IFMENWEREANGELS

WILLIAMR.CASTO*

In The Federalist, James Madison wrote, with characteristic

eleganceandinsight:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angelsweretogovernmen,neitherexternalnorinternalcon
trols on government would be necessary. In framing a gov
ernment which is to be administered by men over men, the
greatdifficultyliesinthis:Youmustfirstenablethegovern
menttocontrolthegoverned;andinthenextplace,obligeit
tocontrolitself.Adependenceonthepeopleisnodoubtthe
primary control on the government; but experience has
taughtmankindthenecessityofauxiliaryprecautions.1

ScottGerbersADistinctJudicialPower2isawonderfulexplora
tionofoneofMadisonsauxiliaryprecautions.
ProfessorGerbertracestheevolutionoftheconceptofsepa
ration of powers from Aristotle to the creation of the Federal
Constitution.Inparticular,ProfessorGerberconsiderstheidea
ofajudicialbranchofgovernmentindependentfromtheother
branches.Themajorpartofhisanalysiscarefullyexploresthe
development of an independent judiciary in each of the origi
nalcoloniesandstates.3
James Madison surely saw an independent judiciary as one
oftheauxiliaryprecautionsnecessarytocontrolthegovern
mentsexerciseofpower,but,tohimindependencewassimply
ameanstoanend.OneoftheConstitutionsprimarystructural
precautionsagainstmisuseofgovernmentpoweristhesepara
tion of powers.4 If the judiciary is to operate as an effective
checkonthelegislativeandtheexecutivebranches,thejudici
*PaulWhitfieldHornProfessor,TexasTechUniversity.
1.THEFEDERALISTNo.51,at322(JamesMadison)(ClintonRossitered.,1961).
2.SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN
INDEPENDENTJUDICIARY,16071787(2011).
3.Seeid.at39321.
4.Seeid.at3536.

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arymusthavesomemeasureofinsulationfromtheenormous
powerwieldedbytheothertwobranchesofgovernment.
Inthebooksconcludingchapter,ProfessorGerbertakesup
the issue of judicial review and convincingly details the rela
tionship between judicial independence and the power to en
forceaconstitutionbynullifyingunconstitutionalactions.5The
power of judicial review is an important aspect of constitu
tional governance, but our modern preoccupation with this
powercan obscureother,perhaps moreimportant,benefitsof
judicialindependence.
I.

AMERICANPLURALISM

PluralismhasbeenaconstantinAmericanhistoryfromthesev
enteenth century to the present. To be sure, many colonies (and
laterstates)strovethroughouttheeighteenthcenturytoensurea
measure of judicial independence.6 Nevertheless, other colonies
and states made no effort to create structural safeguards that
wouldprotectjudgesfromexecutiveandlegislativeintrusions.7
During much of North Carolinas colonial existence, there
wereconstantdisputesbetweentheroyalgovernorandthegen
eral assembly over control of the courts.8 In reaction to this ex
perience,theNorthCarolinaConstitutionof1776explicitlypro
vided [t]hat the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powersofgovernment,oughttobeforeverseparateanddistinct
from each other.9 Moreover, the North Carolina Constitution
provided specific structural safeguards to assure judicial inde
pendence.Thejudgesoftheprimarycourtsweretoholdtheir
officesduringgoodbehaviorandtoreceiveadequatesalaries
duringtheircontinuanceinoffice.10Notwithstandingthisguar
antee, the legislature did not always provide an adequate sal
ary.11 Some leading North Carolina political figures embraced
theconcept ofjudicial reviewandexpresslynotedtherelation
shipbetweenjudicialreviewandjudicialindependence.In1781,
5.Seeid.atch.16.
6.Seeid.at41,4849,67(Virginia).
7.Seeid.at143,23839(ConnecticutandNewJersey).
8.Seeid.at18598.
9.Id.at202.
10.Id.at203.
11.Seeid.at20405.

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GovernorBurkeurgedthatwithoutjudicialreviewcivilliberty
wouldbedeprivedof itssurest defencesagainstthemost dan
gerous usurpations, that is the independency of the Judiciary
poweranditscapacityofprotectingIndividualsfromtheopera
tionofLawsunconstitutionalandtyrannical.12Fiveyearslater,
JamesIredelltookthesameposition.13
New Jersey stands in stark contrast to North Carolina. The
NewJerseyConstitutionof1776isaflatrejectionofseparation
ofpowers.Instead,NewJerseyoptedforlegislativesupremacy
and made the judiciary dependent upon the legislature.14 The
statedidnotofficiallyembraceaconceptofjudicialindepend
enceuntiltheConstitutionof1844.15
Connecticutisanothercolony,thenstatethatdisplayedlittle
interestincreatingaconstitutionalstructuretoensurejudicial
independence. Indeed, the state had no written constitution
until1818.16ColonialConnecticutpaidnoattentiontotheni
ceties of separation of powers,17 and this situation continued
in early statehood. Superior judges tenure was subject to an
nualreappointmentbythegeneralassembly.18Inaddition,the
courts individual judgments were subject to review by a Su
preme Court of Errors consisting of the lieutenant governor
andtheupperhouseofthelegislature.19Finally,anindividual
judgmentalsowassubjecttoreviewthroughspeciallegislation
inthegeneralassemblythatcouldreversethejudgment.20
Connecticuts rejection of separation of powers and judicial
independence was, in significant part, a function of the thor
oughgoingCalvinismthatpredominatedamongthestatespo
litical elite. When James Madison wrote, If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on govern
12.Seeid.at206.
13.SeeWilliam R. Casto,There Were Great MenBefore Agamemnon, 62 VAND. L.
REV.371,37885(2009).
14.GERBER,supranote2,at23637.
15.Seeid.at23840.
16.Id.at143;seealsoWesleyW.Horton,ConnecticutConstitutionalHistory1776
1988(August1988),http://www.cslib.org/cts4ch.htm.
17.GERBER, supra note 2, at 150 (quoting ROBERT J. TAYLOR, COLONIAL CON
NECTICUT:AHISTORY39(1979)).
18.Id.at153.
19.Id.
20.Seeid.at15354.

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ment would be necessary,21 he was writing rhetorically. In

contrast, one of the fundamental doctrines of Connecticuts
New Divinity Calvinism was that, indeed, angelsactually
God,himselfruledtheentireworld,includingConnecticut.22
These Calvinists believed that all human affairs are minutely
predestined. Everything, including the states rulers, was part
ofGodsplan.23Forexample,OliverEllsworth,thestatesmost
prominentnationalpolitician,believedhehadbeenselectedby
GodtoserveintheUnitedStatesSenate.24Giventhisextreme
version of predestination, there was no particular need to
guard against government misconduct in Connecticut. In the
viewofthestateslargelyCalvinistrulers,itsufficedthatCon
necticutwasgovernedbyrighteousrulers.
II.

JUDICIALREVIEW

ProfessorGerbersconcludingchapterontherelationshipbe
tween judicial review and judicial independence is a masterful
capstone to his meticulous statebystate exploration of judicial
independence.Hepresentsalinkedtriumvirateofseparation
of powers, judicial review, and judicial independence. The
Founders believed that government abuse could be limited by
separating the powers of government into three coequal
branchesandthatthejudicialbranchwouldcurbmisconductby
thelegislativeandtheexecutivebranches.25Animportantpartof
the judiciarys participation in this balance of powers scheme
was the power to refuse to give effect to unconstitutional mis
conductbytheotherbranchesthroughjudicialreview.26Finally,
thepowerofjudicialreviewwouldbesignificantlylesseffective
if the other branches could effectively control the judiciary.27
Hencearosetheneedforjudicialindependence.
SomemightquibblewithparticulardetailsofProfessorGer
bers concluding analysis. For example, delegates like James
21.THEFEDERALISTNO.51,supranote1,at322(JamesMadison).
22SeeWilliamCasto,OliverEllsworthsCalvinism:ABiographicalEssayonReligionand
PoliticalPsychologyintheEarlyRepublic,36J.CHURCH&ST.507,51113(1994).
23.Seeid.
24.Seeid.at513,526.
25.SeeGERBER,supranote2,at3537.
26.Seeid.at33233.
27.Seeid.at33336.

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MadisonmighthavecometothePhiladelphiaconventionwith
the principal objective of forming a government that would
provid[e]moreeffectuallyforthesecurityofprivaterights,28
butthedelegateswereunabletoattainthisobjectiveinthefi
nal Constitution recommendedto the States. In fact, the origi
nal Constitution had little to say about protecting individual
rights. Under the system of federalism cobbled together in
Philadelphia,theprotectionofindividualrightssuchasprop
erty rights, contract rights, and freedom from physical harm
wasbyandlargelefttothestategovernments.29Moreover,the
originalConstitutionfamouslyhadnoBillofRights.Evenwith
the addition of the Bill of Rights, it was intended to protect
againstfederalnotstatemisconduct.30
Undoubtedly,theFramersweredeeplyinterestedinprotect
ingindividualrightsfromgovernmentpower.AsMadisonex
plained,thegreatdifficultyliesinthis:Youmustfirstenable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place,
obligeittocontrolitself.31Theprincipalobjectiveoftheoriginal
federalgovernmentwastocreateastrongnationalgovernment
that could deal effectively with national problems like foreign
affairs, national security, and foreign commerce. In addition,
thefederalgovernmentwasempoweredtodealgenerallywith
problems of interstate commerce, including uniform national
systems ofbankruptcy and patent law.32 The creation of a po
tentiallypowerfulgovernmentcreatedaseriousancillaryprob
lem:howtoobligeittocontrolitself.
Professor Gerber persuasively points to the triumvirate of
separation of powers, judicial review, and judicial independ
ence as one of the Constitutions important auxiliary precau
tions, to use Madisons words, against government miscon
duct. In particular, he surely is correct to conclude that as a
practicalmatter,aconstitutionalstructureofjudicialindepend
encestrengthensthejudiciaryspracticalabilitytooverridelegis
lative and executive decisions.33 In this regard, judicial inde
28.Id.at32930.
29.SeeTHOMAS B. MCAFEEETAL., POWERS RESERVEDFORTHE PEOPLEANDTHE
STATES:AHISTORYOFTHENINTHANDTENTHAMENDMENTS4142(2006).
30.Seeid.at33.
31.THEFEDERALISTNo.51,supranote1,at322(JamesMadison)(emphasisadded).
32.U.S.CONST.art.I,8.
33.SeeGERBER,supranote2,at33336.

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pendenceisadirectandimportantbuttresstothepowerofjudi
cialreview,butisnotalwaysnecessaryforjudicialreview.Pro
fessorGerberpointsoutinstancesofjudicialreviewinstatesthat
moreorlessrejectedseparationofpowersandprovidedtheju
diciarywithlittle,ifany,structuralprotections.Forexample,the
Connecticut judges in the Symsbury Case did so.34 Likewise, in
Holmes & Ketchamv. Walton,NewJerseyjudges did thesame.35
Cases like Symsbury and Walton simply establish that judicial
independenceisnotinallsituationsanabsoluteprerequisitefor
judicialreview.Atthesametime,itcannotbedeniedthatjudi
cial independence facilitates the exercise of judicial review.
Moreover,ProfessorGerbernotesthatsophisticatedmembersof
thefoundinggenerationspecificallythoughtso.36
Still,thetriumvirateofseparationofpowers,judicialreview,
and judicial independence cannotstanding aloneprotect
any individual rights because these important concepts relate
solelytoprocessandareessentiallyvalueneutral.Thesethree
concepts taken together are entirely silent on the substantive
contentofindividualrights.Totakeamodernexample,if the
Constitution enables the President as CommanderinChief to
override all the limitations inthe Constitution, the courts pre
sumably would never challenge presidential action, no matter
how extreme, so long as the president actually approved the
action.Thepresidentsactionsimplywouldnotimplicatesepa
rationofpowersandjudicialreview.
The procedural nature of Professor Gerbers triumvirate high
lightsthesignificanceoftheverticaloriginsofjudicialreview.A
verticalhierarchyoflawstellsthejudiciarywheretofindsubstan
tivelimitsongovernmentaction.37TheFramersbelievedthatul
timate sovereignty came from the people.38 To be sure, exactly
who the people were was not entirely clear. Nevertheless, the
Framers understood that the Constitution was intended to limit

34.Seeid.at340.ForjudicialindependenceinConnecticut,seesupranotes2124
andaccompanyingtext.
35.SeeGERBER,supranote2,at24345.ForjudicialindependenceinNewJersey,
seesupranotes1415andaccompanyingtext.
36.SeeGERBER,supranote2,at33334.
37.ScottD.Gerber,ThePoliticalTheoryofanIndependentJudiciary,116YALE L.J.
POCKETPART223,226(2007).
38.SeeMCAFEE,supranote29,at4244.

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government power.39 Therefore, the substantive constitutional

limits that defined individual rights were clear to the judiciary.
TheselimitswereliterallywrittenintotheConstitution.
Theactualimplementationofjudicialreviewrequirestheju
diciarytointerprettheConstitution,andthisinterpretivefunc
tion lies at the heart of many of todays constitutional contro
versies. In the founding generation, the problem of
constitutional interpretation was not as significant. Everyone
knew that the Constitution came from the people, and the
members of the judiciary in the founding generation were
themselves political leaders of the very group of people who
createdtheConstitution.Thejudiciaryofthefoundinggenera
tion did not face aserious interpretive problem because it felt
thatitknewwhatthepeopleintended.
III.

BEYONDJUDICIALREVIEW

Foranumberofreasons,manydiscussionsofjudicialreview
undulyexaggeratethepowersimportance.Onereasonforthis
exaggeration stems from a tendency to view twentyfirst cen
tury societyparticularly political societyin terms of con
flicts of values and interests. From this viewpoint, the judici
arysinparticulartheSupremeCourtspowerresidesinits
abilitytoresolveconflictsandimposeitsjudgmentsuponother
governmentalunits.40
Thestructuralprotectionsofjudicialindependenceundoubt
edlycontributetothejudiciarysabilitytowieldthepowerof
judicial review. But the societal benefits of judicial independ
encedonotflowsolelyfromjudicialreview.AlthoughProfes
sor Gerber emphasizes the relationship between judicial inde
pendence and judicial review in his concluding chapter, he
notesthat[j]udicialindependenceisalsovaluableinnoncon
39.Id.
40.Accordingly,themodernparadigmsofgreatjudicialopinionsareMarburyv.
Madison,5U.S.(1Cranch)137(1803)andBrownv.Bd.ofEduc.,347U.S.483(1954).
Intheformercase,Federalistjustices,whosecoalitionwasoutofpower,tweaked
the nose of the dominant coalition led by Thomas Jefferson and reaffirmed the
Courtsauthoritytousethepowerofjudicialreviewtooverturnpoliticalbranch
decisions. In the latter case, the Court struck boldly at a national disgrace when
the political branches were morally paralyzed. In each of these cases, the Court
was in conflict with powerful societal forces and firmly reiterated its constitu
tionalroleasashieldagainstabusesofgovernmentpower.

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stitutionalcases.41Ifthepowerofjudicialreviewdidnotexist,
independent judges nevertheless would play an important re
strainingrolesimplybyproviding aneutraladministrationof
existing laws. For example, the legislature frames many laws
thattheexecutivethenadministers.Thisparadigmholdsforall
criminallaws.Inaparticularcase,theexecutivebranch,acting
throughprosecutors,mightwishtogiveanexpansiveinterpre
tationinconsistentwiththelegislativesgeneralplan.Aninde
pendent judiciary can more effectively referee the resulting
conflictbetweenlegislativeandexecutivepolicy.
In addition, and perhaps of greater importance, rule of law is
essentialtotheeffectiveoperation of a market economy likethe
oneintheUnitedStates.42Ruleoflawrequiresmostparticipants
in the market to believe that laws usually will be enforced on a
fairanduniformbasis.Thus,thestructuralprotectionsthatcon
tribute to judicial independence foster the markets faith in the
judiciary.43 Many years ago, Chief Justice Taft believed that no
single element in our government system has done so much to
secure capital for the legitimate development of enterprises
throughouttheWestandSouthastheexistenceoffederalcourts
there, with a jurisdictionto hear diverse citizenship cases.44 Ul
timately,thecontributionsofindependentjudgestotheeffective
functioningofamarketsystemhaveproveninvaluable.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States is an overtly pluralistic society,
generalconsensusisneverthelesspossibleonsomeissues.Pro
fessor Gerbers book describes widespread disagreement over
the course of some two centuries that eventually converged
intoageneralconsensusthatthejudicialshouldbeindepend
entofthelegislativeandtheexecutive.

41.GERBER,supranote2,at334n.35.
42.See Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15,
2008,www.economist.com/node/10849115.
43.Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence:
EvidencefromEighteenthCenturyEngland,7AM.L.&ECON.REV.,Spring2005,at1,
27(2005).
44.WilliamHowardTaft,PossibleandNeededReformsintheAdministrationofJus
ticeintheFederalCourts,47A.B.A.REP.250,259(1922).