CHAPTER13

THE END OF THE CLASSICAL

The End of the
Beginning, the End
ofthe End

'"' m

a..&SSfQl

Architccture from the fifteenth century to the prescnt ha~ bet>n under the influence of three
ficuon~." Nom~thstandmg the apparent succession of architectural styles. cach "ith its
0\\11 label-classicism. neoclassicism, romanticisrn. modcrnism. postmodernism. and
so on into the futurc-thcsc lhr('(' fictiorn; have persisted in one form or another for five
h11nd red years. They are represe11tation, reaso11, and his101y. 1 Each of the fictions hat.I ;in
underlying purposc: rcprcscntalion was to emhody the idea of meaning: rcason was lo codify
the idea of Lruth: history was to recover the idea of the timeless from the idea of change.
Because of !he persistcncc of these categorie~. it \\ill be necessal') to considcr this period
as manifesting a continuity 111 architectural thought. TI1is continuous mode of thought can
be reforred to as 11!1: classical.1
ll was not until the late twentieth century that thc classical could be appreciated asan
abstract system ofrelations. Such rccognilion occuntd because the architecturc of tbe early
part o thc twent ieth ce11lury ltself carne to be considcrcd part ofhistory. Thus il is now pos
sible to sec that. although stylistically different from previous architcclures, "modem"
architecture exhibits a ststcm of rclalions similar 10 Lhe classicaJ. Prior to lhis time. the
"classical" \V3S taken to be either S}'llOn)mous "ith ";udtitecture conceived o as a continuous
tradition from antiquity or. by the mid-nineteenth Cl'ntury. a historicizcd Sl)'ic. Todar the
pcriod of time dominated by the classical ciln Ul' ~ccn as au episteme." to emplor Fou
ca u l ~s tenn- a continuous pcriod ofknowledgc thal includes the early twcnticth ccnlury.
Despite thc proclaimcd 11.1pture in botb ideoloiy ami slylc associated wilh the Modern
Movement, the three fictions have never been qul"tioned and so remain intact. 11lis is to
say Lhat architecture sincl' tite mid-fiftecnth ccntury aspired to be a paradigm of the classic,
of that which is timekss. mta11111gfi1l. and 1me. 1n thl" <;t"nse that architecturc attcmpts to
rccovcr that which is classic. 11 can be called "classical."I
The "Fiction" of Representatlon: The Simulation of Meanlng
The first "fiction" is rcprcsentation. Before the Renaisoancc thcre was a congrul'nce o

language and representation. Tite meaning of language wa in a face ,allll". comC)~d

within representation: in other words. tite way lan~e produced m.:aning could be
represenud witliin language. Things 11..:re, muh and mcaning were selt-<"idem. The meaning
of a romauesquc or gothic cathedral was in itself it \\as de lacto. Renaiancl' buildings
on the other hand-and :ill buildiugs after thtm that pretended ro be "ardmccture"rcccived lheir value by rtpresenting an alrcady valucd architecture. by being ~unufacra
(representations of rcprcsc11tallons) of antique buildings: they were d~ 111re." lnio 111essage of
th~ past was uscd to verify thr mroning of the present. Prcc1selr becau.<e of thi< net.>d to veril)'.
Renaissance architecture was thc first simulation. an unwitting liction of thc obect.
By the late eighteenth century historical relati,ity came to supersede the ace value of
language as representation. and this view of history prompted a search for certaint). for ori
gins both historical and logical, for tnt!h and proof. and for goals. Truth was no longer
thougbt to reside in reprcscntation but was believed to exist outsidc it. in thc processes of
history. This shift can be ~Nn in the changiug status o the orders: until the seventeenth
ctntury the> were lhought to be paradigmatic and timeless: afterward thc possibility of

the ir ti melessness depended on a necessa ry historicity. This shift. as ha5 ; = bec1 ~

gested, occurred because language hacl ceasecl to intersect with representaon -r-,;.~ ?:!.
because it was not 111eanng but a message that '>vas displayed in the object.
Modern architecture clairned to rcctify and liberate itself from the Renais::.a.no:: f =
of representation by asserting that it was not necessary for architecture iO r~- .oa:::
another architecture; architecture was solely to embody its own fimction. \~ ith ilie ~
tive condusion tbat form follows function, modem architecture introduced the idea ~.2
building should express - that is. look like - its function. or like an idm of funaiOll
it should manifest the rationality of its proct>.sses of production and composition .- TI:::;:s.
in its effort to distance itself from the earlier representational traditiou, modem axcno:a:ture attempted to s trip itself of the outward trappings of "class ical" syle. This proa:s.s
reduction was caJJed abstractio11 . A column without a base and capital was thoueh: ~;;e~
abst:raction. 111us reduced, form was believed to embody function more "honestlr- 5'.xh column looked more like a real column, !he simplest possible load -ca rf)ing eleme::; :he.
one provided with a base and capital bearing arboreal or anthropomorphic motif".
This reduction to pure fUnctionality was, in fact, not abstraction; it was an atieI:;.:lC
represent reality itself ln this sense func:tional goals mere!) replaced thc orders o ,,,,..-tjcz;
composition as lhe starting poinl for arch itectmal design. T11e moderns attempt ro~
realism with an u ndecorated, functional object was a fiction equivalen! to lhe simulac-of the classical in Renaissance representation . For whaL made runction any more -i:= ,
source of imagery than elements chosen from antiquity? The idea of ftmction. in this e=
lhe message of utility as opposed to the message of anliqu ity, was raised toan o~
proposition-a self-evident starting point for design analogous to typology or hislllric::z!:
quotation. The moderns' attempt to represenl realism is, then, a manifestation ,,,! the
same Jiction wherein meaning and ''alue reside outside the world of an architecture a:: zs..
in whicl1 representation is about its own meani.ng rather than being a messag(, of ~
previous meaning.
Functionalism turned out to be yet another styl istic conclus ion; this one based Oll .i
scientific and tedmical positivism, a simulation of efficiency. From this perspecm-e ~
Modern Movemen t can be seen to be contin uous with the ard1itechire that p recede(j
Modern ard1i tecture there fore failed to embody a new val u e in itself. For i11 hying to mbi:r
a rchitettu r< form to its essence, to a p ure reality, the moderns assumed they were tnsforming the field o referential figuration to that of non-referential "objectivity." In~
howeve.r, their "objective forms never left the classical tradition. They were simply ~tJ 1p;:::e!
down dass ical forms, or forms referring to a new set of givens (function, technolo=
Thus. Le Corbusiei's houses that look like modern steamships or biplanes exhibit the ~
referential attitude toward representaLion as a Renaissance or classical building. 111e paz::""
of reference are different, but the implications for the object are the samc.
The com mitment to return moderuist abstraction to history seems to sum up. far o;:
time. thc proble m of represcntation. lt was given its "postmodem invcrsion in Ro;ie::
\'enturi's distinction between the "duck" and thc "decorated shed. "~ A duck is a buil~
that looks like its funclion or that allows its intemal order to be displayed on its exte,..<Y:- ~

U DOf 1Wl CW SKAl

decorated shcd is a building 1hat functions as a billboard, where 30) kind of imagery
(excl'pl its interna! functiou) - letters, palterns. cven architectural elemenls - convcys a
mtssage accessible to all. In this sense lhe stripped-down "abstractions" of modemism are
still referential objects: technological rather than lypological ducks.
llut the postrnodernists fail lo make another dislinction wbicl1 is exemplified in Vcnturi's
comparison of the Doges' Palace in Vcnice, which be calls a decorated shed. and Sanso
vinos library anoss 1hc Piana San Ma rco, which he says is a duck.9 TI1is obscurcs the
more significant distinction between architecturc "as is" and archilecture as mcssage. Thc
Dogcs' Palace is nota decorated shed bl'cause it was not representational o another arcbi
tecture: lts signilicance camc directly from the meaning cmbod icd in the figmes 1hem
seh'cs; i1 was an architecture as is." Sansovino's library may seem to be a duck, but only
beca use it fa lis inlo the history of library types. Thc use of the orders on Sa nsovinds library
spcaks not lo lhe function or type of the library. but rather to the rcpresenlation of a previ
ous architecture. The fas:;ides of Sansovino's library contain a rnessagc. not an inherent
mea ning; they are signhoards. Venturi's misreading ofthesc buildings seems motivated by
a prcference for the decorated shcd. Whilc the replicalion of lhe orders had signilicance in
Sansovins rime {in thal lhey definc<l the classical), tlic replicalion of lhc same orders
today has no significance because the valuc S)'Stem representcd is no longer "alued. A sign
begins to replicate or. in )can Baudrillard's tem1, "simulate once the rl'ality it reprcsents
is dcad.' Wlacn there is no longer a distinction between representation and realily. when
reality is only simulation. then representarion loses its a priori source of significanc!', and
it. loo, hecomes a simu lation.

Tbe "fiction" of Reason: The Simulation of Truth

The sccond "fiel ion of post-medieval architeclure is reason. lf representalion was a simu
lation of the mcaning of the present through the message of antiquity, then reason was a
simu lation of the meaning o the truth through the message of scicnce. This fiction is
slrongly manife~i in l\entielh-century ardlitecture, as it is in that of the four prcceding
cenniries; its apogee was in the Enlighlcnmenl. The quesl for origin in architecture is the
inilial manicstation of the aspiration 1oward " rational sourcc for design. Before the
Renaissance the idea of origin was seen as self-evident it~ me411ing and importancc "wenl
without saying"; il belonged loan a priori universe of valucs. In the Renaissancc, \vith the
loss of a self-cvident unherse of values. origins were sought in nalural or divine sources or in
a c:osmological or anthropomorphic geomeay. l11c reproduction of1hc image ofthe Virruvian
man is tbe most renowned example. Not surprisingl. since the origin was thoughl 10 con
ta in lhe seeds of the objecfs purposc and thus its destination. this belief in the exislence
of an ideal origin led dircctly 10 a beliefin the exislence oan id~al end. Such a genelic idea
ofbeginning/end depended on a beliefin a universal plan in nature and the cosmos which,
through the application of classical rules of composition concerning hierarchy, order, and
d osure, would confer a hacmony of lhc whole upon the parts. The perspecrh'e of the end
thus directed the srrategy for beginning. TI1crefore. as Alberti first defined il in Odia Pitwra
composition was not an opcncnded or neulral process of !Tansfonnation. but rather a

strategy for arriving ata predetermined goal; it was the mecbanism bv wh'cl = ~
order, represented in lhe orders, was translated in to a specic fo1m. Reaain~ .. p~
cosmological goals of Renaissance composition, Enlightenment arcbitecrur "'~
rational process of design whose ends were a product of pure. secular reason ratM-d:=
divine or<ler. The Renaissance vision of barmony (faith in tbe dMne) led rurunllv ID
scbeme of arder that was lo replace it (faith in rea son) , which was the logical dete mm
of form frorn a priori types.
Durand embodie.s this moment ofthe supreme authmity of reason. In his ueatL--e; - ~
orders become type forms. ancl natural and divine origins are replaced by rational sofo ...
to the problems ofaccommodation and constiuction. The goal is a sociall) "rele= a::=
tecture; it is attained through the rational trausformation of typl? fonns. l..ater, 1' :e
nineteenth and carly twcntieth ceuturies, fuuction aud technique replaced dk catak-;i:e
type forms as origins. But lhe point is that from Du rand on, it was belie\ed that e ...ro. *
reason- the same process used in science. mathematics, and tcchnology- \\as e:;~
producing a truthful (that is. meaningf.I) architectural object. And with tbe success of~
nalism as a sdentific method (one could almost ca ll it a "style"ofthought) in tbe~........,.....
and early n ineleenlh centuries, architecture adopted the self.e,~dent values conferre:
rational orgins. lf an archtecture looked rational-that is. rcprescntcd rationali-.- --=
bdieved to rcprcscnl truth. As in Jogic, al the point where ali deductions de\eloped a11 initial premse corrobora:te that premise. there is logical closu re and, il was belierc:C. CE:
tJin truth. Moreover, in this procedure the primacy of the 01igi11 remains intact. The n!ll>
na! became the moral and aesthetic basis of modern architecture. And the reprt>sen?>,o;--"'
task o architecture in an age of reaso n was to portray its own modeos of knowing.
At this point in the evolution ofconsciousness someth ing occurred: reason turna! s:s
focus onto itselfand thus began the process ofits own undoing. Queostioning its "11 ~
ami mocle of knowing, reason exposed itself to be a fiction." The proccsses for 1..-nowu:::=measurement, Jogical proof, causality- tu.rned out to be a network of value-laden ~
ments, no more than effective modes of persuasion. Values were dependen! on ano:ber
tclcology, anothe r end fiction, Lhat of rationality. EssenLially, then, nothing had ~
changed from the Rcna issancc idea of origin . Whclhcr the appeal was to a divine o:-:mtural order. as in the fteenth century. orto a rational technique a11d t)pological fnC'11ln. a:
in Lhe post-Enlightenment period, it ulti mateJy amounted to the same thing- to the jea
that architecture's value <lerived from a source outside itself. Function and type \\CJ'c valuc-laden origins equivalent to <Ihine or natural ones.
In this second "ction the crisis ofbelief in reason eventually undennined the P' wu
of sclf.evidcnce. As reason began lo turn on itself, to queslion its ow11 status, its autl.~
to convey truth, its power to prove, began to evaporate. The analysis of anal) sis re\'e--1.
that logic cou ld not do wbat reason had claimed for it-revea l the self-evident tn1th of
origins. What botb the Renaissance and the modern relied on as the basis of trurr ,-zs
found to requre, in Pssence, faith . Ana lysis wa s a form of simulation: knowledge ~ 2
OC\\ religion. Similarly. it can be sccn that architccturc ncvcr cmbodied reason: ne
only s tate the des ire to do so; there is no ard1itectural image of reason. Arcbitecture ~

senled an aesthetic of the expeiience of (the persuasiveness of and desire for) reason.
Analysis, and the llusion of proof, in a continuous process thal recalls Nietzsche's charac
terization of .. trnth," is a ueverending series of figures, metaphors, and metonymies:
/11 a cognitive environment i11 which reason lias been revealed to depend 011 a belief i11 lmowl
edge, therefore to be irreducibl met(lphoric. a dussiml architccture- that is, an arc/1itecture w/1ase
proccsses of traniformatio11 are va/ue-/ade11 strategies grow1ded on self-evide11t ora priori originstvill alwo ys be a11 arcltitectu" of restatement a11d not of represmtatio11, no matter liow i ngeniously
tJie 01igins are sele.cted for tl1is tra11sfom1atio11, 1101 /1ow inl'entive tlie lrcl/1sfonnatio1i is.
Architectural rcstalcmeul. replication. is a nostalgia for the seauity ofknowing. a belief
in the contimtity of\Vestern lhought. Once analysis and reason replaccd sel f-evidcncc as thc
means by which tmth was rcvcaled, the classic or timeless gua lity of huth ended and the
need for verification began.
The "Fiction" of History: The Simulation of the Timeless
l11e tbird "fiction" of cfassical Western architecture is that of history. Prior to the mid-fifteenth
cenlury, lime was conccived nondialecticall}~ from antiguity to the Middle Ages there was no

concept of the "rorward movemeut" oflime. Arl did nOl seek its justification in tcrms ofthe
past or future; il was ineffable and timeless. Jn ancient Greece the temple and the god were
one and the same; architecturc was divine and na tural. For this reason it appeared "classic"
to the "dassical" epoch that followed. The dassic could not be represented or simulated. it
could on ly be. In its straightfonvard assertion of itsclf it was nondialectical and timeless.
In midfifteenth century the idea of a tempqral origin emerged, and with it the idea of
the past. This intenupted the eternal cycle of time by positing a fi.xed point of beginning.
Hencc the loss of the timeless, for the existence of origin requi red a temporal reality. The
attempt of the dassical to recover the timcless tumed, paradoxically, to a time-bound con
cept ofhistory as a source oftimelessness. Moreover, the consciousness oftime's forward
movement carne to "explain" a prncess ofhistorical change. By the nineteenth centtir) this
process was secn as "dialectical.u With dialectical time carne the idea of the zeitgeist, with
cause and effect rooted in presentness-that is, with an aspired-to timelessness of the present. ln addition to its aspiration to timelessness. the "spirit of the age" held that an a pri
ori relationship existed between history and ali its manifestations at 3ll}' given moment. lt
was necessary only to identify the governing spiril to know what style of a1chitectute was
properly ex-pressive of. and relevant to, !he time. Implicit was the notion that man shonld
always be "in harmony"-or at least in a non-disjunctive relation - with his time.
In its polcmic rejection of the histo1y that preceded it, the Modern Movement
attempted to appeal to values for tls (harmonic) relationship othcr than those that embodied
the eternal or universal. In seeing itself as superseding the values of the preceding architecture, tbe Modern Movement substituted a universal idea of relevance for a universal idea
o [ history, analysis of progr;un for analysis of history. lt presumed itself to be a va lue-free
and collective form of inten'ention, as opposed to the virtuoso individualism and informed
connoisseurship personified by lhe post-Renaissance architect. Relevance in modern a.rchitecture carne to lie in embodying a va lue other than the natural or divine; the zeitgeist was

Q:OO!TAllWSIW

seen to be contingent and of the present, rather than as absolure and e.ermi
difference in value between prcsenlness and the uni\'ersal -between the tO!llC -~
o 1he zetgest and the elernal \'alue of the dassical-only re<ultt<i n )t: aoc<:ie= s:t
fact, smply the opposte set) of acsthctic preferences. The presumabl' ncu:n1 ,,.......-. cE.
"epochal will" supported asymmt'try '-er symmetry. dynamism O\'er ,1abili:-. a~
hierarchy over hierarcby.
The imperatives of thc "historical momcnt" are always evidcnt in the c:mma:=
betwecn the representatlon o thc fu nction of architccture and ils fonn . Ironical!}. mc,architecture, by invoking the zcitgeist rather than dong away with history. only C'OO"-ime::
to actas the .. midwife to historically significan! form." In this sense modern archi:ec=
was not a rupture with hislory. but simply a moment in the same conunuum. a episode in the cvolution othc zeitgeist. And architecture's represemauon of 1t$ pa."'ricrlzeitgeist turned out to be kss "modem than orgnally thought.
One o the questions that may be asked is why the moderns <lid not S!'e th<!m..~ i=
1his continuity. One ans,~er is thal the idcology ofthe zeitgest bound them to their prese:::
history with the promise to rclease them from their past history; tl1ey 111ere 1d~~
trappt:d in the ill11sio11 oftl1e etemity of il1eir 011111 time.
111e late twentieth century, with its retrospective knowledge th31 modemism r~s
become history, has inheritecl nothing lcss than 1he recognition of 1hc end o the ablit\ af
a classical or refcrenLial architecture to express its own time as timelcss. The illusory umelessness of the present brings wi1h t an awareness of the limeful nature of past time. lt i.:;
for this reason that the representalion o a zeitgeist always implies a simulation; it is seer
in the classical use o 1he replicalio11 of a past time to invoke the timeless as thc expressior. ot
3 prest11I time. Thus, in the zeilgeist argument. therc will always be this unacknowledged
paradox. a smulation of the timeless tl1rough the replication of the timeful.
Zeitgeist history. too, is subject to a questioning of its own authority. How can it be
possible, from wthin history. to determine a timeless truth of irs spirit? Thus history
ceases lobean objective source of truth: origins and ends once again lose 1heir u11iversal
ity (that is, their self-evidenl vahre) and. likc history, bccome fictions. 1f it is no longer possible to pose the problem of architec1urc in terms of a zcitgeist-that is if orchitecture can
no longer assert its relevance through a consonance with its zeitgcist-thcn il must turn
to sorne other slructure. To escape such a dependence on the zcitgcist-tl1at is. tl1e idea
that the purpos<: of an architectural style is to embody the spirt of its age- il is necessal)
to propose an alternative idea of architecture. one whereby it is no longer the purpose of
architecture, but irs ine~itab1liiy. to cxpress its own time.
Once the traditonal values of classical architecture are understood as not meaningful,
true, and tmeless. it must be concluded that these classical values were cJ/IV(lys simulations
(and are not merely seen to be so in light of a presen1 rupturc ofhistory or the present dis
illusionmem with the zeitgcist). lt becomes clear that the classica\ itself was a simulation
that architecture sustained for livc hundred years. Because the classical did nol recognize
1tst!lf as a simulation, it sought to rcprcsent extrinsic values (which il cou ld not do) in the
~ise of its own reality.

The result. thcn. of seeing classicism and modemism as part of a single historical con
tinuity is the understanding th;it lherc are no longer any self-cvident values in representation.
reason, or history to confer legitimacy on the object. TI1is loss of sdf.evdenl valuc allows
the timeless lo be cut free from thc meaningful and the truthfuL lt pcrmirs lhe ;iew that
there is no one truth (a timeless lruth). or onc meaning (a timeless meaning}. but merely
the timeless. When the possibihl:) is raiscd that the nmeless can be cut adrift from the
limeful (history). so too can thc timelcss be cut away from universality to produce a time
lessness which is no1 u11ivcrsal. This separation makes it unimportant whethcr origins are
na rural or dhinc or fi.mctional; tlitts. il is no longer nccessary 10 produce a classic-that is,
a timeless-architecture b) recoursc to thc dassical valucs inherent in representation, reason,
and histOl).
The Not- Classlcal: Architecture as Flctlon

TI1e necessity of the quotation marks around thr term "fiction" is now obvious. The three
'ictions jusi discussed can be seen not as fictions but rather as simulations. As has bccn
:>aid. fiction becomes simulation when it does not recognize its condition as fiction, when it
:ries to simula ti' a condition of reality. truth. or non-fiction. The simulation of representation
m architecture has led, first of ali , toan excessive conccntration of inven li\'C cnergies in thc
representational objcct. Whcn colurnns are seen as SLJrrogates oftrees ancl wirtclows rescm
ble the portholes of ships. architcclural elements become representalional figures canying
an inordinate burclcn of mcaning. 1n othcr disciplines representation is not the only pur
po<:e of figuration. In literarurc. for example. metaphors and similes hai;c a "ider range of
application-poetic, ironic. and thc like-and are not limited to allegorical or referential
functions. Conversely. in architcctur~ only one aspecl of the figure is tra<litionally al work:
tbject reprcscnta tion. n1e architectural figure always a li udes to-aims al the represen tal ion
' -sorne othcr object, whethcr architectural, anthropomorphic. natural, or technological.
Second, the simulation of rcason in architecrure has been based 011 a dassical valuc
!"en 10 the idea of truth. But Heidegger has notcd that error has a trajeclol') parallcl to
:ruth. that error can be thc unfolcling of truth. 'J Tinas to proceed from "error or ficlion is
o counter consciously the tradtion of "mis-reading" on which thc classical unwittingly
~pendcd-nol a presuruedly logic.al lransformation o something a priori, but a deUber
~ error" stated as such. one whch presupposcs only its own interna! 1rutl1. En-or in this
a..~ doe~ not asswne the same valut' as trulh; it is not simpl)' its dialectical opposite. ll is
u:;.;.re like a dissimulation, a nolcontaining" of the value of truth.
FUlally, thc simulated fiction ofModem Movemcnt history, umvittingly inherited from
d:e classical, was that any present-day architecturc must be a rcflection oits zeitgeist; Lhat
' :uchitecture can simultaneously be about presenlness and universality. But if architcc:-.. ;; inevitably about lhe itwcntion of fictions. it should also be possible to propose an
rcnitecrure that embodies an other fiction. one thal is not sustained by the values of pres
cn;:ess or universality and, more importantly, that docs not consider its purpose to refiect
Ce.e \'alues. This other fiction/object, then, dearly should eschew the ficlions of the das
ge frepresentation, reason. and history). which are attempts to Nsolve" the problem of

architecnll"e rationall)~ for strategics and solutions are ves tiges of a goal-0n enred ~~ -=
the world. lfthis is Lhe case. Lhe question becomes. What can be the model for archr:rc;-;17
whcn thc esscnce of what was efecUve in the classical model-the presumed re~
value of structures, representations. methodologes o[ origins and ends. a.nd ~
processes-has been shown to be a simulation?
Jt is not possible to answer such a queston with an altem ative modeL But a series cf
characterstcs Glll be proposed lhal typify this apoda, this loss in our capaci~ toco~
tualize a new model for architechire. These characteristics, outlined below, arise from thi!
which cannot be: thcy forrn a structure of absences.' The purpose in proposing them tS nat
to reconstitute what has just been dismissecl, a model for a t11eory of architecture-for ~
such models are ultimately futile. Rather what is bcing proposed is an expansion ~-on:!
the limilaUons presented by the classical model to the realizalion of arcliict11rt as " 1n&cpendeut discours~. free o externa! values- classical or any other-that is, the illlerse...~
of the meaningjree, the arbitrary. ancl thc timeless in the artificial.
The meaning-ree, arbitra~. and timeless c1'eation of artificiality in th is sen se mus: be
distinguished from what Baudrillard has called .. simulation":'; it is notan attempt to er~
the dassical distinction between reality and representation-thus again making :m:h=ture a set of conventions simulating the real; il is, rather, more like a ilissimulaior_
Whereas simula!ion allempts to obliterate the difference between real and imagin aT\ D
simulation leaves untouchecl the difference between reality and illuson. The relatio~'-..i;;
between dissimulation and reality is similar to the signification embodied in the mas..l;; tbe
sign of pretending to be no/ what one is-that is, a sign whicl1 seems not to s ignify 3"J
thing besides itself (the sign of a sign, or the negation of what is behind it). Such a:!.:;,..
simulation in architecture can be given the provisional title of the "notclassical : As d:<
simulation is not the inverse, negative, oropposite of simulation, a "notdassical" archi~~
is not the inverse, negative, or opposite. of class ical arcbitecture; it is merely different from a;
other than. A "not-dassical" aTchitecture is no longer a certification of cxperience or a~
tion of history. reason, or reality in the present. lnstead, it may more appropriately be descr..!ie:
asan other manifestation, an architecture as is, now as a fiction. It is a reprcscntation ofitsf.
of its own valucs and interna) experience.
The claim that a "notclassical" architecture is necessary, that t is proposed by the neepoch or the rupture in the continuity of history. would be another zeitgeisl argument. The
"notdassical" rnercl) proposes an end lo the dominance of classical values in ordc-r w
reveaJ other values. ft proposes, nota new value ora new zeitgeist, but merely another condition-one of reacling architecture as a text. There is nevertheless no question that li;:S
idea of the reading of architecture is initiated by a zeitgeist argument that today the cb <sical signs <u-e no longer significant and have become no more than replications. A r-"':d assical" arc;hitectme is. therefore, not unresponsive to the realization of the dosure inherent in the world; rather, it is unresponsive to 1epresenting it.

00 OF m O.USJUl

The End of the Begi nning

.\n origm of 1alue implies a stale ora condition of origin before valuc has been gil-en to it.
A beginning is such a condition prior lo a valued origin. 1n order to reconstruct tbe time
!ess the state of as is. of face va lue . one must begin: bcgin by eliminating thc lime-bound
concepts of the classicaJ. which are primarily origin and end. The cnd of the beginning is
abo the e nd of the beginning of valuc. But it is not possible to go back to thc carlier, preh1'1oric state of gyace, thc Eden of timelcssness before origins and cnds were valued. \Ve
must begin in lhc present- withOll l necessarily giving a value to presentncss. The attempt
to reconstruct the timeless today must be a fiction which recognizcs the fictional ity o its

'''11 task-that is , it should nol attempt to simulate a limcless reality.

As has been suggested above, latent in Lhc dassical appeal to origi11s is the more gen-

eral problem of cause and elfect. This formula, part of the fictions of reason and histot;.
rt'duces architE'ct11re loan "added 10" or incssentiaJ object by making it simply an cffect
of certain causes trndcrstood as origins. This problem is inhcrent in ali of classical architecrure. induding its modernist aspee!. The idea of architcctul'e as something "aclded to" rather
:han somethrng with its own being - as adjectival rather than nominal or ontological!eads to the perccption of architecturc as a practica! de..-icc. As long as architecture is primarily

a de\icc designated for use and for shelter-that is, as long as il has origin~ in programmatic
functions- il will alwas 'onstilule an effect.
But once this "sclf.evident" characlcristic of architectme is dismissed and archltccture
is seen as having no a priori origins -whether functional. divine. or nalur~l-altemative
+lctions for the origin can be proposed: for example. one that is arbilm1')'. one that has no
enernal value dcrived from meaning. truth, or timelcssness. lt is possiblc to imagine a
beginning internally consistent but no1 c.onditioncd by or contingent on historie origins
with supposedly S(lf-evident values.'7 Thus, while classical origins were thought to have
their source in a divine or natural ordE'r and modem origins were held to derive their value
from deductive reason , "not-dassical' origins can be strictly arbitrar)". simply starting
j)'lints. without value. They can be artificial and rclative, as opposed 10 natural, divine, or
uni..-ersal. '~ Sud1 artificiality delermined beginnings can be free of universal values
l>ecause they are merely arbitrary points in time, when the ard1ilcclural process commences. One l'xample of an artificia l Ol'igln is a graft, as in the genetic insertion of an alen
body into a hosl to provide a new rcs ult. ', As opposed to a collage ora monta ge. which lives
'"ithin a context a11d alludes lo an origin, a grafi is an im'ented site, which does not so
much have objecl characteristics as thosc o process. A graft is not in itself genetically arlll
nry. lis arbitrariness is in its freedom frorn a valuc system of non-arbitrariness (that is,

the classical). 11 is arbitrary in its provision of a choice of reading which brings no exlernal
;alue to the process. Bul further. in its artificial and relative nature a graft is not in itself
necessarily an achievable result, bul mcrely a site tha1 contains motivation for aclion - that
:s. the beginni ng of a process.' 0
).!otivation lakes something arbitrary - thal is, something in its artificial state which
not obedient toan externa! Slrttclure of values - and implies an action anda movement
concerning an interna! structwe which has an inherent order and an interna! logic. This

;<

raises the question of the motivation or purposc from an arbitrary origin. How can sorne-

thing be arbitrary and non-goal-oricnted butstill be intcrnally motivatcd? Every state h

be argued, has a motivation toward its own being-a motion rather than a direction !lb"t
because architecture cannot portraror enact reason as a value <loes not mean that it

argue systematically or reasonably. In all proccsses therc must necessaril be some beginning point; but the valuc in an arbitrary or intentionally ficlive architecture is found in~

int1i11sic nature of its action rather !han in the direc:tion of its course. Since any proc:ess
must nccessaril bave a heginning anda movement, however, the fic:tional origin musl be
considered as having at lea.s i a methodological value-a value concerned with generatini:
the interna] relations of the process itsclf. But if !he bcginning is in fact arbitrary, there cm

be n.o direction toward closure or end, beca use the motivation for cbange of state (that is fue
inherenl instability of the beginuing) can neverlead to a state of no change (that is, an endl
Thus, in their freedom from the universal values of both historie origin and directiooa.
proccss, motvations can lead to ends diffcrent from those of the prcvious value-laclen end

The End of the End

Along with the end of the origin, the second hasic characteristic of a "not-classical" archltecture, therefore, is its freedom from a priori goals or ends-the end ofthe end. Tbe end
of the classical also mcans the end of the myth of the end as a value-laden effect o the
progress or direction of history. By logica lly leading to a potential closu1e of thought. tbe
fictions of the classical awakened a dcsire to confronl. display, and cven transcend the end
of hlstory. This desire was manifest in the modern idea of utopia, a time beyond histoT). I
was thougbl thal objects imbued with valuc because of their relationship to a self-evidentl}
mea11ingul origin could somehow transcend thc present in moving toward a timeless
futurc, a utopa. This idea of progress gave false value to the present; utopia, a fonn of fan
tasizing about an "open" and limitless end, forestalled the notion of closurc. Thus the modern crisis of closure marked the end of the process of moving toward the end. Such clises
(or ruptures) in ow perception of tbe continuity of history arise not so much out of a
cliange in our idea of 01igins or en<ls than out of tlie failure of the prese11t (and its objecB)

to sustan our expectations of the future. And once the contnuity ofhistory is broken in
our percepton, any representaton of the classical, any "classicism," can be seen only as a
belief. At Lhis poinl, where our reccived values are "in crisis." the end ofthe end raises the
possibility ofthe invention and realization of a blatantly fictional l'uture (which is therefore
11011-threatening in its "trnth" value) as opposed to a simulatcd or idealized one.
Wi!h thc end of the end, what was formerly the process of composilion or transfor
mation ceases to be a causal strategy, a process of adclition or subtraction from an origin.
lnstead, the process bccomes onc of modification -the nvention of a non-dialectical, non
clirectional, non-goaJ-01iented process." The "invented" origins from wlcb this process
receives its motivation dffer from the accepted, mythic 01igins of the classicists b) being arbi
trar;-. rein\'ented for each circumstance. adopted for the moment and not forever. The process
of modification can be seen as an openended tactic ratber than a goal-oriented strategy. A

stnegy is a process that is detennined and value-laden before it begins; it is clirected. Since

..oO! 1111 CWSlW

the arbitrary origin cannot be known in advance (in a cog11itive sense), it does aot depend
on knowledge dcrived from 1hc classical lradition and thus cannot engender a strategy.
In this context architcctural form is revealed as a "place oinvention rather lhan as a
subservient representation of anothcr ard1i1ecturc oras a strictly practical devicc. To invent
an archi tecture is to allow architecturc 10 be a cause: in order to be :1 cause, it musl arise
from something outside a directcd strategy of composition.
The end of the end also concerns tl1c end o the object represcntation as 1hc only
metaphoric subje-c1 in architecwre. In the pasl thc metaphor in architecturc was used to
convey such forc~s as tension, compression, extension. and clongation; these were qualities tbat could be seen, if not literally in the objects them~elves. tlien in rhe relationship
between objects. The idea of t11e metaphor here has notliing to do with the quahties gcnera1ed between buildings or between buildings and spaces: rnther, 1t has 10 do witli the idea
that the internal process itself can genera te a kind of non-represenutional figuration in the
object. This is an appeal not to the classical aesthetic of the object, but to the potential
poetic oan architectural text. Thc problem, then, is to distinguish texts from representa
tions. to convcy the idea that what one is sccing, t11e material object, is a tcxt rather than a
series of image refcrences to othcr objects or values.
This suggests the idea of ard1itecture as "writing as opposed to ard1itecture as image.
What is being "wrillcn is not thc objectitsel-its mass and volume-but 1he act omassing.
This idea gives a metaphoric body to the act o architecture. lt tl1en signals its re-ading
through an other system of signs. called traces. Traces are not to be read literally. since
they have no other value tlian to signa! the idea that therc is a reading e\ent and tha1 reading should take place; trace slgnals the idea 10 read.'' Thus a trace is a partial or fragmenta!)' sign; it has no objecthood. lt signifies an action that is in process. In this sense a trace
is no1 a simulation of reality; it is a dissimulation because it reveals itself as distinct from
its fonner reality. lt does not sinrnlate tl1e real, but represents and records the action inheren t
in a fonncr or future reality. which has a value no more or lcss real !han the trace itself. TI1at
is, trace is unconccmed with forrning an imagc whidi is tl1e rcpresentation of a previous arcltitecturc or of social customs and usages; rather, il is concemed with the marking-litcrally
thc figuration-of its own internal processes. Thus the trace is tite record of motivation.
the record of an action, notan image o anolhcr objectorigin.
In this case a not-classic:al" architecture begins acthcly to itl\'olve an idea of a reader
conscious of bis own identity as a reader rather than as a user or obsener. lt proposes a
new reader distanred rom any externa] yaJue system (particularly an architecturalhistori
cal system). Such a reader brings no prior competence to 1he act of reading olber than an
identi1y as a reader. That is. sud1 a reader has no preconcehed knowledge of what archi
tccture should be (in terms of its proportions, te:\."tures. seale. and the like): nor does a notclassica1" architecture aspire to make itself understandable through these preconceptions.1
The competence of !he reader (of ard1itecture) may be defined as the capacity to dis
tinguish a sensc: of knowing.from a sense ofbelieving. At any given time t11e conditions for
"knowledge" are "deeper !han philosophic conditions: in fact, they provide the possibility
of distinguishing philosophy from lteraturc, science rrom magic, and religion from myth.

UDOf Tll! CIASSIW

The new competcnce comes from the capacit}' to rcad per se. to know how to read, and
more importan tly, to know how toread (bul not necessarily decode) architccture as a text.
Thus the ncv. "object" mus t have the capacity to reveal itself firsl of ali as a text. as a reading evenL The archtectural ficrion proposed here differs from the classical ficlion in ts pri
mary condition as a text and in the way it is read: the new reader is no longer presumed to
know the na ture of truth in the object. e ithcr as a represcn1a1ion of a ralional origin oras
a manifestation of a universal se t of rules govcrning proportion. harmony, and ordering.
Bul further, knowing how 10 decodc s no longer importa.ni; simply, language in this con
text is no longer a code to assign meanings (that rl1is mea ns thar). Tbe activit}' of reading is
lirst and foremost in the recognition of something as a language (that il is). Reading, in this
sense. rnakes available a leve! of i11dicatio11 rathcr tha11 a level of meaning or expression.
Tberefore. to propase 1he rnd of the bcginning and thc end of the end ' 1 is lo proposc
the end ofbeginnings and ends ofvalue-10 propose an olher 1imeless spacc ofimen
tion. lt is a "timeless"' space in the present '"ithout a determining relalion toan ideal fuhire
or 10 an idealizcd past. Architechrre in 1he r resent is scen as a process of inventing an
artificial past and futureless presenl. lt remcmbers a nolonger future.
This paptr is basal 011 llm:e 11011-verifiable assumplions or values: timeless (originless.
endltss) arcl1iteclure; no11-repr~se111atio11al (objectless) arcl1itecture; and artificial (arbilrary,
reaso11/ess) archi tectu re.

Notts
t.

Jean Baudrillard, Si11114(atio11s (Now York: Semo1cxt(c), 198}) 83. Je3n Baudrillard porlry tho: period begln
nug in thc fi1<-onlh contut)' by~"''" dUI'or~nt imubcra: counterfeit, production. and simufation. He says thot
tbc lirsr i bu~ on thc naniral '"'' uf \Olu. 1he SOnd on the commcrclal law o''"' nd th third on lh
srrucrural la" of ,.1u.,_

1. The renn

cJu>icar is often confu.I \>ilh 1he ide of !he cbssic" nd wilh the l)liSlic rncthod o das3i

rism. That which is classic, according to Joseph Rykwert. itwokes the idt of"nciem and ernplry" nd sug
gests "authority and disunclion'": it is a model of '''ha1 is excellent or ol thr fina rauk. ~1orr;- ilnport.an1.ly. h
implies ns 0011 urnelessness. thc uka that it

i.::: ~l

r:ank atan)' tin1P.

Cla~skis:m. as oppoc;td

to thc classical.

";U be dencd h ..., as a method of attempting lo rmduce a dassic" r~ult b) appealing lo a cJssaJ poSI.
Thi a<.cords "th the definillon glvt'n b) Sir John Summer.;on. for whom dassci>m 1s rl<)I <e> much a sel of

idP:t?i and \'1lues as it is a stylc. He 111011tains 1J1nt '"hile n1uc-h of Co1hic 3rchitecnue \\'as b:i-:rod on t:he sanie
pro(lOrtionI relatronships

ch~

"dassicJ" orchitocturr of the Renaissanc. no one

coul~ tnriu.<e

a Gothic

calhedrol whh Rttaissanc poluto: il simpl) dtd nnl ha\'e the look of damci<m. In conlra;I Oemetti Por
ph~rios argl1r~

th:at cJass:icism is nol ; sryic. but m~tt"ad h.is to do ,,,th ratK>nalism: ..As mU<.h as archirec~

1s a tectonic di~(oursc. it is by definiton tra.nsp,rent UJ 1allona1ity ... thc 1t;sons to be lc:amccl toda) Ccom ck1s
~1osrr1 tht11~r()re.

are not to l>e fouud in classicii;111's

oh'no. here <onu= cl>ssicism \\ilh

th~ dassical

~tylistic

\\'finklcs but in ch1$i;ic:lsnl's talionaUty." Por.

and lht cl>c5'ic. 1hat is. wilh a se1 of nluc. pn-ileging 1ho

ttuth" 1rht '' rHon3li~1of1ecion10 '~' exprcsS101f ond error. Thc fallcy of this pproocb

1> 1ru11

cla<9

cmn rebn 011 on ideo ofhisroricI conllnuil) inh<ront m th< classcal. 1hcrcfo~ ir does not produce the lim

lessness chaimclt"ri~tic ofihc classic. 111e c:las.sical, by ilnpJi<;ation, h:1$ ;i n1orc relative su tu~ th:.n the dassic; it
C\"t"kcs nrr.rlrs~

pu1. " -goldcn a~, superior to thc modero rirn~ or thr- present.

UIDOfTH( ClASSltll

Michcl Fou<ult, Tli< Order of111p !Ncw York: Rndom Housc, 1973). lt is prcdscly Michd Foucaulrs di"
tinction bet\\'een the classical and tnodem that has never becn adequatel)' articulated in relationship to ardli
tettur. ltt conlra~l

w l'oucault's episternologicaJ differentiation. archittc-turt ha~ rtinained an unintarupte<l

rnode of rcpr<.-scn1atiou from thc fiftccnth ccahuy to the prcscnt. In fact, t \\'ll be seen tht \vhat is ssun1cd
in architecn1re to be classical is. in Foucault's tern1s. 1nodcrn. and \vhat is assun1cd in architecrure to be mod

crn is in n..i1ity foucault's classical. Foucault's di!'tinction is not \\'hat i~ at is.-sue here. but rather thc contiuuty
that has persisled in archhecture froll1 Lhe c.l.:issic:lJ to the presetll d.:t)'
4.

Fouc:~ult, xxii. \'\'hite the term ..epistenie as

used here is si1nilar to Foucauh's use of th, teml in defining ;ton

rinuons period ofkno\vJedge, it is n~es.sary to poinl out thal the thne perlod here dened as the rlas5ical epis
len1e diHel'S ff(l rn Foncnuh's dfrinition. F<>ucault locatt'S t\.VO discontinuities in 1he de4.'t-lopn1erH of\Vestem c1.1lt11rf':

U1e classical and the ntodern. 1le identifies 1.he classica1. beginnin.g in the n1id-seve1ltee11th ceutury, \Vith lhe
pnm.icy ofthc interscction o(la.nguagc and rcprcscruation; thc \'Jluc oflauguagc,

be sclf..c\idcnt .and to rcccivc

it~

justification "'ilhin l:ingua_gc.: the:

\VlY

~its

rucaning." \vas sccn to

langttage providcd 1nc111i11g could be

represented 'vithin language. On the othcr hand. Foucault idenrifies the 1nodem. originaring in the earlr nine

te<:nth cennuy, with the ascendance of historical condnuity and sclf.generatcd anal)'lic processes over language
a11cl

;.

n:pn:sc.:ntation.

..1'he End of the CJassical'" is not about the end of the dassic. lt mereiy questions a contlngent value sm.tcnue

which. when attachcd to thc Idea of ~\e dassic. yiclds an crroncous scnsc of thc classkal. lt Is not that the
dcs.i:re for a classic is :it an end, but th:n the dotnin.:tnt condition!' of the c.las.sicaJ (orlsin. end .md the process.
nf r,nmpC)~i 1ioo) r1rt

und~r r~()n~itfcr:tlion.

Thus it mighl ~ n1ort

ncair:tt~

10 titlc- lhis eS-(:l)' "Tht F.nd ()f th~

ClassicaJ as Classic."
6.

Fr;u>eo Rorsi, f rtm Bnltl,\111 Albtrtl (Ntw York: l larper ami Row, 19n). ih< fo~dt of ~t< cltun:h of Sant'Andrea
in tvfanluia by Alberti is oae of the fina uses of tht' trans-position of ancient building types to

achi~ve

botb

vt:rific.<:Hion and authority. lt n1~rks . ViS Bon.; says...a dcciSi\'C t1.1n1ing ;;nvay from thc vtmacul41.r tu tht' Latiu'n
(272). lt is: acceptable in the *ven1acular" to revive thc classical temple front because the function of the temple

irt antiqult and

~>e church

in the fiftcenth ccnn1ry ws similar. Howel'cr. lt Is quite anothcr mattcr to overla)

thc tcn1plc front \\ith the triu1nphal ard1. See R. Wirtko\\'er. Ar,f1irmumf
(Ne\\ York:

\V.

Principl~

in rJ1c Age of Hun1tAnisn~

W. Norton. 1971). and also D. S. Cha1nbcrs, Patrous and Artisis in rht Rt!ttaissanc (London:

MacMillan. 1970).
lt is 35 if Alberti \\'ere saying that \\"'ilh lhe aulhOl'it) or God hl

que-stion. 1n-a111nus t l'f'SOfl to thr. 5)111001,:; of

Ws O\\'D P'\'er to re:ril)- tbe church. Thus. the use of the triu1nphal arch becon1es a n1essage on the f;J~ild o
S:.utt'.A.Jtdrc:i r:s1hcr than an embodintt1H ofits inhe.rtnt me3ning.

7.

Jeff Kipnis. from a seminar ot lhe Graduate School of Design. HOJ"-ard Univer-ity. Ul Febnmy 1984. "Form can
not follo\V func.tion until func.tio11 {induding but nor linted to use) h.a$ fi.rsr eniergcd .as a pos.siblny of form ..

8.

Roben Venluri, Dtnise Scon a rO\vn, 2nd Stt\'tn Ittnour. l.ittn1ingfrou1 Uu

\~ Tht Forga.:1.e-n

Sj'fltlu:ili-.nn of

Ar.l1llrc11oral Form, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Pre>s. '977) 8.

9.

See the film, Dqund U1opla: CJ1mvi11g A1riodes '" Amtn.:an Ar.hit(.ruu

.;~.,

York \liclr.iel

Bloc~wood

Pruductions, 198}).
10.

Baudrilfard, 8. 9. ln rcfccring to thc dcod1 of thc reality of God, Baudrillud ..)'S, "Mctiph~ial desair came
fiom the idea that thc in1ages concealed notbing at .all .and dlat in fact ther \.-ere not un.ages but acrually

pctfect shnulacra,"
u . leone BattL;ra Alberti, 011 Pni111i11g (New Haveu: Vale Unversity f'ress, 1966). 68-74
12.

1'.1onis Kline, Mcultt111at-ics.: 111.t lA~ ofCtrlainry (NM'' Yorlc Oxord Univers:ifl Press. 1980). 5.

13. Martn Heidegger, "On lhe Fssence ofiruth." in Basic \Vrifoigs. ed. Oovid Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and
Ro''' 1977). 133. "Er~OC)' e; 1he esseruial counteressence lei 1he

pl'irnor~ial

essenct" of1n1th. Erranc)1 opetls

ENDOf nn cwm:.o.L

itself upas the open region for cvcry oppositc csscntial ~ruth. Ertoncy ~nd the concealing of what is concealed

be long to the pritnordiaJ essence o truth...

14. Cille Odcuze. "Plato ad thc Sinmlacrum." Oaober. no. 27 (Wintcr 1983). Deleuzc uses o slighdy difforent

terminolog)' to ddress a very similar set of lssues: he d]sCTL>Ses the rlotonic distinction between model, copy.
and "simulacromH as a

1nc~ns of :.ssigning

\:ilue Jnd hier.ard1ical position to objecls and ideas. He exploiins

the ovcnhro\\ of Platonii;1n .as Lhe suspension o tht a priori valutJaden 'Status of U1t" Pla.tonic ropy in ordtr to
"raise up shnulacra. to 3$St"rt their rig.ht:s ove-r icous ar copies. The problt"nl no longerconct':rus the distlnction
Essence{Appearan<:f of Model {Copy. This whole distin~1ion opera tes in thc world of rcprescntaton. n1e simul3cn un is nol degraded copy. rather h contains a posiLi\'to P"'er \Vhich ni;.:Kat(is l>o original and copy. buth
mod~I

ond reproduction. Of the at least h\'o dhergent series in1eriorized in the sin1u1acru.m neithe-r can be

assigned as ori!:,rinal oras copy. lt doesn't evc.n \Vork to ilt\'oke the rnodeJ of the Other, becau,:,e no nlode1 rcsi5"ts
thc ,..,rtigo of thc simulacrum (52. 3). Simulation is use<! here in a sense which dosely ap>roximates Deleuie's
use of copy or kon, while d issimulation is conceptually veryclose to his descripton of the prt-Socratic smulacr.
1S Oauclrillard, z.. In th.e cssay MThc Precession of Sin1uJ3cra. 83udrill:i.rd d i~CLL.'>ses the nruure of sim11la1inn 3nd

tite hnplicahun

ur prescntday s1n1\tlacra oa our pcrccption of the nan1re of reality :ind representation: "Sonle

Uting has diSllppeared; the sovercign differcncc bcl\\'CCll thcm (d1c real and . smulation models) that w3s
the abst.ractions charm."

16. B<mdrillard, 5. Distmguishing bcl\vccn sinmlotion ond whot he calls dissimulation, Baudrillor<l s<1ys that to
dissimuliltc is to fe.igu not to have \Vhat one has. To shnl1lace is 10 felgn to htive \\'hat oue hasn' t. . . Son1eone

who feigns an illness con simply go to bed and make believe he is 111. Someon< who sirnulal<'S an illn<SS pro
duc~ in

himselfsoinie of Lhe syn1p101ns. (Llure). 111us feiyning . . . is only n1asked: \Yhe:reas simularion threat

eu!\ the cference ber,veen ' true-' ond

fals~

and bet\vee:n rear and imaginary. Since the simulator produces

'rme' symptoms. is he ill or 1101)' Accordiag to Baudrillard, srnulatiou is rhe gencrarlon by modcls of a real

ily \\1ithou1 origin: il no longer llois t be ntional. sincc it is no longer 1neasured aga.inst 501ne ideal or negativc
instance. While thi sounds very much like my proposal of thc "not<bssical," the "not-classk3l" is funda
rnc.-ntally different in that it is a dissitnulation and not ~ simul:iti<">n. B:iudrill3rd discusscs lhe d3nger in thc
r~alization

of the sirnu.Jacra- for \v_hen it e.nters the real \\orld it is its oa1ure to ltlke on 1h~ re-al'" a1tributt5 o

that 'vhi.h it is simuJaring. Dissbnulation hcrc is dcfi.11ed differently. it makes :ippare.nt the sh11u.latio11 \vith ali
of its i1nplications on thc valuc st.itus of re:alitf 'vithout distorting lhe sin1ulacra or allo,ving it 10 lose its

precarious positinn. pois~ bPbvee:n tJu! real a1Jd lhe w1re-al, tl1e tnodel and the otJ1er.
ry. \t/h3t is zat issut in :in artificial origi.J1 is not n1otivation (.as opposed roan essential or originary cause, as in an

otigin of thc claS$iral) hui r.ilh~r the idea of seJf..,vdence. In deducti\e logic, readng badtward lnevitably produce.e; sclf.evidenre.

Hl.!l'lCt

tht :Jnal>li( proc~ss o Lhe c.l;issicaJ '''ould ahvays produce a self.evident origin. Yet

there ;are no J priori self.e,,.;dent proc~dur~s ,Nhich could give- one origin any valut- over any other. Jt c.:au bt- pcoposc-d in J. "notclassical'" architec:ture tha1 an)' inilial conditi,(>r1 c:an produce sclfevident procc.-dure~ that have
a.o lotem;i,I n1otivation.
18. The idea of arbitrary or artificial m ~iis sense musi be distinguished from thc classical idc3 of 3rchitcc:turc as
al'tificti1 uah1re or from the idea of the arbitrarincss o rr.he sigu in language..A.rbitrary in Lhl~ conlext means

having no natur.d conncction. ThC' insight that origins a:re a contingency of languagf" is h:ased on an appeaJ to
re-.a.ding: the origin can be arbitrou-y because it is contingient on a reading that brings its O\Vll strategy \vith iL
i9. Jonathaa Culler, On D<eo11stnictio11: 11"'1' a11d Critlcim Aji<r S1ruct11ralism (lthaca: Comell University l're;s.
198:<). This is basically similar to Jacques Dcrtid use of grafl in literary deconstructon. He discusses graft

as m clcm cnt which can be discovered iu a tcxt 1hro11gh a det:onstructhe rending: "Dtt:onstruction is, among
othcr things. an attempt to ldentify grafts In the tex1S it anl~"Zes: what are the poinlS ofjunctme and Stress
'ivhcrc onc scion or line or argumenl has beeu spliced \\~l1h an.01her~ ... l!ocusing on thcse 1no1nents~ decon

IHD DfTMI CWSICAL

\lmttion ducid4tes !he hettt0gn<t) of lh 1..n {1;0). Th threr dcfining ')lUllir> ograft .. 11 ts uscd In this
pap<r are (1) graft bcgins "'ith th arbitra~ and amJicul conjuncuon of () rwo disbnct tl1'ractonsncs which

art 10 d1c-ir 1n1bi.I fonn unstablt. H i~ lhts Hl.)1ab1hty "-h.1th pTO\idcs the nl<1fi\-a1ion (tite ilttenlpl to ttrum to
>tablit) and also allows modifiration to ra~ place. (J) ln the !ncl<lon thtro must be somethmg which ollow

for an energy to be ~t otf by th tu111i11 togethcr of tllc rwo chorocrtti.in. Culler's discusslon o dcconsmictivc str;itcgy contains ::ill ol tht' t:ILrn-t'nts of gra.ft: 1t beg1ns by :u1alv,1s of t~xt to revea! opposition~. Th~st ar'
1UXt-aposcd in ~uch =i \Vil) as to U't'ilti:: Jl\O\'tmcnt. and the dttnl'\c.tn1cuon (~raft) is idcntifi:able in ttrtn!li of rhat
moti\'3tion. This papee.\\ hic:h conccntntcs on :nnspo< .n t~ ,... .. d("',., from a purc m.a.lytic fnmt'"ork 101 pro~m (or \\'Otk. is rnor4! conc:tmed \\"'\th \\ita! hlppen< n tM procr,, 01 co~sctoush~ nuking gr.

ns 1h.an finding

lh- th>t rmy ,.,~ bttn pl.ccd UllCOfCOUSI) in.!.-<\. Smc<. ,,.n b) ddirudon j; a prOC<'1< or rnodilicallon,

11 i unlihl> that ouccould find <11c or unde-.top<d womcnt ot nft in an rchilectural 1<">1. onc would be
rnore hkeli to re>d only ls rt'~ulls. Graf1 is u>ed hett m

"' tlut cJ,,.,.I) r?<embles Culkrs a111lysis o Oenida's

rncthod for deconstn1clio11 of oppo~itlon: To deconstruct an oppM111'1n

stnJct an opposirion is to undo and di~pl.ntt" it. to sitwtc n dlffttrntl\.. f1501.

i!i

not to dc-stroy it. . , To dfCOn

1bh~ conc:tntntu.Jn on

thc app.lreJltl)'

rntar1pn4tl puts tbc logic o supplrmttHarih t'> '-'Ork .u m mtr.tl)fett\~ <trl!lt': '""h:.I ha~ bttu r.:lc:-ieatcd to thc
margins or ret as1de b) prcviolL\ intt'rprrtrrs ma,; be mi.pol'U.nt prec~dy for :.h0$e' re;a~on.s 1h.-e lot."J u to bt set

><id (L\I "'1:'.da tmphlllt~ gnn a<>'" "~"""' COIJd;:an cicpposmon: :hi< P'I""' '"""" th pnxrmul
l>pt.'CtS ,,fuch ancrge from rht n10mrrtt o~ zr~~ The rru.}O: dfi7tttnrt< a~ of tt'mrinolo~ , .il.lld C1'n9h..~1s.
20.

cuner. 99 "The rbitral") narur< o rh """ and the S\'ltm ... th no pos ..... tem>> .,,,...... lh p.indoxial
nolion of an 'insrih1led lnl.CC' 'a .)1.nJct\ltt of infirute rrff'JT.JI u

~1

ch t11t'R .re onJ~ m.ces-tr.1.ccJ prior to ;JO'!

Clllity o( which lhey rntghl bt rh trlCC." This dtsoipton o(i11st1lulcd lre<" relates doicly tO rh< lda O OlOI

vation 3S pul fortb iu 1lus paper. Likc DcrridJ'!ii Minstituted lraCI"' ruouvabon descnbes a srstem "h1ch i< inltr
nall) r.onsisltnl. but arbitral')' In th.it it hl.S no btgiruung or tnd and no

nctt$S31l

or i.~lutd dirtction_ h

rtm;ains a S)stem of d.iffcrcncci. comrrrhensble onl)' ut h:r111s of thc spoaccs betu-een elemtf'!1'( or n'ornc-nb of
tht procc.s. Thus. mon,-.uon htrt ~ <irnila< 10 O.,md drscnpnon o dilfcrence-t is tht forct \\11l11n rhe
oUt tlut causes n to be d~..,,~mic '11 ntf}

point ofa continuous tran~form3tion.. Interna) moll\ auon <J~~rnuncs

ll>0 nature of modilic>.on for the obj.ct an<l i rende~

rc~dable 1hrough trace.

21. ftffKipns. "A1cbitecrure Unhound; 11npubhsb.d papcr. 198~. Modificarion is ont 0>pcc1 oft>lenson whid1

i:t defined by

Kipni~ :i~ :t

C'.t>niponttnt o dt:t..01npositiot1. \Vhllc cxt"nsion is anr tnoverneut fro rn un origin (or

:in initial condition). Jnodifi(..ation ,a spccific fon11 o e.xtensicnl co11ct1rned "'lth presen;ng thc cvtdcnce ()f i11itiol <onditions (Or >ample. throush no ddtion

' sublroclion o 111a1<rtalicy). On thc OlhM' h3nd, rnthesis

is an Hlmple of txtnisiou \\ludt e.loes not lttempt to m:unt:un t'\'"tdence of ininaJ

attMnpt~ ro c::reatr a rlt"\'li

condirion~

bue r:ither

"holt'

2.2. Tht' concept oftracf in artlutture as put for"-a.rd here i~ si1n1lar 10 Dtrrida:s. idea in tlu.t 1t su~ts th31 thf'ff"

un be noithor rrpr..<'ntatwnal obiea nor rcprcsc.ntablc "rtalil)." Archlect\lre becomes tCXI r.i~1rr ~m1 obiect
\\'htn il i,.; conceh't'd 1t11d pn.~c:ntcd ;is 3 S)'Sten1 of dHttrence~ mther thiln as a.n bnage or JJl il'il:11fd prtF-l"ncr:.
Trnct is the visual 1nanfcst1t1on of dtis

~ys1ern of diflereuces .1

re<.'Ord of 1no\rn1cnt {\Vithcuit dirt"'flinu) ct1 u~i1tg

U$ to cead the pre$ent obfcct 3S 3 ~)'~ten1 of relationsh1ps tu otltt'r prior and subsequent n10\"t>tntn1~ Tn:u.t" b tu bt-

d1>tinushcd from )acque Dtrrid.-S

115 ofthc renn.

for ~mela dittetl~ "''""" th id~ of Jifln:nce to the

fact that tt is impossible 10 i~btt '"ptt-~" as: an ennt). "'lhr prC"'i<"nCt o nmtian ts conct-1\0lblt' unh ulSOfar as
"'<'1 mstant is ~r marktd w\1h 1he tn<<> ofthc put and fururc the pre;ent 1ris1ant 1> rrot tllt' pist and

fururc ... tbe P""""' instant 1s not $C>medrlng g;,..,.. but product of 11,. r-<lJioris between p1>1 nd futurc. lf

motion is to b<- p~nt, pr..enct n>u$t alreadr be rnarktd b) drlftrnce and defeu:11 (Cullcr. 97). Thc Idea lha1
prcscnce is ne\er a shnp1e a~oluu: runs counrcr to aJJ o our unuili\'~ con\ ictions. lf thcrc an be no inh~rf'111ly
1neaningful prtSCUC"t' \\'hich '5 JIOt itsclfa systr.m of diftrrncr11 lhttn 1hert' c~11 bt- no valuc-ladcn or :\ prio1i origin.

[JID

' nu CUS.SfCAl
>J. W have alwas rcad "rchile<:lurc. Traditio11ll)' JI cd not lnduco r..tliJIH but rcspo11dd lo i1. 'le use of arbitrari
nt<.< h<re i!. an Id<> IO stimulate or induct tM ~din of trxes \\;lhoul r<fcrcnces IO m... ning but rathcr In oUl<r
cond1tions of proccss-that is. co stimuJ.atc J>Ul't reading '\ithout v;fut" or prcjudice. a-; oppose<l lO tntcrpretation.
24. Prtviously, thtrc '\'3S assun1t:d Lo be 3n :i priori languagc of value, a poctl')'. existing \vithin

\\tare S>.)ing th>i >rchilturc is me~ languagc.

We FTad whethcr we know whai

archil~lure.

l~ge we

or noL \Ve can n-ad Frt"nth ,,;1h ou1 undtf')Qnding Frtn(h. \\'e c:an knO\\' som'n~ 1s spcakin3

No"

are readin11

nons~use

or

noli>e. Beforc \\'to :are con1petcn1 coread aud u11dcrstand lOt'IT)' "'r: can kno'v sornc.th111J to be iangu:igc:. Readiug
in this coutext is not conccmcd '''ith dt:eoding for rncarng or for J>Ol!lic content but r.ather for indtiition.
25. C. F. Franco Rtlla. "Tempo drlla fine e tempo delfiniZto fThe Age o h~ End and lh4' Age of the fk:mning).

CmobrJ/a 48. no. 498-99 On.-F<i>. 1984): to6-8. n imilarit)' 10 1he lltl< of Fnncn Rella's art1de is COll
cldcn1al, for IV< use the trrms .. l>.:ginn!ng" ond "cud .. for e1uir.Jy diRertm purpo~s. Rrlla identific~ the presrnl as the ae of lhe cnd. Sltang tb>t tht par.tdo:uc re.:uh of prorcss has b.en lo t roaie culiurc 1hot simul
tan<'Ously desir.. prO&r"S> nd is burdtn.d with a""'"" nf passmg and the chromc en5" ofirredN>rnable lcm.
Th,. result is a culture \\'hi(h does not l('l\'t \\hat has bcc-n hui the cnd of \vhat ht1s becn. lt hitCs th" presenl.
1hc xistlng, and the chng111g. lt thcrefor~ Jo,.:s nothmg. R~IJ;'s anide pos.,. lhe question of "'hcthcr it is
pouible 10 bwld today. to dtt1gn m a way thI is with ro1hrr thn aga111>1 time. He dr~uts l~ rctUm to sensr
of 1hne-bou11<lc:dncss and the possibility or I\"illg in onc'$ m.vn age \\ilhout attcm1,1ing tu rctunl 10 the pasl.
Thc mechamsm by which he propose$ lO re-<1calt this po1sibility is myth. He dif~m1tiates m1h rom fiction.
nd ti is th.1s d1fftrer1 "luch illuminaln !he opposilton bet"een hi proposal and th4' propo<i11ons of thi>
papt>r. ~1)1h i dtfined as tradilionol >IO'} of ostensibly histotical

''"" that sCf\'C< 10 unfold pan of 1hc

,,or1dvie\v of a people in tht lr:iditio.uaJ vulut-1:.iden seri:tt", giving_ hi~tory and thus

\'31Uf'

to li1tu:h:ss or ine.x-

pli<.oble e\en!J. Rdl. dsm1$<t< fi<tton u \'Cri<imililud<. merely cttling tite appcranco of1ru1h. lnsicd of
ltlCmpting 10 lttUm t0 thr raf;t, tn)tll at1cmpt5i to cre:atc a flC\\' beglnn1ng mt'TCI)" SIU31ng US at ~n earfier. lnd

!Clls acme. st~le ofJ"'iety. Rul my1h can1101 allovia1e thc par:idoxofproress. Ag;iinst bo1h ofthcsc. The End
of lhe Begitwmg and the End o thc End' prO>OS<'S disslmub1io11. which is neithcr th< >1mularion of ,_,iy o<
we krlO\\ it nor thc propooal of an aherml< lnilh, wltich ppeals to the 1dentical wrt) mg structur.. obeliefth:it is, orig:ins. tr.ln'\forrnatu;ns. and ends. "T11e End of tht Classical" 111si!tts on 111;dntalning a stJtP of anxie-ty,

proposing 6ction in :t ~lf:rtfltxh~c scnst. o proccss wit.hout orig'in~ ur cnds which rnuintains its ''r" firtion:il
11)'

ro1her thm proposiog. >1mul.ition or lt\llh.