RULE 98-100

[G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998]

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses

RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them? The answer to this interesting query, certainly not one
of first impression, would have to be reached, not solely on the basis of law and jurisprudence,
but also the hard reality presented by the facts of the case.
This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,[2] in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioners.
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed. Not
long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu[4] which rendered a decision[5] approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses
providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They further
agreed:

(c) That the children of the parties shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the
complaint. This shall constitute a first lien on the net proceeds of the house
and lot jointly owned by the parties situated at Cinco Village, Mandaue City;
(d) That the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person
or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband; or any

undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands consent as the parties are by this
agreement legally separated;[6]
Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree
that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.[7]
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00
to P20,000.00 a month[8] a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his childrens
expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara
Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith
signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that
her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because
she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children
would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her
husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children for the following reasons:

1. The decision in Civil Case No. JD-707 allowed her to enter into any contract
without the written consent of her husband;
2. Her husband had left the Philippines to be an illegal alien in the United States and
had been transferring from one place to another to avoid detection by Immigration
authorities, and
3. Her husband had divorced her.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were too
meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over
his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving
custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished
custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The
court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

On March 27, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of
adoption with a dispositive portion reading as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for adoption of the minors Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald
V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. These
children shall henceforth be known and called as Keith D. Clavano, Charmaine D.
Clavano and Joseph Anthony D. Clavano respectively. Moreover, this Decree of
Adoption shall:
(1) Confer upon the adopted children the same rights and duties as though
they were in fact the legitimate children of the petitioners;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature, of the children; and,
(3) Vest the same authority in the petitioners.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, Philippines with a copy of this Decree
of Adoption for registration purposes.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the lower court was impelled by these reasons:

(1) The Cang children had, since birth, developed close filial ties with the Clavano
family, especially their maternal uncle, petitioner Ronald Clavano.
(2) Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press,
real estate business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in
Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
(3) The natural mother of the children, Anna Marie, nicknamed Menchu, approved
of the adoption because of her heart ailment, near-fatal accident in 1981, and
the fact that she could not provide them a secure and happy future as she
travels a lot.
(4) The Clavanos could provide the children moral and spiritual direction as they
would go to church together and had sent the children to Catholic schools.
(5) The children themselves manifested their desire to be adopted by the Clavanos
Keith had testified and expressed the wish to be adopted by the Clavanos
while the two younger ones were observed by the court to have snuggled
close to Ronald even though their natural mother was around.

On the other hand, the lower court considered the opposition of petitioner to rest on a very
shaky foundation because of its findings that:

(1) Petitioner was morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of his
being an improvident father of his family and an undisguised Lothario. This
conclusion is based on the testimony of his alleged paramour, mother of his
two sons and close friend of Anna Marie, Wilma Soco, who said that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife in the very house of the Cangs in Opao,
Mandaue City.
(2) The alleged deposits of around $10,000 that were of comparatively recent
dates were attempts at verisimilitude as these were joint deposits the
authenticity of which could not be verified.
(3) Contrary to petitioners claim, the possibility of his reconciliation with Anna
Marie was dim if not nil because it was petitioner who devised, engineered
and executed the divorce proceedings at the Nevada Washoe County court.
(4) By his naturalization as a U.S. citizen, petitioner is now an alien from the
standpoint of Philippine laws and therefore, how his new attachments and
loyalties would sit with his (Filipino) children is an open question.
Quoting with approval the evaluation and recommendation of the RTC Social Worker in her
Child Study Report, the lower court concluded as follows:

Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And
abandonment of a child by its (sic) parent is commonly specified by statute as a
ground for dispensing with his consent to its (sic) adoption (Re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514 P.
161, Ann. [As. 1914A, 214]). Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only
without the consent of the parent, but even against his opposition (Re McKeag, 141
Cal. 403, 74 P. 1039, 99 Am. St. Rep. 80; Re Camp. 131 Cal. 469, 63 P. 736, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 371; Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 P. 690, citing R.C.L.; Seibert, 170
Iowa, 561, 153 N.W. 160, citing R.C.L.; Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 67 N.E. 349;
97 Am. St. Rep. 441; Wilson v. Otis, 71 N.H. 483, 53 A. 439, 93 Am. St. Rep. 564;
Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23, 20 L.R.A. 199, 62 Am. St. Rep. 17.) [9]
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that
it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective
and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to
the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give
their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the

representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study
report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

Article 188 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the parent who
has abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92 Phil. 729; Santos vs.
Ananzanso, 16 SCRA 344). The question therefore is whether or not oppositor may be
considered as having abandoned the children. In adoption cases, abandonment
connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish
parental claims to the child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs. Ananzanso, supra), or the
withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display voluntary
affection. The issue of abandonment is amply covered by the discussion of the first
error.
Oppositor argues that he has been sending dollar remittances to the children and has in
fact even maintained bank accounts in their names. His duty to provide support comes
from two judicial pronouncements. The first, the decision in JD-707 CEB, supra,
obliges him to pay the children P1,000.00 a month. The second is mandated by the
divorce decree of the Nevada, U.S.A. Federal Court which orders him to pay monthly
support of US$50.00 for each child. Oppositor has not submitted any evidence to
show compliance with the decision in JD-101 CEB, but he has submitted 22 cancelled
dollar checks (Exhs. 24 to 45) drawn in the childrens names totalling $2,126.98. The
last remittance was on October 6, 1987 (Exh. 45). His obligation to provide support
commenced under the divorce decree on May 5, 1982 so that as of October 6, 1987,
oppositor should have made 53 remittances of $150.00, or a total of $7,950.00. No
other remittances were shown to have been made after October 6, 1987, so that as of
this date, oppositor was woefully in arrears under the terms of the divorce decree. And
since he was totally in default of the judgment in JD-707 CEB, the inevitable
conclusion is oppositor had not really been performing his duties as a father, contrary
to his protestations.
True, it has been shown that oppositor had opened three accounts in different banks, as
follows
Acct. No.
1) 118-606437-4
2) 73-166-8

Date Opened
July 23, 1985
Oct. 29, 1987

Balance
$5,018.50

Name of Bank
Great Western Savings, Daly City, Cal.,
U.S.A.

March 5, 1986
Oct. 26, 1987

3,129.00

Matewan National Bank of

Williamson, West Virginia, U.S.A.

3) 564-146883

December 31, 1986

Oct. 29, 1987

2,622.19

Security Pacific National Bank, Daly

City, Cal., U.S.A.

The first and third accounts were opened however in oppositors name as trustee for
Charmaine Cang and Joseph Anthony Cang, respectively. In other words, the accounts
are operated and the amounts withdrawable by oppositor himself and it cannot be said
that they belong to the minors. The second is an `or account, in the names of Herbert
Cang or Keith Cang. Since Keith is a minor and in the Philippines, said account is
operable only by oppositor and the funds withdrawable by him alone.
The bank accounts do not really serve what oppositor claimed in his offer of evidence `the aim
and purpose of providing for a better future and security of his family.[10]
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. He emphasized that the
decree of legal separation was not based on the merits of the case as it was based on a
manifestation amounting to a compromise agreement between him and Anna Marie. That he and
his wife agreed upon the plan for him to leave for the United States was borne out by the fact that
prior to his departure to the United States, the family lived with petitioners parents. Moreover, he
alone did not instigate the divorce proceedings as he and his wife initiated the joint complaint for
divorce.
Petitioner argued that the finding that he was not fit to rear and care for his children was
belied by the award to him of custody over the children in Civil Case No. JD-707. He took
exception to the appellate courts findings that as an American citizen he could no longer lay
claim to custody over his children because his citizenship would not take away the fact that he is
still a father to his children. As regards his alleged illicit relationship with another woman, he
had always denied the same both in Civil Case No. JD-707 and the instant adoption case. Neither
was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of the Clavanos as she was
residing in Mandaue City seven (7) kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of
Cebu City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco should not have been given
weight for it was only during the hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother
of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan City to convince her to be a
witness for monetary considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be hypocritical of
the Clavanos to claim that they could love the children much more than he could.[11]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this
Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
Article 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides -

ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;

(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the Department of
Social Welfare or any duly licensed child placement agency under whose
care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
On December 17, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 91
amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. As thus
amended, Article 31 read:

ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving
counselling and appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social
Services and Development or from a duly licensed child-placement
agency;
(3) The Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly licensed
child-placement agency under whose care and legal custody the child
may be;
(4) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
(Underscoring supplied)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [12] As
such, when private respondents filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the
applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code
which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code
provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family Code, the statutory
provision on consent for adoption now reads:

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents,
if living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring
supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law,
the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:

SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to
the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent,
and by the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child, or if there are no
such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the child is
in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society or person,
by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons;
but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to
the adoption shall not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child [13] or that such
parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of
adoption. Thus, the Court declared:

x x x. The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption

proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts
relating to the child and its parents, which may give information to those interested,
than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption
statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. [14]
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the
petition for adoption. Petitioners consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the

petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
father as follows:

3. That the childrens mother, sister of petitioner RONALD V. CLAVANO, has given
her express consent to this adoption, as shown by Affidavit of Consent, Annex
`A. Likewise, the written consent of Keith Cang, now 14 years of age appears on page
2 of this petition; However, the father of the children, Herbert Cang, had already left
his wife and children and had already divorced the former, as evidenced by the xerox
copy of the DECREE OF DIVORCE issued by the County of Washoe, State of
Nevada, U.S.A. (Annex `B) which was filed at the instance of Mr. Cang, not long
after he abandoned his family to live in the United States as an illegal immigrant. [15]
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent
of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child
by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence[16] dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent
thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination.The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary
issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor natural father
to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition for
adoption be considered on its merits.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. [17] This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.[18] However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority
to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform
to the evidence on record.[19]
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court has held that the exceptions to the rule that factual
findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal are the
following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts
and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion [21] on the issue of whether

petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
In its ordinary sense, the word abandon means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce
utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of putting under a ban. The emphasis is
on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another,
hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim ones rights or
interests.[22] In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports
any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and
legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.[23]
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment.[24] While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:

1. Exh. 1 a 4-page undated letter of Menchu (Anna Marie) addressed to Dear Bert
on a C.Westates Carbon Phil. Corp. stationery. Menchu stated therein that it had
been a long time since the last time youve heard from me excluding that of the
phone conversation weve had. She discussed petitioners intention to buy a
motorbike for Keith, expressing apprehension over risks that could be engendered
by Keiths use of it. She said that in the last phone conversation she had with
petitioner on the birthday of Ma, she forgot to tell petitioner that Keiths voice had
changed; he had become a bagito or a teen-ager with many fans who sent him
Valentines cards. She told him how Charmaine had become quite a talkative
almost dalaga who could carry on a conversation with her angkong and how
pretty she was in white dress when she won among the candidates in the Flores
de Mayo after she had prayed so hard for it. She informed him, however, that she
was worried because Charmaine was vain and wont to extravagance as she loved
clothes. About Joeton (Joseph Anthony), she told petitioner that the boy was smart
for his age and quite spoiled being the youngest of the children in Lahug. Joeton
was mischievous but Keith was his idol with whom he would sleep anytime. She
admitted having said so much about the children because they might not have
informed petitioner of some happenings and spices of life about themselves. She
said that it was just very exciting to know how theyve grown up and very
pleasant, too, that each of them have (sic) different characters. She ended the
letter with the hope that petitioner was at the best of health. After extending her
regards to all, she signed her name after the word Love. This letter was mailed on

July 9, 1986 from Cebu to petitioner whose address was P.O. Box 2445,
Williamson, West Virginia 25661 (Exh. 1-D).
2. Exh. 2 letter dated 11/13/84 on a green stationery with golden print of a note
from Menchu on the left upper corner. Anna Marie stated that we wrote to
petitioner on Oct. 2, 1984 and that Keith and Joeton were very excited when
petitioner called up last time. She told him how Joeton would grab the phone from
Keith just so petitioner would know what he wanted to order. Charmaine, who
was asleep, was so disappointed that she missed petitioners call because she also
wanted something that petitioner should buy. Menchu told petitioner that
Charmaine wanted a pencil sharpener, light-colored T-shirts for her walking shorts
and a (k)nap sack. Anna Marie informed petitioner that the kids were growing up
and so were their needs. She told petitioner to be very fatherly about the childrens
needs because those were expensive here. For herself, Anna Marie asked for a
subscription of Glamour and Vogue magazines and that whatever expenses he
would incur, she would replace these. As a postscript, she told petitioner that
Keith wanted a size 6 khaki-colored Sperry topsider shoes.
3. Exh. 3 an undated note on a yellow small piece of paper that reads:
Dear Herbert,
Hi, how was Christmas and New Year? Hope you had a wonderful one.
By the way thanks for the shoes, it was a nice one. Its nice to be thought of at
Xmas. Thanks again.
Sincerely,
Menchu
4. Exh. 4 a two-page undated letter of Keith on stationery of Jose Clavano, Inc.
addressed to Dear Dad. Keith told his father that they tried to tell their mother to
stay for a little while, just a few weeks after classes start(s) on June 16. He
informed petitioner that Joeton would be in Kinder I and that, about the
motorbike, he had told his mother to write petitioner about it and well see what
youre (sic) decision will be. He asked for chocolates, nuts, basketball shirt and
shorts, rubber shoes, socks, headband, some clothes for outing and perfume. He
told petitioner that they had been going to Lahug with their mother picking them
up after Angkong or Ama had prepared lunch or dinner. From her aerobics, his
mother would go for them in Lahug at about 9:30 or 10:00 oclock in the evening.

He wished his father luck and the best of health and that they prayed for him and
their other relatives. The letter was ended with Love Keith.
5. Exh. 5 another undated long letter of Keith. He thanked his father for the
Christmas card with $40.00, $30.00 and $30.00 and the card of Joeton with $5.00
inside. He told petitioner the amounts following his fathers instructions and
promise to send money through the mail. He asked his father to address his letter
directly to him because he wanted to open his own letters. He informed petitioner
of activities during the Christmas season that they enjoyed eating, playing and
giving surprises to their mother. He apprised him of his daily schedule and that
their mother had been closely supervising them, instructing them to fold their
blankets and pile up their pillows. He informed petitioner that Joeton had become
very smart while Charmaine, who was also smart, was very demanding of their
mother. Because their mother was leaving for the United States on February 5,
they would be missing her like they were missing petitioner. He asked for his
things and $200.00. He told petitioner more anecdotes about Joeton like he would
make the sign of the cross even when they would pass by the Iglesia ni
Cristo church and his insistence that Aquino was not dead because he had seen
him on the betamax machine. For Keith, Charmaine had become
very maldita who was not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton
was full of surprises. He ended the letter with Love your son, Keith. The letter
was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked petitioner for the bathing suit,
key chain, pencil box, socks, half shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She
reminded him of of her birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old.
She informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was IM. They had
fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start on January 9 although Keiths
classes had started on January 6. They would feel sad again because Mommy
would be leaving soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, Love, Charmaine.
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to petitioner that they had not
been remiss in writing letters to him. He informed him of their trip to Manila they
went to Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurels house, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
executive house, Tagaytay for three days and Baguio for one week. He informed
him that he got honors, Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent
grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he was glad they
would be together in that school. He asked for his reward from petitioner and so
with Charmaine and Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could
save. He told petitioner that he was saving the money he had been sending them.

He said he missed petitioner and wished him the best. He added that petitioner
should call them on Sundays.
8. Exh. 8 a letter from Joeton and Charmaine but apparently written by the latter.
She asked for money from petitioner to buy something for the school and
something else. She promised not to spend so much and to save some. She said
she loved petitioner and missed him. Joeton said hi! to petitioner. After ending the
letter with Love, Joeton and Charmaine, she asked for her prize for her grades as
she got seventh place.
9. Exh. 9 undated letter of Keith. He assured petitioner that he had been writing
him; that he would like to have some money but he would save them; that he
learned that petitioner had called them up but he was not around; that he would be
going to Manila but would be back home May 3; that his Mommy had just arrived
Thursday afternoon, and that he would be the official altar boy. He asked
petitioner to write them soon.
10. Exh. 10 Keith thanked petitioner for the money he sent. He told petitioner that
he was saving some in the bank and he was proud because he was the only one in
his group who saved in the bank. He told him that Joeton had become naughty
and would claim as his own the shirts sent to Keith by petitioner. He advised
petitioner to send pants and shirts to Joeton, too, and asked for a pair of topsider
shoes and candies. He informed petitioner that he was a member of the basketball
team and that his mom would drive for his group. He asked him to call them often
like the father of Ana Christie and to write them when he would call so that they
could wait for it. He informed petitioner that they had all grown bigger and
heavier. He hoped petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him so
long to write because he did not want to commit any mistakes. He asked
petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar) and, after thanking petitioner, added that
the latter should buy something for Mommy.
11. Exh. 11 a Christmas card For My Wonderful Father dated October 8, 1984
from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, Our Wish For You with the year 83 written on
the upper right hand corner of the inside page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
13. Exh. 13 a letter of Keith telling petitioner that he had written him even when
their Mom was there where she bought them clothes and shoes. Keith asked
petitioner for $300.00. Because his mother would not agree to buy him a
motorbike, he wanted a Karaoke unit that would cost P12,000.00. He informed
petitioner that he would go to an afternoon disco with friends but their grades

were all good with Joeton receiving stars for excellence. Keith wanted a bow and
arrow Rambo toys and G.I. Joe. He expressed his desire that petitioner would
come and visit them someday.
14. Exh. 14 a letter of Keith with one of the four pages bearing the date January
1986. Keith told his father that they had received the package that the latter sent
them. The clothes he sent, however, fitted only Keith but not Charmaine and
Joeton who had both grown bigger. Keith asked for grocery items, toys and more
clothes. He asked, in behalf of his mother, for low-heeled shoes and a dress to
match, jogging pants, tights and leotards that would make her look sexy. He
intimated to petitioner that he had grown taller and that he was already ashamed
to be asking for things to buy in the grocery even though his mother had told him
not to be shy about it.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A.
showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for
the benefit of his children.[25] Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies of checks sent by petitioner to the
children from 1985 to 1989.
These pieces of evidence are all on record. It is, therefore, quite surprising why the courts
below simply glossed over these, ignoring not only evidence on financial support but also the
emotional exchange of sentiments between petitioner and his family. Instead, the courts below
emphasized the meagerness of the amounts he sent to his children and the fact that, as regards the
bank deposits, these were withdrawable by him alone. Simply put, the courts below attached a
high premium to the prospective adopters financial status but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and psychological well-being of the children.
True, Keith had expressed his desire to be adopted by his uncle and aunt. However, his
seeming steadfastness on the matter as shown by his testimony is contradicted by his feelings
towards his father as revealed in his letters to him. It is not at all farfetched to conclude that
Keiths testimony was actually the effect of the filing of the petition for adoption that would
certainly have engendered confusion in his young mind as to the capability of his father to
sustain the lifestyle he had been used to.
The courts below emphasized respondents emotional attachment to the children. This is
hardly surprising for, from the very start of their young lives, the children were used to their
presence. Such attachment had persisted and certainly, the young ones act of snuggling close to
private respondent Ronald Clavano was not indicative of their emotional detachment from their
father. Private respondents, being the uncle and aunt of the children, could not but come to their
succor when they needed help as when Keith got sick and private respondent Ronald spent for
his hospital bills.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a
person simply because he could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his
natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals,[26] the Court awarded custody of a minor
illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and market vendor instead of to his

affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child opted to go with his
mother. The Court said:

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent
promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a
decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.
In Celis v. Cafuir[27] where the Court was confronted with the issue of whether to award
custody of a child to the natural mother or to a foster mother, this Court said:

This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother
and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered
by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the
opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to
poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride
and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make
her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship
between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to
be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might
yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret
consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of
taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother
who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her
associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood
count. x x x.
In Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court stated that (I)n ascertaining the welfare and best
interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. Thus, in awarding custody of the child to the father, the Court said:

A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel
are more intent on emphasizing the `torture and agony of a mother separated from her
children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key
issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived
of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the
welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration. (Italics supplied) [29]
Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his
children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into account the physical,

emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child. [30] The conclusion of the
courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his
inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could
provide. There should be proof that he had soemotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents. The letters he
received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie
between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their
whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems
and triumphs.
The Court is thus dismayed that the courts below did not look beyond petitioners meager
financial support to ferret out other indications on whether petitioner had in fact abandoned his
family. The omission of said courts has led us to examine why the children were subjected to the
process of adoption, notwithstanding the proven ties that bound them to their father. To our
consternation, the record of the case bears out the fact that the welfare of the children was not
exactly the paramount consideration that impelled Anna Marie to consent to their adoption.
In her affidavit of consent, Anna Marie expressly said that leaving the children in the
country, as she was wont to travel abroad often, was a problem that would naturally hamper her
job-seeking abroad. In other words, the adoption appears to be a matter of convenience for her
because Anna Marie herself is financially capable of supporting her children. [31] In his testimony,
private respondent Ronald swore that Anna Marie had been out of the country for two years and
came home twice or three times, [32] thereby manifesting the fact that it was she who actually left
her children to the care of her relatives. It was bad enough that their father left their children
when he went abroad, but when their mother followed suit for her own reasons, the situation
worsened. The Clavano family must have realized this. Hence, when the family first discussed
the adoption of the children, they decided that the prospective adopter should be Anna Maries
brother Jose. However, because he had children of his own, the family decided to devolve the
task upon private respondents.[33]
This couple, however, could not always be in Cebu to care for the children. A businessman,
private respondent Ronald Clavano commutes between Cebu and Manila while his wife, private
respondent Maria Clara, is an international flight stewardess. [34] Moreover, private respondent
Ronald claimed that he could take care of the children while their parents are away, [35] thereby
indicating the evanescence of his intention. He wanted to have the childrens surname changed to
Clavano for the reason that he wanted to take them to the United States as it would be difficult
for them to get a visa if their surname were different from his. [36] To be sure, he also testified that
he wanted to spare the children the stigma of being products of a broken home.
Nevertheless, a close analysis of the testimonies of private respondent Ronald, his sister
Anna Marie and their brother Jose points to the inescapable conclusion that they just wanted to
keep the children away from their father. One of the overriding considerations for the adoption
was allegedly the state of Anna Maries health she was a victim of an almost fatal accident and
suffers from a heart ailment.However, she herself admitted that her health condition was not that
serious as she could still take care of the children. [37] An eloquent evidence of her ability to
physically care for them was her employment at the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles [38]- she
could not have been employed if her health were endangered. It is thus clear that the Clavanos
attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority apparently stemmed from their notion that he

was an inveterate womanizer. Anna Marie in fact expressed fear that her children would never be
at ease with the wife of their father.[39]
Petitioner, who described himself as single in status, denied being a womanizer and father to
the sons of Wilma Soco.[40] As to whether he was telling the truth is beside the point. Philippine
society, being comparatively conservative and traditional, aside from being Catholic in
orientation, it does not countenance womanizing on the part of a family man, considering the
baneful effects such irresponsible act visits on his family. Neither may the Court place a
premium on the inability of a man to distinguish between siring children and parenting
them. Nonetheless, the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be
taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father.
[41]
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a bad husband does not
necessarily make a bad father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly
speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority
over the children.[42] Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he
took the trouble of sending a telegram[43] to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the
adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the
case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in
the United States.[44]
Private respondents themselves explained why petitioner failed to abide by the agreement
with his wife on the support of the children. Petitioner was an illegal alien in the United
States. As such, he could not have procured gainful employment. Private respondents failed to
refute petitioners testimony that he did not receive his share from the sale of the conjugal home,
[45]
pursuant to their manifestation/compromise agreement in the legal separation case. Hence, it
can be reasonably presumed that the proceeds of the sale redounded to the benefit of his family,
particularly his children. The proceeds may not have lasted long but there is ample evidence to
show that thereafter, petitioner tried to abide by his agreement with his wife and sent his family
money, no matter how meager.
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries
out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.[46] The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is
not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural
rights of the parents over the child.[47]
In this regard, this Court notes private respondents reliance on the
manifestation/compromise agreement between petitioner and Anna Marie which became the
basis of the decree of legal separation. According to private respondents counsel, [48] the authority
given to Anna Marie by that decree to enter into contracts as a result of the legal separation was
all embracing[49] and, therefore, included giving her sole consent to the adoption. This conclusion
is however, anchored on the wrong premise that the authority given to the innocent spouse to
enter into contracts that obviously refer to their conjugal properties, shall include entering into
agreements leading to the adoption of the children. Such conclusion is as devoid of a legal basis

as private respondents apparent reliance on the decree of legal separation for doing away with
petitioners consent to the adoption.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal
separation did not, of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing
the children up for adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: . . . in case of legal
separation of parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. In awarding custody, the court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
It should be noted, however, that the law only confers on the innocent spouse the exercise of
parental authority. Having custody of the child, the innocent spouse shall implement the sum of
parental rights with respect to his rearing and care. The innocent spouse shall have the right to
the childs services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions
regarding his care and control, education, health and religion.[50]
In a number of cases, this Court has considered parental authority, the joint exercise of
which is vested by the law upon the parents,[51] as

x x x a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose
of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their hearts and senses. As regards parental
authority, `there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority,
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution.
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.[52] (Italics
supplied)
As such, in instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived
of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation
case. To reiterate, that award was arrived at by the lower court on the basis of the agreement of
the spouses.
While parental authority may be waived, as in law it may be subject to a compromise,
there was no factual finding in the legal separation case that petitioner was such an
irresponsible person that he should be deprived of custody of his children or that there are
[53]

grounds under the law that could deprive him of parental authority. In fact, in the legal separation
case, the court thereafter ordered the transfer of custody over the children from Anna Marie back
to petitioner. The order was not implemented because of Anna Maries motion for reconsideration
thereon. The Clavano family also vehemently objected to the transfer of custody to the petitioner,
such that the latter was forced to file a contempt charge against them.[54]
The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. In the instant case for
adoption, the issue is whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant
dispensation of his consent to their adoption. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the
effects of a decree of adoption.[55] But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
issue of petitioners abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was
tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.
As regards the divorce obtained in the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v.
Escao[56] that a divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not
recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy. While petitioner is now an
American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently remained a Filipino citizen, the
divorce has no legal effect.
Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals,[57] a case involving the
visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their
children, see to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This
authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be
renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of
course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the Civil Code, there has been a
pronounced trend to place emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest of a child who needs the love and care
of parents. After the passage of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act No. 8043 on Intercountry
Adoption[58] and Republic Act No. 8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of
Filipino children.[59]
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following
policies in the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:

(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her
parent(s) and be provided with love, care, understanding and security towards
the full and harmonious development of his/her personality.[60]

(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her
interest shall be the paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set
forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. [61]
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological
parent(s).[62]
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of
particularrelevance to instant case are the following provisions:

States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention.[63]
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both
parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular
basis, except if it is contrary to the childs best interests. [64]
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a
regular basis, save in exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts
with both parents . . .[65]
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction
to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child.[66]
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes
with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best
interests of the child.This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right
of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that
of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and
harmonized to the fullest extent possible.
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are now of
legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure, they shall
be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not to state that
this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests regarding
their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was filed. [67] Said
petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law
and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of
Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
Balalong, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document
itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or
destruction.Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the
marriage contract.
The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August
24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being

more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated
05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto. [2]
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision[3] is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein

Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract excluded under the best
evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh. B spurious and non-existent.

b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L.
MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.

And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased

Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of areconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by
then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case
No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendantappellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate
as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity
of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim as the
legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob
was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr.
Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary
evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution
of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing
officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to,
nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his thumbmark on
said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a
Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged
date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial
court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not genuine. In other words, not of
Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of the
Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly gave the
copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. And as admitted by
appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the
date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed
Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin Molina who signed on top of the typewritten name
of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of
records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge
Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas signature in

the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken
at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then
presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from glaucoma.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document
Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya
and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and
significant fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing
between the questioned and the standard signature and concluded that the questioned
and the standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and the same
person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former
NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two
(32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures
examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of
significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of
writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and
concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961
granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of
Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine
and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and
declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. [4] (citations
omitted, emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6,
par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by
the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copyof the
marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be
established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be
proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that would
constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of such document.
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of
the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary evidence

of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently

establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.
With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was
genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the
performance of his regular duties.
Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a
rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of
forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification
is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the
fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will
not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in
determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the
Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored
by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there
exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially
when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence. [5] (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.[6]
The Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. [7]
The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has not
been sufficiently established.
First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may
be assailed only in a direct proceeding. [8] Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent
Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio,
because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. [9] We cannot sustain this
contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the
parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that
Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. [10] An affidavit
to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.[11] Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.[12] The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed
adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be
proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.[13] Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost,
without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its
contents.[14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded
the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the
following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the
letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and

petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the
Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the
subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be
reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of
Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
[15]
the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution
are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter
of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss,
has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxxxxxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral
or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the
weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis
ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we said that marriage may be prove[n] by
other competent evidence.[17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by
those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. [18] The Court has also

held that [t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one
who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.[19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were
certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained. [20] Even if we were to
agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must
emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent
and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the
fact of marriage."[22] (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure

to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented
to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated
this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract,
we accepted testimonial evidence in its place.[25]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975
in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and

Statistics Office (NCSO).[26] He finds it quite bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.[27] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the
first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate
the marriage.[28] In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar.Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.[29]
Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of

marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio -- Always presume marriage.[30] (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.31
towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [32] Given the
undisputed, even accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife,[34] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of
Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court
also gave credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the
credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x x.[35]

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and
respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is
not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not
the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined
the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. [36] Hence, the
present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in
petitions under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on the
questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses
were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly
on respondents expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. [38] Respondent
Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and
cites the following portion as proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges testimony out of its
context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moyas statements contained no
ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]

The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was
declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the
Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this
Order and whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I cant
make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.[41]

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of
the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. [42] Indeed, we find no reason and the
respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L.
Moya were not written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would
point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter J. [43]

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought
without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent
Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.[44]
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal
cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.[45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts
that he performed thereafter.[46] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management [47] in Manila
and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,[48] issued Certifications that
there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent. [49]

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows
that the alleged adoption is a sham.
[50]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob
and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed
adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.

HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y
NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other
name would smell as sweet?
This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which
challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 158, Pasig City, datedSeptember 13, 1994 in JDRC Case No. 2964.
Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
[1]

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent
spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a
petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the
[2]

circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed

minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for
the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition,
and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends
since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents residence.
[3]

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the
relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal
opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder
of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single
proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as
two separate proceedings.
[4]

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties,

the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:
WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for
all legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the
legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing of
the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and
executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig,
Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of
the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the adopted child,
which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born.
Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.
[5]

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by

petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting
parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications
under the law to be adopters, and have amply complied with the procedural
requirements for the petition for adoption, with the findings of the trial court
being recited thus:
[6]

[7]

To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March
16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published in the March 31,
April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general
circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record
(Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child
Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl
finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through
Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly
individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and financially
capable to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.
Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share
their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously
provide him a happy and secure home life.
Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the
Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the
Munsons during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with
Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.
We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran
aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized.
[8]

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower
court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are
accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the
court below granting the petition for adoption.
[9]

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the
prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor

adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there
was lawful ground for the change of name.
I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given
or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed
by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely,
a decree of adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of
the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under
Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be
complied with.
[10]

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws
and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for
change of name. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the
change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with
that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus
granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted,
with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
[11]

[12]

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for

adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2
which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and
vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules
against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two
separate but related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the

conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the

court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.
[13]

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding

change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a
system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal
construction and application of the Rules, the welfare and interest of the
adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding.
[14]

[15]

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that
Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron
Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced
by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set
forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of preventing
fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin
Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual
obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any
immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to
reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the
action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on
the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published
together with the petition for adoption.
[16]

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal
effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname
of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate
and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by
nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It
is the change of the adopteessurname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for
by petitioner.
However,
the given or proper name,
also
known
as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does
not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of
adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used
in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear
and determine the same, and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded
in the civil register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and
cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory
procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible,
a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to
which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change)
[17]

[18]

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register
is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can

only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or
grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional
trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name
resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the
petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change
of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of
hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at such hearing. It
is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition
and the reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court
may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall
furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it
cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial
law system.
[19]

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject
petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee, all of which
taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully
deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.
[20]

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of

imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on
the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al. and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. is
misplaced.
[21]

[22]

A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action

would, therefore, appear to be called for.
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is
meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may
under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or
rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.
[23]

[24]

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally

not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of
separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory
in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of
action arose from the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder
rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice
wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To
achieve these ends, they are liberally construed.
[25]

[26]

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party

litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be
joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the
causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature
and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits
where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in

one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation

between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the
disposition of litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so
as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of
the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally
construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties
may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as
practicable, with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of
justice.
[27]

[28]

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is

to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a
standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal
application. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or
equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. While the
rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common
question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon
regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized.
[29]

[30]

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso

subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of
parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented.
effectively disallows unlimited joinder.
[31]

[32]

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express
prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant
their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings
which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is
individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings
involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate
the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee
properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for
change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is
the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of
name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and
determined for neither action is dependent on the other.
[33]

The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed
only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our
Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in
nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation
between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the proposed
adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may
only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying
a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of
a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that
the two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus the joinder would be
improper.
In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one
petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4,
Comment).
We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of
intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to

pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer
the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of
heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land
subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of
relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for
adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the
case at bar.
Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was,
in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and
instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the
pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete determination of
the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more
emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where
the conditions are not satisfactorily met.
[34]

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will
make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous
grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As
already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and
substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee.The
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately
related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most
expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial
proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding
reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , the Court clarified the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action:
[35]

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no
positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join
all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present
rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite several
causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified.This,
therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the causes of action shall be joined

in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or
refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the remaining cause or
causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for
change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be
invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with
the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers
alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative
justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that
strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business.
[36]

[37]

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may

be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important
in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly
and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the
prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority
they acknowledge.
[38]

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own

wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et
al. that:
[39]

[40]

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each
other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of
fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each
other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance
of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of
such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxx xxx xxx
x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of
reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x
x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean
that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the
orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice
eschews anarchy.
Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its
proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the
court. In such situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to
suspend the operation of the rules.
[41]

We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private
respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the
proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put
to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to
his welfare and benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would
justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that
stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case,
considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and
in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.

The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation

of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the
proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the
merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such
questions as relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid
down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public
policy. They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be
changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an
action for their singular convenience.
[42]

[43]

In Garcia vs. Republic, we are reminded of the definiteness in the

application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the
appropriate proceeding:
[44]

x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or
misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the
proper remedy.
Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at
achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his
prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being
unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted
manner in which he adjudicated this case may be characterized as a
regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and
jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition
for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the
only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been
known since he came to live with private respondents.
[45]

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon

the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name
as prayed for in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by

which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This largely
echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was
symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as
much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name of their
adopted child.
[46]

The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled
on this point in this manner:
As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than
for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of
giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the
grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
[47]

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated

ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word
or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and
distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as
well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an
individual has two parts:
The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name
is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to
which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is
entitled is fixed by law.
[48]

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the
civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil
register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a
person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code
seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on
the interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.
[49]

[50]

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed
legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name
that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil
register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance
with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is
essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
[51]

[52]

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a

privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of
name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a
person can be authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name
or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register,
he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which
may justify such change.
[53]

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being

sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and

there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
[54]

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one
was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which
he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change
of name. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different
name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to
legally authorize a change of name. A name given to a person in the church
records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at
variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and cannot be
recognized as his real name.
[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such
rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to
justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been
baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private
respondents and that it was the name by which he had been called and
known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with
private respondents. Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious
entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name
has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases
chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as
unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee herein to use
his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would
be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon.
[59]

[60]

The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his

assailed order that
(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name
given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law x x x.
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than
for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions

of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon
grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at birth.
and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.
The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the
case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the
change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption
granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon
reaching the age of majority, he filed a petition in court to change his surname
from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He
adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment
and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese
ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his
surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This
Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere
incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.
It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given
name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at
issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose
with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the
imperative necessity of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed
procedures.
Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:
Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being
named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is
previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently
sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first case, there
is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs first
name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721).
In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their

capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right
to name the child had already been exercised by the natural parent. Adopting parents
have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted by private
respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a
right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling
grounds.
[61]

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to
the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that
the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context. It should not be
misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
[62]

The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the

proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered,
regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the
purpose of identification, the same constitutes the official name. This
effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered
save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate
proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.
While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized,
guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive
parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of
adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is
unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. To
repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption
and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include
the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of
concern to the Court.
Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper

or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this
time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is
conditioned on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and
satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of
respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private
respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y
Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law.
In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS,
JAIME
B.
CARANTO,
and
ZENAIDA
P.
CARANTO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; RULE 108 OF THE RULES
OF COURT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. - With regard to the second
assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals
and the trial court erred in granting private respondents prayer for the
correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the
trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this- case and
because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court,
insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and
without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule
108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil
status of persons. This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of
name. Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of
the Civil Code - to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the Rules of
Court in 1964 - covers those harmless and innocuous changes, such as
correction of a name that is clearly misspelled. Thus, in Yu v. Republic(21
SCRA 1018 [1967]) it was held that to change Sincio to Sencio which

merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the
vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe
v. Republic (168 SCRA 294 [1988]) it was held that the change of
petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo is a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is
appropriate. Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE CIVIL REGISTRAR AS AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND TO GIVE NOTICE BY PUBLICATION OF
THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY RENDERS THE
PROCEEDING OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID; CASE AT
BAR. - The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding.He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial
court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is
void. The absence of-an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual
all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published
as required by Rule 108, 4 which reads: 4. Notice and publication. - Upon
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. While there was
noticegiven by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for
adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the
prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was, mentioned that
in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar -was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence
of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to
render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry
was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as
to the subject matter.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Encarnacion, De Guzman & Associates Law Office for respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which affirmed in toto the decision of
Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, granting private
respondents petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the
correction of the minors first name Midael to Michael.
[1]

The petition below was filed on September 2, 1988 by private respondents

spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent
Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents
were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that
judgement be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;
b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that
the first name which was mistakenly registered as MIDAEL be corrected to
MICHAEL.

The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21, 1988, giving notice
thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the
correction of the name of the child from Midael to Michael. He argued that

although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error,
it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the
correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondents Zenaida
Caranto, Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child), and the minor
testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, who endorsed the adoption of the minor,
being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision. The RTC dismissed the
opposition of the Solicitor General. on the ground that Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) applies
only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons. It cited
Rule 108, 1, which provides that any person interested in an act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of the persons which has been recorded
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto. It held that the correction of names in the civil
registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, 2 as entries subject
to cancellation or correction. According to the trial court, the error could be
corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to prevent multiplicity of
actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered granting the herein petition and
declaring that:
1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents and purposes, the son by adoption of
petitioners Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minors name shall be Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original name of
Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as appearing in his record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the birthplace of said minor, is hereby
directed to accordingly amend (and) correct the birth certificate, of said minor; and
4. This judgement shall retroact to September 2, 1988, the date of filing of the herein
petition.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his

contention that the correction of names cannot be affected in the same
proceeding for adoption. As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Case for adoption because in the
notice published in the newspaper, the name given was Michael, instead of
Midael, which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 23,1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic,
invoked by the petitioner in support of its plea that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that case
involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the
petitioners to file a separate petition for correction of name would entail
additional time and expenses for them as. well as for the Government and the
Courts.
[2]

Hence this petition for review. Private respondents were required to

comment. Despite opportunity given to them, however, they did not file any
comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the private respondents petition for adoption. Petitioners contention is
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor
child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for
adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name
of the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name in the record of birth
(Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that this was a substantial defect in the
petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed there was a question of
identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different
person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
[3]

The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the

name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves
merely the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears
as Midael as given name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. Changing the name of the child

from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any

confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same
rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication
requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by
publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for
adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming
the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that
both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private
respondents prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil
registry.
Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of
the minor, is void and without force or effect.
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only
to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108, 2
plainly states:
2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
This case falls under letter (o), referring to changes of name. Indeed, it
has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code - to
implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of Court in 1964 - covers
those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is

clearly misspelled. Thus, in Yu vs. Republic it was held that to change Sincio
to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first
name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic it was held that the change of petitioners name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a mere
innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding is appropriate.
[4]

[5]

[6]

Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of this Rule
provides:
3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the
proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less
given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indenpensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceeding
subsequent to the filling of the complaint including the judgment.
[7]

[8]

Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required
by Rule 108, 4 which reads:
4. Notice and publication. - Upon filling of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of
the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice
only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned
that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being
sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently,
of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as

an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for
correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concered, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as
to party and as to the subject matter.
[9]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court the order to the local civil registrar to change the name MIDAEL to
MICHAEL in the birth certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the
adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies

middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an
adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the
child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest
and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds
that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present
constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes,
shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article
189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate

child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only
one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated;
(5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name,
the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public
interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the
family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules
which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his
status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted
child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of
a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by

Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate

Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized
the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of
the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family
to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname
of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother,
how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his

point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father
and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article
364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname
is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family
name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he
may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof.
Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of
legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the
Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really
the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall
bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a
middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or
not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which
endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when thePhilippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
[18]
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998,[19]secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial

or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the

father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of
her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal
lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains
an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert
or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached
to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they
are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers
surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
[25]
The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of
the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it

may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or
obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly
MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers
surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered
in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165546

February 27, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her
Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8,
1996. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on
December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor
child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. 2 Her claim for monthly pension was settled on
February 13, 1997.3
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter 4 dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia AguasMacapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna

abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man
on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children
with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pea. In support of
her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the original birth certificate 5 of one Jefren H. dela
Pea, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo
C. dela Pea, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension in
September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticias allegations. In a
Memorandum6 dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the
investigation reported that, based on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablos first cousin and
neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal
children with Rosanna; Jenelyn7 and Jefren were Rosannas children with one Romeo C. dela Pea;
and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still
pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was
not capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo
was infertile, the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was
advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350.00 representing the total death
benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.8
Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said
decision.9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.10
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions
with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20, 1998. 11 Janet H. Aguas, who also
claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. The case was
docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and
Rosannas marriage certificate; (2) Janets certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnns certificate of live birth;
and (4) Pablos certificate of death.
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence
showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of
factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims. 12
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as
evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablos signature as Jeylnns father. They asserted that
Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under one roof. In
support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and
Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife
until the latters death. In Janets birth certificate, which was registered in the Civil Registry of San
Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged
infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely

because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated the deceased only for
tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the information the SSS gathered from the doctor
was privileged communication.14
In compliance with the SSCs order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports 15 signed by clerks from
the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on
December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peas birth on November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of
Jeylnns birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablos death on December 8, 1996.
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the authenticity of
Pablos signature as appearing on Jeylnns birth certificate from his claim records, particularly his
SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application. 16 The SSS complied with said directive and
manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablos signature in the
birth certificate was made by the same person who signed the members record and other similar
documents submitted by Pablo.17
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for
clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that she had
known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the couple were married and lived in
Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but four
years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Nio Triangulo, San
Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the
spouses real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse later transferred
residence, not far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in
the old house.19
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15
years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her
neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but she did not know whose
child Jefren is.20
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in by the
spouses because for a long time they could not have children; 21 however, there were no legal papers
on Janets adoption.22 Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after the latters baptism, there
was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Pea was claiming that he was the father of
the child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got mad and even
attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna
separated;23 she knew about this because at that time their mother was sick, and she would often
visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna was no
longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was
staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela Pea were still living together.24
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for clarificatory
questions.25 During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two baptismal certificates:
that of Jeylnn Aguas,26 child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October 29, 1991, and

that of Jenelyn H. dela Pea,27 child of Romeo dela Pea and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January
29, 1992.
On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering
Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of P10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and
Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed the SSS to pay the
death benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal
heirs.28
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she
had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pea during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo.
The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Pea stating that his mother,
Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Pea, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that
Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pea while she was still married to Pablo (as evidenced by
the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Pea showing that she was the child of Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea and that she was born on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded
that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death because of her act of
adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her
father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC
deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded,
based on the latters baptismal certificate, that she was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela
Pea. It also gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of
Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticias declaration that she was
only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion was denied by
the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. 30 The claimants then elevated the
case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a new one is entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits accruing from
the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of
computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut and
suspended in September 1997.
SO ORDERED.31
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were the
children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these records were
binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public documents may only be
challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere
testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she
ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosannas alleged affair with Romeo dela

Pea was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Pea during her
marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made
her not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse,
she is entitled to support from her husband.32
The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for lack of
merit.33 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it
I
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT
FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY
BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO SECTION
(k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.
II
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE
PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS. 34
Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735,
which defines a dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by Pablo when she
engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Pea and married the latter during her
marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to receive
support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is evident from the birth certificate of
Jefren H. dela Pea showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela
Pea. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo;
consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary.35
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the pension because,
based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the
legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority under Section
5(a) of the Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents relationship
with the member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without correcting their
birth certificates.36
Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna committed acts of
adultery or that she married another man after the death of her husband. They contend that Janet
and Jeylnns legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family
Code, none of which were proven in this case.37
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS
death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the
Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari, the
Court may not review the factual findings of the CA.39 It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 to
review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 40 However,
the Court may review findings of facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 41 The Court finds these instances present
in this case.
At the time of Pablos death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are entitled to death
benefits:
Sec.13. Death benefits. Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employees death, (a) his primary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependents
pension: Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary
beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty
times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That the death benefit shall not be less than
the total contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos:
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled to
the minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member as
follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall, unless the
context indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and
incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular
support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be

the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by
the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 42
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born
on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4,
1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latters death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident
that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa
Dizon,43 extensively discussed this presumption
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170,44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988),
the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 46
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs.47 In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy
of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be
contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate
signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.48
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date
of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof
of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.49 It should be noted that

respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janets alleged birth certificate. However, the Court
cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnns because it was not verified in
any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn,
there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janets birth on the date stated in the
certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 50 Here,
the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by
Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janets adoption did not undergo any legal
proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161,
as amended, only "legally adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof
that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider her a dependent child of Pablo,
hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must
prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimantspouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2)
that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show
that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was
verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established
that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a
husband and wife are obliged to support each other,51 but whether one is actually dependent for
support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of
marriage alone.
In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent
as "one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to,
someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will,
power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent
spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who
abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was
not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence,
the Court denied her claim for death benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death,
it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied with,
particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his death. Aside from her own
testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as

husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where
they made such declaration.
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC will not prevail
over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that
Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter died. Except for the
bare assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no further statement
regarding the witnesses assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablos death.
On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after Jeylnns baptism as a result of an
argument regarding Romeo dela Pea. According to Leticia, there was a commotion at their
ancestral house because Romeo dela Pea was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when
he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The SSCs observation and conclusion
on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further believe
Leticias testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Pea are one and the same
person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San
Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez.
Jenelyn H dela Pea, on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn
dela Pea was born approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically
impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so short a time. x x x The
testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of
Jeylnn because of the commotion that was created by Romeo dela Pea who wanted Jeylnn to be
baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish of Sto. Nio in San
Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Pea. They changed her date of birth also to make it appear
in the record of the parish that she is another child of Rosanna.53
On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living at Pablos
house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Pea up to the present.
Mariquita testified as follows:
Hearing Officer:
Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Ngayon at kahit na noon.
Hearing Officer:
Kailan namatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:

1996.
Hearing Officer:
Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
Mrs. Dizon:
Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.
Hearing Officer:
So, buhay pa si Pablo
Mrs. Dizon:
. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
Hearing Officer:
Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
Hearing Officer:
Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?
Mrs. Dizon:
Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya
Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni
Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.
Hearing Officer:
Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
Mrs. Dizon:
Oo.
Hearing Officer:

Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.
Hearing Officer:
Saan naman?
Mrs. Dizon:
Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On
the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no
legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna
was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is
declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948

June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the
petitioner herein.
The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of
Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for the adoption of minors Elaine
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September
7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural
children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, 7 the children
were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to
Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to
the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her
children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to
adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to
the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent 9 to the adoption
of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his
willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor
childrens name follow the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises. 10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to
submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance12 but deputized the City
Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was
allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees,
to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in
evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said
consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac,
submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos,
eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the
paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care,
guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which
is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted
and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her
as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to
look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support
to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma
D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody
is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and
that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors. 17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the
death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who
attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three
minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with
minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental
love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children
up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also
finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children. 18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent
of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to
prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from
their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children
relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the
surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the
corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the
oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK
OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK
OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner
failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother.
Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence
as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a
Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support
the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari 26 on September 7, 2004, assigning
the following errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED
SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND
WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is
entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b)
whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court
treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to
ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus,
the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the
child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. 31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,
provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed
of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with
said adopter and the latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. 32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In
this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who
arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require
Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The
children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia
and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD
social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker
that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No.
8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as

claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she
should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. 33 The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence,
love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance,
the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to
have existed at the time of adoption.36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim
that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with
the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now
serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have
been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still living with
their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal. 39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and
concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother
and petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a
happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner
had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support
of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial

help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which
she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her
mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners
since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered
Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and
his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents
who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other
paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up
to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently
sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial
constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine
herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia
continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what
her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of
severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same
shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of
parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally
abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given
to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The
offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the
court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the
markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally
offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The
joint written consent of petitioners children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it
to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs
to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be

considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public
or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it,
and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In
case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making
the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such
he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited
law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the
children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her
siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in
Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less
than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide
financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in
the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely
on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with
the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public Health &
Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of
the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the
children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo,
Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might
be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the
financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children
and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the
records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew,
there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is
not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.