F Techniques
PSI Sources
MSDS information
COSHH in UK
Chemical inventories
Process flow diagrams
Relief Valve Calculations
P&IDs
Plot plans
Electrical line diagrams
Hazard zone diagrams
Operating procedures
Training records
Loss control reports
Shift logs
Reviewing P&IDs
Operating limits
Ability to isolate systems and equipment
Pressure relief points
Venting points
Flame arrester applications
Fail-safe responses
Ability to deal with loss of utilities
Purging connections
Flushing and cleaning connections
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
EXTERNAL
HAZARDS
NATURAL
HAZARDS
HUMAN ERROR
HAZARDS
OTHER
HAZARDS?
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOP
MITIGATION
MEASURES
LIKELIHOOD
ANALYSIS
CONSEQUENCE
ANALYSIS
RESIDUAL RISK
MANAGEMENT
YES
OPERATION
NO
FURTHER
RISK REDUCTION
REQUIRED
?
OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
RISK
ANALYSIS
RISK ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY
BP Techniques
Hazard Identification
Techniques
Checklists
HAZID
What-If Analysis
Structured brainstorming to identify and correct
possible deviations in a plan or design.
Multi-disciplined team
Process, Maintenance, Technical and Specialty
Personnel.
Information Requirements
PFDs, Control Logic, Equipment Data Sheets, Plot
plan, Alarm set points, Baseline process data.
Simple format
Easy to facilitate
Quick to execute
Highly flexible - creative brainstorming
Can be used at any stage of design, construction,
or operation of a system or process.
Useful in evaluating organizational MOC
BUT dependent on skilled and experienced
participants.
What-If Analysis
WHAT IF?
CAUSE
(WHY?)
SAFEGUARDS
(WHY NOT?)
CONSEQUENCES
(SO WHAT?)
STRATEGY
(THEN WHAT?)
Contamination
Wrong concentration
Leak/rupture
Misdirected flow
Sampling
Maintenance
Hoisting
Instrumentation
Control function
Corrosion /erosion
Isolation
No mixing
Stratification
Quality infraction
No flow
Restricted flow
Poor heat transfer
Service failure
Human error
Wrong material
Exercise #
Chemical Warehouse
What-If - Exercise
A propane heating system is used to heat a chemical
warehouse. Materials consist of several hundred
drums of aqueous ammonia, chlorinated
hydrocarbons, toluene and benzene. Products are
stored in steel drums on stacked wooden pallets.
The heating system contains two 500-gallons LPG
bullets, a small vaporizer, piping and 4 floor mounted
heating units.
Conduct a What If analysis using simple format.
CAUSE
SAFEGUARDS
CONSEQUENCES
STRATEGY
(WHY?)
(WHY NOT?)
(SO WHAT?)
(THEN WHAT?)
Cold weather
Temperature
thaw
Line protected
inside building and
within fenced off
area. Still exposed
under roof.
Possible fire or
service interruption.
Install a mechanical
cover over the entire
length of gas supply
line. Ensure that roof
overhang cannot
discharge directly onto
gas supply equipment.
HAZOP
HAZOP Method
Divide the process into nodes.
Describe intent of the node (flow, temp,
pressure)
Identify possible deviations (hi flow, low temp)
Identify causes (blocked valve, failed
instrument)
Develop consequences
List existing safeguards
Assign hazard ranking (optional)
Propose recommendations
Repeat for each node.
HAZOP Worksheet
Node:
Inlet piping
Parameter:
Flow
Drawing No.:
Deviation
Cause
Consequence
Safeguards
No flow
Downstream
valve CV-124
inadvertently
closed
Piping between
pump and CV124 will see
pump deadhead
pressure
Pipe rating is
sufficient for
deadhead
pressure
High flow
Upstream
valve CV-120
fails full open
12605-ABC
Recommenda By
tions
Who/When
Consider the
addition of a
flow alarm
downstream
of CV-120
J. Smith,
Engineering
November
2006
IMPACT OF FAILURE
M
M
H
M
L
ITEM C
ITEM A
ITEM D
ITEM N
ITEM Q
H
L
M
L
M
Risk Assessment
Techniques
10
Risk Matrix
Positive
Fundamental Risk-based Tool
Simple, graphical tool. Easy to communication.
Qualitative Uses ranges of severity and
likelihood
Variety of uses at different business levels
D
IMPAC
T
Negative
Multiple versions
Inconsistent scaling
Axes reversed
C
B
A
FREQUENCY
Risk Matrix
E
May need
to add
several
safeguards.
HIGH
CONSEQUENCE
LOW
A
Should
add at
least one
safeguard.
FREQUENCY
11
BP Risk Matrix
Frequency Band - MAR
(<10-6/yr)
(10-6 to 10-5/yr)
(10-5
to 10-4/yr)
Frequency
(10-4 to 10-3/yr)
(<10-3/yr)
HSSE
Re
c
du
sk
Ri
Frequency Band
(<10-3)
(10-3 to 10-1/yr)
focus
(>10-1/yr)
MIA
1
D
2
PSM & IM
Standard
focus
LOPA Method
LOPA starts with an initiating event and examines
individual failure modes. How many failure
MECHANICAL
PSV
mechanisms are there?
INTERLOCK
Failure
BPCS/ALARM
EXPLOSION OF
LP SEPARATOR,
FIRE, SHRAPNEL
Initiating
event
LIQUID FEED TO HP
SEPARATOR STOPS
DUE TO UNIT SHUTDOWN
Success
Failure
12
LOPA Sequence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
LOPA Process
Not all safeguards are IPLs but all IPLs are
safeguards.
IPL performs
Undesired consequence
prevented by IPL
Initiating event
IPL fails
Undesired consequence
occurs despite the
presence of IPL
LOPA Application
SIL-1
10-1 TO 10-2
SIL-2
10-2 TO 10-3
SIL-3
10-3 TO 10-4
13
LOPA Summary
LOPA should be used to validate the need for
additional layers of protection.
Proposed safeguards should be analyzed to
determine whether they will reduce the risk to an
acceptable level.
SIL rated instrumentation should only be used in
critical instances when the need is demonstrated.
SIL rated instruments must receive support and
discipline of the organization.
QRA is:
Very detailed and comprehensive
Takes much data, time, and resources
Quantitative (consequence impact and
frequency)
Allows objective decision making
Regulated, in some locations
Can illustrate risk reduction
14
Numbers of people that may be killed simultaneously from accidents at one site
10-4
UNACCEPTABLE
10-5
10-6
10-7
RISK
REDUCTION
REQUIRED
ACCEPTABLE
Number of fatalities = N
15
Individual Risk
The risk that a
(hypothetical)
person will be
lethally injured due
to industrial activity
when this person
resides there 24
hours per day,
unprotected at the
same spot.
BP Approach to Risk
16
MAR Approach
High level approach used exclusively by BPs
Senior Leadership
Screening tool to identify the highest levels
of Societal & Environmental Risk that the
BP Group is exposed to.
Reporting line is a high level of risk.
Continuous Risk Reduction IS REQUIRED
both above and below the line.
MAR Methodology
Identifies worst case scenarios in plant areas
Models consequences and
Impact on population
Frequencies based on historical industry and company
experience and reflect average design and operation
Does not reflect those cases where unit design is much
better or worse than average
Does not specifically cover operation of plant outside
reasonably anticipated parameters
Does not specifically examine transient or temporary
activities
MAR Process
Starts by identifying some, not all, risks on a
Hazard and Risk Register
Group Reporting Lines (onsite/offsite) are based
on company sustainability, regulatory precedents
and industry experience
Facilitates Continuous Risk Reduction
17
MAR is not
IM standard mostly
frequency reduction
18
19