Redening the Miraculous: al-Ghazl,

Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi on Quranic

Miracle Stories
Isra Yazicioglu
ST JOSEPHS UNIVERSITY

Introduction
The Quran narrates many miracle stories about messengers. When Abraham is
thrown into the re, it miraculously becomes cool and safe for him (Q. 21:69) and
Mary conceives Jesus as a virgin (Q. 3:458, Q. 19:1821).1 Similarly, Jesus heals
the blind and sick with his touch, and revives the dead (Q. 5:110), while Moses staff
goes through instant metamorphosis and performs unexpected services (Q. 7:1179,
Q. 20:1720, Q. 20:6570, Q. 26:436, Q. 27:10 and Q. 28:31). Likewise,
Solomon understands the language of the birds (Q. 27:16) and has miraculous
means of transportation (Q. 34:12), and so on. Side by side with these miracle stories
one also nds repeated criticisms of those who demand miracles from Muammad
(for example, see Q. 6:810, Q. 17:905, Q. 52:445, and Q. 6:335). Even earlier
prophets such as Noah are presented as criticising the demands for miracles
(Q. 11:31). Time and again, the Quran claims that the demand for miracles is a
misguided one, and that the natural world contains sufcient evidences for faith.
To my mind, it is curious that the Quranic miracle stories are narrated in the midst
of a discourse that de-emphasises the miraculous. In addition, one may also raise
the question of the relevance of these miracle stories for the audience of the Quran.
Since the Quran repeatedly presents itself as guidance,2 it is not unfair to ask
how these miracle stories t into such an edifying framework. The aim of this paper
is to explore these hermeneutical questions in light of the reception history of the
Quran. I shall discuss how readers of the Quran have endeavoured to interpret
the miracle stories as meaningful and consistent narratives within the Quran. More
specically, I shall look at one particular crucial medieval debate on Quranic miracle

Journal of Quranic Studies 13.2 (2011): 86108

Edinburgh University Press
DOI: 10.3366/jqs.2011.0021
# Centre of Islamic Studies, SOAS
www.eupjournals.com/jqs

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stories; and then turn to interpretation of miracles by a relatively neglected

contemporary Muslim exegete, Said Nursi.
In what follows, I rst describe the theme of miracles within the Quranic discourse,
and then explore how two major classical Muslim scholars, namely Ab mid
Muammad b. Muammad al-Ghazl (d. 505/1111) and Abl-Wald Muammad
b. Amad b. Muammad b. Rushd (d. 595/1198), engaged with Quranic miracle
stories. I shall argue that each of these crucial interpreters raised questions about the
relevance of these stories for themselves, and read these miracle stories in overlapping
as well as diverging ways. In the second part of this study, I turn to a contemporary
interpretation of miracle stories by Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (18701960). I shall
discuss how Nursi attempts to make sense of the juxtaposition of miraculous
and ordinary in the Quran, and reads the miracle stories as relevant for a
contemporary believer. I shall also argue that Nursis approach provides a
reconciliation of al-Ghazls and Ibn Rushds diverse concerns and insights about
the Quranic miracle stories.
An Apparent Puzzle: Miracle Stories and Natural Signs in the Quran
The Quran repeatedly notes that prophets have been sent throughout history with
clear and manifest yt (signs), but many people refused to heed them (see, for
example, Q. 6:25 and Q. 7:146). In addition to using the term ya to refer to miracles,
the Quran also uses it to refer to various natural phenomena, and repeatedly talks
about such things as rain and wind, the stars, the sun and moon, grains and fruits, the
growth of an embryo, the production of milk and honey, ships sailing on water, and
the different human races, as yt pointing to the mercy, power and wisdom of God.
These natural signs are visible and yet one still needs to be educated in order to
recognise them. This instruction is the very function of the revealed message sent by
God through the prophets. Thus, the Quran employs the same word, ya, for the very
message of God proclaimed by His messengers. The signs/verses of the revelation
recited by the prophet disclose the signs in the universe.3
The Quran is also explicit about the relational aspect of signs of God: regardless
of how major a natural sign or even a miracle is, certain people will never believe
(Q. 7:146). That is, something is a sign only in relation to someone who is open to
consider it as a sign; if one refuses to consider it, the signs can not force themselves
on the person. From a Quranic perspective, the relational aspect of the sign does not
make the sign less powerful. As Fazlur Rahman put it, the signs do not become
subjective because many do not see them, any more than the sun becomes
subjective because animals habituated to darkness cannot see it.4
Having noted the strong correlation the Quran posits between itself and natural
phenomena, let me now turn to the issue of miracles. According to the Quran, among

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the excuses the disbelievers gave for not believing in the Quran was that they needed
to see a number of supernatural events conrming Muammads truthfulness. They
needed, for instance, to see him miraculously gaining possession of lush gardens and
vineyards, and a house made of gold; they wanted to witness him bringing down the
skies, ascending to the heavens before their eyes and returning with a tangible Book,
and even bringing God and angels before them face to face (Q. 17:905). The Quran
replies to these demands for miracles in several ways, all of which are critical. First, it
reiterates its frequent emphasis on natural phenomena as a sufcient sign for the
reality of God (for example, Q. 17:99). Second, it presents the very revelation of the
Quran as a miracle that can only be explained by reference to the Divine (if you have
doubts about the revelation We have sent down to Our servant, then produce a single
sura like it enlist whatever supporters you have other than God if you truly [think
you can], Q. 2:23; also Q. 10:38, Q. 11:13, Q. 17:88, Q. 52:334, etc.). At other times,
it notes that earlier peoples did not believe even when they saw miracles (for example,
Q. 5:110, Q. 10:757, Q. 17:59, Q. 27:1013). Finally, it condently declares that
the disbelievers will still not believe even if they are granted the miracles they
demand: even if We had sent down to you [Prophet] a book inscribed on parchment,
and they had touched it with their own hands, the disbelievers would still say, This
is nothing but blatant sorcery (Q. 6:7); similarly, even if they saw a piece of
heaven falling down on them, they would say, Just a heap of clouds (Q. 52:44).
In sum, the Quranic response to the demand for miracles constitutes a criticism of
such demands.
Despite its critical stance with respect to the demand for miracles, the Quran
also narrates many miracle stories about bygone messengers. Since the Quran insists
that its aim is not to merely narrate stories for the sake of narrating them,5 and it
acknowledges that it is not addressing bygone communities in the pre-Muammadan
period (see Q. 3:44, Q. 11:49, Q. 11:100 and Q. 12:102), how could these stories be
interpreted meaningfully? After all, unlike the signs in nature referenced in the
Quran, the reader does not have access to the miracles narrated in it. In other words,
while the audience of the Quran could actually look at natural phenomena such as
rain, or the stars, to apply (or question) Quranic claims about natural signs, they have
no ability to witness the miracles related in the Quran. Hence, it is fair to ask the
hermeneutical question: how might these miracle stories in the Quran be meaningful
and relevant for a reader? In order to pursue this question, I rst shall turn to medieval
interpretations.
The Medieval Muslim Reception of Quranic Miracle Stories
Traditionally, one way Muslims made sense of the miracle stories in the Quran was
through referring to the differing needs of the various prophets. In other words, many
Muslim scholars maintained that the major miracle of each prophet is tailored to the

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needs of his times.6 Thus, for instance, they believed that God gave Moses miracles
that would outdo magic just because it was appropriate to his situation: in Moses time
people were interested in magic, and the Egyptian high priest of the time was a
sorceror. Similarly, Jesus was given healing miracles because in his time these were
held in high regard. As for Muammad, the traditional view is that he was given the
Quran, a miracle of eloquence, since his rst audience highly valued eloquence.7
Moreover, the Quran was an appropriate miracle for the nal prophet, Muammad,
whose audience was to continue till the end of time.8
This traditional interpretation explains how it could be maintained, within the
Quranic perspective, that supernatural events were not central to Muammads
mission.9 It does not quite explain, however, what the reader of the Quran is to
make of the miracle stories found in the Quran. The various miracles recounted
might have worked for their audience in ancient times, but what does the audience
of the Quran, which is contemporary with Muammad, or living after him, to
take from the very narratives of these miracles? One may also raise the question
of how is the reader, who is repeatedly invited to take the past prophets as examples
of conduct (e.g. Q. 33:21, Q. 60:46), expected to make sense of these miracle
stories? Not surprisingly, these questions have been raised throughout the
reception history of the Quran. It is especially (albeit not exclusively)10 in the
work of some medieval Muslim thinkers that we see a discussion about the meaning
of these stories. As case studies, we shall now look at how two classical Muslim
thinkers, namely al-Ghazl and Ibn Rushd, interpreted the implications of miracle
stories.
Al-Ghazl on Miracle Stories in the Quran
Often what rst comes to mind regarding al-Ghazls approach to miracle stories
is his famous defence of the possibility of miracles in Tahfut al-falsifa
(The Incoherence of the Philosophers). In this work, which is devoted to a critical
analysis of certain philosophical claims that contradict faith, al-Ghazl argues
eloquently and incisively for the logical possibility of miracles and defends a literal
reading of miracle stories in the Quran, in the sense of viewing them as actual
interruptions in the usual course of nature. Moreover, in his other works devoted to
clarication of theological and credal issues, such as Fayal al-tafriqa and Iqtid
fl-itiqd, al-Ghazl argues that miracles constitute decisive evidence for the
truthfulness of a prophet. Yet, despite his defence of the literal sense of miracle stories
as well as their evidentiary value, in his other writings, such as al-Munqidh min
al-all, al-Ghazl makes a surprising about turn and claims that miracles on their
own cannot establish certainty and in fact are almost useless for faith formation. This
apparent contradiction in al-Ghazls approach to the issue of miracles is actually
very instructive. In order to make sense of his interpretation, I shall rst offer a closer

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look at how he evaluates the evidentiary value of miracles differently in different

contexts, and then analyse how he argues for the possibility of miracles.
According to al-Ghazl, two fundamental principles make up the core of prophetic
messages: faith in one God and faith in the hereafter. These two pillars are afrmed
and corroborated by reason: every piece of knowledge, whether ancient or modern, is
really a corroboration of the faith in God and in the Last Day.11 Other details of
prophetic messages are rationally neutral, and reason, having conrmed the core of the
message, can defer to these details in revelation without any difculty. The miracles of
the prophets play a facilitative role in conrming the veracity of their mission and
submitting to the details about which reason is neutral.12
On the other hand, in al-Munqidh min al-all, al-Ghazl suggests that in case of a
contradictory or illogical claim, even the most impressive miracle cannot serve as a
proof for that claim:13
I know very well that ten is more than three. If anyone tries to dissuade
me by saying, No, three is more than ten, and wants to prove it
by changing in front of me this stick into a serpent, even if I saw
him changing it, still this fact would engender no doubt about my
knowledge. Certainly, I would be astonished at such a power, but
I would not doubt my knowledge.
In another context al-Ghazl goes further, questioning the evidentiary value of
miracles in general. He notes that it is possible that the turning of the staff into a
serpent may be a deception; if it not be deception, it is at most a remarkable feat, and
does not necessarily prove anything about the claims of the person.14 Al-Ghazls
reference to Moses staff turning into a serpent is noteworthy since it is the most
oft-quoted miracle story in the Quran (it is mentioned in Q. 7:1179, Q. 20:1720,
Q. 20:6570, Q. 26:436, Q. 27:10 and Q. 28:31). Indeed, al-Ghazl declares:
I believe in the veracity of Muammad peace be upon him and in the veracity of
Moses peace be upon him not by reason of the splitting of the moon, and the
changing of the staff into serpent: for that way is open to ambiguity and one may not
rely on it.15 He even goes on to say that anyone who believes in the veracity of a
prophets mission because of the changing of the staff into a serpent ends up
worshipping the golden calf, again referencing Moses celebrated miracle, here in
addition to the golden calf incident mentioned in the Quran (Q. 2:51ff., Q. 2:93,
Q. 7:148 and Q. 20:88ff.). Rather than on the basis of miracles, then, one should
believe a prophet on the basis of the consistency and truthfulness of this prophetic
message, only then is ones knowledge of the prophet assured, it becomes a necessary
knowledge, a knowledge that cannot be brought about by any number of miracles,
and the conviction is clearer than the conviction resulting were the prophet to change
a thousand sticks into snakes.16

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Some scholars have been puzzled by al-Ghazls apparently contradictory remarks.

Indeed, at rst sight it seems irreconcilable that in some of his writings al-Ghazl
insists that miracles do not count much for the formation of ones religious convictions
while in Tahfut he strongly defends the literal sense of miracle stories in the Quran.17
I suggest that the contradiction appears only if we interpret al-Ghazls defence of the
plain sense of miracles as a way of defending the evidentiary value of miracles. Yet,
that may not be the case at all. It may well be that al-Ghazls insistence on the
possibility of reading miracle stories literally is not about emphasising the convincing
power of miracles. What is it about, then? A closer look at how al-Ghazl defends the
literal meaning of miracle stories can give be of use here.
In the process of demonstrating that a literal reading of miracles is logically coherent,
al-Ghazl offers a critical analysis of natural determinism. He argues that in nature we
observe one event following the other consistently, such as re and burning, but we do
not observe that one actually produces the other. Thus, the causal relationship we posit
between two things in nature (e.g. re causes burning) as well as the suggestion that
such relationship is irreversible (e.g. re has to burn) is in fact a mental habit, rather
than an empirical reality out there or logical necessity. In other words, al-Ghazls
very defence involves a re-conceptualisation of the whole notion of natural causality,
and a philosophical formulation of how the natural order is not a logical given but a
continuously re-enacted divine gift. Thus, miracle stories enable al-Ghazl to look at
natural causation anew, and recognising its contingence, he arrives at a more profound
sense of ones relation to natural causality and its sustainer. It should be noted that
al-Ghazls argumentation on this point was not only theologically signicant but
also constituted a watershed in philosophy. As Taneli Kukkonen notes, al-Ghazls
critique of natural determinism and his distinction between mental and empirical was
a philosophical breakthrough, anticipating David Humes and Immanuel Kants
revolutions in Western epistemology.18
Al-Ghazl makes it clear that by his defence of the possibility of change in the usual
course of nature he does not at all suggest that one has to give up his daily habit of
expecting things to behave in certain ways. Hence, one may accept the theoretical
possibility that the natural order can be reversed at any minute (since it is utterly
contingent), but be certain in daily life that such a reversal will not take place. Thus,
one may suggest, for instance, that the virgin birth narrative of Jesus in the Quran
does not require that in everyday life a believer should expect virgins to suddenly
conceive. For al-Ghazl, belief in the possibility of change in nature conrms Gods
omnipotence, while expecting the ordinary course of nature to continue conrms
Gods wisdom19 and mercy.20
Needless to say, a detailed analysis of al-Ghazls philosophical defence of
miracles is beyond the scope of this article. What is signicant for our purpose,

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however, is the fact that al-Ghazl takes the trouble to offer a profound and
detailed logical analysis so as to defend a literal reading of miracle stories. He
undertakes this defence despite the fact that (1) he does not always regard miracles
as crucial evidences for faith; (2) he does not suggest that one should give up
ones daily certainty about the ordinary course of nature; and (3) he interprets
other Quranic verses non-literally. (Indeed, al-Ghazl argues that there are some
verses whose non-literal interpretation is essential and others whose non-literal
readings are preferable over literal ones.21) In other words, al-Ghazl insists on
reading miracle stories literally not because he is a strict literalist, nor because he
thinks we should not expect the natural order to continue, and neither because he sees
miracles as strong evidences for faith. What, then, is the point of his insistence that
miracle narratives in the Quran should be read literally? As noted earlier, it is a way
of suggesting that despite its consistent maintenance, the natural order is not a logical
given but a divine gift. The gift is real and is experienced in a regular fashion and yet
cannot be taken for granted as if it had to be. Hence, al-Ghazls interpretation
offers a profound reading of the miracle stories: for him they are not entertaining
tales about ancients, nor do they have a magical convincing power for faith, rather
they usher a new way of looking at the ordinary, the everyday. To reiterate, the crucial
message in these stories for him is not that patterns in nature will be interrupted
at arbitrary points. Rather, the point is to understand that there is no logical or
empirical basis to claim that nature works on its own, and that instead one should
receive natural order as a divine gift; in awe and gratitude. This interpretation of
miracle stories is indeed very Quranic and ts in quite well with the wider
emphasis of the Quran on the natural world as full of divine signs. In sum, within
al-Ghazls apparently puzzling remarks on miracles, one can discern a way of
reading the miracle stories that actually takes into account the overall approach of the
Quran. Let us now turn to another interpreter, Ibn Rushd, who, writing around half a
century later, deeply disagreed with al-Ghazls analysis of natural causality in the
light of miracle stories.
Ibn Rushd on Miracle Stories in the Quran
As is well known, in response to al-Ghazl, Ibn Rushd wrote Tahfut al-Tahfut
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), in which he systematically quotes and
critiques al-Ghazls arguments. In the case of interpreting miracle stories, Ibn Rushd
rejects the very conclusion al-Ghazl sought to establish: the possibility of change
in the course of nature. For Ibn Rushd, to admit the possibility of change, even on a
theoretical level, destroys the certainty of scientic knowledge. If one were to read
miracle stories as temporary interruptions of the natural order, then scientic
knowledge based on this order would not be certain and the distinction between
certainty and conjecture would collapse.

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According to Ibn Rushd, the existence of necessary causation within nature is a

demonstrative truth based on empirical facts. It is before our very eyes that things
affect, cause, produce and inuence other things. Al-Ghazl had claimed that we do
not actually observe causal connections between things, but only observe that certain
things go together, like re and burning. He had insisted that we never actually
observe that re produces burning (and further argued that the real agent of burning is
the One who makes both the re and the burning). According to Ibn Rushd, this
distinction is mere sophistry; any reasonable person would admit that he or she does
observe causal connections in nature and that they are logically necessary.22 If one
were to question this, there would be no room left for human knowledge and
reasoning, and all the sciences would vanish:23
Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, and denial of
knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and
that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither
proof nor denition exist, and that the essential attributes which
compose denitions are void.
Thus, Ibn Rushd argues that there must be irreversible causal links between things.
And, accordingly, it does not seem possible to read miracle stories in the Quran
literally.
It should be noted that Ibn Rushd refrains from explicitly addressing miracle
stories at length: he believes that it is better for the demonstrative class, i.e. the
philosophers, not to discuss this matter. Indeed, he nds it signicant that we do
not nd that any of the ancient philosophers discuss miracles, although they
were known and had appeared all over the world.24 Why would Ibn Rushd
want the discussion of miracles to be skipped by the demonstrative class? For
two reasons: the rst is to let the common person benet from the miracles in
their own way, and the second is his belief, similar to that held by al-Ghazl,
that miracles do not have demonstrative value in establishing the veracity of the
prophets.
As for the rst aim of letting the common person benet from miracle stories,
Ibn Rushd notes that a philosopher should not publicly attack the literal interpretation
of miracle stories. To be sure, the philosophers commitment to the necessity of
natural causation is not compatible with the common persons literal reading of
miracle stories, which assumes that natural causality is suspended for the sake of the
prophets mission. Yet, the philosopher has to respect the common person and must
not voice his disagreement, for the literal sense of the miracles impresses the common
person and makes him trust the prophetic message. It encourages him to follow the
revelation, which will enable him to attain the virtues necessary for happiness in this
world and in the afterlife. Since the philosopher is a supporter of virtue, he should

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support its attainment through belief in miracles, and not disclose the demonstrative
approach to the public.25
For Ibn Rushd, another reason for not discussing miracles is that a wondrous event is
only an indication given to the prophets, but it is in no way a proof of prophecy. The
real proof of prophecy is the message of the prophet. Thus, Ibn Rushd notes that
Muammads greatest miracle, as attested also by the tradition, was the message he
brought from God. Only this kind of miracle can count as evidence:26
The clearest of miracles is the Venerable Book of God, [the Quran],
the existence of which is not an interruption of the course of nature
assumed by tradition, like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but its
miraculous nature is established by way of perception and
consideration for every man who has been or who will be till the
day of resurrection. And so this miracle is far superior to all others.
Indeed, only by considering the wisdom and truthfulness of the message or scripture
(shar), can one conrm the veracity of the messenger.27 It is noteworthy that
Ibn Rushd, like al-Ghazl, refers to a frequent Quranic motif Moses staff turning
into a serpent when questioning the value of physical miracles as proofs for faith.
Ibn Rushd further notes that the question of establishing the veracity of a prophet is a
historical question, rather than a philosophical one. Philosophically, one only afrms
the possibility of a class of people who have been chosen by God to communicate
guidance to human beings. This possibility of existence of a messenger is agreed
upon, with the exception of materialists or naturalists (dahriyya). The exact question
of who these people were can be ascertained by looking at the historical reports, and
thus there is no need to try to discuss them theoretically.28
In sum, a miracle is not something that Ibn Rushd nds crucial for his purposes of
believing in a prophet; nor does he want to undo the edifying effect of miracle stories
on the common person. In these points, his approach is reminiscent to al-Ghazls,
who also questioned and even criticised the evidentiary value of miracles in some of
his writings, though in his other works he suggested that miracles serve as evidence
for faith. The only difference is that, unlike al-Ghazl, Ibn Rushd does not see
miracles as philosophically signicant, and he is satised to skip a detailed discussion
of miracles by saying that they are divine things beyond human understanding (huwa
amr al-ilh mujaz an idrk al-uql al-insniyya).29
Our brief analysis of al-Ghazl and Ibn Rushd shows that the reception history of
the Quran contains some very interesting engagements with miracle stories. Both
al-Ghazl and Ibn Rushd seek to make sense of miracle stories within their overall
understanding of the Quran. Ibn Rushd recognises a tension in the literal meaning as
an unavoidable one given that the Quran is serving different audiences, including the

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common person and the philosophers. Ibn Rushds reading of miracle stories
also reveals a justied concern for the stability of human knowledge about nature:
if one allows the possibility of miracles, how can one go about ones daily business
trusting that the usual course of nature will continue? Ibn Rushd also expresses
concern about the strength of the evidentiary value of miracles. Al-Ghazl seems to
have anticipated and shared many of Ibn Rushds concerns, hence his insistence that
the acceptance of miracles does not undo our everyday certainty about natural order
and also his recognition that miracles do not necessarily work as decisive evidences
for faith.
Unlike Ibn Rushd, however, al-Ghazl sees a universal value in Quranic miracle
stories. By deconstructing the alleged necessity of natural causality in the context of
his defence of miracle stories, al-Ghazl reads miracle stories as reminders that we
should see the natural order as divine gift. In the following section, we shall turn to a
contemporary Muslim thinkers interpretation of miracle stories that seems to
incorporate both al-Ghazls insistence on reinterpreting natural causality in the light
of the Quran, as well as Ibn Rushds insistence that the miracle stories can not be read
in a manner that undermines scientic inquiry.
A Contemporary Interpretation of Miracle Stories: The Case of Said Nursi
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (18871960) was a Muslim exegete and thinker whose
life-time spanned the nal decades of the Ottoman Empire, its collapse and dissolution
after the First World War, and the rst 37 years of the nascent secular Turkish
Republic, which was notorious for religious oppression, especially until the 1950s.
Nursi had a comprehensive traditional education and also independently studied
the sciences of the time, particularly mathematics and the natural sciences. He taught
as a professor in a graduate seminary and also served as an expert scholar as part
of Drl Hikmet-il Islmiye, the highest religious institution of the Ottoman Empire at
the time.30 Nursis approach to miracle stories in the Quran attempts to relate these
stories to the life of a contemporary reader.
Nursis magnum opus, the Risale-i Nur (Epistles of Light), was written mainly
in Ottoman Turkish, with some crucial parts penned in Arabic. In the Risale,
Nursi attempts to present an interpretation of the Quran in a way that appeals to
both heart and mind, by offering a close reading of the Quran and critically bringing
the traditional legacy of Quranic exegesis, adth, sm and Islamic theology
into conversation with contemporary issues. In this respect, as Oliver Leaman has
suggested, the Risale can be regarded as part of the Iya [Revival] Tradition, as a
project of reviving the faith for the modern age.31 Similarly, Sait Ozervarli notes that
Nursi contributed to the revival of kalm by broadening its scope and restructuring it
as a Quranic theology.32

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The Risales exegesis of the Quran does not take the form of a running commentary.
Rather, its volumes are composed of pieces written thematically or as letters to
disciples, and are saturated with exegesis of different Quranic verses throughout.
Nursi usually starts a chapter or a treatise with a selected set of verses, raises a
general thesis question whose answer will be constituted by an interpretation of these
verses, and then proceeds to the discussion. The discussion constructs a framework
within which the selected verses can be interpreted or expounds a profound principle
that sheds light on these verses. One treatise, for instance, cites the verses about Gods
immediate control of each being and then proceeds to explain in detail how tawd can
be derived from a close observation of the world.33 Another treatise about gratitude
rst notes that gratefulness is constantly mentioned in the Quran and then proceeds to
explain why this is so by discussing how gratitude is implied in the very ontology
of beings and is dignifying to the human self.34 Throughout, the Risale not only
offers commentary on the verses cited in the beginning of each treatise but often also
brings in many other verses in paraphrased form or as direct citations. Aware of
the exegetical nature of his work, Nursi himself claims that it is a manevi tefsir
(Ar. tafsr manawiyya), an exegesis that cogently expounds the truths of belief in the
Quran.35 Many sections of the Risale are also devoted to issues of Quranic
hermeneutics: how to dene and approach the Quran, principles of its interpretation
and how to reconcile apparent contradictions.36
After this brief introduction to Nursis work, I shall now look at how his commentary
on miracle stories offers a nuanced way of making sense of these stories within the
Quranic discourse. His approach is reminiscent of al-Ghazls in that he takes the
literal sense of the stories as worthy of reection, and it also connects with
Ibn Rushds concerns by making connections to modern science and technology.
Nursi offers a reading of miracle stories in the Quran that may be relevant for a
contemporary reader.
Nursi on the Miraculous and the Ordinary
According to Nursi, one of the main purposes of the Quran is to re-present what is
familiar and usual to the reader under a new and fresh light. The Quranic discourse
aims to tear apart the veil of familiarity that the reader often casts over the things in
nature:37
With its acute expositions, the Quran of Miraculous Exposition rends
the veil of familiarity and the habitual cast [sic] over all the beings in
the universe, which are known as ordinary things but are in fact each
extraordinary and a miracle of Divine Power. [It] reveals those
astonishing wonders to conscious beings. It attracts their gazes and
opens up for minds an inexhaustible treasury of knowledge.

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In other words, for Nursi, a central concern of the Quranic discourse is to show that
what is often overlooked simply because of its familiarity is in fact miraculous, a
miracle of God. Nursis use of the term miracle to refer to ordinary occurrences must
be intentional here. Indeed, throughout the Risale he repeatedly uses the term mujiza
to refer to the wonderfulness of everyday events that call for the existence and the
qualities of a transcendent being. Nursi uses the term mucize-i kudret, i.e. miracle of
divine power, to refer to ordinary events, such as rain, the growth of a ower, and so
on.38 In his very use of the term miracle to refer to ordinary, he is suggesting a
redenition of what a miracle is, which is also in agreement with the literal sense of
the term in Arabic. Since mujiza literally means that which renders weak, that which
overwhelms, a miracle is anything that the natural causes are incapable of producing.
That is, whenever a result overwhelms its natural cause, i.e. whenever we realise that
a regular result associated with an apparent natural cause is in fact beyond the capacity
of that apparent cause, we are justied in calling it a miracle, even if it happens
repeatedly and frequently. Thus, for instance, the production of breast milk is a
miracle and a sign of the Sustainer. This is not because it is unusual, nor because the
natural causes associated with the production of breast milk are unknown. Rather, the
production of breast milk is a miracle because it overwhelms the capacity of
the natural causes associated with it.39 The cells, the hormones, etc. do not have
the mercy, wisdom, knowledge and power to create such a timely, nutritious, suitable
food for the infant. There is, according to Nursi, a transcendental gap between an
apparent cause and its result and it is this gap that calls for an absolute Maker
working through the apparent causes.40 For Nursi, even human inventions, such as
electricity, are actually a miracle of divine power. The apparent causes of electricity,
namely blind and lifeless particles being completed in a circuit, cannot be the
real creator of kilometres of darkness being turned into light in half a second.41 The
result does go beyond the capacity of its apparent causes, and therefore points to
the source of the light (God as al-nr) who, through the blind particles, enlightens the
darkness.42
Nursis interpretation of nature as continuously created and as revealing the
attributes of the Creator is not radically new in the Muslim tradition. It is in line
with traditional Sunn and f theology. Nursis metaphors and explanations are,
however, often new and, not surprisingly, more suited to a modern audience. What is
signicant for the purposes of this study is the fact that Nursi presents the
reinterpretation of natural causality as a central aim of the Quran. Time and again,
Nursi notes that the mission of the revelation is to decipher the world and to reveal
the treasures in nature, i.e. His messages embedded in nature about Gods qualities,
such as His mercy, power and wisdom. The primary task of divine revelation and its
exposition by a messenger of God is to disclose to people the miracles in everyday
life.43

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Nursis Rereading of Everyday Life in Light of Quranic Miracle Stories

At this point, one may observe that Nursis redenition of the concept of miracle
makes sense of the juxtaposition of miracle stories with the de-emphasis on the
miraculous in the Quran. That is, Nursi takes the Quranic emphasis on natural signs
as a cue to interpret the miracle stories. Indeed, Nursi suggests that miracle stories, as
stories of interruption of the ordinary course of nature, invite the reader of the Quran
to rethink the uninterrupted ordinary course of nature. Thus, for instance, Abrahams
miraculous survival in re because of the divine command (Q. 21:69) is meant to
suggest that when the re does burn at other times, it does so because of Gods
command, not because of its blind nature and on its own.44 In other words, for Nursi,
the miracle story of re cooling off with Gods command teaches the reader that in
everyday life re burns because of Gods agency.
A more detailed example of how Nursi understands Quranic miracle stories as
highlighting the ordinary course of nature is to be found in his treatise devoted to the
Quranic phrase bismillh (in the name of God). The treatise explains that all things
in nature recite bismillh all the time, albeit not literally with tongues or human-like
voices, but with lisn al-l, that is through the very way they come into being,
function, and pass away. In what follows, I shall analyse the reasoning through which
Nursi connects his explanation of the ontological basis of bismillh to miracle stories
in the Quran.
First, Nursi offers a simple parable for his common reader to clarify his understanding
of the Quran in relation to the natural world:45
If you were to see that a single person had come and had driven all the
inhabitants of a town to a place and compelled them to work, you
would be certain that he had not acted in his own name and through his
own power, but that he was a soldier, acting in the name of the
government and relying on the power of a king.
Here, Nursi is arguing the need to refer to an unseen agent by showing the
incapacity (acz) of apparent causes. If there is a mismatch between ones
individual strength and what she accomplishes, the latter being more than her
capacity, than it must be that she is not acting in her name, with her own power,
but acting in the name of, i.e. through the power of, something greater who is
supporting her. Thus, if one person is able to make the whole town obey him, it
cannot be that he is acting in his own name as a mere citizen who happens to
have ideas about what everyone else should do. Rather, he must be acting in the name
of an authority, such as a government that does have power over each citizen.
Applying the same logic embodied in the parable to everyday observation, Nursi
suggests:46

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In the same way, all things act in the name of Almighty God, for
minute things like seeds and grains bear huge trees they raise loads
like mountains. That means all trees say: In the Name of God, ll up
their hands from the treasury of Mercy, and offer them [the fruits] to
us. All gardens say: In the Name of God, and become caldrons of the
kitchens of Divine Power in which are cooked numerous varieties of
different foods. All blessed animals, such as cows, camels, sheep, and
goats, say: In the Name of God, and become fountains of milk from
the abundance of Mercy, offering us a most delicate and pure
sustenance in the name of the Provider. The roots and rootlets, soft
as silk, of all plants, trees, and grasses, say: In the Name of God, and
pierce and pass through hard rock and earth. Mentioning the name of
God, the name of the Most Merciful, everything becomes subjected to
them.
In other words, according to Nursi, we repeatedly observe natural actors that are
accomplishing results beyond their apparent power. This shows that they must be
acting in the name of an all-powerful One, i.e. be empowered through the One, instead
of acting on their own. That is, a close analysis of the natural events calls for the
agency of an unseen One who enables a minute seed to ourish into a huge tree, a fruit
tree to bear fruits, animals to produce milk, and so on. Not surprisingly most of
Nursis examples from nature are Quranic (see, for example, Q. 2:22, Q. 6:95,
Q. 6:141, Q. 7:57, Q. 14:32 and Q. 16:66).
After having explained the idea of God acting through natural causes, or natural
causes acting in Gods name, Nursi then makes a connection with the miracle stories
in the Quran. He connects Moses miracle as mentioned in the Quran with the
everyday phenomenon of roots spreading through hard rock and earth. He claims
that whenever a root pierces through the soil to reach to a water resource, it is a reenactment of Moses miracle of splitting the rock with his staff and bringing forth
water: like the Staff of Moses, each of those silken rootlets conform to Gods
command of, And We said, O Moses, strike the rock with your staff [Q. 2:60].47
Similarly, the natural phenomenon of delicate green leaves retain[ing] their moisture
for months in the face of extreme heat48 is a re-enactment of Abrahams miraculous
survival in the midst of blazing re: the delicate leaves thin as cigarette paper
recite the verse, O re be cool and safe for Abraham [Q. 21:69] against the heat of
the re, each like the body of Abraham.49 Hence, the Quranic miracle stories
serve as reminders of everyday miracles and provide counter-arguments against
naturalists who deem natural causes efcient on their own. Thus, Nursi concludes:
even heat and hardness, in which you [naturalists] most trust, are under a [divine]
command.50

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It is worth repeating that for Nursi daily events are wonders, not because the apparent
causes have not yet been discovered, but because the apparent causes are insufcient
to breach the transcendental gap between them and the effects. In the case of rootlets
piercing through hard soil, for instance, one may discover that these delicate leaves
release a secretion with which the soil is pierced. Yet, the knowledge of this secretion
does not obviate the need for an unseen maker. Rather, the production and secretion of
such a liquid, as well as such liquids apparent ability to digest the hard soil, points
again to the wisdom and power of an agent other than the poor, unconscious rootlets.
Therefore, Nursis interpretation of miracle stories in relation to everyday events starts
with accepting the apparent cause-effect relations we assume in nature, and seeing the
very conjunction of a natural cause with its effect as a sign of the Divine. Since this
approach does not rest on the denial of empirical data, or on the ignorance of natural
causes, it addresses Ibn Rushds concern that science be protected from mythical
interpretations of miracles.51 In what follows, we shall observe how Nursi makes a
further connection between science and miracles.
Nursis Reading of Miracle Stories in Relation to Science and Technology
According to Nursi, just as the prophets in the Quran are exemplary gures to follow,
the stories of their miracles are not merely historical stories, but rather comprise
numerous meanings of guidance.52 He suggests that one of these guiding messages is
to trace the nal limit of mans science and industry and encourage him to go
forward toward that goal.53 Indeed, Nursi argues that:54
Just as the all-wise Quran sends the Prophets to human communities
as leaders and vanguards in respect of spiritual and moral progress, so
too it gives each of them some wonders and makes them the masters
and foremen in regard to humankinds material progress Thus, just
as by speaking of the spiritual and moral perfections of the Prophets, it
is encouraging people to benet from them, so too in discussing their
miracles, it is encouragingly hinting [that we can] attain to things
similar to them and imitate them.
Nursi offers examples of miracle stories in the Quran that he interprets in this vein as
encouragements to discover, in Gods name, further wonders in nature. One example
is the mention of speedy winds at the service of Solomon: and [We subjected] the
wind for Solomon. Its outward journey took a month, and its return journey likewise
(Q. 34:12). Nursi understands this verse to mean that Solomon travelled in the air and
covered the distance of two months journey in a single day. And, he nds in it an
indication that human beings can progress to discover speedy means of travel and, by
telling this story, the Quran is indirectly encouraging the reader to discover those
means. Indeed for Nursi, through this verse the Creator is speaking to human beings

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saying, O human being! I mounted one of my servants on the air because he gave up
the desires of his soul. If you too give up the souls laziness and benet thoroughly
from certain of my laws in the cosmos, you too may mount it .55 In a similar vein,
Nursi interprets Moses miraculous staff with which he readily brings forth water from
the rock (Q. 2:60 and Q. 7:160), as encouragement to nd tools to drill the earth in
order to reach its resources. Another example is Jesus healing miracles in the Quran:
[Jesus said] I will heal the blind and the leper, and bring the dead back to life with
Gods permission (Q. 3:49). Nursi notes that, just as Jesus spiritual description
provides examples for human moral conduct, so too do his miracle stories have an
exemplary dimension: just as the Quran explicitly urges man to follow Jesus (upon
whom be peace) high morals, so too it allusively encourages him towards the elevated
art and Godly medicine of which he was the master.56 One day, Nursi predicts,
medical technology will also be able to temporarily reverse death, as anticipated in
Jesus miracle story in the Quran.57
It is interesting to note that Nursi sees no tension between his pro-tech interpretation
and the spiritual interpretation of the verse.58 God has given two gifts to Jesus: one
was the remedy for spiritual ills, and the other the cure for physical sicknesses. Thus,
dead hearts were raised to life through the light of guidance. And sick people who
were as though dead found health through his breath and cure.59 Within the same
miracle narrative, God is both encouraging the believer to seek to internalise Jesus
message, and also to seek further development in medicine: you too can nd the cure
for every ill in the pharmacy of My wise [creation].60 Along similar lines, one could
suggest that the virgin birth narrative can also be taken as hinting at the horizons of
reproductive technology and helping the reader to entertain the possibility of
conception even when sexual intercourse is unsuccessful.61
As Kelton Cobb notes, Nursis connection between miracle narratives and current
technology may come across more like reading into the text rather than reading of the
text.62 Yet, it is clear that Nursi, as an insider, is working with the assumption that it is
genuinely the all-knowing God who is speaking in the Quran and addressing not only
the context of rst/seventh centuryArabia but also the later centuries till the end of
time.63 Indeed, Nursi believes that as the time is getting older, the Quran is getting
younger.64 Thus, his reading is not the result of a naive conation of exegesis and
eisegesis, but a self-conscious attempt on the part of a believer to read the Quran as
speaking to his contemporary context.
Moreover, Nursi emphasises that what he sees as a Quranic encouragement of
technological development is a vague and indirect meaning of these passages; it is
contained in the Quran as a hint rather than an explicit statement.65 It makes perfect
sense to him that encouragement for technology is a hint: since the Qurans main aim
is to teach about the Creator and eternal life, technological development disconnected

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from faith, purely for its own sake, would not be worthy of mention in the Quran.66
Nursi is hopeful, however, that there are people who have the skill and the
understanding to put these indirect suggestions into their proper worshipful contexts,
and that miracle stories are sufciently encouraging for them:67
if there are among you [readers of the Quran] respected craftsmen
and artists and inspired inventors, who, purely for the benet of Gods
servants, serve the general interest and public well-being and
betterment of social life, which is a valuable worship, these signs
and indications of the Quran are surely sufcient for those sensitive
people, who of course form a minority, in order to encourage their
efforts and appreciate their art.
Conclusion
Miracle stories in sacred texts have been a source of both fascination and heated
debate across religious traditions. To my mind, what makes the Quranic miracle
stories especially interesting, and even initially puzzling, is the fact that they are
part of a discourse that also de-emphasises the miraculous. Indeed, in this article,
I repeatedly raised two questions about the interpretation of miracle stories in
the Quran. The rst related to what I presented as a curious juxtaposition: miracle
stories being narrated side by side with criticism of demands for miracles and
emphasis on natural signs. The second related to the edifying framework of the
Quran: if Quranic claims for its own coherence and its function in terms of guidance
are to be taken seriously, how could these stories be interpreted as edifying? Here,
I noted a contrast between supernatural events and other signs mentioned in the
Quranic discourse: while the reader has immediate access to signs occurring in nature
(as well as the Quranic message which is presented as a sign in itself), he or she does
not seem to have any way of witnessing the supernatural events narrated in the
Quran.
In my analysis, I rst noted a common traditional approach to the miracle stories in the
Quran. Traditional interpreters often make a distinction between Muammads
audience and the audiences of earlier messengers. Thus, it was understood that while
supernatural events were needed for prophets preaching to ancient people, the last
prophets miracle had to be more appropriate to the message, so as to be relevant to
rst/seventh century Arabia as well as henceforth until the end of time. I noted that
even though this approach justies the de-emphasis of supernatural events in
Muammads mission, it does not quite engage with the question of how the audience
of the Prophet is supposed to relate to the miracle stories in the Quran.
Next, I turned to two crucial medieval Muslim interpreters, namely al-Ghazl and
Ibn Rushd, who grappled with implications of miracle stories. My analysis revealed

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that both al-Ghazl and Ibn Rushd seemed somewhat uncomfortable with the idea
that miracles counted as decisive proofs for the truthfulness of a messenger.
Moreover, both rejected as fanciful the idea that miracle stories undermine everyday
certainty about natural order. Yet, there were also pronounced differences in their
interpretations. Taking his cue from miracle stories, al-Ghazl offered a sophisticated
critique of natural determinism and argued for the logical possibility of miracles. In
contrast, Ibn Rushd dismissed al-Ghazls critique as sophistry and maintained that
accepting the possibility of suspensions in natural order was an affront to human
knowledge and science. It seems that Ibn Rushd sensed a tension between the ordinary
and miraculous in the Quran, and was responding by dividing the audience of the
Quran into two. He suggested that the demonstrative class will notice the tension but
will be willing to overlook it so as to make room for ordinary class of believers who
are impressed by miracle stories. Ibn Rushds ultimate response of glossing over the
tension seemed less than satisfactory for the purposes of this article, while alGhazls response seemed quite promising in showing how these stories could have
an important edifying function for all readers.
This article noted that al-Ghazls critique of natural causation was a philosophical
breakthrough in that it distinguished between our mental habits of expecting natural
order to continue and the ontological status of that order. More signicant was
the crucial exegetical moment it brought. Al-Ghazls detailed argument for
demonstrating that natural order is contingent, even though we are justied in daily
life to expect it to continue, served to highlight that the continuation of the order is a
divine gift, not a logical given. Al-Ghazls interpretation was all the more intriguing
given that he was not a thorough-going literalist in Quranic interpretation, and that
he expressed hesitations about evidentiary value of miracles. Thus, I argued that his
deconstruction of natural causality so as to allow a literal reading of miracle stories is
a way of reinterpreting the natural order in the light of miracle stories.
In the second part of this article, I turned to a contemporary Muslim interpretation,
which offered a crystallisation of al-Ghazls insight as well as, surprisingly, an
indirect conrmation of Ibn Rushds concerns about knowledge and science. In my
analysis of the Risale-i Nur, I showed how Said Nursi provocatively employs the term
miracle to talk about the ordinary. Nursi insists that the source of his redenition of
natural as miraculous, i.e. as worthy of wonder and awe, is the Quran. According to
him, a central purpose of the Quran is to usher in a new perspective on the familiar
and the ordinary. Conrming al-Ghazls logic, Nursi explains in different ways,
through empirical examples as well as metaphors, that apparent/natural causes do not
explain their effects and actually call for the agency of a transcendent agent. Hence,
Nursi brings out al-Ghazls insight more clearly: a meaningful interpretation of
miracle stories is directly connected to an interpretation of nature in the light of the
Quran. He reads the Quranic miracle stories in the light of Quranic emphasis on the

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ordinary course of nature: miracle stories are read as stimulating reminders to rethink
the ordinary course of nature as signs of God.
I also discussed how Nursis approach indirectly incorporates Ibn Rushds justied
concern about human knowledge and the study of natural causes. Indeed, Nursi sees
in Quranic miracle stories practical guidance about how to study nature. To him, if
prophetic stories are meant for guidance, then the stories of their miracles can also
give practical guidance. In Nursis interpretation, Quranic miracle stories cannot be
taken as an excuse for neglecting the study of nature. Rather these very narratives
encourage scientic study by pointing to horizons of possibilities in nature that will
be opened up by divine power. Thus, miracle stories are interpreted as indirect
encouragements to discover nature further and improve technology with the
awareness that technology is also a divine gift. In other words, for Nursi, Quranic
miracle stories suggest not only that technological wonders are possible, but also are
to be sought after in the name of the One who makes them possible.
In sum, the hermeneutical questions raised in this article about Quranic miracle
stories have enabled us to investigate how different Muslim interpreters have read
these apparently puzzling narratives in diverse and fruitful ways. Not surprisingly,
in the realm of scriptural interpretation, there is often more than what initially meets
the eye.

NOTES
1 Throughout this article, the standard Egyptian numbering of the Quran is used.
M.A.S. Abdel Haleems English translation of the Quran, The Quran A New Translation
by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, Oxford Worlds Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) is
used, except where the Quran is cited within another quote, in which case the quoted authors
translation is retained.
2 See, for example, Q. 2:2, Q. 2:185, Q. 3:138, Q. 10:57 and Q. 16:64.
3 As Fazlur Rahman also notes the parallel (or even identity) between the revelation of the
Quran and the creation of the universe has been pointed out by several Muslim authors who
have noted the numerous passages in which the revelation of the Quran and the creation of
nature are coupled (Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Quran, 2nd edn (Kuala Lumpur:
Islamic Book Trust, 1999), p. 71). Indeed, sometimes in one passage the term ya is used in
these two different but related senses, referring both to revelation and natural world.
For instance: Alif Lam Mim Ra. These are the signs (yt) of the Scripture (kitb). What your
Lord has sent down to you [Prophet] is the truth, yet most people do not believe. It is God who
raised up the heavens with no visible supports and then established Himself on the throne;
He has subjected the sun and the moon each to pursue its course for an appointed time;
He regulates all things, and makes the revelations (yt) clear so that you may be certain of
meeting your Lord. It is He who spread out the earth, placed rm mountains and rivers on it,
and made two of every kind of fruit; He draws the veil of night over the day. There truly are
signs (yt) in this for people who reect (Q. 13:13, emphasis mine). Indeed, the Quran often
associates the rejection of the Prophetic message with a rejection of the natural signs: however

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eagerly you may want them to, most men will not believe and there are many signs (yt) in
the heavens and the earth that they pass by and give no heed to. (Q. 12:1035, emphasis mine).
4 Rahman, Major Themes, p. 70.
5 The Qurans insistence that it does not contain fables of the ancients (asr al-awwaln,
Q. 6:25, Q. 8:31, Q. 16:24, Q. 23:83, Q. 25:5, Q. 27:68, Q. 46:17, Q. 68:15 and Q. 83:13) can
be understood as emphasising that the Quranic stories are not told as mere fables, but for an
edifying purpose.
6 Denis Grill, art. Miracles in Encyclopaedia of the Qurn.
7 For contemporary examples of this traditional view, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart
of Islam (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), p. 24; M. Sami M. Ali, Scientic Miracles of the
Glorious Quran, tr. Abdussamad Kyle (Syria: n.p., 1997), pp. 102.
8 Halil I. Bulut, Kuran Isnda Mucize ve Peygamber (Istanbul: Ragbet Yayinlari, 2002),
pp. 2312; see also Issa J. Boullata, The Rhetorical Interpretation of the Quran: Ijz and
Related Topics in Andrew Rippin (ed.), Approaches to the History of Interpretation of the
Quran (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 13942.
9 These scholars also noted, however, that Muammad was given some additional miracles
to the Quran by God, even though the Quran was his central miracle. See Grill, art. Miracles.
10 While exploring the f literature on the subject is beyond the scope of this article, I would
like to acknowledge that it does contain excellent examples of relating Quranic stories to the
life of a believer. Interpreters such as Rm and Ibn Arab read the stories of the prophets,
including their miracles, as containing lessons for spiritual progress that is potentially applicable
to any reader. See, for instance, John Renard, All the Kings Falcons: Rumi on Prophets and
Revelation (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998) and Ibn Arab, The Bezels
of Wisdom, tr. and intr. R.W.J. Austin (New York: Paulist Press, 1980).
11 Al-Ghazl, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, tr., intr. and annot. Michael E. Marmura
(Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), p. 3.
12 Al-Ghazl, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, p. 3.
13 Al-Ghazl, Freedom and Fulllment, an Annotated Translation of al-Ghazls
al-Munqidh min al-alal and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazl, tr. Richard Joseph
McCarthy (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980), p. 22. Similarly, in his Qiss al-mustaqm,
al-Ghazl regards miraculous events as valueless when accompanied by a claim that is
irrelevant to what is accomplished by that miracle. If someone, for instance, claims to have
mastered a topic, it would be more convincing for that person to demonstrate his knowledge by
telling what he knows rather than walking on water. His walking on water does not really count
as an evidence of his knowledge of an irrelevant topic. See al-Ghazl, Qists al-mustaqm, ed.
S.J. Victor Chelhot (Beirut: Al-Mabaa al-Kathoulkiyya, 1959), p. 80.
14 Al-Ghazl, The Correct Balance (a translation of Qists al-mustaqm), in Freedom and
Fulllment, p. 316.
15 See al-Ghazl, Qiss al-mustaqm, p. 80.
16 See al-Ghazl, Qists al-mustaqm, p. 80.
17 See the introduction by Richard Joseph McCarthy in al-Ghazl, Freedom and Fulllment,
pp. lli.
18 Taneli Kukkonen, Possible Worlds in the Tahfut al-Falsifa: Al-Ghazl on Creation and
Contingency, Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000), pp. 479502, at p. 480.
19 In fact, in his exposition of one of Gods names, al-akam (the Arbitrator), al-Ghazl
notes that a believer should not be anxious over what will happen in the future, and trust that
God has decreed a stable and wise pattern which cannot but be fullled: It is necessary that it

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[whatever comes to be] exist: if it is not necessary in itself; it will be necessary by the eternal
decree which is irresistible. So man learns that what lies within [divine] power shall come to
exist and that anxiety is superuous (al-Ghazl, Al-Ghazl on the Ninety-Nine Beautiful
Names of God: al-Maqad al-asn f shar asm Allh al-usn, tr. D.B. Burrell and N. Daher
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1995), p. 90.
20 Hence, al-Ghazls suggestion that it is out of consideration of human welfare that certain
possibilities, such as the disclosure of the time of the Final Hour, are not enacted by God. See:
Nabih Amin Faris (tr. and annot.), The Foundations of the Articles of Faith: Being
A Translation with Notes of the Kitb Qawid al-Aqid of al-Ghazls Iy Ulm al-Dn,
(Lahore: Sh. Muammad Ashraf, 1963), pp. 423.
21 Faris, The Foundations of the Articles of Faith, pp. 445, pp. 4950.
22 Simon Van Den Bergh (tr., intr. and annot.), Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (2 vols, Oxford: Messrs. Luzac & Co, 1954), vol. 1,
p. 318. Leor Halevi comments that Ibn Rushd failed to appreciate the nuance of al-Ghazls
contention because of the limitations of Aristotelian conceptions of causality. Averroes thought
that matter acts according to its essence, not according to physical laws. Given such causal
explanations, it is unfortunate that Averroes dismissed Ghazls attack as mere sophistry
(Leor Halevi, The Theologians Doubts: Natural Philosophy and the Skeptical Games of
al-Ghazl, Journal of the History of Ideas 63:1 (2002), pp. 1939, at p. 24).
23 Van Den Bergh, Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut, p. 320.
24 Van Den Bergh, Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut, p. 322.
25 The reason for this is that these are the principles of the acts through which man becomes
virtuous, and that one can only attain knowledge after the attainment of virtue. One must not
investigate the principles which cause virtue before the attainment of virtue, and since the
theoretical sciences can only be perfected through assumptions and axioms which the learner
accepts in the rst place, this must be still more the case with the practical sciences (Van Den
Bergh, Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut, p. 315).
26 Van Den Bergh, Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut, p. 316.
27 Like al-Ghazl, Ibn Rushd says that if there are two people who claim to be physicians,
and one tries to prove it by treating the sick and the other tries to prove it by walking on water,
the formers proof is much stronger than the latter. See Ibn Rushd, Manhij al-adilla f aqid
al-milla, ed. Mahmd Qsim, 2nd edn (Cairo: Anglo-Eyptian Library, 1964), p. 212; Averroes,
Faith and Reason in Islam: Averroes Exposition of Religious Arguments, tr. Ibrahim Najjar
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), pp. 956.
28 Ibn Rushd, Manhij, p. 215.
29 Van Den Bergh, Averroes Tahfut al-Tahfut, p. 322; Ibn Rushd, Tahfut al-Tahfut,
ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), p. 509.
30 For summary of Nursis comprehensive intellectual training, see Colin Turner and
Hasan Horkuc, Said Nursi: Makers of Islamic Civilization (Oxford: I.B. Tauris, 2009),
pp. 519.
31 Leaman is here referring to the famous saying attributed to the Prophet Muammad, which
predicts that in each age God will send a person from the Muslim community to revive the faith.
See Oliver Leaman, Nursis Place in the Ihya Tradition in A Contemporary Approach
to Understanding the Quran: The Example of the Risale-i Nur 20th22nd September, 1998,
The Istanbul Foundation for Science and Culture (Istanbul: Sozler Nesriyat A.S., 2000),
pp. 70717.
32 M. Sait Ozervarli, Said Nursis Project of Revitalizing Contemporary Islamic Thought in
Ibrahim Abu Rabi (ed. and intr.), Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of

Redening the Miraculous

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Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), pp. 31733,
at pp. 3212. Nursi himself claimed to have brought out a new and profound reading of the
Quran for the contemporary age as well as a renewal of the discipline of Islamic theology,
kalm (Ziyad Khalil Muammad al Daghamin, The Aims of the Quran in Bediuzzaman Said
Nursis Thought in A Contemporary Approach to Understanding the Quran: The Example of
the Risale-i Nur 20th22nd September, 1998, The Istanbul Foundation for Science and Culture
(Istanbul: Sozler Nesriyat A.S., 2000), pp. 35379, at p. 379).
33 Said Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat (2 vols, Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yaynlar, 1996), vol.1,
pp. 125ff.
34 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol.1, pp. 520ff.
35 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol.1, p. 1089.
36 See Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol.1, pp. 4955; pp. 97109; pp. 160203, pp. 1985 ff.,
etc.
37 Nursi, The Words: From the Risale-i Nur Collection, tr. Sukran Vahide, new and rev. edn
(Istanbul: Sozler Publication, 1998), p. 150. Nursi is critical of the attitude that privileges
freaks, which have fallen from being extraordinary, come out of the order of creation, and
deviated from the perfections of their true natures. According to this approach, one ignores the
formation of innumerable healthy babies as commonplace, and regards only an abnormal baby,
e.g. one born with two heads, as worthy of wonder (Nursi, The Words, p. 150). (Unless
otherwise noted, translations from the Turkish original are from Sukran Vahides translation,
with my occasional minor modications.)
38 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol.1, p. 26, pp. 389, p. 83, p. 88, p. 91, p. 99, pp. 2612,
p. 264, p. 275, p. 307, p. 311, p. 417, p. 487, p. 921, p. 940, p. 1,355, p. 1,368, etc.
39 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol.1, p. 921.
40 Nursi, The Words, p. 435.
41 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol. 2, p. 1,859.
42 Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol. 2, p. 1,859.
43 See for instance: Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol. 2, p. 26, p, 92. Thus, for instance,
according to Nursi the Quranic perspective rejects the tendency to see a three-legged baby
more astonishing than a normal baby, or to see the survival of an insect in water more amazing
than the nourishment of young with breast milk (see also Nursi, The Words, p. 151.)
44 Nursi, The Words, p. 269.
45 Nursi, The Words, p. 16 (italics mine).
46 Nursi, The Words, pp. 167.
47 Nursi, The Words, p. 17.
48 Nursi, The Words, p. 17.
49 Nursi, The Words, p. 17.
50 Nursi, The Words, p. 17.
51 For an example of Nursis more explicit use of knowledge of natural causes as pointers to
God, see his discussion of the scientic description of the digestion of food and cleansing of the
blood in Nursi, The Words, p. 622, n. 3.
52 Nursi, The Words, p. 262.
53 Nursi is not unique in suggesting this pro-tech interpretation of miracle stories. An Indian
Muslim scholar, Shibl Numn (18571914) similarly interprets miracle stories as pointing to
future technological development. See (in the Persian translation), Shibl Numn, Ilm-i
Kalm-i Jadd, tr. M. Taki Fakhr Dai Kilani (Tehran: n.p., 1329), pp. 613; pp. 1012, cited in

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Journal of Quranic Studies

Ozervarli, Said Nursis Project, p. 333, n. 68. The difference between Nursi and Numn is
that Nursi does not see a tension between technological hints and the interpretation of miracle
stories as departures from normal course of nature.
54 Amended translation from Nursi, The Words, p. 262. Also see Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat,
vol. 2, p. 1,270.
55 Nursi, The Words, p. 262.
56 Nursi, The Words, p. 263.
57 Nursi, The Words, p. 263.
58 Cf. Muhammad Asad, a contemporary interpreter of the Quran, who renders the most of
the plain sense of this verse about Jesus miracles in spiritual terms. As for the healing miracles,
which is hard to render differently in translation, he adds a footnote saying that the healing
narratives should be taken in spiritual sense rather than literal sense. See Asad, Message of the
Quran (Gibraltar: Dr al-Andals, 1984), n. 38 in ref. to Q. 3:49. Nursis interpretation is
interesting in that he offers both readings and does not see a tension between the two.
59 Nursi, The Words, p. 263.
60 Nursi, The Words, p. 263.
61 Isra Yazicioglu, The Use of Peirces Pragmatism for Quranic Interpretation, Journal of
Scriptural Reasoning 8:2 (2009), accessed at http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/ssr/issues/
volume8/number2/ssr08_02_e02.htm.
62 He insightfully notes that to his own ears that are admittedly conditioned by modernity, it
feels a bit strained (Kelton Cobb, Revelation, the Disciplines of Reason, and Truth in the
Works of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Paul Tillich in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (ed.), Islam at the
Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (New York: State University
of New York Press, 2003), pp. 12950, at p. 135.)
63 For Nursis denition of the Quran as talking to all humanity till the end of time, see his
treatise on the Quranic interpretation, See, Nursi, The Words, 25th Word, esp. pp. 3778.
64 See Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol. 2, p. 573, p. 2,340.
65 Nursi, The Words, p. 273.
66 Nursi, The Words, p. 273. Elsewhere, Nursi notes that since the Quran is speaking to all
ages, including centuries preceding the modern era where science and technology uncovered
many new things, it would be unwise for it to mention explicitly what is to become obvious
only centuries later. See: Nursi, Risale-i Nur Klliyat, vol. 2, p. 96.
67 Nursi, The Words, p. 274.