Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE
DIRECTOR
OF
RELIGIOUS
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

AFFAIRS,

complainant,

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal
assistance
12
Escolta,
Manila,
Tel. 2-41-60.

Room,

service
105

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in
the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further
mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that
he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to

the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for
the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by
writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO
H.
LEDESMA,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a
motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to
the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to
delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be
plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There
is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be
taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is
not one of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to
comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on

the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very
much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation
a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition
is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then
and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of
the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3,
1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as
well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of
November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved
futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime
was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in
the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his
order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution
to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the
accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the
Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the
motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial
would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused.
The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963,
October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8,
1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another
order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging
indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 9,
1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has
been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to
come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there
was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court
and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the Commission on Elections
and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed
a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable
then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this
disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in
the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To
avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered
without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention.
After all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be
fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was
de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court
should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of
their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez
in People v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a courtappointed counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty
to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the
case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of
the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accuseddefendant expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For,
indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger
dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to
fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel
could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of

law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable
time
to
procure
an
attorney
of
his
own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The present Constitution is even
more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of
an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for
the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility
as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a
member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,
when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex B.
2 Ibid, Annex C.
3 Petition, pars. 3-9.

4 Petition, Annex C.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid..
7 L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.
8 Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA
798; People v. Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v.
Serafica, L-29092-93, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera,
L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245; People v. Aguilar, L-30932, Jan.
29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115; People v. Estebia, L-26868, July 29, 1971, 40
SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-32692, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 230;
People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 391; People v.
Valera, L-30039; Feb. 8, 1972, 43 SCRA 207; People v. Francisco, L30763, June 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 451; People v. Espia, L-33028, June
30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614; People v. Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46
SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L-33730, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129;
People v. Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 221; People v.
Ricalde, L-34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v. Martinez, L35353, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June
22, 1973, 51 SCRA 286; People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973, 51
SCRA 317; People v. Alamada, L-34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103;
People v. Andaya, L-29644, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 137; People v.
Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 132; People v. Saligan, L35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v. Bacong, L-36161, Dec.
19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.
9 4 Phil. 298.
10 Ibid, 300.
11 L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.
12 Ibid, 109-110, Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20
SCRA 717; Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21
SCRA 1.
13 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).
14 Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v.
Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912);
United States v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26
Phil. 616 (1914); United States v. Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); United States
v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); United States v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371

(1915); United States v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743 (1917); People v. Abuyen,

52 Phil. 722 (1929).
15 Cf. Article IV, Section 19.
16 Section 20.
G.R. No. L-18727

August 31, 1964

JESUS
MA.
vs.
ANTONIO
MA.
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

CUI,

plaintiff-appellee,

CUI,

defendant-appellant,

Jose
W.
Diokno
for
Jaime
R.
Nuevas
and
Hector
L.
Hofilea
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

for

plaintiff-appellee.
defendant-appellant.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
office in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239
of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of
their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order
prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan
nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se
hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem.
Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de
Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos
sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la
muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui,
Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o

ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente
faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de
Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death
in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first
died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies
and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they
are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February
1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui
pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The
next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no
prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui
later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds
the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February
1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a

strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means
not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is
defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion"
(Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word
"abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las
cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by
a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law.
This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are
by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being
his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little
to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose,
however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers.
(Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.")
Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or
university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under
Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which
invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d);
shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which
work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that
the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of
his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he
assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or
not it decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice
will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney
and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and proper person to
practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed
between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p.
443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,
notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to
the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of
good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to
attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the
office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to
discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as
a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the
office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from
section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of
plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father
and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for
further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the
case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro
Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma.
Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First
he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of
the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had
taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the
position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950
(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the
plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein.
The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who
had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration
of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954
he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon
afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it
said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive
Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The
motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included
in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the

parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is
not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro
Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated
in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case
of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his
acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to
continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui
after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be
ventilated in such an action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present
claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the
right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action
against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the
running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the
defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any
better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right
arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to
discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson
of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the
deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is
a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea
titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant
than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders
was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews
named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was
Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from
the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not
justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed

and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
RAUL
A.
VILLEGAS,
petitioner,
vs.
ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, BRANCH 11, presided by HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge;
BRIGIDA VERA CRUZ, joined in and assisted by her husband JOSE VERA CRUZ,
and PRIMITIVO CANIA JR., respondents.
G.R. No. L-51928 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G.
PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL,
petitioners,
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities
& Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and
ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979,
respective, involved the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which
used to read:
Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, ...
The antecedents facts follows:
L-53869
On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was
filed by Raul A. Villegas against the Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private
respondents) before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, then presided by
Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay (Civil Case No. 431-L). An answer, dated October 11, 1979,
was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino 1.
Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu. Raul A.
Villegas "challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record on

the ground that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of
First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are
essentially trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or
Courts of original jurisdiction. After the Opposition and Reply to the Opposition were
filed, Judge Dulay issued an Order inhibiting himself from the aforesaid case because
Assemblyman Legaspi was likewise the lawyer of his wife in two pending cases. The
case was re-raffled and redocketed as Civil Case No. R-18857, and transferred to
Branch II, presided by Judged Francisco P. Burgos (respondent Court).
In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of
Assemblyman Legaspi, as well as the Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter.
Hence, this recourse to certiorari and Prohibition.
A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980
enjoining respondent Court from acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.
L-51928
Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken
Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T.C. Acero to annul the sale of
Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C
Acero, allegedly on the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been
sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as
counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred
by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.
Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio
Puyat, et als. Hon. Sixto T.J. de Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately.
And since the issue involved is on all fours with L-53869, the Court opted to resolve
Case No. L-51928 jointly with L-53869 instead of with L-51122 as originally directed.
The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang
Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can
appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any
Assemblyman from appearing as counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with
appellate jurisdiction", and the "similar" provision of Section 17, Article VI, of the 1935
Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads:
... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as
counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate
jurisdiction.

A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation
now comprehends all members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined
to members of the Commissions on Appointments, a body not provided for under the
1973 Constitution.
Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national
plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, Section 11 now reads:
SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate jurisdiction, ...
The term 'collegiate" remains deleted , and the terminology is now "Court without
appellate jurisdiction."
Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be
resolved under the amended provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general
rule, the provisions of a new Constitution take effect immediately and become operative
on pending litigation." 1
Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as
counsel" "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction.
"Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction". 2
"Counsel" means "an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or
management of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at law; a lawyer
appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public
officer, or public body". 3 Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is "counselor, an
attorney at law; one or more attorneys representing parties in an action". 4 Thus,
"appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal
advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of
another. This is the common, popular connotation of this word which the Constitution
must have adopted. In one case, 5 in resolving the question of what constitutes
'appearance as an advocate," the Court held that "advocate" the Court held that
"advocate" means one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or judicial
court, a counselor.
Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman
Valentino L. Legaspi, in preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil
Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, appears as
their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for
Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XXI. They represent and plead the cause of another before a Court of justice.
The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman
Legaspi and Fernandez, respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with
appellate jurisdiction?

There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is
that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a case already instituted and does not
create that cause 6 Or, that it necessarily implies that the subject-matter has been
instated in and acted upon by some other court whose judgment or proceedings are to
be reviewed. 7 In an early Philippine case, 8 it was held to mean jurisdiction to review
the judgment of an inferior court. And, that it calls for and demands previous legitimate
jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9
By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However,
under the same statute, their jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original
and (b) appellate. 11 They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and
Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by
Municipal judges of provincial capatals or City Judges pursuants to the authority granted
under the last paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act. 12
It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by
the deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both the original and amended
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is
that Courts of First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the
previous prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts with appellate jurisdiction from
decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated otherwise, under the
amended proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.
It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took
cognizance of the suits in the exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate
jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi are still prohibited from
appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.
It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality".
Depending on the case before it, said Courts can be either of appellate or original
jurisdiction. The question then to be resolved is whether or not Assemblymen can
appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance in cases originally filed with them.
We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision,
appearance by legislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases
wherein said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored
principle that whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution,
whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed implied and
intended in the provision itself. 14
It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided
that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before
any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear
that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before
any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear

that members of the Commission on Appointments could not appear before Courts of
First Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the framers was "appellate jurisdiction" more
than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the scope of the
prohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were
barred from "appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction."
Consistently, the principal criterion is "appellate jurisdiction." So that, when a legislator
appears in an original case filed with a Court with "appellate jurisdiction."
Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of
lawyers in the legislature. 15 Their office has always favored them with the influence and
prestige that it carried. Today, as before, it is only "appellate practice" that is allowed
with the significant difference that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This
so because with the removal of the legislative power to review appointments the source
of power and influence that members of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the
exercise of the legal profession has been greatly minimized.
This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because
the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is
intended. 16 In fact, the original emandement proposed by Antonio V. Raquiza, Delegate
of the First District, Ilocos Norte, in Resolution No. 345 entitled "Prohibiting Members of
the National Assembly to Use Their Office As a Means of Promoting Sel-Interest"
was to bar a National Assembly member from appearing as counsel before any Court.
In the "Whereas" clauses, that proposal was believed to be an "improvement" over
Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution and the purpose of the proposed
amendement was explained as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or
administrative cases where a legislator cannot appear. In our proposal he
is absolutely barred because it is feared that the practice of his profession
will interfere with the performance of his duties or that because the power
of his office might influence the administration of justice.
... (Emphasis supplied) 17
The co-author of Resolution No. 345. Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone
District of Isabela, and Floor Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated
further on the purpose behind the prohibition when he wrote in his Position Paper that
'The prohibition against appearing as counsel is necessary because of the under
influence which members of Congress enjoy when they practice before the Courts and
especially before administrative agencies. It is an accepted fat that our legislature is
composed of a predominance of practicing lawyers, and who are therefor expected to
be naturally not averse to exerting all influence that they can muster in the pursuit of
their profession." Continuing, he said: "The inability to practice as counsel ... should be
part of the sacrifices entailed in running for the position of lawmaker. 18 The

amendement proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O. Catan, Jr. of Negros Oriental even

went further: "No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office,
appear as counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative body ..." 19
Delegate Emerito M. Salva from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own
amendment, thus:
Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of
office, practice directly or indirectly any occupation or profession or be
allowed to engage directly or indirectly in any trade, business, or industry.
20

and explained:
10.2. Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the
assemblymen should render full-time service to the national. He pointed
out that they should be barred from the practice of their respective
professions since they would reasonably be compensated for devoting
their time to the work of the National Assembly. 21
While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did
not carry the several amendments proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment
prevailing at the 1971 Constitutional Conventional, and reinforce the condition that
appearance as counsel by Assemblymen was meant to be confined to appellate
practice and not unlimited practice before Courts of First Instance. That sentiment has
been carried over the amendment ratified in the April, 1981 plebiscite. For, there is no
substantial difference between "Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction" (the
original 1973 provision) and "Court without appellate jurisdiction' (the amended
provision).
The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of
undue influence upon the administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office
for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus preserve the independence of
the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a signed Judge of the
Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the
latter Court acts in the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper
hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his office possesses is
more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases because
the decision or resolution appealed from the latter situation has already a presumption
not only of regularity but also of correctness in its favor.
In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason,
justice and public interest.
The limited application to "appellate practice" is a view-point favored by constitutionalist
of eminence, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution
of the Philippine, 22 where he said:

It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal

case, but he cannot do so before any administrative body. Also, while it is
only appellate practice that is allowed a member of the National Assembly,
formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a Senator or Representative
who was in the Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the
present Constitution. Those differences should be noted (Emphasis
supplied) 23
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the
Constitutional prohibition, thus:
... The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a
sentiment shared by the last Constitutional Convention, because of the
widespread belief that legislators found it difficult to resist, as perhaps
most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the purpose was and is
to stress the fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the
maxim that a public office is a public trust. ... 24
Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and
Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not
appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said
Courts in the two cases involved herein.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set
aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby declared
prohibited from appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch II, in Civil Case No. r-18857, respectively. The Restraining Order issued
heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.
No costs in either case.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 16 Am Jur., 2d. p. 219 citing Cassard v. Tracy, 52 la Ann 835, 27 So
368.

2 Pacilio vs. Scarpati, 300 N.Y.S. 473, 478.

3 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1966, p. 518.
4 Third Edition, 1969, p. 278.
5 Haverty Furniture Co. vs. Fausta, 124 S.N. 2d 694, 697.
6 Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175, 2 L. Ed. 60; In re Constitutionality
of House Bill No. 222, 90 SW2d 692, 293.
7 Ex parte Evans, 52 S.E. 419, 420.
8 U.s. vs. Atienza, 1 Phil. 737 (1903).
14 Black, on Interpretation of laws, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 29.
15 "Legislative Department, " (U.P. Law Center Constitutional Revision
Project, 1970) p. 297.
16 Marcos and Concordia vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 246, 248 citing
11 Am. Jur. 680-682.
17 "Committee Reports, Vol. 33 Committee on Legis, Power, Part I, as
compiled by the National Library."
18 "Speeches and Positions Papers, V.6; Hermoso-Oliverso: Compiled by
National Library, 1976.
19 Prop. Amend. No. 69 to CC/C Legis. Power Rep. 03/4-6-72; Date
Submitted: 7-14-72; 5:31 P.M.
20 Prop. Amend. No 127 to CC/C Legis. Power/Rep. 03/4-6-72; Date
Submitted: 8-28-72; 2:50 p.m.
21 Minutes, October 11, 1972 p. 4.
23 Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution ratified in
a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981 "no member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall appear as counsel ... before any court ... in any original
case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office, ...". (Emphasis supplied).
24 Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, p. 205, Second Edition.

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ and ENRIQUEZ,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Julio
D.
Enriquez,
Sr.
for
petitioner.
Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June
1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and
control over all territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served
by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the
boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served
by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On
19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127
providing, among others, for the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of
all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions,
liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all government-owned waterworks
and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts (51 Off.
Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and
passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present
administration not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No.
1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No.
152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on
the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and
prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of
Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from
exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality, (Annex B). On 2 May
1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality
of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or
proceedings in court to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage
the services of a special counsel, and appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to
the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its contemplated action
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the
Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No.

201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the
municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and
conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to
and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500
and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the
hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become
final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for
judgment to the appellate court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and
necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial and appellate courts including
court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and witnesses and cost of
transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June
1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil
No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the
terms and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16
July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the
petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40
paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee.
Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer
forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for
pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for
initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the
Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not disqualified to handle and
prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had no
authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the
refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On
15 August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11
September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under
section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed
this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. When the council is desirous
of securing a legal opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the
constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall frame such question in
writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.
SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions.
The provincial fiscal shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its
officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and council of the various
municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so
requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any
such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation.
The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal

district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the
Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal
district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the
province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and
counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality
in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the
municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial
Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of
the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1
and when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was
of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore, would not
be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not
justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or
prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions
enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for
inhibition or disqualification.3 And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline
employment,4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided
for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well
and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which
he is about to enter. . . ."5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in
place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant
to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner claims that the municipal
council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision over the
Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority in the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and
direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and
absurd position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is
untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No.
94, series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off.
Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the
Government Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano
vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from
control as follows:
. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to

fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from
requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without
authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for
payment of attorney's fees. The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

See Reyes vs. Cornista, 92 Phil., 838; 49 Off. Gaz. 931; Municipality of Bocaue and
Province of Bulacan vs. Manotok, 93 Phil., 173.
2

Section 13, Rule 115 and Section 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

Cf. Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil., 7337; People vs. Lopez, 78 Phil., 286.

Canon No. 31 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Section 23, Revised Administrative Code.

G.R. No. L-42992

August 8, 1935

FELIPE
SALCEDO,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO
HERNANDEZ,
respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner, has not
been acted upon to date, for the reason that the question whether or not the decision which has
already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the first assignment of error relied

upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for which purpose the case was set
for hearing on August 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads
as follows:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an
outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the
means within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which
has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter
of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has
a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of
each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to
state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
"sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.
When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten
days for that purpose. In this answer attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from regretting having
employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them several times
contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to
tell the truth.
The phrases:
. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls . . . .
. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a
right to do, the judicial outrage . . . .
and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes
of "sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice",
disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the
court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with
no less than having proceed in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of
the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the
rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and
mocking from which the words "outrage" and "mockery" used therein are derived, mean
exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages
132 and 513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for
many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason
and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a
serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions
submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the
course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will
resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the
intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the
part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the
sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration
of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark
called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him
to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees
the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of Legal
Ethics, which reads as follows:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to
receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is
proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but not otherwise,
such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected.
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the
court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need
no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions
and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability
(13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the
facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed
and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention
constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court
is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and, reiterating what
this court said on another occasion that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts
in order that there be due administration of justice (In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944), and so that the
institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail in their mission, said
attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded,
and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing
the phrases which as has been stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de
oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was declared that
"The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct",
until the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood for the fullest expression of freedom of
speech. I stand for the application of that basic principle now.

The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such is found
in a second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out of which arise
more bitter feelings than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous language, in fact vigorous
and convincing enough to induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is hardly necessary
to add that that action was taken entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion here
judicially penalized.
Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is
directed to words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the growth of
Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by side
with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case of Garchitorena vs. Crescini
and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be noted. One came
from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came from a judge and is accepted.
The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the respondent.
Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the
part of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by intimidation will justify not alone
punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone believe that the action taken in
this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such methods? Judges are of
sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every wind.1avvphil.et
The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a hostile
court. He owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case is lost, which he
thinks should have been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do well charitably
to overlook professional improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at losing a case.
So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to
offer a few corroborative authorities.
Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in
the subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said: "No class of the
community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. ... To say that an attorney
can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of
his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to
attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present
system." (Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently was
elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the former capacity, in sustaining a
contempt of court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again, that a judge will generally and
wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it
with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides
against another; and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The
disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than
bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge,

therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak
of disappointment. A second thought will generally make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and
the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am.
Rep., 747.)
The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently the
leader of progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a famous
case, he said: "When it considered how contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for the
same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive, may involve
strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the necessities of the case 'to
insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the
evidence in the case anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still
less can I find there anything that obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I
possibly can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U.S.,
402.)
In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the Supreme
Court had decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-General Wood, out
of friendship for Cailles, had invited members of the court to Malacaang previous to
formulating the decision, and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a banquet.
The proceedings for contempt initiated against the respondent by the Attorney-General were
halted by the court. In he opinion it was said: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a
moment that memory of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright
of judicial integrity for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also,
that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of
the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone
even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with
scrupulous care. The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human sensitiveness
to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial character may induce too drastic action. It may
result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. Respect for
the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than
by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent
thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court,
high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language
soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect and
consideration which he has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and that the
language of the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity of
the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion constitutes contempt
of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal of wrong
intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a member of the bar of long and honorable

standing with this blemish. With due deference to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly
dissent therefrom.
Vickers, J., concurs.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District
Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply
Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He
wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate
the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract
void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on
record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action
before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore
no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words,
"Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, VicePresident, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio
in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal
Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop
deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa
& Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD
26."i[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1.
"Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2.

"Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3.

"Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4.
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.ii[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"iii[3] in which he questioned the authority of
Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to
"a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only
"the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also
"a scion of a Royal Family **."iv[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,v[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he
might comment thereon.vi[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and
within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by
falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.vii[7] He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any
abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by
the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);viii[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of
an honest mistake.ix[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."x[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend.xi[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that
she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;xii[12]
He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return
it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection
with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents
as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.xiii[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December
15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.xiv[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1)
Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2)
Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3)
Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4)
Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against **
(his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense
of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who
had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.xv[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.xvi[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and
employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."xvii[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."xviii[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy,
or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The
law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."xix[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and
an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.xx[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that
he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held
conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts.xxi[21] While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

SANTA
PANGAN,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

complainant

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and
March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of
respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on
respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch
VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case
No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one
"Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent
admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection
with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his
Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are
Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of

Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record
containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A
lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As
an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of
"truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should
characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the
court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to
the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
violated his solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of
the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to
deception or permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by
which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect
resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The
circumstance that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a
more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of
this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as
possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted
by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED
Barredo, (Chairman), Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Santos, is on leave.

#Footnotes
1 Jessup Professional Ideals of the Lawyer 18, Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 116-120.
2 People v. Beattie, 137 111. 553, 31 Am. St. Rep. 384.
G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE
LAWYER'S
ASSOCIATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office,
respondent.
Arturo
A.
Alafriz
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for
June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members
of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director
has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in
good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in
the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in
violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the
prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit

the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the
respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of
the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who
practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so
by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been
holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to
practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned
formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may
practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in

litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare
of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices
(Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.
I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent
cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use
and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to
be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal
principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of
evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention
shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any
printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for
more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the
right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the
grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation,
under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide
for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in
case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the
patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or
if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the
condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or working of the
patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the
Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary
to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal

principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions
of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts,
the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any
other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent
Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly
technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to
a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is
not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts
of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the
legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a
patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior
public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable
to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed
to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of
course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members
of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the
preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an
invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application
for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons
desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are
already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned

after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled.
He invites our attention to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents
are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution
of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these
rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before
any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States
who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of
attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and
shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine
whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the
qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an
examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in
the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as
follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of
such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in
good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and
assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications
or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and

opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case
from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be
incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply
with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter,
deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The
reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or
so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under
such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the
provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations
requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination.
We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the
United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the
qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by
the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention
has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to
determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe
forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious
and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws
relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937,
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of
Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules
and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in
and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law
giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination
prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be
no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures,
confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first
pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by
this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or
tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City1[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four
(4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime
in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot
a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate
of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine
Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant
then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced
herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she
has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her
and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought
things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her
husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and
complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her
husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August
11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,2[2] respondent
averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during
one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact

1[1]

Records, Vol. I, p. 5.

2[2]

Records, Vol III, p. 8.

got married in Hawaii, USA in 19853[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not
live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to
know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only
return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties.
During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised
when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in
March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported
to work with the law firm5[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented
herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos
Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they
were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui
never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which
belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built
exclusively from her parents funds.6[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought
moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment
case against respondent.
In her Reply7[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent
knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her
even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also
charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same

3[3]

Records, Vol. III, p. 17.

4[4]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 10-11.

5[5]

Rilloraza Africa De Ocampo & Africa Law Offices.

6[6]

Records, Vol. III, p. 12.

7[7]

Records, Vol. III, p. 26.

was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the
"illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the
complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part
of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in
1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of
1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established
by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima
facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of
husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof
of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause
for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a
statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs.
Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of
their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing
conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed 9[9] on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

8[8]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 71, 73-74.

9[9]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a
Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10[10] wherein she charged
respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she
was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11[11] duly certified by
the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos
Ui was within the wedlock.12[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 18313[13] and 18414[14] of the Revised Penal Code,
and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative
of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),15[15] respondent
averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the
same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she

10[10]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 113-117.

11[11]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.

12[12]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 114-115.

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation.-The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
13[13]

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the
respective penalties provided therein.
Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence.- Any person who shall knowingly offer in
evidence a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as
guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section.
14[14]

15[15]

Records, Vol. III, p. 133.

relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16[16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone
issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she
deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint
should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.17[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim
in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already
married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties
with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the
civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her,
and he was so open in his courtship.18[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer
had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got
married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier
marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui
who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to
rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent
with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a
picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,19[19] does not prove that she
16[16]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 265 287.

17[17]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 275, 281.

18[18]

Records, p. 278 citing TSN dated January 22, 1993, p. 52.

19[19]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 52, 54-56.

acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The
pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by
Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the
offense charged 20[20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice
21[21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act
because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered
the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered
as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love
with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true
civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22[22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in
the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because
they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.23[23] It
was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986,
would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.
Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum 24[24], respondent stated that complainant
miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists
that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her
mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was
made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted
its Report and Recommendation, finding that:

20[20]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 71 74.

Resolution No. 030, Series of 1992 of the Department of Justice dated December 18, 1991,
Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.
21[21]

22[22]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 289 300.

23[23]

Records, Vol. III, p. 296.

24[24]

Records, Vol. III, pp. 317 321.

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by
Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission
does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary
human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents
himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another
woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature,
single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true
civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988).
She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines
in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr.
Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the
children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act
on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion
rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her
chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege

that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law
are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.25[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good
moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the
bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
disbarment.

25[25]

Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, (1985)

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,

flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959).26[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos
Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they
got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon
her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent
are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms
of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today
is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social
responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts
of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in
such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement
with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to
ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui
had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted
the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also,
despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first
child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents
allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community.27[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to

26[26]

Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591, 594 (1981)

27[27]

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 454, 464(1998)

constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high

degree.28[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."29[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui
upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After
all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.30[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely
relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui.
For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall
the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a
lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it
is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts
and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,
for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673 citing Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court;
Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil.
587, 591-593; Royong vs. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April
29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440,
444-445)
28[28]

29[29]

Ibid.

30[30]

Ibid.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a

photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 598

March 28, 1969

AURORA
SORIANO
vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.
Vicente
E.
Aragona,
Jr.
Office of the Solicitor General for the Government.

DELES,

in

his

complainant,

own

behalf.

CASTRO, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a verified lettercomplaint of Aurora Soriano Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the
former with having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a motion
filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which allegedly caused her great
mental, torture and moral suffering.
On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the complaint. On
December 10, 1963 the respondent filed his answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in the
questioned motion, but claiming in his defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon
information received but also upon other matters of public record. He also averred that the
complainant had made a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to declare him in
contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was however dismissed together with the
complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that the complainant failed to
move for the reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that during the few
years that he has been a member of the bar, he has always comforted himself correctly, and has
adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the practice of law is a sacred trust in the interest of
truth.
This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation. Because both parties reside in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in
turn referred the case to the City Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and reception of evidence. Both
the petitioner and the respondent adduced evidence in the investigation which was conducted.

Thereafter, the City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of the investigation,
including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal who personally conducted the
investigation that the petition for disbarment be dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed
with this Court his report, concurring in the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal.
Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of the
intestate estate of the late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano,
Sr. who are heirs of the estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in special proceeding 128 of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and above the opposition of
the complainant, the intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of
the estate by the complainant to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as
lessee of the said land. In effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers
Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being tenanted by them upon authority
of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.
In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of the
landholdings by placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect
their rights, countered by filing against a the complainant two petitions with the Court of
Agrarian relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian court), docketed therein as
C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They alleged in their
respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of
riceland located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of
the intestate estate of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow their
leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start of the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on
March 7, 1962, the respondent [complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow
the plowed land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners. Consequently, they
prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her
representatives from interfering with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending
determination of the merits of their petitions. However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer
for the issuance of an interlocutory order of injunction pendente lite was considerably delayed
not only by reason of several postponements granted at the behest of the complainant but also
because of the assurance made by her through counsel in open court at the hearing of June 16,
1962, that neither she nor any of her men would disturb or interfere with the petitioner's
possession of their leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.
But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing, the complainant's men
again entered the land in question and planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the
Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr.
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on June 20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no objection by the complainant against the said
motion, and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the
interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and
in her behalf to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners
in their respective landholdings."

On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in Sara,
Iloilo, served copies of the order on the complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos
Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers to the possession of their landholdings. On the same
day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the complainant, about the said
order.lawphi1.et
For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the
palay planted on the land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.
Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a
telegram 2 which reads as follows:
BALASAN OCT 2 62
GILDA ACOLADO
ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY
TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT
HARVEST TODAY....
MAMANG
The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda
Acolado, their daughter.
After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was
coming to Iloilo City; when informed that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs.
Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went to see
the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had sent the telegram upon request of
the Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the
complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the
palay thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why the said Albert
and his armed companions harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of
the complainant; and that instead of filing a complaint with the chief of police as she originally
planned, she decided instead to see the respondent without delay.
Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the
agrarian court, on October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in
Contempt of Court" (hereinafter referred to as motion for contempt), praying that the
complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for, contempt of court for
violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very
same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out from the,
records claiming that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it was the respondent who
should be punished for contempt for deliberately misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not
content with this reply and countermotion for contempt the complainant also lodged on October

4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent with the City Fiscal of Iloilo, based
on the same allegedly libelous allegations made against her by the respondent in the latter's
motion for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarily investigating the said
complaint, the assistant city fiscal to whom it was assigned dismissed the same on the ground
that the allegations of the motion for contempt were privileged communications. The
complainant did not appeal from the, said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither did she elevate the
same for review to the Department of Justice.
Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for
contempt filed by the respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's
countermotion, also for contempt, against the formal instead, by order dated October 24, 1963,
the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the complainant's
counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao
brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with it the dismissed of
all incidents therein, including the motion for contempt and counter-motion for contempt. Again,
the complainant did not ask for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal
therefrom. She filed instead the present administrative complaint against the respondent.
The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, Atty.
Vicente E. Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under
oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and
1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains false and libelous imputations injurious to the honor of the
complainant.
For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto.
COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of the above-entitled
cases, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states that:
1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this
Honorable Court issued an interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of
which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an interlocutory order is hereby
issued ordering the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her
behalf, to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the
petitioners in their respective landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc Balasan
Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each of them, in these two cases, pending the
bearing of these cases on the merits.
The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC
Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby
ordered to implement this order and to report to this Court his proceedings in this
particular within a week from the date of his implementation of this order.

SO
ORDERED.
Iloilo
City,
(SGD.)
JUAN
Commissioner

June

21,

1962.
TERUEL

C.

2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC Company
stationed at Sara, Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings
in question and to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of
petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of said Commanding Officer is
now on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;
3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram from the
petitioners, through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached as Annex "A"
and made part hereof, informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a certain Albert,
with the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay of the petitioners yesterday despite the
vehement opposition of the petitioners not to enter their landholdings;
4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the petitioners,
knowing fully well the existence and implementation of the interlocutory order of this
Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross and open defiance and disobedience of said order
and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of this Court in the peaceful
administration of justice;
5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the
authority of this Court constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of court;
6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court and duly
punished, the lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery
and rendered useless by the stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
respondent and her armed goons be declared and punished for contempt of Court until
such time that she turns over the produce of the landholdings in question which she
harvested illegally and until such time that she fully complies with the interlocutory order
of this Court.
Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.
Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.
E.
I.
Counsel
Lopez
Iloilo City
By:

Soriano

Jr.

and

for
Bros.

V.

E.

the
Bldg.,

Iznart

Aragona
Petitioners
Street

(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.

The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in Balasan
but in Iloilo City where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after which she
left for her home which is situated also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan and Iloilo
City is 135 kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo City one has to travel four hours by car
or six hours by bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert, mentioned in the motion, is
Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed on the lands
involved in the C.A.R. cases she never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes from the time she was
informed of the interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October 2,
1962 when the said Alberto Boneta and several armed men allegedly harvested the crops on the
lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited
the aforesaid lands in 1962. Her uncontradicted testimony lends credence to her claim that she
did not order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the Aglinao
brothers' landholdings.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the
questioned motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the
respondent.
In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged that
is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same
are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And
that, in view of this, the person who makes them such as a judge, lawyer, or witness
does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or
an action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for
contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254
and 1255 besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases,
they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.
To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned
pleading lack sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not strengthen the
complainant's position. "The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the
utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact, "Even when the statements are
found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made
in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual .... The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms
.... A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law
throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides." 5

Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the
interests of his clients. For, contrary to the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely
merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for contempt.
According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram on
October 2, 1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was coming
to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True enough Mrs.
Soriano saw the respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was
personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed
men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers and, against the objections of the latter,
harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her inquiry, she was informed that they were
acting upon orders of the complainant.
Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent to file the questioned
motion for contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have
actually witnessed the incident in question, coupled with the complainants own admission that
the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants
whom she had illegally placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers, it was not
unseemly for the respondent to assume that Albert did act at the behest of the complainant. After
all, the complainant had, in the past, committed the same forcible act of entering the said
landholdings on June 18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the agrarian court that she
would not disturb or interfere with the Aglinao brothers' possession, pending final resolution of
the petitions filed by them against her. In truth it is precisely such forcible entry into the said
lands that precipitated the issuance of the very interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 which the
respondent accused her of disobeying in his motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the
aforenarrated circumstances provided the respondent a probable cause for belief in the
truthfulness of the allegations which he couched in rather intemperate language in his motion for
contempt. He had merely acted in righteous indignation over the wrong supposedly done to his
aggrieved clients believing as he did in the truth of his charges without deliberate intention
whatsoever to malign and villify the complainant.
The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been
distilled from wisdom and experience. "The privilege is not intended so much for the protection
of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the
promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages." 6 Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in
the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients they may be pardoned
some infelicities of language. 7
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself,
as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar. 8 Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought always to be exercised

with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 9
In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to
continue in the practice of law and remain an officer of the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

Admitted to the Bar in 1960.

Exhibit 5.

L-23908, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 555, 558.

Sison vs. David, L-11268, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60.

U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743.

People vs. Aquino, supra; Sison vs. David, supra quoting 33 Am. Jur. 123-124.

Dorado vs. Pilar, 104 Phil. 743, 748.

In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 70; 5 Am. Jur.
411; see also Re Caughan, 24 ALR 858, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P 353; Re Rotchrock, 131
ALR 226, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 160 P2d 907; Re Keenan, 996 ALR 679, 287 Mass. 577, 192
NE 65; Re Kerl, 8 ALR 1259, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P 40.
9

Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S Ct 569; 27 L Ed 552.

A.C. No. 492

September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA
BLANZA
and
vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

MARIA

PASION,

complainants,

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that

way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims
in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they
handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers.
But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of
their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent
refused to surrender them.
Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received
the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for photostating purposes only. His
failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him the
money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents
from the photostat service. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned
over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the photostat service
receipt to the fiscal.
Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants
nothing for his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the former's exoneration, or at most, that he
be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a
severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension claims for six
years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him,
and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel,
appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing
therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative
case.1
Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims since
there was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent, however, overlooks
the fact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover
fees.2 But having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend
to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary
action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating
the accusations against him.3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has
not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted4 that respondent asked
them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor.
Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during the
fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. And the condition of the
photostats themselves they appear to have been in existence for quite some time5 supports
respondent's allegation that they remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure of
the owners (respondents and/or complainants), to withdraw the same upon payment of the

corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing
their respective claims.1awphl.nt
As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the
former denies this. Fiscal Raa made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza
pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound to
respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in
the hearing set for October 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of record
appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally
insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer
has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal
technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in
this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal
standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their
pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated
their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted
that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the
high standards of his chosen profession require of him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

See Annex "A" of respondent's memorandum.

7 C.J.S. 1018.

See In re Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191.

Records, pp. 15, 18.

See Records, pp. 25-34.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO,

respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for
allegedly notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary
public had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latters failure to
honor SPACs Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor
G. Simpliciano was the latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly
commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications[1] issued by the Clerk of Court of
Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the
following documents, viz:
1. Verification[2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC,
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February
18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to defendants
Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiffs
Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002;
2. Affidavits of Merit[3] signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in
par. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as
alleged Notary Public in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;
3. The Affidavit of Service[4] signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged Notary Public in
Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the pleading mentioned in
Par. 1 hereof;
4. The Affidavit of Service[5] of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as Notary
Public. This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants Motion (1) For
Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow defendants
to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002.
5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[6] signed this time by a
certain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, notarized on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson
Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Forum

Shopping was attached to defendants Motion For Extension of Time To File

Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;
6. The Affidavit of Service[7] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal
Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before
Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as Notary Public on 16 August 2002. This
Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan was also attached to that Motion For
Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;
7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[8] executed by one Celso N.
Sarto, alleged Executive Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC
and notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002,
attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court
of Appeals; and
8. Affidavit of Service[9] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of
Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged Notary Public for
Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002.
On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty.
Simpliciano to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order.[10]
On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion[11] for extension of time to file
answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion[12] to resolve the complaint after the extension
requested by respondent ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May
2003, with no comment or pleading filed by respondent.
On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order,[13] giving respondent a last
chance to file his answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent failed to do so.
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation[14] dated 12
February 2004, pertinent portions of which read:
A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that
respondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his
commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed and
executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose commission expires
December 31, 2002.
All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondents alleged notarial
book which reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that
as per records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary public for
and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003
showed that as per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary public
for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and
2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.
It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents,
he was not commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for
having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public
without having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the
legal profession.
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of
respondents commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present
and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof
furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation
should this recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of the Board of
Governors.[15]
Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a
suspension of six (6) months.[16]
We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano
did not have a commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as
evidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002.[17] Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP
Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized a total of
590 documents.[18] The evidence presented by complainant conclusively establishes the
misconduct imputed to respondent.
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of
affidavits of merit, certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of
service, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in
Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondents petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any
evidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted,
but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent
a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut
complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of
interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can

only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty.
Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[19] Membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only
during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish an attorney.[20] Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v.
Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and
trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession.[22]
Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.[23]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from
imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties.[24]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere
casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but
also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.[25] For such reprehensible conduct, the
Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the
notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.[26]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a
document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or

commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents
with an expired commission:
1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such
as the extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and
four (4) deeds of absolute sale - all involving unregistered lands, after his commission
as Notary Public expired;
2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only
one (1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.
3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he
notarized an absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the
same time, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he
entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor of
a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What
aggravated respondents unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction
involved was in favor of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore,
a minor.
4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he
notarized five (5) documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit,
supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as
Notary Public expired.
Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary
public and as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board
of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be barred from being
commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro, which the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As
modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED

PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
Administrator as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ.,
concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

[1] Rollo, p. 78.

[2] Rollo, pp. 15-24.
[3] Rollo, pp. 25-27.
[4] Rollo, p. 28.
[5] Rollo, p. 37.
[6] Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[7] Rollo, p. 45.
[8] Rollo, p. 75.
[9] Rollo, p. 77.
[10] Rollo, p. 82.
[11] Rollo, pp. 83-86
[12] Rollo, pp. 88-89.
[13] Rollo, p. 92.
[14] Rollo, pp. 96-102.

[15] Rollo, pp. 100-102.

[16] Rollo, p. 95.
[17] Rollo, pp. 78-80.
[18] Rollo, p. 101.
[19] Bongalonta v. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176, 20 January 1995, 240 SCRA 310.
[20] Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1.
[21] A.C. No. 4539, 14 May 1997, 272 SCRA 408.
[22] Id. at 413.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.; Arrieta v. Llosa, A.C. No. 4369, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 248, cited in Nunga
v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 30 April 1999, 306 SCRA 487.
[25] Buensuceso v. Barrera, A.C. No. 3727, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 309, 312.
[26] Heinz R. Heck v. Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de
Oro City, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004.
[27] Supra.
[28] A.C. No. 546, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1267.
[29] A.C. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114.
[30] Supra.
[31] Supra.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,

Complainant,

A.C. No. 8390

[Formerly CBD 06-1641]

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,

On leave.

PEREZ, and
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO,

MENDOZA, JJ.

Respondent.
Promulgated:

July 2, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint31[1] dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego S.
31[1]

Rollo, pp. 1-2.

Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the
loan application of Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan
obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1,
2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.32[2] However, upon presentation at the bank for payment on
its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of the
instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the
whole amount of her obligation.

Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerios arraignment was scheduled for August
31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due notice.33[3] Subsequently, a Warrant of
Arrest34[4] was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004, complainant
sent a letter35[5] to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest
against her and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said
letter was received by Atty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return cards.36[6]
Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to abide.

On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any
32[2]

Id. at 5.

33[3]

Id. at 6.

34[4]

Id. at 7.

35[5]

Id. at 8.

36[6]

Id. at 9.

responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter37[7] dated March 16, 2006, respondents mother,
Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs.
Valerio undertook to personally settle her daughters obligation.

On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the
mandatory conference. Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in an
Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No
position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct.

The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerios
mother, in view of the latters failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the
truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued the same. The IBP-CBD, further,
pointed out that Atty. Valerios failure to obey court processes, more particularly her failure to
appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the Court despite the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit
to be a member of the bar.38[8]

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

37[7]

Id. at 11-12.

38[8]

Id.

Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the Court,
in a Resolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a
duly notarized medical certificate issued by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of
medical records to support the claim of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valerio within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice39[9] to comply
with the said Resolution, no medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court
by either respondent and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,40[10] we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial
system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society,
to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of
financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

39[9]

The Resolution dated December 15, 2009 was received on January 6, 2010.

40[10] 480 Phil. 661, 671 (2004).

Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of

the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite
respondents failure to cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the
filing of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerios act of making partial payments of the loan and
interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation to pay on her part. Respondents
mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughters obligation.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerios justification that her daughter,
Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her
from properly answering the complaint against her. Indeed, we cannot take the medical
certificate on its face, considering Mrs. Valerios failure to prove the contents of the certificate or
present the physician who issued it.

Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of
serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to
attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the court
as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her
arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes
upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has
failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Ngayan v. Tugade,41[11] we ruled that [a lawyers] failure to answer the complaint

against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to
lawful orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of
Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,42[12] we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the
respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,43[13] having found guilty of gross misconduct for
issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted to him
by the complainant.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBPCBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years,44[14]
because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown
wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings.

41[11] A.C. No. 2490, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 779, 784.
42[12] 453 Phil. 115, 121, citing Co v. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 (1998).
43[13] 486 Phil. 8 (2004).
44[14] Wong v. Atty. Moya, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP,
which found respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She is hereby
SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

'Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996

Annexes F and G, id.

Annex C-2, id.

Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office
and the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
i[1]

ii[2]

Resolution dated March 25, 1996

iii[3]

Dated April 19, 1996.

iv[4]

Rollo at p. 23.

Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or
communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3)
Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or
his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in said notices.
v[5]

vi[6]

Dated April 22, 1996

vii[7]

Rollo at p. 28.

viii[8]

Id. at p. 60.

ix[9]

Id. at p. 32.

x[10]

Id. at p. 34.

xi[11]

Id. at p. 35, et seq.

xii[12]

Id. at p. 35.

xiii[13]

Id.

xiv[14]

See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

xv[15]

SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

xvi[16]

Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275

RA. No. 6713, Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine
not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1)
year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the
appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
xvii[17]

Apaga v. Ponce. 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo. Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491;
Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377;
Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272,
275
xviii[18]

xix[19]

ART. 19, Civil Code

Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by
analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).
xx[20]

Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled
"Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;" SEE Rule
138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court
xxi[21]

EN BANC

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

B.M. No. 1222

x ---------------------------------------- x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN,

Petitioner,

Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,*
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta, and
Bersamin, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 24, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a
member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.xxi[1]

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the
dispositive portion of which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating

Committee, hereby resolves to

(1)
DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective
upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos &
Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar
examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified
petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed
them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of
petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of
the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his fathers
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon
himself the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his
exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects
benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in

Political Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law

school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of
the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the
conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar
examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader,

petitioner still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic
Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered

government service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of Taguig
City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the
Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a
lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he
continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeos.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioners flourishing career

was cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged
involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid
the rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was
taken as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
member of the Secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next
five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which

unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne
from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation conducted
and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest
apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the
unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the
said humbling experience to make him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following

testimonials and endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his
good moral character:

1)

Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, Resolution Expressing Full Support

to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency,
Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of
the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes dated 4 June 2007 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

2)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang

Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast
Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the
Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA),
Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;

3)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang

Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang
Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa

Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the
Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan,
City of Taguig;

4)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang

Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan
ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng
Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita
(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana,
City of Taguig;

5)

An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of

Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and
his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar dated 8 June 2007 of
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law
Offices;

6)

Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De

Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion
dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest,
Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7)

Testimonial Letter dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata,

President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far
Eastern University (FEU);

8)

Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang

Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang
Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga

Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig

Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9)

Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, A Resolution Recognizing the

Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the Peoples Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and
Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes
dated 11 July 2008 of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);

10)

A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion

in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R.
Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian College Recoletos;

11)

An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and

Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F.
Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President,
General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower
Bicutan, Taguig City;

12)

Testimonial Letter dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz,

President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

13)

Testimonial Letter dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City;
and

14)

Testimonial Letter dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera,

former Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far
Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded
the same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future
may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario,
Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two
years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this
decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the
Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be
taken by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the
violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly
passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our
compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions

and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter
712), which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow

petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes
that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the
various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia

(Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty.
Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of
law for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt
that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of the
Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as
people of known probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already
manifested his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active
involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise,
even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a
debilitating circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance
to others in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioners strength of character
and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the

examination questions from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters knowledge and
consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in
Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do
believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action
ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has
sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise
for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred
for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said
commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the

instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of
petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now
commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioners five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume
practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem
petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension
from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct

offenders.xxi[2] While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose.xxi[3]

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty

of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse
of the disbarred lawyerxxi[4] and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar.xxi[5] For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment
gave him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the
exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the
court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his
professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for
reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has
regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the
judiciary.xxi[6]

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,xxi[7] we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot
close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the
petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of
disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. x x
x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of
his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards
public service, particularly with the Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his
peers in the community and other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty.
Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact
on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he
were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following stern warning:

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He
is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic.xxi[8]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency

and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN
from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE
OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice