INSPECTION
REPORT
SUMMARY REPORT ON
INSPECTION OF ALLEGATIONS
RELATING TO THE
ALBUQUERQUE OPERATIONS OFFICE
SECURITY SURVEY PROCESS
AND THE SECURITY OPERATIONS
SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT
LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
MAY 2000
Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
SUBJECT:
BACKGROUND
The Office of Inspector General received allegations regarding the conduct of security reviews at
the Department of Energys (DOE) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
Specifically, it was alleged that DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (Albuquerque) management
changed the ratings of annual Security Surveys of LANL security operations after members of the
Albuquerque Security Survey team completed the survey. It was also alleged that LANL Security
Operations Division personnel were pressured by their managers to change or mitigate findings in
LANL Self-Assessment reports.
RESULTS OF INSPECTION
Regarding the Albuquerque Security Surveys of LANL Security Operations, we found that:
Albuquerque management changed ratings for the 1998 and 1999 surveys without providing a
documented rationale for the changes;
Albuquerque management did not fully address concerns about a compromise of force-onforce exercise during the 1998 Albuquerque Security Survey at LANL; and
The 1997 and some 1998 Albuquerque Security Survey work papers were destroyed contrary
to Albuquerque policy on the destruction of records. As a result, there was no complete record
to show how ratings were developed by the survey teams.
Some security self-assessments required by LANL procedures were not being conducted; and
DOEs Los Alamos Area Office security staff was not performing all of the oversight
responsibilities associated with the LANL Security Operations Division programs.
We concluded that the processes used to develop the Albuquerque security surveys of the LANL
security operations and the LANL self-assessments were inadequate. As a result, there are
legitimate concerns that the overall security condition at LANL, specifically for Fiscal Years 1998
and 1999, was not being accurately reported.
We provided management with a number of recommendations that, if implemented, would
improve the effectiveness of Albuquerque security surveys and LANL self-assessments.
MANAGEMENT REACTION
Albuquerque management stated that the facts presented and the conclusions reached were
accurate, and that the recommendations were appropriate. Albuquerque management stated that
they would take corrective action.
Due to the concerns identified during our inspection, we recommended that the Department review
these operations at other facilities. Specifically, we requested that the Director, Office of Security
and Emergency Operations evaluate self-assessment programs at other DOE facilities to determine
if they have been fully implemented and adequately represent security conditions. The Director
agreed to this recommendation.
Attachment
cc:
Deputy Secretary
Under Secretary
Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security/Administrator for Nuclear Security
Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations
Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Overview
Introduction and Objectives ..
Details of Findings
Changes to Security Survey Ratings ..
Destruction of Records .
Recommendations .
Appendices
A. Scope and Methodology .
10
12
13
Overview
Introduction
and Objectives
Observations and
Conclusions
Page 1
Details of Findings
Details of Findings
Changes to Security
Survey Ratings
Page 2
Details of Findings
1999 Albuquerque
Survey Team
Compromise of
Force-on-Force
Exercise5
The OIG also found that Albuquerque management did not fully
assess concerns about a compromise of a force-on-force exercise
during the 1998 Albuquerque Security Survey at LANL. The OIG
A force-on-force exercise is conducted as a performance evaluation to assess the capability of the safeguards and
security system to meet performance objectives in response to an outside group referred to as an Adversary Force.
Page 3
Details of Findings
During our inspection we noted that the 1997 and some 1998
Albuquerque Security Survey work papers were destroyed
contrary to Albuquerques policy on the destruction of records.
The OIG also noted that some 1998 and 1999 work papers were
either missing, not organized, or did not contain adequate
summarization to support the ratings in the survey reports. As a
result, there was no complete record to show how the survey teams
developed the ratings.
LANL
Self-Assessments
6
7
Page 4
Details of Findings
LANL has developed their own definition for issues, concerns and observations. Issues are deficiencies discovered
during an internal self-assessment that require a corrective action plan. Concerns and observations are suggestions
that may require improvement and may be mentioned in the text of a report, but they do not require a corrective
action plan.
9
It should be noted that the reviewer had conducted self-assessments in the same organization for three years prior
to this review and had no difficulties in reporting issues developed during the prior self-assessments.
Page 5
Details of Findings
Energys Office of
Independent
Oversight and
Performance
Assurance
Page 6
Details of Findings
Recommendations
Recommendations
Page 7
Recommendations
Inspector Comments
Page 8
The actions planned and taken by the DOE Office of Security and
Emergency Operations and the Albuquerque Operations Office
were responsive to the recommendations.
Appendix A
Scope and
Methodology
Page 9
Appendix B
DOE Survey
Requirements
Albuquerque Security
Survey Requirements
Self-Assessment
Requirements
10
A Topic Team Lead is the individual assigned to head the team that reviews one of the five topic areas as
identified in Appendix C.
Page 10
Appendix B
assessments performed at the Laboratory as the principal means by
which to evaluate compliance with the performance measures
against which [the] Universitys overall performance of obligations
under the contract will be determined.
The University of California, in compliance with contract
requirements, has implemented a self-assessment program that is
defined in a LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Manual
dated June 1996. This manual establishes a three tiered selfassessment process with a primary objective of ensuring the
effective and efficient implementation of the LANL Safeguards
and Security program.
The formalized safeguards and security self-assessment program
includes a plan for each applicable topical and sub-topical area.
The self-assessment process consists of a three-tier process. At
Tier I, each LANL Division is required to conduct a selfassessment within the division. This is accomplished by the
organizational safeguards and security officer, utilizing a checklist
format, covering areas such as computer security, information
security, property protection, and Nuclear Material Control and
Accountability. At Tier II, each section within the LANL Security
Division is required to conduct a self-assessment in their functional
area(s). At Tier III, a LANL self-assessment is conducted by a
team of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) under the direction of
LANL Security Division Program Integration Group.
Page 11
Appendix C
1998 Security Survey Rating Changes11
Program Topic Areas:
Team Leader
Murder board
Final Report
Program Management
Program Management and Administration
Program Planning
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Resolution of Findings
Incident Reporting and Management
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
OVERALL RATING
Protection Program Operations
Physical Security
Marginal
Marginal
Marginal
Security Systems
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
Protective Force
Security Badges, Credentials and Shields
Transportation Security
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
OVERALL RATING
Information Security
Classified Guidance
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Marginal
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
OVERALL RATING Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
Operations Security
Unclassified AISS (Optional)
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Unsatisfactory
Marginal
OVERALL RATING
1998 Composite Rating
11
There is no documentation for the 1999 Security Survey that provides a similar Team Leader rating breakdown.
Page 12
Appendix D
1999 Security Survey Rating Changes
Program Areas:
Program Management
Murder board
Final Report
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Program Planning
Personnel Development and Training
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Resolution of Findings
Incident Reporting and Management
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Security Systems
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Protective Force
Security Badges, Credentials and Shields
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
OVERALL RATING
Protection Program Operations
Physical Security
Transportation Security
OVERALL RATING
Information Security
Classified Guidance
OVERALL RATING
Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability
Basic Requirements
Material Accounting
Marginal
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
Marginal
Material Control
OVERALL RATING
Personnel Security
Access Authorization (Personnel Clearance)
OVERALL RATING
1999 Composite Rating
Page 13
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