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US v Toribio

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered,
in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other
draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would
tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator
sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of Toribio it will defeat the purpose
of the law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction
placed upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an epidemic that wiped 70-100% of
the population of carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the requesites of
a valid exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent
domain. The said law does not constitute the taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and
public interest.



Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)

G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain
acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary


authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such
as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites
which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in
a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power
by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

3. Ermita Malate v City of Manila

J. Fernando
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc.
petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the
fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar
because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their
personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for
being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum
facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry.
The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated
the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of
police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption


of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing
the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in
the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the
right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the
license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in
the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not
be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of
People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person,
the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where
the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and
the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal


laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean."

4. Diosdado Guzman vs. National University

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National
University, seek relief from what they described as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to
allow them to enrol."

In their petition on August 7, 1984 for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were
active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to enroll for the first semester of
the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. As regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his
activities in leading boycotts of classes. They said that Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious
mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties
of respondent University.
The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.

Whether or Not there is violation of the due process clause.

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they
had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had
indeed led or participated in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein or perpetrated acts of vandalism,
coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority. The pending civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief
against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment. Also, apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any
duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor
scholastic standing.


To satisfy the demands of procedural due process, the following requisites must be met:

the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
The petition was granted wherein the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners (students) to reenrol without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings.

5. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia,
that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code;
and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
amalum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.


People of the Philippines vs Cayat

68 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Requisites of a Valid

Classification Bar from Drinking Gin


In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other
liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an
A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned
in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He
averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said
this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as inferior or less capable race and less
entitled will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native nonChristians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification.
The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that
distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary.
The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage. The law,
then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race. On the
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their
Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in
education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing
them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

7. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. vs Pedro Gimenez

15 SCRA 479 Political Law Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act No. 3836
insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators


and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from
disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the
Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office,
contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes
selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12)
years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and
employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a
gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received,
insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase
their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers does not constitute forbidden compensation within the
meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not
constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said
Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and,
therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems
and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their
respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from their places
of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress,
the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.


In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National
Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration
of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation other emoluments.
Emolument is the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation
for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.
RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement
benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision
clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby
declared unconstitutional by the SC.

8. People v Ching Kuan (not digested)

Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-48515

November 11, 1942

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CHING KUAN, defendant-appellant.
Alfredo Feraren for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General De la Costa and Solicitor Kapunan, Jr. for appellee.
Appellant was accused of a violation of section 86 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila in that
on or about the 8th of May, 1941, he constructed a 297-square-meter building of strong materials in the
district of Tondo without the proper permit from the city engineer. He pleaded guilty in the municipal
court and was there sentenced to pay a fine of P150 and the costs. He appealed to the Court of First
Instance, where he again pleaded guilty and was sentenced to pay a fine of P175, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs. Claiming that the fine imposed on him was excessive,
appellant has further appealed to this Court.


The penalty prescribed by section 1137 of the Revised Ordinances for the violation committed by the
accused is a fine of not more than 200 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court. In other words the maximum penalty that the court could have imposed was
imprisonment for six months and a fine of P200.
(1) Appellant urges us to take into consideration his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance and to
reverse our decisions in People vs. Durano, G.R. No. 45114, and People vs. Roque, G.R. No. 47561, in
which we held that the rules of the Revised Penal Code for the application of penalties when mitigating
and aggravating circumstances concur do not apply to a case where the accused is found guilty of the
violation of a special law and not of a crime penalized by said Code. (2) He also contends that the trial
court erred in taking into consideration his financial ability to pay the fine and that article 66 of the
Revised Penal Code is unconstitutional.
1. As to the first contention, we find it unnecessary to reexamine or disturbed the decisions cited,
because, the penalty imposed being only a fine, the rules established in articles 63 and 64 of the Revised
Penal Code concerning the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances could not in any event
be applied herein. If at all, it would be article 66 of the same Code that should be applied. Said article
reads as follows:
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or means of the
2. So we proceed to pass upon appellant's second contention. The trial court said:
The accused in this case is well-to-do and could afford to pay a fine. According to the attorney of
the accused himself, he has a good business, and for that reason he was able to construct a big
building. In view thereof, the Court believes that the penalty imposed by the Municipal Court is
After quoting from article 66, counsel for the appellant says:
As a consequence of this provision, when a fine has to be imposed, a poor person will be required
to pay less than one who is well-to-do, notwithstanding the fact that both commit the same
degree of violation of the law. In such case, the above provision creates a discrimination between
the rich and the poor, in the sense of favoring the poor but not the rich, and thus causing unequal
application of the law. Consequently, the above provision is unconstitutional and void as being a
law which denies to all persons the equal protection of the laws. . . .
It may seem paradoxical, but the truth is that the codal provision in question, in authorizing the
imposition of unequal fines, aims precisely at equality before the law. Since a fine is imposed as penalty
and not as payment for a specific loss or injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the
culprit's wealth or means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the
amount. To an indigent laborer, for instance, earning P1.50 a day or about P36 a month, a fine of P10
would undoubtedly be more severe than a fine of P100 to an officeholder or property owner with a
monthly income of P600. Obviously, to impose the same amount of a fine for the same offense upon two
persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a penalty of unequal severity and,
hence, unjustly discriminatory.
This but goes to show that equality before the law is not literal and mathematical but relative and
practical. That is necessarily so because human beings are not born equal and do not all start in life from
scratch; many have handicaps material, physical, or intellectual. It is not within the power of society


to abolish such congenital inequality. All it can do by way of remedy is to endeavor to afford everybody
equal opportunity.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

9. PT&T vs NLRC
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business
judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor


ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and
it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of
policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the
land not only for order but also imperatively required.


Vera v. Cuevas

Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products
throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are
marketed and sold under the brand Darigold whereas those of private respondent, General Milk
Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc.,
under the brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of
the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its
highest the standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not
bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in
skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty
part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly
marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in which such containers are marked, with
the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the respondents to print on the
labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year
of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents
related to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax Code.
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific and qualifying terms
"skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would
restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been
removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term


"skimmed milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has
been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies
both to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk products of the
petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of
all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have
not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due process of law.