RULE 103-108 RA 9048

[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor

child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma.
Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles
Christian. The birth certificate shows, among others, that the child's full name is
Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes
Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that
the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.[2]
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the
birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be
changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank;
and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to
her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon,
were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the
mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and
Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.[3]
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:
Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida,
praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of her minor child, Charles
Christian Eleosida Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name
BORBON be deleted and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the

surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 - Batangas City", be
likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the
time of the minor's birth were not legally married; and the surname BORBON of
petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also deleted;
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground
Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and
published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at
which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that
all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and
show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.
Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the
petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, within which to file
their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the Solicitor General may not be able
to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
appear for and in behalf of the State.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the
presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:
Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as
contained in the notice of hearing dated April 23, 1997 requiring that office to file
their opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate
of minor child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the same time initially present
evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. [5]
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It ruled:

It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS

AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc.,
may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New
Civil Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL
STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will
ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the
Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name,
ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12,
respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never
married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in
ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON
to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and
device to establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order,
which would authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this
Court, finds the action improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed
by petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the words clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature.
WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic)
dismissed.[6]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether
corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors
to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature.[7]
The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG
submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided
that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual
change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as

long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented.
[8]
Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit his comment on the
petition despite several notices from this Court. Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court
dispensed with the filing of respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the
petition.[9]
We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.[10] This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia[11] where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to
make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to--(1) issue
an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the
order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled
to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.'
xxx[12]
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status
of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under
Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon
receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on
June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The
trial court likewise ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected
places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition
during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall
also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be
granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second
order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The
foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary
proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu

proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and
all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August
25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set
aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED

REPUBLIC
THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

OF

G.R. No. 170340

Present:
QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson
CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL

KHO, MERCY NONA KHOFORTUN,
HEDDY
MOIRA
KHO-SERRANO,
KEVIN
DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and
KELLY
DOGMOC
KHO
(Minor),
Respondents.

PROMULGATED:

June 29, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27,
2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which
affirmed the September 4, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City, Branch 5 granting the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito),

Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the
correction of entries in their birth certificates as well as those of Carlitos minor
children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy
Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of
entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and
Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the deletion of
the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because his
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married.
The same request to delete the married status of their parents from their
respective birth certificates was made by Carlitos siblings Michael, Mercy Nona,
and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of
his and his wifes marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000,
the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition [3] in which it was
additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his record of
birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage
certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and Filipino to Chinese,
respectively.

As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks [4] in
Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which
it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil
registrar[5] stated her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in
the birth records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the
other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel
for respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to
enter its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing
to October 9, 2001.[6] On September 14, 2001,[7] the OSG entered its appearance
with an authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case
and render assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also
presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth
certificates of Carlitos children was requested to the effect that the first name of
their mother be rectified from Maribel to Marivel.
By Decision[8] of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil
registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as
follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2)
delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of
marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in
the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of
the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel
Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
Maribel as Marivel.

With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the

corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from
John Kho to Juan Kho and the latters citizenship from Filipino to Chinese.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the
subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother,
Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings
parents, and the latters citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name
Carlito John Kho to Carlito Kho for non-compliance with jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners
appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines
the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry,
was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held
that the correction of their mothers first name from Maribel to Marivel was made
to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit
the CA conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not
affect the minors filiation from legitimate to illegitimate considering that at the
time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlitos first marriage
was still subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were
born, their children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on
to state, that Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having

been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 3[9] of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with
the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth
record, it noted, falls under letter o of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule
108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change
Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied
because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide
residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos
aliases and his true name as Carlito John I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same
jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the
citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the
married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves
the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
[10]
Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in
his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on
the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.[11]

Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlitos and his siblings parents were
married alters their filiation from legitimate to illegitimate, with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[12] explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the
books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. If the
entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through
mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open,
the consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Valencia,[13] however, this Court ruled, and has since

repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108.[14]
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not
for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature,
but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably
substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted
in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right
in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by appropriate adversary proceeding? Blacks Law
Dictionary defines adversary proceeding[] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an
ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal

warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to

contest it. x x x [15] (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR
THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF
JUDICIAL ORDER, has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the
judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.[16]
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito[17] observed that the obvious
effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction
of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in
the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the
civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied. [18] The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil registrar is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having

or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

There is no dispute that the trial courts Order[19] setting the petition for
hearing and directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose
it was posted[20] as well as published for the required period; that notices of
hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan
and the local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002
during which the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively
participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and
Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and
the trial courts judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[21] That case
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor,
June Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo)
and to correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial
court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo,
however, sought to annul the trial courts decision, claiming that she should have
been made a party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the
RTC of jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barcos petition, this Court held that the publication of the
order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of
entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an

appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, Rule

108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3
of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as
any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would
affect her wards share in the estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by
compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by
publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole
world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded
under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action
against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition
binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [22]

Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or

respondents parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It
may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31,
2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise
any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the
proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially since
the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the
residence[23] she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to
correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts
recorded therein.[24]
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate
of marriage[25] shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not
on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date April 27,
1989 was supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the
time his sons were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.
[26]
Given the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors
were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all
in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the
witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. [27] Again,
that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlitos and his
siblings birth certificates of the entry Married opposite the date of marriage of their
parents, moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St.
Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have
never contracted marriage legally.[28]

A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.[29] Under the circumstances, the deletion of the
word Married opposite the date of marriage of parents is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from
Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of
entries involving changes of name falls under letter o of the following provision of
Section 2 of Rule 108:[30]
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o)changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs

petitions for change of name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlitos official transcript of record from
the Urious College in Butuan City,[31] certificate of eligibility from the Civil
Service Commission,[32] and voter registration record[33] satisfactorily show that he
has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the
dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as
appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during
the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to
question her citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which

certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the adversarial
nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings
uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as Filipino. To disallow the correction
in Carlitos birth record of his mothers citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably
born of the same mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of
the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel. The mistake is clearly clerical
or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding[34] considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is Marivel.
Apropos is Yu v. Republic[35] which held that changing the appellants
Christian name of Sincio to Sencio amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz
Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted
through a summary proceeding.[36] The same ruling holds true with respect to the
correction in Carlitos marriage certificate of his fathers name from John Kho to
Juan Kho. Except in said marriage certificate, the name Juan Kho was uniformly
entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.[37]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177721

July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG,respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes
aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and justice.
Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of
releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in
this Court.
Petitioners allege that:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President,
announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major
daily publications.
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held
in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory
S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the
President.
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated
that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC)."
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive
Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of
said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at
the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also
Chinese.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be
appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1
Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his
father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his
nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the
entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact
that Ongs citizenship at birth is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ongs birth certificate is not changed
by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.2
This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification
Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a
natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that
he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not
have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ongs old
Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent
Ongs remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to
prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent
Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the
functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition.
Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the
appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by
the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus:
SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among
the list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment,
however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs
citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral.
Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive
Secretary submits that:
1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly
nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointees qualifications.

2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of

Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which have the authority and
jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship.
3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen.
4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.4
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised
ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of
those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the
President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment.
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos,
Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a
Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a
result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a
minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ongs mother, Dy
Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who
were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy
Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese
citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the
naturalization.
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification
and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the
Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born.
Summarizing, his arguments are as follows:
I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED
CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL
POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR
DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER
MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and
B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER
AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF
MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE
IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY
PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE

IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."
IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION
UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND
ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO.
V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR
PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS
THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION
BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A
DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT
RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING
NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE
POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit
on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of
transcendental importance. They claim that the Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as
Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ongs
birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is
binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a
Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
The petition has merit.
First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and
taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance,
namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court.
Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.10
Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary
since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in
fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from
extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong
from accepting the same.
Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip
of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a
Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims
under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has
the initial competence to do so.
Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?
On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be
admitted to the Philippine bar.

In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September
14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be
admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a
Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in
1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a
Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate
and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen
at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong
Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
Specifically, the following appears in the records:
PETITION
COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been
born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy
Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his
birth certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen
other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach the
necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached
documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4.
xxx
V E R I F I C AT I O N
Republic of the Philippines )
City of Manila ) S.S.
I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in
the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the
allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge.
(Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila,
Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at
________________, on __________________, 19__.

(Sgd.)
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1979
PTR No. 3114917

January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM

Doc. No. 98;

Page No. 10;
Book No. VIII;
Series of 1979.13
In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter
dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar
Examinations, he has to submit:
1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and
2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General.
Respondent Ong complied with these requirements.
It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that
this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.
It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino
citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil
register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a
substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in
controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to
the contrary admitted.15
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct
clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 16
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs
ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be
threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs
mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Respondent
Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the
time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to

this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by
injunction from doing so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory
S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office,
until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his
birth and citizenship.
This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157043

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- v e r s u s - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 2, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision[2] dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the
decision

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court

(RTC),

Branch

23

of

San

Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of
name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In
Special Proceeding No. R-481,[3] Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1.

[Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor

GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16)
years old and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they
can be served with summons and other court processes;

2.

[Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni

N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459,
dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a
petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire
of his mother [who is residing and working abroad];

3.

Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan,

Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the
filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since
his birth [in 1982];

4.

The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine
(9) years old up to the present;

5.

Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of

Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9,
1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his
mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name
since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil
Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];

6.

The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born
and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on
matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.

[Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears
xxx xxx xxx;
7.

[Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural
child; and

9.

The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to

GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx[4]

Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the
change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents petition
sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.
[5]

Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province

of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.
[6]

The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.[7]
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court
to present her evidence ex parte before a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,
acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.[8]

From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed
an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the
petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.[9]
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courts
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable

parties.[10] Petitioner

cites Republic

of

the

Philippines

v.

Labrador[11] and claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may
be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.[12]
We deny the petition.
The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves
to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name. [13] Understandably,
therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
[14]

This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a

persons name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State
must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its
citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, [15] a separate and

distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in
the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).[16]
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the
court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is
whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since
the reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not
sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a
change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.[17] Such issues
are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties
are impleaded and due process is observed.[18]
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines),[19] the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then
as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally
use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a
natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
(emphasis ours)

Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname
from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis
putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family
Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx(emphasis ours)

Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation

of

Entry

in

Civil

Registry

of

Julian

Lin Carulasan Wang[20] is enlightening:

Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child.[21]

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons

name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights
as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken
lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present
evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court
found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the

Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by
his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also
to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join
her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of
mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner [22] in support of its
position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name.
Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by
petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents case. While the OSG
is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be
adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its
own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name
must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the
cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. There
is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not
alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting
erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition,
the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also
required to reflect the change in name. In this regard, [appellee]
Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding
by posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing
of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG a copy
thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the

petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same
nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower
court is still expected to exercise its judgment to determine whether the
petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments
propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor
the motion to present its evidence ex partewhen it had the opportunity to
do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.[23] (emphasis supplied)

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
[24]

Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the

rules.[25] With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due
notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements
to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties,
including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to
contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN

RE:
PETITION
FOR
CHANGE
OF
NAME
AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN
WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN
LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA

WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly

represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his
middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB
and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a
deed of legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden
surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether
they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny
in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is,

they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. [1]
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. [2] The
trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the
petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when
studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is
merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the
name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no
reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering
that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was
denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004. [4] The trial court maintained that the
Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study
there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law
which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice public
interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not suffice to grant the
petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not reasonable.[5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)
[6]
arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174 [7] of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a
need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family name
for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and harmony
among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the child. [8] It is
argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing the name
as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out that

the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also
alleges that it is error for the trial court to have denied the petition for change
of name until he had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name
to use, contrary to previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor
to petition for change of name.[10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the trial court
correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under
Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the
mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is also no
showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is in the best interest
of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to support a petition for
change of name and/or cancellation of entry.[12] The OSG also adds that the
petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name
or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners allegation that
the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and difficulty is
allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument raised
before the trial court that the dropping of the childs middle name could only
trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner.
Hence, while petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is
no confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle name, it has
also not been shown that the use of such middle name is actually proscribed
by Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that
before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his
certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause,

or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.[14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper
and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. [15] To justify a request
for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held
valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence,
as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper
and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence
available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in
the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts.[17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it
does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt
another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases
in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal with
requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving
requests for change of the given name[18] and none on requests for changing
or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop the middle
name from his registered name? We have to answer in the negative.

A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant at this

point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are
used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive
of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has
frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name, and
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable
and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does
not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle
names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother,[21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,

unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname.[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized
by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does not
have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears
both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle
name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into
Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v.
Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother,
Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to
change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court
granted her petition based on the following considerations: she had elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings
who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their mothers
surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname there still being
ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War; and there was no
showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or
that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her
behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the

surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The

Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant should be granted
where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to eliminate the
stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she continued to use the
surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that justice dictates
that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article 174 of
the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the
father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only
one family name, even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner
therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought
to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name
as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she
had been using since childhood, in her school records and in her voters
registration). The trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the
denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a
legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there is no
legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which
she is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to
grant her petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his name
against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would
show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not
warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are
not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita andAlfon, where the petitioners were
already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name. Being of
age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully
knowing the effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be
unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the petitions for change

of name in these two cases was the presence of reasonable or compelling

grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity
most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a result of World
War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine
citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had
been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name
and she had not used her registered name in her school records and voters
registration records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed
by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case
to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to
petition for change of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the
Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave paramount
consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would
make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not
clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of
change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches
the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at
this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

PLATON AND LIBRADA

CERUILA,

G.R. No. 140305

Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ROSILYN DELANTAR,
represented by her guardian,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE and
DEVELOPMENT,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

December 9, 2005
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn
Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo
Jaloslos.[1] The RTC granted the Ceruilas petition in its decision dated April 11,
1997[2] which was nullified, however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10,
1999.[3] The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4] Hence the present
petition.
The antecedents are as follows:
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at
the Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition
for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada
Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch
119 on November 9, 1996 and Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment was
denied by said court on January 20, 1997.[5]

On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila,
entitled IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR, praying that the birth certificate of
Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth
certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore
invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein, as follows:
a.

The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada

A. Telin;

b.
c.

d.
e.
f.

g.

The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar

being a forgery;
The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father,
considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and
co-guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in
(sic) unknown;
The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents
reflected in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister
and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same
(sic) is actually not legitimate;
The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known
father merely made it appear that she was born at the time the
informations for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil
registrar or (sic) proper recording;
The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of
birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos.[6]

On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing
on March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that
any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or
opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing.[7]
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. [8] However, no representative
appeared during the scheduled hearing.[9]
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the
Ceruilas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria Rosilyn

Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the
office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National
Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective marriage registers the
entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if
any.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil Registrar of
Manila and the National Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[10]

The RTC explained in its Decision thus:

During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find out if
there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners counsel, Atty.
Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional requirements
(Exhibits A to E).[11] Thereafter, petitioner husband Platon Ceruila was placed on
the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and after he completed his
testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital in
Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as
Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit I). In the said birth certificate the name of
the childs mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father
as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate likewise shows that
the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married
on February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the
same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old
when the child was born and that she was attended in her delivery thereof by Dr.
Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T.
delos Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address
as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very certificate of
live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of
Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit J) and Librada Delantar (Exhibit K) to prove that they
are full blood brother and sister and could not have been possible for them to have
sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of
Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen
(Exhibit J-1 and K-1). The Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the

petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would
commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the
parents of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal
certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born on January
8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit K-2). Such being the case, then
Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark
contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth certificate of the
latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at the time of her delivery. The
presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as secondary
evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of
birth on file with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all
destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit L). And going for the jugular, so to speak,
the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate
(Exhibit I) purporting to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the
latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner (sic) (Exhibit A-6) are so
strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different
hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern
such discrepancy in the writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioners claim that
the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with no other
alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth
certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of
the herein petitioners.[12]

On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed,
with the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for
cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. [13] She claimed that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned
about the same only from the news onMay 16, 1997. [14] She argued that the RTC
decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due
process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate; and
that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the
appropriate remedy.[15]
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her
mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada
is not an interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father,
the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the birth;
[16]
Libradas allegations are also contradicted by (a) the Records Based on Cord
Dressing Room Book dated April 13-May 29, 1985, issued by Emelita H. Avinante,

Head of the Medical Records Section and Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital,
which is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex E and which states that
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that
her parents are Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar; [17] and (b) the admission of
Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment [18] in Sp. Proc. No. 96-419[19] regarding
the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul as Annex F, where
he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his
parental authority.[20]
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the
respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in Special Proceedings No.
97-81893.
With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.[21]

The CA reasoned that:

As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893
entitled In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of
Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by
her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent therein,contrary to
the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon Ceruila
and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in
the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect sought to annul, cancel
or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth certificate. With more
reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her
legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth certificate was sought to be annulled or
cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but must be made a
party in the said petition.
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which
would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her
birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled.

In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries in
the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an
appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons interested are made parties
therein Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is indeed
wanting of the required notice to all the parties having claim or interest which
would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in the
decision dated April 11, 1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11,
1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner
Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the said decision. Also, the said
decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for lack of due process
there being no adversarial proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent
Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory, and had
in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still the execution thereof produces no
legal effects. [22]

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. [23] Hence, the present
petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION
RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38
DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED:
IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD
HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE THE
SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.[24]

As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the
entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case
should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of
falsified documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code [25] and Section 15, Rule 6
of the Rules of Court[26]and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were only
constrained to utilize the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the
Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which
happens to be a birth certificate in this case; since the present case involves an
ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA which are applicable only to
special proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an
indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is
not an indispensable party and granting that she is, she was deemed duly
impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the case; respondents
location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran away from the
custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the RTC
setting the case for hearing once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial notice and the
requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there was no
adversarial proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general default
thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.[27]
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its
peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab
initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab initio for being
contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases
anew to annul respondents birth certificate.[28]
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the
RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated.[29]
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since
the petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present
action turn around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding; in any case,
due process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a quo annullable;
petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruilas status, i.e., whether or not she is the
mother of respondent, thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court;[30]petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to
enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for their case to be

categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being
invoked by petitioners is a general provision, while entries of record of birth in the
civil register are governed by Republic Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as
amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides for a remedy
when an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous or falsified,
petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of
the rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry to that of an ordinary
civil case for annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs. Valencia,[31] it was
held that the parties who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and
all persons who have or who are claiming interests who would be affected thereby;
respondent, being a person whose interests would be adversely affected by the
petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for
notice; respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly
notified.[32]
Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule
on the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not
the petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the
merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due process; and that in
any case, respondents record of birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove
that she is not the mother of respondent.[33]

Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for
review on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground
for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the issues raised
herein, we shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review
on certiorari.[34]
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an
ordinary civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based
on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters
assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the
date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the
Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is
properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the
negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. [35] As
enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,[36] unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much
too short of the requirements of the rules.[37]

Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of

Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of
birth are at stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the
proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition.
Such reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[38] where the mother sought
changes in the entries of her two childrens birth certificates:
since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only
respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary in nature, is short of what is
required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office
of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but
the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who
may be affected by the change should be notified or represented . . ..
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who,
however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient
to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the
publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process.[40]This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party
was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec.

4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however, earnest efforts were made by
the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.[41]
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the
proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners
make any effort to summon the Solicitor General.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the
cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the
DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties
to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos,
where her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her
into prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove
Rosilyns age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been
cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent
to this petition. Their efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted when the CA
overturned Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos. 13287576[42] considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the
false entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence
should be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA
in exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The
action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the
questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and
void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.
However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the
merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of
Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160597

July 20, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines assails
and seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 21, 2003 in CAG.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in Special
Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein respondent
Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:
1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and
Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her
registered name isRoselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can
remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;

3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and
private records; and
4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to
the name she has always carried and used.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner
thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing
on February 20, 2001.
At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent
five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and
set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20,
respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove
Jurisdictional Facts."
On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express March 26, 2001
directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting,
what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and
actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents
without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the
documents thus submitted and marked in evidence were the following:
Exh. "A" - The Petition
Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing
Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting
Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication
Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings
Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier
Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent took
the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed

to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not
been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name.
An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's petition which cited the
decision of the trial court:
At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified, among others, that
she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued,
Abra since 1995 but before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth. She presented
her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to establish such fact of birth and to effect
that the name Roselie Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name but
instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her school days, while being
a government employee, and in all her public and private records.
She presented her professional license issued by the Professional Regulation Commission,
Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick
Count' document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which documents were
marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She likewise marked her
marriage license as Exhibit N to prove her marriage xxx.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a
passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not
have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.
On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her
realization that there will be a complication upon her retirement. 2 (Words in bracket added.)
On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved and is granted by this
Court for being meritorious.
The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:
a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas
Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and,
b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with Registry Regulations.
Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bangued, Abra for recording and
compliance.
SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)

In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October 21, 2003,4 the appellate court
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, the Republic's present petition on the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE
103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY
OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS
NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional
requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the
CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent jurisprudence,6 non-compliance with these requirements would be fatal
to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. The
provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set
forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed
for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court,
by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing
thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least
once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, . The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days
prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
(Underscoring added.)
On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within four
(4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.

We are not persuaded.

As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18, 2000
and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of
hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of
the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order,
the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA, 7 must emphasize,
however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month
limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the
initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.
It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond
the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September
25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state and correctly so that
the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all
jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction
thereover.8
The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole world
that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.9
In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites
concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must
be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3)
the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the
court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being
heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice of the hearing.
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may
appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall
appear on behalf of the Government.10 The government, as an agency of the people, represents the
public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively
represents the public.11 In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra
for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra
was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a
republication of the initial notice of the hearing.
Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate
is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra
interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits
presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense,

therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that
we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the
matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of
identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can
be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon
showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has
recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will
avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the
change of name will prejudice public interest.13
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a
proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available. 14 What is
involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation
of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts."
With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and
reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has
been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her
scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license,
professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation
Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used
practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond
practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any
opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to
the interests of the State or of other people.16
The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested
name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law
deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification,
while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good moral
character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive
or fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which
she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or

under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona fides of
her request for change of name. As the CA correctly ratiocinated:
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order
to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the
afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less
cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.
Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is
not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police
clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements
of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact
that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the
declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further
fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition.
There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to
present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for
purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused
by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).
At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is
whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have
exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to
disturb the action thus taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174689

October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the
man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex?
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in
a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in
Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance
with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be
in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of
their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen
fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name
or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which
can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of
first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community;
or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced
by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does
not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance

of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status
include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the
newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx

xxx

xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is
no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In

this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used
then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change
of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners
petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer
on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

REPUBLIC
THE PHILIPPINES,

OF

G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan
changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan
filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before
the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or

menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests

and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male
and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor
General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she
has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has
no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition
is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents
dated January 12, 2005 which reads:

petition

in

Decision

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown

that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the
granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth

[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed

fees:
a)
By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to
JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b)

By changing the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters

registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING
THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT
HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE
OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES
NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in

ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name
from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective

for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in
a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the
court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. [5] The OSG
further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG argues that Rule 108
does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the
Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless
the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the
Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders
or processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, [9] change of sex or gender
is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:

Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present
the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he
resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be

signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or
city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and
that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES

IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named
in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective

for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected
thereby
shall
be
made
parties
to
the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the
civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. [12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts
shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of
securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished
a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision

was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 [17] in so far as clerical or

typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of

such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article

407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. [20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the
early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often

appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures

of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
CAH
is
one
of
many
conditions [21] that
involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now
of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
[23]
Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had
their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor
truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a

female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical
testimony
and
scientific
development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed
(neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently
and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body
into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as

ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or

not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having
erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold
of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of
the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent [27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled
to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect
how respondent deals with hisunordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this
case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but
of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial courts
grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies
a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering
the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of
the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON HIGHER G.R. No. 172776

EDUCATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
ATTY. FELINA S. DASIG, NACHURA,
Respondent. REYES,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 17, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a Rule 45 petition for review[1] of the 15 September 2003[2] Decision and 18
May 2008 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61302.
The factual antecedents of the case follows.
Respondent Felina Dasig (Dasig) was the Chief Education Program Specialist of
the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, of
petitioner Commission on Higher Education (CHED). She had also served as the
officer-in-charge of the Legal Affairs Service (LAS) of the CHED.
In a Memorandum dated 9 October 1998,[4] the Director of the LAS brought to the
attention of the CHED several complaints on the alleged anomalous activities
of Dasig during her stint as the officer-in-charge of LAS. Attached to the
memorandum were the sworn affidavits of the complainants. [5] The complainants
consisted of Rosalie Dela Torre (DelaTorre), Rocella Eje (Eje) and Jacqueline Ng
(Ng), students who applied to have their names corrected in their scholastic records
to conform with their birth certificates; MaximinaSister (Sister), the CHED Human
Resource Management Assistant assigned to the Records Unit; and Don
Cesar Mamaril (Mamaril), Leysamin Tebelin (Tebelin), JoemarDelgado (Delgado),
and Ellen Grace Nugpo (Nugpo), all from the CHED LAS staff. All the students
alleged that Dasig tried to exact money from them under the pretense of attorneys
fees in connection with their requests for correction of names in their academic
records. Dasigs former staff at the LAS corroborated the allegations of the
students. They also alleged that Dasig attempted to persuade them to participate in
anomalous activities. Sister, in turn, claimed that Dasig refused to return the
Official Record Book of the CHED which the latter borrowed from her.
Dasig submitted a Memorandum[6] and a Counter-Affidavit[7] to answer the charges
against her. In her memorandum, she denied all the charges against her. She alleged
that it was not within the CHEDs power to entertain the request for change of name

so she advised the students to file petitions in court. Dasig denied that the alleged
closed-door meeting on 3 September 1998 with her former staff at the LAS in
which she tried to persuade them to accept P20,000.00 from Ng had ever taken
place for she was then allegedly in the Office of the Chairman for the Investigation
and Performance Audit of Dr. Jaime Gellor, then President of the Central
Mindanao University. As to the charge that she improperly took the Official Record
Book on 7 September 1998 at around 3:00 p.m. and refused to return the
same, Dasig insisted that she was inside the LAS hearing room during that time
conducting the preliminary conference on the administrative complaint filed by
Dr. Aleli Cornista against
Dr.
Magdalena Jasmin,
Dr. Perlita Cabilangan,
Dr.Arsenia Lumba, and Dr. Teresita de Leon, all from CHED Region 3, together
with
Special
Investigators
Buenaventura Macatangay (Macatangay)
and Eulando Lontoc (Lontoc).
In her counter-affidavit,[8] Dasig explained that she had not offered her services as a
lawyer to any person and that she had never represented any clients other than the
immediate members of her family ever since she was admitted to the
bar. Dasig denied the allegation that she had offered to look for a lawyer for the
petitioners since it was inconceivable to have a lawyer who would
accept P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
The CHED formed a hearing committee and designated the members to investigate
the complaints against Dasig in Resolution No. 166-98.[9] Dela Torre and Eje were
not able to participate in the hearings conducted by the committee for they could
not be notified in their given addresses while Ng and Dasig chose not to participate
despite notice. However, Mamaril, Tebelin, Delgado, and Nugpo all affirmed
before the

committee the veracity of Ngs claim that Dasig solicited money from him and
attested
to
the
fact
that Dasig even
called
them
together
with Macatangay and Lontoc for an emergency closed door meeting at the LAS
conference room at around 4:00 p.m. on 3 September 1998. Dasig allegedly told
them that Ng was willing to pay P20,000.00 for the publication of her request for
correction of name and persuaded them to accept said amount for the purchase of a
television and VHS player for their office and that any excess money would be
divided equally among them. They all objected to Dasigs suggestion.[10]
The hearing committee concluded that there was substantial evidence on
record to hold Dasig liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommended that she be
dismissed. The CHED found that the complaints against Dasig were substantiated
and affirmed the recommendation of the hearing committee to dismiss her from the
service as her actions constituted gross misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[11] The Civil Service

Commission (CSC) upheld the decision of the CHED [12] and denied Dasigs motion
for reconsideration.[13]
Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals and
raised four issues before it.[14] The first issue was whether Dasig was denied due
process of law; the second was whether the CSC erred in not giving weight to the 1
June 1999 Resolution of CHED Chairman Angel Alcala (Alcala) absolving her
from any administrative liability; the third was whether the CSC erred in not
considering evidence discovered after her dismissal which would have materially
affected the result of the case; and the fourth or last was whether the CSC erred in
not considering that the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was too harsh and
oppressive taking into account her thirty years of government service.
While the case was pending before the appellate court, this Court came out
with a Resolution dated 1 April 2003[15] which ordered the disbarment of Dasig.
Several high-ranking officers of the CHED filed an administrative case for
disbarment against Dasig, charging her with gross misconduct in violation of the
Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED with one of the grounds for
disbarment being Dasigs exaction of money fromDela Torre, Eje and Ng. In the
administrative case, the Court affirmed the following findings of fact:
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED,
attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money
as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect
her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to
have known that it was patentlyunethical and illegal for her to demand
sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of Dasig in a
resolution dated 17 June 2003.[17] Despite the Courts findings in the disbarment
proceeding, the Court of Appeals, however, gave a different assessment of the
evidence on record as it found that Dasig was only moonlighting when she offered
her legal services to the students who were requesting the CHED to change their
names appearing in their academic records to conform to their birth certificates.
The money which Dasig had asked from the students was, as found by the
appellate court, for attorneys fees and other litigation expenses. The appellate court
held that the acts of Dasig had constituted only simple misconduct.
Only the aspect of the Court of Appeals decision finding Dasig liable only
for simple misconduct is subject to review before this Court. The appellate court
decided all the first three issues in favor of the CHED. It held that administrative
due process was complied with since Dasig was given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain her side. It also declared the 1 June 1999 resolution of
CHED Chairman Alcala absolving Dasig invalid and without legal effect since it
was he alone who signed it, contrary to the collegial structure of the CHED. And it
gave scant attention to the additional affidavits submitted by Dasig as they were
not presented during the proceedings before the CHED in line with the rule that no
question, issue, or evidence shall be entertained on appeal unless it was raised in
the court or agency below.
The Court of Appeals explained its moonlighting approach, thus:
After a close perusal of the vital portions of Jacqueline S. Ngs
Affidavit, We find that Petitioner was trying to collect the money from
the three students as her attorneys fees and for the purpose of covering
the expenses which shall be incurred in instituting the appropriate action
or proceeding in court- filing fee, publication, etc. for the correction of
the name of said student affiant.[18]
xxxx
We are of the well-considered view, that [p]etitioner was not
trying to use the influence of her position to cause the correction of the
names of the students within the CHED. It can be safely assumed that as
a lawyer, [p]etitioner is fully aware that an error in a persons name may

only be legally corrected upon the filing of the necessary Special

Proceeding under the Rules of Court, specifically Rule
108. Analy[z]ing [p]etitioners acts, therefore, [w]e hold that she was
merely trying to engage in the private practice of the legal profession
while employed at the CHED. This is a classic case of moonlighting, that
is, holding an additional job in addition to a regular one. We are perfectly
mindful of [p]etitioners indiscretion, and so hold that her acts were
improper and unbecoming of a public servant, more particularly of one
with a relatively high and responsible position like her. Simply put,
[p]etitioners acts must not be condoned, particularly considering that she
even attempted to persuade her former staff at the Legal Affairs Services
Office to partake of and materially benefit from her would-be earnings in
the aborted deal with the three students. [19] x x x.

After having been apprised of the Courts factual findings in the disbarment case
against Dasig, the Court of Appeals maintained its decision and denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Specifically, it held thus:
The foregoing ruling of the Highest Court of the Land
notwithstanding, [w]e still do not find the propriety of modifying
[o]ur conclusion that petitioner should be held administratively liable
only for the less serious infraction of Simple Misconduct. Verily, the
disbarment proceedings against petitioner was predicated in part upon
the provisions of the Attorneys Oath which contained more stringent and
rigid standards by which a lawyers act must be tested, whereas [w]e
examine petitioners conduct by using the rules as fixed by the CSC as
well as jurisprudence. But more importantly, aside from the difference in
the laws applied, [w]e cannot defer to and take bearing with the ruling of
the Supreme Court considering that there is a significant variance
between the undisputed facts as found by the High Court in the
disbarment proceedings against petitioner, on one hand, and the material
factual backdrop upon which [w]e tested petitioners conduct in public
service, on the other. It must be emphasized that petitioner did not
participate in the disbarment proceedings, and as a necessary
consequence of her omission it became automatically undisputed, and
thus glaring in the eyes of the High Court, that she extorted money from
the students by way of consideration for a favorable resolution of the
students applications and formal requests for the correction of their
names, which were purportedly pending before petitioners office at the
CHED.[20] x x x.

The lone issue raised in the present petition is whether the Court of Appeals had
correctly held Dasig liable only for simple misconduct.
The Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The Court of Appeals committed a monumental blunder when it arrived at
findings of fact different from those of the Court in the disbarment case. It is
inexplicable why the appellate court would propound and insist on its
moonlighting conclusion when even Dasig herself had denied offering her services
to anyone in the first place. It was only after the Court of Appeals had come up
with such finding that Dasig incorporated it into her theory of defense, belatedly
arguing that she should not be held liable for moonlighting since the CHED allows
limited practice of law pursuant to an alleged CHED memorandum dated 16
January 1995 entitled, Authorizing Lawyers of the Commission to Engage in
Limited Practice of Profession.
Despite having been apprised of the Courts findings in the disbarment case
which should be a matter of judicial notice [21] in the first place, the Court of
Appeals still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Courts decision
ordering the disbarment of Dasig in which one of the determinative facts in issue
was whether Dasig had attempted to extort money from Dela Torre, Eje and Ng
who in turn had wanted to have their academic records corrected to conform to
their birth certificates.
Apart from its mandated duty to take judicial notice of the resolution in the
disbarment case, the Court of Appeals is bound by this Courts findings and
conclusions in the said resolution in accordance with the doctrine
of stare decisis et non quieta movere.[22] Although the administrative case is
different from the disbarment case, the parties are different and trials were
conducted separately, there can only be one truth: Dasig had attempted to extort
money from the students. For the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to that which follows, if the facts are substantially the same,
even though the parties may be different. Otherwise, one would be subscribing to
the sophistry: truth on one side of the Pyrenees, falsehood on the other![23]

Obstinately, the appellate court sought to justify its presumptuously aberrant

stance on the alleged circumstance that Dasig had not participated in the
disbarment case. A careful look at the Courts decision shows that Dasig had been
duly informed of the disbarment case when the Court in a resolution dated 3
February 1999 required her to file a Comment on the charges against her. The
resolution was sent to the same address she had used in filing the petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. She likewise chose not to comply with the order
of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline dated 6

February 2001 which had directed her to submit an Answer to the Complaint. The
IBP Commission had directed her anew to file her Answer in an order dated 8
January 2002, but again she failed to comply with the directive.
[24]
Although Dasig had chosen not to respond to the complaints against her, she
was still able to file a motion for reconsideration, which this Court denied with
finality. Clearly, Dasig was given sufficient opportunity to respond to the charges
against her.
The Court of Appeals asserted that "petitioner did not participate in the
disbarment proceedings, and as a necessary consequence of her omission it became
automatically undisputed, and thus glaring in the eyes of the High Court, that she
extorted money from the students.[25] In more comprehensible terms, the appellate
court declared that petitioner did not participate in the disbarment proceedings; and
because of her non-participation the conclusion on her extortion activity was
unquestioned and appeared ineluctable from the Courts perspective. It is worth
noting
that
disbarment
proceedings
are
under
the
[26]
administration of the Supreme Court under the Rules of Court pursuantto its

constitutional mandate.[27] Thus, the statements of the Court of Appeals constitute a

desultory assault on the institutional integrity of this Court, aside from being
incorrect and illogical.
Indeed, the remarks tend to erode and undermine the people's trust and
confidence in the judiciary, ironically coming from one of its subordinate courts.
No lower court justice or judge may deride, chastise or chide the Supreme Court.
And the "with due respect" approach that preceded the remarks as a veneer cannot
justify much less obliterate the lack of respect which the remarks evince. In fact, it
is the duty of lower courts to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court and render
obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty
of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the
nation."[28] "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all other courts
should take their bearings," so declared Justice J. B. L. Reyes.[29]
Quite obviously, when this Court dispensed the supreme penalty on Dasig in
the disbarment case based on the factual milieu it had upheld, the Court of Appeals
should have done no less by affirming the most severe penalty imposable under the
law which the CHED and the CSC had inflicted on Dasig in the administrative
case that involved the same factual milieu. But, alas, the appellate court
unjustifiably chose to reduce the penalty by downgrading the administrative
offense.
The Court of Appeals erred when it found that Dasig had merely attempted
to practice law while employed at the CHED in offering her services to the three
students for the correction of their names through judicial proceedings under Rule
108. The procedure under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court was not applicable to the
students who only wanted to correct entries in their academic records to conform to
their birth certificates. Rule 108 is for the purpose of correcting or canceling
entries in the civil registry involving (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g)legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation;
(n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. [30] Hence, there is

no justification for Dasig to ask for money under the guise of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses when it was her duty as the officer-in-charge of LAS to either
approve or disapprove the students request to change entries in their academic
records to conform to their birth certificates.
From another perspective, the appellate court erred when it disregarded the
factual findings of the CHED. It ignored the well-settled rule that by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon;
hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded not
only great respect but even finality by this Court when they are supported by
substantial evidence.[31] The gauge of substantial evidence,[32] which is the least
demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, is satisfied since there are reasonable
grounds to believe that Dasig is guilty of the charges against her which led to her
dismissal from service. And neither Dasig nor the Court of Appeals was able to
show gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law on the part of the CHED and
the CSC. The findings of the administrative agencies were further bolstered when
the Court arrived at similar findings of fact in the disbarment case, in which the
quantum of proof is preponderance of evidence. In evaluating the same evidence as
this Court in the disbarment case, it is truly inconceivable how the Court of
Appeals could have arrived at its moonlighting finding.
However, the accrued leave credits of Dasig shall not be forfeited despite the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from government service. The forfeiture of
leave credits is not one of the accessory penalties of dismissal from service
imposed by Section 58[33] of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution dated 15 September 2003 and 18 May
2008 respectively areREVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 001302 affirming the CHED Resolution dated 29
November 1999 is hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the
accessory
penalty
of
forfeiture
of
leave
credits
be
deleted.
Hence, Felina Dasig is ORDERED to be DISMISSED from the service with
cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and

perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service, including

that in government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Presiding Justice, Court of
Appeals, Manila, for dissemination to the Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED