Medina, Jr. (son
of U.S. federal judge Harold Medina). In his opening argument he asserted that the privacy
law in question in New York was unconstitutional, due to its broadness and for punitively
impacting the press for publishing factual information. [7] As a secondary argument, Medina
put forth the notion that the prior ruling in the case was inappropriate because the jury was
allowed to determine liability of Life based on the inaccuracy of the article, while neglecting
to take into account whether or not the act by the magazine was reckless or willful. [8] He put
forth the potential for a lawsuit against the press for a simple unintentional error, "It comes
down to if you treat it on a mistake basis, on truth or falsity, what has happened to the law
of libel? You don't need the law of libel any more and the safeguards. It is much easier to sue
for violation of your right of privacy. But all the defenses that have been set up in the libel
law disappear."[8]
Regarding his preparation for the case, Nixon remarked to The New York Times journalist
Fred Graham, "I locked myself up in my office for two weeks. No phone calls. No
interruptions. It takes a tremendous amount of concentration." [5] Graham later wrote of
Nixon's argumentation, "Whatever the peculiarities of Nixon's preparation, his performance
before the Court proved sound and workman-like, well within the bounds of effective oral
advoacy."[7] Nixon argued that a fictional account is not newsworthy, and therefore freedom
of the press is not impacted by the privacy law. [9] His essential premise put forth the notion
that the "fictionalization" aspect of privacy law did not harm freedom of expression.[9]
In his 1985 book The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court, author Bernard Schwartz
revealed that an initial conference had resulted in votes of 6 to 3 to affirm the judgment in
favor of the Hill family.[6][10] Justice Abe Fortas wrote a draft opinion, but it was not published
by the Court.[11][6][10]
After the 1985 publication of Schwartz's book revealed the initial draft opinion of the Court in
the case,[6][10] former President Richard Nixon requested his prior White House
Counsel Leonard Garment to investigate the matter.[12] Garment had previously worked with
Nixon as his legal partner, and assisted him during the Time, Inc. v. Hill case.[12] Garment
contributed an article to The New Yorker which reported on the research undertaken by
Nixon before each of the arguments in the case. [13][14] He recounted Nixon's response after
hearing of the verdict of the Court, "I always knew I wouldn't be permitted to win a big
appeal against the press."[13][14] Garment emphasized a comment from the dissent opinion
written by Justice Harlan, which warned undesired media attention imparted "severe risk of
irremediable harm ... [to] individuals exposed to it and powerless to protect themselves
against it."[13][14]
Following the first argument before the Court, justices changed their opinions about the
matter, and Justice Hugo Black wrote in a memo to his fellow justices, "After mature
reflection, I am unable to recall any prior case in this Court that offers a greater threat to
freedom of speech and press than this one does." [15] Justice Black emphasized that though
the media makes mistakes at times in its reporting, requiring press organizations to pay out
for claims which were not libel related to inaccuracies which did not hurt individuals'

24

reputation, would engender a situation of self-censorship.[16] A subsequent argument was

ordered, and the majority opinion shifted since the initial draft opinion. [15]
A second argument before the Court took place in October 1966. [17] Medina requested the
Court declare the privacy law in question unconstitutional, because, "[i]n this field of
privacy, I merely suggest that when it is nondefamatory and when you are talking about a
public fact, we should have the protection that the fellow who comes in to sue us must prove
both falsity and knowledge of falsity, or recklessness, and that this is a minimum, because,
mind you, this article here, the dissent in the appelate division, found it was an informative
presentation of legitimate news."[17]
In his reply to Medina's argumentation, Nixon stated, "It is our contention that in this case it
was argued by the plaintiff, it was established by the evidence, it was charged by the court,
it was found by the jury, and it was held by the courts of New York in their appeals courts,
that Life magazine lied, and that Life magazine knew that it lied. That is the proposition that
I content for here."[17]
However, the trial judge in the initial case did not provide the jury with an instruction that it
had to provide an opinion of recklessness or willful inaccuracy on the part of Life magazine
in order to yield a decision in favor of the plaintiff. [17] Medina concluded the reargument
period by emphasizing his view that in case it was determined by the Court that evidence
showed the Life magazine staff was aware of the inaccuracy of the article in question, this
lack of jury instruction was crucial. [17] Medina said that due to this failure to inform the jury of
a requirement to find willful inaccuracy on the part of Lifemagazine, "I still think I am entitled
to win."[17]
In January 1967, the Court determined in a 5-4 decision in favor of Time, Inc.
[16]
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the opinion of the Court.[16] Justice Brennan had
previously written the majority opinion in the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964;
that case ruled individual officials who were publicly known were not able to obtain claims
for inaccurate media coverage except in the case of reckless or willful reporting of said
inaccuracies.[16] In this case, Justice Brennan utilized a similar test to the matter at hand.
[16]
He permitted that Life could have a fresh trial where it could be determined whether or
not the magazine's reporting was reckless or willfully inaccurate. [16] Justice Brennan wrote
about the balance between freedom of speech and exposure to public view:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or
comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only
pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter
which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of
the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The
risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value
on freedom of speech and press.[16]
The majority opinion held that states cannot judge in favor of plaintiffs "to redress false
reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the
report with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth". [4] This decision had the
impact of elaborating on the "actual malice" standard of the Court's prior holding in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, to also include cases involving false light.[4]
A dissent written by Justice Fortas was joined by Justice Tom C. Clark as well as Chief
Justice Earl Warren.[12] In addition to Justice Fortas, Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote
another dissent.[12] Justice Harlan observed that as Hill was not a public individual, he was
unable to obtain significant viewership for a potential response. [12] He pointed out that this
created a problem of "unchallengable untruth", and stated a necessity would have been to
request Hill prove negligence on the part of Life magazine's editorship in their falsehoods, as
opposed to the more stringent test of proving that the inaccuracy was actually reckless or
willful.[12]

25

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board

No. 74-773
Argued October 14, 1975
Decided March 3, 1976
424 U.S. 507
Syllabus
When striking members of respondent union picketed in front of their employer's leased
store located in petitioner's shopping center, the shopping center's general manager
threatened them with arrest for criminal trespass if they did not depart, and they left. The
union then filed unfair labor practice charges against petitioner, alleging that the threat
constituted interference with rights protected by 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), concluding that the NLRA had been
violated, issued a cease and desist order against petitioner, and the Court of Appeals
enforced the order. Petitioner and respondent union contend that the respective rights and
liabilities of the parties are to be decided under the criteria of the NLRA alone, whereas the
NLRB contends that such rights and liabilities must be measured under a First Amendment
standard.
Held:
1. Under the present state of the law, the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no
part to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here did not have a First Amendment
right to enter the shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against their
employer. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551. Pp. 424 U. S. 512-521.
2. The rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent exclusively upon the NLRA, under
which it is the NLRB's task, subject to judicial review, to resolve conflicts between 7 rights
and private property rights and to seek accommodation of such rights "with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other," NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 351 U. S. 112. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may
reconsider the case under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone. Pp. 424 U. S. 521-523.
501 F.2d 161, vacated and remanded.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
Page 424 U. S. 508
POWELL, filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 424 U. S. 523.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 424 U. S. 524. MARSHALL, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 424 U. S. 525. STEVENS, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

26

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