Adipratomo 1

Ari W Adipratomo

English 102 C2

Professor M Gulias

Preventive Diplomacy: A Remedy to Cure the ASEAN’s

Classic Transnational Issues

This paper argues why the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) should

replace traditional diplomatic strategies among the ASEAN members (sometimes referred to as

the ―ASEAN Way‖) with a set of rules called ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ which can actively

prevent the escalation of transnational and regional problems. This paper also discusses the

history and the development of the ―ASEAN Way‖ and argues that although this method has

benefited diplomatic measures for ASEAN in the past, it cannot comply any longer with

contemporary Southeast Asian challenges. The paper calls for the two blocks of ASEAN

members, -- the conservatives and the progressives-- to compromise and come up with a set of

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ rules that can address the concerns of sovereignty and non-interference.

Introduction

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become an enormously

important region in the world today. The East and Southeast Asian Region these days ―represent

more than 60 percent of the world‘s population and possess a combined GDP greater than

European Union‖ (Francis 3). The ASEAN is also one of the most vibrant trade and industry
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areas in the world. Thus, any transnational issues that occur in this area can potentially affect the

world‘s population. Many countries also consider their relationship with the ASEAN as crucial;

therefore, it is understandable why the U.S. Secretary of State always tries to attend the

ASEAN‘s annual meetings.

Recently, we have witnessed the escalating extent of transnational issues in the Southeast

Asian region that varies from the human rights violations that happen in Myanmar to the

environmental tragedies of forest fires and the Tsunami of 2004 in Indonesia. As the regional

organization of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN seems ill equipped to prevent these transnational

issues from becoming worse. This may be due to the fact that a traditional regional doctrine used

in conducting regional diplomacy, called the ―ASEAN way,‖ prevents the ASEAN from

interrupting the internal affairs of its members. Tobias Nischalke describes the ―ASEAN way‖ as

a set of rules to conduct regional foreign policy that includes ―the norms of non-interference,

respect for sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflict, and non-use of force‖ (12). The ―ASEAN

Way‖ encourages ―the Southeast Asian countries to seek an informal and incremental approach

to co-operation through lengthy consultation and dialogue‖ (Katsumata 111). Some of ASEAN

original members such as Indonesia and Malaysia are holding tight to this doctrine, while some

others such as Philippines and Thailand are criticizing the ―ASEAN way‖ and proposing a new

set of rules to govern ASEAN‘s foreign policy.

This paper will argue why the ASEAN should replace their rigid ―ASEAN Way,‖ with

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that can actively prevent the transnational problems from arising and

escalating to a higher level. The paper also discusses the history and the development of the

―ASEAN Way,‖ arguing that the rule that had been crucial in the formative years of ASEAN can

no longer address recent transnational issues. By examining both sides of the approaches
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(―ASEAN Way‖ and ―Preventive Diplomacy‖), this paper will try to come up with some

common-ground solutions that can create a bridge between these two factions and eliminating

the differences that they have regarding the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ issue.

Conservatives and Progressives

As I mentioned before, with the recent transnational challenges in the region, some of

the ASEAN members such as Thailand and Philippines have lost their faith in the doctrine of

―ASEAN Way.‖ They urge the ASEAN to develop a new set of rules that are capable of actively

preventing transnational issues from arising, and to keep the existing issues isolated and not

spreading or escalating them to a higher level. These demands drive the opponents against the

―ASEAN way,‖ or as we may call them progressives, proposing the form of ―Preventive

Diplomacy‖ that can be defined as an ―‗action to prevent disputes from arising …to prevent

existing disputes from escalating …and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur‘‖ (Tay

254). These members believe that ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ will not violate the principle of non-

interference of the ASEAN because the form of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that they proposed will

respect the state sovereignty and requires the authorization from the states that involved. For the

progressives, the ―non-compliance with the ‗ASEAN way‘ has been too common, and external

influences too strong to support the community idea‖ (Nischalke 11).

On the other hand, strict adherents of the ―ASEAN way,‖ --or whom we may call ―the

conservatives,‖ such as Indonesia and Malaysia-- are very reluctant to free themselves from this

doctrine. For these ASEAN members, the concern over domestic security is above everything

else. They want their internal affairs to be exempted from external interferences so that they can

concentrate in constructing their nations; therefore, it is understandable why they enviously

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guard the principle of non-interference. Conservatives also have a long history of mutual distrust

between them. Thus, the doubt leads to the fragile unity among the ASEAN members. With this

distrust in mind, we can conclude that the non-interference principle in one way or another

becomes the manifestation of the defense mechanism practiced by the conservatives. Hiro

Katsumata believes that the basic principles of the ―ASEAN way,‖ ―can also be understood with

reference to the ASEAN members‘ weak socio-political cohesion‖ (115). In addition, it is

important to note that the cultural factors also influence the decision of the ASEAN‘s

conservatives to defend the ―ASEAN way‖ because this doctrine resemble local value of

―musyawarah [the decision-making process through discussion and consultation] and mufakat

[the consensus decision arrived at]‖ (109).

The ASEAN and “ASEAN Way”

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on the 8th of

August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand by five original members, who are: Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapore, Philippines and Thailand through the ―signing of Bangkok Declaration‖ (Snow and

Brown 283) The main purposes of the ASEAN are to promote the growth of economic, social

progress and cultural development as well as promoting the peace and security in South East

Asian region. The essence of the Bangkok declaration reflects the collective concern of ASEAN

as describes below by Donald Snow and Eugene Brown:

The Bangkok Declaration committed the members to a joint effort to promote economic

cooperation and regional welfare; underlying the declaration were three common

objectives for the region: economic, social and cultural development, political and

economic stability in the face of superpower rivalry, and resolution of intra-regional

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differences. In addition there was the political goal of providing a united front to avoid

being drawn to the Vietnam War (Snow and Brown 284).

In order to achieve the ASEAN goals, the members of the ASEAN agreed to develop a

unique doctrine to conduct the regional diplomacy among its members. This doctrine – or

sometimes referred as The ―ASEAN Way‖ – is basically a fundamental set of rules that utilized

to conduct the regional diplomacy among the ASEAN members. The ―ASEAN Way‖ includes

practices such as agreement of not interfering other country‘s internal affairs, and quiet

diplomacy where it is common to talk about transnational issues only among the countries that

are affected. The ―ASEAN Way‖ also emphasizes the non-use of force in inter-state relations as

well as peaceful resolution of disputes according to consensus and agreement.

The development of the ―ASEAN Way‖ can‘t be separated from the influences of the

geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia at that time. In the early 1960‘s, there was a major

regional conflict in the region that involved Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia. The base of the

problem was the objections of the Philippines and Indonesia in the creation of a newly

independent Malaysia. Indonesia felt afraid Malaysia would be a basis for the western nations to

spread their influence in the Southeast Asian region. The situation was even more complicated

when the interest of the big powers such as the Netherlands, Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S.

got involved. The peak of the confrontation reached when Indonesia launched the attack on the

newly born Malaysia in the military operation known as ―Ganyang Malaysia‖ (Destroy

Malaysia) or sometimes also referred as ―konfrontasi‖ (confrontation).

Now that we have passed the confrontation era or sometimes referred as the ―post-

konfrontasi‖ era, the trauma of ―konfrontasi‖ has led to the development of mutual distrust
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among the ASEAN members. Because of this distrust, the ASEAN members ―have been—and

continue to be – plagued by interstate disputes, internal subversion and move to secede‖

(Katanyuu 827). The distrust and the traumatic experiences shared among the nations in

Southeast Asia have been carried as far as the establishment of the ―ASEAN Way‖ principles of

non-interference and informal diplomacy.

The development of the ASEAN‘s principle of non-interference is greatly influenced by

the desire of the ASEAN countries to build the nations without the intervention from the foreign

countries. When the ASEAN was established in the 1967, few years after ―Konfrontasi,‖ many

of its members had just gained their independence or at least had just started to build their

countries. During that time, ―their policy priority was to maintain domestic stability‖

(Katsumata 828). Therefore, in order to achieve the policy priority and also to stimulate the

internal affairs and development in ASEAN members, the members‘ internal affairs must not be

the object of intervention from the foreign nations. This concept of non-interference is reflected

in numerous ASEAN document such as: ―the Bangkok Declaration; the Zone of Peace, Freedom

and Neutrality [ZOPFAN] Declaration; and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation‖ (Katayuu

827).

Defining “Preventive Diplomacy”

Dag Hammarskjold, former United Nations Secretary-General, invented the term of

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ for the first time in 1960. The basic elements that make up the

foundation of the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ include the norms of ―international law and the

United Nations‘ goal to ‗take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of

threats to peace‘‖ (Tay 2). The interpretation of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ slightly changed during
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the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War framework, the theory of

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ focused on actions to keep narrow clashes from aggravating ―wider

involvement and confrontation between the two superpowers‖ (2).

When we move forward to the post-Cold War era, the concept of ―Preventive

Diplomacy‖ has changed once more. Now, the term ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ means ―actions to

prevent disputes from arising … to prevent existing disputes from escalating…and to limit the

spread of the latter when they occur‖ (Yuzawa 787). The application of the ―Preventive

Diplomacy‖ comprises the presence of good will offices by the third parties that can be

implemented as easy as ―a telephone call during onset of a crisis‖ or can be extended ―to fact-

finding missions and mediation during the onset of a potential crisis‖ (Tay 2). The essence of

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ is not exclusively limited to the preventive actions and diplomatic

measures. Sometimes, the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ can be carried as far as the ―actual use of

limited force, or other coercive measures‖ (3).

The concept of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ would soon attract the attentions from the

ASEAN‘s progressives. The ASEAN‘s progressives, who have been disappointed with the lack

ability of the ―ASEAN way‖ to accommodate the recent challenges, would soon try to adopt the

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ into the framework of the ASEAN foreign policy. In order to deal with

the concern of state sovereignty and the non-interference principles held by the conservatives,

the progressives proposed a modified version of the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that can addressed

the concern of both progressives and conservatives.

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Why are some of the ASEAN countries reluctant/encourage to change the “ASEAN Way?”

Among the founding fathers of the ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia are the two

countries that support the strict interpretation of the ―ASEAN Way." As the big supporters of the

―ASEAN Way‖ the conservatives try to defend the ―ASEAN Way‖ with every effort that they

have. The reason why the conservatives try to defend the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ is

understandable. With a long history of mutual distrust and concern over the national sovereignty,

the ―ASEAN Way‖ is a non-negotiable value for the conservatives. The issue of sovereignty has

become very crucial for the conservatives. The reason why the issues of sovereignty become

very important become obvious when we examine the conservatives‘ post-independence years

that had been highlighted by the national security problems that ―arose as a result of intervention

or interference by outside powers in Southeast Asian affairs‖ (Katsumata, ―Reconstruction‖

112). These historical backgrounds have make the ASEAN conservatives hold tight to the

―ASEAN way‖ because the ―ASEAN Way‖ allows the conservatives to, ―concentrate on

domestic matters‖ and also to evade ―interference or criticism from other states that would have

been an obstacle to nation building‖ (Katsumata, ―ASEAN diplomacy‖ 5). The main reason why

the ASEAN conservatives are hesitate to change the ―ASEAN Way‖ is because they are afraid

that the different form of regional diplomacy – i.e. ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ – will hindered with

their principles of non-interference and states sovereignty.

On the other hand, the progressives who have been unsatisfied with the progress made by

the ―ASEAN Way‖ proposed the adaptation of a new set of rules. Bangkok has become the most

vocal party to call for changes in the doctrine of the ―ASEAN Way.‖ The main reason why

Thailand proposed the changes is explicable. Thailand is one of the ASEAN countries that suffer

severely from the impact of many ASEAN transnational issues. Some of the transnational issues
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that impacting Thailand include the problems of the illegal refugees from neighboring country of

Cambodia and Myanmar, that has created tremendous health and social challenges for the

Bangkok, as well as the environmental haze problem caused by the forest fires in Indonesia.

These issues have pushed Thailand to urge the ASEAN to interpret the ―ASEAN Way‖ in a more

flexible way. The Bangkok efforts gain supports from the Philippines. Both countries ―have

been relatively distinct‖ from other ASEAN members and also ―politically western‖ (Katsumata,

―ASEAN Diplomacy‖ 9). These two countries have become the locomotive of change for he

ASEAN foreign policy in the past few years.

Conservatives belief that the ―ASEAN way‖ has no longer able to address the

contemporary issues in the Southeast region and it need to be changed with a more flexible

doctrine. The conservatives belief that ―‗many old principles...are no longer adequate‘‖ to

address the contemporary transnational issues, and they call for a ―‗regional…cooperation and

solutions‘‖ to deal with these contemporary transnational issues (Katsumata, ―ASEAN

Diplomacy‖ 4). The attempt to deal with these new challenges – that ranges from economic,

environmental, drug trafficking, and terrorism – ―require a collective response‖ from all of the

ASEAN members (2). They believe that the only way for the ASEAN to deal with these new

challenges is by interpreting the ―ASEAN Way‖ into a more flexible way or by implementing

the modified version of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ into the framework of the ASEAN foreign

policy.

The Common Ground Solutions

It is clear for us that in order to solve the contemporary transnational issues, the ASEAN

has to come with a flexible doctrine of regional diplomacy that can addressed the concern of its
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conservatives and progressives members. The form of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that addressed by

the progressives can be adopted into the ASEAN foreign policy‘s framework as long as it can

address the concern over state sovereignty and the principles of non-interference.

In the exercise of ―Preventive Diplomacy,‖ several applications of ―Preventive

Diplomacy,‖ such as the propose of the good offices by the third party and utilization of fact

finding missions, may be said, by the conservatives, to have some degree of interference to the

internal affairs of a nation. To address these issues, there are several ways that can be taken by

the ASEAN to modify the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ so that it would address the concern of every

ASEAN members. The first solution is to bring the proposal of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ to the

ASEAN meetings and then try to discuss and come up with the guidance principles. These

principles ―need to be discussed and mutually accepted‖ by both conservatives and progressives

(Tay 6). By increasing the awareness of the ASEAN members over the nature of ―Preventive

Diplomacy‖ –which is ―restricted to diplomatic and other similar actions‖ and has a nature of

―non coercive‖ (7) – the ASEAN members could ―foster greater trust‖ from its members and also

can fairly applied the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ in the framework of the ASEAN foreign policy

(Tay 6).

The second solution to the concern over state sovereignty and non-interference principle

is to increase the awareness of the ASEAN members to the principle of state responsibility. It is

true that each state has absolute sovereignty within the boundaries of their own region, but

whenever the transnational issues—that potentially affecting neighboring states— emerged,

―they are responsible to other states for trans-boundary damage‖ (Tay 6). When the neighboring

countries affected from one country‘s problem, the dimension of the problems has move from

―purely domestic jurisdiction‖ problems to the regional problems. The utilization of some sort of
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interfering actions is needed to prevent the issues and conflicts from spreading to a wider area.

Therefore, the question regarding the state sovereignty and non-interference is no longer valid in

this situation.

The third and the last method is to add the state consent whenever the applications of

―Preventive Diplomacy‖ are obviously need to be implemented to solve the problem. Whenever

the ―state consent is given, preventive diplomacy is clearly not interference‖(Tay 7). In order for

the consent to be given, this method is also has to be flexible. The host state should be able to

give some limitations and guidance to the fact-finding missions and third party on how far they

can go before they reach the limit where the absolute sovereignty of a country play. As the

ASEAN move toward the preventive diplomacy, The ASEAN

Must therefore strike a balance between two polarities. It needs to find a median

between…the degree of institutionalization foe preventive diplomacy that the consensus

of states may accept and…the degree of institutionalization that preventive diplomacy

requires in order to be effective (8)

Conclusions

In an attempt to addresses and solves the contemporary transnational issues—that require the

collective actions – the ASEAN has to change their rigid doctrine of the ―ASEAN Way‖ with a

more flexible doctrine of ―Preventive Diplomacy.‖ The form of ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that

proposed by the progressives has to address the concerns of the state sovereignty and the

principles of the non-interference that held by other members of the ASEAN. Some of the

applications of the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ that seems to incoherence with the concept of the

state sovereignty and non-interferences will need to be modified so that the ―Preventive
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Diplomacy‖ can be mutually accepted by both conservatives and progressives. There are several

solutions to solve the concern over state sovereignty and non-interference principle. The first one

is by discussing and compromising the suitable principle that will be used to guide the ASEAN

in the practice of ―Preventive Diplomacy.‖ The second method is by increasing awareness over

the state responsibility. Whenever the issues are affecting more than one country, the issues have

moved from local sphere to regional sphere. Therefore, some sort of intervention is needed to

limiting the spread of the conflict. The last method of modifying ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ will be

adding the state consent and authorization whenever interfering exercises of ―Preventive

Diplomacy,‖ such as the use of fact-finding missions or god offices, are needed. Whenever the

state gives the authorization, the exercises of preventive diplomacy are clearly not a form of

interference. By exercising the ―Preventive Diplomacy‖ ASEAN can strengthen their socio-

political cohesion by
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