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G.R. No.

L-24165
August 30, 1968
JUAN M. SERRANO, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, CHAMBER OF TAXICAB SERVICES, INC., ADMIRAL TAXI CO., INC.,
LITA ENTERPRISES COMPANY, INC., SABINO GONZALES, ET AL., respondents.
The PSC in its decision passed the claim of 99 applicants for certificate of public convenience to operate and
maintain taxicab service, specifying by name those granted such certificates of public convenience, sixty in
number, but failing to refer individually to the unsuccessful ones. According to the petitioner, he completed the
presentation of his evidence, but the oppositors did not present any evidence to rebut the evidence of the
petitioner as to his qualification and financial capacity. Nonetheless, the Public Service Commission denied
completely, his application without specifying whether the application of the petitioner was dismissed for lack of
interest or failure to prosecute or denied for failure to qualify.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of PSC is valid even if it does not give the reasons for disqualification.
HELD:
NO. Seven cardinal primary rights must be respected the last being "that quasi-judicial tribunals," and the
Public Service Commission is one of them, "should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it." It does
not admit of doubt that when in a decision under review respondent Public Service Commission did not even
bother to refer individually to petitioner and state why his application is either dismissed or denied, there was a
violation of the above cardinal primary right. The failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to
have his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the reasons
for the decision, which necessarily would likewise require a finding of facts, cannot receive judicial approval.
The error of the Public Service Commission is thus marked and manifest. The gravity of such a failing is
underscored not only by deprivation of a right to which petition is entitled, but also by the obstacle placed on
the responsibility entrusted to us of reviewing decisions and orders of the Public service Commission.

G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979

MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE BOARD,
petitioner,

vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV,
INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. They
brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of
the Tax Code. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever
form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the
words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.
ISSUE:
WON the BIR has jurisiction to prosecute the respondents.
HELD:
NO. The petitioners, Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are
without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding, mislabeling
and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the matters cited is
vested upon the Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food and Drug
Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also intervening
in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have also
jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only cause
overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official
action which is neither practical nor desirable. Moreover, Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has
been repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and not to
filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled
milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the equal
protection of the laws.

UNILONGO vs COURT OF APPEALS


Facts: Sto. Nino de Cul de Sac Neighborhood Association Inc. (SNSNAI) was incorporated and
registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) by petitioners Unilongo Group,

comprising them as the original Board of Trustees. However, since no elections for a new Board of
Trustees and for a new set of officers were held from the time of its incorporation, the petitioners
subsequently amended the SNSNA's by-laws by changing the term of office of the Board of Trustees
from 1yr to 2 yrs. Despite amendments, elections were held by private respondents Dino Group, from
where they emerged as the new officers. Then again, the Unilongo group established Sto. Nino de
Cul de Sac Homeowners Association Inc. (CHSHA) and registered the same with the Home
Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). From this arise the controversy on who should represent
the homeowners and hold the offices and positions therefrom. Private respondents, in their quo
warranto complaints, sought to ouster the Unilongo group from the Board of Trustees of the SNSNAI
and to dissolve the CDSHA and declare its registration with the HIGC null and void for being in
contravention of law and illegally formed. In response, two pleadings, an answer with counterclaim
and a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, were filed by
petitioners. They contended that disputes involving homeowners association fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HIGC. The motion to dismiss was denied. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was again denied for lack of merit. On
appeal, petitioners contended that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies.
Issue: Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.
Held: NO. HIGC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. The
jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeowners association including
their dissolution as found in P.D 902-A has been transferred to the Home Insurance and Guarantee
Corporation. Whatever ambiguities that may arise regarding jurisdiction over quo warranto action
against corporation or person usurping corporate offices are classified and resolved by the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Quo Warranto actions against corporation or person using
corporate offices fall under the jurisdiction of SEC, unless otherwise provided for by law, such as
where the corporate entities involved are homeowners associations, in which case jurisdiction is
lodged with the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC).

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