SIX: POST-‐EMPLOYMENT
-‐ “Security
of
Tenure”
=
right
not
to
be
removed
from
one’s
job
except
for
a
valid
reason
and
through
proper
procedure
as
authorized
by
the
LC
-‐ Regular
employment,
cannot
terminate
EXCEPT
for
just
cause
or
causes
enumerated
in
the
law
-‐ If
not,
reinstatement
w/o
loss
of
seniority
rights
and
other
privileges;
full
backwages
(w/
allowances);
other
benefits
or
monetary
equivalent
computed
from
time
compensation
was
withheld
to
actual
reinstatement
-‐ Non-‐regular
employment
or
probationary
employment,
cannot
lawfully
terminate
before
the
end
of
the
agreed
period
w/o
just
cause
-‐ Guaranteed
by
Consti,
Art.
XIII
§
3,
punished
by
CC
Art.
1710
-‐ Managerial
employees
covered
-‐ An
acting
appointment
is
merely
temporary,
or
one
which
is
good
until
another
appointment
is
made
to
take
its
place.
And
if
another
person
is
appointed,
the
temporary
appointee
should
step
out
and
cannot
even
dispute
the
validity
of
his
successor’s
appointment.
The
undisturbed
unanimity
of
cases
is
that
one
who
holds
a
temporary
appointment
has
no
fixed
tenure
of
office;
his
employment
can
be
terminated
anytime
at
the
pleasure
of
the
appointing
power
without
need
to
show
that
it
is
for
cause.
As
to
THE
right
to
procedural
due
process,
there
is
no
need
of
a
notice
to
the
acting
appointee
or
any
form
of
hearing.
Such
procedural
requirements
apply
where
the
officer
is
removable
only
for
cause.
The
rule
that
a
bona
fide
appointment
in
an
acting
capacity
is
essentially
temporary
and
revocable
in
character
and
the
holder
of
such
appointment
may
be
removed
anytime
even
without
hearing
or
cause.
Aklan
v.
Guarino
(2007)
Art.
280
REGULAR
OR
CASUAL
EMPLOYMENT
LABOR
II
(Finals)
3C
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
1
of
11
-‐ “Project
Employee”
=
employment
has
been
fixed
for
a
specific
project
or
undertaking,
the
completion
or
termination
of
which
has
been
determined
at
the
time
of
the
engagement
of
the
ee.
-‐ Employment
is
coterminous
with
the
project
for
which
the
ee
was
hired.
May
even
be
terminated
if
a
particular
phase
for
which
he
was
employed
has
ended.
-‐ Basic
requisite:
Status
is
effected
and
implemented
in
GOOD
FAITH
-‐ No
need
to
pay
separation
pay.
-‐ Contract
workers
are
NOT
regular
workers,
unjust
to
require
the
er
to
maintain
them
in
the
payroll
while
they
are
doing
absolutely
nothing
except
waiting
for
another
project.
-‐ If
part
of
a
work
pool,
then
the
end
of
that
project
or
any
phase
thereof
will
not
mean
a
severance
of
the
ee-‐er
rel’p.
-‐ They
become
REGULAR
EEs
when:
o There
is
continuous
rehiring
of
project
employees
even
after
the
cessation
of
a
project
[NOT
controlling
just
as
BADGE
of
regular
employment);
and
o The
tasks
performed
by
the
alleged
“project
employee”
are
vital,
necessary,
and
indispensible
to
the
usual
business
or
trade
of
the
er.
-‐ To
qualify
as
member
of
a
work
pool,
the
worker
must
still
be
considered
an
employee
of
the
construction
company
while
in
the
work
pool.
In
other
words,
there
must
be
proof
to
the
effect
that
petitioner
was
under
an
obligation
to
be
always
available
on
call
of
private
respondent
and
that
he
was
not
free
to
offer
his
services
to
other
employers.
Fernandez
v.
NLRC
(1994)
-‐ Project
employees
are
entitled
to
separation
pay
if
the
projects
they
are
working
on
have
not
yet
been
completed
when
their
services
are
terminated.
And
this
should
be
true
even
if
their
contracts
have
expired,
on
the
theory
that
such
contracts
would
have
been
renewed
anyway
because
their
services
were
still
needed.
De
Ocampo
v.
NLRC
(1990)
-‐ Where
the
employment
of
project
employees
is
extended
long
after
the
supposed
project
has
been
finished,
the
employees
are
removed
from
the
scope
of
project
employees
and
considered
regular
employees.
This
court
has
consistently
held
that
failure
of
the
employer
to
file
termination
reports
after
every
project
completion
with
the
nearest
public
employment
office
is
an
indication
that
private
respondent
was
not
and
is
not
a
project
employee.
Audion
Electrice
v.
NLRC
(1999)
-‐ While
the
absence
of
a
written
contract
does
not
automatically
confer
regular
status,
it
has
been
construed
by
this
Court
as
a
red
flag
in
cases
involving
the
question
of
whether
the
workers
concerned
are
regular
or
project
employees.
Hanjin
v.
Ibanez
(2008)
-‐ While
this
Court
has
recognized
the
validity
of
fixed-‐term
employment
contracts,
it
has
consistently
held
that
this
is
the
exception
rather
than
the
general
rule.
More
importantly,
a
fixed-‐term
employment
is
valid
only
under
certain
circumstances.
In
Philex
Mining
Corp.
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,
the
Court
defined
"project
employees"
as
those
workers
hired
(1)
for
a
specific
project
or
undertaking,
and
wherein
(2)
the
completion
or
termination
of
such
project
has
been
determined
at
the
time
of
the
engagement
of
the
employee.
Scrutinizing
petitioners’
employment
contracts
,
however,
failed
to
reveal
any
mention
therein
of
what
specific
project
or
undertaking
petitioners
were
hired
for.
Although
the
contracts
made
general
references
to
a
"project,"
such
project
was
neither
named
nor
described
at
all
therein.
The
employment
status
of
a
person
is
defined
and
prescribed
by
law
and
not
by
what
the
parties
say
it
should
be.
Equally
important
to
consider
is
that
a
contract
of
employment
is
impressed
with
public
interest
such
that
labor
contracts
must
yield
to
the
common
good.
Thus,
provisions
of
applicable
statutes
are
deemed
written
into
the
contract,
and
the
parties
are
not
at
liberty
to
insulate
themselves
and
their
relationships
from
the
impact
of
labor
laws
and
regulations
by
simply
contracting
with
each
other.
Price
v.
Innodata
(2008)
-‐ “Seasonal
Employment”
=
regular
ees;
called
to
work
from
time
to
time;
temporarily
laid
off
during
off
season;
not
strictly
speaking
separated
from
service
but
merely
on
leave
of
absence
without
pay
until
they
are
reemployed;
employment
just
suspended
-‐ Entitled
to
separation
pay,
one
month’s
pay
=
average
monthly
pay
during
season
worked
-‐ UNLESS
only
employed
for
ONE
season
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
2
of
11
o Not
compliant
with
requisites
of
regular
employment
-‐ If
the
activity
for
which
he
was
hired
when
he
was
a
casual
recurs,
he
is
the
one
to
be
hired
and
acquires
security
of
tenure.
Er
needs
just
cause
not
to
rehire
him.
-‐ Casual
when
IRREGULAR,
UNPREDICTABLE,
SPORADIC,
and
BRIEF
IN
NATURE,
and
outside
usual
business
-‐ Still
could
be
governed
by
a
CBA
and
may
have
all
rights
and
privileges
as
well
as
duties
of
a
regular
ee
during
the
period
of
actual
employment
-‐ “Fixed
Period
Employment”
=
only
a
definite
period
as
agreed
by
the
parties,
may
be
justified
under
the
CC
-‐ Requisites
for
validity:
o Must
be
shown
that
period
was
KNOWINGLY
and
VOLUNTARILY
agreed
upon
by
the
parties.
o No
force,
duress,
or
improper
pressure
on
ees
or
any
other
circumstance
that
vitiates
consent;
no
dominance
by
the
er
over
the
ee
(dealt
with
each
other
on
equal
terms)
-‐ Seafarers
are
the
exception,
not
entitled
to
separation
pay
when
term
of
contract
ends,
governed
by
POEA
Standard
Employment
Contract.
-‐ “Probationary
employee”
=
one
who
is
on
tentative
employment
during
which
the
employer
determines
whether
he
is
qualified
for
permanent
employment
-‐ Should
not
exceed
six
months
from
date
ee
started
working
-‐ UNLESS
covered
by
apprenticeship
agreemnt
stipulating
longer
period
-‐ May
be
terminated
if
fails
to
qualify
as
regular
ee
o Standards
must
be
reasonable
o Must
have
been
made
known
by
the
er
to
ee
at
time
of
his
engagement
-‐ If
allowed
to
work
after
probationary
period
REGULAR
-‐ Requires
the
existence
of
documentary
evidence
to
show
probationary
status
-‐ Limited
tenure
but
still
has
security
of
tenure,
so
just
cause
must
still
be
shown.
And
if
for
cause
er
does
not
have
to
wait
till
probationary
period
is
over.
-‐ Limitations
to
terminations:
o Must
accord
with
the
req’ts
of
the
contract;
o The
dissatisfaction
of
the
er
is
real
and
in
GF,
not
feigned
to
circumvent
the
or
contract;
o No
unlawful
discrimination
-‐ Nature
of
work
may
create
a
circumstance
that
a
probationary
period
longer
than
six
months
is
valid
and
binding.
It
may
even
be
extended
at
the
ee’s
request
to
give
the
ee
a
second
chance
to
pass
the
standards
of
the
er.
-‐ Double
(or
multipl)
probation
is
NOT
allowed
ee
on-‐the-‐job
training
first
then
hired
on
probation
for
six
months
-‐ Six
months
=
180
days
-‐ Private
school
teachers
to
be
regular:
o Full-‐time
teacher
o Rendered
three
consecutive
years
of
service
o Satisfactory
service
-‐ Within
the
limited
legal
six-‐month
probationary
period,
probationary
employees
are
still
entitled
to
security
of
tenure.
It
is
expressly
provided
in
the
afore-‐quoted
Article
281
that
a
probationary
employee
may
be
terminated
only
on
two
grounds:
(a)
for
just
cause,
or
(b)
when
he
fails
to
qualify
as
a
regular
employee
in
accordance
with
reasonable
standards
made
known
by
the
employer
to
the
employee
at
the
time
of
his
engagement.
It
is
undisputed
that
PDI
apprised
Magtibay
of
the
ground
of
his
termination,
i.e.,
he
failed
to
qualify
as
a
regular
employee
in
accordance
with
reasonable
standards
made
known
to
him
at
the
time
of
engagement,
only
a
week
before
the
expiration
of
the
six-‐month
probationary
period.
Unlike
under
the
first
ground
for
the
valid
termination
of
probationary
employment
which
is
for
just
cause,
the
second
ground
does
not
require
notice
and
hearing.
Due
process
of
law
for
this
second
ground
consists
of
making
the
reasonable
standards
expected
of
the
employee
during
his
probationary
period
known
to
him
at
the
time
of
his
probationary
employment.
It
is
in
apprising
him
of
the
standards
against
which
his
performance
shall
be
continuously
assessed
where
due
process
regarding
the
second
ground
lies,
and
not
in
notice
and
hearing
as
in
the
case
of
the
first
ground.
PDI
v.
Magtibay
(2007)
Art.
282
JUST
CAUSES
FOR
TERMINATION
LABOR
II
(Finals)
3C
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
3
of
11
JUST
CAUSE
(Art.
282)
AUTHORIZED
CAUSE
(Arts.
283-‐284)
CAUSE
Faults
and
misdeeds
of
ee
Business
or
economic
reasons;
measures
taken
by
ee
bec
of
business
exigencies
SEPARATION
PAY
Er
not
liable
(except
for
compassion/financial
assistance
to
Required
(unless
closure
or
cessation
of
operation
due
to
deserving
ee)
serious
business
losses
duly
proved)
DUE
PROCESS
Notice
(2
notices
–
a.
charging
ee
of
particular
acts
or
omissions
Notice
to
ee
and
DOLE
30
days
before
that
may
cause
his
dimissal;
b.
informs
ee
of
er’s
decision)
and
hearing/invesitigation
(no
formal
investigation
is
necessary
where
ee
expressly
admitted
infractions,
just
notice
of
er’s
findings)
EFFECTIVITY
DATE
Determined
by
er
30
days
after
notice
-‐ Just
causes:
(a) Serious
misconduct/
willful
disobedience
(lawful
orders,
connected
to
his
work)
(b) Gross
or
habitual
neglect
of
duties
(c) Fraud
or
willful
breach
of
trust
(d) Commission
of
crime
or
offense
gaianst
er
or
immediate
member
of
family
or
rep
(e) Analogous
causes
-‐ “Serious
misconduct”
=
improper
or
wrong
conduct;
transgression
of
some
established
and
definite
rule
of
action;
forbidden
act;
dereliction
of
duty;
willful
in
character;
wrongful
intent;
not
mere
error
in
judgment;
of
grave
and
aggravated
character
not
merely
trivial
and
unimportant
But
must
be
connected
to
work
-‐ Sexual
harassment
and
falsification
of
a
time
card
areincluded
-‐ “Willful
disobedience”
o orders,
regulations,
or
instructions
are
reasonable
and
lawful;
[depends
on
circumstances]
o sufficiently
known
to
the
ee;
o in
connection
to
duties
of
ee.
-‐ Must
relate
to
substantial
matters.
-‐ Resorted
to
without
regard
to
its
consequences
-‐ Prohibiting
rel’ps
bet.
ee’s
could
be
valid
if
necessary
to
protect
trade
secrets,
nature
of
industry,
etc.
Enforcing
the
policy
is
not
dismissal
or
constructive
dismissal
-‐ If
transfer
is
not
motivated
by
discrimination
or
bad
faith
or
is
done
as
punishment
or
does
not
result
in
demotion
in
rank
or
diminution
is
pay,
benefits,
or
other
privileges
without
sufficient
cause
then
it
should
be
obeyed
otherwise
it
is
constructive
dismissal.
o Er
must
show
that
it
was
not
unreasonable,
inconvenient,
or
prejudicial
to
the
ee;
o No
demotion
etc.
-‐ Cannot
promote
an
ee
without
consent
even
if
it’s
merey
a
result
of
a
transfer
(sheesh)
-‐ “Neglect
of
duties”
=
absence
of
that
diligence
that
an
ordinarily
prudent
man
would
use
in
his
own
affairs
-‐ Not
necessary
that
actual
loss,
damage,
or
prejudice
has
been
suffered
by
er
on
ee’s
account;
sufficientthat
it
tends
to
prejudice
er’s
interest
(unreasonable
to
force
er
to
wait
for
that
evil)
-‐ Can
impose
productivity
standards
that
may
serve
as
a
basis
for
the
just
cause
of
dismissal
-‐ Abandonment
of
job
is
a
form
of
neglect
o Failure
to
report
for
work
or
absence
without
valid
or
justifiable
reason
o Clear
intention
to
sever
er-‐ee
rel’p
[determinative
factor
manifested
by
overt
acts]
o Absece
is
insufficient
basis
o Er
has
the
burden
to
prove
it
-‐ “Fraud,
loss
of
confidence”
=
any
act,
omission,
or
concealment
which
involves
a
breach
of
legal
duty,
trust
&
confidence
justly
reposed,
and
is
injurious
to
another.
-‐ Must
be
committed
against
er
or
in
connection
of
ee’s
work
-‐ Innocent
nondisclosure
of
facts
is
not
included
-‐ Loss
of
confidence
only
applies
to
ees
who
occupy
positions
of
trust
&
confidence,
ee
must
be
routinely
charged
with
the
care
and
custody
of
er’s
money
or
property.
Must
be
based
on
willful
breach
clearly
established
by
proven
facts.
LABOR
II
(Finals)
3C
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
4
of
11
-‐ Cashiers,
managers,
supervisors,
salesmen,
assitant
cook
in
a
hotel
in-‐charge
of
food
preparation/custody
&
release
of
supplies,
or
other
similar
personnel
fall
under
this
classification.
If
any
other
r&f
employee,
like
an
electrician
or
janitors,
there
must
be
proof
of
actual
loss.
-‐ Proof
beyond
reasonable
doubt
not
required,
must
be
basis
but
not
absolute.
Must
be
substantial
and
not
arbitrary.
-‐ “Commission
of
a
crime
or
offense”
–
spouse,
ascendants,
descendants
legit
or
illegit,
adopted,
related
by
affinity
in
the
same
degrees,
by
consanguinity
within
the
fourth
civil
degree
-‐ “Analogous
causes”
=
dependent
on
circumstances
-‐ Should
be
due
to
voluntary/willful
act
or
omission
of
ee
-‐ Being
found
positive
of
use
of
dangerous
drugs
is
an
analogous
circumstance
but
not
being
found
positive
of
HIV/AIDS.
-‐ Procedure:
Charged
validity
of
charge
established
in
a
manner
consistent
with
due
process
[Must
have
a
legal
ground
and
follow
legal
procedure/
manner
of
dismissal
must
be
legal]
-‐ If
due
process
not
observed
but
dismissal
was
for
a
valid
cause,
the
separation
is
still
legal,
ee
remains
dismissed.
Dismissal
was
merely
defective/ineffectual
tll
the
court
affirmed
it.
But
the
er
may
be
held
liable
for
damages.
o Wenphi
Doctrine:
Pay
indemnity,
award
depends
on
facts
of
the
case
and
gravity
of
the
omission
of
the
er.
(1989)
o Serrano
Doctrine:
Pay
full
backwages
from
the
time
of
dismissal
to
the
finality
of
the
court’s
decision,
if
under
Art.
282
then
just
that
but
if
under
Arts.
283-‐284
this
must
be
aid
in
addition
to
separation
pay.
[to
deter
dismissals
without
due
process]
(2000)
o Agabon
Doctrine:
Pay
indemnity
in
the
form
of
nominal
damages
(lighter
than
Serrano
backwages
but
heavier
than
Wenphil
indemnity);
depends
on
the
degree
of
gravity
of
er’s
diregard
for
procedural
due
process;
separation
pay
under
Arts.
283-‐284
still
applies
(2004)
o JAKA
Doctrine:
Art.
282
Sanction
to
er
tempered
bec
the
dismissal
process
was,
in
effect,
initiated
by
an
act
imputable
to
the
ee
Arts.
283
Stiffer
sanction
since
initiated
by
er’s
exercise
of
the
management
prerogative.
(2005)
o DOLE
Doctrine:
Previous
notice
to
DOLE
is
not
necessary
if
ee
consented
to
his
retrenchment
or
applied
for
it.
o If
under
Arts.
283-‐284,
can
be
paid
for
the
30
days
and
excused
from
work
but
the
termination
cannot
be
said
to
take
effect
till
after
the
30
days.
-‐ Burden
of
proof:
on
employer
to
affirmatively
show
rationally
adequate
evidence
that
it
was
for
a
justifiable
cause;
substantial
proof
more
than
a
mere
scintilla,
relevant
evidence
as
a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
-‐ Appropriate
penalty
=
depends
on
lightness
or
gravity
of
the
offense;
er’s
toleration
of
or
laxity
in
past
of
similar
offenses;
ee’s
years
of
service
and
clean
record;
amount
of
money
or
value
involved;
not
necessarily
dismissal;
if
it
can
be
avoided
without
oppressing
the
er
then
it
should
be;
can
be
forfeiture
of
benefits,
demotion
with
due
process
since
it’s
like
dismissal.
-‐ Dismissal
is
still
valid
even
if
ee
acquitted
because
only
substantial
evidence
is
required
in
dismissal.
-‐ “Constructive
dismissal”
=
involuntary
resignation
resorted
to
when
employment
becomes
impossible,
unreasonable,
or
unlikely
when
there
is
demotion
in
rank
or
diminution
in
pay;
clear
discrimination;
insensibility
or
disdain
by
er
becomes
unbearable;
status
changed
from
regular
to
casual;
unexplained
reduction
of
workdays;
floating
status
-‐ With
the
finding
that
private
respondent
was
illegally
dismissed,
he
is
entitled
to
reinstatement
without
loss
of
seniority
rights
and
other
privileges
and
to
his
full
backwages
inclusive
of
allowances,
and
to
other
benefits
or
their
monetary
equivalent
computed
from
the
time
his
compensation
was
withheld
from
him
up
to
he
time
of
his
actual
reinstatement.
Public
respondent
limited
private
respondent’s
backwages
from
the
date
of
his
dismissal
and
up
to
the
time
when
petitioner
allegedly
offered
to
reinstate
private
respondent.
Condo
Suite
Club
Travel
v.
NLRC
(2000)
-‐ It
is
the
obligation
of
the
employer
to
pay
an
illegally
dismissed
employee
or
worker
the
whole
amount
of
the
salaries
or
wages,
plus
all
other
benefits
and
bonuses
and
general
increases,
to
which
he
would
have
been
normally
entitled
had
he
not
been
dismissed
and
had
not
stopped
working.
The
salary
base
properly
used
in
computing
separation
pay
and
the
back
wages
due
to
petitioner
should
include
not
just
the
basic
salary
but
also
the
regular
allowances
that
petitioner
had
been
receiving.
LABOR
II
(Finals)
3C
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
5
of
11
-‐ At
the
time
of
their
dismissal
in
1979,
Avera
and
Simangan
were
already
71
and
73
years
old
and
could
not
be
expected
to
continue
much
longer
in
the
petitioner’s
employ.
It
is
only
fair,
therefore,
that
they
be
allowed
back
pay
only
for
the
period
of
3
years
as
in
the
case
of
other
illegally
dismissed
employees.
St
Louis
College
of
Tuguegarao
v.
NLRC
(1989)
-‐ While
it
is
true
that
the
essence
of
due
process
is
simply
an
opportunity
to
be
heard
or,
as
applied
in
administrative
proceedings,
an
opportunity
to
explain
one’s
side,
meetings
in
the
nature
of
consultation
and
conferences
as
such
the
case
here,
however,
may
not
be
valid
substitutes
for
the
proper
observance
of
notice
and
hearing.
Equitable
Banking
v.
NLRC
(1997)
-‐ Backwages
to
be
awarded
to
an
illegally
dismissed
employee,
should
not,
as
a
general
rule,
be
diminished
or
reduced
by
the
earnings
derived
by
him
elsewhere
during
the
period
of
his
illegal
dismissal.
The
underlying
reason
for
this
ruling
is
that
the
employee,
while
litigating
the
legality
or
his
dismissal,
must
still
earn
a
living
to
support
himself
and
family,
while
full
backwages
have
to
be
paid
by
the
employer
as
part
of
the
price
or
penalty
he
has
to
pay
for
illegally
dismissing
his
employee.
Bustamante
v.
NLRC
(1996)
-‐ Clearly,
the
law
intended
reinstatement
to
be
the
general
rule.
It
is
only
when
reinstatement
is
no
longer
feasible
that
payment
of
separation
pay
is
awarded
to
an
illegally
dismissed
employee,
such
as
in
the
ff
circumstances:
1. employer
has
ceased
operations,
implemented
retrenchment
or
abolished
the
position
due
to
installation
of
labor-‐
saving
devices;
2. illegally
dismissed
employee
has
contracted
a
disease
and
reinstatement
will
endanger
the
safety
of
his
co-‐employees
3. where
strained
relationship
exists
between
the
employer
and
the
dismissed
employee.
Pheschem
Industrial
v.
Moldez
-‐ Strained
relationship
may
be
invoked
only
against
employees
whose
positions
demand
trust
and
confidence,
or
whose
differences
with
their
employer
are
of
such
nature
or
degree
as
to
preclude
reinstatement.
Dimabayao
v
NLRC
(1999)
-‐ Even
if
the
order
or
reinstatement
of
the
LA
is
reversed
on
appeal,
it
is
obligatory
on
the
part
of
the
employer
to
reinstate
and
pay
the
wages
of
the
dismissed
employee
during
the
period
of
appeal
until
reversal
by
the
higher
court.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
employee
has
been
reinstated
during
the
appeal
period
and
such
reinstatement
order
is
reversed
with
finality,
the
employee
is
not
required
to
reimburse
whatever
salary
he
received
for
he
is
entitled
to
such,
more
so
if
I
he
actually
rendered
services
during
the
period.
Roquero
v.
PAL
(2003)
-‐ Separation
pay
shall
be
allowed
as
a
measure
of
social
justice
in
those
cases
where
the
employee
is
validly
dismissed
for
causes
other
than
serious
misconduct
or
those
reflecting
on
his
moral
character,
but
only
when
he
illegally
dismissed.
JPL
Marketing
v.
CA
(2005)
-‐ The
backwages
to
be
awarded
should
not
be
diminished
or
reduced
by
earnings
derived
by
the
illegally
dismissed
employee
elsewhere
during
the
term
of
his
illegal
dismissal.
In
labor
cases,
particularly,
corporate
directors
and
officers
are
solidarily
liable
with
corporation
for
the
termination
of
employment
of
corporate
employees
done
with
malice
or
in
bad
faith.
Kay
Products
v.
CA
(2005)
-‐ Article
282(e)
of
the
Labor
Code
talks
of
other
analogous
causes
or
those
which
are
susceptible
of
comparison
to
another
in
general
or
in
specific
detail.
For
an
employee
to
be
validly
dismissed
for
a
cause
analogous
to
those
enumerated
in
Article
282,
the
cause
must
involve
a
voluntary
and/or
willful
act
or
omission
of
the
employee.
Theft
committed
by
an
employee
against
a
person
other
than
his
employer,
if
proven
by
substantial
evidence,
is
a
cause
analogous
to
serious
misconduct.
John
Hancock
v.
Davis
(2008)
-‐ Respondent's
negligence,
although
gross,
was
not
habitual.
In
view
of
the
considerable
resultant
damage,
however,
we
are
in
agreement
that
the
cause
is
sufficient
to
dismiss
respondent.
This
is
not
the
first
time
that
we
have
departed
from
the
requirements
laid
down
by
the
law
that
neglect
of
duties
must
be
both
gross
and
habitual.
In
Philippine
Airlines,
Inc.
v.
NLRC,
we
ruled
that
Philippine
Airlines
(PAL)
cannot
be
legally
compelled
to
continue
with
the
employment
of
a
person
admittedly
guilty
of
gross
negligence
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
although
it
was
his
first
offense.
In
that
case,
we
noted
that
a
mere
delay
on
PAL's
flight
schedule
due
to
aircraft
damage
entails
problems
like
hotel
accommodations
for
its
passengers,
re-‐booking,
the
possibility
of
law
suits,
and
payment
of
special
landing
fees
not
to
mention
the
soaring
costs
of
replacing
aircraft
parts.
[21]
In
another
case,
Fuentes
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,
we
held
that
it
would
be
unfair
to
compel
Philippine
Banking
Corporation
to
continue
employing
its
bank
teller.
In
that
case,
we
observed
that
although
the
teller's
infraction
was
not
habitual,
a
substantial
amount
of
money
was
lost.
School
of
Holy
Spirit
v.
Taguiam
(2008)
-‐ Totality
of
Conduct
Doctrine
An
employee’s
past
misconduct
and
present
behavior
must
be
taken
together
in
determining
the
proper
imposable
penalty.
The
totality
of
infractions
or
the
number
of
violations
committed
during
the
period
of
employment
shall
be
considered
in
determining
the
penalty
to
be
imposed
upon
an
erring
employee.
The
offenses
committed
by
him
should
not
be
taken
singly
and
separately
but
in
their
totality.
Fitness
for
continued
employment
cannot
be
compartmentalized
into
tight
little
cubicles
of
aspects
of
character,
conduct,
and
ability
separate
and
independent
of
each
other.
It
is
the
totality,
not
the
compartmentalization,
of
such
company
infractions
that
Buguat
had
consistently
committed
which
justified
her
dismissal.
LABOR
II
(Finals)
3C
JeAn
Atty.
Dante
Cadiz
Page
6
of
11
-‐ In
Agabon
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,
we
upheld
as
valid
the
dismissal
for
just
cause
although
it
did
not
comply
with
the
requirements
of
procedural
due
process.
We
ruled
that
while
the
procedural
infirmity
cannot
be
cured,
it
should
not
invalidate
the
dismissal.
However,
the
employer
should
be
held
liable
for
non-‐compliance
with
the
procedural
requirements
of
due
process.
The
violation
of
Buguat’s
right
to
statutory
due
process
by
the
petitioner
warrants
the
payment
of
indemnity
in
the
form
of
nominal
damages
in
the
amount
of
P30,000,
which
is
appropriate
under
the
circumstances.
Challenge
Socks
v.
CA
(2005)
-‐ Aboitiz’s
reliance
on
the
past
offenses
of
Salas
for
his
eventual
dismissal
is
likewise
unavailing.
The
correct
rule
has
always
been
that
such
previous
offenses
may
be
used
as
valid
justification
for
dismissal
from
work
only
if
the
infractions
are
related
to
the
subsequent
offense
upon
which
the
basis
of
termination
is
decreed.
While
it
is
true
that
Salas
had
been
suspended
on
June
1,
2000
for
failure
to
meet
the
security
requirements
of
the
company,
and
then
on
July
20,
2001
for
his
failure
to
assist
in
the
loading
at
the
fuel
depot,
these
offenses
are
not
related
to
Salas’
latest
infraction,
hence,
cannot
be
used
as
added
justification
for
the
dismissal.
Salas
v.
Aboitiz
One
-‐ Let
it
be
stressed
that
insofar
as
the
application
of
the
doctrine
of
trust
and
confidence
is
concerned,
jurisprudence
has
distinguished
the
treatment
of
managerial
employees
or
employees
occupying
positions
of
trust
and
confidence
from
that
of
rank-‐and-‐file
personnel.
With
respect
to
the
latter,
loss
of
trust
and
confidence
as
a
ground
for
dismissal
requires
proof
of
involvement
in
the
alleged
events
in
question,
but
as
regards
managerial
employees,
the
mere
existence
of
a
basis
for
believing
that
such
employee
has
breached
the
trust
of
his
employer
would
suffice
for
his
or
her
dismissal.
For
this
purpose,
there
is
no
need
to
present
proof
beyond
reasonable
doubt.
It
is
sufficient
that
there
is
some
basis
for
the
loss
of
trust
or
that
the
employer
has
reasonable
ground
to
believe
that
the
employee
is
responsible
for
the
misconduct
which
renders
him
unworthy
of
the
trust
and
confidence
demanded
by
his
position.
EPacific
Global
v.
Cabansay
(2007)
-‐ The
Court
finds
that
Moreno
has
indeed
committed
misconduct
against
respondent
SSC-‐R.
Her
admitted
failure
to
obtain
the
required
permission
from
the
school
before
she
engaged
in
external
teaching
engagements
is
a
clear
transgression
of
SSC-‐R’s
policy.
However,
said
misconduct
falls
below
the
required
level
of
gravity
that
would
warrant
dismissal
as
a
penalty.
The
Court
holds
that
Moreno
should
be
reinstated
to
her
former
position,
without
loss
of
seniority
rights
and
other
privileges,
but
without
payment
of
backwages.
In
accordance
with
Durabuilt
Recapping
Plant
&
Co.
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission,
the
Court
may
not
only
mitigate,
but
also
absolve
entirely,
the
liability
of
the
employer
to
pay
backwages
where
good
faith
is
evident.
The
Court
cannot
likewise
award
attorney’s
fees
to
Moreno
in
view
of
the
above-‐
mentioned
finding
of
good
faith
on
the
part
of
SSC-‐R.
Moreno
v.
San
Sebastian
(2008)
-‐ Managerial
employees
are
tasked
to
perform
key
and
sensitive
functions,
and
thus
are
bound
by
more
exacting
work
ethics.
As
a
consequence,
managerial
employees
are
covered
by
the
trust
and
confidence
rule.
The
same
holds
true
for
supervisory
employees
occupying
positions
of
responsibility.
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
position
of
petitioner
as
chief
cook
is
supervisory
in
nature.
It
is
sufficient
that
there
must
only
be
some
basis
for
the
loss
of
trust
and
confidence
or
that
there
is
reasonable
ground
to
believe,
if
not
to
entertain
the
moral
conviction,
that
the
employee
concerned
is
responsible
for
the
misconduct
and
that
his
participation
in
the
misconduct
rendered
him
absolutely
unworthy
of
trust
and
confidence.
It
is
a
hornbook
doctrine
that
infractions
committed
by
an
employee
should
merit
only
the
corresponding
penalty
demanded
by
the
circumstance.
The
penalty
must
be
commensurate
with
the
act,
conduct
or
omission
imputed
to
the
employee
and
must
be
imposed
in
connection
with
the
disciplinary
authority
of
the
employer.
Sagales
v.
Rustan’s
(2008)
-‐ Pursuant
to
the
case
of
Agabon
v.
NLRC,
the
prevailing
doctrine
is
that
where
the
dismissal
is
for
just
cause,
the
lack
of
statutory
due
process
does
not
nullify
the
dismissal
or
render
it
illegal.
The
employer,
however,
should
indemnify
the
employee
in
the
form
of
nominal
damages
to
vindicate
or
recognize
the
employee’s
right
that
was
violated.
Cornelio
v.
Coca-‐cola
(2005)
-‐ Preventive
suspension
is
justified
where
the
employee’s
continued
employment
poses
a
serious
and
imminent
threat
to
the
life
or
property
of
the
employer
or
of
the
employee’s
co-‐workers.
The
Court
ruled
that
preventive
suspension
which
lasts
beyond
the
max
period
of
30
days
amounts
to
constructive
dismissal.
Not
a
penalty
for
the
offense,
can
be
considered
as
such
after
offense
is
proved
&
appropriate
penalty
determined.
Maricalum
Mining
v.
Decorion
(2006)
-‐ The
rule
is
that
the
transfer
of
an
employee
ordinarily
lies
within
the
ambit
of
the
employer’s
prerogatives.
The
employer
exercises
the
prerogative
to
transfer
an
employee
for
valid
reasons
and
according
to
the
requirement
of
its
business,
provided
the
transfer
does
not
result
in
demotion
in
rank
or
diminution
of
the
employee’s
salary,
benefits
and
other
privileges.
In
Allied
Banking
Corporation
v.
Court
of
Appeals,
the
Court
ruled
that
an
employee
cannot
validly
refuse
a
transfer
order
on
the
ground
of
parental
obligations,
additional
expenses,
and
the
anguish
he
would
suffer
if
assigned
away
from
his
family.
Genuino
Ice
v.
Magpantay
(2006)
-‐ Although
Mateo’s
infraction
was
not
habitual,
we
must
take
into
account
the
substantial
amount
lost.
In
this
case,
LBC
lost
a
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motorcycle
with
the
book
value
of
P46,000
which
by
any
means
could
not
be
considered
a
trivial
amount.
Valid
dismissal.
LBC
v.
Mateo
(2009)
-‐ An
employee
who
cannot
get
along
with
his
co-‐employees
is
detrimental
to
the
company
for
he
can
upset
and
strain
the
working
environment.
Without
the
necessary
teamwork
and
synergy,
the
organization
cannot
function
well.
Thus,
management
has
the
prerogative
to
take
the
necessary
action
to
correct
the
situation
and
protect
its
organization.
When
personal
differences
between
employees
and
management
affect
the
work
environment,
the
peace
of
the
company
is
affected.
Thus,
an
employee’s
attitude
problem
is
a
valid
ground
for
his
termination.
It
is
a
situation
analogous
to
loss
of
trust
and
confidence
that
must
be
duly
proved
by
the
employer.
-‐ The
burden
of
proof
is
not
on
the
employee
but
on
the
employer
who
must
affirmatively
show
adequate
evidence
that
the
dismissal
was
for
justifiable
cause.
Heavylift
Manila
v.
CA
(2005)
-‐ Respondent
was
not
issued
a
written
notice
charging
him
of
committing
an
infraction.
The
law
is
clear
on
the
matter.
A
verbal
appraisal
of
the
charges
against
an
employee
does
not
comply
with
the
first
notice
requirement.
Also,
in
Loadstar
Shipping
Co.,
Inc.
v.
Mesano,
the
Court,
sanctioning
the
employer
for
disregarding
the
due
process
requirements,
held
that
the
employee’s
written
explanation
did
not
excuse
the
fact
that
there
was
a
complete
absence
of
the
first
notice.
-‐ However,
the
doctrine
in
Serrano
had
already
been
abandoned
in
Agabon
v.
NLRC
by
ruling
that
if
the
dismissal
is
done
without
due
process,
the
employer
should
indemnify
the
employee
with
nominal
damages.
King
of
Kings
Transport
v.
Mamac
(2007)
-‐ Allowable
measures
to
prevent
losses
or
the
closing
or
cessation
of
operation
of
the
establishment
or
undertaking
is
the
installation
of:
o Labor
saving
devices
or
Redundancy
Ee
is
entitled
to
separation
pay
=
at
least
one
month’s
pay
or
at
least
one
month
pay
for
every
year
of
service,
whichever
is
higher
o Retrenchment
If
not
due
to
it
is
NOT
due
to
serious
business
losses
or
financial
reverses
separation
pay
=
one
month’s
pay
or
at
least
one-‐half
month
pay
for
every
year
of
service,
whichever
is
higher
o At
least
6
months
=
1
years
-‐ Must
serve
written
notice
to
ee
and
DOLE
30
days
before
-‐ No
question
that
automation
is
allowed
to
effect
more
economy
and
efficiency.
-‐ “Redundancy”
=
services
of
an
ee
are
in
excess
of
what
is
reasonably
demanded
by
the
actual
requirements
of
the
enterprise;
superfluous
position
-‐ Could
be
a
result
from
overhiring,
decreased
business,
stopping
of
a
product
line
or
service,
merging
of
job
functions
to
streamline
but
must
show
adequate
proof
that
abolished
positions
were
unnecessary.
-‐ “Retrenchment”
=
For
a
valid
retrenchment,
the
following
requisites
must
be
complied
with:
(a)
the
retrenchment
is
necessary
to
prevent
losses
and
such
losses
are
proven;
(b)
written
notice
to
the
employees
and
to
the
DOLE
at
least
one
month
prior
to
the
intended
date
of
retrenchment;
and
(c)
payment
of
separation
pay
equivalent
to
one-‐month
pay
or
at
least
one-‐half
month
pay
for
every
year
of
service,
whichever
is
higher.
We
cannot
favor
the
bare
assertions
and
empty
figures
submitted
by
the
petitioner
over
the
financial
statements
audited
by
independent
auditors
presented
by
respondent
without
transgressing
the
basic
rule
in
assessing
business
losses,
entrenched
in
jurisprudence.
Manatad
v.
PT&T
(2008)
-‐ Date
of
notice
to
workers
is
controlling.
-‐ It
is
possible
for
a
CBA
to
prohibit
the
er
from
employing
a
contractor
to
perform
the
functions
of
the
abolished
positions
-‐ Standards
of
retrenchment:
o Firstly,
the
losses
expected
should
be
substantial
and
not
merely
de
minimis
in
extent.
o Secondly,
the
substantial
loss
apprehended
must
be
reasonably
imminent,
as
such
imminence
can
be
perceived
objectively
and
in
good
faith
by
the
employer.
o Thirdly,
be
reasonably
necessary
and
likely
to
effectively
prevent
the
expected
losses.
The
employer
should
have
taken
other
measures
prior
or
parallel
to
retrenchment
to
forestall
losses,
i.e.,
cut
other
costs
than
labor
costs.
o Lastly,
but
certainly
not
the
least
important,
alleged
losses
if
already
realized,
and
the
expected
imminent
losses
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sought
to
be
forestalled,
must
be
proved
by
sufficient
and
convincing
evidence.
The
reason
for
requiring
this
quantum
of
proof
is
readily
apparent:
any
less
exacting
standard
of
proof
would
render
too
easy
the
abuse
of
this
ground
for
termination
of
services
of
employees.
Philippine
Tuberculosis
v.
NLRC
(1998)
-‐ Should
be
proven
by
financial
statements
duly
audited
by
an
independent
external
auditor
or
it’s
illegal,
but
Court
may
still
declare
it
illegal
if
documents
warrant
it.
It
would
then
be
of
no
effect.
Any
quitclaims
signed
would
be
invalid.
May
still
contest
separation
and
is
entitled
to
reinstatement
or
backwages
and
separation
payment.
-‐ Who
should
be
retrenched?
Based
on:
o Less
preferred
status
(temporary
ees)
o Efficiency
rating
o Seniority
(although
may
consider
other
factors,
cannot
totally
ignore
this)
Asufrin
v.
San
Migeual
(2004)
o LIFO
rule
not
statutory
duty
of
er
unless
CBA
provides
otherwise,
(if
2
to
be
considered,
“last
in,
first
out”)
-‐ Can’t
force
a
company
to
keep
operating
if
it
faces
serious
losses
or
business
decline.
Also
if
in
GF
just
wants
to
stop.
But
separation
pay
must
be
aid
when
closure
is
NOT
due
to
losses.
-‐ An
employer
may
close
or
cease
his
business
operations
even
if
he
were
not
suffering
from
business
losses
or
financial
reverses.
This
is
so
for
Article
283
of
the
Labor
Code,
as
amended,
categorically
grants
an
employer
the
authority
to
do
so:
by
serving
a
written
notice
on
the
worker
and
the
Ministry
of
Labor
and
Employment
at
least
one
(1)
month
before
the
intended
date
thereof.
Payment
of
separation
pay.
As
long
as
the
company’s
exercise
of
the
same
is
in
good
faith
to
advance
its
interest
and
not
for
the
purpose
of
defeating
or
circumventing
the
rights
of
employees
under
the
laws
or
valid
agreements,
such
exercise
will
be
upheld.
AISFB
v.
CA
(2005)
-‐ Proof
of
losses
must
be
presented
at
hearing
before
Labor
Arbiters,
cannot
be
entertained
before
CA
or
SC
in
order
to
excuse
er
from
payment
of
eparation
pay.
-‐ Also
not
reuire
when
forced
to
cease
business
bec
gov’t
acquires
land
for
agrarian
land
reform;
relocation
is
NOT
cessation.
-‐ Purchaser
of
a
company
is
NOT
required
to
absorb
ees
of
selling
corp;
can
just
give
preference
to
them
but
even
if
done
in
good
faith
&
reasonable
selling
corp
still
has
to
pay
separation
pay!
If
done
in
bad
faith
then
liable.
-‐ Merger:
MUST
absorb
the
employees
and
count
the
years
of
service
in
the
previous
company
since
the
transferee
is
NOT
an
entirely
new
corporation.
-‐ We
believe
that
redundancy,
for
purposes
of
our
Labor
Code,
exists
where
the
services
of
an
employee
are
in
excess
of
what
is
reasonably
demanded
by
the
actual
requirement
of
the
enterprise.
Succinctly
put,
a
position
is
redundant
where
it
is
superfluous,
and
superfluity
of
a
position
or
positions
may
be
the
outcome
of
a
number
of
factors,
such
as
over
hiring
of
workers,
decreased
volume
of
business,
or
dropping
of
a
particular
product
line
or
service
activity
previously
manufactured
or
undertaken
by
the
enterprise.
The
employer
had
no
legal
obligation
to
keep
in
its
payroll
more
employees,
than
are
necessary
for
the
operation
of
its
business.
In
contracting
the
services
of
Gemac
Machineries,
as
part
of
the
company's
cost-‐saving
program,
the
services
rendered
by
the
mechanics
became
redundant
and
superfluous,
and
therefore
properly
terminable.
The
company
merely
exercised
its
business
judgment
or
management
prerogative.
And
in
the
absence
of
any
proof
that
the
management
abused
its
discretion
or
acted
in
a
malicious
or
arbitrary
manner,
the
court
will
not
interfere
with
the
exercise
of
such
prerogative.
De
Ocampo
v.
NLRC
(1992)
-‐ For
a
valid
implementation
of
a
redundancy
program
the
employer
must
comply
with
the
ff
requisites:
1. written
notice
served
on
both
the
employee
and
the
DOLE
at
least
one
month
prior
to
the
intended
date
of
termination;
2. payment
of
separation
pay
equivalent
to
at
least
one
month
pay
or
at
least
one
month
pay
for
every
year
of
service,
whichever
is
higher;
3. good
faith
in
abolishing
the
redundant
position;
4. fair
and
reasonable
criteria
in
ascertaining
what
position
are
to
be
declared
redundant
Lowe
v.
CA
(2009)
-‐ A
Statement
of
Profit
and
Loss
submitted
to
prove
alleged
losses,
without
the
accompanying
signature
of
a
certified
public
accountant
or
audited
by
an
independent
auditor,
is
nothing
but
a
self-‐serving
document
which
ought
to
be
treated
as
a
mere
scrap
of
paper
devoid
of
any
probative
value.
We
have
ruled
that
the
hiring
of
new
employees
and
subsequent
re-‐hiring
of
“retrenched”
employees
constitute
bad
faith.
Flight
Attendants
v.
PAL
(2008)
-‐ Where
there
is
nothing
that
would
indicate
that
an
employee's
position
was
abolished
to
ease
him
out
of
employment,
the
deletion
of
that
position
should
be
accepted
as
a
valid
exercise
of
management
prerogative.
It
is
a
well-‐settled
rule
that
labor
laws
discourage
interference
with
an
employer's
judgment
in
the
conduct
of
his
business.
Absent
any
unfair
or
oppressive
act
against
private
respondent,
the
Court
cannot
and
should
not
interfere
with
management
decisions
validly
undertaken
by
petitioner.
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-‐ Private
respondent's
contentions
that
his
previous
benefits
were
stripped
upon
his
reappointment
are
without
merit.
Plainly,
when
an
office
or
a
position
is
abolished,
all
benefits
accompanying
the
position
also
are
removed.
Pantranco
v.
NLRC
(1999)
-‐ As
already
stated,
Art.
283
of
the
Labor
Code
does
not
obligate
an
employer
to
pay
separation
benefits
when
the
closure
is
due
to
losses…
North
Davao
v.
NLRC
(1996)
-‐ Relocating
the
business
to
a
place
to
which
the
employees
cannot
or
do
not
want
to
transfer
(principally
because
of
distance)
may
be
considered
cessation
of
business.
It
is
not
closure
or
cessation
on
account
of
serious
business
losses.
Consequently,
the
employer
must
pay
the
employees
the
separation
pay
required
under
Art.
283
at
the
rate
of
one
month’s
or
one-‐half
month’s
pay
per
year
of
service
whichever
is
higher.
Cheniver
Deco
(2000)
Art.
284
DISEASE
AS
GROUND
FOR
TERMINATION
-‐ “Resignation”
=
an
act
by
an
ee
who
fins
himself
in
a
situation
where
he
believes
hat
personal
reasons
cannot
be
sacrificed
in
favor
of
the
exigency
of
the
service
and
he
has
no
other
choice
but
to
disassociate
himself
from
his
employment.
-‐ Ee
may
serve
resignation
without
just
cause
if
serves
one
month
notice,
without
which
may
be
held
liable
for
damages
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-‐ No
notice
required
when:
o Serious
insult
on
honor
and
person
by
er
o Inhuman
and
unbearable
treatment
o Commission
of
crime
or
offense
against
ee
or
immediate
family
of
ee
o Analogous
causes
-‐ May
be
withdrawable
even
if
ee
called
it
irrevocable
Art.
286
WHEN
EMPLOYMENT
NOT
DEEMED
TERMINATED
-‐ Illegal
dismissal
=
prescribes
in
FOUR
years
under
Art.
1146
of
CC;
money
claims
instituted
independently
of
crim
axn.
No
civil
action
may
be
instituted
before
it
is
finally
determined
unless
it
involves
employee’s
compensation
-‐ The
three-‐year
prescriptive
period
can
be
interrupted
by
a
claim
filed
at
the
proper
judicial
or
quasi-‐judicial
forum,
an
extra-‐
judicial
demand
on
the
employer
or
the
employer’s
acknowledgment
of
its
debt
or
obligation.
Rivera
v.
UNILAB
(2009)
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