FROM 1937 TILL INDEPENDENCE

INAUGURATION OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY;

CONGRESS MINISTRIES FORMED IN A MAJORITY OF
INDIAN PROVINCES : 1937
The Elections:
For five years, the Congress and government were locked in conflict and
negotiations until what became the Government of India Act of 1935 could be
hammered out. But by then, the rift between the Congress and the Muslim
League had become unbridgeable as each pointed the finger at the other
acrimoniously. The Muslim League disputed the claim by the Congress to
represent all people of India, while the Congress disputed the Muslim League's
claim to voice the aspirations of all Muslims.
The Government of India Act of 1935 was practically implemented in 1937. The
provincial elections were held in the winter of 1936-37. There were two major
political parties in the Sub-continent at that time, the Congress and the Muslim
League. Both parties did their best to persuade the masses before these
elections and put before them their manifesto. The political manifestos of both
parties were almost identical, although there were two major differences.
Congress stood for joint electorate and the League for separate electorates;
Congress wanted Hindi as official language with Deva Nagri script of writing while
the League wanted Urdu with Persian script.
According to the results of the elections, Congress, as the oldest, richest and
best-organized political party, emerged as the single largest representative in the
Legislative Assembles. Yet it failed to secure even 40 percent of the total number
of seats. Out of the 1,771 total seats in the 11 provinces, Congress was only able
to win slightly more then 750. Thus the results clearly disapproved Gandhi's claim
that Congress party represented 95 percent of the population of India. Its
success, moreover, was mainly confined to the Hindu constituencies. Out of the
491 Muslim seats, Congress captured 26. Muslim Leagues' condition was bad as
it could only win 106 Muslim seats. The party only managed to win two seats from
the Muslim majority province of Punjab.

The Congress majority:

The final results of the elections were declared in February 1937. The Indian
National Congress had a clear majority in Madras, Uttar Province, Central
Province, Bihar and Orrisa. It was also able to form a coalition government in
Bombay and Frontier Province Congress was also able to secure political
importance in Sindh and Assam, where they joined the ruling coalition. Thus
directly or indirectly, Congress was in power in nine out of eleven provinces. The
Unionist Party of Sir Fazl-i-Hussain and Praja Krishak Party of Maulvi Fazl-i-Haq
were able to form governments in Punjab and Bengal respectively, without the
interference of Congress. Muslim League failed to form government in any

province. Quaid-i-Azam offered Congress to form a coalition government with the

League but the Congress rejected his offer.
The Congress refused to set up its government until the British agreed to their
demand that the Governor would not use his powers in legislative affairs. Many
discussions took place between the Congress and the British Government and at
last the British Government consented, although it was only a verbal commitment
and no amendment was made in the Act of 1935. Eventually, after a four-month
delay, Congress formed their ministries in July 1937.
The Congress declared Hindi as the national language and Deva Nagri as the
official script. The Congress flag was given the status of national flag,
slaughtering of cows was prohibited and it was made compulsory for the children
to worship the picture of Gandhi at school. Vande-Mataram, from Bankim
Chandra Chatterji's novel Ananda Math, was made the national anthem of the
country.
To investigate Muslim grievances, the Muslim League formulated the "Pirpur
Report" under the chairmanship of Raja Syed Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur. Other
reports concerning Muslim grievances in Congress run provinces were A. K. Fazlul-Haq's "Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule", and "The Sharif Report".
The allegation that Congress was representing Hindus only was voiced also by
eminent British personalities. The Marquees of Lothian in April 1938 termed the
Congress rule as a "rising tide of Hindu rule". Sir William Barton writing in the
"National Review" in June 1939 also termed the Congress rule as "the rising tide
of political Hinduism".
At the outbreak of the World War II, the Viceroy proclaimed India's involvement
without prior consultations with the main political parties. When Congress
demanded an immediate transfer of power in return for cooperation of the war
efforts, the British government refused. As a result Congress resigned from
power.

Political deadlock in India as Congress ministries resign

: 1939
The Congress victory in the 1937 election and the consequent formation of
popular ministries changed the balance of power within the country vis-a-vis the
colonial authorities. The stage seemed to be set for another resurgence of the
nationalist movement. Just at this time, the Congress had to undergo a crisis at
the top an occurrence that plagued the Congress every few years.
Subhash Bose had been a unanimous choice as the President of the Congress in
1938. In 1939, he decided to stand again - this time as the spokesperson of
militant politics and radical groups. Putting forward his candidature on 21 January
1939, Bose said that he represented the 'new ideas, ideologies, problems and
programmes' that had emerged with 'the progressive sharpening of the antiimperialist struggle in India.' The presidential elections, he said, should be fought
among different candidates 'on the basis of definite problems and programmes.'
On 24 January, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, J.B. Kripalani and four other
members of the Congress Working Committee issued a counter statement,

declaring that the talk of ideologies, programmes and policies was irrelevant in
the elections of a Congress president since these were evolved by the various
Congress bodies such as the AICC and the Working Committee, and that the
position of the Congress President was like that of a constitutional head who
represented and symbolized the unity and solidarity of the nation. With the
blessings of Gandhiji, these and other leaders put up Pattabhi Sitaramayya as a
candidate for the post. Subhas Bose was elected on 29th January by 1580 votes
against 1377. Gandhiji declared that 'Pattabhi's defeat is my defeat'.
The line of propaganda adopted by Bose against Sardar Patel and the majority of
the top Congress leadership whom he branded as rightists. He openly accused
them of working for a compromise with the Government on the question of
federation. The Congress leaders, labeled as compromisers, resented such
charges and branded them as a slander. After Subhash's election, they felt that
they could not work with a President who had publicly cast aspersions on their
nationalist bonafides. Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign along with the other twelve
working committee members. He did not like the idea of confronting Bose
publicly. But he did not agree with Bose either.
Subhash Bose believed that the Congress was strong enough to launch an
immediate struggle and that the masses were ready for such struggle. He was
convinced, as he wrote later, 'that the country was internally more ripe for a
revolution than ever before and that the coming international crisis would give
India an opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which is rare in human
history.'
He, therefore, argued in his Presidential address in Tripuri for a programme of
immediately giving the British Government a six-months ultimatum to grant the
national demand of independence and of launching a mass civil disobedience
movement if it failed to do so. Gandhiji's perceptions were very different. The
internal strife reached its climax at the Tripuri session of the Congress, held from
8 to 12 March 1939. Bose had completely misjudged the faith of Congressmen.
They were not willing to reject Gandhiji's leadership or that of other older leaders
who decided to bring this home to Subhash.
Bose could see no other way but to resign from the Presidentship. Nehru tried to
mediate but to no avail. Bose could also not get the support of the Congress
Socialists and the Communists at Tripuri or after.
At the outbreak of the World War II, the Viceroy proclaimed India's involvement
without prior consultations with the main political parties. When Congress
demanded an immediate transfer of power in return for cooperation of the war
efforts, the British government refused. As a result Congress resigned from
power.

1942: Quit India Resolution Congress leaders arrested,

Subhash Chandra Bose forms Indian National Army :
1942

Cripps Mission
Cripps Mission was deputed by British parliament in early 1942 to contain the
political crisis obtained in India. The mission was headed by Sir Stafford Cripps, a
Cabinet Minister. Cripps, a radical member of the Labour Party and the then
Leader of the House of Commons, was known as a strong supporter of Indian
national movement. Cripps Mission was prompted by two considerations. First,
Gandhi's call for the Satyagraha (literally 'insistence on truth', generally rendered
'soul force') movement in October 1940 was designed to embarrass Britain's war
efforts by a mass upheaval in India and needed to be ended in the British
interest. Secondly, the fall of Singapore (15 February 1942), Rangoon (8 March),
and the Andamans (23 March) to the Japanese was threatening the entire fabric
of British colonial empire. In the face of these crises, the British felt obliged to
make some gestures to win over Indian public support.
The Cripps offer reiterated the intention of the British government to set up an
Indian Union within the British Commonwealth as soon as possible after the war,
and proposed specific steps towards that end. A constituent assembly would be
elected by the provincial legislatures acting as an Electoral College. This body
would then negotiate a treaty with the British government. The future right of
secession from the Commonwealth was explicitly stated. The Indian states would
be free to join, and in any case their treaty arrangements would be revised to
meet the new situation.
The offer dominated Indian politics for the rest of the war. Although the British
official circles claimed that the Cripps offer marked a great advance for its
frankness and precision, it was plagued throughout, and ultimately torpedoed, by
numerous ambiguities and misunderstandings. The Congress was very critical of
the clauses regarding nomination of the states' representatives by the rulers and
the provincial option Jawaharlal Nehru had desperately sought a settlement
largely because of his desire to mobilise Indian support in the anti-fascist war,
while most Congress working Committee members and Gandhi himself had been
apathetic. This embittered Congress-British relations, and things were then
rapidly moving towards a total confrontation in the form of quit india movement.
But Cripps blamed the Congress for the failure of the Plan, while the Congress
held the British government responsible for it. A chance of establishing a united
independent India was thus lost.

Quit India Movement

Quit India Movement, 1942 an important event of the Indian freedom struggle,
was the outcome of a compound of anti-white fury. The cripps mission, with its
vague proposals of a post-war Dominion Status for India, a constitution making
body elected by provincial legislatures and the native states, provincial opt out
clause, the immediate participation of Indian leaders in war effort but the retention

of the control of Indian defence by the British, satisfied none and threatened to
Balkanise the Indian subcontinent.
The retreat of the British from Malay, Burma and Singapore, leaving their
dependants to fend for themselves, the indescribable plight of the Indians
trekking back home from these places, the racial ill-treatment meted out to
Indians by white soldiers stationed here and there in India, the 'scorched earth'
policy pursued by the British in Bengal to resist probable Japanese invasion
which resulted in the commandeering of all means of communicating, war-time
price rise, black-marketeering and profiteering - all these contributed to the
creation of an anti-white fury. Above all, there was the attempt of the British
bureaucracy right from the outbreak of the war for a wholesale crackdown on the
Congress on the pattern of 1932.
The early morning round up of Congress leaders on 9 August 'unleashed an
unprecedented and country-wide wave of mass fury'. And the wave engulfed the
Bengal cities, particularly the bigger ones. There were three broad phases of the
movement. The first was predominantly urban and included hartals, strikes and
clashes with the police and army in most major cities. All these were massive and
violent but quickly suppressed.
The second phase of the movement started from the middle of August. Militant
students fanned out from different centres, destroying communications and
leading peasant rebellion in Northern and Western Bihar, Eastern UP, Midnapore
in Bengal, and pockets in Maharastra, Karnataka and Orissa. A number of shortlived local 'national governments' were also set up.
The third phase of the movements started from about the end of September and
was characterised by terrorist activities, sabotage and guerrilla warfare by
educated youths and peasant squads. Parallel national governments functioned
at Tamluk in Midnapore, Satara in Maharasfra, and Talcher in Orissa. All the three
phases of the movement were crushed by brutal atrocities including the use of
machine guns from the air.
A good deal of controversy exists about the nature of the movement-whether it
was a 'spontaneous revolution' or an 'organised rebellion'. The famous 'Quit India'
resolution passed by the Bombay session of the AICC on 8 August 42 followed up
its call for 'mass struggle on non violent lines on the widest possible scale',
'inevitably' under Gandhi, with the significant rider that if the Congress leadership
was removed by arrest, every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must
be his own guide...'. The Wardha working committee resolution of 14 July had
also introduced an unusual note of social radicalism-'the princes', 'jagirdars',
'zamindars' and propertied and moneyed classes derive their wealth and property
from the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom eventually
power and authority must belong.
At the crucial working committee session of 27 April - 1 May, Gandhi's hard-line
was backed by a combination of Right-wingers like Patel, Rajendra Prasad and
Kripalni and the socialists like Achyut Patwardhan and Narendra Dev. Jawaharlal
was initially hesitant, but ultimately joined the queue and only the Communists
opposed the Quit India resolution.

During and after the Quit India upsurge, the British in documents like Tottenhams'
Report painted the whole outburst as a 'deliberate fifth columnist conspiracy',
intending to strengthen the Axis powers. This interpretation not only ignored the
consistent anti-fascist international stance of the Congress throughout the 1930s,
but also made a historical travesty of the facts that being arrested in the early
morning of 9 August the Congress leaders could hardly lead the outburst and that
the Quit India resolution was also remarkably vague about the details of the
coming movement. Far from ruling out further negotiations, the whole thing may
conceivably have been an exercise in brinkmanship and a bargaining counter
which was followed by an explosion only because the British had decided on a
policy of wholesale repression. Despite strenuous efforts, the British failed to
establish their case that the Congress before 9 August had really planned a
violent rebellion.
The movement was, in reality 'elemental and largely spontaneous'. It was
sparked off by a variety of factors and of an expectation that British rule was
coming to an end. Bureaucratic high-handedness and provocation worsened the
situation. Financial losses incurred in Malay and Burma induced sections of
Indian business community to give some covert support to a movement (even if
violent) for a short while.
The real picture was that the removal of established leaders left younger and
more militant cadres to their own initiative and gave greater scope to pressure
from below. Amery's slander that the Congress had planned attacks on
communications and sabotage boomeranged with a vengeance, for many
believed that this really had been the Working Committee's plan. In any case, in a
primary hegemonic struggle as the Indian National Movement was, preparedness
for struggle cannot be measured by the volume of immediate organisational
activity but by the degree of hegemonic influence that the movement has
acquired over the people.
The participation of labour was short-lived and limited but there was certainly
considerable covert upper-class and even Indian high official support to secret
nationalist activities in 1942. Such support enabled activists to set up a fairly
effective illegal apparatus, including even a secret radio station under Usha
Mehta for three months in Bombay. Unlike in the Civil Disobedience days, middle
class students were very much in the forefront in 1942, whether in urban clashes,
as organisers of sabotage, or as motivators of present rebellion. What made the
movement so formidable, however, was the massive upsurge of the peasantry in
certain areas, particularly in Bihar.
Indeed, that 1942 clearly surpassed all previous Congress led movements in its
level of anti-British radicalism possibly reduced internal class tensions and social
radiation. The characteristic feature of this movement was that private property
was less attacked and even no-revenue was not as comprehensive as in 193034.
The paradox why the people turned violent when the Congress insisted on nonviolence may be solved in the following manner. In the struggle there were many
who refused to use on sanction violent means and confined themselves to the
traditional weaponry of the Congress. But many of those, including many staunch

Gandhians, who used 'violent means' in 1942 felt that the peculiar circumstances
warranted their use. Many maintained that the cutting of telegraph wires and the
blowing up of bridges were all right as long as human life was not taken but
others admitted that they could not square the violence they used, with their belief
in non-violence, although they did resort to it in most trying circumstances and in
self-defence.
Gandhi refused to condemn the violence of the people because he saw it as a
reaction to the much bigger violence being perpetrated on the state. It is held that
Gandhi's major objection to violence was that its use prevented mass
participation in a movement. For in 1942, Gandhi had come round to the view that
mass participation would not be restricted as a result of isolated violence. Gandhi
had come to realise that the kind of non-violence he had wanted his country men
to inculcate and practise, could not be achieved and so towards the end of his
career he had kept some amount of space for the participants to follow their own
line of action. His patience had been dragged to such extremes that he felt that
even at the cost of some risks, he should ask his people to resist slavery.
Although Gandhi was now in an unusually militant mood, at no stage was he
prepared to forsake his faith in non-violence. He would have liked the movement
to be non-violent but was prepared to run the risk of unrestricted mass action
even if that meant civil war. He thus said, 'Let them entrust India to God or, in
modem parlance, to anarchy'.
The Quit India movement was thus not a controlled volunteer movement like
Gandhi's previous movements of 1920-22 and 1930-34. It was not conceived as a
traditional Satyagraha. It was to be a 'fight to the finish', an 'open rebellion', 'short
and swift' which could very well plunge the country into a 'conflagration'. Foreign
domination was to be ended whatever the cost.
Scholars have analysed the questions of 'spontaneity' and 'preparedness' in
terms of action and reaction. The arrest of the leaders made the people aghast
and took them completely unaware. Strikes and demonstrations followed and 'the
very size of the crowds made the Government nervous'. Tension bred tension and
led to confrontation. The people had no guidance, the leaders were either behind
the bars or underground. Passions were ranging high. Individuals and groups
interpreted the situation to the best of their understanding and acted, as they
thought best. The continuing police repression and 'Ordinance Raj' further
inflamed the feelings of the people. There had been no Congress call for civil
disobedience. 'Therefore what started as individual acts of angry defiance, soon
swelled into a movement, and the movement into a revolt'.
The gravity and extent of the Quit India movement by linlithgow's own admission
may be compared to those of the Revolt of 1857. It failed because an unarmed
people without leaders and proper organisation could not stand for long before
the mighty strength of an imperial government in power. Yet, the significance of
the great movement lay in the fact that it placed the demand for independence on
the immediate agenda of the national movement. After Quit India, there could be
no turning back. Any future negotiations with the British government could only be
on the manner of transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of
bargain and this became amply clear after the war.

Modern India : Gandhi-Jinnah Talks break down on

Pakistan issue : 1944:
The Round Table Conference of 1929 was Gandhi's Waterloo. He erred in going
to London as the sole spokesperson of the Congress, pinning hopes on the
appeals from British statesmen. There he was cornered by the chosen few from
among the Muslims who asked him to justify how he could speak on behalf of
their community, while Mauna Shasta Ali, former Khilafat leader, warned the
Hindus: "If the Hindus don't meet our demands this time, we're going to make war
on them. We ruled the Hindus once. We at least don't intend to be ruled by them
now." The British Government planned to announce the Communal Award B this
time the Scheduled Castes were to be favored, as were the Muslims in 1909. In
disgust, Gandhi returned home empty-handed, while the government armed itself
for letting loose repression.
Gandhi failed to checkmate Jinnah's dangerous moves. Jinnah had no influence
with the Muslim Premiers of Punjab, Sind and Bengal. Even when Fall Hue from
Bengal had proposed the Pakistan resolution, he had later turned anti-Jinnah;
while Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullaha, Sind Premier, had opposed the resolution.
Gandhi did not capture an opportunity to form an anti-Jinnah front along with
them. That was against his spirit of compromise as against confrontation. He
ploughed his lonely furrow. The landed Gandhi in a complex situation in 1942,
which exerted pressure on him for action. There were the Communists and other
Leftists who favored support for the war in view of Russia and Britain having
become allies. On the other hand, there were lurking fears that Japan might
occupy India. In April 1942, the first Japanese bombing of India took place and
there was seizure of the Andaman Islands.
On his release from prison in 1944, Gandhi committed a great blunder in his talks
with Jinnah, when all his colleagues were in jail. This boosted Jinnah's prestige
amongst the Muslims in two ways: as a wrecker, and as the Quaid-e Azam,
Jinnah came on level with Gandhi, the Mahatma. The Gandhi-Jinnah talks had
serious repercussions. Immediately Jinnah acquired the status of sole
spokesmanship.

The 1946 Cabinet Mission

When the Cabinet mission arrived in Delhi in March, it had three members,
Cripps, A.V. Alexander and Pethick-Lawrence. They would work in close
conjunction with the Viceroy who was assured that it was not intended that he
should be treated as a lay figure.
The Mission's task was to try to bring the leaders of the principle Indian political
parties to agreement on two matters: The method of framing a constitution for a

self-governing, independent India The setting up of a new Executive Council or

interim government that would hold office while the constitution was being
hammered out.
The main problem was, as it always had been, the Hindu-Muslim partition.
Congress wanted a unified India and the Muslim League wanted a separate,
independent Pakistan. The Mission set to work at once, spending two weeks in
lengthy discussions with representatives of all the principal political parties, the
Indian States, the Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and other communities, and with
Gandhi and several other prominent individuals. But at the end of these
discussions there was still no prospect of an agreement between the parties and
the mission decided to put forward the two possible solutions for consideration. A
truncated Pakistan, which Wavell had wanted to tell Jinnah was all he would get if
he kept insisting on a sovereign Pakistan.
A loose federation with a three-tier constitution - provinces, group of provinces
and an all-India union embracing both British India and the Indian States, which
Cripps had devised with the help of two Indian officials, V.P. Menon and Sir B.N.
Rau. The Union would be limited to three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and
communications, with powers to raise funds for all three; all other subjects would
vest in the provinces, but the provinces would be free to form groups, with their
own executives and legislatures, that would deal with such subjects as the
provinces within the group might assign them. In this way the Provinces that
Jinnah claimed for Pakistan could form Groups or sub-federations and enjoy a
large measure of autonomy thus approximating to Pakistan.
After some demur, Jinnah agreed to the federation plan, Congress also
reluctantly agreeing and both parties were invited to send representatives to
discuss it with the Mission at Simla. A week of discussions led to no agreement
and the Mission decided to refurbish the plan to meet the views of the parties as
far as possible that had been expressed at Simla. The final statement of the plan
was published on May 16th.
The statement rejected decisively a wholly sovereign Pakistan of the larger or the
smaller truncated variety. It went on to commend the plan for an all-India Union,
with a three-tier constitution and went on to indicate the method how it should be
brought about. A Constituent Assembly was to be elected by members of the
Provincial Legislatures and after a preliminary full meeting, at which an advisory
committee would be set up on fundamental rights, minorities and tribal areas,
would divide into three Sections - Section A consisting of the representatives of
the six Hindu-majority provinces; Section B of the representatives of the Punjab,
the North-West Frontier Province and Sind; and Section C of the representatives
of Bengal and Assam. These sections would draw up constitutions for the
provinces included in them and would also decide whether a group should be
formed and, if so, with what subjects; but a province would have the option to opt
out of a group by a vote of its legislature after the new constitutional
arrangements had come into operation. Finally the Constituent Assembly was to
meet again as a whole, this time along with representatives of the Indian States in
appropriate numbers to settle the Union Constitution.

The Statement was well received and was widely accepted as clear evidence of
the British Government's genuine desire to bring British rule in India to a peaceful
end. Gandhi pronounced it 'the best document the British Government could have
produced in the circumstances.' Jinnah was less enthusiastic, but both sides gave
it consideration. Congress wanted to interpret the statement as meaning that
provinces could choose whether or not to belong to the section in which they had
been placed, but the Mission countered this with a further Statement on 25th
May, in that the provinces in each section were an essential feature of the
scheme.
Wavell and the mission wrote to the Indian states rulers, warning them that when
Britain quit India it would cease to exercise the powers or shoulder the obligations
of paramountcy. They would not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to an
Indian Government, but the ending of the relationship would leave a void, and it
was suggested, would be best filled by entering into a federal relationship with the
new Government of India as units in the proposed Union. They would retain their
internal sovereignty and all their powers save those ceded to the Union in
connection with the three subjects of foreign affairs, defence and
communications. The Princes were reasonably content with this.
While the League and Congress were giving thought to the Statement of May
16th, the Mission went about the formation of a new executive council or interim
government, but they also prepared and sent home a breakdown plan. The plan
followed the premise that one of the main parties would reject the proposals. If
the Muslim League rejected the proposals, Congress would go ahead on the
premise that parts of the country not willing would be left out of the union. If
Congress dismissed the proposals, it might be followed by a threat to seize power
in another 'Quit India' movement. Wavell proposed that the British should then
withdraw from the six Hindu-majority provinces and allow them to become entirely
independent but retain control of the other provinces until fresh arrangements
acceptable to their population could be made.
However, he opened discussion regarding the formation of an interim
government, which the Mission decided should be initiated by Wavell, with the
party leaders while they and the mission were still in Simla. The members of the
interim government, except the Viceroy, would all be Indian and it would be, as far
as possible, like a dominion government, but the Viceroy, in light of the existing
constitution, would still retain overriding powers. Congress accepted these
stipulations with a bad grace, but pleased Jinnah and the League who were
happy to accept any check to Congress dominance of the interim government.
Discussions were still in progress when, on 6th June, the Muslim League voted to
accept the constitutional proposals. The acceptance was said to be 'in the hope
that it would ultimately result in the establishment of a complete sovereign
Pakistan'. The Congress working committee delayed giving their verdict, and
further discussions about the interim government failed to bring about agreement
as the League wanted parity with Congress and the exclusive right to nominate
all Muslim members, both of which had been rejected by Congress.
The Mission, who was impatient to end their work and head home, decided to put
forward compromise proposals. On June 16th, the Viceroy announced that

discussion with the parties would not be further prolonged and that he was
issuing invitations to fourteen named persons to serve as members of an interim
government, Six were Hindu members of Congress including one member of the
Scheduled castes, five were members of the Muslim League, and the remaining
three a Sikh, a Parsee and an Indian Christian. The message also included a
statement that stated:
'In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in
setting up a coalition government on the above lines, it is the intention of the
Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an interim government which will be as
representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th.'
With the Muslim League ready to accept, Congress appeared to be on the verge
of accepting until Gandhi intervened. Gandhi took his stand on principle,
regardless of practical consequences. He said that acquiescence by Congress in
the non-inclusion of a Congress Muslim in the interim government would be, he
argued, the sacrifice of a vital principle to which Congress, as a national party
with a Muslim president, could never agree at any time or place or in any
circumstances. They rejected the interim government proposals. The Mission
took the statement of June 16th to mean that Congress had agreed with the May
16th Statement that it was no longer possible to proceed with the formation of an
interim government. Jinnah was infuriated by this interpretation, and now felt
outwitted by Congress and tricked by Cripps. He declared the Mission's
interpretation had been dishonestly 'concocted by the legalistic talents of the
Cabinet Mission and charged the Mission and the Viceroy with breach of faith. He
also stated that the Congress acceptance of the May 16th Statement had not
been genuine.
Wavell agreed with this view, but the mission wanted to try and salvage
something and in a valedictory statement they expressed they gladness that
'Constitution-making can now proceed with the two major parties and their regret
at the failure to form an interim coalition government, but said that after the
elections to the Constituent Assembly had finished, the Viceroy would make fresh
efforts to bring one into being. Meanwhile, a temporary caretaker government
would be set up. The mission left bearing a note from Wavell that the
government should be prepared for a crisis in India and must therefore have a
breakdown policy in readiness.

History of Indian Flag - (1904 - 1947):

Indian flag means tiranga has many interesting attributes creating it unique.
Indian flag represents India's long freedom struggle. It shows the status of India
and Independent republic. India's constituent assembly adopted the design of the
National Flag on 22nd July, 1947. The code regulates display and use of the Idian
flag. The late Prime Minister Pandit Nehru called it as a symbol of feedom not
only for ourselves but for all people.
Indian flag history started from the 20th century to pre-independence period. Irish
disciple of Swami Vivekananda made the first national flag in 1904. Her name
was sister Nivedita and then after the flag came to be known as sister Nivedita's

flag. This flag was designed using colors yellow and red. Yellow color signified
symbol of success and red color shows freedom struggle. Bengali word "Bonde
Matoram" was written on it. The flag contained figure of 'Vajra', weapon for god
'Indra' and a white lotus in the center. The Vajra signified strength and lotus
shows depicts purity.

1906:
In 1906, another Indian flag was designed after Sister Nivedita's flag. It was
designed using three colors: blue, yellow and red. This flag blue strip had 8 stars
of slightly various shapes, red strip had 2 symbols. The first one symbol was the
sun and second symbol was the star. The yellow strip color had 'Vande Mataram'
written on Devnagiri script.
Again in 1906 only another version of this flag came into existence that contained
orange, yellow and green colors. This flag was known as 'Lotus flag' or Calcutta
flag'. This flag signified the Indian unity and capacity of freedom struggle.

1907:
In 22 August 1907, Shyamji Krishna Varma, Madam Bhikaji Cama and Veer
Savarkar had designed a new flag. This flag was called as Madam Bhikaji Cama
flag. This flag was similar to flag in 1906 with the exemption colors and the flower
closest to hoist. In 1907, the flag was hosted in foreign country Germany first
time. Thus this flag was also referred as Berlin Committee flag. This flag was
made up of three colors green followed by golden saffron and the red color at the
bottom. It had "Vande Mataram" written on it.

1916:
In 1916, the new flag was designed by Lokamanya Tilak and Dr. Annie Besant's.
Congress session hosted this flag in Calcutta. Colors used for this flag are white,
green, blue and red. Each color was used in striped manner. The five red and
four green strips represents Singh and Nair, the white strip color signified seven
stars of Saptarishi.

1917:
In 1917, the new flag was adopted by Bal Ganga Dhar Tilak. Bal Ganga Dhar
Tilak was the leader of the Home Rule League. This flag had union jack at top,
near hoist. At that time the status of Dominion was being demanded for India.
This flag signified seven stars of "Saptashi". This flag contains four blue and five
red strips. It had a semi-circular moon and a star on the top fly end. This flag did
not become popular in masses.

1921:
In 1921, Mahatma Gandhi designed the new flag containing three colors: white,
green and red. White color on the top of this flag signified truth. In the middle of
this flag green color shows the earth and Indian agriculture. Red color on the
bottom of this flag signified spirit and freedom struggle. This flag pattern was
based on the flag of Ireland.

1931 :

In 1931, Pingali Venkayya was designed a new flag. It also has three colors
white, green and saffron. Saffron color was at the top of this flag, white in the
middle and the green at the bottom. The saffron color signified the strength. The
white color shows truth and the green color signified the earth and the Indian
agriculture. In the center of this flag there was 'Charkha' in blue color.

1947:
In 1947, the flag with three colors was accepted by Indian and the whole country.
A National flag of India was adopted by the three colors in 1947. While a result,
the flag in 1931 was adopted as Indian flag but 'Charkha' in the center was
replaced by 'Wheel' (Chakra). In this way our National flag came into being.

Description of Indian Flag (Tiranga):

In 22nd July 1947, the National flag of India was adopted by Indian constituent
assembly. Its use of the flag is regulated by a certain regulations. Pingali
Venkayya designed the National flag of India. The flag signified struggle for
freedom for every people.
The National flag of India is designed with horizontal strips of three colors
(Tiranga) of deep kesari (saffron) at the top, white in the center and dark green on
the bottom in equal proportions. The saffron color shows sacrifice, courage and
strength, the white color signified truth and purity; the green color shows fertility
and faith. On white band at the center, there is Chakra in navy blue to show the
Dharma Chakra, the charka of law in the Sarnath lion capital. The charka is
known as 'Ashoka Chakra. It has 24 spokes. It shows that there is life in
movement and death in stagnation. The center symbol the Chakra (wheel) was a
Buddhist symbol in back to 200th century B.C.

Manufacturing of Indian flag:

Indian flag manufacturing is put up by committee. This committee is called as
'Bureau of Indian Standards'. It also lays our rules regarding flag hosting. It
specifies the color, cloth, dye, thread count and everything on the flag. The Indian
flag (tiranga) can only be made up of 'Khadi'. It is manufactured from two kinds of
khadi one for its major part and the second part for the cloth which holds flag to
the staff.

Mountbatten's plan of Partition:

Announcement of Lord Mountbatten's plan for partition
of India : 3 June 1947:
The British government sent a Cabinet Mission to India in March 1946 to
negotiate with Indian leaders and agree to the terms of the transfer of power.
After difficult negotiations a federal solution was proposed. Despite initial
agreement, both sides eventually rejected the plan.
An interim government with representatives of all the Indian parties was proposed
and implemented. However, it soon collapsed through lack of agreement. While

the Muslim League consented to join the interim government the Indian National
Congress refused. By the end of 1946 communal violence was escalating and the
British began to fear that India would descend into civil war. The British
government's representative, Lord Wavell, put forward a breakdown plan as a
safeguard in the event of political deadlock. Wavell, however, believed that once
the disadvantages of the Pakistan scheme were exposed, Jinnah would see the
advantages of working for the best possible terms inside a united India. He wrote:
'Unfortunately the fact that Pakistan, when soberly and realistically examined, is
found to be a very unattractive proposition, will place the Moslems in a very
disadvantageous position for making satisfactory terms with India for a Federal
Union.' This view was based on a report, which claimed that a future Pakistan
would have no manufacturing or industrial areas of importance: no ports, except
Karachi, or rail centres. It was also argued that the connection between East and
West Pakistan would be difficult to defend and maintain. The report concluded:
'It is hard to resist the conclusion that taking all considerations into account the
splitting up of India will be the reverse of beneficial as far as the livelihood of its
people is concerned'.
Lord Mountbatten replaced Lord Wavell as Viceroy of India in 1947.
Mountbatten's first proposed solution for the Indian subcontinent, known as the
'May Plan', was rejected by Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru on the grounds it
would cause the 'balkanisation of India'. The following month the 'May Plan' was
substituted for the 'June Plan', in which provinces would have to choose between
India and Pakistan. Bengal and Punjab both voted for partition.

On 3 June 1947, Lord Mountbatten announced his plan.

The salient features were:Mountbatten's formula was to divide India but retain maximum unity. The country
would be partitioned but so would Punjab and Bengal, so that the limited Pakistan
that emerged would meet both the Congress and League's position to some
extent. The League's position on Pakistan was conceded to the extent that it
would be created, but the Congress position on unity would be taken into account
to make Pakistan as small as possible. Whether it was ruling out independence
for the princes or unity for Bengal or Hyderabad's joining up with Pakistan instead
of India, Mountbatten firmly supported Congress on these issues.
The Mountbatten Plan sought to effect an early transfer of power on the basis of
Dominion status to two successor states, India and Pakistan. For Britain,
Dominion Status offered a chance of keeping India in the commonwealth for
India's economic strength and defence potential were deemed sounder and
Britain had a greater value of trade and investment there.
The rationale for the early date for transfer of power was securing Congress
agreement to Dominion status. The additional benefit was that the British could
escape responsibility for the rapidly deteriorating communal situation.
A referendum was to be held in NWEP to ascertain whether the people in the
area wanted to join India or not. The princely states would have the option of
joining either of the two dominions or to remain independent. The Provinces of

Assam, Punjab and Bengal were also to be divided. A boundary commission was
to be set up to determine the boundaries of these states.

Reasons for the acceptance of "Partition" by the

Congress:
By accepting the Mountbatten Plan/Partition, the Congress was only accepting
what had become inevitable because of the long-term failure of the Congress to
draw in the Muslim masses into the national movement and stem the surging
waves of Muslim communalism, which, especially since 1937, had been beating
with increasing fury.
The Congress leaders felt by June, 1947 that only an immediate transfer of power
could forestall the spread of Direct Action and communal disturbances. Sardar
Patel rightly said, "a united India even if it was smaller in size was better than a
disorganised and troubled and weak bigger India."
Difficulties created by the obstructionist policies and tactics of the League proved
to the Congress that the leaders of the Muslim League were concerned only with
their own interests and the future of India would not be safe with them in the
government. They would act as a stumbling block in the path of India's progress.
The Congress leaders also felt that the continuance of British rule never was and
never could be in the good interest of Indians. Sooner they quit, the better it
would be.

Partition of India and Independence : 15 Aug

1947
Sentiments of Indian nationalism were expressed as early as 1885 at the Indian
National Congress, which was predominantly Hindu. In 1906 the All-India Muslim
League formed with favorable relations towards British rule, but by 1913 that
changed when the League shifted its focus and began to view Indian selfgovernment as its goal. It continued to favor Hindu-Muslim unity towards that end
for several decades but in 1940 the League began to call for a separate Muslim
state from the projected independent India. The league was concerned that a
united independent India would be dominated by Hindus. In the winter of 1945-46
Mohammed Ali Jinnah's Muslim League members won all thirty seats reserved for
Muslims in the Central Legislative Assembly and most of the reserved provincial
seats as well.
In an effort to resolve deadlock between Congress and the Muslim League in
order to transfer British power "to a single Indian administration", a three-man
Cabinet Mission formed in 1946 which drafted plans for a "three-tier federation for
India." According to those plans, the region would be divided into three groups of
provinces, with Group A including the Hindu-populated provinces that would
eventually comprise the majority of the independent India. Groups B and C were
comprised of largely Muslim-populated provinces. Each group would be governed

separately with a great degree of autonomy except for the handling of "foreign
affairs, communications, defense, and only those finances required for such
nationwide matters." These issues would be addressed by a minimal central
government located in Dehli.
The plan, however, did not take into account the fate of a large Sikh population
living in Punjab, part of the B-group of provinces. Mughal emperors' persecution
of Sikh gurus in the 17th century had infused the Sikh culture with a lasting antiMuslim element that promised to erupt if the Punjab Sikhs were to be partitioned
off as part of a Muslim-dominated province group. Although they did not make up
more than two per cent of the Indian population, the Sikhs had since 1942 been
moving for a separate Azad Punjab of their own, and by 1946 they were
demanding a free Sikh nation-state.
As leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah accepted the Cabinet Mission's proposal.
However, when Nehru announced at his first press conference as the reelected
president of Congress that "no constituent assembly could be bound by any
prearranged constitutional formula," Jinnah took this to be a repudiation of the
plan, which was necessarily a case of all or nothing. The Muslim Leagues
Working Committee withdrew its consent and called upon the Muslim nation to
launch direct action in mid-August 1946. A frenzy of rioting between Hindus and
Muslims ensued.
In March of 1947 Lord Mountbatten was sent to take over the viceroy, and
encountered a situation in which he feared a forced evacuation of British troops.
He recommended a partition of Punjab and Bengal in the face of raging civil war.
Gandhi was very opposed to the idea of partition, and urged Mountbatten to offer
Jinnah leadership of a united India instead of the creation of a separate Muslim
state. However, Nehru would not agree to that suggestion. In July Britain's
Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act, which set a deadline of midnight
on August 14-15, 1947 for "demarcation of the dominions of India." As a result, at
least 10 million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs fled their homes to seek sanctuary on
whichever side of the line was favorable to them. The ensuing communal
massacres left at least one million dead, with the brunt of the suffering borne by
the Sikhs who had been caught in the middle. Most of them eventually settled in
Punjab.
Jinnah presided as the governor-general of Pakistan, which was geographically
divided into East Pakistan and West Pakistan and separated by Indian territory
(including half of Punjab and half of Bengal). However, ownership of Kashmir
remained in dispute until it came to a head and war broke out once again in 1965.
The unrest did not end there; in 1971 tensions between East and West Pakistan
over Bengali autonomy developed into another civil war, with the result that
Bangladesh became an independent country in 1972 and West Pakistan
remained Pakistan.

Indian Independence:
Between 1940 and 1942, the Congress launched two abortive agitations against
the British, and 60,000 Congress members were arrested, including Gandhi and
Nehru. Unlike the uncooperative and belligerent Congress, the Muslim League

supported the British during World War II. Belated but perhaps sincere British
attempts to accommodate the demands of the two rival parties, while preserving
the unitary state in India, seemed unacceptable to both as they alternately
rejected whatever proposal was put forward during the war years. As a result, a
three-way impasse settled in: the Congress and the Muslim League doubted
British motives in handing over power to Indians, while the British struggled to
retain some hold on India while offering to give greater autonomy.The Congress
wasted precious time denouncing the British rather than allaying Muslim fears
during the highly charged election campaign of 1946. Even the more mature
Congress leaders, especially Gandhi and Nehru, failed to see how genuinely
afraid the Muslims were and how exhausted and weak the British had become in
the aftermath of the war. When it appeared that the Congress had no desire to
share power with the Muslim League at the center, Jinnah declared August 16,
1946, Direct Action Day, which brought communal rioting and massacre in many
places in the north. Partition seemed preferable to civil war. On June 3, 1947,
Viscount Louis Mountbatten, the viceroy (1947) and governor-general (1947-48),
announced plans for partition of the British Indian Empire into the nations of India
and Pakistan, which itself was divided into east and west wings on either side of
India. At midnight, on August 15, 1947, India strode to freedom amidst ecstatic
shouting of "Jai Hind" , when Nehru delivered a memorable and moving speech
on India's "tryst with destiny."